A Weapon-Salve for the Churchs Wounds, Religious treatise 1 · Part 1 · Chapter 1

A Weapon-Salve for the Churchs Wounds · Religious treatise 1 · Part 1 · Chapter 1

p. 1CHAP. I.

Things necessary for the Churches Peace, must be clearly revealed. The Form of Church-Government not so, as appears by the remaining Controversie about it. An Evidence thence, that Christ never intended any one Form, as the only means to Peace in the Church. The Nature of a Divine Right discussed. Right in general either makes things Lawful, or else Due. For the former, a Non-prohibition sufficient; the later, an Express Command. Duty supposeth Legislation and Promulgation. The Question stated. Nothing binds unalterably but by virtue of a standing Law, and that two-fold; The Law of Nature and Positive Laws of God. Three ways to know when Positive Laws are unalterable. The Divine Right arising from Scripture-Examples, Divine Acts, and Divine Approbation, considered.

HE that imposeth any matter of Opinion upon the§ 1. belief of others, without giving Evidence of Reason for it, proportionable to the confidence of his Assertion, must either suppose the thing propounded, to carry such unquestionable Credentials of Truth and Reason with it, that none who know what p. 2they mean can deny it entertainment; or else that his own understanding hath attained to so great perfection, as to have authority sufficient to oblige all others to follow it. This latter cannot be presumed among any who have asserted the freedom of their own understandings, from the dictates of an Infallible Chair: but if any should forget themselves so far as to think so, there needs no other argument to prove them not to be Infallible in their Assertions, then this one Assertion, that they are infallible; it being an undoubted Evidence that they are actually deceived▪ who know so little the measure of their own understandings. The former can never be pretended in any thing which is a matter of Controversie among men, who have not wholly forgot they are Reasonable Creatures, by their bringing probable arguments for the maintaining one part of an opinion as well as another. In which case, though the Arguments brought be not convincing for the necessary entertaining either part to an unbiassed understanding, yet the difference of their Opinions is Argument sufficient, that the thing contended for is not so clear as both parties would make it to be on their own side; and if it be not a thing of necessity to salvation, it gives men ground to think, that a final decision of the matter in controversie, was never intended as a necessary means for the Peace and Unity of the Church of God. For we cannot with any shew of reason imagine, that our Supreme Law giver and Saviour, who hath made it a necessary duty in all true members of his Church, to endeavour after the Peace and Unity of it, should suspend the performance of that duty upon a matter of Opinion, which when men have used their utmost endeavors to satisfie themselves about, they yet find, that those very grounds which they are most inclinable to build their Judgements upon, are either wholly rejected by others, as wise and able as themselves; or else, it may be, they erect a far different Fabrick upon the very same foundations. It is no ways consistent with the Wisdom of Christ in founding his Church, and providing for the Peace and Settlement of it, to leave it at the mercy of mens private judgments, and apprehensions of things, than which nothing more uncertain, and thereby make it to depend upon a condition never like to be attained in this world, which is the agreement and Uniformity of mens Opinions. p. 3For as long as mens faces differ, their judgements will. And until there be an Intellectus Averroisticus, the same understanding in all persons, we have little ground to hope for such an Universal Harmony in the Intellectual World; and yet even then the Soul might pass a different judgement upon the colours of things, according to the different tincture of the several Optick-Glasses in particular bodies, which it takes a prospect of things through. Reason and Experience then give us little hopes of any peace in the Church, if the unity of mens judgements be supposed the condition of it: the next inquiry then is, how the Peace of the Church shall be attained or preserved, when men are under such different perswasions; especially if they respect the means, in order to a Peace and Settlement. For the ways to Peace, like the fertile soils of Greece, have been oft-times the occasion of the greatest quarrels. And no sickness is so dangerous as that when men are sick of their remedy, and nauseate that most which tends to their recovery. But while Physitians quarrel about the Method of Cure, the Patient languisheth under their hands; and when men increase Contentions in the behalf of Peace, while they seem to Court it, they destroy it. The only way left for the Churches Settlement and Peace under such variety of apprehensions concerning the Means and Method, in order to it, is to pitch upon such a foundation, if possible to be found out, whereon the different Parties retaining their private apprehensions, may yet be agreed to carry on the same work in common, in order to the Peace and Tranquillity of the Church of God. Which cannot be by leaving all absolutely to follow their own ways; for that were to build a Babel instead of Salem, Confusion instead of Peace; it must be then by convincing men, that neither of those ways to peace and order, which they contend about, is necessary by way of Divine Command, (though some be as a means to an end) but which particular way or form it must be, is wholly left to the prudence of those in whose Power and Trust it is to see the Peace of the Church be secured on lasting Foundations. How neerly this concerns the present Debate about the Government of the Church, any one may quickly discern. The main Plea for Forms of Government in the Church, is their p. 4necessity, in order to its Peace and Order, and yet nothing hath produced more disorder and confusion then our Disputes about it have done. And our sad experience still tells us, that, after all our Debates, and the Evidences brought on either side, men yet continue under very different apprehensions concerning it. But if we more strictly enquire into the causes of the great Distances and Animosities which have risen upon this Controversie, we shall find it hath not been so much the difference of Judgements concerning the Primitive Form of Government, which hath divided men so much from one another, as the prevalency of Faction and Interest in those whose Revenues have come from the Rents of the Church, and among others of greater Integrity it hath been the Principle or Hypothesis which men are apt to take for granted, without proving it; viz. that it is in no case lawful to vary from that Form, which by obscure and uncertain conjectures, they conceive to have been the Primitive Practice. For hereby men look upon themselves as obliged by an unalterable Law, to endeavour the Establishment of that Idea of Government, which oft-times Affection and Interest, more then Reason and Judgement, hath formed within them; and so likewise bound to over throw any other Form not suitable to those Correspondencies which they are already engaged to maintain. If this then were the Cause of the Wounds and Breaches this day among us, the most successful Weapon-salve to heal them, will be, to anoint the Sword which hath given the Wound, by a seasonable inquiry into the Nature and Obligation of particular Forms of Government in the Church. The main Subject then of our present Debate will be, Whether any one particular Form of Church Government be setled upon an unalterable Divine Right; by virtue whereof all Churches are bound perpetually to observe that Individual Form? or, whether it be left to the Prudence of every particular Church to agree upon that Form of Government which it judgeth most conducible within its self to attain the end of Government, the Peace, Order, Tranquillity, and Settlement of the Church. If this latter be made fully appear, it is then evident that, however mens judgements may differ concerning the Primitive Form of Government, there is yet a sure ground for p. 5men to proceed on in order to the Churches Peace. Which one Consideration will be motive sufficient to justifie an attempt of this Nature, it being a Design of so great Importance, as the recovery of an advantagious piece of ground, whereon Different Parties may with safety not only treat, but agree in order to a speedy Accommodation.

We come therefore closely to the business in hand, and, for§. 2. the better clearing of our passage, we shall first discuss the Nature of a Divine Right, and shew whereon an unalterable Divine Right must be founded, and then proceed to shew how far any Form of Government in the Church is setled upon such a Right. Right in the general is a relative thing, and the significationforeign Arist Ethic. l. 5. c. 6▪ and import of it must be taken from the respect it bears to the Law which gives it. For although in common acception it be often understood to be the same with the Law its self, as it is the rule of actions (in which sense Ius naturae, gentium, civile, is taken for the several Laws of Nature, Nations, and particular States) yet I say Ius, and so Right, is properly something accruing to a person by virtue of that Law which is made, and so jus naturae is that right which every man is invested in by the Law of Nature, which is properly jus personae, and is by some call'd jus activum, which is defined by Grotius to be Qualitas moralis personae competens ad aliquid juste habendum aut agendum▪ by Lessius to be Potestas Legitima ad rem aliquam Grot. de jure b…lli & pac. lib. 1. cap. 1. Sect. 4. L…ss. de justit. & jure l. 2. c. 2. Dub. 1. Etymol. Philol. voc. jus.obtinendam, &c. So that by these descriptions, Right is that Power which a man hath by Law to do, have, or obtain any thing. But the most full description of it is given by Martinius, that it is adhaerens personae necessitas vel potestas recta ad aliquid agendum, omittendum, aut permittendum, that whereby any person lies under a necessity of doing, omitting or suffering a thing to be, or else hath a lawful authority of doing, &c. For we are to consider that there is a two-fold Right, either such whereby a man hath Liberty and Freedom by the Law to do any thing; or such whereby it becomes a mans necessary duty to do any thing. The opening of the differenceEtymol. l. 5. cap. 3. of these two, and the different influences they have upon persons and things, is very useful to our present purpose: Ius then is first that which is justum; so Isidore, Ius dictum quia justum est. So what ever is just, men have right to do it: p. 6Now a thing may be said to be just either more generally, as it signifies any thing which is lawful, or in a more restrained sense, when it implies something that is equal and due to another. So Aristotle distributes foreign into foreign.Ethic. l. 5. cap. 2. The former sense of it is here only pertinent, as it implies any thing which may be done according to Law, that is, done jure, because a man hath right to do it. In order to this we are to observe, that an express Positive Command is not necessary to make a thing lawful, but a non-prohibition by a Law is sufficient for that. For it being the Nature of Laws to bound up mens Rights, what is not forbidden by the Law is thereby supposed to be left in mens power still to do it. So that it is to little purpose for men to seek for Positive Commands for every particular action to make it lawful; it sufficeth to make any action lawful, if there be no Bar made by any direct or consequential prohibition; unless it be in such things whose lawfulness and goodness depend upon a meer Positive Command. For in those things which are therefore only good, because commanded, a Command is necessary to make them lawful, as in immediate positive acts of Worship towards God; in which nothing is lawful any further then it is founded upon a Divine Command. I speak not of Circumstances belonging to the Acts of Worship, but whatever is looked upon as a part of Divine Worship, if it be not commanded by God himself, it is no ways acceptable to him, and therefore not lawful.Mat. 15 9. Isa. 29. 11.Matt 15:9Isa 29:11 So our Saviour cites that out of the Prophet▪ In vain do they worship me, teaching for Doctrines the commandments of men, which the Chaldee Paraphrast and Syriack version render thus, Reverentia quam mihi exhibent est ex praecepto & documento humano, plainly imputing the reason of Gods rejecting their worship, to the want of a Divine Command forTertull. de Orat. cap. 12 v. Herald. digress. lib. 2. cap. 2. in Tertull. what they did. And therefore Tertullian condemns all those things to be vacuae observationis & superstitioni deputanda, as superstitious, which are done sine ulli…s Dominici a…t Apostolici praecepti autoritate, without the Warrant of Divine Command. Although even here we may say too, that it is not meerly the want of a Divine Precept which makes any part of Divine Worship uncommanded by God unlawful, but the General Prohibition, that nothing should be done in the immediate p. 7Worship of God, but what we have a Divine Command for. However, in matters of meer Dece…cy and Order in the Church of God, or in any other civil action of the lives of men, it is enough to make things lawful, if they are not forbidden. But against this, that a Non-prohibition is warrant enough to make any thing lawful, this Objection will be soon leavied, that it is an Argument ab authoritate negativè, and therefore is of no force: To which I answer▪ that the Rule, if taken without limitation, upon which this Objection is founded, is not true; for although an Argument ab authoritate negativè, as to matter of Fact avails not, yet the Negative, from Authority, as to matter of Law and Command, is of great force and strength. I grant the Argument holds not here; we do not read that ever Christ or his Apostles did such a thing, therefore it is not to be done; but this, we read of no Law or Precept commanding us to do it, therefore it is not unlawful not to do it; and we read of no Prohibition forbidding us to do it, therefore it may be lawfully done; this holds true and good, and that upon this two-fold Reason. First, From Gods Intention in making known his Will; which was not to record every particular fact done by himself, or Christ, or his Apostles, but it was to lay down those general and standing Laws, whereby his Church in all Ages should be guided and ruled: And in order to a perpetual obligation upon the Consciences, there must be a sufficient promulgation of those Laws which must bind men. Thus in the case of Infant-Baptism, it is a very weak unconcluding Argument to say that Infants must not be baptized, because we never read that Christ or his Apostles did it; for this is a Negative in matter of Fact; but on the other side, it is an Evidence that Infants are not to be excluded from Baptism, because there is no Divine Law which doth prohibit their admission into the Church by it; for this is the Negative of a Law; and if it had been Christs intention to have excluded any from admission into the Church, who were admitted before as Insants were, there must have been some positive Law whereby such an Intention of Christ should have been expressed; For nothing can make that unlawful which was a duty before, but a direct and express Prohibition from the Legislator himself▪ p. 8who alone hath power to re…cind as well as to make Laws. And therefore Antipaedobaptists must, instead of requiring a Positive Command for baptizing Infants, themselves produce an express Prohibition excluding them, or there can be no appearance of Reason given, why the Gospel should exclude any from those priviledges, which the Law admitted them to. Secondly, I argue from the intention and end of Laws, which is to circumscribe and restrain the Natural Liberty of man, by binding him to the observation of some particular Precepts. And therefore where there is not a particular Command and Prohibition, it is in Nature and Reason supposed that men are left to their Natural freedom; as is plain in Positive Humane Laws; wherein men by compact and agreement for their mutual good in Societies, were willing to restrain themselves from those things which should prejudice the good of the Community; this being the ground of mens first inclosing their Rights and common Priviledges, it must be supposed, that what is not so inclosed, is left common to all as their just Right and Priviledge still. So it is in Divine Positive Laws, God intending to bring some of Mankind to happiness, by conditions of his own appointing, hath laid down many Positive Precepts, binding men to the practise of those things as duties which are commanded by him. But where we find no Command for performance, we cannot look upon that as an immediate duty, because of the necessary relation between Duty and Law; and so where we find no Prohibition, there we can have no ground to think that men are debarred from the liberty of doing things not forbidden. For as we say of Exceptions, as to General Laws and Rules, that an Exception expressed firmat regulam in non exceptis, makes the Rule stronger in things not expressed as excepted; so it is as to Divine Prohibitions; as to the Positives, that those Prohibitions we read in Scripture make other things not-prohibited to be therefore lawful, because not expresly forbidden. As Gods forbidding Adam to taste of the fruit of one Tree, did give him a liberty to taste of all the rest. Indeed, had not God at all revealed his Will and Laws to us by his Word, there might have been some Plea why men should have waited for particular Revelations to dictate the goodness or evil of particular actions, not p. 9determined by the law of nature; but since God hath revealed his will, there can be no reason given why those things should not be lawful to do, which God hath not thought fit to forbid men the doing of. Further we are to observe, that in these things which are thus undetermined in reference to an obligation to duty, but left to our natural liberty as things lawful, the contrary to that which is thus lawful, is not thereby made unlawful. But both parts are left in mens power to do, or not to do them; as is evident in all those things which carry a general equity with them, and are therefore consonant to the Law of Nature, but have no particular obligation, as not flowing immediately from any dictate of the natural Law. Thus community of goods is lawful by the law and principles of nature; yet every man hath a lawful right to his goods by dominion and propriety. And in a state of Community it was the right of every man to impropriate upon a just equality, supposing a preceding compact and mutual agreement. Whence it is that some of the School-men say, that although the Law of Nature be immutable, as to its precepts and prohibitions, yet not as to its demonstrations (as they call them;) as, Do as you would be done to, binds always indispensably; but, that in a state of nature all things are common to all, This is true, but it binds not men to the necessary observanceAlex. Alensis. part. 3. q. 27. m. 3. of it. These which they call Demonstrations are only such things as are agreeable to nature, but not particularly commanded by any indispensable precept of it. Thus likewise it is agreeable to nature, that the next of the kindred should be heir to him who dies intestate; but he may lawfully wave his interest if he please. Now to apply this to our present case; According to this sense of jus for that which is lawful, those things may be said to be jure divino, which are not determined one way or other by any positive Law of God, but are left wholly, as things lawful, to the prudence of men to determine them, in a way agreeable to natural light, and the general Rules of the Word of God. In which sense I assert any particular form of Government agreed on by the Governours of the Church, consonant to the general Rules of Scripture, to be by Divine Right, i. e. God by his own Laws hath given men a power and liberty to determine the particular p. 10form of Church-Government among them. And hence it may appear, that though one form of Government be agreeable to the Word, it doth not follow that another is not; or, because one is lawful, another is unlawful: but one form may be more agreeable to some parts, places, people and times, then others are. In which case that form of Government is to be setled which is most agreeable to the present state of a place, and is most advantagiously conducible to the promoting the ends of Church-Government in that place or Nation. I conclude then according to this sense of jus, that the Ratio regiminis Ecclesiastici is juris divini naturalis, that is, that the reason of Church-Government is immutable, and holds in all times and places, which is the preservation of the peace and unity of the Church; but the modus regiminis Ecclesiastici, the particular form of that Government is juris divini permissivi, that both the Laws of God and Nature have left it to the Prudence of particular Churches to determine it. This may be cleared by a parallel Instance. The reason and the Science of Physick is immutable, but the particular prescriptions of that Science are much varied, according to the different tempers of Patients. And the very same reason in Physick which prescribes one sort of Physick to one, doth prescribe a different sort to another, because the temper or disease of the one calls for a different method of cure; yet the ground and end of both prescriptions was the very same, to recover the Patient from his distemper. So I say in our present case; the ground and reason of Government in the Church is unalterable by divine right; yea, and that very reason which determines the particular forms: but yet, these particular forms flowing from that immutable reason, may be very different in themselves, and may alter according to the several circumstances of times, and places, and persons, for the more commodious advancing the main end of Government. As in morality there can be but one thing to a man in genere summi boni, as the chief good, quò tendit & in quod dirigit aroum—to which he refers all other things; yet there may be many things in genere boni conducentis, as means in order to attaining that end. So though Church-Government vary not as to the ground, end, and reason of it; yet it may, as to the particular forms of it: p. 11As is further evident, as to forms of Civil Government: though the end of all be the same; yet Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, are in themselves lawful means for the attaining the same common end. And as Alensis determines it, in the case of Community of goods by the Law of Nature, that the same reason of the Law of Nature which did dictate Community of goods to be most suitable to man in the state of Innocency, did in his faln estate prescribe a propriety of goods, as most agreeable to it; so that herein the modus observanti… dissered, but the ratio praecepti was the same still; which was mans comfortable enjoyment of the Accommodations of life: which in Innocency might have been best done by Community; but in mans degenerate condition, must be by a Propriety. So the same reason of Church-Government may call for an Equality in the persons, acting as Governours of the Church in one place, which may call for Superiority and subordination in another.

Having now dispatched the first sense of a Divine Right,§. 3. I come to the other, which is the main seat of the Controversie, and therefore will require a longer debate. And so jus is that which makes a thing to become a duty: so jus quasi jussum, and jussa jura, as Festus explains it, i. e. that whereby a thing is not only licitum, in mens lawful power to do it or no, but is made d…bitum, and is constituted a duty by the force and virtue of a Divine Command. Now mans obligation to any thing as a duty, doth suppose on the part of him from whose authority he derives his obligation, both legislation and promulgation. First there must be a Legislative Power commanding it; which if it respects only the outward actions of a man in a Nation imbodied by Laws, is the supreme Magistrate; but if the obligation respect the consciences of all men directly and immediately, then none have the power to settle any thing by way of an universal standing Law, but God himself: Who by being sole Creator and Governour of the World, hath alone absolute and independent Dominion and Authority over the souls of men. But besides Legislation, another thing necessary to mans obligation to duty, is, a sufficient promulgation of the Law made; Because though before this there be the ground of obedience on mans part to all Gods Commands, yet there p. 12must be a particular Declaration of the Laws, whereby man is bound in order to the determination of Mans duty. Which in Positives is so absolutely necessary, that unless there be a sufficient promulgation and declaration of the will of the Law-giver, mans ignorance is excusable in reference to them; and so frees from guilt and the obligation to punishment. But it is otherwise in reference to the dictates of the natural Law, wherein though man be at a loss for them, yet his own contracted pravity being the cause of his blindness, leaves him without excuse. Hence it is said with good reason, that though man under the Moral Law, was bound to obey Gospel-precepts, as to the reason and substance of the duties by them commanded, as Faith, Repentance from dead works, and New Obedience; yet a more full and particular revelation by the Gospel was necessary, for the particular determination of the general acts of obedience, to particular objects under their several Modifications expressed in the Gospel. And therefore Faith and Repentance under the Moral Law, taken as a transcript of the Law of Nature, were required under their general notion as acts of obedience, but not in that particular relation which those acts have under the Covenant of Grace. Which particular determination of the general acts to special objects under different respects, some call New Precepts of the Gospel, others New Light; but taking that light as it hath an influence upon the consciences of men, the difference is so small, that it deserves not to be named a Controversie.

But that which I am now clearing is this, that whatsoever binds Christians as an universal standing Law, must be clearly revealed as such, and laid down in Scripture in such evident terms, as all who have their senses exercised therein, may discern it to have been the will of Christ, that it should perpetually oblige all believers to the Worlds end, as is clear in the case of Baptism, and the Lords Supper. But here I shall add one thing by way of caution; That there is not the same necessity for a particular and clear revelation in the alteration of a Law unrepealed in some circumstances of it, as there is for the establishing of a New Law. As to the former, viz. the change of a standing Law as to some particular circumstance, p. 13a different practice by persons guided by an infallible spirit is sufficient; which is the case as to the observation of the Lords day under the Gospel: For the fourth Command standing in force as to the Morality of it, a different practice by the Apostles may be sufficient for the particular determination of the more ritual and occasional part of it, which was the limitation of the observation of it to that certain day. So likewise that other Law standing in force, that persons taken into Covenant with God should be admitted by some visible sign, Apostolical practice, clearly manifested, may be sufficient ground to conclude what the mind of Christ was, as to the application of it to particular persons; and what qualifications are requisite in such as are capable of admission, as in the case of Infants. Whereby it is clear why there is no particular Law or command in reference to them under the Gospel, because it was only the application of a Law in force already to particular persons, which might be gathered sufficiently from the Apostles practice, the Analogy of the dispensation, the equal reason of exclusion under the Law, and yet notwithstanding the continual admission of them then into the same Gospel-Govenant; Circumcision beingRom. 4. 8.Rom 4:8 the Seal of the Righteousness of Faith. But this by the way, to prevent mistakes. We must now by parity of reason say, that either the former Law, in those things wherein it was not typical, must hold in reference to the form of. Government in the Church of Christ; or else that Christ by an universal Law hath setled all order in Church Government among the Pastors themselves; or else that he hath left it to the prudence of every particular Church, to determine its own form of Government, which I conceive is the direct state of the Question about Divine Right, viz. Whether the particular form of Government in the Church be setled by an universal binding Law or no?

But for a further clearing the state of the Question, we§. 4. must consider what it is that makes an unalterable Divine Right, or a standing Law in the Church of God: for those who found forms of Government upon a Divine Right, do not plead a Law in express terms, but such things from whence a Divine Right by Law may be inferred. Which I p. 14now come to examine; and that which I lay down as a Postulatum, or a certain conclusion according to which I shall examine others …ssertions concerning Divine Right, is, That nothing is founded upon a Divine Right, nor can bind Christians directly or consequentially as a positive Law, but what may be certainly known to have come from God, with an intention to oblige Believers to the worlds end. For either we must say, it binds Christians as a Law when God did not intend it should; or else Gods intentions to bind all Believers by it, must be clearly manifested. Now then, so many ways and no more as a thing may be known to come from God with an intention to oblige all perpetually, a thing may be said to be of an unalterable Divine Right; and those can be no more then these two; Either by the Law of Nature, or by some positive Law of God: Nothing else can bind universally and perpetually but one of these two, or by virtue of them, as shall be made appear. I begin with the Law of Nature. The Law of Nature binds indispensably, as it depends not upon any arbitrary constitutions, but is founded upon the intrinsecal nature of good and evil in the things themselves, antecedently to any positive Declaration of Gods Will. So that till the nature of good and evil be changed, that Law is unalterable as to its obligation. When, I say, the Law of Nature is indispensable, my meaning is, that in those things which immediately flow from that Law by way of precept, as the three first Commands of the Moral Law, no man can by any positive Law be exempted from his obligation to do them; neither by any abrogation of the Laws themselves, nor by derogation from them, nor interpretation of them, nor change in the object, matter, or circumstance, whatsoever it be. Now although the formal reason of mans obedience to the precepts of this Law, be the conformity▪ which the things commanded have to the Divine Nature and goodness, yet I conceive the efficient cause of mans obligation to these things, is to be fetched from the Will, Command, and Pleasure of God: Not as it is taken for an arbitrary positive will, but as it is executive of Divine purposes, and as it ingraves such a Law upon the hearts of men. For notwithstanding mans Reason, considered in it self, be the chiefest instrument of discovery what p. 15are these necessary duties of humane nature (in which sense Aristotle defines a Natural Law to be that which foreign, hath every where the same force and strength,Ethic. l. 5. cap. 10. i. e. as Andronicus Rhodius very well interprets it, foreign, among all that have the free use of their reason and faculties) yet I say, it is not bare Reason which binds men to the doing of those things commanded in that Law, but as it is expressive of an Eternal Law, and deduceth its obligation from thence. And so this Law, if we respect the rise, extent, and immutability of it, may be call'd deservedly the Law ofV. Selden. de jure Nat. apud▪ Eb…ae lib. 1. c. 7 & 8. Mol. de just & Iur. p. 1 disp. 3. Alphons. de leg. pur▪ l. 2. c. 14. Nature; but if we look at the emanation, efflux, and original of it, it is a Divine Law, and so it is call'd by Molina, Alphonsus à Castr…, and others. For the sanction of this Law of Nature, as well as others, depends upon the Will of God, and therefore the obligation must come from him, it being in the power of no other to punish for the breach of a Law, but those who had the Legislative Power to cause the obligation to it. It appears then from hence, that whatever by just consequence can be deduced from the preceptive Law of Nature, is of Divine Right, because from the very nature of that Law (it being indispensable) it appears that God had an intent to oblige all persons in the world by it.

The second way whereby we may know what is of Divine§. 5. Right, is by Gods positive Laws; for God being the Supreme Governour of the World, hath the Legislative Power in his hands, to bind to the performance of what duties be please, which carry no repugnancy in them to his Divine Nature and Goodness. Hence arise all those positive Laws of God which we have in Scripture; for God's end in his written Law was, that man should have a Copy of all Divine constitutions by him, that he might therein read what his duty was toward his Maker. The Precepts of the Law of Nature, are by the Jews call'd▪ foreign and foreign absolutely, without any addition; because they are of such things as do perpetually bind, which because they are known to all by natural light, they sometimes call them foreign praecepta scientia; and being that their righteousness is so evident and apparent, they call them foreign verba rectitudinis: p. 16but the clearest difference between the precepts of the Law of Nature, and other positive commands, is that which the famous Is. Casaubon takes notice of out of the Jewish Doctors.Exercit. Eccles. advers. Ba…. exer. 16. sect. 43. Observant doctissimi è Rabbinis, inter foreign & foreign han… esse differentiam, quod Mitsvoth, sive pr…ceptorum ratio aperta est, ut, Deum cole, Honora patrem & matrem; at Chukim, statuta sive decreta earum rerum esse dicunt quarum foreign ratio soli Deo sit nota, ut Circumcisionis & similium. The reason of the Laws of Nature is evident, but of positive Laws there is no reason to be given foreign non est alia S…id. de jure Nat. apud Ebr. l. 1. cap. 10.praeter decretum regis, no other account to be given of them but the will of God. The Laws of Nature are by the LXX. often call'd foreign, and so used, Rom. 2. 16. by Iustin Martyr, foreign. by Iosephus, foreign Colloq. …um Tryph. Jud…o. Origin. lib. 16. cap. 10. V. G…ot. in Luc. 1. 6.Luke 1:6but Gods positive Laws are call'd foreign: thence we read of Zachary and Elizabeth, Luke 1. 6. foreign, &c. walking in all the Ordinances and Commandments of God blameless, and those are call'd foreign, by S. Paul, Ephes. 2. 15. the Law of Commandments in Ordinances. Now although this difference be not always observed in the words in Scripture, yet there is a vast difference between the things themselves, though both equally commanded by God. That which is most to our present purpose to observe, is, that Positives being mutable and alterable in themselves, a bare Divine Command is not sufficient to make them immutable, unless there be likewise expressed, that it is the Will of God that they should always continue. This was that which the Jews stumbled at so much, and do to this day; because they are assured their Law came once from God, therefore it must of necessity have a perpetual obligation: as may be seen in their two great Doctors Maimonides and Abarbinel, who both ofMaimon. de fundam. legis, cap. 9. sect. 1. Abarb. de Capit. fidei. cap. 8. p. 29. Ed. Vorstii. them make the Eternity of the Law one of the Fundamental Articles of their Creed. But Abarbinel splits this Article into two; whereof the first is, that the Law of Moses shall never be changed; the other, that no other Law shall come instead of it. The original of which grand errour is from want of observing the difference between things commanded by God, some of which are good, and therefore p. 17commanded; others commanded, and therefore good. In which latter, if the reason of the Command ceaseth, the Command its self obligeth no longer. As the Ceremonial Law was to be their foreign, which is not meant in regard of the sharp severe nature of the Law to drive themGal. 3. 24.Gal 3:24 unto Christ, as it is by many interpreted; but the Law is a Paedagogue in regard of its tutorage and conduct, as it signified him whose office it was to conduct Noblemens Children to the School (as a learned man observes.) This being then the office of the Law, when the Church was now entred into Christs School, the office of this Paedagogue then ceased. And so the Ceremonial Law needed no abrogation at all▪ exspiring of its self at Christs coming, as Laws made for the times of war do when peace comes. Only because the Jews were so hardly perswaded that it should exspire (the believing Jews conceiving at first the Gospel came rather to help them to obey the Law of Moses then to cancel the obligation of it) therefore it was necessary that a more honourable burial should be given to it, and the Apostles should pro rostris declare more fully that believers were freed from that yoke of Ceremonies, under which the neck of their fore-fathers had groaned so long. It appears then that a positive Law coming from God doth not meerly by virtue of its being enacted by God, bind perpetually all persons, unless there be a Declaration of Gods Will adjoyned, that it should do so.

It will be here then well worth our inquiry to find out§. 6. some foreign or notes of difference whereby to know when positive laws bind immutably, when not; I shall …ay down these following. First, when the same reason of the Command continues still, then we cannot conceive how that which was instituted upon such an account as remains still, should not have the same force now which it had at first. That positive Law under which Adam was in his state of Innocency touching the forbidden fruit, did not bind any longer then his fall; because the reason of the Command ceased, which was the tryal of mans obedience: For which, God made choice of a very facile and easie Command, according to that rule of Politicians In minimis obedientiae periculum faciunt Legislatores, of which they give this rational account, Quia legislatoris p. 18ad obedientiam obligantis potius habenda est ratio, quàm rei de quâ lex est lata: thence arose that Law of the Ephori at Sparta, barbam tondere, to which no other reason was annexed but this, obtemperare legibus, to learn them to obey the Laws. This was Gods aim in that easie Command given to Adam, to make thereon an experiment of mans willingness to obey his Maker, and wherein man soon lost that Obsequii gloria, as he in Tacttus calls it, which, as Pliny saith, is in to major quod quis minus velit. But had this Law been a standing Law for all mankind, it would have continued its obligation still; but since, we see that it was only a personal, temporary, probative precept; for no sooner was man fallen but its obligation ceased. So likewise those precepts of the Judicial Law which immediately respected the Commonwealth of the Jews as such, their obligation reacheth not to Christians at all, nor (as it is generally conceived) to the Jews themselves, when out of the Consines of their own Countrey, because the reason of those Laws doth neither descend to Christians, nor did travel abroad with the Jews. But those judicial Laws which are founded upon common equity to bind still, not by virtue of that Sanction, but by virtue of common principles of equity, which certainly in the present shortness of humane reason cannot be fetched from a clearer Fountain then those Laws which once came from the Fountain of Goodness: none of whose constitutions can any ways be supposed to deviate from the exactest rules of Justice and Equity. And upon this very ground too, some part of the fourth Commandment is abrogated, and the other continues to bind still; For the reason of the Ceremonial and occasional part is ceased, and the reason of what was Moral, continues. Therefore the School-men say right of the Sabbath day, Cultus est à naturâ, modus à lege, virtu… à Gratiâ. Nature dictates that God should be worshipped, the Law informs what day and time to spend in his worship, Grace must enable us to perform that worship on that day in a right manner. And because the same reason for Gods Worship continue… still, therefore it is a Precept of the Natural Law, that God should be worshipped. What time precisely must be spent in Gods Worship (as one day in seven) though the reason be evident to nature of it when it is made known; yet p. 19it is hard to conceive that Nature could have found out the precise determination of the time. Although I must confess the general consent of Nations, as to the seventh part, (if it were fully cleared) would speak fair to be the voice of Nature, or at least a tradition received from the Sons of Noah, which, if so, will be an evidence of the observation of the Sabbath before the Children of Israels being in the Wilderness. But granting that the seventh part of time was a positive Law of God, yet I say it binds immutably, because there is as strong a reason for it now as ever, and Ratio immutabilis praecepti, facit praeceptum immutabile. This I take to be the sense of those who distinguish between morale positivum, and morale naturale, i. e. that some things are so moral, that even Nature its self can discover them, as that God should be worshipped. Other things are so moral, that though the reason of them be founded in Nature, yet there wants Divine Revelation to discover them to us; but when once discovered, are discerned to be very agreeable to common principles of reason: And these when thus discovered, are as immutably obligatory as the other, because the reason of them is immutable. And of this nature, is the determination of the particular time for Gods worship, and limitation of it to one day in seven. But what was in that Precept meerly occasional, as the first and original ground of its limitation to the seventh in order, Gods resting on that day from the work of Creation, and the furtherGen. 22. Deut. 5. 15Gen 22Deut 5:15 ground of its inforcement to the Jews, viz. their deliverance out of Egypt; these being not immut…ble, but temporary and occasional, may upon as great ground given, and approved of God for that end (as is evident by the Apostles practice) be sufficient reason of the alteration of the seventh day to the first day of the week. By this may briefly be seen how irrationally those speak, who say we have no further ground for our observation of the Lords day now, then for other arbitrary Festivals in the Church, viz. The Tradition of the Church of God. I grant, the Tradition of the Church doth acquaint us with Apostolical practice, but the ground of our observation of the Lords day, is not the Churches Tradition, but that Apostolical practice conveyed by Universal Tradition (which setting aside the Festivals observed upon the Lords days, can very hardly be …ound for any other.) But supposing Universal Tradition p. 20for other Festivals; I say, here Tradition is not only used as a testimony and instrument of conveyance, as in the other case of the Lords day; but is it self the only argument, and the very ground of the original observation: Between which two, what a wide difference there is, let any rational man judge. But for a further clearing this observation, we must consider, that the reason of the Command, which we say is the measure of its obligation, must not be fetched from mens uncertain conjectures (among whom dreams often pass for reasons) but it must be either expressed in the Law its self, or deducible by apparent and easie collection from it; as is plain in the Decrees of the Apostles about things strangled, Act 15. 29.Acts 15:29and offered to Idols, where the reason of the Command is plainly implied, to wit, for present compliance with the Jews; and therefore no sooner did the reason of the Command cease, but the obligation of it ceased too: but of this more afterwards. This is one way then to discern the difference between positive Laws, as to the obligation of them, by the ground and reason of the Command. And therefore it is well observed by Divines (which further confirms what I now prove) that no Command doth bind against the reason of the Command; because it is not the words, but the sense and reason of a Command which hath the greatest obligatory force. Therefore Tully tells us, that the ratio juris & legislatoris consilium, Ora…. … …. Cae…iu.is the best Interpreter of any Law; who excellently and largely proves, that the reason of the Law is the Law, and not the words. So much for the first Rule.

Secondly, Another way to know when Positive Laws are§. 7. immutable, is, when Gods Will is expresly declared that such Laws shall bind immutably. For it being granted on all hands, that God may bind us to those things which are left indifferent by the Law of Nature, and likewise for what term he please; the only inquiry left, is to see in his Word whether he hath so bound us or no; and, if he hath, whether he hath left it in mans power to revoke his Laws. For as to Positive Laws expresly laid down in Scripture, the ground of which is only as the Jews speak foreign the will of the King, i. e. Gods own pleasure, without any reason or occasion of it else expressed, or necessarily implied; these do bind immutably, unless the same Power which commanded them, p. 21doth again revoke them. For we cannot in any wise conceive that the wise God should after the declaring his own will, leave it in the power of any corrupt fallible▪ Being to determine, or dispence with the obligation of his own Laws. Which to do, and instead of them to enforce others immediately upon the Consciences of men, as standing Laws, is an attempt beyond that of the Gyants against heaven (or the men at Babel▪ ) that being only an affectation of reaching heaven, but this an actual usurpation of Gods supreme and legislative power and authority. But though man hath nor, God alwayes reserves to himself a power to relax, interpret, and dispence with his own positive Laws, which imply no repugnancy to his own nature. And this power is alwayes to be understood in all Laws to be reserved to God, where he hath not himself declared that he will not use it▪ which is done either by the annexing an Oath on a Promise, which the Apostle calls the two immutable things in which it is impossible Heb. 6. 1….Heb 6:1for God to lie. For though God be free to promise, yet when he hath promised, his own nature and faithfulness binds him to performance; in which sense I understand those who say, God in making promises is bound only to himself, and not to men; that is, that the ground of performance ariseth from Gods faithfulness. For else if we respect the right coming by the promise, that must immediately respect the person to whom it is made, and in respect of which we commonly say that the promiser is bound to performance. But the case is otherwise in penal Laws, which though… never so strict; do imply a power of relaxation in the Legislator: because penall Laws do only constitute the debstum poenae▪ and bind the sinner over to punishment, but do not bind the Legislator to an actual execution upon the debt. Which is the ground that the person of a Mediator was admittable in the place of faln man, because it was a penal Law, and therefore relaxable. But because the debt of punishment is immediately contracted upon the breach of the Law, therefore satisfaction was necessary to God as Law-giver, either by the person himself, or another for him; because it was not consistent with the holiness of Gods nature and his wisdom as Governor, to relax an established Law, without valuable consideration▪ p. 22Now for the third kind of Gods Laws, besides promissory and penall, viz such as are meerly positive respecting duties, which become such by vertue of an express command: these, though they be revocable in themselves, yet being revocable only by God himself, and his own power, since he hath already in his Word fully revealed his Will, unlesse therein he hath declared when their obligation shall cease, they continue irreversible. This is the case as to the Sacraments of the New Testament, which being commands meerly positive, yet Christ commanding Christians as Christians to observe them, and not as Christians of the first and second Ages of the Church, his mind can be no otherwise interpreted concerning them, then that he did intend immutably to bind all Christians to the observance of them. For al though the Socinians say, that BaptismCatech. Racov. cap. 4. was only a Rite instituted by Christ for the passing men from Judaism and Gentilism to Christianity, yet we are not bound to look upon all as reason that comes from those who professe themselves the admirers of it. For Christs Command nowhere implying such a limitation; and an outward visible profession of Christianity being a duty now, and the Covenant entred into by that Rite of initiation, as obligatory as ever, we have no reason to think that Christs command doth not reach us now, especially the promise being made to as many as God shall call, and consequently the same duty requiredActs 3. 38.Acts 3:38 which was then in order to the obtaining of the same ends. A third way to discern the immutability of positive Laws, is, when the things commanded in particular are necessary to the being, succession, and continuance of such a Society of men professing the Gospel, as is instituted and approved by Christ himself. For Christ must be supposed to have the power himself to order what Society he please, and appoint what Orders he please to be observed by them; what Rites and Ceremonies to be used in admission of Members into his Church, in their continuing in it; in the way, means, manner of ejection out of it; in the preserving the succession of his Church, and the administration of Ordinances of his appointment. These being thus necessary for the maintaining and upholding this Society, they are thereby of a nature as unalterable, as the duty of observing what Christ hath commanded p. 23is. How much these things concern the resolution of the Question proposed, will appear afterwards. Thus we have gained a resolution of the second thing, whereon an unalterable Divine Right is founded; viz, either upon the dictates of the Law of Nature, concurring with the rules of the written word; or upon express positive Laws of God, whose reason is immutable, or which God hath declared shall continue, as necessary to the being of the Church.

The next thing is to examine the other pretences which are§ 8… brought for a Divine Right; which are either Scripture▪ examples, or Divine acts, or Divine approbation. For Scriptureexamples: First; I take it for granted on all hands, that all Scripture examples do not bind us to follow them; such are the Mediatory acts of Christ, the Heroical acts of extraordinary persons, all accidentall and occasionall actions. Example doth not bind us as an example; for then all examples are to be followed, and so we shall of necessity go, quà itur, non quà eundum, walk by the most examples, and not by rule. There is then no obligatory force in example it self. Secondly, there must be then some rule fixed to know when examples bind, and when not; for otherwise there can be no discrimination put between examples which we are to follow, and which to avoid. This rule must be either immediately obligatory, making it a duty to follow such examples, or else directive, declaring what examples are to be …ollowed: And yet even this latter doth imply, as well as the former, that the following these examples thus declared, is become a duty. There can be no duty without a Law making it to be a duty, and consequently, it is the Law making it to be a duty to follow such example, which gives a Divine Right to those examples, and not barely the examples themselves. We are bound to follow Christs example, not barely because he did such and such things, (for many things he did we are not bound to follow him in) but because he himself hath by a command made it our duty to follow him in his humility, patience, self-denyal,Matth. 11. 21. 1 John 2. 6. 1 Pe…. 2… ▪ 22.Matt 11:211 John 2:61 John 2:1 &c. and in whatever things are set out in Scripture for our imitation. When men speak then with so much confidence, that Scripture-examples do bind us unalterably, they either mean that the example it self makes it a duty, which I have p. 24shewn already to be absurd; or else that the morall nature of the action done in that example, or else the Law making it our duty to follow the example, though in its self it be of no morall nature. If the former of these two, then it is the morality of the action binds us, without its being incarnate in the example: For the example in actions not morall, binds not at all, and therefore the example binds only by vertue of the morality of it; and consequently, it is the morality of the action which binds, and not the example. If the latter, the rule making it our duty, then it it is more apparent that it is not the example which binds necessarily, but that rule which makes it a duty to follow it; for examples in indifferent things do not bind without a Law making it to be a duty: And so it evidently appears, that all obligatory force is taken off from the examples themselves, and resolved into one of the two former, the morall nature of the action, or a positive Law. And therefore those who plead the obligatory nature of Scripture-examples, must either produce the morall nature of these examples, or else a rule binding us to follow those examples. Especially, when these examples are brought to found a New positive Law, obliging all Christians necessarily to the end of the world. Concerning the binding nature of Apostolicall practice, I shall discourse largely afterwards. The next thing pleaded for a Divine Right, is by Divine Acts. As to this▪ …t is again evident that all Divine Acts do not constitute such a Right; therefore there must be something expressed in those Acts when such a Divine Right follows them; whence we may infallibly gather, it was Gods intention they should perpetually oblige: as is plain in the cases instanced in the most for this purpose; as Gods resting on the seventh day making the Sabbath perpetual: For itGen. 2. 2.Gen 2:2 was not Gods resting that made it the Sabbath, for that is only expressed as the occasion of its institution; but it was Gods sanctifying the day, that is, by a Law setting it apart for his own service, which made it a duty. And so Christs resurrection was not it which made the Lords day a Sabbath of Divine Right; but Christs resurrection was the occasion of the Apostles altering only a circumstantiall part of a morall duty already; which being done upon so great reasons, and by p. 25persons indued with an insallible spirit, thereby it becomes our duty to observe that morall command in this limitation of time. But here it is further necessary to distinguish between acts meerly positive, and acts donative or legall. The former con…er no right at all, but the latter do; not barely as acts, but as legall acts, that is, by some declaration that those acts do conserr right. And so it is in all donations, and therefore in Law the bare delivery of a thing to another doth not give a legall title to it, without express transferring of dominion and propriety with it. Thus in Christs delivering the Keys to Peter and therest of the Apostles, by that act I grantMatth. 16. 19. 18. 18.Matt 16:19Matt 16:18 the Apostles had the power of the Keyes by Divine Right; but then it was not any bare act of Christ which did it, but it was only the declaration of Christs will conferring that authority upon them. Again, we must distinguish between a right confer…'d by a donative act, and the unalterable nature of that Right; for it is plain there may be a Right personall as well as successive, derivative, and perpetuall. And therefore it is not enough to prove that a Right was given by any act of Christ, unless it be made appear it was Christs intention that Right should be perpetuall if it oblige still. For otherwise the extent of the Apostolical Commission the power of working miracles, as well as the power of the Keyes (whether by it we mean a power declarative of duty, or a power authoritative and penall) must continue still, if a difference be not made between these two; and some rule sound out to know when the Right conferr'd by Divine Acts is personall, when successive. Which rule thus found out, must make the Right unalterable, and so concerning us, and not the bare donative act of Christ▪ For it is evident, they were all equally conferr'd upon the Apostles by an act of Christ: and if some continue still, and others do not, then the bare act of Christ doth not make an unalterable Divine Right. And so though it be proved that the Apostles had superiority of order and jurisdiction over the Pastors of the Church by an act of Christ; yet it must further be proved, that it was Christs intention that superiority should continue in their successors, or it makes nothing to the purpose. But this argument I confess, I see not how those who make a necessary Divine Right p. 26to follow upon the acts of Christ, can possibly avoid the force of. The last thing pleaded for Divine Right, is Divine approbation; but this least of all constitutes a Divine Right: For if the actions be extraordinary, Gods approbation of them as such, cannot make them an ordinary duty. In all other actions which are good, and therefore only commendable, they must be so, either because done in conformity to Gods revealed Will, or to the nature of things good in themselves. In the one, it is the positive Law of God, in the other the Law of Nature, which made the action good, and so approved by God, and on that account we are bound to do it. For God will certainly approve of nothing but what is done according to his Will revealed, or natural; which Will and Law of his, is that which makes any thing to be of Divine Right, i. e. perpetually binding, as to the observation of it. But for acts of meerly positive nature, which we read Gods approbation of in Scripture, by vertue of which approbation those actions do oblige us; in this case, I say, it is not Gods meer approbation that makes the obligation, but as that approbation, so recorded in Scripture, is a sufficient testimony and declaration of Gods intention to oblige men: And so it comes to be a positive Law, which is nothing else but a sufficient declaration of the Legislators will and intention, to bind in particular actions and cases. Thus now we have cleared whereon a necessary and unalterable Divine Right must be founded; either upon the Law of Nature, or some positive Law of God, sufficiently declared to be perpetually binding.