Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, Discourse · Chapter 7
CHAP. VII. The Athanasian Creed clear'd from Contradictions.
III. I Now come to the last thing I proposed, viz. to shew, That it is no contradiction to assert three Persons in the Trinity and but one God; and for that purpose, I shall examine the charge of Contradictions on the Athanasian Creed. The summ of the first Articles, say they, is this, Notes on Athanasius his Creed, p. 11.The one true God is three distinct Persons, and three distinct Persons, Father, Son and Holy Ghost are the one true God. Which is plainly, as if a Man should say, Peter, James and John, being three Persons are one Man; and one Man is these three distinct Persons, Peter, James and John. Is it not now a ridiculous attempt as well as a barbarous Indignity, to go about thus to make Asses of all Mankind, under pretence of teaching them a Creed. This is very freely spoken, with respect, not merely to our Church, but the Christian World, which owns this Creed to be a just and true Explication of the Doctrine of the Trinity. But there are some Creatures as remarkable for their untoward kicking, as for their Stupidity. And is not this great skill in these Matters, to make such a Parallel between three Persons in the Godhead, and Peter, Iames and Iohn? Do they think there is no difference between an infinitely perfect Being, and such finite limited Creatures as Individuals among Men are? Do they suppose the divine Nature capable of such Division and Separation by Individuals, as human Nature is? No, they may say, but ye who hold three Persons must think so: For what reason? We do assert three Persons, but it is on the account of divine Revelation, and in such a manner, as the divine Nature is capable of it. For it is a good rule of Boethius, Talia sunt praedicata, qualia subjecta permiserint. We must not say that there are Persons in the Trinity, but in such a manner as is agreeable to the divine Nature; and if that be not capable of Division and Separation, then the Persons must be in the same undivided Essence. The next Article is, Neither confounding the Persons, nor dividing the Substance; But how can we, say they, not confound the Persons that have, as ye say, but one numerical Substance? And how can we but divide the Substance, which we find in three distinct divided Persons? I think the terms numerical Substance, not very proper in this case; and I had rather use the Language of the Fathers, than of the Schools; and some of the most judicious and learned Fathers would not allow the terms of one numerical Substance to be applied to the divine Essence. For their Notion was, That Number was only proper for compound B…ings, but God being a pure and simple Being was one by Nature and not by Number, as S. Basil speaks (as is before observed) because he is not compounded,Basil. Ep. 141. nor hath any besides himself to be reckon'd with him. But because there are different Hypostases, therefore they allow'd the use of Number about them, and so we may say the Hypostases or Persons are numerically different; but we cannot say that the Essence is one Numerically. But why must they confound the Persons, if there be but one Essence? The relative Properties cannot be confounded; for the Father cannot be the Son▪ nor the Son the Father; and on these the difference of Persons is founded. For, there can be no difference, as to essential Properties, and therefore all the difference, or rather distinction must be from those that are Relative. A Person of it self imports no Relation, but the Person of the Father or of the Son must; and these Relations cannot be confounded with one another. And if the Father cannot be the Son, nor the Son the Father, then they must be distinct from each other. But how? By dividing the Substance? That is impossible in a Substance that is indivisible. It may be said, That the Essence of created Beings is indivisible, and yet there are divided Persons. I grant it, but then a created Essence is capable of different accidents and qualities to divide one Person from another, which cannot be supposed in the divine Nature; and withall the same power which gives a Being to a created Essence, gives it a separate and divided Existence from all others. As when Peter, Iames and Iohn received their several distinct Personalities from God; at the same time he gave them their separate Beings from each other, although the same Essence be in them all.
But how can we but divide the Substance which we see in three distinct divided Persons? The question is, whether the distinct Properties of the Persons do imply a Division of the Substance? We deny that the Persons are divided as to the Substance, because that is impossible to be divided; but we say, they are and must be distinguished as to those incommunicable Properties which make the Persons distinct. The essential Properties are uncapable of being divided, and the Relations cannot be confounded; so that there must be one undivided Substance and yet three distinct Persons.
But every Person must have his own proper Substance; and so the Substance must be divided if there be three Persons. That every Person must have a Substance to support his Subsistence is not denied, but the question is, Whether that Substance must be divided or not. We say, where the Substance will bear it, as in created Beings, a Person hath a separate substance, i. e. the same Nature diversified by Accidents, Qualities and a separate Existence, but where these things cannot be, there the same Essence must remain undivided, but with such relative Properties as cannot be confounded. But may not the same undivided Substance be communicated to three divided Persons; so as that each Person may have his own proper Substance, and yet the divine Essence be in it self undivided? This is not the case before us. For the question upon the Creed is, Whether the Substance can be divided? And here it is allow'd to remain undivided. Yes in it self, but it may be divided in the Persons. The Substance, we say, is uncapable of being divided any way; and to say, that a Substance wholly undivided in it self, is yet divided into as many proper and peculiar Substances, as there are Persons, doth not at all help our understanding in this matter; but if no more be meant, as is expresly declared, than That the same one divine Nature is wholly and entirely communicated by the eternal Father to the eternal Son▪ and by Father and Son to the eternal Spirit, without any Division or Separation; it is the same which all Trinitarians assert. And it is a great pity, that any new Phrases or Ways of Expression should cause unreasonable Heats among those who are really of the same Mind. For those who oppose the expressions of three distinct Substances as new and dangerous; yet grant, That it is one peculiar Prerogative of the divine Nature and Substance, founded in its infinite, and therefore transcendent Perfection, whereby it is capable of residing in more Persons than one; and is accordingly communicated from the Father to the Son and Holy Ghost; but this is done without any Division or Multiplication. Now if both Parties mean what they say, where lies the difference? It is sufficient for my purpose that they are agrred, that there can be no Division as to the divine Essence by the distinction of Persons. And so this passage of the Athanasian Creed holds good, Neither confounding the Persons nor dividing the Substance.
The next Article, as it is set down in the Notes on Athanasius his Creed, is a contradiction to this. For there it runs, There is one Substance of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost. They might well charge it with Contradictions at this rate. But that is a plain mistake for Person; for there is no other variety in the Copies but this, that Baysius his Greek Copy hath foreign, and that of Constantinople foreign, but all the Latin Copies Persona. But what consequence do they draw from hence? Then, say they, the Son is not the Father, nor is the Father the Son, nor the Holy Ghost either of them. If they had put in Person, as they ought to have done, it is what we do own. And what follows? If the Father be not the Son, and yet is the one true God, then the Son is not the one true God, because he is not the Father. The one true God may be taken two ways: 1. The one true God, as having the true divine Nature in him, and so the Father is the one true God; but not exclusive of the Son, if he have the same divine Nature. 2. The one true God, as having the divine Nature so wholly in himself, as to make it incommunicable to the Son; so we do not say, that the Father is the one true God, because this must exclude the Son from being God; which the Scripture assures us that he is; and therefore though the Son be not the Father, nor the Father the Son, yet the Son may be the one true God as well as the Father, because they both partake of the same divine Nature, so that there is no contradiction in this, That there is but one true God, and one of the Persons is not the other. For that supposes it impossible, that there should be three Persons in the same Nature; but if the distinction of Nature and Persons be allow'd, as it must be by all that understand any thing of these matters, then it must be granted, that although one Person cannot be another, yet they may have the same common Essence. As for instance, let us take their own, Peter, Iames and Iohn. What pleasant arguing would this be, Peter is not Iames nor Iohn, nor Iames nor Iohn are Peter, but Peter hath the true Essence of a Man in him; and the true Essence is but one and indivisible; and therefore Iames and Iohn cannot be true Men, because Peter hath the One and indivisible Essence of a Man in him? But they will say, We cannot say that Peter is the One true Man, as we say, That the Father is the One true God. Yes; we say the same in other Words, for he can be said to be the One true God in no other Respect, but as he hath the One true Divine Essence. All the difference lies, that a finite Nature is capapable of Division, but an infinite is not.
It follows, The Godhead of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost is all one, the Glory Equal, the Majesty Co-eternal.
To this they say, That this Article doth impugn and destroy it self. How so? For, if the Glory and Majesty be the same in Number, then it can be neither Equal, nor Co-eternal. Not Equal for it is the same, which Equals never are, nor Co-eternal for that intimates that they are distinct. For, nothing is Co eternal, nor Co temporary with it self.
There is no appearance of Difficulty or Contradiction in this, if the Distinction of Persons is allowed; for the three Persons may be well said to be Co-equal and Co-eternal; and if we Honour the Son, as we Honour the Father, we must give equal Glory to him.
But one great Point of Contradiction remains, viz. So that the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God, and yet there are not three Gods; but one God.
First, they say, This is as if a Man should say, the Father is a Person, the Son a Person, and the Holy Ghost a Person, yet there are not three Persons; but one Person. How is this possible, if a Person doth suppose some peculiar Property, which must distinguish him from all others? And how can three Persons be one Person, unless three incommunicable Properties may become one communicated Property to three Persons? But they are aware of a Distinction in this Case, viz. that the term God is used Personally, when it is said God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost; but when it is said, There are not three Gods, but one God, the term God is used Essentially, and therefore comprehends the whole three Persons, so that there is neither a Grammatical, Notes on Athanas. his Creed, p. 13.nor Arithmetical Contradiction. And what say our Vnitarians to this? Truly, no less, Than that the Remedy is worse, (if possible) than the Disease. Nay then, we are in a very ill Case. But how I pray doth this appear? 1. Say they, Three personal Gods, and one Essential God make four Gods; if the Essential God be not the same with the personal Gods: and tho' he is the same, yet since they are not the same with one another, but distinct, it follows, that there are three Gods, i. e. three personal Gods. 2. It introduces two sorts of Gods, three Personal and one Essential. But the Christian Religion knows and owns but One, true and most high God of any sort. So far then, we are agreed, That there is but One, true and most high God; and that because of the perfect Vnity of the Divine Essence, which can be no more than One, and where there is but One Divine Essence, there can be but One true God, unless we can suppose a God without an Essence, and that would be a strange sort of God. He would be a personal God indeed in their critical Sense of a Person for a shape or appearance. But may not the fame Essence be divided? That I have already shew'd to be impossible. Therefore we cannot make so many personal Gods, because we assert one and the same Essence in the three Persons of Father, Son and Holy Ghost. But they are distinct, and therefore must be distinct Gods, since every one is distinct from the other. They are distinct as to personal Properties, but not as to Essential Attributes; which are and must be the same in all: So that here is but one Essential God, and three Persons.
But after all, why do we assert three Persons in the Godhead? Not because we find them in the Athanasian Creed; but because the Scripture hath revealed that there are Three, Father, Son and Holy Ghost; to whom the Divine Nature and Attributes are given. This we verily believe, that the Scripture hath revealed; and that there are a great many places, of which, we think no tolerable Sense can be given without it, and therefore we assert this Doctrine on the same Grounds, on which we believe the Scriptures. And if there are three Persons which have the Divine Nature attributed to them; what must we do in this Case? Must we cast off the Vnity of the Divine Essence? No, that is too frequently and plainly asserted for us to call it into Question. Must we reject those Scriptures which attribute Divinity to the Son and Holy Ghost, as well as to the Father? That we cannot do, unless we cast off those Books of Scripture, wherein those things are contained.
But why do we call them Persons, when that Term is not found in Scripture, and is of a doubtful Sense? The true Account whereof I take to be this. It is observed by Facundus Hermianensis, Facund. l 1. p. 19. Ed. Serm.that the Christian Church received the Doctrine of the Trinity before the Terms of three Persons were used. But Sabellianism was the occasion of making use of the name of Persons. It's true, That the Sabellians did not dislike our Sense of the Word Person, (which they knew was not the Churches Sense) as it was taken for an Appearance, or an external Quality; which was consistent enough with their Hypothesis, who allow'd but One real Person with different Manifestations. That this was their true Opinion, appears from the best account we have of their Doctrine, from the first Rise of Sabellianism. The Foundations of it were laid in the earliest and most dangerous Heresies in the Christian Church, viz. that which is commonly called by the name of the Gnosticks, and that of the Cerinthians and Ebionites. For how much soever they differ'd from each other in other things; yet they both agreed in this, that there was no such thing as a Trinity, consisting of Father, Son and Holy Ghost; but that all was but different Appearances and Manifestations of God to Mank…nd. In consequence whereof, the Gnosticks denied the very Humanity of Christ, and the Cerinthians and Ebionites his Divinity. But both these sorts, were utterly rejected the Communion of the Christian Church; and no such thing as Sabellianism was found within it. Afterwards, there arose some Persons who started the same Opinion within the Church:Theod. haeret. Fab. l. 2. c. 3. the first we meet with of this sort, are those mention'd by Theodoret, Epigonus, Cleomenes, and Noëtus, from whom they were called Noe…ians; not long after, Sabellius broached the same Doctrine in Pentapolis, and the Parts thereabouts; which made Dionysius of Alexandria appear so early and so warmly against it.Athan. de Sent. Dionys. p. 558. But he happening to let fall some Expressions, as though he asserted an Inequality of Hypostases in the Godhead, Complaint was made of it to Dionysius then Bishop of Rome; who thereupon explained that, which he took to be the true Sense of the Christian Church in this matter. Which is still preserved in Athanasius: Athanas. de Decret. Fidei Nicen. p. 275.Therein he disowns the Sabellian Doctrine, which confounded the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, and made them to be the same; and withal, he rejected those who held three distinct and separate Hypostases; as the Platonists, and after them the Marcionists did. Dionysius of Alexandria, when he came to explain himself, agreed with the others and asserted the Son to be of the same Substance with the Father;Athanas. de Sent. Dionys. as Athanasius hath proved at large: but yet he said, That if a distinction of Hypostases were not kept up, the Doctrine of the Trinity would be lost; as appears by an Epistle of his in S. Basil. Athanasius saith,Basil de Sp. Sancto c. 29. That the Heresie of Sabellius lay in making the Father and Son to be only different Names of the same Person; Athan. Orat. 4. c. Arian. p. 456. Greg. Nazian. Or. I. p. 16, 17.so that in one Respect he is the Father, and in another the Son. Gregory Nazianzen in opposition to Sabellianism, saith, We must believe one God, and three Hypostases; and commends Athanasius for preserving the true Mean, in asserting the Vnity of Nature, and the Distinction of Properties. S. Basil saith,Or. XXI p. 380. That the Sabellians made but one Person of the Father and Son: that in Name they confessed the Son; but in Reality they denied him. In another place, that the Sabellians asserted but one Hypostasis in the Divine Nature;Basil. Hom. 27. p. 602, 604. Basil. Epist 141. but that God took several Persons upon him, as occasion required: sometimes that of a Father, at other times of a Son; and so of the Holy Ghost. And to the same purpose, in other places he saith,…pist. 64.391. That there are distinct Hypostases with their peculiar Properties; which being joyned with the Vnity of Nature make up the true Confession of Faith. There were some who would have but One Hypostasis; whom he opposes with great vehemency; and the Reason he gives, is, That then they must make the Persons to be meer Names; which is, Sabellianisn. And, he saith, That if our Notions of distinct Persons have no certain Foundation they are meer Names, such as Sabellius called Persons. But by this Foundation he doth not mean any distinct Essences, but the incommunicable Properties belonging to them, as Father, Son and Holy Ghost.
It is plain from hence, that the necessity of asserting three Hypostases, came from thence, that otherwise they could not so well distinguish themselves from the Sabellians whose Doctrine they utterly disowned; as well as Arianism and Iudaism; and it appears by the Testimonies of Athanasius, Gregory Nazianzen and S. Basil, Athanas. …. 567. Greg. Naz. p. 16. Basil. Hom. 27.that they look'd on one as bad as the other; and they commonly joyn Iudaism, and Sabellianism together.
But yet there arose Difficulties, whether they were to hold one Hypostasis or three. The former insisted on the generally received Sense of Hypostasis for Substance or Essence; and therefore they could not hold three Hypostases without three distinct Essences, as the Platonists and Marcionists held. Upon this a Synod was called at Alexandria to adjust this matter, where both Parties were desired to explain themselves.Ruffin. p. 211. hist. l. 1. Athan. Ep. ad Antioch, p. 577. Those who held three Hypostases were asked, Whether they maintained three Hypostases as the Arians did, of different Substances and separate Subsistences, as Mankind and other Creatures are? Or as other Hereticks, three Principles or three Gods? All which they stedfastly denied. Then they were asked, Why they used those terms? They answered, Because they believed the Holy Trinity to be more than mere Names; and that the Father, and Son, and Holy Ghost had a real Subsistence belonging to them; but still they held but one Godhead, one Principle, and the Son of the same Substance with the Father; and the Holy Ghost not to be a Creature, but to bear the same proper and inseparable Essence with the Father and the Son. Then the other side were asked, When they asserted but one Hypostasis, whether they held with Sabellius or not; and that the Son and Holy Ghost had no Essence or Subsistence? which they utterly denied; but said, that their meaning was, That Hypostasis was the same with Substance; and by one Hypostasis, they intended no more, but that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost were of the same individual Substance; (for the Words are foreign and so they held but one Godhead and one divine Nature: and upon these terms they agreed. From whence it follows, that the Notion of three Hypostases, as it was received in the Christian Church, was to be under…ood so as to be consistent with the Individual Vnity of the divine Essence. And the great rule of the Christian Church was to keep in the middle, between the Doctrines of Sabellius and Arius; and so by degrees, the Notion of three Hypostases and one Essence was look'd on in the Eastern Church, as the most proper Discrimination of the Orthodox from the Sabellians and Arians.
But the Latin Church was not so easily brought to the use of three Hypostases, because they knew no other Sense of it, but for Substance or Essence; and they all denied that there was any more than one divine Substance, and therefore they rather embraced the Word Persona; and did agree in the Name of Persons, as most proper to signifie their meaning, which was, That there were three which had distinct Subsistences, and incommunicable Properties, and one and the same divine Essence. And since the Notion of it is so well understood, to signifie such a peculiar Sense, I see no reason why any should scruple the use of it. As to its not being used in Scripture, Socinus himself despises it, and allows it to be no good reason. For when Franciscus Davides objected, That the terms of Essence and Person were not in Scripture; Socinus tells him,Socin. Vol. l. p. 778. That they exposed their cause who went upon such grounds; and that if the sense of them were in Scripture, it was no matter whether the terms were or not.
H…ving thus clear'd the Notion of three Persons, I return to the Sense of Scripture about these matters. And our Vnitarians tell us, that we ought to interpret Scripture otherwise. How doth that appear? They give us very little encouragement to follow their Interpretations, which are so new, so forced, so different from the general Sense of the Christian World, and which I may say, reflect so highly on the Honour of Christ and his Apostles, i. e. by making use of such Expressions, which if they do not mean, what to honest and sincere Minds they appear to do, must be intended (according to them) to set up Christ a meer Man to be a God. And if such a thought as this could enter into the Mind of a thinking Man, it would tempt him to suspect much more as to those Writings than there is the least colour or reason for. Therefore these bold inconsiderate Writers ought to reflect on the consequence of such sort of Arguments, and if they have any regard to Christianity, not to trifle with Scripture as they do.
But say they, The question only is, Whether we ought to interpret Scripture when it speaks of God, Notes on Athanas. his Creed, p. 13.according to reason or not, that is like Fools or like wise Men? Like wise Men no doubt, if they can hit upon it, but they go about it as untowardly as ever Men did. For is this to interpret Scripture like wise Men, to take up some novel Interpretations, against the general Sense of the Christian Church from the Apostles times? Is this to act like wise Men, to raise Objections against the Authority of the Books, they cannot answer: and to cry out of false Copies and Translations without reason, and to render all places suspicious, which make against them? Is this to interpret Scripture like wise Men, to make our Saviour affect to be thought a God, when he knew himself to be a mere Man, and by their own Confession had not his divine Authority and Power conferr'd upon him? And to make his Apostles set up the Worship of a Creature, when their design was to take away the Worship of all such, who by Nature are not Gods? Answer to my Sermon, p. 14.Is this like wise Men, to tell the World, that these were only such Gods, whom they had set up, and God had not appointed; as though there were no Real Idolatry but in giving Divine Worship without God's Command.