Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, Discourse · Chapter 6

Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity · Discourse · Chapter 6

p. 68CHAP. VI. No Contradiction for three Persons to be in one common Nature.

II. THat it is no contradiction to assert three Persons in one common Nature. I shall endeavour to make these matters as clear as I can; for the greatest difficulties in most mens minds have risen from the want of clear and distinct apprehensi…ns of those fundamental Notions, which are necessary in order to the right understanding of them.

1. We are to distinguish between the Being of a thing, and a thing in Being; or between Essence and Existence.

2. Between the Vnity of Nature or Essence, and of Existence or Individuals of the same Nature.

3. Between the Notion of Persons in a finite and limited Nature, and in a Being uncapable of Division and Separation.

1. Between the Being of a thing, and a thing in Being. By the former we mean the Nature and Essential Properties of a thing; whereby it is distinguished from p. 69all other kinds of Beings. So God and his Creatures are essentially distinguished from each other by such Attributes which are incommunicable; and the Creatures of several kinds are distinguished by their Natures or Essences; for the Essence of a Man and of a Brute are not barely distinguished by Individuals, but by their kinds. And that which doth constitute a distinct kind is One and Indivisible in it self: for the Essence of Man is but one and can be no more; for if there were more, the kind would be alter'd; so that there can be but one common Nature or Essence to all the Individuals of that kind. But because these Individuals may be or may not be, therefore we must distinguish them as they are in actual Being, from what they are in their common Nature; for that continues the same, under all the Variety and Succession of Individuals.

2. We must now distinguish the Vnity which belongs to the common Nature, from that which belongs to the Individuals in actual Being. And the Vnity of Essence is twofold:

1. Where the Essence and Existence are the same, i. e. where necessary Existence doth belong to the Essence, as it p. 70is in God, and in him alone; it being an essential and incommunicable Perfection.

2. Where the Existence is contingent, and belongs to the Will of another; and so it is in all Creatures, Intellectual and Material, whose actual being is dependent on the Will of God.

The Vnity of Existence may be consider'd two ways.

1. As to it self, and so it is called Identity; or a thing continuing the same with it self: the Foundation whereof in Man is that vital Principle which results from the Union of Soul and Body. For as long as that continues, notwithstanding the great variety of changes in the material Parts, the Man continues entirely the same.

2. The Vnity of Existence as to Individuals may be consider'd as to others, i. e. as every one stands divided from every other Individual of the same kind; although they do all partake of the same common Essence. And the clearing of this, is the main point, on which the right Notion of these matters depends.

In order to that, we must consider two things.

1. What that is, whereby we perceive the difference of Individuals?

p. 712. What that is, which really makes two Beings of the same kind to be different from each other?

1. As to the reason of our Perception of the difference between Individuals of the same kind, it depends on these things.

1. Difference of outward Accidents, as Features, Age, Bulk, Meen, Speech, Habit and Place.

2. Difference of inward Qualities and Dispositions; which we perceive by observation, and arise either from Constitution, or Education, or Company, or acquired Habits.

2. As to the true ground of the real Difference between the Existence of one Individual from the rest, it depends upon the separate Existence which it hath from all others. For that which gives it a Being distinct from all others and divided by Individual Properties, is the true ground of the difference between them, and that can be no other but the Will of God. And no consequent Faculties or Acts of the Mind by Self-Reflection, &c. can be the reason of this difference; because the difference must be supposed antecedent to them. And nothing can be said to make that, which must be supposed to be before it self; for there must p. 72be a distinct Mind in Being from all other Minds, before it can reflect upon it self.

But we are not yet come to the bottom of this matter. For as to Individual Persons, there are these things still to be consider'd.

1. Actual Existence in it self, which hath a Mode belonging to it, or else the humane Nature of Christ could not have been united with the divine, but it must have had the personal Subsistence, and consequently there must have been two Persons in Christ.

2. A separate and divided Existence from all others, which arises from the actual Existence, but may be distinguished from it; and so the humane Nature of Christ, although it had the Subsistence proper to Being, yet had not a separate Existence, after the Hypostatical Vnion.

3. The peculiar manner of Subsistence, which lies in such properties as are incommunicable to any other; and herein lies the proper reason of Personality. Which doth not consist in a meer Intelligent Being, but in that peculiar manner of Subsistence in that Being which can be in no other. For when the common Nature doth subsist in Individuals, there is not only a separate Existence, but something p. 73so peculiar to it self, that it can be communicated to no other. And this is that which makes the distinction of Persons.

4. There is a common Nature which must be joyned with this manner of Subsistence to make a Person; otherwise it would be a meer Mode; but we never conceive a Person without the Essence in Conjunction with it. But here appears no manner of contradiction in asserting several Persons in one and the same common Nature.

5. The Individuals of the same kind are said to differ in number from each other, because of their different Accidents and separate Existence. For so they are capable of being numbred. Whatever is compounded is capable of number as to its parts, and may be said to be one by the Union of them; whatever is separated from another is capable of number by distinction. But where there can be no Accidents nor Division, there must be perfect Unity.

6. There must be a Separation in Nature, where-ever there is a difference of Individuals under the same kind. I do not say there must be an actual Separation and Division as to place, but that there is p. 74and must be so in Nature, where one common Nature subsists in several Individuals.foreign. Porphyr. Isag. c. 2.…6. Niceph. Callist. l. 18. c. 47. For all Individuals must divide the Species, and the common Nature u…ites them. And this Philoponus understood very well, and therefore he never denied such a Division and Separation in the divine Persons, as is implied in distinct Individuals: which is the last thing to be consider'd here.

3. We are now to enquire how far these things will hold as to the Persons in the Trinity, and whether it be a Contradiction to assert three Persons in the Godhead and but one God. We are very far from disputing the Vnity of the divine Essence, which we assert to be so perfect and indivisible, as not to be capable of such a difference of Persons as is among Men. Because there can be no difference of Accidents, or Place, or Qualities in the divine Nature; and there can be no separate Existence, because the Essence and Existence are the same in God; and if necessary Existence be an inseparable Attribute of the divine Essence, it is impossible there should be any separate Existence; for what always was and must be, can have no other Existence than what is implied in the very Essence. But p. 75will not this overthrow the distinction of Persons and run us into Sabellianism? By no means. For our Vnitarians grant, That the Noetians and Sabellians held, Discourse concerning the nominal and real Trinitarian, p. 16.that there is but one divine Substance, Essence or Nature, and but one Person. And how can those who hold three Persons be Sabellians? Yes, say they, the Sabellians held three relative Persons. But did they mean three distinct Subsistences, or only one Subsistence sustaining the Names, or Appearances, or Manifestations of three Persons? The latter they cannot deny to have been the true sense of the Sabellians. But say they, these are three Persons in a classical critical Sense. We meddle not at present with the Dispute which Valla hath against Boethius about the proper Latin Sense of a Person (and Petavius saith Valla's Objections are mere Iests and Trifles) but our Sense of a Person is plain,Petav. de Trinit. l. 4. c. 4. that it signifies the Essence with a particular manner of Subsistence, which the Greek Fathers called an Hypostasis, taking it for that incommunicable Property which makes a Person.

But say our Vnitarians, a Person is an intelligent Being, Defence of the History of the Unit. p. 5.and therefore three Persons must be three intelligent Beings. I answer, that this may be taken two ways. p. 761. That there is no Person where there is no intelligent Nature to make it a Person, and so we grant it. 2. That a Person implies an intelligent Being, separate and divided from other Individuals of the same kind, as it is among men: and so we deny it as to the Persons of the Trinity, because the Divine Essence is not capable of such Division and Separation as the humane Nature is.

But say they again, The Fathers did hold a specifical Divine Nature, Ib.and the Persons to be as so many individuals. This they repeat very often in their late Books; and after all, refer us to Curcellaeus for undeniable Proofs of it.Ib. Let us for the present suppose it,Answer to La Moth. p. 5. Explic. p. 13. Letter to the University, p. 13. then I hope the Fathers are freed from holding Contradictions in the Doctrine of the Trinity; for what Contradiction can it be, to hold three individual Persons in the Godhead, and One common Nature, more than it is to hold that there are three humane Persons in One and the same common Nature of Man? Will they make this a Contradiction too? But some have so used themselves to the Language of Iargon, Nonsense, Contradiction, Impossibility, that it comes from them, as some men swear, when they do not know it. But I am not willing to go off p. 77with this Answer; for I do take the Fathers to have been men of too great Sense and Capacity to have maintained such an absurd Opinion, as that of a Specifick Nature in God. For either it is a mere Logical Notion, and Act of the Mind without any real Existence belonging to it as such, which is contrary to the very Notion of God, which implies a necessary Existence; or it must imply a Divine Nature, which is neither Father, Son, nor Holy Ghost. Which is so repugnant to the Doctrine of the Fathers, that no one that is any ways conversant in their Writings on this Argument, can imagine they should hold such an Opinion. And I am so far from being convinced by Curcellaeus his undeniable Proofs, that I think it no hard matter to bring undeniable Proofs that he hath mistaken their meaning.

Of which I shall give an Account in this Place, because I fear his Authority hath had too much sway with some, as to this matter. I shall not insist upon his gross mistake in the very entrance of that Discourse, where he saith,Curcell. devocibus Trinit. Sect. 70. That the Bishops of Gaul and Germany disliked the Homoousion, and gave three Reasons against it; whereas Hilary speaks of the Eastern Bishops whom he goes about to vindicate p. 78to the Western Bishops, who were offended with them for that reason; as any one that reads Hilary de Synodis may see. But I come to the main Point. His great Argument is from the use of the Word foreign which may extend to Individuals of the same kind. Who denies it? But the Question is whether the Fathers used it in that sense, so as to imply a difference of Individuals in the same common Essence? There were two things aimed at by them in their Dispute with the Arians.

(1.) To shew, That the Son was of the same Substance with the Father, which they denied, and made him of an inferior created Substance, of another kind. Now the Fathers thought this term very proper to express their Sense against them. But then this Word being capable of a larger Sense than they intended, they took care, (2.) To assert a perfect Unity and Indivisibility of the Divine Essence. For the Arians were very ready to charge them with one of these two things. (1.) That they must fall into Sabellianism, if they held a perfect Unity of Essence: or (2.) When they clear'd themselves of this, that they must hold Three Gods; and both these they constantly denied. To make this clear, I shall produce the Testimonies p. 79of some of the chief both of the Greek and Latin Fathers, and answer Curcellaeus his Objections.

Athanasius takes notice of both these Charges upon their Doctrine of the Trinity:Athanas. de Sentent. Dionys. p. 558, 567. Orat. 4. de Arian. p. 456. As to Sabellianism he declared, That he abhorred it equally with Arianism; and he saith, it lay in making Father and Son to be only different Names of the same Person; and so they asserted but one Person in the Godhead. As to the other Charge of Polytheism, he observes, That in the Scripture Language, all mankind was reckon'd as one, because they have the same Essence; and if it be so, as to Men, who have such a difference of Features, of Strength, of Vnderstanding, of Language, De Communi Essent. &c. p. 214.how much more may God be said to be One, in whom is an undivided Dignity, Power, Counsel and Operation. Doth this prove such a difference, as is among Individuals of the same kind among men? No man doth more frequently assert the indivisible Vnity of the Divine Nature than he. Expos. Fidei, p. 25…. In illud Omnia mihi trad p. 154.He expresly denies such divided Hypostases, as are among men; and saith, That in the Trinity there is a Conjunction without confusion, and a distinction without Division; that in the Trinity there is so perfect an Vnion, and that it is so undivided and united in it self; that p. 80where-ever the Father is, there is the Son and the Holy Ghost, Ep. ad Serap. p. 259.and so the rest, because there is but one Godhead, and one God who is over all, and through all, and in all. But saith Curcellaeus, Orat. 4. c. Arian. p. 554, 456, 459. &c.The contrary rather follows from this foreign or mutual Inexistence, for that could not be without distinct Substance, as in Water and Wine. But this is a very gross mistake of the Fathers Notion, who did not understand by it a Local In-existence as of Bodies,Curcell. Sect. III. but such an indivisible Vnity that one cannot be without the other, as even Petavius hath made it appear from Athanasius and others.

Athanasius upon all Occasions asserts the Unity of the Divine Nature to be perfect and indivisible. Petav. de Trinit. l. 4. c. 16. De Decret. Synod. Nic. p. 259.269, 274, 276.God, saith he, is the Father of his Son foreign, without any Division of the Substance. And in other places, that the Substance of the Father and Son admit of no Division, and he affirms this to have been the sense of the Council of Nice; so that the foreign must be understood of the same indivisible Substance. Orat. 5. c. Arian. p. 514.Curcellaeus answers, That Athanasius by this indivisible Vnity meant only a close and indissoluble Vnion. De Decret. Synod p. 275. Curcell. Dissert. n. 106.But he excluded any kind of Division, and that of a Specifick Nature into several individuals as a real Division in Nature; for no man whoever treated p. 81of those matters denied, that a Specifick Nature was divided, when there were several individuals under it. But what is it which makes the Vnion indissoluble? Is it the Vnity of the Essence or not? If it be, is it the same individual Essence, or not? If the same individual Essence makes the inseparable Union, what is it, which makes the difference of individuals? If it be said, The incommunicable Properties of the Persons; I must still ask how such Properties in the same individual Essence, can make different individuals? If it be said to be the same Specifick Nature; then how comes that which is in it self capable of Division to make an indissoluble Vnion?

But saith Curcellaeus,Curcell. n. 82. Athanasius makes Christ to be of the same Substance as Adam, and Seth, and Abraham, and Isaac are said to be Con-substantial with each other. And what follows? That the Father and Son are divided from each other, as they were? This is not possible to be his Sense; considering what he saith of the Indivisibility of the Divine Nature. And Athanasius himself hath given sufficient warning against such a Mis-construction of his Words;Athanas. de Synod. Arim & Seluc. p. 916, 920, 928. and still urges that our Conceptions ought to be suitable to the Divine Nature, p. 82not taken from what we see among men. And it is observable, that when Paulus Samosatenus had urged this as the best Argument against the term foreign, That it made such a difference of Substances as is among men; P. 919.for that Reason saith Athanasius, his Iudges were content to let it alone, for the Son of God is not in such a sense Con-substantial; but afterwards, the Nicene Fathers finding out the Art of Paulus, and the significancy of the Word to discriminate the Arians, made use of it, and only thought it necessary to declare, that when it is applied to God, it is not to be understood, as among individual Men.

As to the Dialogues under Athanasius his Name, on which Curcellaeus insists so much;Curcell. n. 84. it is now very well known that they belong not to him, but to Maximus; and by comparing them with other places in him,Maxim. Oper. T. II. p. 384. T. I. p 413. it may appear, that he intended no Specifick Nature in God.

But saith Curcellaeus, Curcell. Sect. 73.If the Fathers intended any more than a Specifick Nature, why did they not use Words which would express it more fully, As foreign and foreign? For that very Reason, which he mentions from Epiphanius, because they would seem to approach too near to Sabellianism.

p. 83S. Basil was a great Man, (notwithstanding the flout of our Vnitarians,)A Discourse conc…rn…g No…l and real Unitar. p 26. and apply'd his thoughts to this matter, to clear the Doctrine of the Church from the Charge of Sabellianism and Tritheism. As to the former, he saith, in many places, That the Heresie lay in making but one Person as well as one God, Basil Hom. …7. p. 60…, 604. Epist. 141, 391, 64.or one Substance with three several Names. As to the latter, no man asserts the individual Unity of the Divine Essence in more significant Words than he doth. For he uses the foreign and foreign,T. I. p. 605. T. II. p. 9…6.. as S. Cyril of Alexandria doth likewise,Cyril Alex. Dialog. de Trinit. 3. p. 498, 500. and yet both these are produced by Curcellaeus for a Specifick Nature.

But saith Curcellaeus, Curcell. n. 74.S. Basil in his Epistle to Gregory Nyssen doth assert the difrence between Substance and Hypostasis to consist in this, That the one is taken for common Nature, and the other for individual, and so making three Hypostases, he must make three Individuals, and One common or Specifick Nature. I answer, That it is plain by the design of that Epistle, that by three Hypostases he could not mean three individual Essences. For he saith, The design of his writing it, was to clear the difference between Substance and Hypostasis. For saith he, From the p. 84want of this, some assert but one Hypostasis, as well as one Essence; and others, because there are three Hypostases, suppose there are three distinct Essences. For both went upon the same Ground, that Hypostasis and Essence were the same. Therefore saith he, those who held three Hypostases, did make foreign a Division of Substances. From whence it follows, that S. Basil did look upon the Notion of three distinct Substances as a mistake: I say distinct Substances, as Individuals are distinct; for so the first Principles of Philosophy do own that Individuals make a foreign, or Division of the Species into several and distinct Individuals.

But doth not S. Basil go about to explain his Notion by the common Nature of man, and the several Individuals under it; and what can this signifie to his purpose, unless he allows the same in the Godhead? I grant he doth so, but he saith the Substance, is that which is common to the whole kind; the Hypostasis is that which properly distinguisheth one Individual from another; which he calls the foreign the peculiar incommunicable Property.foreign. Which he describes by a Concourse of distinguishing Characters in every Individual. But how doth he apply these things p. 85to the divine Nature? For therein lies the whole difficulty. Doth he own such a Community of Nature, and Distinction of Individuals there? He first confesses the divine Nature to be incomprehensible by us; but yet we may have some distinct Notions about these things. As for instance, In the Father we conceive something common to him and to the Son; and that is the divine Essence: and the same as to the Holy Ghost. But there must be some proper characters to distinguish these, one from another; or else there will be nothing but confusion: which is Sabellianism. Now the essential Attributes and divine Operations are common to them; and therefore these cannot distinguish them from each other. And those are the peculiar Properties of each Person, as he shews at large.

But may not each Person have a distinct Essence belonging to him, as we see it is among Men?

For this S. Basil answers: (1.) He utterly denies any possible Division in the divine Nature.

And he never question'd,foreign p. 810. B. but the distinction of Individuals under the same Species was a sort of Division, although there were no Separation. And the followers of Ioh. Philoponus did hold an indissoluble p. 86Vnion between the three individual Essences in the divine Nature; but they held a distinction of peculiar Essences, besides the common Nature, which they called foreign and foreign; as appears by Photius, Phot. Cod. 24.who was very able to judge. And it appears by one of themselves in Photius, that the controversie was, whether an Hyposiasis could be without an individual Essence belonging to it self;Cod. 234. or whether the peculiar Properties and Characters did make the Hypostasis. But as to S. Basil's Notion, we are to observe; (2.) That he makes the divine Essence to be uncapable of number, by reason of its perfect Unity. Here our Vnitarians tell us, that when S. Basil saith,Discourse conce…ning the Nominal and Real Unitar. p. 26, 27. That God is not one in number, but in nature, he means: as the Nature of Man is one, but there are many particular Men, as Peter, James and John, &c. so the Nature of God, or the common Divinity is one, but there are as truely more Gods in number, or more particular Gods, as there are more particular Men. but that this is a gross mistake or abuse of S. Basil's meaning,Basil. Ep. 141. I shall make it plain from h…mself. For, they say, That he held, that as to this question, How many Gods? it must be answered, Three Gods in number, or three Personal Gods, and one in p. 87Nature, or divine Properties; whereas he is so far from giving such an answer, that he absolutely denies that there can be more Gods than one in that very place. He mentions it as an Objection, that since he said, That the Father is God, the Son God, the Holy Ghost God; he must hold three Gods; to which he answers, We own but one God, not in Number, but in Nature: Then say they, He held but one God in Nature and more in Number. That is so far from his meaning, that I hardly think any that read the passage in S. Basil, could so wilfully pervert his meaning. For his intention was so far from asserting more Gods in Number, that it was to prove so perfect a Unity in God, that he was not capable of number, or of being more than one. For, saith he, That which is said to be one in Number, is not really and simply one, but is made up of many, which by composition become one; as we say, the world is one, which is made up of many things. But God is a simple uncompounded Being; and therefore cannot be said to be one in Number. But the World is not one by Nature, because it is made up of so many things, but it is one by Number, as those several parts make but one World. Is not this fair dealing with such a Man as S. Basil, to represent his p. 88Sense quite otherwise than it is? As though he allow'd more Gods than one in Number? Number, saith he again, belongs to Quantity, and Quantity to Bodies, but what relation have these to God, but as he is the Maker of them? foreign. Basil. T. II. p. 926.Number belongs to material and circumscribed Beings; but, saith he, the most perfect Vnity is to be conceived in the most simple and incomprehensible Essence. Where it is observable, that he uses those Words which are allow'd to express the most perfect and singular Unity. Which Petavius himself confesseth,Petav. de Trinit. l. 4 c. 13. n. 10. that they can never be understood of a specifick Nature: and Curcellaeus cannot deny, That foreign being added to foreign, doth restrain the Sense more to a numerical Vnity, as he calls it. How then is it possible to understand S. Basil of more Gods than one in number? And in the very same Page he mentions the foreign, the Sameness of the divine Nature, by which the foreign is better understood.

But Curcellaeus will have no more than a specifick Vnity understood.Cur. n 106. Before he said, that foreign would have signified more, but now he finds it used, the case is alter'd: So that the Fathers could not mean any other than a specifick Vnity, let them use what expressions they pleas'd. p. 89But these, I think are plain enough to any one that will not shut his Eyes.

In an other place, S. Basil makes the same Objection and gives the same answer. One God the Father, and one God the Son; how can this be, and yet not two Gods? Because, saith he, the Son hath the very same Essence with the Father. Not two Essences divided out of one, as two Brothers; but as Father and Son, the Son subsisting as from the Father, but in the same individual Essence: foreign.

But Curcellaeus hath one fetch yet, viz. That S. Basil denied God to be one in Number, Basil. T. I. p. 604. Cur n. 113.and made him to be one in Nature, because he look'd on a specifick Vnity or Vnity of Nature as more exact than numerical. S. Basil look'd on the divine Nature as such to have the most perfect Vnity, because of its Simplicity, and not in the least speaking of it as a specifick Vnity; but Curcellaeus himself calls this,N. 105. an Vnity by a mere Fiction of the Mind; and can he imagine this to have been more accurate than a real Unity? These are hard shifts in a desperate cause.

After all, our Vnitarians tell us,T. II. p. 30. That S. Basil doth against Eunomius allow a distinction in Number with respect to the Deity. But how? As to the Essence? By no p. 90means. For he asserts the perfect Vnity thereof in the same place, even the Vnity of the Substance. But as to the characteristical Properties of the Persons, he allows of Number, and no farther. But say they, This is to make one God as to essential Properties, and three as to Personal. How can that be? when he saith, so often there can be but one God, because there can be but one divine Essence; and therefore those properties can only make distinct Hypostases, but not distinct Essences. And is this indeed the great Secret which this bold Man, as they call him, hath discover'd? I think those are much more bold, (I will not say impudent) who upon such slight grounds, charge him with asserting more Gods than one in Number. But Gregory Nyssen, Cur. n. 106. Greg. Nyssen. T. III. p. 17.saith Curcellaeus ▪ speaks more plainly in his Epistle to Ablabius; for saith he, To avoid the difficulty of making three Gods, as three Individuals among Men are three Men; he answers, that truly they are not three Men, because they have but one common Essence, which is exactly one, and indivisible in it self, however it be dispersed in Individuals▪ the same, he saith, is to be understood of God. And this Petavius had charged him with before,Petav. de Trin. l. 4. … 9 n. 2, 3. as appears by Curcellaeus his Appendix.

p. 91This seems the hardest passage in Antiquity for this purpose, to which I hope to give a satisfactory answer from Gregory Nyssen himself.

1. It cannot be denied, that he asserts the Vnity of Essence to be Indivisible in it self, and to be the true ground of the Denomination of Individuals; as Peter hath the name of a Man, not from his individual Properties, whereby he is distinguished from Iames and Iohn; but from that one indivisible Essence, which is common to them all, but yet receives no Addition or Diminution in any of them.

2. He grants a Division of Hypostases among Men, notwithstanding this Indivisibility of one common Essence: For saith he; among Men, although the Essence remain one and the same in all, without any Division;foreign yet the several Hypostases are divided from each other, according to the individual Properties belonging to them. So that here is a double consideration of the Essence: as in it self, so it is one and indivisible; as it subsists in Individuals, and so it is actually divided according to the Subjects. For although the Essence of a Man be the same in it self, in Peter, Iames and Iohn; yet taking it as in the p. 92Individuals, so the particular Essence in each of them is divided from the rest. And so Philoponus took Hypostasis for an Essence individuated by peculiar Properties; Niceph. Calist. hist. l. 18. c. 47.and therefore asserted, that where-ever there was an Hypostasis, there must be a distinct Essence; and from hence he held the three Persons to have three distinct Essences.

3. We are now to consider, how far Gregory Nyssen carried this, whether he thought it held equally as to the divine Hypostasis; and that he did not, appears to me from these arguments:

1. He utterly denies any kind of Division in the divine Nature; for in the conclusion of that Discourse, he saith, it is not only foreign (a Word often used by the Greek Fathers on this occasion, from whence Athanasius against Macedonius inferr'd an Identity, Athan. T. II. p. 280.and Caesarius joyns foreign;Caesar. Quaest. 3. p. 12. and so S. Basil uses it) but he adds another Word, which is foreign, Indivisible. Yes, as all Essences are indivisible in themselves; but they may be divided in their Subjects, as Gregory Nyssen allows it to be in Men. I grant it, but then he owns a Division of some kind, which he here absolutely denies p. 93as to the divine Nature; for his words are, that it is foreign in any consideration whatsoever. Then he must destroy the Hypostases. Not so neither, for he allows that there is a foreign as to the Hypostases however. For he proposes the Objection himself, That by allowing no difference in the divine Nature, the Hypostases would be confounded. To which he answers, That he did not deny their difference, which was founded in the relation they had to one another; which he there explains; and that therein only consists the difference of the Persons. foreign.Which is a very considerable testimony, to shew that both Petavius and Curcellaeus mistook Gregory Nyssen's meaning. But there are other arguments to prove it.

2. He asserts such a difference between the divine and human Persons, as is unanswerable, viz. the Vnity of Operation. For, saith he, among Men, if several go about the same Work, yet every particular Person works by himself, and therefore they may well be called many; because every one is circumscribed: but in the divine Persons he proves that it is quite otherwise, for they all concurr in the Action towards p. 94us; as he there shews at large. Petavius was aware of this, and therefore he saith, he quitted it and returned to the other; whereas he only saith, If his Adversaries be displeased with it, he thinks the other sufficient. Which in short is, that Essence in it self is one and indivisible; but among Men it is divided according to the Subjects; that the divine Nature is capable of no Division at all, and therefore the difference of Hypostases must be from the different Relations and Manner of Subsistence.

3. He expresses his meaning fully in another place. For in his Catechetical Oration, Greg. Nyssen, Tom. III. p.he saith, he looks on the Doctrine of the Trinity as a profound Mystery (which three individual Persons in one specifick Nature is far from.) But wherein lies it? Chiefly in this, That there should be Number and no Number; different View and yet but One; a distinction of Hypostases, and yet no Division in the Subjects. For so his words are, foreign; which is contrary to what he said of human Hypostases. Now, what is the Subject in this case? According to Curcellaeus his Notion, it must be an Individual. But since he asserts there can be no Division in the Subjects, then he must p. 95overthrow any such Individuals, as are among Men. These are the chief Testimonies out of the Greek Fathers, whose authority Curcellaeus and others rely most upon, as to this matter, which I have therefore more particularly examin'd.

But S. Ierom, saith Curcellaeus, Cur. n. 48.in his Epistle to Damasus, thought three Hypostases implied three distinct Substances; and therefore when the Campenses would have him own them, he refused it and asked his Advice. Then it is plain, S. Ierom would not own three distinct Substances, and so could not be of Curcellaeus his mind. But saith he, S. Ierom meant by three Substances, three Gods different in kind, N. 107.as the Arians did. But how doth that appear? Doth he not say, the Arian Bishop, and the Campenses put him upon it? But who was this Arian Bishop, and these Campenses? No other than the Meletian Party; for Meletius was brought in by the Arians, but he joyned against them with S. Basil and others, who asserted three Hypostases; and the Campenses were his People who met without the Gates, as the Historians tell us. But it is evident by S. Ierom, that the Latin Church understood Hypostasis to be the same then with Substance; and the reason why they p. 96would not allow three Hypostases, was, because they would not assert three Substances. So that Curcellaeus his Hypothesis hath very little colour for it among the Latin Fathers; since S. Ierom there saith, it would be Sacrilege to hold three Substances, and he freely bestows an Anathema upon any one that asserted more than one.

But Hilary, saith Curcellaeus, owns a specifick Vnity, Cur. n. 89.for in his Book de Synodis, he shews, That by one Substance, they did not mean one individual Substance, but such as was in Adam and Seth, that is of the same kind. No man asserts the Vnity and Indiscrimination of the divine Substance more fully and frequently than he doth; and that without any Difference or Variation, as to the Father and the Son. And although against the Arians he may use that for an Illustration, of Adam and Seth; yet when he comes to explain himself, he declares it must be understood in a way agreeable to the divine Nature. And he denies any Division of the Substance between Father and Son,Hilar. de Synod. n. 67. but he asserts one and the same Substance to be in both; and although the Person of the Son remains distinct from the Person of the Father, Hilar. de Trinit. l. 4. n. 6.yet he subsists in that Substance of which he was p. 97begotten, and nothing is taken off from the substance of the Father, by his being begotten of it.

But doth he not say, That he hath a Legitimate and proper Substance of his own begotten Nature from God, the Father? Hilar. de Synod. n. 18.And what is this, but to own two distinct Substances?

How can the Substance be distinct, if it be the very same; and the Son subsist in that Substance of which he was begotten? And that Hilary (besides a multitude of passages to the same purpose in him) cannot be understood of two distinct Substances will appear by this Evidence.

The Arians in their Confession of Faith before the Council of Nice set down among the several Heresies which they condemned;Hilar. de Trinit. l. 6. n. 12. that of Hieracas, who said the Father and Son were like two Lamps shining out of one common Vessel of Oil. Hilary was sensible that under this that Expression was struck at, God of God, Light of Light, which the Church owned. His Answer is, Luminis Naturae Vnitas est, non ex connexione porrectio. i e. they are not two divided Lights, from one common Stock; but the same Light remaining after it was kindled that it was before. As appears by his Words, Light p. 98of Light, saith he, implies, That it gives to another that which it continues to have it self.Lumen ex lumine, quod sine detrimento suo naturam suam praestat ex sese, & quod dat habet, & quod dederit habeat, nascatur que quod sit. And Petavius saith, that the Opinion of Hieracas was, That the substance of the Father and Son differ'd Numerically as one Lamp from another. And Hilary calls it an Error of humane Understanding which would judge of God,Petav. de Trinit. l. 5. c. 8. n. 9, 12. by what they find in one another.

Doth not S. Ambrose say, as Curcellaeus quotes him,Curcell. n. 96. That the Father and Son are not two Gods, because all men are said to be of one Substance?

Ambros. de Fide l. 5. c. 3. ed. Nov.But S Ambrose is directly against him. For, he saith, The Arians objected, that if they made the Son true God, and Con-substantial with the Father, they must make two Gods; as there are two men, or two Sheep of the same Essence; but a Man and a Sheep are not said to be Men, or two sheep. Which they said to excuse themselves, because they made the Son of a different kind and substance from the Father. And what Answer doth S. Ambrose give to this?

1. He saith, Plurality according to the Scriptures rather falls on those of different kinds; and therefore when they make them of several kinds, they must make several Gods.

p. 992. That we who hold but One Substance, cannot make more Gods than One.

3. To his instance of Men, he answers, That although they are of the same Nature by Birth, yet the… differ in Age, and Thought, and Work, and Place from one another; and where there is such Diversity, there cannot be Vnity: but in God, there is no difference of Nature, Will, or Operation; and therefore there can be but one God.

The last I shall mention is S. Augustin, whom Curcellaeus produces to as little purpose;Curcell. n. 97. for although he doth mention the same instance of several Men being of the same kind; yet he speaks so expresly against a Specifick Vnity in God; that he saith, The Consequence must be, Aug. de Trinit. l. 7. c. 6.that the three Persons must be three Gods; as three humane Persons are three Men. And in another place, That the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, are One in the same individual Nature. And what saith Curcellaeus to these places, for he was aware of them.C Maxim l. 1. To the latter he saith, That by individual, he means Specifick. This is an extraordinary Answer indeed.Curcell. n. 114. But what Reason doth he give for it? Because they are not divided in Place or Time, but they may have their proper Essences however.

But where doth S. Augustin give any p. 100such Account of it?August. de Trinit. l. 4. c. 21. l. 5. c. 3, 5, 8. l. 6. c. 1. De Ago…e Christ. c. 16. C. Maxim. l 3. c. 10. He often speaks upon this Subject; but always gives another Reason. viz. because they are but One and the same Substance. The Three Persons are but One God, because they are of One Substance; and they have a perfect Vnity, because there is no Diversity of Nature, or of Will. But it may be said, That here he speaks of a Diversity of Nature. In the next Words he explains himself, that the three Persons are One God, propter ineffabilem conjunctionem Deitatis; but the Union of three Persons in one Specifick Nature, is no ineffable Conjunction, it being one of the commonest things in the World; and in the same Chapter, propter Individuam Deitatem unus Deus est; & propter uniuscujusque Proprietatem tres Personae sunt. Here we find one Individual Nature; and no difference but in the peculiar Properties of the Persons.

In the other place he is so express against a Specifick Vnity, that Curcellaeus his best Answer is,Curcell. n. 114. That in that Chapter he is too intricate and obscure. i. e. He doth not to speak his Mind.

Thus much I thought fit to say in Answer to those undeniable Proofs of Curcellaeus, which our Vnitarians boast so much of, and whether they be so or not, let the Reader examine and judge.