Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, Discourse · Chapter 5
CHAP. V. Of their Charge of Contradiction in the Doctrine of the Trinity.
BUT I shall not take any Advantages from thence, but immediately proceed to the next thing I undertook in this Discourse, viz. To consider what Grounds they have for such a Charge as this, of Contradiction and Impossibility. In my Sermon which gave occasion to these Expressions (as is before intimated) I had undertaken to prove, that considering the infinite Perfections of the Divine Nature, which are so far above our reach, God may justly oblige us to believe those things concerning himself which we are not able to comprehend; and I instanced in some Essential Attributes of God, as his Eternity, Omniscience, Spirituality, &c. And therefore, if there be such Divine Perfections, which we have all the Reason to believe, but no Faculties sufficient to comprehend, there can be no ground from Reason to reject such a Doctrine which God hath revealed, because the manner of it may be incomprehensible by us. And what Answer do they give to this?
They do not deny it in general, that God may oblige us to believe things above our Comprehension;Answer to the Serm. about the Trinity, p. 4, 5, 8. but he never obliges us to believe Contradictions, and that they Charge the Doctrine of the Trinity with; and for this they only referr me to their Books, where they say it is made out. But I must say, that I have read and consider'd those Tracts, and am very far from being convinced that there is any such Contradiction in this Doctrine, as it is generally received in the Christian Church; or as it is explained in the Athanasian Creed. And, I shall shew the unreasonableness of this Charge from these things.
1. That there is a Difference between a Contradiction in Numbers, and in the Nature of things.
2. That it is no Contradiction to assert three Persons in One Common Nature.
3. That it is no Contradiction to say that there are three distinct Persons in the Trinity and not three Gods. If I can make out these things, I hope I may abate something of that strange and unreasonable confidence, wherewith these men charge the Doctrine of the Trinity with Contradictions.
1. I begin with the first of them. And I shall draw up the Charge in their own words. In one of their late Books they have these Words.
History of the Unitar. p. 9. n. 7.Theirs, they say, is an Accountable and Reasonable Faith, but that of the Trinitarians is absurd and contrary both to Reason and to it self; and therefore not only false but impossible. But wherein lies this Impossibility? That they soon tell us. Because we affirm that there are Three Persons, who are severally and each of them true God, and yet there is but one true God. Now, say they, this is an Error in counting or numbring, which when stood in is of all others the most brutal and inexcusable; and not to discern it is not to be a Man. What must these men think the Christian Church hath been made up of all this while? What? were there no Men among them but the Vnitarians? D…fence of the History of the Unitarians, p. 7.none that had common sense, and could tell the difference between One and Three? But this is too choice a Notion to be deliver'd but once; we have it over and over from them. In another place, they say, We cannot be mistaken in the Notion of One and Three; we are most certain that One is not Three, and Three are not One. This it is to be Men! But the whole Christian World besides are in Brutal and Inexcusable Errors about One and Three. This is not enough, for they love to charge home; for one of their terrible Objections against the Athanasian Creed is,A…t o… Athanasiu…, p. 13. That here is an Arithmetical, as well as Grammatical Contradiction. For, in saying God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, yet not three Gods but one God, a Man first distinctly numbers three Gods, and then in summing them up brutishly says, not three Gods but one God. Brutishly still! Have the Brutes and Trinitarians learnt Arithmetick together? Methinks such Expressions do not become such whom the Christian Church hath so long since condemned for Heresies. But it may be with the same Civility they will say, It was brutishly done of them. But can these Men of Sense and Reason think, that the Point in Controversie ever was, whether in Numbers, One could be Three, or Three One? If they think so, I wonder they do not think of another thing; which is the begging all Trinitarians for Fools; because they cannot count One, Two and Three; and an Vnitarian Jury would certainly cast them. One would think such Writers had never gone beyond Shop-books; for they take it for granted, that all depends upon Counting. But these terrible Charges were some of the most common and trite Objections of Infidels.Interrogant enim nos aliquando Infideles, & dicunt, Patrem quem dicitis, Deum dicitis? Respondemus Deum. Filium quem dicitis, Deum dicitis? Respondemus Deum Spiritum Sanctum quem dicitis, Deum dicitis? Respondemus Deum. Ergo inquiunt, Pater & Filius & Spiritus Sanctus tres sunt Dei. Respondemus, Non. Turbantur, quia non illuminantur, cor clausum habent quia clavem fidei non habent Aug. in Ioh. Tr. 39. St. Augustin mentions it as such, when he saith, the Infidels sometimes ask us, what do you call the Father? We answer, God. What the Son? we answer, God. What the Holy Ghost? we answer, God. So that here the Infidels make the same Objection, and draw the very same Inference. Then, say they, the Father, Son and H. Ghost are three Gods. But what saith S. Augustin to this? Had he no more skill in Arithmetick than to say there are Three and yet but One? He saith plainly that there are not three Gods. The Infidels are troubled, because they are not Inlightend; their heart is shut up, because they are without Faith. By which it is plain, he look'd on these as the proper Objections of Infidels and not of Christians. But may not Christians have such doubts in their minds? He doth not deny it; but then he saith, Where the true foundation of Faith is laid in the heart, which helps the Vnderstanding;Nos ergo Fratres, fide praecedente, quae sanat oculum cordis nostri, quod intelligimus sine obscuritate capiamus, quod non intelligimus sine dubitatione credamus. Ibid. we are to embrace with it, all that it can reach to; and where we can go no farther, we must believe without doubting: which is a wise resolution of this matter. For there are some things revealed, which we can entertain the notion of in our minds, as we do of any other matters, and yet there may be some things belonging to them which we cannot distinctly conceive. We believe God to have been from all Eternity; and that because God hath revealed it; but here is something we can conceive, viz. that he was so; and here is something we cannot conceive, viz. How he was so. This Instance I had produced in my Sermon, to shew that we might be obliged to believe such things concerning God, of which we cannot have a clear and distinct Notion; as that God was from all Eternity, although we cannot conceive in our minds, how he could be from himself. Now, what saith the Vnitarian to this, who pretended to Answer me? He saith, If God must be from himself, Answ. to Serm. p. 5.then an Eternal God is a Contradiction; for that implies, that he was before he was; and so charges me with espousing the cause of Atheists. I wish our Vnitarians were as free from this Charge as I am. But this is malicious cavilling. For my design was only to shew, that we could have no distinct conception of something which we are bound to believe. For upon all accounts we are bound to believe an Eternal God, and yet we cannot form a distinct and clear Idea of the manner of it. Whether being from himself be taken positively, or negatively, the matter is not cleared; the one is Absurd, and the other Unconceivable by us. But still I say, it is a thing that we are bound to believe stedfastly, although it is above our comprehension. But instead of Answering to this, he runs out into an Examination of one notion of Eternity: and as he thinks, shews some Absurdities in that, which are already answer'd. But that was not my meaning, but to shew that we could have no clear and distinct Notion of Eternity; And if his Arguments were good they prove what I aimed at, at least as to that Part; and himself produces my own Words to shew, that there were such Difficulties every way, which we could not master; and yet are bound to believe, that necessary Existence is an inseparable Attribute of God. So that here we have a clear instance of what S. Augustin saith, That we may believe something upon full Conviction, as that God is eternal; and yet there may remain something which we cannot reach to by our understanding, viz. the manner how Eternity is to be conceived by us: which goes a great way towards clearing the Point of the Trinity, notwithstanding the Difficulty in our conceiving the manner how Three should be one, and One three.
But S. Augustin doth not give it over so; Let us keep stedfast, A fundamento fidei non recedamus, ut ad culmen Perfectionis veniamus. Deus est Pater. Deus est Filius, Deus est Spiritus Sanctus, & ramen Pater non est qui Filius: nec Filius est qui Pater, nec Spiritu… Sanctus. Patris & Filii Spiritus, Pater est aut Filius. Ibid.saith he, to the Foundation of our Faith, that we may arrive to the top of Perfection; the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Ghost is God; the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father, nor the Holy Ghost either Father or Son. And he goes on. The Trinity is one God, one Eternity, one Power, one Majesty, Three Persons one God. Trinitas Unus Deus, Trinitas una Aeternitas, una Potestas, una Majestas, tres Personae sed non tres Dii.So it is in Erasmus his Edition; but the late Editors say, that the word Personae was not in their Manuscript. And it is not material in this Place, since elsewhere he approves the use of the word Persons, as the fittest to express our meaning in this Case.Non audemus dicere unam Essentiam tres Substantias, sed unam Essentiam vel Substantiam, tres autem Personas, quemadmodum multi Latini ista tractantes & digni auctoritate dixerunt, cum alium modum aptiorem non invenirent, quo enunciarent verbis, quod sine verbis intelligebant. Aug. de Trinit. l. 5. c. 8. For since some Word must be agreed upon, to declare our Sense by, he saith, those who understood the Propriety of the Latin tongue, could not pitch upon any more proper than that, to signifie that they did not mean three distinct Essences, but the same Essence with a different Hypostasis, founded in the Relation of one to the other; as Father and Son have the same Divine Essence, but the Relations being so different that one cannot be confounded with the other, that which results from the Relation being joyned with the Essence, was it which was called a Person.
But saith S. Augustin, The Caviller will ask, Nunc mihi Calumniator respondeat, quid ergo tres? Ecce inquit tres dixisti, sed quid tres exprime? Immo tu numera. Nam ego compleo tres, cum dico, Pater & Filius & Spiritus Sanctus. Id. ubi supra. Id enim quod Pater ad se est, Deus est, quod ad Filium est, Pater est: quod Filius ad seipsum est, Deus est; quod ad Patrem est, Filius est.if there be Three, what Three are they? He answers, Father, Son and Holy Ghost. But then he distinguishes between what they are in themselves, and what they are to each other. The Father as to himself is God, but as to the Son he is Father: the Son as to himself is God, but as to the Father he is the Son. But how is it possible to understand this? Why, saith he, Take two men, Father and Son; the one as to himself is a Man, but as to the Son a Father; the Son, as to himself is a Man, but as to the Father, he is a Son: but these two have the same common Nature.
But saith he, Will it not hence follow, that as these are two Men, so the Father and Son in the Divine Essence must be two Gods? No, Sed non quomodo illi duo homines sunt sic isti duo Dii. Quare hoc non est ita ibi? Quia illud aliud, hoc autem aliud est, quia illa Divini… est, haec humanitas.there lies the difference between the humane and Divine Nature. That one cannot be multiplied and divided as the other is.
And therein lies the true Solution of the Difficulty, as will appear afterwards. When you begin to count, saith he,Ubi cogitare coeperis, incipis numerare; ubi numeraveris, quid numeraveris, non potes respondere. Pater, Pater est; Filius, Filius; Spiritus Sanctus, Spiritus Sanctus est. Quid sunt isti tres? non tres Dii? Non. Non tres omnipotentes? Non, sed unus Omnipotens. Hoc solo numerum insinuant, quod ad invicem sunt, non quod ad se sunt. you go on, One, two and Three. But when you have reckon'd them what is it you have been Counting? The Father is the Father, the Son the Son, and the Holy Ghost, the Holy Ghost. What are these Three? Are they not three Gods? No, Are they not three Almighties? No, They are capable of Number as to their Relation to each other; but not as to their Essence which is but One.
The substance of the Answer lies here, the Divine Essence is that alone which makes God, that can be but One, and therefore there can be no more Gods than one. But because the same Scripture, which assures us of the Unity of the Divine Essence, doth likewise joyn the Son and Holy Ghost in the same Attributes, Operations and Worship, therefore as to the mutual Relations, we may reckon Three, but as to the Divine Essence, that can be no more than One.
Boëthius was a great Man in all respects,Boëth. Oper. p. … 121. for his Quality, as well as for his Skill in Philosophy and Christianity; and he wrote a short but learned Discourse to clear this Matter. The Catholick Doctrine of the Trinity, saith he, is this; the Father is God, the Son God and the Holy Ghost; but they are not three Gods but one God. And yet (which our Vnitarians may wonder at) this very man hath written a learned Book of Arithmetick. But how doth he make this out? How is it possible for Three to be but One? First he shews, That there can be but one Divine Essence; for to make more than One must suppose a Diversity. Principium enim Pluralitatis Alteritas est. If you make a real difference in Nature as the Arians did, then there must be as many Gods, as there are different Natures. Among men, there are different individuals of the same kind; but, saith he, it is the Diversity of Accidents which makes it; and if you can abstract from all other Accidents, yet they must have a different Place, for two Bodies cannot be in the same place. The Divine Essence is simple and immaterial, and is what it is of it self; but other things are what they are made, and consist of Parts, and therefore may be divided. Now that which is of it self can be but One; and therefore cannot be numbred. And one God cannot differ from another, either by Accidents or substantial Differences. But saith he, there is a twofold Number; one by which we reckon; and another in the things reckoned. And the repeating of Units in the former makes a Plurality,Numerus enim duplex est, unus quidem, quo numeramus, alter verò qui in rebus numerabilibus constat; Ergo in Numero quo numeramus, repetitio unitatum facit Pluritatem; in rerum vero numero non facit Pluralitatem Unitatum repetitio. but not in the latter. It may be said, that this holds where there are only different Names for the same thing; but here is a real Distinction of Father, Son and Holy Ghost. But then he shews, "That the difference of Relation, can make no Alteration in the Essence; and where there is no Diversity, there can be but one Essence, although the different Relation may make three Persons. This is the substance of what he saith concerning this Difficulty,Ita igitur substantia continet Unitatem, relatio verò multiplicat Trinitatem. Nam idem Pater qui Filius non est; nec idem uterque qui Spiritus Sanctus. Idem tamen Deus est, Pater Filius & Spiritus Sanctus. which, as he suggests, arises from our Imaginations, which are so filled with the Division and Multiplicity of compound and material things, that it is a hard matter for them so to recollect themselves as to consider the first Principles and Grounds of Vnity and Diversity. But if our Vnitarians have not throughly consider'd those foundations, they must, as they say to one of their Adversaries,Answer to Milb. p. 52. argue like novices in these questions. For these are some of the most necessary Speculations for understanding these matters; as what that Vnity is which belongs to a perfect Being; what Diversity is required to multiply an infinite Essence, which hath Vnity in its own Nature: whether it be therefore possible, that there should be more divine Essences than one, since the same essential Attributes must be, where ever there is the divine Essence? Whether there can be more Individuals, where there is no Dissimilitude, and can be no Division or Separation? Whether a specifick divine Nature be not inconsistent with the absolute Perfection, and necessary Existence which belongs to it? Whether the divine Nature can be individually the same, and yet there be several individual Essences: These and a great many other Questions it will be necessary for them to resolve, before they can so peremptorily pronounce, that the Doctrine of the Trinity doth imply a Contradiction on the account of the Numbers of Three and One. And so I come to the second Particular.