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The Doctrine of the Sabbath · Thomas Shepard

The Doctrine of the Sabbath, Thesis 27 – Thesis 28

Thesis 27.

There is scarce any thing but it is morally indifferent, untill it falls under some divine determination:Vid. Course of conformity. pag. 114. but divine determination of twofold. 1. Of such things which are not good, fit or needfull for man to observe without a command, as Sacrifices and Sacraments, and such likes: now herein, in such lawes, positive determination may be very well inconsistent with morality; and it may bee safely said that such a law is not morall, but rather positive, and thus the learned sometimes speak. 2. Of such things as are equall, good in themselves, needfull and suitable for man; and here particular determination and morality may kisse each other, and are not to be opposed one to another: and hence it is that if Gods Commandment positively determines us to observe any part of instituted worship (suppose Sacraments or Sacrifices) yet such lawes are not morall (although it bee morall in generall to worship God after his owne will;) because the things themselves are not good in themselves nor needfull: but if God shall determine us to observe a Sabbath day, this determination doth not take away the morality of the command; because it being good in it selfe to give God the meetest and fittest proportion of time for holy Rest, and the commandment declaring that this seventh part, or so, is such a time, hence it comes to passe that this time is good in it selfe, and therefore determination by the commandment in this case, doth not abolish the morality hereof. It is a morall duty to pay tribute to Caesar, to give to Caesar that which is Caesars: hence because a man may give too much or too little to him, that determination which directs us to that particular which is Caesars due and most meet for him to receive, and us to give, that is best in it selfe, and is therefore morall; so prayer is a morall duty, but because a man may bee tempted to pray too oft, or else too seldome, hence determination of the fittest and this fittest season, makes this or that morall. So 'tis here in the Sabbath. I doe willingly and freely professe thus farre with our Adversaries of the morality of the Sabbath; that it is a morall duty to give God some time and day of holy Rest and worship, as 'tis morall to give Caesar his due, and to pray to God: but because we may give God too many dayes, or too few, hence the determination of the most meet and fittest proportion of time, and particularly of this time, makes this and that to be also morall. If no day at all in generall was good and fit for man to give to God, and God should notwithstanding command a seventh day, then the commandment of such a day with such positive determination could not bee morall any more then the determination of sacrrifices and such like. But every day (say some of our Adversaries) some day (say others of them) being acknowledged to be equall, just and good, and most meet to give to God, hence it is that determination of a seventh day doth not abolish but clear up that which is morall, because it points out unto man that which is most meet and equall: Hence therefore it follows, that a seventh day is therefore commanded because it is good, and not good meerly because commanded. Determination also, declaring what is most meet, declareth hereby that this commandment is also morall, and not meerly positive and ceremoniall: which not being well considered by some, this fourth commandment (having some more positivenesse and determination then divers of the rest) hath therefore been the chiefe stumbling stone and rock of offence to many against the morality of it, by which they have miserably bruised themselves, while they have endeavoured to destroy it, upon so grosse a mistake.

Thesis 28.

It is true that God out of his absolute soveraignty and good pleasure of his will, might have determined us to observe a fourth, a ninth, a twentieth part of our time in holy rest more or lesse, as well as to a seven…h; yet let us consider of God as acting by counsell, and weighing and considering with himselfe, what is most meet and equall, and what proportion of time is most fit for himselfe; and then (with leave of better thoughts when I see better reason) I suppose no man can prove (unlesse hee bee made privy to the unknowne secrets of the wisdome of God) that any other proportion had been as meet as this now made by the actuall determination of God; there was not therefore the meer and soveraigne will of God which thus determined of this seventh part of time, but also the wisedome of God, which considering all things saw it most mee… and suitable for man to give, and God to receive from man, and therefore being commanded, and thus particularly determined, becomes morall.