The Doctrine of the Sabbath, Thesis 25 – Thesis 26
Thesis 25.
There are therefore four rules to guide our judgments aright herein, whereby we may know when a law is sutable and agreeable to humane nature, and consequently good in it selfe; which will bee sufficient to cleare up the Law of the Sabbath, to be truely morall (whether in a higher or lower degree of morality it makes no matter) and that it is not a law meerly temporary and ceremoniall.
1. Such lawes as necessarily flow from naturall relation, both between God and man, as well as between man and man; these are good in themselves, because sutable and congruous to humane nature: for there is a decency and sweet comlinesse to attend to those rules to which our relations binde us. For from this ground the Prophet Malachy cals for feare and honour of God as morall duties, because they are so comely and seemly for us, in respect of the relation between us, If I be your Lord, and Master and Father, where is my feare? where is my honour? Mal. 1.6. Love also between man and wife is pressed as a comely duty by the Apostle, from that near relation betweene them, being made one flesh, Ephes. 5.28, 29. there are scarce any who question the morality of the duties of the second Table, because they are so evidently comely, suitable and agreeable to humane nature, considered relatively, as man stands in relation to those who are or should bee unto him as his owne flesh; and therefore he is to honour superiors, and therefore must not kill, nor steale, nor lye, nor covet, nor defile the flesh, &c. but the morality of all the rules of the first Table is not seen so evidently, because the relation between God and man, which makes them comely and suitable to man, is not so well considered: for if there be a God, and this God be our God, according to the first Commandement, then it's very comely and meet for man to honour, love, feare him, delight, trust in him, &c. and if this God must be worshipped of man, in respect of the mutuall relation between them, then 'tis comely and meet to worship him with his owne worhsip, according to the second Commandment, and to worship him with all holy reverence according to the third Commandment; and if he must be thus worshipped, and yet at all times (in respect of our necessary worldly imploiments) cannot be so solemnly honoured and worshipped as is comely and meet for so great a God, then 'tis very fit and comely for all men to have some set and stated time of worship, according to some fit proportion, which the Lord of time onelyonly can best make, and therefore a seventh part of time which he doth make, according to the fourth Commandment.
2. Such lawes are drawne from the imitable Attributes and Works of God, are congruous and suitable to mans nature: For what greater comelinesse can there be, or what can be more suitable to that nature, which is immediately made for God, then to be like unto God, and to attend unto those rules which guide thereunto? Hence to be mercifull to men in misery, to forgive our enemies and those that doe us wrong, to be bountifull to those that be in want, to be patient when we suffer evill, are all morall duties, because they are comely and suitable to man, and that because herein hee resembles and is made like unto God: Hence to labour six dayes and rest a leventh is a morall, because a comely and suitable duty, that because herein man followes the example of God, and becomes most like unto him. And hence it is that a seventh yeare of rest cannot be urged upon man to be as much morall as a seventh day of rest, because man hath Gods example and patterne in resting a seventh day, but not in resting any seventh yeare; God never made himselfe an example of any ceremoniall duty, it being unsuitable to his glorious excellency so to doe, but onelyonly of morall and spirituall holinesse; and therefore there is somewhat else in a seventh day that is not in a seventh yeare: and it is utterly false to thinke (as some doe) that there is as much equity for the observation of the one as there is of the other. And here by the way may bee seen a grosse mistake of Mr. Primrose, Prim. par. 2. cap. 7. Sect. 13, 14, 15.who would make Gods example herein not to be morally imitable of us, nor man necessarily bound thereunto, it being not naturally and in respect of it selfe imitable, but onelyonly because it pleased God to command man so to doe: as also because this action of God did not flow from such attributes of God as are in their nature imitable, as mercy, bounty, &c. but from one of those attributes as is not imitable, and which wee ought not to imitate, viz. his omnipotency. But suppose it did flow from his omnipotency, and that wee ought not to imitate his omnipotency, and that wee who are weaknesse it selfe cannot imitate omnipotent actions, yet its obvious to common sense, that such acts which arise from such attributes as cannot be imitated of us, in respect of the particular effects which are produced by them, yet in the actings of such attributes there may be something morally good which is imitable of us. As for example, though wee are not to imitate God in his miraculous works (as in the burning of Sodome and such like) yet there may bee that justice and wisedome of God shining therein which wee ought to imitate, for wee ought to see before we censure and condemne, as God did in proceeding against Sodome: So 'tis in this extraordinary worke of making the Word, wherein although we are not to goe about to make another world within that time as God did, yet therein the labour and rest of God was seene, which is imitable of man; which labour and rest as they are morall duties, so they are confirmed by a morall example, and therefore most seemly and comely for man to imitate from such an example: And whereas hee affirmes that this example was not morall, because it was not it self imitable, being grounded onelyonly upon Gods free will: The reason is weake; for to labour in ones Calling is without controversie a morall duty (as idlenesse is a morall sin) yet if one would aske why man is to labour here, and not rather to lead a contemplative life in the vision and fruition of God immediately? I suppose no reason can be given, but the good pleasure of God, who in his deepe wisdome saw it most meet for man to spend some proportionable time in labour for himselfe, and some in rest for God, whereunto he gave man such an eminent example from the beginning of the world. Master Primrose cannot deny but that a convenient time for labour and rest in generall, is morall:Ibid. But (saith he) if God had not declared his will by a Commandment particularly to labour six dayes and rest the seventh, the Jewes would not have thought themselves bound to this observation from Gods example onelyonly; which shewes that there is no morality in it to bind the conscience for ever. But it may be as well doubted whether acts of bounty and mercy (to which hee thinks wee are bound meerely from Gods example) in respect of the particular application of these acts, to enemies of God and of our selves as well as to friends, be of binding vertue meerly by Gods example, unlesse we had a commandment thereunto: for in morall precepts, as the thing is commanded because it is good, so 'tis not morally good *Vid. Thes. 9.unlesse it be commanded: but suppose that Gods example of labour six dayes and rest the seventh, should not have been binding as other examples, unlesse there had been a commandment for so doing, yet this is no argument that this example is not morall at all, but onelyonly that it is not so *P…aecopt…rum m…ralium t… p…ex est gradus, &c. Aqui. 1 2. q. 10…, art. 11.equally morall and knowne to be so, as some other duties bee; for man may spend too much time in labour, and give God too short or too little time for rest, if therefore hee wants the light of a commandment or rule to direct and guide him to the fittest and most meet proportion of time for both, is hee not apt hereby to break the rule of morality, which consists (as hath been shewne) in that which is most suitable, comely and convenient for man to give to God or man? The commandment therefore in this case measuring out and declaring such a proportion, and what time is most convenient and comely for man to take to himselfe for labour, or to give to God for rest, it doth not abolish the morality of the example, but doth rather establish and make it: It sets out the most comely and meet proportion of time for labour and rest, and therefore such a time as is most good in it selfe, because most comely and proportionable, which being therefore commanded is a morall duty in man, and the example hereof morally binding in God.
3. Such lawes which mans reason may see, either by innate light, or by any other externall helpe and light to bee just and good and fit for man to observe, such lawes are congruous and suitable to humane nature. I say by any external helpe, as well as by innate light, for neither internall nor externall light doe make a thing just and suitable to man, no more than the light of the Sun or the light of a Lanthorne doe make the Kings high-way to the City, but they onelyonly declare and manifest the way, or that which was so in it selfe before: Hence it comes to passe that although mans reason cannot see the equity of some lawes, antecedenter by innate light, before it bee illuminated by some externall light, yet if by this externall light the minde sees the equity, justice, and holinesse of such a law, this may sufficiently argue the morality of such a law, which was just and good, before any light discovered it, and is now discovered onelyonly, not made to be so, whether by internall or externall light: And hence Aquinas well observes,Aquin. 1.2. q. 99. art. 2. & 100 ar…. …. that morall lawes (which hee makes to be such as are congruous to right reason) sometimes are such, as not onelyonly command such things which reason doth, readily see to bee comely and meet, but also such lawes about which mans reason may readily and easily erre and go astray from that which is comely and meet. And hence it is, that although no reason or wit of man could ever have found out the most just and equall proportion of time, or what proportion is most comely and suitable, or that a seventh part of time should have been universally observed as holy to God; yet if any externall light and teaching from above, shall reveale this time, and the equity and suitableness of it, so that reason shall acknowledge it equall and good, that if we have sixe dayes for our selves, God should have one for himselfe, this is a strong argument that such a command is morall, because reason thus illuminated cannot but acknowledge it most meet and equall: For though reason may not by any naturall or innate light readily see that such a division of time is most suitable, and yet may readily erre and misconceive the most suitable and convenient proportion and division of time, it's then a sufficient proof of the morality of such a command, if the congruity and equity of it be discerned consequenter only (as we lay) and by externall light.
4. What ever law was once writ upon mans heart in pure nature is still suitable and congruous and convenient to humane nature, and consequently good in it selfe and morall. For whatever was so writ upon Adams heart, was not writ there as upon a private person, but as a common person, having the common nature of man, and standing in the roome of all mankinde: Hence as nothing was writ then but what was common to all men, so such things thus writ were good for all men and suitable to all men, it being most injurious to God, to think that any thing evill should be imprinted there: if therefore it bee proved that the law of the Sabbath was then writ upon mans heart, then it undenyably followes that it is meet and suitable to all men still to observe a Sabbath day; and indeed to the right understanding of what is suitable to man as man, and consequently morall, there is nothing more helpfull, than to consider of our primitive estate and what was suitable to our nature then; for if that which is morall in marriage is to be searched for, in the first and ancient records of our first creation by the appointment of our Saviour; I then know no reason (whatever others object) but morality in all other lawes and duties is there to bee sought also; for although our originall perfection is now defaced and lost, and in that respect is a merum non ens, (as some call it) yet it had once a being, and therefore in this controversie we may lawfully enquire after it, considering especially that this being which once it had, may be suffiently knowne by the contrary being of universall corruption that is in us now, as also by the light of the Scriptures, in which the searcher and maker of all hearts declares it unto us, and indeed there are many morall duties which will never appeare good and suitable to man, but rather hard and unreasonable (because impossible) untill we see and remember from whence we are fallen, and what once we had.
Thesis 26.
If therefore a morall law command that which is suitable to humane nature, and good in it selfe, then it followes from hence, (which was toucht before) that divine determination of something in a law, doth not alway take away morality from a law, for divine determination is many times no more but a plain and positive declaration of that which is suitable, just and good and equall for man to observe: now that which points out and declares unto us the morality of a law, cannot possibly abolish and destroy such a law. For a morall law commanding that which is suitable and good (as hath been shewne) it is impossible that the Commandment which determineth and directeth to that which is good, that by this determination it should overthrow the being of such a good law, nay verily particular determination and positivenesse (as some call it) is so farre from abolishing, as that it rather addes to the being, as well as to the clearing up and manifestation of such a law. For if it be not sufficient to make a morall law, that the thing be good in it selfe, but that also it must be commanded; then the Commandment which many times onelyonly detemines to that which is good (and consequently determination) doth adde unto the being of a morall law.