The Christian Life Part 2 Volume 1, Part 2 · Chapter 4 · Section 2
SECT. II. Of the Proofs and Evidences which there are to create in us a Belief of the divine Providence.
HAVING in the foregoing Section given an account of those Parts or Branches of the Divine Providence, which are necessary to be believed in order to the founding the Obligations of Religion; I shall proceed in the next place, to shew what Evidences there are to create this Belief in us; and because this is the great Fundamental of all Religion, upon the Belief of which it all immediately depends, I shall endeavour to demonstrate the Truth of it,
1. A priori, by Arguments drawn from God himself.
2. A posteriori, by Arguments drawn from sensible Effects of God in the World.
I. I shall endeavour to assert the Truth of a divine Providence by Arguments drawn from God himself. For supposing that there is a God, that is to say, an infinitely wise, and good and powerful Cause of all things, (which I doubt not to make appear when I come to discourse of the sensible Effects of God in the World) it will from thence necessarily follow that he upholds, disposes and governs all things by an over-ruling Providence; For
1. If there be such a God, he must necessarily be and exist of himself, without any dependence upon any superior Cause.
2. He must necessarily be the Cause of all other things that are and do exist.
3. He must necessarily be present with all things.
4. Where ever he is, so active are his Perfections that he cannot but operate wheresoever he finds Objects to work upon. From all which I shall make appear it will necessarily follow, that he continually exercises an over-ruling Providence over the World.
I. IF there be a God he must necessalily exist or be of himself without Dependence on any superiour Cause. For when we speak of God, we mean by him a Being that is as perfect as it is possible, that hath nothing before him, nothing superior to him, nothing greater than himself; which cannot be meant of any derived Being; because all Effects are after their Causes, and in some respect inferiour to them, as deriving their Beings, and all their Excellencies and Perfections from them. But to say of God that he is after or any way inferiour to any Cause, is a palpable Contradiction to the very Notion of him; 'tis to say that there is something before the eternal Something, superior to the Supreme Something, more perfect than infinite Perfection. So that either there can be no such Being as a God in the World, or he must be of himself or from his own Essence, in which there must be such an infinite Fulness of Being, as that from all Eternity past to all Eternity to come it is infinitely removed from not Being, and so by a Necessity of Nature must from ever have been and for ever be. And such a Being we must admit of whether we will admit of a God or no; for either we must allow that this World, or at least the Matter of it exists of it self by its own never▪ failing Fulness of Being, without ever needing any Cause to produce it, (which as I shall shew you by and by is impossible) or that all things in it derive their Being from some first Cause who having no Cause in being before him must necessarily be uncaused and unproduced; and if God exists of himself, as he must do supposing he is, he must be superiour to all things; for that which is of it self cannot but be, and that which cannot but be can have no Power above it, because if it hath, that Power might have either hindered or extinguished its Being, and so it might not have been.
So that Gods Self-existence necessarily supposes him exalted above all Power and Superiority, and consequently to be the supreme and sovereign Power over all things; but to suppose him to be supreme and Sovereign without exercising Rule and Domion, is ridiculous; for without the Exercise of Dominion supreme Power is but a useless and insignificant Cypher-flourish with a glorious Name, Rule and Dominion being the only proper Sphere for supreme Power, as such, to move and act in. So that unless God rules and governs, he is supreme to no Purpose, and his sovereign Power is useless and in vain; for if he exert his sovereign Power at all, it must be in Rule and Dominion, which is its only natural Province; but if he doth not, his Sovereignty is only a Majestick Sloth that sits sleeping in an awful Throne with its Hands in its Bosom, without ever doing any thing that is Sovereign; and of what Use is that sovereign Power that never exercises any act of Sovereignty? Since therefore Gods Self-Existence necessarily supposes his sovereign Power over all things, we must either grant that he continually exercises this Power in ruling and governing the World, or assert that it is utterly useless and in vain, which as I shall shew by and by is as absurd as it is blasphemous.
II. If there be a God he must necessarily be the Cause of all other things that are and do exist. For whatsoever might not have been, or may not be, must be derived from something which cannot but be. If it might not have been how came it to be? Not from it self to be sure, for then it must always have necessarily been; and therefore it must finally be resolved into some other Cause which is of it self, and so cannot but always have been and always be. Now that this World is not of it self, but from some other Cause that is of it self is evident; because whatsoever is of it self, must necessarily have all the Being, and all the Perfection of Being that is possible. For that which is of it self is necessarily of it self, and it is not only true that it cannot but be, but also that it cannot but be of it self; for if it might not have been of it self, it might not have been at all, because it self or its own Essence is the only Ground or Reason of its Being; and therefore if that Reason might have failed it might never have been at all. Now that which necessarily is of it self, hath neither actual nor possible Cause of Being; for if it hath an actual Cause, it is not of it self; if any possible one, it is not necessarily of it self; and if it hath no possible Cause of Being, it is all that its possible to be, that is, it is so compleat and perfect, that no possible Being or Perfection of Being can be added to it.
BESIDES, that which is of it self includes Necessity of Being in its Essence, and that which includes Necessity of Being, must always actually be what it is, and have nothing potential in its Nature; and that which hath nothing potential must have all possible Being and Perfection. For if there be any possible Perfection of Being which it hath not, it must be in possibility of being what it is not; and if so, it is not necessarily what it is. So that if the World be of it self, it must include in the Nature of it a Necessity of Being; and if so, it must always actually be, that is, be always out of all Possibility either of not being or of being what it is not; and if it be out of all Possibility of not Being, it must have all Possible Being; if out of all Possibility of being what it is not, it must have all possible Perfection of Being, that is, all possible Power and Knowledge and Wisdom and Goodness, which do all as necessarily result from Self-Being as any essential Property from any Essence. Since therefore this material World hath none of these possible Perfections of Being in it, it is impossible it should be of it self, and if it be not of it self, it must have a Cause of Being that is distinct from and before it self; and what can this Cause be but God; since that which caused the World must be before all Causes, and that which is before all Causes must be uncaused and of it self, and that which is of it self must have all possible Perfection, and consequently be God.
SINCE therefore the World was made by God, it will from hence necessarily follow that it is ruled and governed by him. For if he made the World, to be sure he made it for some End, it being unconceivable that infinite Wisdom should frame a World that is capable of the most noble and excellent Ends, without designing it to any End at all; and if he designed it for any End, to be sure he is concerned that that End whatever it be should be accomplished; and if he be, his own Concernment will lead him to the Exercise of a Providence, which is nothing else but a constant and steady Guidance of those Beings which he hath made, to those common and particular Ends for which he made them. For if he made them for any End, to be sure whatever it was, he did not let it drop out of his Mind and Thoughts as soon as he had made them, but still carries it along in his Eye and Intention; and if he still intends that End, there is no doubt but he still prosecutes it, which he cannot do without a Providence; for how can he drive things on to the Ends for whice he made them, if he be withdrawn from the World, and hath wholly sequestred himself from all the Affairs of it?
III. IF there be a God, he must necessarily be present with all things; because being of himself without any Cause, he must be without any Bounds or Limits of Being. For it is altogether unconceivable how any thing that is of it self should be restrained or limited by it self. For tho we must allow something to be of it self whether we will admit of a God or no, yet we cannot suppose that which is of it self to be the Cause of it self, without a Contradiction; because every Cause must be before its Effect; and therefore to suppose that which is of it self, to be the Cause of it self, is to suppose it to be before it self, that is, to be when it is not, or to be and not be together, which is impossible. When therefore we say that something is of it self, our meaning can be no other that this, that it hath such an immense Plenitude of Being in it self, as that it neither needed nor required any Cause to produce it; and how can that which is of it self without being the Cause of it self, be any way restrained or limited by it self? For that which limits Beings, is only the Will or Power of their Causes, which either would not or could not bestow any further Being or Perfection upon them; and therefore only such things as are caused are limited, because they being produced out of nothing, are only so far and no farther brought into Being, as their Cause was willing or able to bring them. That therefore which exists of it self without any Cause of Being, must exist of it self without any Limits of Being; because it was neither limited by it self nor by any other Cause; and that which hath nothing to limit it, must necessarily be immense and boundless. God therefore being this Self-existing Being, must necessarily be of an unlimited Essence; an Essence which no possible Space can either circumscribe or define, but must necessarily be diffused all through, circumfused all about, and present with all things.
AND if he be present with all things, how is it imaginable he should sit still among them, and exercise no Providence over them? For since he is a living Being, he must be vitally present wheresoever he is, and that he should be vitally and yet unactively present among a World of Beings, that he should live in this wide Vniversity of things, and in every Part of it, and yet take no more Notice of, have no more Influence upon it than if he were a dead and sensless Idol, is altogether inconceivable; and we may as well imagine a Sun in the Universe without Heat or Light, as a living God surrounding and penetrating all things, without ever exerting his active Powers, or shedding forth his vital Influence upon them. For where ever life is it will operate; and therefore since God who is all Life and Activity is every where, he must operate every where, and if he operate every where, that Operation is an Vniversal Providence.
IV. and Lastly. IF there be a God, he must be endowed with all those active Perfections of Power and Wisdom, Justice and Goodness; all which must be present wheresoever he is. For as for Power, it is nothing else but the Spring or Fountain of Causality; and therefore since God is the first Cause, he must necessarily be the Spring of the Power of all Causes; and that from which all Power is derived must it self be all-powerful; otherwise it would derive more Power than it hath, and be the Cause of that whereof it hath no Causality, which is a Contradiction. And then as for Wisdom and Goodness, they are inseparable to perfect Power; which how forcible soever it be, cannot be perfect except it be conducted by Wisdom and Goodness; for without these, Power is only an irresistible Whirlwind that sweeps and hurries all things before it without any End, or Method, or Order. And what a lame, blind and defective Power must that be that can neither design nor contrive, neither propose to it self beneficial Ends, nor yet choose suitable Means to effect them? and in a word, that can neither intend well nor prosecute wisely? If therefore the Power of God be perfect, as it cannot but be, being the Original of all Power, it must necessarily be conjoyn'd with perfect Wisdom and Goodness; with perfect Goodness to level its Intentions at good and beneficial Ends; with perfect Wisdom to order and direct its Prosecutions.
SINCE therefore perfect Power, and Wisdom and Goodness are essential to God, they must be coextended with his Essence, which as I shewed before is extended to all things. And how can we conceive such active Perfections as these to be present with all things without ever acting upon them? For the very End and Perfection of all these Attributes consists in their Exercise; for so the End of Power is Action, the End of Wisdom is ordering and contriving, and the End of Goodness is doing good. How then can we suppose that an infinite Power whose End is Action, should be present where a World of things are to be done, and do nothing? that infinite Wisdom whose End is ordering and contriving, should be present where a World of things are to be ordered, and order nothing? or that infinite Goodness whose End is doing good, should be present where a World of good is to be done, and do none at all? What is this but to transform the divine Perfections into senesless Idols, that have Eyes, but see not, hands, but act not; that have boundless, boundless, but useless and unactive Powers; that have glorious Names, but in reality stand but for so many Cyphers in the World? And thus I have endeavoured to demonstrate a Providence by Arguments drawn from God himself; but because there may be something in them too subtile and Metaphysical for common Apprehensions to reach, I have but briefly insisted on them. I proceed therefore in the second place to another sort of Arguments, which are more easie and obvious, viz. such as are drawn from sensible Effects, of which I shall give these six Instances.
1. The constant Direction of things to the same good Ends, which have no Design in themselves.
2. The watchful Providence of things which have no Fore-sight in themselves.
3. The mutual Agreement and Correspondency of things which have no Vnderstanding of themselves or of one another.
4. The Continuation of things in the same comely Order, which have no Government of themselves.
5. Miraculous Events.
6. Predictions of future and remote Contingencies.
I. ONE sensible Instance of a divine Providence is the constant Direction of things to the same good Ends which have no Design in themselves. When we see things void of all Sense and Reason as constantly directed to good Ends, as they could be if they had Sense and Reason, we may be sure that there is a Reason without them that framed them for those Ends, and directs them to them; it being unconceivable how Chance or blind Necessity that have no Design, or Art, or Contrivance in them, should constantly operate as regularly as Reason it self. Now if we survey this vast Universality of things, we may easily observe, at least of the generality of them, that they are framed for and directed to some Wise and excellent End; and though through our own short-sightedness or want of Enquiry we do not see the Vse and Tendency of them all, yet this is no Argument at all that they are vain and superfluous. For as we now see the Use of a world of things which past Generations understood not, so there is no doubt but future Generations will understand the Use of a World more than we; and therefore since the Vsefulness of the Generality of things is now so apparent and visible, we ought in all Reason to conclude, that our not discerning the Vsefulness of them all, proceeds not from their Defect but from our own Ignorance▪
LET us therefore briefly survey this beautiful Scene of things that is before us. The Sun and Earth, for Instance, are things that are utterly void of Vnderstanding, and therefore can have no Design or Contrivance in them; how then came they to place and continue themselves at such a commodious Distance from one another? Whereas in such a vast and immense Space they might have found ten thousand Millions of other Places and Distances to fix in? The Earth might have found room enough to place it self either much nearer to or much remoter from the Sun than it is; but if it had done so, it must have either been everlastingly parched or everlastingly frozen and benighted, and either way converted into an useless, barren and inhabitable Desert; whereas where it now is, it stands at the most convenient Distance from the Sun, to be warmed and cherished by his enlivening Fires, and neither to be roasted by being too near them, nor frozen by being too far from them; but to receive from them such a temperate heat, as is sufficient to excite its seminal Virtues, and to draw up its Juices into them, and thereby to ripen its natural Fruits, and in a word, to comfort and refresh its Inhabitants, and to render it to them a pleasant, a healthful, and a fruitful Paradise. Since therefore of ten thousand Millions of Places wherein it might have fixed in that Immensity of Space that surrounds it, it hath fixed upon and doth still continue in the best without any Design or Wisdom of its own, it is plain that there is an over-ruling Wisdom without it that chose its place and fixes and determins it thereunto. Again, How came the Sun (for whether it be the Earth that moves about the Sun, or the Sun about the Earth is all one to our Enquiry) how came this Sun, I say, which hath no Reason to govern it self by, to be determined to such a useful Course of Motion? what makes this vast and mighty Body move round the Earth in twenty four hours, in finishing which spacious Circle of Motion it must fly far swifter than a Bullet from a Canons Mouth; and yet through so many Ages each twenty four hours it hath constantly performed it, without being so much as one Minute faster or slower; whereby it makes those just and regular Returns of Day and Night to both the Hemispheres, so that neither the one nor the other is either too much heated by his Presence, or too long benighted by his Absence, because as soon as the one hath been sufficiently warmed and cherished with his Rays, he immediately retires from it into the other, and by so doing he gives the active Animals leave to rest, the over-heated Air to cool, and the Gasping Earth to repair its fainting Vertues, which a continued Heat would soon exhaust and extinguish. Thus by returning Day and Night to both Parts of the Earth once in twenty four Hours, he preserves both their Heat and Moisture upon which all Generation depends, in a due and regular Temper, so that neither their radical Moisture is consumed by the parching Droughts of the Day, nor their vital Heat extinguished by the cool Moistures of the Night, but the one still allays and tempers the other by their quick and alternate Revolutions. How then came the Sun that understands no utility and designs no End, to be determined to this Course of Motion, which above all others is so admirably useful and advantageous to this World we live in? Again, What is the Reason that since he thus equally moves round the Earth, he doth not always move in the same Circle, but runs out every Day into a different Circle almost a whole Degree farther northward or southward, and this so constantly and so precisely that in six thousand succeeding Revolutions, he hath never varied so much as one Minute from his Course either one way or the other, and by these his stated Ex-currencies towards the North and South he makes the Seasons of the Year, gives a Summer and a Winter, a Spring and a Fall to all Parts of the Earth, without which the Earth would long ere this have been utterly useless, and all its Fruits and for want of them its Animals too would have for ever perished? For some Parts of it would have been scorched with everlasting Heat, other bound up with everlasting Frost; here it would have been all a Sandy, there all an Icy Desert, and so both Vegetation and Generation would every where have utterly ceast either for want of Moisture or for want of Heat. How came the Sun then which hath neithr Sense nor Reason of his own to guide him, to be directed into such a commodious Course of annual Motion, whenas in that vast Space he moves in, he might as well have run ten thousand other Courses of Motion? He might have moved all the Year round the Earths Equator; but if he had done so, all the middle Tracts of Earth both Northward and Southward would soon have been scorched up with his continual Presence, and all the remoter Parts both ways would quickly have died with Cold through his perpetual Absence: or he might have run his annual Course on one side only of the Earths Equator, and made his circular Excursions to or beyond the Pole; but if he had done so, he must have left a great Part of the opposite Hemisphere exposed to everlasting Night and Cold, whereas in the annual Course of Motion he now performs, he sheds forth his Light, and Heat, and Influence over all the World, and by turns gives every Part its yearly Seasons; which is a plain Evidence that all his Motions are conducted by a wise and over-ruling Mind, which among so many Courses of Motion that lie before him in the boundless Space he moves in, hath determined him to that which for Perpetuity is much the best and most commodious.
AND the same is to be said of the Motions of the Moon, which Nature hath designed for a vicarious Light to the Sun, to supply his Absence and perform his Office in this lower World. For what makes this senseless and irrational Planet, that moves without any Intention of its own, wander by turns Northward and Southward some Degrees beyond the Sun? And what makes it move Northward when the Sun is Southward, and again South-ward when the Sun is North-ward, whereas in that immense Space wherein it swims, it hath room enough to run a thousand other Courses of Motion, none of which could have been so advantageous to us as this? For by moving North-ward when the Sun is South-ward and so è contra, it moderates the Cold and Darkness of the winter Nights, and by passing beyond the Tropicks which are the Boundaries of the Sun, it in some measure supplies his Absence, by enlightning those long and tedious Nights in which the Regions towards the Poles are buried; which is a plain Instance of the singular Care of Providence, that no Parts of the Earth should be left altogether destitute of the necessary Comforts of the heavenly Light and Warmth.
Again, How came the Air which hath no Design in it self to place it self so commodiously as it hath done between the Earth and the Heavens? Why is there not a wide vacuity between? Or if some Body must needs intervene, why was it not Fire or Water as well as Air, which of all other Bodies is the most commodious? For had it been a void Space, there could have been no Intercourse between Heaven and Earth; or had it been filled with Fire or Water, it would have consumed or drowned the Earth and all things belonging to it; but as for the Air which is a thin, soft, fluid and transparent Body, it is of all others the most proper Vehicle of the Celestial Influences. For what other Body is there that through such a stupendous Distance could have conveyed down to us the Light and Heat of the Sun, with such an ineffable Swiftness; or what other Element could have been so proper for Animals to move and breath in? Since therefore this Space between the Earth and Heavens might have been supplied with other Bodies, but with none so fit as Air, which yet is no way conscious of its own Fitness, and so cannot be supposed to choose this Space for it self, it is a plain Evidence that there was a wise Mind without it that chose this Habitation for it.
AND now we are come down to this terrestrial Globe which consists of Earth and Water, let us briefly consider the admirable Use of both, and of all things appertaining to them. How came the senseless Water to bore Holes and Channels in the Banks of the Ocean through long Tracts of Earth, and against its own Nature to climb up to the tops of Mountains, that so it may be able not only to run down again with Ease, but also to carry it self to such Heights afterwards, as the Necessities of Men and Beasts require, and to unite into large Rivers that run into all the inland Parts of the Earth, watering both them and their thirsty Animals all along as they go, till at last they return into the Ocean again? How comes this dull and senseless Element that can consult neither its own Convenience nor that of other Beings, to be salt where it is convenient for it self to be salt, viz. in the Ocean, by which it is preserved from Putrefaction; and fresh where it is convenient for other Beings that it should be fresh, viz. in the Fountains and Rivers, that so it may be fit to fructify the Earth, and be a wholesom Drink for its Animals? How come so many Rivers and Fountains which do all arise from the salt Waters of the Sea, to be stript of their salt Particles, by oosing through the Pores of the Earth, and thereby to be rendred both fruitful to the Ground and wholsom for Men and Beasts? How comes it to pass that so many Clouds as are drawn up out of the salt Ocean, should in their Ascent so far shake off their Salt as to descend back again upon the Earth in sweet and fresh Showers? And how come those Vapours of which the Clouds consist, and which are much thicker and heavier than the Air, to be drawn aloft as they are by the Rays of the Sun, which have neither Pumps nor Buckets to exhale them? And when they are aloft in the Air, how come they to gather into thick Clouds, and not rather to disperse themselves about in that vast Expansum, or to return back again to the Earth in thin Vapors as they arose; and while they hang in the Air, what is it that susteins their Weight, and when they fall, how comes it to pass that they ordinarily fall in soft and gentle Showers that water the Roots of the Grass and Corn without any Prejudice to their Stalks and Blades, and not rather in Mists or Streams, which either would be insufficient to moisten the Earth, or lay wast its Corn and Fruit with the Violence of their Fall? All which are illustrious Instances of a wise and powerful Providence, that directs and orders this senseless Element, and causes it ordinarily to move and act as if it had Wisdom in it self and did therewithal industriously consult the publick good of the World; but this Argument you may find handled more at large in a late excellent Treatise de Deo.
AND now we are arrived to the Earth whereon we live and move and have our Beings, which tho it self be of a broken and irregular Figure, and seems to be rather the mighty Ruins of some more beautiful Structure, than an original Effect of the divine Art and Contrivance, yet contains in it the most amazing Instances of an alwise and alpowerful Providence. For how came this dull and stupid Lump to be impregnated with such an infinite Variety of seminal Vertues, all which do proceed as orderly and artificially in the Formation of their Plants and Fruits, as if they were every one endued with a most wise and intelligent Mind? For since the Plants do all derive their Nourishment from the inward Parts of the Earth, it is necessary that some Parts of them should be buried under Ground, that so they may come at their Food; and that these Parts should be fitted with spongy strings to fasten them to the Earth, and to suck in those Juices of it whereon they feed; and accordingly the seminal Vertue of every Plant first forms it self a Root under Ground, which runs out more or less from the Centre of it into greater or smaller Strings proportionable to the Magnitude of the Plant it bears, that so how great soever it be it may by these Strings be so fastned to the Earth, as that the Wind to which its upper Parts are exposed, may not be able to tear them up; then this seminal Form whatsoever it be, digests these Strings into a porous and spongy Substance fit to suck in the Juices of the Earth on every side, and bores little Holes or strait Fibres through them from one end to the other, that so by these Conduit-pipes they may all convey the Juices they imbibed into the Centre of the Root; and having thus formed its Root, and by these Strings or nervous Filaments supplied it with plenty of Juice, by strange mysterious Art it concocts the liquid Matter into a hard and solid Substance, through which it also bores an infinite number of strait Fibres from the very Centre of the Root, to convey up with it those Juices that are lodged there, with the thicker Parts of which it nourishes and increases its more solid Substance, thrusting forth the thinner towards the Surface, and the thinnest at the Extremities of its Branches; the former of which it digests into a Bark wherewithal it cloaths the tender Body of its Plant, to defend it against the Violences of Heat and Cold; the latter into Leaves, and therewithal adorns its Branches, and shelters its Fruit from the scorching of the the Sun, and the excessive Moisture of the Rain; and by thus distributing the still-rising Juices, it still encreases its Plant till such time as it arrives to its full growth and Maturity; so that from the utmost Strings of the Root, to the Centre of it, from the Centre of the Root to the highest Branches of it, from the Branches to the Leaves and Fruit of it, these porous Fibres run on, by which every part how distant soever from the Root, sucks up its Juices and digests them into its own Substance; for even the Leaves and Fruit are hung upon the Branches by little, soft and Spongy Stalks, through which there run innumerable Fibres that convey the Juice from the Branches, and by stupendous Art distribute it by their Pores through all the whole Body of the Leaves and Fruit.Vide Lessius de Prov. But then by what particular Art the seminal Vertues of each particular kind doth so constantly and regularly concoct and elaborate the Juices of the Earth into their own specifick Smells and Tasts, and Figure and Colours, is a Mystery that confounds and puzles all our Philosophy. Now whence I beseech you proceeds this curious, inimitable Art which we with all our Reason can neither transcribe nor comprehend? Not from the things themselves sure; for how can they have Art that have no Reason? And therefore of Necessity it must proceed from some alwise, superintending Mind, that either immediatly contrives and frames them, or else impresses their seminal Vertues with its own alwise and powerful Art whereby they contrive and frame themselves.
AND if in the Composure of every Plant there are such visible Footsteps of a divine Art, how much more of every Animal, whose Parts for infinite Variety, delicate Smalness, exquisite Shape, Position and Temper, do as far excell the other, as the Offices for which they are designed? For tho the plastick Soul that forms the Animal, hath not the least Ray of Art or Reason of its own, yet in the Formation of it, it proceeds with as much curious and incomparable Art as if it were endowed with the most perfect Reason. For first it Spins out the thicker Parts of the seminal Matter into little Threds or Fibres, part of which it hollows into Pipes, and part into Spunges, some whereof are more thin, and some more solid; all which with wondrous Art it cuts and prunes in divers places, fitting their Ends to one another, and in divers Manners knitting them together into a well-proportioned Structure of Bones and Members; then of the thinner Parts of the seminal Matter it forms the Intrails, viz. the Liver and Heart and Brains, drawing out from each certain Fibres to be framed into Veins, and Arteries and Nerves, for which End it bores and hollows them through, extends and stretches them out at length, and divides them into innumerable Branches, which it spreads through all the Intrails, and thereby maintains a mutual Communication between them, and derives the Nourishment and animal and vital Spirits through all the Body; and having thus spun the several Parts out of the seminal Matter, and curiously woven them together, it concocts the remainder of the Matter which is still supplied with new Nourishment into the Substance of those several Parts, and this in such precise and regular Proportions, as to form every one of them, tho infinitely various from one another, into its own proper Figure, and Measure, and Proportion; so that within seven days after the Conception, the whole Body is entirely framed, and distinguished into all its proper Parts and Members, which though they are so vastly great in their Number, so strangely different in their Size and Figure, so infinitely various in their Motions and Tendencies, do all contribute one way or other to the Beauty and Benefit of the Whole; some to propagate the Kind, others to preserve the Individual, others to distinguish what is necessary, convenient and pleasant from what is dangerous, offensive or destructive to its Nature; some to pursue what is good, others to shun what is evil, others to enjoy those goods, and others to defend it against those evils that threaten or invade it; so that of all these infinitely numerous and diverse Parts, not one can be wanting or defective without some considerable Damage to the Whole. How then is it conceivable that such an infinite number of different Animals, which are all so perfect in their Kind, so amazingly curious in their Composition, as that we with all our Reason can discern nothing in them that is either superfluous or defective, nothing in their Figure that is irregular, nothing in their Position that is misplaced, nothing in their Motion that is exorbitant; should all of them be framed by their several Plastick Souls, which are utterly blind and irrational, without the Conduct and Direction of an all-wise and all-powerful Providence? Should you behold a confused Heap of Earth, and Stone, and Iron and Timber without any visible Artificer near it, fall a pollishing its own Parts, fitting them to one another and disposing them into Order according to the Rules of Architecture, and at length frame them all together into the Form of a most beautiful Palace, would you not conclude that some skilfull Mind were invisibly present there, and did work upon this senseless Heap, and dispose its Parts into this comely Order? And yet in the Composure of any one Animal there is infinitely more Art than in the most beautiful structure in the World. How then can we imagine that the blind, artless Matter of which it is composed, could ever have framed it self into this admirable Form and Contexture, had not some great Mind been invisibly present at the Composition of it, or at least imprinted on its artless Mattter, some powerful Signature of its own wise Art to direct, and order and contrive it.
I might from hence have proceeded to the formation of Man, the Masterpiece of all this lower Creation, in whose Frame and structure there are such Miracles of Art as do outreach both the Imitation and Wonder of the most raised and comprehensive Minds. For who can sufficiently admire the skilful Contexture of his Corporeal Parts, which though almost infinite in Number and Variety, do not only compose a Body of a most amiable Symmetry and Proportion, but are also as exactly framed, and tempered and adapted to perform the Offices of Life and Motion, and Sense and Reason, as Art or Wit can fancy or imagine them? But then how much more admirable is the Soul which inhabits and animates this Body; for of whatsoever Substance this thing we call our Soul is, it is evidently framed for great and noble Operations, to disclose the Mysteries of Nature, and to dive into its deep Philosophy, to penetrate into the Causes of things, and with its nimble and sagacious Thoughts to survey this ample Theatre of Beings; to recollect things past, and to foretel things to come, to invent the most useful Arts and comprehensive Sciences, to dictate good Laws, and project wise Policies for the Government of Humane Societies, and in a word, to understand the right Reasons of things, and to regulate its Will and Affections by them: And is it possible we should imagine a Being thus exquisitely framed to be the Product of a blind and artless Matter, to be nothing but a lucky Jumble of senseless and irrational Atoms? For suppose it were nothing but elaborated Matter, yet certainly it requires infinite Art and Skill to contrive and fashion it into all those curious Springs, and Wheels and Mechanick Knacks that are necessary to render it not only a living and feeling, but also a wise and rational Matter. For how is it conceivable that a little Drop of Water without the Assistance of any Mind or Providence, should form it self not only into all the Parts and Lineaments of a Humane Body, but also into a Humane Mind, a Mind of vast Desires and infinite Capacities of Knowledg, that can form Ideas within it self of every thing that is round about it, and from them can frame innumerable Propositions, and deduce them into Arts and Sciences: and in a word, that can move it self and the Body it lives in, by its own internal Springs, and form it self into so many various and contrary Affections by the mysterious Force and Energy of its own Reason and Discourse? If you beheld a dead Pencil move without any visible Hand, and dip it self into various Colours, and draw but an exact Picture of a Man, you would doubtless conclude either that some invisible Limbner had infused into it the Art of Limbning, or did immediately manage and direct it. But should you find this Picture when it is drawn and finished, not only live and move, but reason and discourse, and exert all sorts of Animal and Humane Operations, could you imagine that ever the blind, irrational Pencil formed it of it self without being managed or directed by some superiour Mind or Providence?
AND thus I have given some brief Instances of the constant Direction of all sorts of things, how stupid and irrational soever, to some wise and good End, which is a plain Evidence of an universal Providence over the World, that in a constant and uniform Series directs things to their proper Ends that have no Aim or Design of their own, and so are utterly uncapable to guide and direct themselves.
II. ANOTHER sensible Evidence of a divine Providence is, the sagacious Providence of things that have no Foresight in themselves. For among irrational Beings that can neither apprehend for what Ends they act, nor by what Means they may best effect them, how strange is it to consider with what Insight and Providence they many of them act in storing up Provisions for themselves against a time of Extremity, in framing their own Beds and Nests, and defending themselves and their Young against approaching Dangers; in educating their Young, and propagating their Kind through all succeeding Generations, insomuch that if they were every one endued with Reason of their own to foresee their own Dangers, and forecast their own Conveniency and Safety, they would not act with more Skill and Sagacity than they do. For thus the Plants that have neither Sense nor Reason to discern the Periods of their own Growth and Decay, when they have almost spent themselves, and are ready to wither and die, run up into Seed, as if they foresaw their own approaching Fate, and did thereupon bethink themselves of propagating their Kind before it be too late, and leaving a numerous Posterity behind them. And therefore since they have neither Thought nor Forecast in themselves, 'tis evident that there is a Providence that thinks and forecasts for them.
Thus also those Plants that shoot up on high, but are too weak to support themselves, such as the Hop and Vine and Ivy, run out into little strings or tendrils with which they lay hold upon some body that is stronger than themselves, as if they were conscious of their own weakness, and so to prop up themselves did designedly twist about those stronger bodies that are best able to support them. And therefore since they neither know their own weakness, nor yet the strength of the Trees or Wall they depend on, it is evident that there is a wise Providence that knows both, and guides and directs them to their safety.
And as there is a visible Providence over Plants, so there is also over brute and irrational Animals, and especially over the smallest and most contemptible, who by reason of their natural weakness and impotence are less able to provide for themselves. For thus the Spider is a Creature as void of Reason as the Plant of Sense, and yet with what wondrous Art doth he spin his Web out of a viscous matter within his own Bowels? He extends the threads of it cross to one another, leaving equal Angles in the middle, fastning the extreme to the opposite threads, and then least through the weakness of the slender threads of which it is composed the Fly he hunts should happen to break through, he weaves several under-nets one within another, and with a wondrous Art fastens them all together, that so if one should fail, the other might hold; and when he hath thus fix'd and spread his subtile and strange-contrived Snares, he lies in wait in a little Den without, made by him on purpose to conceal himself; from whence, as soon as the Fly is entangled, he swiftly runs and seises it, and having killed it carries it away and lays it up in a safe Repository against a time of Famine. In all which performance this irrational Insect proceeds as providently and wisely as if in a long deduction he had inferr'd one thing from another and acted upon the most rational deliberation; and therefore since he is void of reason himself, and doth not determine himself by any natural Logic of his own, he must proceed by the reason and direction of some wise Mind without him, that hath the guidance and disposal of his motion. For he begins not to exercise his Art after he is arriv'd to a riper age, but is born with his Trade about him, and spins and weavs fpom his very Infancy; nor is there any diversity in his Manufacture, as there useth to be in those of rational Artificers, but 'tis always woven in the same manner, and figure, and fashion, which is a plain evidence that he effects it not by any art or reason of his own but by mere natural instinct, which is nothing but the impression of the art and reason of the Author of Nature, which impression knows not what it doth, nor upon what reasons it proceeds, but only answers to the Reason of God as the signature doth to the Seal that imprest it, and like an Eccho articulates and resounds his Voice without understanding what it means. And as the sensless Eccho when it reverberates words that carry Sense and Reason in them, supposes the original Voice to proceed from some intelligent Mind; so these irrational Instincts of Nature which express so much art and reason in their operations, do necessarily imply that there is some wise Mind or Providence to which they owe their original and continuance.
FOR thus to instance farther, with what a strange and wonderful Art do the Bees frame their Combs, which they divide on each side into a world of little six-corner'd cells, and then prop them up with middle walls of pillars which they raise from the floor into an arch, by which as they are rendred more strong, so the Bees have an entrance through to repair them whenever they decay; and having thus artificially built their houses, with what industry do they wander to and fro to gather the sweet dews of Heaven, whereon they live, from the herbs and flowers of the field, and with what care do they treasure them up in those little cells against winter, when they can neither go forth by reason of the cold to seek their sustenance abroad, nor yet find it if they could; and when they have fill'd their cells with their winter provision, they providently draw over the mouth of them a thin skin or membrane to preserve the grateful liquor lest it should drop out and be lost; and in a word, in what a regular order do they live, they rest and labour all together, and in the discharge of several offices conspire to the same work; some press the flowers with their feet, others with their mouths or down of their bodies gather up the moistures which these press out and carry them home to their cells; some bring home the materials of which these cells are compos'd, others disburthen them of it, others build with it, and others plane and polish the building. Thus all hands are at work first to build the house they are to dwell in, and to divide it into its several apartments, and then to store them all with provision against the ensuing time of scarcity. Now therefore (not to mention their wondrous polity and government of which so many curious observations have been made) how is it possible they should do all these things with so much regularity and exact order, without being guided by some art and reason? But yet 'tis certain 'tis not by any reason of their own; they do not at all consider when they build, how needful houses are for themselves and their Winter provisions, nor how convenient that waxy matter which they gather is to build those houses, nor what necessity there is of dividing them into distinct cells and apartments; they understand not the nature of those sweet dews which they gather, whether they are food or poison, and when they gather more than they have present need of they know not why they do it, they reason not with themselves that Winter is approaching, wherein neither these dews will fall upon which they live, nor themselves be able to go forth and gather them, and that therefore it behoves them to store themselves beforehand against the ensuing famine; and when that they have laid up their store and are binding it in with the membrane they draw over it, they do not consider that 'tis a fluid matter that will be apt to run out and be lost; and yet all these things they perform with as much regularity and art, as if they had throughly weigh'd and considered and perfectly understood the reasons of them; which is a plain evidence that they are acted by a reason that is not their own, and what other reason can this be than that of the divine mind which governs and disposeth all things? And the same may be said of Ants, and Moles and Palmer-worms and innumerable other animals, which though they have no reason of their own, are yet in many instances as evidently conducted by reason as any rational beings whatever.
For with what admirable art do the irrational Birds form their nests a little after their coupling; they begin to build though they neither consider that they are breeding, nor yet do foresee when they shall lay; by which it's plain that there is a Providence which considers and foresees for them; and though they understand not what materials are fittest to build their nests nor in what order to frame and dispose them, yet there is a very wise understanding that directs them both to choose and contrive the materials, and this with greater art than we with all our reason can do. For as for the outward surface of the nests which comes not near their bodies, they frame it with sticks and thorns which with inimitable art they twist and interweave into a round and uniform hollowness, which they commonly dawb round with mud to render it more compact and warm; when this is done though they understand not their own specific frame and constitution, yet they proceed as if they did, and suit their nests to the strength or weakness of their natures; for those of them that are of a hardier make content themselves with this inward plaistering, and when 'tis dryed proceed to lay and hatch their eggs on it, without troubling themselves to line it with any softer materials, as if they knew beforehand that the constitution of their young would be such as would not need any softness or delicacy; whereas those that are of a tenderer frame take care to cloath the hard plaistering with straw or hay or moss, upon which those that are tenderest of all make another layer of hair or down or feathers, as if they perfectly understood what degree of softness and warmth would be necessary for the preservation and nourishment of their tender off spring. Since therefore it's certain that they know none of all these things, and yet they act as if they did, they must necessarily be supposed to act by the direction of some wise Mind that perfectly knows them all. And then again considering with what patience and diligence the female sits upon her eggs when she hath laid them, as if she understood the plilosophy of her own warmth, how necessary it is to form and animate and hatch them, and with what care and industry the male brings her in provision whilst she is sitting, that so she may not be forc'd by the necessities of Nature to neglect her eggs and leave them too long expos'd to the cold air which in a short time would destroy the tender principles of life within them; and in a word, with what care and industry they both conspire to cherish and feed their young when they are hatch'd, till such time as they are cloath'd and fledg'd and can fly abroad to seek provision for themselves; considering, I say, how in all these things they proceed as if they perfectly understood the reasons and necessities of their own actions, it's plain that they must be guided either by a reason in their own or in some other mind that hath the command and conduct of their motions. Now that it is not by a reason of their own is evident, because whatsoever they do, they necessarily do, and cannot possibly do otherwise, for they never vary in their operations, never try any new experiments, but always proceed in the same road and repeat the same things in the same method, which is a plain sign that they cannot do otherwise, and consequently that they act not from reason but necessity; and therefore since they are made and impelled to act as they do, and yet do act so rationally and wisely, that which impels them must be a rational mind either acting upon them immediately, or by a fix'd and permanent impression of its art and reason on their motions. For as Aristotle hath long since observ'd foreign, they do these things neither by any art nor council nor deliberation of their own. They are not masters of the wisdom by which they act, but are meerly passive to the impressions of that wisdom, that are made upon them. For so men we see for their own profit and others pleasure can teach Dogs and others animals to dance the measures of tunes and other artificial motions, the rules and ends of which they understand not; for when they perform these motions, they neither think of their masters profit nor the spectatour's pleasure, which is the end and design of them, nor understand the proportions of musick which is the rule of them, so that the reason of their motions is only in their teachers mind, who by frequent use doth by degrees imprint the practice of his art upon their fancies; and if a man can so imprint his art upon these artless creatures, as to make them practice it without understanding either the grounds or reasons of it, how much more may an allwise and Almighty mind. And therefore since de facto we behold a world of curious art among brute animals, that far exceeds all the little feats we can teach them, why may we not as reasonably believe, that any one of these dancing animals learnt all his artificial motions, the reasons of which he understands not, without any arts-master to teach him, as that Ants and Bees acquir'd all the art and Providence they practice, without either discovering the reasons of it by any understanding of their own, or being ever instructed in it by any other provident mind; for art and providence cannot be supposed without reason, and therefore since the reason of their art is not in themselves, it must necessarily be in some mind without them that hath the conduct and direction of all their motions.
III. ANOTHER sensible evidence of a divine Providence is the mutual agreement and correspondency of things that have no understanding of themselves or of one another. For if we look abroad into the World we cannot but observe an admirable harmony among things which yet have no kind of knowledg of one another, and therefore cannot be supposed to have framed and adapted themselves to one another, nor yet to be so fram'd and adapted, but by the Art and contrivance of some very wise and intelligent Mind. For how can any cause fit any two things to one another without having some Idea in his mind of the natures of them both? If therefore in the nature of things we can discover a world of mutual suitabilities, of this to that and of one thing to another, it will be a sufficient argument that they all procced from some wise Cause that had an universal Idea of their natures in his mind, and saw how such a thing would suit such a thing, before ever he actually adapted them one to another.
NOW not to insist any further upon the admirable fitness of the Sun and Earth, the Water and Earth, the Air and Heaven and Earth one to another, which I have largely discoursed already, how exactly is every animal fitted for its element, and every element for its animals? Thus the Birds for instance, are fitted with wings to fly aloft in the air, and the air is fitted to bear them up, and to yield to the vibration of their wings: the Fishes are fitted to swim in the water, having finns which serve instead of oars to cut through and divide the streams, and the waters are fitted for the fish to swim in, being a soft and fluid substance that is easily cut and divided; and as for the earth and those earthy animals that inhabit it, there is an admirable congruity between them; for they being all fram'd to walk or creep must have an hard and solid matter to move on, and the earth being an hard and solid matter requires such animals as can walk or creep on it; and as every element is fitted for the motion of its animals, and every animal to move in its element; so every element hath a food that is proper to the appetites of its animals, and, every animal an appetite that is proper to the food of its element. So that as every animal is fitted within with all those faculties and organs that are requisite to its procuring and enjoying what is good for it, and its shunning and repelling what is hurtful, so it is also furnish'd without with all that is necessary or convenient for its support and satisfaction. Thus every faculty within hath an object without prepar'd for it, that is exactly correspondent therewith, without which, as hath been excellently observ'd, the faculty would become vain and useless, yea and sometimes harmful and destructive, as reciprocally the object would import little or nothing if such a faculty were not provided for and suited to it. For thus the Eye would be perfectly useless if it were not for the light, and the light would be much less considerable if it were not for the Eye; for if all light were extinguish'd, all those curious colours into which the light is refracted would be utterly insignificant; and if all those colours were extinguished, the Eye would be utterly depriv'd of one of its most pleasant entertainments. And what use would there be of all that infinite variety of melodious sounds, fragrant odours, and delicious savours which this frame of nature affords, were there no hearing, smelling or tasting faculties? and what would these faculties signifie were there no such sounds or odours or savours? So that these objects and faculties are all as perfectly fitted one to another as it was possible for art to fit them: nothing could be better sitted for seeing than the eye, nothing better fram'd to render things visible than the light, and light can be refracted into no colour so grateful unto the eye as green, which is the great colour of Nature; and the same may be said of the ear and sounds, the smell and odours, the tast and savours; and if the eye were made to see and the ear to hear, as there is no doubt but they were, being so exquisitely fram'd for that purpose; to be sure light was made for seeing and sounds for hearing, and so for all the rest; and how is it possible that so many things should be made so exactly harmonious and agreeable with one another without the powerful art and direction of some very skilful mind, that knew before-hand that this thing would perfectly fit that, and consequently had a perfect Idea of them both? When therefore we behold such exact correspondencies between the motive faculties of Animals and the elements they move in, between the fruits and products of those Elements and the faculties of tast, digestion, and nutrition in those animals that inhabit them, and in a word between all sensible objects without and sensitive objects within, how is it possible we should be so senseless as not to trace out an all-directing wisdom by footsteps that are so exprest and remarkable? For suppose you heard a musical Instrument move its own strings into an exquisite harmony and run long divisions of curious and well-proportion'd notes, without the impulse of any visible Artist, would you not conclude either that some invisible hand did immediately touch and play upon its strings, or that they were mov'd by some internal spring and contrivance of a musical mind? how then can we attend to the admirable harmonies of Nature, to the natural references and due proportions and exact correspondencies of all its innumerable parts to one another without believing that there is some great harmonical mind which tun'd it at first and still plays upon it by the immediate touch and impulse of its own invisible hand.
AND as all things are thus fitted and adapted together, so are they also most regularly subordinated to one another according to their rank and worth; the sensless elements with all their fruit and product being subject to the use of animals to whom they afford a vast variety of all conveniencies and necessaries answerable to their desires and needs; so that of all those vast numbers of sensitive Beings there is no one kind or individual, no not so much as a fly, or worm, or insect but what is plentifully supplied out of these common store-houses of Nature. And as the elements are subjected to the use of animals, so both are subject to the use of Man, who is as much superiour to the brute animals, as they are to the sensless elements. To him therefore, as it is most fit and congruous, all things here below pay tribute; the Earth ingenders within its bowels quarrie's of stone and mines of coal and mettals to serve his necessary uses and conveniences, and spreads its surface with a vast variety of herbs and flowers and fruitful trees to supply him with food and with Physick, and treat him with pleasure and delight; to entertain his eye with beautiful colours, his smell with fragrant odours and his palate with delicious savours; the Waters serve to quench his thirst, to dress his food, to fructifie his fields and gardens, to cleanse his body and habitation and to maintain and facilitate his entercourse and traffick with all parts of the World; the Air fans him with refreshing gales, supplies him with breath and with vital and animal spirits; the Fire warms and cherisheth him, concocts his meat and drink into fit and wholesom nourishment, and serves him in his most necessary Arts and manual operations. And as all the four elements do one way or other conspire to our use and benefit, so do all the animals too that inhabit them, though as yet there are sundry of them whose use we have not discovered, but as for the generality of them they are innumerable ways adapted to our use; some to furnish our Table with food and delicacies, others to prevent or to remove our Diseases with their medicinal Vertues; some to cloath and some to adorn our Bodies, others to assist us in and others to ease us of our labours, and others to entertain us with chearful sports and recreations. Thus all things here below have as plain a reference to the use of Man who is the noblest part of them, as if some wise and powerful Mind had contriv'd them on purpose to serve and benefit him; as on the contrary Man hath so plain a reference to them considering his needs and his sensitive and rational faculties, as if the same wise Mind had fram'd him on purpose to use and enjoy them.
AND is it possible that after all this we should be so stupid as not to discern those bright beams of wisdom which shine through so many perspicuous correspondencies? For it's certain that either they must be design'd by Wisdom, or happen by Chance; and is it possible that a blind Chance which can do nothing regularly and is the Parent only of monstrous and deform'd births, should thus exquisitely fit and adapt things to one another in such a long and orderly series; that Chance which never yet compos'd a tune or wrote a line of coherent sense should ever be the Author of this great frame of things, in which there is more of harmony than in all the musical composures, and more of sense and Philosophy than in all the studied Volumes in the World? And if it cannot be the effect of Chance it must be the product of Wisdom and Providence.
IV. ANOTHER sensible evidence of a divine Providence is the continuation of things in the same comely order which have no government of themselves. That things are put into a most useful, wise and artificial order hath been sufficiently demonstrated under the foregoing particulars; now I would fain know what was it reduced them to and still continues them in this order; did the blind parts of the matter whereof these things are composed, once upon a time as they were wandring through the field of infinite space becken to one another, and by common consent assemble themselves into a General Council, and there advise together how they should rank and marshal themselves into a World, and when upon grave and mature advice they had agreed upon, and describ'd and chalk'd out the laws of their motion did they break-up Council, and set forth in their several lines to the execution of their Canons and Decrees, till by their oblique, parallel and counter-motions, they at last interwove themselves into all those beautiful contextures we behold? He who can imagine this to be either probable or possible, must himself be as dull and stupid as those sensless parts of matter are, of which he dreams. Well then, since these things could not be effected by any Council or contrivance in the matter it self, was it by mere chance that these blind parts of matter floating in an immense space, did after several justlings and rancounters jumble themselves into this beautiful frame of things? alas, this is a conceit, if possible, more ridiculous than the former; for how is it possible to imagine that Chance should ever make a Man? in the contexture of whose parts there are such wonders of Art as do as far exceed the most curious Engines and Machines that ever humane Art invented, as the most glorious and magnificent Palace doth a Castle of Cards. And if Chance cannot so much as draw the picture of a Man, which is but a rude imitation of his outside, how much less can it shape Temper and connect all those hidden and subtil springs of life and motion, sense and imagination, memory and passion within him? Well then, since it was neither from any wisdom in the matter of them, nor from any casual motion of that matter that this orderly series of things did proceed, was it from a blind necessity? but pray what made this necessity? how came the matter of these things that might have mov'd otherwise having an infinite space about it, and no principle within i… to encline it one way more than another, to determine it self to this series of motion? if you say it was by Chance, I have shew'd it is impossible; and if you say it was from Eternity, that is all one. For as an excellent Author of our own hath observ'd, Whether it were now, or yesterday, or from Eternity infers no difference as to our purpose; not the circumstance of the time, but the quality of the Cause being only here considerable; the same cause being alike apt or unapt yesterday as to day, always as sometimes, from all Eternity as from any set-time to produce such effects. So that 'tis as possible for matter fortuitously moved without any Art or Council to compose a World now, and to frame it into Animals and Men a… it was from Eternity; that is, 'tis from all Eternity, and now equally impossible; and if it were by the Council of some intelligent Mind that it was fram'd into this world of Beings and orderly series of things, then it is doubtless by the same Mind that its order and harmony is still continued and preserved. For it is altogether as impossible for matter of it self unguided by Wisdom and Art to pursue any constant course, as to fall into any regular form, it being as we see all torn and broken into little parts innumerably many, and infinitely diverse in their size, and figures, and motions, and thence onelyonly fit in their several courses to cross and confound each other. How then is it possible without vast Wisdom and answerable Power so to manage this wild and disordered swarm of Atomes as to determine them to their proper bounds, continue them in their regular ranks and files and preserve them in the same tenure of action, so as that in all those new productions of the individuals of every kind of Plants and Animals which are every day compounded out of them, they should none of them ever extravagate in their motions so as to disturb and hinder one another, and finally disorder and interrupt the natural course of Generation? When therefore we consider how this great Machine of the World (as the above-cited Author expresseth it) whose parts are infinite for number and variety, hath stood six thousand years together always one and the same, unimpair'd in its beauty, unworn in its parts, unwearied and undisturbed in its motions; through what an infinite series of generations and corruptions all its plants and animals have past, and yet how after they have been corrupted over and over, and their whole frames have been broke in pieces, and all their parts divided and dispers'd, they have still been generated anew, and rallied into the same specifick natures, which, though they still consist of numberless parts are constantly drawn up into the same postures and figures and positions, and with strange regularity digested into the same handsom order, as if they all kept time with the musical Laws of some Almighty Mind, as the stones of Thebes did with Amphion's Lute, and thereby continually danc'd into their natural figures; When, I say, we consider these strange and wondrous things, what tolerable account can we give of the performance of them without an over-ruling Providence? For how is it imaginable that in a six thousand years course of Generations and Corruptions these blind and undesigning parts of matter, which by reason of their infinite diversity are so naturally apt to thwart and disturb one another, should maintain such regular courses of motion as still to concenter in the same forms, so as that through all this vast tract of time not so much as one kind of plants or animals should miscarry; how, I say, could this have been, had they not all along been conducted by a steady and unerring Providence?
V. ANOTHER Sensible evidence of a Divine Providence is the miraculous events that have hapned in the World. By Miraculous Events, I mean such as either for their matter or manner of production do exceed the Power of natural Causes, or at least are produc'd by them out of their establish'd course and order. Such as dividing the Sea, stopping the Sun, raising the Dead, curing the sick, and blind, and lame, with a touch or word; of all which we have notorious instances both in the Old and New Testament, and these attested with as full and convincing Evidence as ever any matters of Fact were that are recorded in History. For as for the Miracles of the Old Testament, besides that they were sundry of them perform'd in the publick view of Nations, and were recorded in those very Ages wherein they were wrought, and so could have been easily disproved by ten thousand living Witnesses had they not been true; besides that they were attested by the most antient Heathen Poets and Historians in their Mythologies and Histories, who to be sure would never have yielded the glory of such wondrous Effects to a Nation whom they hated and despised, had they not been forced to it by undeniable Evidence; In a word, besides that they were confirm'd by the succeeding Prophets of that Nation, who both by the Miracles they wrought, and by the exact accomplishment of their Predictions have sufficiently evidenc'd themselves to be supernaturally inspired; Besides all which, I say, the Miracles of the Old Testament are abundantly attested by the New, the credit whereof is ratified and confirm'd by a world of new Miracles wrought by our Saviour himself, and particularly by his Resurrection from the dead, which are not only in part confessed by the Jews themselves, his most mortal Enemies, and by the Heathen Writers who were implacable Persecutors of his Religion, but also by his own Disciples and Apostles, who, as I shall shew hereafter, were Eye-witnesses of these Miracles, and did not only attest them with their Mouths, but also sealed their testimony with their blood, and confirm'd it before all the World with infinite other Miracles which they wrought in his Name, and which they continued to work for several Ages together, as is evident not only from the wondrous success of their Ministry, which without being attested with such miraculous Effects could never have propagated in so short a time such an hated Religion over all the World, but also from the confident Appeals which the Christian Writers frequently make to their heathen Enemies, in which they Subpoena them in as daily Spectators of their wondrous Works, and for the truth of them challenge their own Eyes and Ears. So then that there have been such miraculous Effects can no more be doubted than that there have been such Men as Pompey the Great or Julius Caesar, the former being attested, all things considered, with much more Evidence than the latter.
AND if this attestation be true, there must be a Providence; for how is it possible that blind Nature which neither deliberates nor chooses, should of it self ever vary or interrupt its course without rushing into utter confusion and disorder? How should any part of it, when 'tis once moved either faster or slower than ordinary, so restrain, or quicken its own motion as to reduce it self back again to its establish'd Course? For if it once move faster, it must have some degree of motion super-added to it, and till that is withdrawn it must move faster for ever: if it move slower, it must have some degree of motion withdrawn from it, and 'till that be restored it must move slower for ever: how then is it possible that Nature or any part of it which moves by a blind necessity, should of its own accord either hasten and then slacken, or slacken and then hasten the course of its motion, as it must do in the production of miraculous Effects, without being influenc'd by an Almighty Providence? We have several miraculous Instances of the diverting natural Causes from their course and stopping them in it; such as causing the Waters to divide and stand still, and the Sun to move backward. Now how is it conceivable that any natural Cause that hath no will of its own to move and determine it, should either stop its own motion and then move again, or divert from its course and then return again, if it were not under the command of some will without it, that guides and disposeth it according to its own Council? But besides these Scripture Miracles, there are sundry miraculous Instances of the rewarding good Men and punishing bad publickly recorded in the Histories of all Ages; some of vindicating the Innocence, others of restoring the lives, others of relieving the necessities of good Men; some of detecting the Crimes of bad Men, others of striking them dead in their impious facts, others of punishing them in kind, and others of inflicting on them those very Plagues which they have imprecated on themselves to give credit to a falshood; of some or other of which there is scarce any Age of the World which hath not been furnished with sundry notorious instances; so that unless we will give the Lye to all humane testimony, and condemn the Records of all Ages for publick Cheats and Impostures, we cannot deny but that there have been sundry Miracles in the World, and if of all these Miracles that have been so strongly attested there be but any one true and real, that one is a sufficient argument of an over-ruling Providence. For if ever any thing hath been effected that is either above the Power or contrary to the established Course of natural Causes, it must be brought to pass by the Power of God, and if God doth sometimes visibly exert his own immediate efficacy on this World, that is a plain evidence that he always governs it; for whenever he thus exerts it, it is for some reason to be sure, and for what other reason should he thus strip his Arm and visibly exert his Power upon or before us, but either to awaken our attention or to confirm our faith, or alarm our fear, or encourage our hope; and if ever he had any such design upon us, it must be in order to his governing us; for to what other purpose can an Almighty Being be supposed to address himself to our Hope and Fear, and Faith and Attention, but to subdue and reduce us under his Rule and Government.
VI. And lastly, Another visible evidence of a divine Providence is Predictions of future aad remote contingencies. That there have been such things hath been universally acknowledged by Heathens as well as Jews and Christians. As for the Heathen, Tully gives numerous instances of it in his two Books of Divination; In the first of which he sets down this as the great Principle of Prediction: Esse Deos & eorum providentiâ mundum administrari eosdemque consulere rebus humanis, nec solum universis verum etiam singulis, i. e. That there are Gods, and that by their Providence the World is governed, that they take care of humane Affairs, and this not only in general, but in particular. And of these Predictions he tells us there was one Chrysippus who wrote a large Book, in which he gives innumerable instances of them, all confirmed by very good Authority. Besides which there were their Oracles and their Sybilline Writings, among which if there had not been a great many true Predictions, it is not to be imagined that ever the wiser and more inquisitive part of Men should be so far imposed on as they were to pay such a mighty respect and veneration to them, and that not only for a little while, but for several Ages together. But as for their Oracles, there are sundry of them recorded in ancient Historians together with their punctual accomplishments; and Tully in particular tells us of one of Apollo his Oracles which foretold a thousand years before that Sypselus the Tyrant should reign at Corinth. And Varro makes mention of one Vectius Valens an Augur in the time of Romulus, who when Rome was building foretold by the flying of twelve Vultures that the City should continue a thousand two hundred years, which accordingly hapned. But as for the reality of Predictions we need seek no farther than the Holy Scriptures, in which you have sundry Prophesies of things which hapned a long time after, as particularly of the deliverance of the Jews from those two Captivities, the one in Aegypt, the other in Babylon; the former of which was foretold four hundred years, and the latter above seventy years before it came to pass, and yet both of them accomplished punctually to a day, as you may see in Gen. 15.13. compared with Exod. 12.41. and Jer. 25.12. compared with 2 Chron. 36.21, 22. which latter ▪ Prophesie is not only recorded in Scripture, but mentioned by Eupolemus an heathen Historian cited by Eusebius, Prepar. pag. 454. Thus also you have Esay his Prophesie of Cyrus whose name and atchievements he most exactly foretells long before he was born, Esay 44.45. And then for Daniel's Prophesies of the grand Revolutions of the Empires of the World, they do so punctually describe what hapned long after, that Porphyry himself, though a mortal Enemy to Christianity, is forced to confess the exact agreement of his Prophesies with the succeeding Events, vid. St. Chrysost. cont. Jud. Tom. 6. p. 326. and hath no other way to evade the force of them but by affirming without any colour of Reason or Authority that they were written afterwards in or near the time of Antiochus Epiphanes, though it is evident that the LXX Interpreters who translated the Old Testament a hundred years before, translated this Prophesie of Daniel with it. And Josephus expresly tells us, that Jaddus the High Priest shewed this very Prophesie to Alexander the Great, who lived long before Antiochus, Joseph▪ Antiqu. l. 11. But to name no more, there are the Prophesies of the Messias, of the place and most particular circumstances of his Nativity, and Ministry, and Life, and Death, and Resurrection, and Ascension, all which were so punctually accomplished in our Blessed Saviour, that did not the Jews, in whose hands they have been always preserved, own and acknowledge them, one would be apt to suspect that they were forged on purpose by some Christian to countenance our Saviours pretence of being the true Messias.
AND if there be any such thing as Prophesie, if but any one of all these Instances be real (and that none of them should, would be very strange) this one will be a sufficient evidence of a Divine Providence; for to foresee things at a distance, and before their Causes are in being, so as to describe before hand the precise Time, and Place, and Manner of their existence, or to foresee things casual and contingent, that wholly depend upon the free choice and determination of voluntary Agents, requires a mind of infinite comprehension, that sees through all the whole Series of Causes, and hath a perfect prospect not only of those things that actually exist, but also of all that are future and possible. For how is it possible to foresee a remote futurity in all its particular Circumstances, whose immediate Cause is either unborn, or free and undetermined, without having a perfect inspection not only into the natures, and inclinations, and tendencies of things, but also into all their particular Conjunctions and Conspiracies; and that Mind which sees into all these, must needs be all-seeing and have nothing concealed from it, that is either present, or future, or possible. So that if there be any such thing as Prediction of remote and contingent futurities, it must necessarily proceed from an all-seeing Mind; and if there be an all-seeing Mind that oversees the whole World, and accurately inspects all that is past, or present, or to come in it, is it imaginable that such a Mind should sit looking on as an idle Spectator and act no part it self in such a vast and busie Scene of thihgs? For that it thus exactly inspects and takes notice of the World, is a plain Argument that it is greatly concerned for it; and that it should be greatly concerned for it, and yet do nothing about it, nor exercise any Providence over it, is altogether inconceivable. And thus I have shewn, with all the plainness I could, what Evidences there are to create in us a belief of a Divine Providence, which I persuade my self are such, as duly considered, cannot but prevail with Minds that are not steel'd against all convictions, and utterly abandoned both of their Reason and Modesty.