The Christian Life Part 2 Volume 1, Part 2 · Chapter 4 · Section 3

The Christian Life Part 2 Volume 1 · Part 2 · Chapter 4 · Section 3

p. 310SECT. III. The Objections against Providence considered and answered.

I Now proceed to the third and last thing proposed to be treated of in this Chapter; and that is to shew the Insufficiency and Vnreasonableness of the common Pretences to Infidelity in this matter; and here not to insist upon all the little and shameful Cavils which have been made against Providence, which are so very inconsiderable that 'twould be too great a Credit to them to be seriously confuted; I shall insist upon those only which are the common, and do carry the fairest shew of Reason with them, and they are these five:

1. That the Exercise of a Providence doth not comport with the Majesty of God.

p. 3112. That it doth not consist with the Ease and Happiness of God.

3. That it is not reconcilable with the manifold Evils which we behold in the World.

4. That if there were such a Providence, it could not admit of the unequal Divisions of Goods and Evils which are made in this World.

5. That it is not to be reconciled with the wretched State and Condition to which we behold the greatest part of Mankind abandoned.

I. IT is objected against the Being of Providence, that it doth not comport with the Majesty of God to take notice of, or concern himself about the little Affairs of this World. Which is such an Objection as carries its own Answer with it; for I would fain know which is most sutable to Majesty, to sit still or to act, to wrap up it self in everlasting Sloth and Idleness, or to display it self in a vigorous Activity? And if it be greater and more Majestick, as doubtless it is, for any Being to employ and exercise its Powers, than to let them lie asleep and make no use of them, I would fain know in what higher Sphere can God exercise his Powers than in governing the World. For to govern well is the best p. 312and greatest thing that we can frame an Idea of; 'tis to do the greatest good, to dispense the noblest Virtues, and to shed forth the amplest Sphere of Benefits. And therefore since the World is such a vast Dominion, doubtless the most glorious Employment that the largest Mind can undertake, is to rule and govern it; and there is nothing can be greater and more Godlike, than to sit at the Helm of this floating Universe, and steer its Motions to their Ends with a steady and unerring Hand. What therefore can God do more worthy of himself than to govern the World well and wisely? Or wherein can he better display the Glory of his own Perfections, than in keeping this mighty Engine in such an admirable Order, so as that though its Parts are infinite in Number and Variety, and in their several Lines of Motion do frequenly cross and intersect each other, yet do they neither clash nor interfere, disturb nor confound one another, but in their different Functions mutually assist each other, and all conspire in a common Good, composing out of their infinite Discords a most elegant Harmony, in which mighty Performance there is scope enough for an infinite Power to exert its utmost Activity, for an infinite Wisdom p. 313to employ its utmost skill, and for an infinite Goodness to put forth its utmost Beneficence.

So that to undertake this Province of governing the World, is so far from being beneath the Majesty of God, that it would be an unpardonable Arrogance for any but a God to undertake it; and if Contrivance be the End of Wisdom, Action of Power, Beneficence of Goodness, as doubtless they are; where can the infinite Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness of God find a more ample Sphere for Action, Contrivance, and Beneficence than in the Government of the World? And if it be the proper Exercise of Majesty to govern, what can better comport with the greatest Majesty than to display it self in the Government of the largest Dominion, which is that of the World?

BUT then considering that God himself is the Father of all this great Family of Beings, how can it be beneath his Majesty to take care of his own Off-spring? Why should it be below him to provide for any thing which was not below him to create? If there be any thing in this World so contemptible as not to deserve his Regard, why did he create it? If there be not, why should he disdain to govern it? p. 314And if every thing in this World hath some End for the sake of which God thought it worthy to be one of the Objects of his Creation, why should he not as well think the constant Direction of it to that End, to be an Object worthy of his Providence?

II. IT is further objected against the Being of Gods Providence, that it is inconsistent with his Quiet and Happiness. For to attend to such an infinite number of things as the Government of the World includes, cannot but distract his Thoughts, and thereby disturb him in the Injoyment of himself. All which is a gross mistake, arising from no other cause but our measuring God by our selves; because we find our own Minds so narrow, and our own Powers so limited, as that we cannot without Distraction attend to many things at once, therefore we conclude that this mighty Business of governing the World must needs be very uneasie to God. Whereas if we considered God as a Being that is infinitely perfect, whose Almighty Power implies an Ability to do whatsoever is possible, and whose infinite Knowledge includes an universal Prospect of all things past, present, and to come, this would easily convince us of the Vanity and Falshood of p. 315this Objection; for it is by reason of Imperfection that Beings operate with Labour and Difficulty; it is because their Powers are weak and not able to conquer without strugling the Resistances of the Objects upon which they operate; but against perfect and infinite Powers there are no Objects can make such Resistance as to put them upon strugling and Labour; so that to an omniscient and omnipotent Mind there can be nothing difficult to be known or effected; and it is altogether as easie to it to know all things that are knowable, and do all things that are possible, as to know or do any one thing whatsoever; because whatsoever it doth it doth perfectly. How then can the Government of the World be difficult or uneasie to God, whose Knowledg and Power are perfect and infinite; and consequently can inspect and govern all the Beings in the World with as much Facility as if they had only one Being to take care of; and if one Man can with Ease manage one Business which he perfectly understands, why may not God manage all who understands all better than we understand any one; and suppose the things of the World were infinite, yet since Gods Knowledg and Power are infinite too, there is the very same Proportion of Infinite to Infinite as of One to One.

p. 316FOR it is to be considered that the natural Tendency of infinite Power is to Action, of infinite Wisdom to Contrivance, of infinite Goodness to Beneficence; and how can we imagine that it should be any Disturbance to God to follow the Inclination of his own Perfections? And therefore since it is equally easie to his infinite Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness to exert themselves in a larger Sphere of Action, Contrivance and Beneficence as in a narrower, why should it more disturb him to govern a whole World, than one single Being? It would doubtless be rather a disturbance to him to act nothing, to contrive nothing, and to do no good; because this would be to cross the Inclination of his own Perfections; but since it is as easie to him to exercise those Perfections about many things as about few; to exercise them about a world of things must rather be a Delight than a Disturbance to him, because the more he exercises them, the more he complies with their natural Tendencies and Inclinations.

AND what though this World be a great and cumbersome Mass of things; it can be no Labour to God to move and actuate it, who as an universal soul is diffused through it, and vitally present with every p. 317part of it; for he moves it not as Bodies move Bodies by thrusting and pressure, but as Souls move Bodies by Thought and Will; and as our Soul doth move its Body, and determine the Motion of its Members merely by thinking and willing, without any material Pressure, without any Machines or Engines, even so God, who is the great Soul of the World, doth actuate every Part, and regulate every Motion of it without any laborious heavings or thrustings, merely by the all-commanding Influence of his own Almighty Thought and Will. And if it be no Labour to our Soul to think and will, and therewithal to move our Body, why should we think it any Labour to God by the same Operations to move the World? For suppose our Soul were clothed with a Body as large as the whole Vniverse, and were but vitally present with every Part of it, it would doubtless move it all with as much Ease, and command it every way with as much Freedom as it doth the Body wherein it now resides; how then can it be difficult to a perfect Mind which penetrates all through, and coexists with every Part of this material World, to move and actuate the Whole, and moderate all the Motions of it according to its own Will and Pleasure?

p. 318III. IT is farther objected against a Providence, that it is not consistent with the manifold Evils, both moral and natural, which we behold in this World. If there were a just and gracious Providence over-ruling the World, how can it be imagined that it should ever permit so many Irregularities as we every day behold in Mens Lives and Manners, or suffer so many Calamities and Miseries to befall its Subjects? Both which as I shall shew you are very fairly consistent with a just and righteous Providence.

FOR as for the first, to wit, the moral Evils or Irregularities of Mens Manners, the Permission of them in the World is no more inconsistent with the Goodness of Gods Providence, than his making of free Agents was with the Goodness of his nature. For his Permission of sin is no more than his permitting free Agents to act freely, and according to that Liberty to Good and Evil wherewith he framed and created them; and why may he not as well permit them to act freely as create them to act freely? But to be essentially determined to good, so as not to have any natural Liberty to Evil, seems inconsistent with the State of a Creature; for there is no Will can be naturally and essentially p. 319determined to good, which is not conducted by an infallible Mind; for whilst the Mind which is the Guide may possibly err, the Will which is guided by it must be liable to go astray. Since therefore no Will can be essentially good but that which is guided by an infallible Mind, and since no Mind can be essentially infallible but one that is omniscient, it necessarily follows that to be free to Good and Evil is as natural to all reasonable Creatures, as to be finite in Knowledge and Vnderstanding; and accordingly our Saviour declares that to be naturally and essentially good is the incommunicable Prerogative of the divine Nature, Luke 18.19. and if so, then either God must have made us free to Good and Evil, or not have made us at all, and there must have been no such Orders of Being as Men and Angels, which are the Crown and Glory of all the Creation; and is it not much better that there should be such Beings, than that there should be no such thing as Liberty to Good and Evil? And if it were not inconsistent with the Divine Goodness to create free Agents, why should it be inconsistent with it to permit them to act freely? 'Tis true indeed we are naturally more free to Evil than the Angels, and some Angels perhaps were more free to it p. 320than others; but what then? Was God obliged in Goodness to make all Kinds of Beings equally perfect? If so, there must have been but one Kind of Beings in the whole Universe, and consequently there must have been infinite Kinds of Beings that are capable of Happiness for ever unmade, or for ever unprovided for. Wherefore since the Goodness of God was so infinitely fruitful as to communicate it self in different Degrees of Perfection to all Possibilities of Being, that so there might be no Kind wanting to compleat the Universe, it was requisite that there should be a mean Degree of Perfection between Angels and Brutes; otherwise there would have been a Gap and Chasme in the World, not only a possible Kind of Being wanting, but a Kind which by partaking both of Reason and Sense, of Spirit and of Matter, is the foreign, as Simplicius expresses it, i. e. the vital Joynt that clasps the upper and lower World together; and if it were no way unsutable to the Goodness of God to create the two Extremes, viz. Angels and Brutes, why should it be thought unsutable to make a middle Nature between them?

IT is true, by partaking of both Natures we are not only free to Evil in p. 321common with Angels, but also liable to stronger Temptations to it than they; because we are placed in a tempting Body among a great many brutish Passions and Appetites, and that Body is placed in a tempting World among a great many sensitive Goods and Evils, that are continually importuning those Appetites to mutiny against Reason, and to carry us away captive into Folly and Wickedness; but to place us in this state is so far from being inconsistent with the Goodness of God, that it is exactly pursuant to the Design of a most wise and gracious Providence. For since we are placed by the Condition of our Natures in a lower Rank of Being and Perfection than Angels, we have no more reason to complain of that, than Ants or Flies have that they are not Men. But in this imperfect state the highest good that Providence could design us was to put us into a state of Trial and Probation, wherein by the good use of our Liberty we might by degrees fit our selves for and at length arrive to a better and more raised Condition, and by an orderly Progression from this rude and imperfect state, might in the different Periods of our Lives grow up into higher and more excellent Capacities, and at length ripen into Perfection. Now in order to our Trial p. 322it was tequisite we should be placed among Difficulties, without which no Proof can be made of our Virtues, of our Patience, and Temperance, and Chastity and Equanimity, Meekness and Sobriety; all which are proper to us as Beings made up of Angel and Brute; from the latter of which Natures all those brutal Appetites arise in us, in the good or bad Government whereof consists the Nature of Humane Virtue and Vice. So that this present state of our Life is intended by God for a Field of Combat between our Sense and our Reason, our brutal and angelical Nature, and that the Victory of our Reason might through the Difficulty of it be rendered more glorious and rewardable, God hath furnished its Antagonist with the Weapons of worldly Temptation to assault and oppose it, to try its strength and Mettle, and to exercise both its active and passive Virtues; intending when it hath conquered, to translate us hence as a Reward of our Victory into a free and disintangled state, where we shall be vexed and inticed no more with the Importunities of sensual Lust and Affection, but to all Eternity enjoy the Serenity and Pleasure of a pure, angelical Nature. And what is there in all this that is any way unsutable, yea, that is p. 323not every way answerable to the Goodness of Providence? 'Tis true, instead of conquering, we may, if we please, yield our selves captive to Folly and Wickedness; but what then? Is Providence to be blamed for leaving Mens Hands at Liberty, because some have been so desperate as to cut their own Throats? 'Tis sufficient that he hath proposed to us Reward enough to encourage us to contend, and contributed to us Assistance enough to enable us to conquer, and having done all that becomes a wise and good Governour to prevent our Sin and Ruine, who is to be blamed for it but our selves? God leaves us at Liberty indeed among Temptations to Evil; and this the very State and Composition of our Natures requires; but all he designs by it, is to exercise our Virtues, and thereby to improve and train us up to a state of higher Perfection, and to furnish us with glorious Opportunities of fighting for and winning Crowns and Rewards; and this is so far from any way reflecting on the Goodness of his Providence, that it is an illustrious Instance of it; and yet 'tis only thus far that he is concerned in the Being of sin in the World; all the rest is owing to our own mad and desperate abuse of our natural Liberty, to our wilful Opposition to his gracious p. 324Intentions, and obstinate Resistance to his powerful Arts and Methods of preventing our Sin and Ruine. What then can be more unreasonable than for us to object against the Goodness of Gods Providence that which is purely the Effect of our own Madness and Folly?

AND if the Evil of Sin be no way inconsistent with the Goodness of Providence, much less is the Evil of Misery, since the Generality of those Evils which we suffer in this World are either the natural Effects, or the just Punishments, or the necessary Antidotes and Preventives of our sin. And therefore when you come into a great School of wild and unruly Boys, you may as well argue that there is no Master of it, because there are Rods and Ferulaes in it, as that there is no Providence over this sinful World, because there are Miseries and Afflictions in it; for upon the Being of Sin in the World, the Being of Misery is so far from being an Argument against Providence, that 'tis rather a Demonstration of it; because a… sinful World can no more be governed without Misery, than an unruly School without Correction.

IV. ANOTHER Objection that is made against Providence is that unequal division of Goods and Evils that is made p. 325in this World. If there were a just Providence that over-ruled the World, one would think it should make a more visible Distinction between good and bad Men in the Distribution of its Rewards and Punishments; whereas in the ordinary Course of things we see all things happen alike to all, and many times it fares worst with the best, and best with the worst of Men. Now because this is the greatest and most universal Objection that was ever urged against the Providence of God, I shall in answer to it endeavour to shew, 1. That it is for the most part false and groundless, 2. That so far as it is true, it is no Argument at all against a Providence.

First, I say this Objection, that there is no Difference made among Men as to the Goods and Evils of this World, is in a great Measure false and groundless. For I make no doubt but in the ordinary Course of things good Men are more prosperous even in this World than bad; as for times of Persecution, they are a just Exception from the general rule of Providence; because therein God to serve his own Glory, and the great Ends of Religion, exchangeth with good Men spiritual for temporal, and heavenly for earthly Enjoyments, which is such an Exchange as no man will account a p. 326Robbery that understands the just value of those different Commodities.

'TIS true, it hath been an usual Complaint in all Times and Ages, that it fares best with the worst, and worst with the best; and through the commonness of it, it is now grown into a Maxim. But it is to be considered that Men always pity the miserable and envy the prosperous, and that these Passions do naturally bribe their Judgments to think worse of the one, and better of the other than either deserve; for those whom we pity we are inclined to love, and those whom we love we are inclined to think well of; as on the contrary, those whom we envy we are inclined to hate, and those whom we hate we are inclined to think ill of; and then because God doth not reward and punish Men according to the Sentence that our blind Pity or Envy passes on them, we are ready to quarrel with his Providence. And besides, there are a world of close Hypocrites, that under a mighty shew and Ostentation of Piety do secretly indulge themselves in sundry wastful and ruinous Vices, which many times reduce them to Poverty and Misery, and these we commonly rank among the good it fares ill with; as on the contrary there are abundance of good Men, that in the Course p. 327of a reserved, modest and unaffected Piety, whieh makes but very little shew in the Eye of the World, are blest and prospered, and these we as commonly rank among the bad that fare well. Since therefore we are such incompetent Judges of good and bad Men, we should be very careful how we object against the Providence of God such Maxims as are only founded on our own fallacious Observations. But could we strip our selves of Pity and Envy, and penetrate into the insides of Men, I doubt not but we should soon be satisfied that good Men have much the Advantage of bad, even as to the Happiness and Prosperity of this World; for though perhaps there are many more bad Men prospered than good, because there are far more bad than good Men in the World, yet in Proportion to their Numbers I doubt the prosperous good would far exceed the prosperous bad, though there should be but thirty of the one to forty of the other; and supposing that in Proportion there were more bad Men than good advanced to worldly Greatness, (which yet is very doubtful, considering how prone we are to judge ill of great Men, and to reckon more of them into the Number of the bad than we ought, through Envy and Misunderstanding the Reasons of their Actions) p. 382yet it is to be considered that the true state of worldly Happiness and Prosperity consists not in a great but in a moderate Fortune, and that the good things of this World are no where so freely and entirely enjoyed, as in the middle Region between Poverty and Riches; for as Poverty is attended with Famine and Cold and Anguish, so Greatness is attended with Hurry and Tumult, impaled with Cares, and imprisoned with Pomp and tedious Ceremony; so that the truly unfortunate are the Necessitous and the Great, while the middle State without partaking of the evils of either, includes all that is truly desirable in both Extremes; all that Poverty wants, and all that Greatness enjoys; and in this happy state I dare boldly affirm there are proportionably far more good Men than bad; For it is a very rare thing for a good Man that is honest and industrious, and depends upon God for a Blessing, to be reduced to extreme Necessity; so very rare, that David in all his life time could not produce one Instance of it, Psal. 37.25. for miserable Poverty is usually the Consequence either of Idleness, or Luxury, or Faction, or Knavery; all which are inconsistent with true Goodness; and a good Man in any Condition on this side pinching Necessity, is p. 329ordinarily even in this Life far more happy than the most gay and prosperous Sinner, whose outward Glory and Greatness is usually nothing but the gaudy Cover of a Tragical Inside, of a Mind that is tortured with Pride and Envy, with boundless Hopes, insatiable Desires, and horrible Reflections, that dash and embitter all his Enjoyments, while the good Man under his mean and simple Outside, carries a great and happy Soul, a contented Mind, a chearful Heart, and a calm Conscience, which mightily sweeten all his Enjoyments, and make his homely Morsel outrelish the most studied Luxuries. Let us therefore but judg impartially of Men, and but truly state what is the most happy Condition of humane Life, and proportion the number of the good to the bad, and ballance the Insides of the one with the Outsides of the other, and I doubt not but we shall be easily convinced that even in this Life the good ordinarily fare much better than the bad; for in true Computation Necessity and Greatness are the only unfortunate States of humane Life, and in these there are far more bad Men than good; but between these two all Conditions are in a manner indifferent as to the Happiness of Men; and in this happy Mean there p. 330are far more good Men than bad; and then the Minds of good Men having infinitely the advantage of the Minds of bad, as to the rendering their outward Condition happy, it is impossible but that ordinarily and generally they must be the more happy and prosperous.

Secondly, So far as this Maxim, that all things happen alike to all, is true, it is no Argument at all against a Providence; and that upon these following Accounts. 1. Because many of the Goods and Evils of this World happen to us not as Rewards and Punishments, but in the necessary Course of secondary Causes. 2. Because the Goods and Evils of this World are in themselves so mean and inconsiderable that it would be beneath the Wisdom of Providence to be very exact and curious in the Distribution of 'em. 3. Because this Life is properly the state of our Trial and Probation, and not of our Reward and Punishment. 4. Because the Goods and Evils that befall us here are not so truly to be estimated by themselves as by their Effects and Consequents. 5. This promiscuous Distribution of things, so far as it is, is very requisite to assure us of a Judgment to come. 6. Because the exact Adjustment of things is reserved for a future Judgment.

p. 331I. THE hapning of all things alike to all is no Argument against Providence; because many of the Goods and Evils of this World happen to us not as Rewards and Punishments, but in the necessary Course of second Causes. For in this Life good and bad Men are so mingled together, rhat in Cases of common Calamity what happens to the one must happen to the other without a miraculous interposal of Providence. Thus while God leaves second Causes to their natural Course, how is it possible that War, or Plague, or Famine should distinguish between the good and bad that are incorporated together in the same Societies; and so long as free Agents are left to act freely, wicked Parents will frequently spoil their Constitutions by the repeated Excesses of their Riot and Wantonness; and while they do so, their Diseases, without a Miracle, will descend upon their righteous as well as unrighteous Posterity; and wicked Neighbours, whilst it lies in their way, or serves their Interest, will wrong and oppress the just and unjust without any distinction. But you will say, why then doth not Providence interpose between second Causes and good Men, and miraculously protect them from their mischievous Effects? To which in short I p. 332answer, that in some extraordinary cases God hath interposed, of which there are innumerable Instances both in sacred and profane History; but to expect that he should ordinarily and constantly do this, is very unreasonable, because it cannot be done without giving a perpetual Disturbance to the Course of Nature, which being in the whole most orderly and regular, full of admirable Beauty and Contrivance, ought not to be disturbed and inverted upon ordinary Occasions. For if the established Course of things be wise and regular in the whole, why should we expect that God should be perpetually tampering with it, and interrrupting and varying it by his immediate Interposals, as if he were dissatisfied with his own Contrivance, and upon every Revisal of this great Volume of the World, did still discover new Errataes in it to be corrected and amended. The Evils therefore which good Men suffer are not ordinarily so momentous as to oblige a wise and good God to interrupt the Couse of Nature to prevent them; and it is much better that some violences should be offered to good Men, than that a constant violence should be offered to the Nature of things; and since God can carry on his good Designs to good Men in a still and p. 333silent Path, and cause all their adverse Accidents to unwind of themselves, and at last to clear up into a blessed Close, is it not much better he should do it this way, than by offering perpetual Violence and Disturbance to Nature?

II. THE happening of all things alike to all is no Argument against a Providence, because the Goods and Evils of this World are so mean and inconsiderable, that it would be beneath the Wisdom of Providence to be very exact and curious in the distribution of them. It is no part of wisdom to be nice and curious about Trifles. 'Twas ridiculous enough in Caligula to imploy a mighty Army only to gather a great heap of Cockle shels; but when he had gathered them, it would have been much more ridiculous to have taken a great deal of care to divide them amongst his Soldiers in exact Proportions to each ones Merit and Desert. Now though we look upon the Goods and Evils of this World as things of vast and mighty Moment, yet God who sees them with far better Eyes than we, knows very well that they are but Trifles in comparison with those endless Goods or Evils we must enjoy or suffer in another World, and that it is a very inconsiderable thing whether we fare well p. 334or ill this moment, who immediately after must fare well or ill for ever; and therefore he looks on it, as he justly may, as a thing beneath his infinite Wisdom to be very exact and curious in dividing to us these momentary Trifles in just Proportions to our particular Deserts; and did we not strangely magnifie them, by looking on them through the false Opticks of our own fantastick Hopes and Fears, we should be so far from objecting against Gods Providence these unequal Distributions of them, that were they more exact and equal we should rather object against his Wisdom, as thinking it a very mean Employment for a Deity to be very nice and curious in proportioning such momentary Enjoyments and Sufferings to the Merit or Demerit of immortal Creatures. So that considering of what little moment the present Goods and Evils are which good Men suffer and bad Men enjoy, they ought rather to be lookt on as an Argument of Gods Wisdom than as an Objection against his Providence; for he understands the just value of things, and knows that the best of these worldly Goods are bad enough to be thrown away upon the worst of Men, and so expresses his just scorn of these admired Vanities, by scattering them abroad p. 335with a careless Hand; for why should he partake of the Errours of vulgar Opinion, and express himself so very regardful of these Trifles as to put them in gold Scales and weigh them out to Mankind by Grains and Scruples.

III. THAT all things here do happen alike to all is no Argument against Providence, because this Life is properly the state of our Trial and Probation, and not of our Reward and Punishment. The divine Providence hath placed us here as Candidates and Probationers for those everlasting Preferments it designs us hereafter, that so by training and exercising us in all those excellent Virtues that are proper to our Natures, it may improve us from one degree of Perfection to another, 'till at last it hath accomplished us for the heavenly State; in order to which Design it is necessary that there should be an unequal Distribution of things, whereby good Men may sometimes suffer and bad Men prosper; otherwise there would be no occasion for any of our passive Virtues, nor any tryal of our active. For Affliction is the Theatre of Patience and Fortitude, and Resignation to God, and without it there would be no room in the Lives of good Men for the Exercise of these virtues, which p. 336for want of Objects to act on, would rust and wax languid. Again, Difficulty is the Touchstone of our Love and Faith and Ingenuity; but should Providence be always crowning the Righteous, and dragging Offenders to Execution, such a Procedure would determin our Liberty, and leave us no room for the Exercise of our Faith and Ingenuity; for then the Rewards and Punishments of Providence would be so sensibly and continually present with us, and so urgently press upon our Hopes and Fears, that it would be impossible for us not to believe in God, and next to impossible not to obey him; and being thus forced to believe and obey, what Excellency would there be in our Piety and Virtue? What Charity is it for a Miser to lend his Money upon Assurance of twenty per cent? Or what Loyalty for a Traitor to discover his Conspirators within sight of a Wrack? And just as little Virtue would there be in any of our good Works, were there an exact Equality in the Distributions of Prodence. For then we should never do a good Work but upon the certain Prospect of an immediate Reward, nor repent of a bad one but upon the irresistible Dread of some immediate Punishment. But in this inequality of things wherein the good often p. 337suffer and the wicked prosper, we are left in a free and unconstrain'd Condition, and whether we are virtuous or vitious, devout or profane, it is out of Choice and not of Necessity. So that now to believe and obey the sacred Dictates of Religion is generous and ingenuous, and our Faith and Obedience is our virtue and Excellency, because we believe and obey without Force and against Temptations and Difficulties.

AND as this unequal State of things is of absolute Necessity to try and exercise our Virtues, so it is also very assistant thereunto. For that Providence doth generally and not universally bless and prosper good Men, is a great support to a wise and rational Belief. For as a late excellent Author hath well observed, if things were constantly managed one way without any variation, we might be apt to conclude that the World was under the rigid Laws of a fatal Necessity; if on the other side there were no Rule observed, no Footsteps of Method in the Dispensations of Providence, we might be tempted to believe that Chance rules the World; but when we observe that in the management of things there is an Intermixture of these two, viz. that there is a general Rule, and that there p. 338are particular Exceptions from it, we have just reason to conclude that all is under a free Almighty Agent, that rules the World according to the Determinations of his own Will. As this way of Providence, viz. to interweave into good Mens Fortunes Adversity with Prosperity, is in this respect very advantageous to their Faith, so is it also to the whole State of their Virtue; for as on the one hand a continued train of prosperous Events would be apt to bloat and elevate their Minds, so on the other a continued series of Adversity would be apt to sink and depress their Spirits, whilst this middle way of Interchange in their Condition balances them on both sides, and keeps them in an even, steddy and well-poized Temper. Since therefore this Life is the state of our Trial, it is evident that an exact Equality of things would be a much stronger Objection against the Wisdom of Providence, than all these present Inequalities are against the Justice of it. For Hardships and Difficulties are necessary to a state of Trial, and were good Men always blest and bad Men always punished, this Life instead of being a Probation to either would be the Heaven of the one and the Hell of the other; and since some Afflictions are necessary to p. 339try good Men, and some Prosperities to try bad, it would be a strange oversight of Providence, when it designs the Trial of both, to fix them in such a Condition, wherein no through Experment can be made of either. So that for us to object against Providence for making such unequal Distributions in a state wherein it designs our Trial, is in effect to object against Wisdom for acting most sutably to its own Designs.

IV. THAT all things here do happen alike to all is no Argument against Providence, because the Goods and Evils that befal us here, are not so truly to be estimated by themselves as by their Effects and Consequents. For the divine Providence, which runs through all things, hath disposed and connected them into such a Series and Order, that there is no single Event or Accident but what is purely miraculous, but depends upon the whole System, and hath innumerable Causes antecedent to it, and innumerable Consequents attending it; and what these Consequents will be, whether good or bad, is beyond our Skill to prognosticate; so that though the Event be never so good or bad singly and apart by it self, yet in Conjunction with all those Consequents that will most certainly attend p. 340it, the best Event for all we know may prove most mischievous, and the worst most beneficial to us. So that for us boldly to pronounce concerning the Good or Evil of Events, before we see the Train of Consequents that follow them, is very rash and inconsiderate. As for instance, you see a good Man oppressed with Sorrows and Afflictions, and a bad Man crowned with Pleasures and Prosperities; and considering these things apart by themselves, you conclude that the one fares very ill and the other very well; but did you at the same time see the Consequents of the ones Adversity and the others Prosperity, it is probable you would conclude the quite contrary, viz. that the good Mans Adversity was a Blessing, and the bad Mans Prosperity a Curse. For I dare boldly affirm that good Men generally reap more substantial Benefit from their Afflictions than bad Men do from their Prosperities; the one smarts indeed at present; but what follows? perhaps his Mind is cured by it of some Disease that is ten times worse to him than his outward Affliction; of Avarice or Impatience, of Envy or Discontent, of Pride or vanity of Spirit; his Riches are lessened, but his Virtues are improved by it; his Body is impaired but his Mind is p. 341grown sound and haile by it, and what he hath lost in Health or Wealth, or Pleasure or Honour, he hath gained with vast advantage in Wisdom and Goodness, in Tranquillity of Mind and Self-enjoyment. And methinks no Man, who believes he hath a Soul, should grudg to suffer any tolerable Affliction for the bettering his Mind, his Will and his Conscience. On the other hand the bad Man triumphs and rejoyces at present; but what follows? his Prosperity either shrivles him into Miserableness, or melts him into Luxury; the former of which impoverishes, and the latter diseases him; for if the former be the Effect of his Prosperity, it increases his Needs, because before he needed only what he had not, but now he needs both what he hath not and what he hath; his covetous Desires treating him as the Faulkner doth his Hawk, still luring him off from what he hath seized to fly at new Game, and never permitting him to prey upon his own Quarry. and if the latter be the Effect of his Prosperity, that is, if it melts him into Luxury, it thereby wasts his Health to be sure, and commonly his Estate too; and so whereas it found him poor and well, it leaves him poor and diseased, and only took him up from the Plow p. 342and sets him down at the Hospital. In general, while he is possessed of it, it only bloats and swells him, makes him proud and insolent, griping and oppressive, pampers and inrages his Lust, stretches out his Desires into an insatiable Bulimy, sticks his Mind full of Cares and his Conscience of Guilts, and by all these woful Effects it inflames his Reckoning with God, and treasures up Wrath for him against the day of Wrath; so that comparing the Consequents of the good Mans Adversity with those of the bad Mans Prosperity, it is evident that the former fares well even in his worst Condition, and the latter ill in his best. It's well for me, saith good David, that I was afflicted, for before I was afflicted I went astray, but now I have kept thy Commandments, Psalm 119.67. But on the contrary, when the Wicked spring as the Grass, saith the same Author, and when all the workers of Iniquity do flourish, it is that they shall be destroyed for ever, Psalm 92.7. If then in the Consequents of things good Men are blessed in their Afflictions, and bad Men plagued in their Prosperities, as it is apparent they generally are, these unequal Distributions are so far from being an Argument against Providence, that they are a glorious Instance of p. 343it. For wherein could the divine Providence better express its Justice and Wisdom together, than by benefiting the good and punishing the bad by such cross and improbable Methods?

V. THAT all things here do happen alike to all, is no Argument against Providence, because it is very requisite it should often do so, to assure us of a Judgment to come. For were the Affairs of this World managed with that exact Equality as that the good did never suffer nor the bad escape unpunished, we should be deprived of one of the best moral Arguments of a future Judgment. For as on the one hand should Providence never reward the good nor punish the bad in this Life, but confound them together without any Distinction, it might tempt us to despair of any just Retributions from it in the Life to come; so on the other hand were the Goods and Evils of this Life weighed out to Men in exact Proportions to their Merit and Demerit without any Inequality, we might be tempted to think that there is no need of, and consequently no ground to expect any Judgment to come. For what occasion would there be for any future Judgment if all things were already exactly balanced and adjusted; and therefore as to confirm p. 344us in the Belief of the Justice of Providence, it was requisite the same plain Instances should be given of its Distinguishing the good from the bad by present Rewards and Punishments; so to confirm us in the Expectation of a Judgment to come, it was no less requisite that there should be some In equality in the present Management and Distribution of things, and that the Goods and Evils of this World should not be administred with that exact Regularity as to prevent the necessity of a day of Judgment; but that there should be undecided Cases enough remaining for a future Tribunal to adjust and determine. So that as in the present management of things there is Equality enough to induce us to believe a just Providence; so there is also Inequality enough to induce us to expect a future Judgment; God having wisely provided in his present Administration of things, to give us Instances enough of his just Procedure towards the good and bad, and yet to leave us Instances enough of unrewarded Virtue and prosperous Wickedness, to assure us that he intends an after Reckoning. For how can we reflect upon these repeated Examples of just Reward and Punishment, which in every Age almost God sets before us, and not believe p. 345that he governs the World? And how can we reflect upon those manifold Evils which some good Men suffer, and Goods which some bad Men enjoy, without believing that he hath appointed a Day wherein he will adjust these Inequalities and vindicate the Cause of oppressed Virtue, and crush triumphant Wickedness into everlasting Confusion?

VI. And lastly, That all things here do happen alike to all, is no Argument against Providence, because the exact Adjustment of things is reserved for a future Judgment. I confess were God to make no other Distribution to the just and unjust, but what is made in this Life, the Inequality of it would be a strong Objection against his Providence; but then considering that all this cloudy Scene of things will shortly close up in a righteous Judgment, wherein for the Evils which the good have suffered they shall be awarded an eternal Happiness, and for the Goods which the bad have enjoyed they shall be doomed to everlasting Wretchedness, this is sufficient to vindicate the Justice of Providence were these present Inequalities a thousand times greater than they are. For suppose that after a short Melancholy Dream good Men were to live happily, and after as short a pleasant p. 346one bad Men were to live wretchedly but for a thousand years in this World; we might as well object against Providence this unequal Distribution of the melancholy Dream to the good, and the pleasant one to the bad, notwithstanding the succeeding thousand years of their Happiness and Misery, as we do the sufferings of the Righteous and Prosperities of the Wicked, which bear far less Proportion to that Eternity of Happiness and Misery that is to succeed them, than the Sorrow or Pleasure of a Moments Dream doth to a thousand years real Calamity or Blessedness.

FOR the Providence of God from the first to the last is all but one continued Plot, like that of a well-contrived Comedy, which at first is very obscure and intricate; so that by what is past or present there is no guessing at the Conclusion; for all through the intermediate Acts Virtue and Honour fight their way through Difficulties and Disappointments, and sometimes the Hero acts a sad, and sometimes the Villain a prosperous Part, at which the unskilful Spectator grieves, and is ready to damn the Poet for distributing such unequal Fates; but then in the fifth and last Act all the cross Accidents clear up, and p. 347issue in a fair Conclusion; and in the close of all, the Hero is crowned, and the Villain hissed off the Stage. Let us therefore have but the patience to stay 'till Providence hath finished its whole Plot, and closed up all its mighty Scenes in the general Judgment of the World, and then we shall see all these Inequalities set right, and the Fates of good and bad Men determined by a most just Award. But for us to quarrel at Providence now, who are yet got no farther, it may be, than to the middle of the great Drama, and to find fault with its Procedure for crossing the good and prospering the bad, is rudely to overturn the Stage before the Entrance into the fifth Act, and to hiss off the Almighty Poet for not compleating his Design before he is arrived to the Conclusion. And thus I have endeavoured to answer more at large this Objection against Providence, because it hath been more insisted on than any other, and hath more generally stumbled Mens Belief of divine Providence.

V. And lastly, It is farther objected that the Being of a just and good Providence, is not to be reconciled with that wretched State and Condition to which we behold the greatest part of Mankind abandoned p. 348For if there were a good Providence that over-ruled the Affairs of this World, how is it imaginable that ever so great a part of Mankind as the Infidel World includes, should be left so utterly destitute as they are of the Knowledg of God, and of the Means of attaining their everlasting Happiness? To which I shall briefly answer these three things:

I. THAT the Infidel World is not perhaps left so utterly destitute as we are apt to imagine; for they have the Law of Nature to direct them, by which alone they must be tried, and stand or fall at the Day of Judgment; which as to the main strokes of their Duty, is so plain and intelligible, that no sincere Inquirer can be ignorant of it; and if when they may understand it they will not, or if when they do understand it, they wilfully transgress and violate it, the Divine Providence hath been sufficiently good to them to leave them for ever inexcusable. For so far as their Ignorance is invincible it is not their Sin, nor shall they ever be accountable for it, or for any sinful Omission or Commission thence proceeding, and if they only answer for not understanding their Duty when they might, or for not performing it so far as they understood it, they can have p. 349no reason to complain that they are hardly dealt with. But then,

II. As they have not those vast Advantages that we have of becoming good, and growing up into the state of Perfection and Happiness, so proportionably less Degrees of Good will be accepted of those that do well, and less Degrees of Punishment exacted of those that do ill; for that Maxim of our Saviour, Luke 12.48. To whomsoever much is given, of him much shall be required, necessarily implies the contrary, viz. that to whomsoever less is given of him less shall be required; and if so, it is certain that so much as their means of being good are less than ours, so much the less good God will accept of them than of us; and as God will accept less good of the best Infidels, so he will exact less Punishment of the worst; for so our Saviour himself hath assured us, that it will be more tolerable for Tire and Sidon, and Sodom and Gomorrah in the last Day, than for those who persist in their Vnbelief and Disobedience in despight of the Proposals of the Gospel. If then in Proportion to their present Disadvantages less good will be accepted of those who make any Improvement, and less Punishment exacted of them who make none, neither the one p. 350sort nor the other hath any reason to complain; and though their Condition were worse than it is, yet under these Circumstances it would be fairly consistent with the Goodness of the Divine Providence. But then,

III. And lastly, Though their Condition were a great deal worse than it is, yet it would be very unreasonable for us to object it against the Goodness of the divine Providence, unless we better understood than we do, how God will dispose of them in the other World. Indeed if Mens Fate consisted in what they suffer and enjoy in this Life, we might better judg of Providence by what is before us; but since our main state is beyond the Grave, whatever befals us here is very inconsiderable, compared with what we must suffer or enjoy hereafter; and as for the present Disadvantages which the heathen World lies under, they are but very short and momentary, and if Providence pleases, it can abundantly compensate them in the World to come; and therefore since yet we know not what it will do, as having no Revelation in the Case, it becomes us to suspend our Judgment 'till the Event hath determined it.

p. 351THIS we know, that Providence hath ways enough, and time enough too between this and the Day of Judgment, to supply these Destitute Souls with all those spiritual Advantages in the other Life, which for Reasons best known to it self it hath hitherto withheld from them; it may if it pleases extend their Trial and Probation beyond this Life, and discover in the other Life the Light of the Gospel, to so many of them at least as have here made any tolerable Improvements under the Light of Nature, and if they make good use of it, reward them accordingly. For though we Christians have no reason to expect any farther Trial after this Life is expired, because we have passed the utmost Trial already, yet who knows but God may make a farther Trial of those in the other Life, upon whom the great Experiment of the Gospel was yet never made; and therefore since Providence can yet be infinitely good to them notwithstanding their wretched Condition at present, and since for all we know it will be so, we ought not to object against it its present Disregard of them, till we see the final Issue of things; for that their present Condition is so bad is no ground for us to argue against Providence, unless we were p. 352sure it would never be better; because for all we know it may yet be rendered good enough not only to justifie, but to glorifie the Goodness of Gods Providence towards them.

AND now to conclude this great Argument. Since we see how necessary the Belief of Providence is to our being truly religious, and what unanswerable Evidence there is of the Truth and Reality of it, what remains but that we heartily endeavour by a calm, fixt, and impartial Consideration of these things, throughly to instruct our selves in the Nature, and firmly to establish our selves in the Belief of it; For our Religion must necessarily ebb or flow according as it is influenced more or less by our Vnderstanding and Belief of the divine Providence, which are the great Principles that move and govern it. For every Branch of the Divine Providence is an inexhaustible Fountain of religious Rhetorick and Persuasion, and in this single Proposition, that God upholds and governs the World, there are a thousand times more Inducements to Piety and Virtue, than in all other Topicks in the World. But how pregnant soever it is with Arguments, and how powerful soever its Arguments are, 'tis impossible it should prevail p. 353upon any reasonable Mind that understands not the Force; and believes not the Truth of it; for all the possible Access which outward Objects have to our Minds, is through our Knowledg and Belief of them, without which the most momentous Proposals are no more capable of affecting us than one of Tully's Orations is of calming the North wind; but he who firmly believes the Truth, and understands the full Emphasis of a Divine Providence, must necessarily be affected by it, if he be but within the Reach and Power of Persuasion; and unless his Will be impregnably fortified against all the Force of Argument and Reason, he will find himself so besieged with Motives on every side persuading him to submit to the Obligations of Religion, that it will be almost impossible for him to defend himself against their powerful Importunities. For what Man in his Wits can sit unconcerned under the lively Belief that he is in the hands of a most just and gracious, alwise, and Almighty Providence, that is conscious to his inmost Thoughts and Purposes, and beholds all his Actions with infinite Complacency or Abhorrence; that hath the disposal of his Life and his Soul, and of all the Goods he can hope for, and all the Evils he can fear, and will p. 354certainly reward him a thousand-fold if he doth well, and if he doth ill as certainly pursue him with a dire Revenge? This Belief carries with it such constraining Terrors and Allurements as cannot but affect all reasonable Minds, and finally prevail with their Hopes and Fears against all contrary Temptations. Wherefore if ever we would fix the Obligations of Religion upon our Minds, it concerns us above all things to be throughly instructed in the Nature, and confirmed in the Belief of the divine Providence.