Defense of the People of England, Chapter 8
CHAP. VIII.
IF you had publiſhed your own opinion, Salmaſius, concerning the Right of Kings in general, without affronting any perſons in particular, yet, notwithſtanding this alteration of affairs in England, as long as you did but uſe your own liberty in writing what your ſelf thought fit, no Engliſh man could have had any cauſe to have been diſpleaſed with you, nor would you have made good the opinion you maintain, ever a whit the leſs. For if it be a poſitive command both of Moſes and of Chriſt himſelf, That all men whatſoever, whether Spaniards, French, Italians, Germans, Engliſh or Scotch, ſhould be ſubject to their Princes, be they good or bad, which you aſſerted (Page 127.) to what purpoſe was it for you, who are a foreigner and unknown to us, to be tampering with our Laws, and to read us Lectures out of them as out of your own Papers and Miſcellanies, which, be they how they will, you have taught us already in a great many words, that they ought to give way to the Laws of God. But now it is apparent that you have undertaken the defence of this Royal Cauſe, not ſo much out of your own inclination, as partly becauſe you were hired, and that at a good round price too, conſidering how things are with him, that ſet you on work; and partly, 'tis like, out of expectation of ſome greater reward hereafter, to publiſh a ſcandalous Libel againſt the Engliſh, who are injurious to none of their Neighbours, and meddle with their own matters only. If there were no ſuch thing as that in the caſe, is it credible that any man ſhould be ſo impudent or ſo mad, as though he be a ſtranger, and at a great diſtance from us, yet of his own accord to intermeddle with our affairs, and ſide with a party? What, the Devil, is it to you what the Engliſh do amongſt themſelves? What would you have, Pragmatical Puppy? what would ye be at? Have you no concerns of your own at home? I wiſh you had the ſame concerns that that famous Olus, your fellow buſie-boſie body, in the Epigram had; and perhaps ſo you have; you deſerve them I'm ſure. Or did that Hotſpur your Wife, who encouraged you to write what you have done, for out-law'd Charles his ſake, promiſe you ſome profitable Profeſſors place in England, and God knows what Gratifications at Charles his Return? But aſſure your ſelves, my Miſtreſs and my Maſter, that England admits neither of Wolfes, nor Owners of Wolfes. So that it's no wonder you ſpit ſo much venom St. Lou, in Latin, Sanctus Lupus; Saint Wolf, is the name of a place in France, where Salmaſius had ſome ſmall Eſtate, and was called ſo from St. Lupus a German Biſhop, who with St. German came over into England, Anno Dom. 429.at our Engliſh Maſtiffs. It were better for you to return to thoſe Illuſtrious Titles of yours in France, firſt to that hungerſtarved Lordſhip of yours at St. Lou; and in the next place to the Sacred Conſiſtory of the moſt Chriſtian King. Being a Counſellor to the Prince, you are at too great a diſtance from your own Country. But I ſee full well that ſhe neither deſires you, nor your Counſel; nor did it appear ſhe did, when you were there a few years ago, and began to lick a Cardinal's Trencher; ſhe's in the right, by my troth, and can very willingly ſuffer ſuch a little fellow as you, that are but one half of a man, to run up and down with your Miſtreſs of a Wife, and Desks full of Trifles and Fooleries, till you light ſome where or other upon a Stipend, large enough for a Knight of the Grammar, or an Illuſtrious Critick on Horſeback; if any Prince or State has a mind to hire a Vagabond Doctor that is to be ſold at a good round Price. But here's one that will bid for you; whether you're a Merchantable Commodity or not, and what you are worth we ſhall ſee by and by. You ſay, The Parricides aſſert, that the Government of England is not meerly Kingly, but that it is a mixt Government. Sir Thomas Smith, a Country-man of ours in Edward the Sixth's days, a good Lawyer, and a Stateſman, one whom you your ſelf will not call a Parricide, in the beginning of a Book which he wrote of the Commonwealth of England, aſſerts the ſame thing, and not of our Government only, but of almoſt all others in the world, and that out of Ariſtotle; and he ſays it is not poſſible that any Government ſhould otherwiſe ſubſiſt. But as if you thought it a crime to ſay any thing, and not unſay it again, you repeat your former thread-bare Contradictions: You ſay, There neither is nor ever was any Nation that did not underſtand by the very name of a King, a perſon whoſe authority is inferior to God alone, and who is accountable to no other. And yet a little after you confeſs, that the name of a King was formerly given to ſuch Powers and Magiſtrates, as had not a full and abſolute right of themſelves, but had a dependance upon the people, as the Suffetes among the Carthaginians, the Hebrew Judges, the Kings of the Lacedemonians, and of Arragon. Are you not very conſiſtent with your ſelf? Then you reckon up five ſeveral ſorts of Monarchies out of Ariſtotle; in one of which only that Right obtain'd, which you ſay is common to all Kings. Concerning which I have ſaid already more than once, that neither doth Ariſtotle give an inſtance of any ſuch Monarchy, nor was there ever any ſuch in being; the other four he clearly demonſtrates that they were bounded by Eſtabliſht Laws, and the King's Power ſubject to thoſe Laws. The firſt of which four was that of the Lacedemonians, which in his opinion did of all others beſt deſerve the name of a Kingdom. The ſecond was ſuch as obtain'd among Barbarians, which was laſting, becauſe regulated by Laws, and becauſe the people willingly ſubmitted to it; whereas by the ſame Author's opinion in his third Book, what King ſo ever retains the Soveraignty againſt the people's will, is no longer to be accounted a King, but a downright Tyrant; all which is true likewiſe of his third ſort of Kings, which he calls Aeſymnete, who were choſen by the people, and moſt commonly for a certain time only, and for ſome particular purpoſes, ſuch as the Roman Dictators were. The fourth ſort he makes of ſuch as reigned in the Heroical days, upon whom for their extraordinary merits the people of their own accord conferr'd the Government, but yet bounded by Laws; nor could theſe retain the Soveraignty againſt the will of the people; nor do theſe four ſorts of Kingly Governments differ, he ſays, from Tyranny in any thing elſe, but only in that theſe Governments are with the good liking of the people; and That againſt their will. The fifth ſort of Kingly Government, which he calls foreign, or abſolute Monarchy, in which the Supreme Power reſides in the King's perſon, which you pretend to be the right of all Kings, is utterly condemn'd by the Philoſopher, as neither for the good of Mankind, nor conſonant to Juſtice or Nature, unleſs ſome people ſhould be content to live under ſuch a Government, and withal confer it upon ſuch as excel all others in vertue. Theſe things any man may read in the third Book of his Politicks. But you, I believe, that once in your life you might appear witty and florid, pleaſed your ſelf with making a compariſon betwixt theſe five ſorts of Kingly Government, and the five Zones of the World; betwixt the two extremes of Kingly power, there are three more temperate Species interpoſed, as there lie three Zones betwixt the Torrid and the Frigid. Pretty Rogue! what ingenious compariſons he always makes us! May you be for ever baniſhed, whither you your ſelf condemn an abſolute Kingdom to be, to wit, to the frigid Zone, which when you are there, will be doubly cold to what it was before. In the mean while we ſhall expect that new faſhioned ſphere which you deſcribe, from you our modern Archimedes, in which there ſhall be two extreme Zones, one Torrid, and the other Frigid, and three temperate ones lying betwixt. The Kings of the Lacedaemonians, you ſay, might lawfully be Impriſoned, but it was not lawful to put them to Death. Why not? Becauſe the Miniſters of Juſtice, and ſome Foreign Soldiers, being ſurpriſed at the Novelty of the thing, thought it not lawful to lead Agis to his Execution, though condem'd to die? And the people of Lacedemon were diſpleaſed at his death, not becauſe condemn'd to die, though a King, but becauſe he was a good man and popular, and had been circumvented by a faction of the great ones. Says Plutarch, Agis was the firſt King that was put to death by the Ephori; in which words he does not pretend to tell us what lawfully might be done, but what actually was done. For to imagin that ſuch as may lawfully accuſe a King, and impriſon him, may not alſo lawfully put him to death, is a childiſh conceit. At laſt you betake your ſelf to give an account of the Right of Engliſh Kings. There never was, you ſay, but one King in England. This you ſay, becauſe you had ſaid before, that unleſs a King be ſole in the Government, we cannot be a King. Which if it be true, ſome of them, who I had thought had been Kings of England, were not really ſo; for to omit many of our Saxon Kings, who had … their Sons, or their Brothers Partners with them in the Government, it is known that King Henry the Second of the Norman Race, reign'd together with his Son. Let them show, ſay you, a Preſident of any Kingdom under the Government of a ſingle perſon, who has not an abſolute power; though in ſome Kingdoms more remiss, in others more intenſe. Do you ſhow any Power that's abſolute, and yet remiſs, you Aſs; is not that power that's abſolute, the Supreme Power of all? How can it then be both ſupreme and remiſs? Whatſoever Kings you ſhall acknowledg to be inveſted with a remiſs (or a leſs) power, thoſe I will eaſily make appear to have no abſolute power; and conſequently to be inferior to a People, free by nature, who is both its own Law given, and can make the Regal Power more or leſs intense or remiſs; that is, greater or less. Whether the whole Iſland of Britain was anciently Governed by Kings, or no, is uncertain. It's most likely that the form of their Government changed according to the Exigencies of the times. Whence Tacitus ſays, The Britains anciently were under Kings; now the great man amongſt them divide them into Parties and Factions. When the Romans left them, they were about forty years without Kings; they were not always therefore under a Kingly Government, as you ſay they were; but when they were ſo, that the Kingdom was Hereditary, I poſitively deny; which that it was not, is evident both from the Series of their Kings, and their way of Creating them; for the consent of the people is asked in expreſs words. When the King has taken … … Oath, the Archbiſhop ſtepping to … side of the Stage erected for that purpoſe, asks the people four ſeveral times, in theſe words, Do you conſent to have this man to be your King? Juſt as if he ſpoke to them in the Roman Stile, Vultis, Jubetis hunc Regnare? Is it your pleaſure, do you appoint this man to Reign? Which would be needleſs, if the Kingdom were by the Law hereditary: But with Kings, Uſurpation paſſes very frequently for Law and Right. You go about to ground Charles's Right to the Crown, who was ſo often conquered himſelf, upon the Right of Conqueſt. William, ſurnamed the Conqueror, …orſooth, ſubdued us. But they who are not ſtrangers to our Hiſtory, know full well, that the Strength of the Engliſh Nation was not ſo broken in that one Fight at Haſtings, but that they might eaſily have renewed the War. But they choſe rather to accept of a King, than to be under a Conqueror and a Tyrant: They ſwear therefore to William, to be his Liege-men, and he ſwears to them at the Altar, to carry to them as a good King ought to do in all reſpects. When he broke his word, and the Engliſh betook themſelves again to their Arms, being diffident of his ſtrength, he renewed his Oath upon the Holy Evangeliſts, to obſerve the Ancient Laws of England. And therefore, if after that he miſerably oppreſſed the Engliſh, (as you ſay he did) he did it not by Right of Conqueſt, but by Right of Perjury. Beſides, it is certain, that many ages ago, the Conquerors and Conquered coaleſced into one and the ſame people: So that that Right of Conqueſt, if any ſuch ever were, muſt needs have been antiquated long ago. His own words at his death, which I give you out of a French Manuſcript written at Cane, put all out of doubt: I appoint no man (ſays he) to inherit the Kingdom of England. By which words, both his pretended Right of Conqueſt, and the Hereditary Right, were diſclaim'd at his death, and buried together with him. I ſee now that you have gotten a place at Court, as I foretold you would; you are made the King's Chief Treaſurer and Steward of his Court-Craft: And what follows, you ſeem to write ex Officio, as by virtue of your Office, Magnificent Sir. If any preceding Kings, being thereunto compelled by Factions of Great Men, or Seditions amongſt the Common People, have receded in ſome meaſure from their Right, that cannot prejudice the Succeſſor; but that he is at liberty to reſume it. You ſay well; if therefore at any time our Anceſtors have through neglect loſt any thing that was their Right, why ſhould that prejudice us their Poſterity? If they would promiſe for themſelves to become Slaves, they could make no ſuch promiſe for us; who ſhall always retain the ſame Right of delivering our ſelves out of Slavery, that they had of enſlaving themſelves to any whomſoever. You wonder how it comes to paſs that a King of Great Britain muſt now-adays be looked upon as one of the Magiſtrates of the Kingdom only; whereas in all other Kingly Governments in Chriſtendom, Kings are inveſted with a Free and Abſolute Authority. For the Scots, I remit you to Buchanan: For France, your own Native Countrey, to which you ſeem to be a ſtranger, to Hottoman's Franco Gallia, and Girardus a French Hiſtorian; for the reſt, to other Authors, of whom none that I know of, were Independents: Out of whom you might have learned a quite other leſſon concerning the Right of Kings, than what you teach. Not being able to prove that a Tyrannical Power belongs to the Kings of England by Right of Conqueſt, you try now to do it by Right of Perjury. Kings profeſs themſelves to Reign By the Grace of God: What if they had profeſſed themſelves to be gods? I believe if they had, you might eaſily have been brought to become one of their Prieſts. So the Archbiſhops of Canterbury pretended to Archbiſhop it by Divine Providence. Are you ſuch a fool, as to deny the Pope's being a King in the Church, that you may make the King greater than a Pope in the State? But in the Statutes of the Realm the King is called our Lord. You are become of a ſudden a wonderful Nomenclator of our Statutes: But you know not that many are called Lords and Maſters, who are not really so: You know not how unreaſonable a thing it is to judge of Truth and Right by Titles of Honour, not to ſay of Flattery. Make the ſame Inference, if you will, from the Parliament's being called the King's Parliament; for it is called the King's Bridle too; or a Bridle to the King; and therefore the King is no more Lord or Maſter of his Parliament, than a Horſe is of his Bridle. But why not the King's Parliament, ſince the King ſummons them? I'le tell you why; becauſe the Conſuls uſed to indict a Meeting of the Senate, yet were they not Lords over that Council. When the King therefore ſummons or calls together a Parliament, he does it by vertue and in diſcharge of that Office, which he has received from the people, that he may adviſe with them about the weighty affairs of the Kingdom, not his own particular Affairs: Or when at any time the Parliament debated of the King's own Affairs, if any could properly be called his own, they were always the laſt things they did; and it was in their choice when to debate of them, and whether at all or no, and depended not upon the King's Pleaſure: And they whom it concerns to know this, know very well, That Parliaments anciently, whether ſummoned or not, might by Law meet twice a Year: But the Laws are called too, The King's Laws. Theſe are flattering aſcriptions; a King of England can of himſelf make no Law: For he was not conſtituted to make Laws, but to ſee thoſe Laws kept, which the People made. And you your ſelf here confeſs, That Parliaments Meet to make Laws: Wherefore the Law is alſo called the Law of the Land, and the Peoples Law. Whence King Ethelſtane in the Preface to his Laws, ſpeaking to all the People, I have granted you every thing, ſays he, by your own Law. And in the form of the Oath, which the Kings of England uſed to take before they were made Kings, The People stipulate with them thus; Will you grant thoſe Juſt Laws, which the People ſhall chuſe? The King Anſwers, I will. And you are infinitely miſtaken in ſaying, That When there is no Parliament ſitting, the King Governs the whole ſtate of the Kingdom, to all intents and purpoſes, by a Regal Power. For he can determine nothing of any moment, with reſpect to either Peace or War; nor can he put any ſtop to the Proceedings of the Courts of Juſtice. And the Judges therefore Swear, That they will do nothing Judicially, but according to Law, tho the King by Word, or M…te, or Letters under his own Seal, ſhould command the contrary. Hence it is that the King is often ſaid in our Law to be an Infant; and to poſſeſs his Rights and Dignities, as a Child or a Ward does his: See the Mirror, cap. 4. Sect. 22. And hence is that common ſaying amongſt us, That the King can do no wrong: Which you, like a Raſeal, interpret thus, Whatever the King does, is no Injury, becauſe be is not … ble to be puniſhed for it. By this very Comment, if there were nothing elſe, the wonderful Impudence and Villany of this fellow, diſcovers it ſelf ſufficiantly: It belongs to the H…ad, you ſay, to command, and … to the Members: The King is the Head of the Parliament. You would not trifle thus, if you had any guts in your brains. You are miſtaken again (but there's no end of your miſtakes) in not diſtinguiſhing the King's Counſellors from the States of the Realm For neither ought he to make choice of all of them, nor of any of theſe, which the r…ſt do not approve of; but for electing any Member of the Houſe of Commons, he never ſo much as pretended to it. Whom the people appointed to that Service, they were ſeverally choſen by the Votes of all the people in their reſpective Cities, Towns, and Counties. I ſpeak now of things univerſally known, and therefore I am the ſhorter. But you ſay, 'Tis …al…e that the Parliament was inſtituted by the people, as the Worſhippers of Saint Independency aſſert. Now I ſee why you took ſo much pains in endeavour…g to ſubvert the Pa…cy; you carry another Pope in your belly, as we ſay. For what elſe ſhould you be in labour of, the Wi…e of a Woman, a He-Wolf, impregnated by a She-Wolf, but either a Monſter, or ſome new ſort of P…cy? You now make He-Saints, and She-Saints at your pleaſure, as if you were a true genuine Pope. You abſolve Kings of all their ſins; and as if you had utterly vanquiſh'd and ſubdu'd your Antagoniſt the Pope, you adorn your ſelf with his ſpoils. But becauſe you have not yet profligated the Pope quite, till the Second and Third, and perhaps the Fourth and Fifth Part of your Book of his Supremacy come out, which Book will nauſeate a great many Readers to death, ſooner than you'll get the better of the Pope by it; let it ſuffice you in the mean time, … you, to become ſome Antipope or other: There's another She-Saint, beſides that Independency that you de…ide, which you have Canonized in good earneſt; and that is, the Tyranny of Kings: You ſhall therefore by my conſent be the High Prieſt of Tyranny; and that you may have all the Pope's Titles, you ſhall be a Servant of the Servants, not of God, but of the Court. For that Curſe pronounced upon Canaan, ſeems to ſtick as cloſe to you, as your Shirt. You call the People, a Beaſt. What are you then your ſelf? For neither can that Sacred Confiſtory, nor your Lordſhip of St. Lou, exempt you its Maſter from being one of the People, nay, of the Common People; nor can make you other than what you really are, a moſt loathſome Beaſt. Indeed, the Writings of the Prophets ſhadow out to us the Monarchy and Dominion of Great Kings by the Name, and under the Reſemblance of a Great Beaſt. You ſay, That there is no mention of Parliaments held under our Kings, that reigned before William the Conqueror. It is not worth while to Jangle about a French word: The thing was always in being; and you your ſelf allow that in the Saxon times, Concilia Sapientum Wittena-gemots, are mentioned. And there are wiſe Men among the Body of the People, as well as amongſt the Nobility. But in the Statute of Merton made in the twentieth year of King Henry the 3d, the Earls and Barons are only named. Thus you are always impoſed upon by words, who yet have ſpent your whole Life in nothing elſe but words; for we know very well that in that age, not only the Guardians of the Cinque-Ports, and Magiſtrates of Cities, but even Tradeſmen are ſometimes called Barons; and without doubt they might much more reaſonably call every Member of Parliament, tho never ſo much a Commoner, by the Name of a Baron. For that in the fifty ſecond Year of the ſame King's Reign, the Commoners as well as the Lords were ſummoned, the Statute of Marlbridge, and moſt other Statutes, declare in expreſs words, which Commoners King Edward the Third, in the Preface to the Statute-Staple, calls, Magnates Comitatum; The Great Men of the Counties, as you very learnedly quote it for me; thoſe to wit, That came out of the ſeveral Counties, and ſerved for them; which number of Men conſtituted the Houſe of Commons, and neither were Lords, nor could be. Beſides, a Book more Ancient than thoſe Statutes, called, Modus habendi Parliamenta, i. e. The manner of holding Parliaments; tells us, That the King, and the Commons may hold a Parliament, and enact Laws, tho the Lords, the Biſhops are abſent; but that with the Lords, and the Biſhops, in the Abſence of the Commons, no Parliament can be held. And there's a reaſon given for it, viz. becauſe Kings held Parliaments and Councils with their People before any Lords or Biſhops were made; beſides, the Lords ſerve for themſelves only, the Commons each for the County, City, or Burrough that ſent them. And that therefore the Commons in Parliament repreſent the whole Body of the Nation; in which reſpect they are more worthy, and every way preferable to the Houſe of Peers. But the power of Judicature, you ſay, never was inveſted in the Houſe of Commons. Nor was the King ever poſſeſſed of it: Remember tho, that originally all Power proceeded, and yet does proceed from the People. Which Marcus Tullius, excellently well ſhows in his Oration, De lege Agraria, Of the Agrarian Law. As all Powers, Authorities, and publick Adminiſtrations ought to be derived from the whole Body of the People; ſo thoſe of them ought in an eſpecial manner ſo to be derived, which are ordained and appointed for the Common Benefit and Intereſt of all; to which Impolyments every particular Perſon, may both give his Vote for the chuſing ſuch Perſons, as he thinks will take moſt care of the Publick, and withal by voting and making Intereſt for them, lay ſuch Obligations upon them, as may entitle them to their Friendſhip, and good Offices in time to come. Here you ſee the true riſe and original of Parliaments, and that it was much ancienter than the Saxon Chronicles. Whilſt we may dwell in ſuch a light of Truth and Wiſdom, as Cicero's Age afforded, you labour in vain to blind us with the darkneſs of obſeurer times. By the ſaying whereof, I would not be underſtood to derogate in the leaſt from the Authority and Pruden…e of our Anceſtors, who moſt certainly went further in the enacting of good Laws, than either the Ages they lived in, or their own Learning or Education ſeem to have been capable of; and tho ſometimes they made Laws that were none of the beſt, yet as being conſcious to themſelves of the Ignorance… and Infirmity of Humane Nature, they have conveyed this Doctrine down to Poſterity, as the foundation of all Laws, which likewiſe all our Lawyers admit, That if any Law, or Cuſtom, be contrary to the Law of God, of Nature, or of Reaſon, …ought to be looked upon as null and void. Whence it follows, that tho it were poſſible for you to diſcover any Statute, or other publick Sanction, which aſcribed to the King a Tyrannical Power, ſince that would be repugnant to the Will of God, to Nature, and to right Reaſon, you may learn from that general and primary Law of ours, which I have juſt now quoted, that it will be null and void. But you will never be able to find that any ſuch Right of Kings has the leaſt Foundation in our Law. Since it is plain therefore, that the Power of Judicature was originally in the People themſelves, and that the People never did by any Royal Law part with it to the King, (for the Kings of England neither uſe to judge any Man, nor can by the Law do it, otherwiſe than according to Laws ſettled and agreed to: Fleta, Book 1. Cap. 17.) It follows, that this Power remains yet whole and entire in the People themſelves. For that it was either never committed to the Houſe of Peers, or if it were, that it may lawfully be taken from them again, you your ſelf will not deny. But, It is in the King's Power, you ſay, to make a Village into a Burrough, and that into a City; and conſequently, the King does in effect create thoſe that conſtitute the Commons Houſe of Parliament. But, I ſay, that even Towns and Burroughs are more Ancient than Kings; and that the People is the People, tho they ſhould live in the open Fields. And now we are extreamly well pleaſed with your Angliciſms, COUNTY COURT, THE TURNE, HUNDREDA: you have quickly learnt to count your hundred Jacobuſſes in Engliſh.
Quis expedirit Salmaſio ſuam HUNDREDAM?
Picamque docuit verba noſtra conari?
Magiſter artis venter, & Jacobaei
Centum, exulantis viſcera marſupii Regis.
Quod ſi dol…ſi ſpes refulſerit nummi,
Ipſe Antichriſti modò qui Primatum Papae
Minatus uno eſt diſſipare ſufflatu,
Cantabit ultrò Cardmalitium melos.
Who taught Salmaſius that French chatt'ring Pye,
To aim at Engliſh and HUNDRED A cry?
The ſtarving Raſcal, fluſht with juſt a Hundred
Engliſh Jacobuſſes, HUNDRED A blunder'd.
An out-law'd King's laſt ſtock.—A hundred more,
Would make him Pimp for th' Anchriſtian Whore;
And in Rome's praiſe employ his poyſon'd Breath,
Who threatn'd once to ſtink the Pope to death.
The next thing you do is to trouble us with a long Diſcourſe of the Earls and the Barons, to ſhow that the King made them all; which we readily grant, and for that reaſon they were moſt commonly at the King's beck; and therefore we have done well to take care, that for the future they ſhall not be Judges of a free People? You affirm, That the Power of calling Parliaments as often as he pleaſes, and of diſſolving them when he pleaſes, has belonged to the King time out of mind. Whether ſuch a vile, mercenary Foreigner as you, who tranſcribe what ſome Fugitives dictate to you, or the expreſs Letter of our own Laws are more to be credited in this matter, we ſhall enquire hereafter. But, ſay you, there is another argument, and an invincible one, to prove the Power of the Kings of England Superior to that of the Parliament; the King's Power is perpetual and of courſe, whereby he adminiſters the Government ſingly without the Parliament; that of the Parliament is extraordinary, or out of courſe, and limited to particulars only, nor can they Enact any thing ſo as to be binding in Law, without the King. Where does the great force of this argument lye? in the words of courſe and perpetual? Why many inferior Magiſtrates have an ordinary and perpetual power, thoſe whom we call Juſtices of Peace. Have they therefore the Supreme Power? and I have ſaid already, that the King's Power is committed to him, to take care, by interpoſing his Authority, that nothing be done contrary to Law, and that he may ſee to the due obſervation of our Laws, not to top his own upon us; and conſequently that the King has no Power out of his Courts; nay all the ordinary power is rather the proples, who determine all Controverſies themſelves by Juries of Twelve Men. And hence it is that when a Malefactor is asked at his Arraignment, How will you be tried? he anſwers always according to Law and Cuſtom, by God and my Country; not by God and the King, or the King's Deputy. But the authority of the Parliament, which indeed and in truth is the Supreme power of the people committed to that Senate, if it may be called Extraordinary, it muſt be by reaſon of its Eminence and Superiority; elſe it is known they are called Ordines, and therefore cannot properly be ſaid to be extra ordinem, out of order; and if not actually, as they ſay, yet vertually they have a perpetual power and authority over all Courts and ordinary Magiſtrates, and that without the King. And now it ſeems our barbarous terms grate upon your Critical ears, forſooth! whereas, if I had leiſure, or that it were worth my while, I could reckon up ſo many Barbariſms of yours in this one Book, as if you were to be chaſtiz'd for them as you deſerve, all the School-boys Ferulers in Chriſtendom would be broken upon you; nor would you receive ſo many Pieces of Gold as that wretched Poet did of old, but a great many more Boxes o'th' ear. You ſay, 'Tis a Prodigy more monſtrous than all the moſt abſurd Opinions in the world put together, that the Bedlams ſhould make a diſtinction betwixt the King's Power and his Perſon. I will not quote what every Author has ſaid upon this ſubject; but if by the words Perſonam Regis, you mean what we call in Engliſh, the Perſon of the King; Chryſoſtome, who was no Bedlam, might have caught you, that it is no abſurd thing to make a diſtinction betwixt that and his power; for that Father explains the Apoſtles command of being ſubject to the Higher Powers, to be meant of the thing, the Power it ſelf, and not of the Perſons of the Magiſtrates. And why may not I ſay that a King, who acts any thing contrary to Law, acts ſo far forth as a private perſon, or a Tyrant, and not in the capacity of a King inveſted with a Legal Authority? If you do not know that there may be in one and the ſame man more Perſons or Capacities than one, and that thoſe Capacities may in thought and conception be ſevered from the man himſelf, you are altogether ignorant both of Latin and Common ſenſe. But this you ſay to abſolve Kings from all ſin and guilt; and that you may make us believe that you are gotten into the Chair vo…r ſelf, which you have pull'd the Pope out of: The King, you ſay, is ſuppoſed not capable of committing any crime, becauſe no puniſhment is conſequential upon any crime of his. Whoever therefore is not puniſht, offends not; it is not the theft, but the puniſhment that makes the thief. Salmaſius the Grammarian commits no Soloeciſms now, becauſe he is from under the Ferular; when you have overthrown the Pope, let theſe, for God's ſake, be the Canons of your Pontificate, or at leaſt your Indulgences, whether you ſhall chuſe to be called the High Prieſt St. …yranny, or of St. Slavery I paſs by the Reproachful language which towards the latter end of the Chapter you give the State of the Commonwealth, and the Church of England; 'tis common to ſuch as you are, you contemptible Varlet, to rail at thoſe things moſt, that are moſt praiſe-worthy. But that I may not ſeem to have aſſerted any thing raſhly concerning the Right of the Kings of England, or rather concerning the Peoples Right with reſpect to their Princes; I will now alledg out of our ancient Hiſtories a few things indeed of many, but ſuch as will make it evident that the Engliſh lately tried their King according to the ſetled Laws of the Realm, and the Cuſtoms of their Anceſtors. After the Romans quitted this Iſland, the Britains for about forty years were ſui Juris, and without any Kings at all. Of whom thoſe they firſt ſet up, ſome they put to death. And for that, Gildas reprehends them, not as you do, for killing their Kings, but for killing them uncondemned, and (to uſe his own words) Non pro veri examinatione, without inquiring into the matter of fact. Vortigerne was for his Inceſtuous Marriage with his own Daughter, condemn'd, as Nennius informs us, the moſt ancient of all our Hiſtorians next to Gildas, by St. German, and a General Council of the Britains, and his Son Vortimer ſet up in his ſtead. This came to paſs not long after St. Auguſtine's death, which is enough to diſcover how …utilous you are, to ſay, as you have done, that it was a Pope, and Zachary by name, who firſt held the lawfulneſs of judging Kings. About the year of our Lord 600, Morcantius, who then Reign'd in Wales, was by Oudeceus Biſhop of Landaff, condemn'd to Exile, for the Murther of his Uncle, though he got the Sentence off by beſtowing ſome Lands upon the Church. Come we now to the Saxons, whoſe Laws we have, and therefore I ſhall quote none of their Preſidents. Remember that the Saxons were of a German Extract, who neither inveſted their Kings with any abſolute, unlimited power, and conſulted in a Body of the more weighty affairs of Government; whence we may perceive that in the time of our Saxon Anceſtors Parliaments (the name it ſelf only excepted) had the Supreme Authority. The name they gave them, was Councils of Wiſe-men; and this in the Reign of Ethelbert, of whom Bede ſays, That he made Laws in imitation of the Roman Laws, cum concilio ſapientum; by the advice, or in a Council of his Wiſe-men. So Edwyn, King of Northumberland, and Ina King of the VVeſt-Saxons, having conſulted with their VViſe-men, and the Elders of the people, made new Laws. Other Laws K. Alfred made, by the advice in like manner of his Wiſe-men, and he ſays himſelf, That it was by the conſent of them all, that they were commanded to be obſerved. From theſe and many other like places, it is as clear as the Sun, that choſen Men even from amongſt the Common People, were Members of the Supreme Councils, unleſs we muſt believe that no Men are wiſe, but the Nobility. We have likewiſe a very Ancient Book, called the Mirror of Juſtices, in which we are told, That the Saxons, when they firſt ſubdued the Brittains, and choſe themſelves Kings, required an Oath of them, to ſubmit to the Judgment of the Law, as much as any of their Subjects, Cap. 1. Sect. 2. In the ſame place 'tis ſaid, that it is but juſt that the King have his Peers in Parliament, to take Cognizance of wrongs done by the King, or the Queen; and that there was a Law made in King Alored's time, that Parliaments ſhould be holden twice a year at London, or oftner, if need were. Which Law, when through neglect it grew into diſuſe, was revived by two Statutes in King Edward the Third's time. And in another ancient Manuſcript, called Modus tenendi Parliamenta, we read thus, If the King diſſolve the Parliament before they have diſpatcht the buſineſs, for which the Council was ſummon'd, he is guilty of Perjury; and ſhall be reputed to have broken his Coronation Oath. For how can he be ſaid to grant thoſe good Laws, which the people chuſe, as he is ſworn to do, if he hinders the People from chuſing them, either by ſummoning Parliaments ſeldomer, or by diſſolving them ſooner than the Publick Affairs require, or admit. And that Oath, which the Kings of England take at their Coronation, has always been looked upon by our Lawyers, as a moſt ſacred Law. And what remedy can be found to obviate the great Dangers of the whole State (which is the very end of ſummoning Parliaments) if that Great and Auguſt Aſſembly may be diſſolved at the pleaſure many times of a ſilly, head-ſtrong King? To abſent himſelf from them, is certainly leſs than to diſſolve them; and yet by our Laws, as that Modus lays them down, the King neither can, nor ought to abſent himſelf from his Parliament, unleſs he be really indiſpoſed in Health; nor then neither, till twelve of the Peers have been with him to inſpect his Body, and give the Parliament an account of his Indiſpoſition: Is this like the Carriage of Servants to a Maſter? On the other hand, the Houſe of Commons, without whom there can be no Parliament held, tho ſummoned by the King, may withdraw, and having made a Seceſſion, expoſtulate with the King concerning Male-adminiſtration, as the ſame Book has it. But, which is the greateſt thing of all, amongſt the Laws of King Edward, commonly called the Confeſſor, there is one very excellent, relating to the Kingly Office; which Office, if the King do not diſcharge as he ought; Then, ſays the Law, He ſhall not retain ſo much as the Name of a King. And leſt theſe words ſhould not be ſufficiently underſtood, the Example of Chilperic King of France is ſubjoyn'd, whom the People for that Cauſe depoſed. And that by this Law a wicked King is liable to Puniſhment, that Sword of King Edward, called Curtana, denotes to us, which the Earl of Cheſter uſed to carry in the Solemn Proceſſion at a Coronation; A token, ſays Mathew Paris, that he has Authority by Law to puniſh the King, if he will not do his Duty: and the Sword is hardly ever made uſe of but in Capital Puniſhments. This ſame Law, together with other Laws of that good King Edward did William the Conqueror ratifie in the Fourth Year of his Reign, and in a very full Council held at Verulam, confirm'd it with a moſt ſolemn Oath: And by ſo doing, he not only extinguiſh'd his Right of Conqueſt, if he ever had any over us, but ſubjected himſelf to be judged according to the Tenor of this very Law. And his Son Henry ſwore to the obſervance of King Edward's Laws, and of this amongſt the reſt; and upon theſe only terms it was, that he was choſen King, whilſt his Elder Brother Robert was alive. The ſame Oath was taken by all ſucceeding Kings, before they were Crowned. Hence our Ancient and Famous Lawyer Bracton, in his firſt Book, Chap. 8. There is no King in the caſe, ſays he, where Will rules … …; and Law does not take place. And in his Third Book, Chap. 9. A King is a King ſo long as he Rules well; he becomes a Tyrant when he oppreſſes the People committed to his Charge. And in the ſame Chapter, The King ought to uſe the Power of Law and Right, as God's Miniſter and Vice-gerent; the Power of wrong is the Devils, and not Gods; when the King turns aſide to do Injuſtice, he is the Miniſter of the Devil. The very ſame words almoſt another Ancient Lawyer has, who was the Author of the Book, called Fleta; both of them remembred that truly Royal Law of King Edward, that Fundamental Maxim in our Law, which I have formerly mentioned, by which nothing is to be accounted a Law, that is contrary to the Laws of God, or of Reaſon; no more than a Tyrant can be ſaid to be a King, or a Miniſter of the Devil, a Miniſter of God. Since therefore the Law is chiefly right Reaſon; if we are bound to obey a King, and a Miniſter of God; by the very ſame Reaſon, and the very ſame Law, we ought to reſiſt a Tyrant, and a Miniſter of the Devil. And becauſe Controverſies ariſe oftner about Names than Things; the ſame Authors tell us, that a King of England, tho he have not loſt the Name of a King, yet is as liable to be judged, and ought ſo to be, as any of the Common People. Bracton, Book 1. Chap. 8. Fleta, Book 1. Chap. 17. No Man ought to be greater than the King in the Adminiſtration of Juſtice; but he himſelf ought to be as little as the leaſt in receiving Juſtice, ſi peccat, if he offend. Others read it, ſi petat. Since our Kings therefore are liable to be judged, whether by the Name of Tyrants, or of Kings, it muſt not be difficult to aſſign their Legal Judges. Nor will it be amiſs to conſult the ſame Authors upon that point. Bracton, Book 1. Chap. 16. Fleta, Book 1. Chap. 17. The King has his Superiors in the Government; The Law, by which he is made King, and his Court, to wit, the Earls, and the Barons: Comites (Earls) are as much as to ſay, Companions; and he that has a Companion, has a Maſter; and therefore, if the King will be without a Bridle, that is, not govern by Law, they ought to bridle him. That the Commons are comprehended in the word Barons, has been ſhown already; nay, and in the Books of our Ancient Laws they are frequently ſaid to have been called Peers of Parliament; and eſpecially in the Modus tenendi, &c. There ſhall be choſen (ſays that Book) out of all the Peers of the Realm, Five and twenty Perſons, of whom five ſhall be Knight, five Citizens, and five Burg…ſſ…s; and two Knights of a County, have a greater Vote in granting and rejecting than the greateſt Earl in England. And it is but reaſonable they ſhould, for they Vote for a whole County, &c. the Earls for themſelves only. And who can but perceive that thoſe Patent Earls, whom you call Earls made by Writ (ſince we have now none that hold their Earldoms by Tenure) are very unfit Perſons to try the King, who conferr'd their Honours upon them? Since therefore by our Law, as appears by that old Book, call'd The Mirror, the King has his Peers, who in Parliament have Cognizance of wrongs done by the King to any of his People; and ſince it is notoriouſly known, that the meaneſt Man in the Kingdom may even in inferior Courts have the benefit of the Law againſt the King himſelf in Caſe of any Injury, or Wrong ſuſtained; how much more Conſonant to Juſtice, how much more neceſſary is it, that in caſe the King oppreſs all his People, there ſhould be ſuch as have Authority not only to reſtrain him, and keep him within Bounds, but to Judge and Puniſh him? For that Government muſt needs be very ill, and moſt ridiculouſly conſtituted, in which remedy is provided in caſe of little Injuries done by the Prince to private Perſons, and no Remedy, no Redreſs for greater, no care taken for the ſafety of the whole; no Proviſion made to the contrary, but that the King may without any Law ruin all his Subjects, when at the ſame time he cannot by Law, ſo much as hurt any one of them. And ſince I have ſhown that it is neither good manners, nor expedient, that the Lords ſhould be the Kings Judges; it follows, that the Power of Judicature in that caſe, does wholly, and by very good Right, belong to the Commons, who are both Peers of the Realm, and Barons, and have the Power and Authority of all the People committed to them. For ſince (as we find it expreſly in our written Law, which I have already cited) the Commons together with the King, make a good Parliament without either Lords or Biſhops, becauſe before either Lords or Biſhops had a being, Kings held Parliaments with their Commons only; by the very ſame reaſon the Commons apart muſt have the Sovereign Power without the King, and a Power of Judging the King himſelf, becauſe before there ever was a King, they in the Name of the whole Body of the Nation held Councils and Parliaments, had the Power of Judicature, made Laws, and made the Kings themſelves; not to Lord it over the People, but to Adminiſter their publick Affairs. Whom if the King, inſtead of ſo doing ſhall endeavour to injure and oppreſs, our Law pronounces him from time forward not ſo much as to retain the Name of a King, to be no ſuch thing as a King; and if he be no King, what need we trouble our ſelves to find out Peers for him? For being then by all good Men adjudged to be a Tyrant, there are none but who are Peers good enough for him, and proper enough to pronounce Sentence of Death upon him judicially. Theſe things being ſo, I think I have ſufficiently proved what I undertook, by many Authorities, and written Laws; to wit, that ſince the Commons have Authority by very good Right to try the King, and ſince they have actually tried him, and put him to Death, for the miſchief he had done both in Church and State, and without all hope of amendment, they have done nothing therein but what was juſt and regular, for the Intereſt of the State, in diſcharging of their Truſt, becoming their Dignity, and according to the Laws of the Land. And I cannot upon this occaſion, but congratulate my ſelf with the Honour of having had ſuch Anceſtors, who founded this Government with no leſs prudence, and in as much Liberty as the moſt worthy of the Ancient Romans or Grecians, ever ſounded any of theirs; and they muſt needs, if they have any knowledg of our Affairs, rejoyce over their Poſterity, who when they were almoſt reduced to Slavery, yet with ſo much Wiſdom and Courage … and aſſerted the State, which they ſo wisely ſounded upon ſo much Liberty, from the unruly Government of a King.