Defense of the People of England, Chapter 7
CHAP. VII.
TO avoid two very great inconveniences, and conſidering your own weight, very weighty ones indeed, you denied in the foregoing Chapter, That the Peoples Power was ſuperior to that of the King; for if that ſhould be granted, Kings muſt provide themſelves of ſome other name, becauſe the people would indeed be King; and ſome diviſions in your Syſtem of Politicks would be confounded; the firſt of which inconveniences would thwart with your Dictionary, and the latter overthrow your Politicks. To theſe I have given ſuch an anſwer as ſhows, That tho our own Safety and Liberty were the principal things I aimed the preſervation of, yet withal, I had ſome conſideration of ſalving your Dictionary, and your Politicks. Now, ſay you, I will prove by other arguments, That a King cannot be judged by his own Subjects; of which Arguments this ſhall be the greateſt and moſt convincing, That a King has no Peer in his Kingdom. What? can a King have no Peer in his Kingdom? What then is the meaning of thoſe Twelve Ancient Peers of the Kings of France? Are they Fables and Trifles? Are they called ſo in vain, and in mock only? Have a care how you affront thoſe Principal men of that Kingdom: Who if they are not the King's Peers, as they are called, I am afraid your Dictionary, which is the only thing you are concerned for, will be found more faulty in France, than in England? But go to, let's hear your demonſtration, that a King has no Peer in his own Kingdom. Becauſe, ſay you, the people of Rome, when they had baniſh'd their King, appointed not one, but two Conſuls; and the reaſon was, That if one of them ſhould tranſgreſs the Laws, his Collegue might be a check to him. There could hardly have been deviſed any thing more ſilly: How came it to paſs then, that but one of the Couſuls had the bundles of Rods carried before him, and not both, if two were appointed, that each might have a Power over the other? And what if both had conſpired againſt the Commonwealth? Would not the Caſe then be … … ſame that it would have been, if one Con… had been appointed without a Colleague? … we know very well, that both Conſuls, and all … Magiſtrates were bound to obey the Senate, …ever the Senate and the People ſaw, that the Intereſt of the Commonwealth ſo required. We have a famous inſtance of that in the Decemviri; who tho they were inveſted with the Power of Conſuls, and were the chief Magiſtrates, yet the Authority of the Senate reduced them all, tho they ſtruggled to retain their Government: Nay, we read that ſome Conſuls before they were out of office, have been declared enemies, and Arms been taken up againſt them; for in thoſe days no man looked upon him as a Conſul, who acted as an Enemy. So War was waged againſt Antony, tho a Conſul, by Authority of the Senate; in which being worſted, he would have been put to death, but that Octavius, affecting the Empire, ſided with him to ſubvert the Commonwealth. Now whereas you ſay, That it is a property peculiar to Kingly Majeſty, that the power reſides in a ſingle perſon; that's but a looſe expreſſion, like the reſt of what you ſay, and is contradicted by your ſelf a little after: For the Hebrew Judges, you ſay, ruled as long as they lived, and there was but one of them at a time: The Scripture alſo calls them Kings; and yet they more accountable to the great Councel. Thus we ſee, That an itch of Vainglory, in being thought to have ſaid all that can be ſaid, makes you hardly ſay any thing but contradictions. Then I ask, what kind of Government that was in the Roman Empire, when ſometimes Two, ſometimes Three Emperors, reign'd all at once? Do you reckon them to have been Emperors, that is, Kings, or was it an Ariſtocracy, or a Triumvirate? Or will you deny, that the Roman Empire under Antoninus and Verus, under Diocleſian and Maximian, under Conſtantine and Licinius, was ſtill but one entire Empire? If theſe Princes were not Kings, your Three forms of Government will hardly hold; if they were, then it is not an eſſential Property of a Kingly Government, to reſide in a ſingle perſon. If one of theſe offend, ſay you, then may the other refer the matter to the Senate, or the People, where he may be accuſed and condemned. And does not the Senate and the People then judg, when the matter is ſo referred to them? So that if you will give any credit to your ſelf, there needs not one Collegue to judg another. Such a miſerable Advocate as you, if you were not ſo wretched a fellow as you are, would deſerve compaſſion; you lye every way ſo open to blows, that if one were minded for ſports-ſake to make a Paſs at any part of you, he could hardly miſs, let him aim where he would. 'Tis ridiculous, ſay you, to imagine, That a King will ever appoint Judges to condemn himſelf. But I can tell you of an Emperor, that was no ridiculous perſon, but an Excellent Prince, and that was Trajan, who when he delivered a Dagger to a certain Roman Magiſtrate, as the cuſtom was, that being the badge of his Office, frequently thus admoniſhed him, Take this Sword, and uſe it for me, if I do as I ought, if otherwiſe, againſt me; for Miſcarriages in the Supreme Magiſtrate are leſs excuſable. This Dion and Aurelius Victor ſay of him: You ſee here, that a worthy Emperor appointed one to judge himſelf, tho he did not make him his equal. Tiberius perhaps might have ſaid as much out of Vanity and Hypocriſie; but 'tis almoſt a crime to imagine that ſo good and virtuous a Prince as Trajan, did not really ſpeak as he thought, and according to what he apprehended right and juſt. How much more reaſonable was it that tho he were ſuperior to the Senate in power, and might if he would, have refuſed to yield them any obedience, yet he actually did obey them, as by vertue of his office he ought to do, and acknowledged … Right in the Government to be ſuperior to his …? For ſo Pliny tells us in his Panegyrick The Senate both deſired and commanded you to be Conſul a fourth time; you may know by the Obedience you pay them, that this is no word of Flattery, but of Power: And a little after: This is the deſign you aim at, to reſtore our loſt Liberty. And Trajan was not of that mind alone; the Senate thought ſo too, and were of opinion, That their Authority was indeed Supreme: For they that could Command their Emperor, might Judge him. So the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, when Caſſius Governor of Syria endeavoured to get the Empire from him, referred himſelf either to the Senate, or the people of Rome, and declared himſelf ready to lay down the Government, if they would have it ſo. Now how ſhould a man determine of the Right of Kings, better, and more truly, than out of the very mouths of the beſt of Kings? Indeed every good King accounts either the Senate, or the People, not only equal, but ſuperior to himſelf by the Law of Nature: But a Tyrant being by nature inferior to all men, every one that is ſtronger than he, ought to be accounted not only his equal, but ſuperior: For as heretofore nature taught men from Force and Violence to betake themſelves to Laws, ſo wherever the Laws are ſet at naught, the ſame dictate of nature muſt neceſſarily prompt us to betake our ſelves to Force again. To be of this opinion, ſays Cicero pro Seſtio, is a ſign of Wiſdom; to put it in practice, argues Courage and Reſolution; to do both, is the effect of Vertue in its perfection Let this ſtand then as a ſetled Maxim of the Law of Nature, never to be ſhaken by any Artifices of Flatterers, That the Senate, or the people, are ſuperior to Kings, be they good or bad: Which is but what you your ſelf do in effect confeſs, when you tell us, That the Authority of Kings was derived from the people. For that power which they transferred to Princes, doth yet naturally, or as I may ſay virtually reſide in themſelves notwithſtanding; for ſo natural cauſes that produce any effect by a certain eminency of operation, do always retain more of their own vertue and energy than they impart; nor do they by communicating to others, exhauſt themſelves. You ſee, the cloſer we keep to Nature, the more evidently does the peoples power appear to be above that of the Prince. And this is likewiſe certain, That the people do not freely, and of choice, ſettle the Government in their King abſolutely, ſo as to give him a Propriety in it; nor by Nature can do ſo; but only for the Publick Safety and Liberty; which when the King ceaſeth to take care of, then the people in effect have given him nothing at all: For Nature ſays the people gave it him to a particular end and purpoſe; which end, if neither Nature nor the People can attain, the peoples Gift becomes no more valid, than any other void Covenant or Agreement. Theſe Reaſons prove very fully, That the People are Superior to the King; and ſo your greateſt and moſt … Argument, That a King cannot be judged by his … becauſe he has no Peer in his Kingdom, nor any Superior falls to the ground. For you take that for granted which we by no means allow. In a popular State, ſay you, the Magiſtrates being appointed by the people, may likewiſe be puniſhed for their Crimes, by the people: In an A…cracy the Senators may be puniſhed by their Collegues. But 'tis a … thing to proceed criminally againſt a King in his own Kingdom, and make him plead for his life. What can you conclude from hence, but that they who ſet up Kings over them, are the moſt miſerable and moſt ſilly people in the world. But, I paay, what's the reaſon why the people may not puniſh a King that becomes a Malefactor, as well as they may popular Magiſtrates and Senators in an Ariſtocracy? Do you think that all they that live under a Kingly Government, were ſo ſtrangely in love with Slavery, as when they might be free, to chuſe Vaſſalage, and to put themſelves all and entirely under the dominion of one man, who often happens to be an ill man, and often a fool, ſo as whatever cauſe might be, to leave themſelves no … in, no relief from the Laws, nor the dictates of Nature, againſt the Tyranny of a moſt outragious Maſter, when ſuch a one happens? Why do they then tender conditions to their Kings, when they firſt enter upon their Government, and preſcribe Laws for them to govern by? Do they do this to be trampled upon the more, and be the more laughed to ſcorn? Can it …e imagined, that a whole people would ever ſo … themſelves, depart from their own intereſt to that degree, be ſo wanting to themſelves, as to place all their hopes in one man, and he very often the moſt vain perſon of them all? To what end do they require an Oath of their Kings, Not to act any … contrary to Law? We muſt ſuppoſe them to do this, that (poor creatures!) they may learn to their …rrow, That Kings only may commit Perjury with impunity. This is what your own wicked Concluſions hold forth. If a King that is elected, promiſe any thing to his people upon Oath, which if he would not have ſw…rn to, perhaps they would not have choſe him, yet if he refuſe to perform that promiſe, he falls not under the peoples censure. Nay, tho he ſwear to his Subjects at his Election, That he will adminiſter Juſtice to them according to the Laws of the Kingdom; and that if he do not, they ſhall be diſcharged of their Allegiance, and himſelf ipſo facto ceaſe to be their King, yet if he break this oath, 'tis God and not man that muſt require it of him. I have tranſcribed theſe lines, not for their Elegance, for they are barbarouſly expreſſed; nor becauſe I think there needs any anſwer to them, for they anſwer themſelves, they explode and damn themſelves by their notorious falſhood and loathſomneſs; but I did it to recommend you to Kings for your great Merits; that among ſo many places as there are at Court, they may put you into ſome Preferment or Office that may be fit for you; ſome are Princes Secretaries, ſome their Cupbearers, ſome Maſters of the Revels; I think you had beſt be Maſter of the Perjuries to ſome of them; You ſha'nt be Maſter of the Ceremonies, you are too much a Clown for that; but their Treachery and Perfidiouſneſs ſhall be under your care. But that men may ſee that you are both a Fool and a Knave to the higheſt degree, let us conſider theſe laſt aſſertions of yours a little more narrowly; A King, ſay you, tho he ſwear to his Subjects at his Election that he will govern according to Law, and that if he do not, they ſhall be diſcharged of their Allegiance, and he himſelf, ipſo facto, ceaſe to be their King; yet can he not be depoſed or puniſhed by them. Why not a King, I pray, as well as popular Magiſtrates? Becauſe in a popular State, the People do not transfer all their Power to the Magiſtrates. And do they in the Caſe that you have put, veſt it all in the King, when they place him in the Government upon thoſe terms expreſly, to hold it no longer than he uſeth it well? So that it is evident, that a King ſworn to obſerve the Laws, if he tranſgreſs them, may be puniſhed and depoſed, as well as popular Magiſtrates. So, that you can make no more uſe of that invincible Argument of the Peoples tranferring all their Right and Power into the Prince; you your ſelf have battered it down with your own Engines. Hear now another moſt powerful and invincible Argument of his, why Subjects cannot judge their Kings, becauſe he is bound by no Law, being himſelf the ſole Lawgiver. Which having been proved already to be moſt falſe, this great reaſon comes to nothing, as well as the former. But the reaſon why Princes have but seldom been proceeded againſt for perſonal and private Crimes, as Whoredom, and Adultery, and the like, is not becauſe they could not juſtly be puniſhed even for ſuch, but leſt the People ſhould receive more prejudice through diſturbances that might be occaſioned by the King's Death, and the change of Affairs, than they would be profited by the puniſhment of one Man or two. But when they begin to be univerſally injurious and inſufferable, it has always been the Opinion of all Nations, that then, being Tyrants, it is lawful to put them to Death any how, condemn'd or uncondemn'd. Hence Cicero in his Second Phillippick, ſays thus of thoſe that kill'd Caeſar, They were the firſt that ran through with their Swords, not a Man who affected to be King, but who was actually ſetled in the Government; which, as it was a worthy and godlike Action, ſo it's ſet before us for our imitation. How unlike are you to him! Murder, Adultery, Injuries, are not regal and publick, but private and perſonal Crimes. Well ſaid Paraſite! you have obliged all Pimps and Proſ…igates in Courts by this Expreſſion. How ingeniouſly do you act, both the Paraſite, and the Pimp, with the ſame breath? A King that is an Adulterer, or a Murderer, may yet govern well, and conſequently ought not to be put to Death, becauſe together with his Life he muſt loſe his Kingdom; and it was never yet allowed by God's Laws, or Man's, that for one and the ſame Crime, a Man was to be puniſhed twice. Infamous foul-mouth, Wretch! By the ſame reaſon the Magiſtrates in a popular State, or in an Ariſtocracy, ought never to be put to Death, for fear of double Puniſhment; no Judge, no Senator muſt dye, for they muſt loſe their Magiſtracy too, as well as their Lives. As you have endeavoured to take all Power out of the Peoples hands, and veſt it in the King, ſo you would all Majeſty too: A delegated, tranſlatitious Majeſty we allow, but that Majeſty does chiefly and primarily reſide in him, you can no more prove, than you can, that Power and Authority does. A King, you ſay, cannot commit Treaſon againſt his People, but a People may againſt their King. And yet a King is what he is for the People only, not the People for him. Hence I infer, that the whole Body of the People, or the greater part of them muſt needs have greater Power than the King. This you deny, and begin to caſt up accounts. He is of greater Power than any one, than any two, than any …, than any ten, than any hundred, than any thouſand, than any ten thouſand; be it ſo, He is of more Power than half the People. I will not deny that neither; Add now half of the other half, will be not have more Power than all th…ſe? Not at all. Go on, why do you take away the Board? Do you not underſtand Progreſſion in Arithmetick? He begins to reckon after another manner. Has not the King, and the Nobility together, more Power? No, Mr Changeling, I deny that too. If by the Nobility, whom you ſtile Optimates, you mean the Peers only; for it may happen, that amongſt the whole number of them, there may not be one Man deſerving that Appellation; for it often falls out, that there are better and wiſer Men, than they amongſt the Commons, whom in Conjunction with the greater, or the better part of the People, I ſhould not ſcruple to call by the Name of, and take them for all the People. But if the King is not Superior in Power to all the People together, he is then a King but of ſingle Perſons, he is not the King of the whole Body of the People. You ſay well, no more he is, unleſs they are content he ſhould be ſo. Now, balance your accounts, and you will find that by miſcaſting, you have loſt your Principal: The Engliſh ſay, that the Right of Majeſty originally and principally reſides in the People; which Principle would introduce a Confuſion of all States. What, of an Ariſtocracy and Democracy? But let that paſs. What if it would overthrow a Gynaecocracy too? (i. e. a Government of one or more Women) under which State or Form of Government, they ſay, you are in danger of being beaten at home; would not the Engliſh do you a kindneſs in that, you ſheepiſh Fellow, you? But there's no hope of that. For 'tis moſt juſtly ſo ordered, ſince you would ſubject all Mankind to Tyranny abroad, that you your ſelf ſhould live in a ſcandalous, moſt unmanlike Slavery at home. We muſt tell you, you ſay, what we mean by the word People. There are a great many other things, which you ſtand more in need of being told: For of things that more immediately concern you, you ſeem altogether ignorant, and never to have learnt any thing but Words and Letters, nor to be capable of any thing elſe. But this you think you know, that by the word People, we mean the Common People only, excluſive of the Nobility, becauſe we have put down the Houſe of Lords. And yet that very thing ſhows, that under the word People, we comprehend all our Natives, of what Order and Degree ſoever; in that we have ſetled one Supreme Senate only, in which the Nobility alſo, as a part of the People, not in their own Right, as they did before; but Repreſenting thoſe Burroughs or Counties, for which they may be choſe, may give their Votes. Then you inveigh againſt the Common People, as being Blind and Brutiſh, Ignorant of the Art of Governing, you ſay there's nothing more Empty, more Vain, more Inconſtant, more Uncertain than they. All which is very true of your ſelf, and it's true likewiſe of the Rabble, but not of the middle ſort, amongſt whom the moſt prudent Men, and moſt skilful in Affairs are generally found; others are moſt commonly diverted either by Luxury and Plenty, or by Want and Poverty, from Virtue, and the Study of Laws and Government. There are many ways, you ſay, by which Kings come to the Crown, ſo as not to he beholden to the People at all for it; and eſpecially, thoſe that inherit a Kingdom. But thoſe Nations moſt certainly be Slaves, and born to Slavery, that acknowledge any one to be their Lord and Maſter ſo abſolutely, as that they are his inheritance, and come to him by deſcent, without any Conſent of their own; they deſerve not the Appellation of Subjects, nor of Freemen, nor can they be juſtly reputed ſuch; nor are they to be accounted as a Civil Society, but muſt be looked on as the Poſſeſſions and Eſtate of their Lord, and his Family: For I ſee no difference as to the Right of Ownerſhip betwixt them, and Slaves, and Beaſts. Secondly, They that come to the Crown by Conqueſt, cannot acknowledge themſelves to have receiv'd from the People, the Power they uſurp. We are not now diſcourſing of a Conqueror, but of a Conquered King; what a Conqueror may lawfully do, we'll diſcourſe elſewhere; do you keep to your Subject. But whereas you aſcribe to Kings that Ancient Right that Maſters of Families have over their Houſholds, and take an example from thence of their abſolute Power, I have ſhown already over and over, that there is no likeneſs at all betwixt them. And Ariſtotle, whom you name ſo often, if you had read him, would have taught you as much in the beginning of his Politicks, where he ſays they judge amiſs that think there is but little difference betwixt a King, and a Maſter of a Family: For that there is not a numerical, but a ſpecifical Difference betwixt a Kingdom and a Family. For when Villages grew to be Towns and Cities, that Regal Domeſtick Right vaniſhed by degrees, and was no more owned. Hence Diodorus in his firſt Book ſays, That anciently Kingdoms were tranſmitted not to the former King's Sons, but to thoſe that had beſt deſerved of the People. And Juſtine, Originally, ſays he, the Government of Nations, and of Countries, was by Kings, who were exalted to that height of Majeſty, not by popular Ambition, but for their Moderation which commended them to good Men. Whence it is manifeſt, that in the very beginning of Nations, that Fatherly and Hereditary Government gave way to vertue, and the peoples right. Which is the moſt natural reaſon and cauſe, and was the true riſe of Kingly Government. For at firſt, men entred into Societies, not that any one might inſult over all the reſt, but that in caſe any ſhould injure other, there might be Laws and Judges to protect them from wrong, or at leaſt to puniſh the wrong doers. When men were at firſt diſpers'd and ſcattered aſunder, ſome wiſe and eloquent man perſwaded them to enter into Civil Societies; that he himſelf, ſay you, might exerciſe Dominion over them, when ſo united. Perhaps you meant this of Nimrod, who is ſaid to have been the firſt Tyrant. Or elſe it proceeds from your own malice only, and certainly it cannot have been true of thoſe great and generous ſpirited men, but is a fiction of your own, not warranted by any authority that I ever heard of. For all ancient Writers tell us, that thoſe firſt Inſtituters of Communities of men, had a regard to the good and ſafety of Mankind only, and not to any private advantages of their own, or to make themſelves great or powerful. One thing I cannot paſs by, which I ſuppoſe you intended for an Emblem, to ſet off the reſt of this Chapter: If a Conſul, ſay you, had been to be accuſed before his Magiſtracy expired, there muſt have been a Dictator created for that purpoſe; though you had ſaid before, that for that very reaſon there were two of them. Juſt ſo your Poſitions always agree with one another, and almoſt every Page declares how weak and frivolous whatever you ſay or write upon any ſubject, is. Under the ancient Engliſh-Saxon Kings, you ſay, the people were never called to Parliaments. If any of our own Country-men had aſſerted ſuch a thing; I could eaſily have convinced him that he was in an error. But I am not ſo much concerned at your miſtaking our affairs, becauſe y'are a Foreigner. This in effect is all you ſay of the Right of Kings in general. Many other things I omit, for you uſe many digreſſions, and put things down that either have no ground at all, or are nothing to the purpoſe, and my deſign is not to vye with you in impertinence.