The Art of Logic and Rhetoric, Book 2 – Title page 2
THE SECOND BOOK OF PETER RAMUS His DIALECTICA of Iudgement.
CAP. 1. What Iudgement is.
Q. HItherto the first part of Dialectica in Invention hath bin expounded; the other part followeth, in Judgment. What then is Iudgment?
A. Judgment is the second pa…t of Logick, of disposing arguments to be judged well.
Q. How are they judged?
A. Every thing is judged by a certain rule of disposition.
Q. It may be thought then, that this part of Logick is called both Iudgment and Disposition from hence.
A. So it is.
CAP. 2. An aff…rmative or negative Axioma.
Q. What are the kindes of judgment?
A. Judgment is Axiomatical, or Dianoeticall.
Q. What is an Axioma?
A. Axioma is the disposition of an argument with an argument; wherein somwhat is judged to be, or not to be.
Q. What is it called, and whence receiveth it the name?
A. In the Latin of Enuntiatum, it is called Enuntiation; of Pronuntiatum, Pronuntiation.
Q. What are the the affections of an Axioma.
A. An Axioma is Affirmative, or Negative.
Q. What is affirmative?
A. Affirmative is when the force of it is affirmed.
Q. And what Negative?
A. When it is denied. From hence springeth the contradiction of Axiomas, when the same argument is affirmed or denied.
CAP. 3. True and false.
Q. What may be a second kinde of the affections of an Axioma?
A. An Axioma secondly is true or false.
Q. How true?
A. VVhen it pronounceth as the thing is.
Q. How false?
A. Contrary.
Q. What are the affections of a true Axioma?
A. A true Axiomas is contingent or necessary.
Q. How contingent?
A. When it is so true, that it may somtimes be false.
Q. Give example.
A. Fortune helpeth the bold; for it may be that which is true to day, to morrow may be false: and therefore the judgment of this contingent verity, is called Opinion: those things of the time past or present, may be certain to a man; but of time to come they cannot by nature, although with God all things are present. Therefore Martial doth worthily mock Priscus.
Priscus, thou often ask'st what I shall be;
If now most rich, hereafter what, truly?
Things for to come canst thou not tel them me?
If thou a Lion art, what wilt thou be?
Q. How necessary?
A. When it is alwayes true, neither can be false.
Q. What is this affirmative called?
A. This affirmative is called foreign, of every thing.
Q. How impossible?
A. Contrarily, where it can be true of nothing.
Q. What belongeth to an Axioma of the artes?
A. An axioma of the arts ought to be foreign; as also Homogene & Catholick.
Q. What is an homogene axioma?
A. An homogene axioma is when the parts are essentiall among themselves: as the form to the thing formed, the subject to its proper adjunct.
Q. VVhat is this called?
A. This Genus of the Species is called foreign, by it self.
Q. VVhat is a Catholick axioma.
A. A Catholick axioma is when the consequent is alwayes true of the anticedent; not onelyonly in every thing and by it self, but also reciprocally.
Q. Give example.
A. A man is a living creature, reasonable: Number is equal or unequal.
Q. VVhat is this called?
A. This is called foreign, universally first.
Q. What then are the lawes of the proper documents of the arts?
A. These three: the first, foreign, the law of ve…ity: the second, foreign, the law of justice: the third, foreign, called the law of wisdom. And such is the judgment of catholick axiomas, the most true and chief knowledge.
CAP. 4. The simple Axioma.
Q. You have expounded the common affection of axiomas, the kindes follow: what are then the kindes of an axioma,
A. An axioma is simple or compound.
Q. VVhat is simple?
A. Simple is that which is contained in the force of one word; and therefore by an affirmative or negative word it affirmeth or denieth.
Q Give example.
A. Fire burneth, fire is hot, fire is not water.
Q. Shew the force of these examples.
A. Here fire is the antecedent, burneth the consequent: and this is the first disposition of invented things; of the cause with the effect, as in the first example; the subject with the adjunct, as in the second; the disagreeing with the disagreeing, in the third: After a certain manner any argument may be enuntiated (except those full of comparison and distribution); ag…eeings, truely, by affirming; disagreeings by denying.
Q. What are the kindes of a simple axioma.
A. A simple axioma is generall, or speciall.
Q. What is generall?
A. Generall is when the common consequent is attributed generally to the common antecedent: And this contradiction doth not alwayes divide the true and false; but both parts of the contingent, as also not of contingents may be false.
Q. Give example of the first.
A. Each place delighted is with Baiis pleasant Rooms.
No place delighted is with Baiis pleasant Rooms.
Q. Give example of the second.
A. Every creature is reasonable: no creature is reasonable.
Q. What is a speciall axioma?
A. A specall axioma is when the consequent is not attributed to every antecedent: and here the contradiction ever divideth the true from the false.
Q. What are the kinds of speciall?
A. Speciall is particular, or proper.
Q. VVhat is particular?
A. Particular is when the common consequent is attributed particularly to the antecedent: but to this axioma it is generally cont…dicted.
Q. Give examples.
A. Somewhat is to be pardoned: Nothing is to be pardoned. Some clemency is not to be praised: All clemency is to be praised.
Q. VVhat is a proper axioma?
A. A proper axioma is when the consequent is attributed to a proper antecedent.
Q. Give example.
A. Fabulla is fair: whose negative and contradiction is, Fabulla is not fair.
CAP. 5. The copulative axioma.
Q. What is the compound axioma?
A. The compound axioma is that which is contained in the force of a conjunction. Therefore from an affirmative oR negative conjunction it is a affirmed or denyed. And a part of the contradiction is true, a part false.
Q. What are the kindes?
A. A compound Enunciate is for his conjunction congregative, or segregative.
Q. What is congr…ative?
A. Congregative is that which enuntiateth all agreeings by affirming, and disagreeings by denying.
Q. VVhat are the kinds?
A. Copulative or connexed.
Q. What is copulative?
A. Copulative is that whose conjunction is copulative.
Q Give example.
A. AEneid. 1.
The east and south windes on the seas do blow
They rush through deep till on the top they show,
The Affrick oft with these his blasts conjoynes.
This therefore shall be the negative and contradiction.
The east and south windes not on seas do blow,
The rush not through the deep, ne on top show:
The Affrick doth not oft his blasts conjoyn.
Q. But whereupon dependeth the judgment of the copulative enunciate?
A. The judgment of the copulative Enunciate being true, dependeth of the truth of all parts: false, at the least of one part false.
Q. What may further be comprised under this head?
A. The enunciate of a relate quality is of this kinde, whose conjunction is the relation it self.
Q. Give example.
A. Eclog. 3.
Some thy song as sleep on grass doth please
The traveller, his weary limbs to ease.
Q. Shew the force of this example.
A. Here the copulative judgment is as if he should say, sleep is gratefull to the weary, and so thy song is pleasing to me.
Q. What is the Negative hereof?
A.
Not me thy song as sleep on grass doth please
The traveller, his weary limbs to ease.
CAP. 6. The connexed Axioma.
Q. What is a connexed Axioma.
A. A connexed axioma is congregative, whose conjection is connexive.
Q. Give example.
A. AEneid. 2. If fortune doth feign Simon miserable, it dishonestly feigneth him to be vain and a lyer. Whose negative is, If fortune doth not feign Simon miserable… it dishonestly feigneth him to be vain and a lyer.
Q. Is not this conjunction also denyed more manifestly, by denying the consequent?
A. Yes.
Q. Give example.
A. Pro Amer. I am not a murtherer, though in their company: De fato: Neither if every Enunciation be true or false, doth it follow therefore that the causes are immutable; For affirmation signifieth, if the Antecedent be, that the consequent is also. Negation therefore and Contradiction determineth, If the Antecedent be, that therefore the consequent is not. Wherefore, when thou shalt judge the connexive to be absolutely true, thou shalt judge it also necessary; and thou shalt understand this necessity to spring from the necessary connexion o… parts, the which may also be even in false parts.
Q. Give example of this.
A. If a man be a Lyon, he is also four footed; this is a necessary connexion.
Q. But if the connexion be contingent, and only put for his probability, how shall it be judged then?
A. Its judgment then shall be only opinion.
Q. Give example.
A. Ter: and Phamphilus, if thou dost this, this day is the last thou shalt see me.
Q. What may be further under this head?
A. This relation connexive of consequence is like to the connexed axioma. As when Tullius is said to be an orator, he hath also skil in pleading well. And thus much of the Congregative axioma.
CAP. 7. The discrete Axioma.
Q. What is a segregative axioma?
A. A segregative axioma is that whose conjunction is segregative, and therefore enunciateth disagreeing arguments.
Q. What are the kindes?
A. A segregative enunciation is discrete or disjunct.
Q. What is discrete?
A. Discrete is that whose conjunction is discretive; and therefore of disagreeings it chiefly enunciateth diverses.
Q. Give example.
A. Tusc. 5. Although they may be judged by the sense of the body, yet they are referred to the minde: Whose negative and contradiction is, Although they may not be judged by the sense of the body, yet they are referred to the mind; or, although they may be judged by the sense of the body, yet they are not referred to the mind. For yet is here a chief conjunction,
Q. How is the discrete Enunciat judged to be true?
A. The discrete enunciation is judged to be true and lawfull, if the parts be not only true, but may be also discrete.
Q. How is the false or ridiculous judged?
A. Contrarily.
CAP. 8. The disjunct Axioma.
Q. What is a disjunct axioma?
A. A disjunct axioma is a segregative axioma, whose conjunction is disjunct.
Q. Give example.
A. Goerg. 1.
There, as they say, is either silent night,
Always most dark, and void of any light;
Or else the morning from us here doth go,
And brings the day unto them there also.
Q. Shew another example.
A. De fato, Every enunciation is true or false.
Q. Here it seemeth is signified from the disjunct, that one only is true.
A. So it is.
Q. What shall the negative and contradiction be.
A. Not every enunciation is true or false.
Q. And what doth the contradiction signifie?
A. That one of them is not true by necessity: for if the disjunction be absolutely true, it is also necessary: and the parts of the disjunct are opposite without any means.
Q. But although the disjunction be absolutely true, and also necessary; may there not be a necessity, that the parts should be separately necessary?
A. No.
Q. Give example.
A. A man is good or not good. Here the disjunction is necessary, and yet A man is good, is not a necessary enunciation; also A man is not good, is not a necessary enunciation.
Q. Whereupon then dependeth the necessity of the disjunction?
A. The necessity of the disjunction dependeth on the necessary opposition and disjunction of the parts, not as their necessary verity.
Q. But is not the disjunction oftentimes from condition?
A. Yes.
Q. Give example.
A. As if it be thought whether Cleon will come, or Socrates, because it was so agreed that one of them only should come.
Q. It seemeth by this, that if the disjunction be contingent, it is not absolutely true, but is only opinionable.
A. So it is, and that more frequently in the use of man.
Q. Give example.
A. Ovid. Epist. Lean.
Either good hap shall now unto me fall,
Or else fierce death the end of loving thral.
CAP. 9. The Syllogisme and its parts.
Q. You have manifested in its selfe the axiomaticall judgement by axiomas: the dianoetical followeth: What therefore is dianoia?
A. Dianoia is when one axioma is derived from another.
Q. What are the kinds of Dianoia?
A. A Syllogisme or Method.
Q. What is a Syllogisme?
A. Syllogism is a Dianoia whereby the question is so disposed with the argument, as the antecedent put, it is necessarily concluded.
Q. Make this plainer.
A. When the axioma is doubtfull, the question is effected, and there is need of a third argument to be placed with the question, for its trust.
Q. How many parts hath the antecedent?
A. The antecedent of a Syllogi…me hath two parts, a Proposition, and an Assumption.
Q. What is a proposition?
A. A proposition is the first part of the antecedent, whereby the consequent of the question is at least disposed with the argument.
Q. What is the assumption?
A. The assumption is the second part of the antecedent, which is affirmed from the proposition.
Q. But what is the consequent part of the syllogisme?
A. The consequent part of the syllogisme, is that which imbraceth the part of the question, and concludeth it.
Q. What is it called?
A. It is called from the nature of its Complexion and Conclusion.
Q. If any part of the syllogisme want, what is said to be?
A. It is called Enthymema.
Q. But what if any part happen to be besides its parts?
A. Then it is called a Porsyllogisme.
Q. Is not the order of the parts oftentimes confounded?
A. Yes.
Q. What then if any doubt shall arise from it?
A. Then that shal be filled up which wanteth, those cut off which abound, and every part digested into his place.
CAP. 10. The simple contracted Syllogism.
Q. What are the kinds of a syllogisme?
A. A syllogisme is simple or compound.
Q. What is simple?
A. Simple is, where the consequent part of the question is placed in the proposition, the antecedent part in the assumption.
Q. What are the affections of it?
A. It is affirmed, denyed, generall, special, and proper.
Q. How is it affirmed?
A. From al the affirmative parts.
Q. How is it denyed?
A. From one negative of the antecedent parts, with complexion.
Q. How is it general?
A. From the general proposition and assumption.
Q. How is it speciall?
A. From one of the generals only.
Q. And how is it proper?
A. From both propers.
Q. What are the kinds of the simple syllogisme?
A. The simple syllogisme is contracted by parts, or explicated.
Q. What is contract?
A. Contract is when the argument for the example is so subjected to a particular question, that the antecedent may be understood to affirm each part; and in the assumption.
Q. Give an example.
A. Certain confidence is vertue, as constancy: certain confidence is not vertue, as boldnesse.
Q. Shew the force of this example.
A. This argument is understood to go before each part of the question, as if it were expressed; constancy is a vertue, and confidence, and therefore certain confidence is a vertue: also boldnesse is not a vertue, and yet it is confidence; and therefore some confidence is not a vertue. So in the use of disputing, the Master of the syllogisme draweth the judgement, neither is it set forth otherwise. And by this exposition the beginning of the syllogism is expounded by Aristotle, so that the syllogisme in its full judgement is more clear and manifest.
CAP. 11. The first kinde of the simple explicated Syllogisme.
Q. What is the explicated Syllogisme?
A. The explicated Syllogism is, whose parts are explicated.
Q. What are the proprieties in this explicated Syllogisme?
A. Two, first the proposition is generall or proper: secondly, the conclusion is like to the antecedent, or the the weaker part.
Q. What are the kinds of it?
A. The kinds are two-fold.
Q. What is the first?
A. The first is, where the argument always followeth the negative in the other part.
Q. Shew some Syllogisme of this kind.
A. GEN. 1.
Ce- A troubled man useth not his reason well:
sa- But a wise man useth his reason well:
re. A wise man is not therefore troubled.
Q. Produce the example of some Orator for this Syllogisme.
A. This judgment is so brought forth of Cicero, Tusc. 3. And when (saith he) the eye is troubled, it is not honestly affected to the fulfilling of its duty: and the rest of the parts, as also the whole body, when it is moved from its state, wanteth its office and function; so a troubled mind is not honestly affected to fulfill his duty. But the duty of the mind is to use reason, and a wise man is always so affected, that he useth reason most excellently; he is therefore never troubled.
Q. Give example of another generall Syllogisme.
A. GEN. 2.
Ca- A mortall thing is compound.
me- A soul is not compound.
stres. A soul therefore is not mortall.
Q. Produce the authority of some Ancient, avouching this Syllogisme.
A. Cicero judgeth the soul to be immortall by this syllogisme. Tusc. 1. For we cannot doubt, saith he, in our minds, unlesse we be perchance ignorant in physicall things, but that there is nothing knit to soules, nothing connexed, nothing copulate, nothing joyned, nothing double; which when it is so, can surely never be parted, nor divided, nor severed, nor drawn asunder, therefore neither perish: for perishing is as it were a departure and separation or breach of those parts, which before the perishing were joyned together.
Q. Give an example of a speciall syllogisme.
A. SPEC. 1.
Fe- A pale man is not couragious.
sti- Maximus is couragious.
no. Maximus therefore is not pale.
Q. Produce authority for this syllogisme.
A. But this judgment Ovid. concludeth, De Pont. 3. El. 3.
Paleness and sloth are not in the high mind,
Rather with vipers them on ground we finde:
In highest things thy minde excels, we see,
No name I finde t' express the wit of thee.
Some miseries do taste, hurt and outworn,
Are made to feel sharpe pricking of the thorn:
Yet thou art wont to help complaining men,
Amongst which number, pray, let me be then.
Q. Shew another example of the speciall syllogisme.
A. SPEC. 2.
Ba- A dancer is Lecherous.
ro- Murena is not Lecherous.
co. Murena therefore is no dancer.
Q. Produce some Orator for this syllogisme?
A. Cic. pro Mur. For no man almost, being sober, danceth, unlesse perchance he be mad; neither alone, nor at a moderate and honest banquet; for dancing is the companion of untimely banquets, pleasant places, and many delights: Thou snatchest that from me, that it is necessary that vices should be: thou leavest that whereby this removed, this vice ought not to be at all; no filthy banquet, no love, no gluttony is shewed: and when we finde not all these things which have the name of pleasure, and vices; there thou canst not finde lechery: nay, thinkest thou to finde a shadow of lust in such?
Q. Avouch some other authority after the like manner?
A. After this manner of judgement Ovid de Trist. 1. concludeth triply, whil'st he sets forth the excuse of his verses.
They that make verses should not merry be,
Our time is clouded with adversity:
They that write verses should enjoy their ease,
The seas, the windes, with winter fierce me presse.
Good poets should not fear, but I feare death,
I dread lest swords do take away my breath:
Then what is here, a right judge will admire,
If reading them they satisfie's desire.
Q. Give example of proper syllogisms.
A. PRO. 1.
Agesilaus is not painted by Apelles.
Alexander is painted by Apelles.
Alexander therefore is not Agesilaus.
Q. Give another example of a proper Syllogism.
A. PRO. 2.
Cesar oppressed his countrey.
Tullius opressed not his countrey.
Tullius therefore is not Cesar.
CAP. 12. The second kinde of the simple explicate Sollogism.
Q What is the second kinde of the explicate Syllogisme?
A. The second kinde of the explicate Syllogisme is, when the argument goeth before in the proposition, the affirmative followeth in the assumption.
Q. Give an example of an affirmative generall after this kinde.
A. AFF. GUN.
Bar- Every just thing is profitable.
ba- Every honest thing is just.
ra. Every honest thing therefore is profitable.
Q. Produce some Orator avouching this Syllogisme.
A. Thus Cicero concludeth, Offic. 2. The Philosophers, truly, with great authority, severely, soundly, and honestly do distinguish these three confused kindes by cogitation. For whatsoever is just, that also they think to be profitable: also, whatsoever is honest, that is just; from whence ariseth, That whatsoever is honest, that is also profitable.
Q. Give an example of a Negative Generall Syllogisme?
A. NEG. GEN.
Ce- A fearfull man is not free.
la- A covetous man is fearfull.
rent. A covetous man therefore is not free.
Q. Prove this by some Poet.
A. It is thus concluded and judged by Horace: Epist. 1.
Who freer is, he that as servant dwelleth,
Or he that in his monies love excelleth:
I do not see, he that desires doth fear,
And he that fears, his freedom doth not bear.
Q. Give another example of this kind of Syllogisme.
A. Ter. in Eu. concludeth and judgeth this; That which is void of counsell, cannot be governed by counsell: Love is void of counsell: It cannot therefore be governed by counsell.
Q. Produce the words of Terrence.
A. The former Syllogism followeth in these words: Master, that thing which hath in it neither counsell nor means, that thou canst not govern by counsell. In love are all these vices, injuries, suspitions, enmities, flatteries, warre, peace again: these uncertain things, if thou wouldest guide by certain reason, thou doest no more then if thou shouldest labour to be mad with reason.
Q. Give an example of the affirmative speciall Syllogisme.
A. AFF. SPE.
Da- Consuls made by vertue, ought studiously to defend the common-wealth.
ri- Cicero is made Consul by vertue.
i- Cicero therefore ought studiously to defend the common-wealth.
Q. Produce Tullies words avouching this Syllogisme.
A. The Orator doth both conclude and judge his own diligence. Agr. 2. For the great care and diligence as wel of all the Consuls, ought to be placed in defending the common-wealth, as of those, who not in the cradle, but in the camp were made Consuls: none of our ancients promised to the people of Rome for me, that I ought to be trusted: to ask of me that I ought, even when I did ask, none of our ancestors commended me to you; therefore if I neglect any thing, there is none who shal intreat me for you. Yet while my life lasts (I being he who am able to defend it from their wickednesse) I promise to you, O Quirites, that you have committed the common-wealth to the providence of a good trust: to a watchfull man, not a coward; to a diligent man, not a sluggard.
Q. Shew another Syllogisme of this kind.
A. That which comes wished for, is gratefull.
Lesbia comes wished for to Catullus.
She is therefore gratefull.
Q. Set forth Catullus his words, wherein he thus concludeth.
A. That which we long for with desires great,
Is acceptable to us when we have't:
Wherefore this gratefull is, more dear then gold,
That Lesbia is come, our friend of old.
Thou dost our wishes grant, our hope restore:
O light most clear! who is there that is more
Happy then I, who have what I desire;
Even what I wish, ther's nought I can require.
Q. Give an example of an Negative Speciall.
A. NEG. SPE.
Fe- The deceiver of a loving maid is not to be praised.
ri- Demophoon is the deceiver of a loving maid, to wit Phillis.
o… Demophoon therefore is not to be praised.
Q. Set forth the words of Phillis in Ovid, so judging.
A. It is no glory virgins to deceive,
Who love a man, and wish him for to have;
Simplicity should rather favour gain.
But I that love, and als… a woman a…,
Deceived am by thee with flattering stile;
The gods thy praises make it all the while.
Q. Give an example of an Affirmative Proper.
A. AFF. PRO.
Octavius is Cesars heir.
I am Octavius.
I am therefore Cesars heir.
Q. Give an example of a Negative Proper.
A. NEG. PRO.
Anthony is not Cesars son.
Thou art Anthony.
Thou art not therefore Cesars son.
CAP. 13. The first connexed Syllogisme.
Q. You have expounded hitherto the simple Syllogism: What now is the compound Syllogisme?
A. The compound Syllogisme is a Syllogisme where the whole question is another part of the affirmed and compound proposition, the argument is another part.
Q. But what if any thing were taken away in the compound Syllogisme?
A. That were to put a speciall contradiction.
Q. What are the kindes of a compound Syllogisme?
A. A compound Syllogisme is connexed or disjunct.
Q. What is a connexed syllogisme?
A. A connexed syllogisme, is a compound syllogisme of a connexed proposition.
Q. How many are the manners o… distinction?
A. It is of two manners.
Q. What is the first?
A. The first manner of the connexed syllogisme is that which assumeth the antecedent, and the consequent concludeth.
Q Give an example of th…s.
A. After this manner Cicero concludeth. lib. 2. De Divinatione.
If they be gods, it is divination.
But they are gods.
It is divination therefore.
Q. Give another example.
A. Offic. 3. And if also nature prescribeth this, that a man to a man, whatsoever he be, for that same cause that he is a man, will use consultation, it is necessary according to the same nature, that the profit of all should be common. Which if it be so, all of us are contained in one and the same law of nature; and this, if it be so indeed, we are certainly forbidden by the law of nature to violate one another: but the first is true: the last therefore is also true.
Q. Give another example.
A. AEncid. 4. Dido adjureth AEneas to remain with her.
Dost thou me fly? by these tears I thee pray,
By thy right hand thee I beseech to stay:
Else thou wilt leave me wretched here alone.
By our dear marriage, our dear love, like none.
If I do ought deserve, if thou hast been
Sweet unto me, have pity on me then.
Look on my slippery house, and now I pray,
If any place for prayers be, I say,
For Lybians sake, for Nomades his kings,
Who hated me, and for all other things
Which I for thee did bear. My credit's lost,
I am alone, for thee thus am I crost:
Besides all this, my fame is quite decay'd,
Rather I had my flesh in dust were laid.
Q. Doth it alwayes assume the same?
A. Oftentimes not the same, but a greater.
Q. Give example.
A. Cat. 1. If thy parents feared and hated thee, neither couldest thou please them by any reason, in my opinion, thou wert to abstain a little from their sight: now the countrey (which is our common parent) hateth and feareth thee, and of a long time judgeth nothing of thee, except it be touching thy death. Canst thou neither avoyd its authority, neither follow its judgment, neither fearest thou its force?
Q. What may further be under this head?
A. This manner of concluding is the very same when the proposition is a relate of time.
Q. Give example.
A. After this kinde the nymph Oenon in Ovid, concludeth the error of her foolishness.
When Paris Oenon hoped to forsake,
It would to Xanthus with all speed betake:
Xanthus, make haste, return thou back again,
That so this Paris Oenon may sustain.
CAP. 14. The second connexed Syllogisme.
Q. What is the second manner of the connexed syllogisme?
A. The second manner of the connexed syllogisme taketh away the consequent, that it may take away the antecedent.
Q. Give example.
A. If a wise man assent to any thing, sometimes also he shall be opinated.
But he shall never be opinated.
Therefore he shall assent to nothing.
Q. Give another example.
A. By the like syllogisme Ovid. Trist. 12. judgeth his foolishness.
If I were wise, those sisters I should hate,
Deities hurtfull to whom on them wait…
But now so great my foolishness is seen,
I build them altars who my hurt have been.
These two kindes of the syllogisme are most usuall of all.
CAP. 15. The first disjunct Syllogisme.
What is the disjunct syllogisme?
A. The disjunct syllogisme is the syllogisme composed of a disjunct proposition.
Q. What are the manners of distinction?
A. Two.
Q. What is the first?
A. The first taketh away one, and concludeth the rest,
Give example.
A. Either it is day, or it is night.
But it is not day.
It is therefore night.
Q. Give another example.
A. The judgment of Cicero in defence of Cluventius is such: But when as this condition was proposed to him, …at either he should accuse justly and piously, or die sharpely or unworthily: he would rather accuse after that manner, then die after this.
Q. Make the disjunction appear clearer.
A. Either he must accuse or die:
He must not die.
He must accuse therefore.
Q. Give another example like to this.
A. There is the like reasoning, Phil. 2. Dost thou not understand it is determined, that either those who have done this thing are homicides, or revengers of liberty? But attend a little, and take the thoughts of a sober man for a little time; and I who am of them, as my self doth confesse, will familiarly argue with thee as a fellow: I deny that there is any mean: I grant, that they are, except they be deliverers and conservers of the Roman Common-wealth, more then villans, more then homicides, more then parricides: if truely it be cruelty, rather to be a father to the country, then a murtherer of ones self: Thou art a wise and considerate man, what sayest thou? if they be parricides, why were they honoured of thee, and called to this order by the Roman People? why was Marcus Brutus by thy means freed from the law, if he were absent more then ten days from the city? why did Apolinares receive Marcus Brutus with incredible honour? why was the provinces given to Cassius and Brutus? why were there Questors added? why were the numbers of Legates increased, and this done by thee? they are not therefore homicides. It followeth then, that by thine own judgement, they are deliverers, when as truly there can be no third admitted.
Q. If the parts of the disjunct proposition shall be more then two, how shall they be judged then?
A. The art of judging them, and concluding them shall be the same.
Q. Give example.
A. So Cicero judgeth Rabitius to be among the Consuls: And we see (saith he) these three to be in the nature of things, to wit, that either he should be with Saturninus, or with the good, or that he should lie hid. But to lie hid is proper to the dead and rotten: to be with Saturnius, of fury and wickednesse: Vertue, and honesty, and shamefastnesse constrained him to be with the Consuls.
CAP. 16. The second disjunct Syllogisme.
Q. What is the second disjunct?
A. The second disjunct, from the proposition the affirmative assumeth one, and taketh away the rest.
Q. Give example.
A. It is day, or it is night:
But it is day:
It is not therefore night.
Q. Give another example after this manner.
A. Thus Iuno concludeth with Iove touching Turnus, AEncid. 10.
What if thou sayest the thing thou dost not mean,
And should to Turnus give his life again?
Now I remain in misery and woe,
And hope for that which will not happen so:
But rather then this ill should come to pass,
I'le mock my self, and hope past hope, alas.
Q. Shew another Syllogisme of this kind.
A. There is the like Syllogism effected from a proposition copulative negative, which is called n…gative complexion, and which obtaineth the force of an affirmative disjunction.
Q. Give example.
A. It is not both day and night:
But it is day:
It is not therefore night.
CAP. 17. The only Method according to Aristotle.
Q. What is Method?
A. Method is a dianoia of divers homogene axioma, preposed for the clearnesse of their nature, from whence the agreeing amongst themselves of them are judged and comprehended in memory.
Q. VVhat is to be considered in Method?
A. As verity and falsity is beheld in the Axioma, consequence and inconsequence in the Syllogisme; so in Method it is to be considered, that by it the more clear may precede, the more obscure may follow; and that altogether order and confusion be judged.
Q. Make this plainer.
A. After this manner is disposed from homogene axiomas in the first place by an absolute notion, the first; in the second place the second, in the the third place the third, and so forward.
Q. It seemeth by this, that Method doth continually pass from universals to …ingulars?
A. So it is: for by this sole and only way it proceedeth from antecedents altogether, & absolute notions, to the declaring of unknown consequences. And this is the only Method that Aristotle taught.
CAP. 18. The first illustration of Methods by illustration of Arts.
Q. But do not Examples set forth this head more clearly?
A. Yes, the examples of doctrines and artes do chiefly demonstrate and set forth the unity of Method; in the which, although all the rules are generall and universall, yet the degrees of them are distinguished: and by how much every thing shall be more generall, by so much it shall more precede.
Q. Why shall the first be in the most generall place and order?
A. because in light and knowledge it is first.
Q. Why shall the subalternates follow?
A. Because in their clearness they are next.
Q. It seemeth by this, that those things which by nature are more known shall precede, those which are less known are substitute, and at length the most speciall follow.
A. So it is.
Q. What then shall precede and be first?
A. The most general definition shall be first.
Q. VVhat shall follow?
A. The distribution.
Q. But how if there be many?
A. Then the partition in perfect parts shal precede.
Q. VVhat shall follow?
A. The division into kindes.
Q. VVhat then?
A. The parts themselves and the kindes, are in the same order to be handled and defined again, in which they were distributed.
Q VVhat further is required?
A. If there shall be a long explication of them, they are to be chained together by the chains of transition.
Q. What benefit redoundeth from hence?
A. It refresheth and recreateth the Auditor.
Q. But may not Example be under this head?
A. Yes; as a more familiar thing is taken, so a more familiar example must be used.
Q. Give example of what you have here shewed out of the art of Grammer?
A. All definitions, distributions, are found in the rules of grammer, and every one of them severally judged; and all these documents, inscribed in diverse tables, are confounded and mingled together as it were in a certain pot.
Q. What part of Dialectica teacheth us to compose these confused rules, and digest them into orders? first there is no need of the places of Invention, when as they are all found: neither of the first judgment of Axiomas, when as every axioma is proved and valued: neither of the second judgment of the Syllogisme, when as all of them are disputed and concluded controversies of severall things by these onelyonly syllogismes: it seemeth therefore to be onelyonly Method, is it not?
A. Yes, it is onelyonly Method.
Q. How is it done?
A. The Logician by this light of artificiall Method selecteth out of this pot the definition of Grammer (for that is most generall) and placeth it in the first place: Grammer is the doctrine of speaking well. Then he taketh out of the same Oven the partition of Grammer, and placeth it in the second place: the parts of Grammer are two: Etymology and Syntaxis. Then out of the same vessel he separateth the definition of Etymology of words, and joyneth it in the third place to those that go before: then he seeketh out the parts of words in letters and syllables, and the kinds in words of number, and without number, and placeth them with their transitions in their severall places. And so the definitions of all the parts of Etymology, together with their distributions, colligations, and most speciall examples he placeth in their severall places, and so likewise in the Syntax. This way all the Arts have proposed to themselves.
CAP. 19. The second example of Method by example of Poets, Orators, Historiographers.
Q. But is Method only set forth in matter of the arts and doctrines?
A. No, it is also declared in all things which we would teach easily and plainly: therefore Poets, Orators, and all manner of writers, as often as they propose any thing to teach to their auditors, do follow this way, although they do not enter and insist upon it all alike.
Q. Give an example out of some Poet.
A. Virgil in his Georgicks dist…buteth, as I said before, the proposed matter into four parts; and in the first book followeth common things, as Astrology, Meteorology, and of corn and tillage; this was the first part of his work: then the transition is adhibited in the beginning of the second book.
Thus… far of tillage and of stars were we;
Now of thee, Bacchus, we'l sing presently.
Then he writeth generally of trees, as also specially of plants; the second transition is adhibited to the third part, but more imperfect and without an Epilogue. In the beginning of the third book of Oxen, Horses, Sheep, Goats, Dogs.
Wee'l sing of goddesse Pales, als' of him,
Who by Amphryso kept his sheep most trim.
At length in the beginning of the fourth book, there is the third transition of the fourth part, but also imperfect from the only preposition of their Bees.
Now of the eyre hony Bee I'le speak.
So therfore the Poet studieth to place the most generall first, the subalternate middle, the most special in the last place.
Q. Give another poeticall example.
A. Ovid in Fast. useth this kind of disposition, proposing in the beginning the sum of his work.
I'le sing of times that passe throughout the year,
Fall of the stars, and rising I'le declare.
By and by, having made imploration, he determineth the partition of the year, made first by Romulus, into ten months, which he reprehendeth.
When as Rooms builder did the year divide,
In it he made five months, and five beside.
And a little further he adjoyneth Numa his more full Divisor.
But Numa neither Janus did omit,
Nor yet the ancient shadows out did put;
But to th' old months two more appointed he.
Here the Poet having interpreted the common differences of holy-dayes, working-dayes, banquet-dayes, kalends, nones, ides, at the last he followeth every month in his place, and with a preface after this order, he passeth from generals to the study of specials.
Ith' whole I have you shew'd what these things be,
It now remains we part them presently.
At length after the exposition of every part, the transition is joyned, as in the end of the first, and beginning of the second book.
The first part of my task is ended now,
The month is done, my little book also:
Janus is done, another month beginneth,
Another book now with that month reneweth.
And in every one of his books afterward the transitions are adhibited, but lesse accurately.
Q. How do the Orators follow this Method?
A. The Orators in poems, narrations, confirmations, perorations do follow this order, as the nature both of the art, and the order of the thing do require, & somtimes more studiously too.
Q. Give example.
A. Cicero in an accusation first by propounding, then by parting, followeth this order. Questor Cu. Paxeris, saith he, thou hast been Consul unto this time fourteen years, and from that day unto this day, in which thou hast made me, I call thee into judgement; there was no void hour found in robbery, wickednesse, cruelty, iniquity. This is the proposition and definition of the chief matter, as in this judgment most generall. The partition followeth; these are the years consumed in the Questorship, and a Sciatica… Embassage, and the Urban Pretorship, and in the Sicilian Pretorship: wherefore this shall be the fourfold disposition on of my accusation, which four parts with their particular partitions he hath also handled in their severall order and place, and coupled them with transitions; the three first in the third book. Wherefore (saith he) his Questorship being shewed, and his first magistracy, together with his theft and wickednesse looked unto, let us attend to the rest. Then having expounded the faults of his embassadorship, the transition to his Pretorship followeth. But let us now come to that famous Pretorship, & those faults which were more known to those which were present, then to us who come meditated and prepared to pleading. This transition is more imperfect without an epilogue; at length in the beginning of the fourth oration there is the like transition to the fourth part of the Sicilian Pretorship. Many necessary things, O Judges, I must pretermit, that I may in some manner speak of those things which are committed to my trust: for I have received the cause of Sicilia; that Province hath drawn me unto this businesse.
Q. Give an example out of the same Historiographer.
A. Livy doth so imbrace the sum of 70. years in the beginning, then divideth them by tens.
CAP. 20. The secrets of Method.
Q. It seemeth that in the diverse axiomaticall homogenes, as also in the judgment of the syllogisme, the notes of Method shall be as often as any thing is taught clearly: but is there no other kinde of Method?
A. Yes, when as the auditor shall be deceived in a certain part with delectation and a greater motion… then certain homogenes are rejected, as the lights of definition, partition and transition: and certain heterogenes are assumed, as digressions from the matter, and commotations upon the thing; but chiefly the order of things in the beginning is turned over, and certain antecedents are put after consequents. Therefore to that rule of perfect Method this may seem somwhat more imperfect; the form is not only lame, things being detracted; or abounding, things being added; but also the order of i… being inverted by certain degrees, is preposterours.
Q. Give an example of it.
A. The like the Poet maketh with a certain greater kinde of artificialness, while he… propoundeth to himself to lead the people, viz. the beast-like heads of the multitude, and therefore he deceiveth divers wayes; he beginneth in the middle, & there oftentimes he comprehendeth the first; to conclude the last, he placeth an uncertain and an unthought of chance. So (as Horace saith) Homer disposeth his Iliads.
Ne doth this man Troyes wars divide so well,
He alwayes maketh haste th'event to tell:
Even in the midst his reader he doth catch,
Leaves off his tract, with haste from it doth snatch;
And thus he lies, thus mingles false with true,
So that ne first nor midst in it I view.
Q. Proceede to furt…er example.
A. So Virgil taketh AEneas from Sicilia, and makes a narration of him in the banquet of Carthage; and at last bringeth in his diverse troubles. So the Commedian Poets, although with great judgment they have distinguished their Comedies by acts and scenes, yet do so effect, that all things seem to be done by chance. The Orators attribute all to victory. Therfore this seemeth to be placed chiefly by them, not so much to teach, as to perswade; when as also those things which do equally excell, are kept even unto the last, and the means are conferred into the middle, according to Homers disposition.
FINIS.
A BRIEF OF THE ART OF RHETORICK.
Containing in substance All that ARISTOTLE hath written in his Three Books of that Subject, Except onelyonly what is not applicable to the English TONGUE.