The Measures of Christian Obedience, Book 4 · Chapter 3
CHAP. III. Of the nature and danger of voluntary sins.
The CONTENTS.
The nature of a wilfill and a deliberate sin. Why it is called a despising of Gods Law, a sinning presumptuously, and with a high hand. Wilfull sins of two sorts, (viz.) some chosen directly and expresly, others only indirectly and by interpretation. Of direct and interpretative volition. Things chosen in the latter way justly imputable. Of the voluntary causes of inconsideration in sins of commission, which are drunkenness, an indulged passion, or a habit of sin. Of the power of these to make men inconsiderate. The cause of inconsideration in sins of omission, (viz.) Neglect of the means of acquiring virtue. Of the voluntariness of all these causes. Of the voluntariness of drunkenness; when it may be looked upon as involuntary. Of the voluntariness of an indulged passion; mens great errour lies in indulging the beginnings of sin. Of the voluntariness and crying guilt of a habit of sin. Of the voluntariness of mens neglect of the means of virtue. No wilfull sin is consistent with a state of Grace, but all are damning. A distinct account of the effect of wilfull sins, (viz.) when they only destroy our acceptance for the present, and when moreover they greatly wound and endanger that habitual virtue which is the foundation of it, and which should again restore us to it for the time to come. These last are particularly taken notice of in the accounts of God.
HAving thus clearly shown in the General that all the dispensation, and allowance for our consistent slips under the Gospel, comes not from the nakedness and want of penalty in any of Christs Laws, but only from the imperfection and involuntariness of our own actions: I will descend now to consider particularly what those consistent slips and transgressions are.
In the management whereof, I shall shew these two things:
First, That our voluntary and chosen sins and transgressions of any of Christs Laws, are not consistent with a state of Grace and Salvation, but are deadly and damnable.
Secondly, That our involuntary and unchosen slips are consistent, and such as Christs Gospel doth not eternally threaten, but graciously bear and dispense with.
First, I say, No voluntary sin, or chosen transgression of any of Christs Laws is consistent with a state of Grace and Salvation, but is deadly and damning.
To make this out, it will be very requisite to show,
1. What sinfull actions are voluntary and chosen: And,
2. That none of them is consistent with a state of Grace, but deadly and damning.
1. What sins and transgressions are voluntary and chosen.
Then we commit a wilfull chosen sin, when we see and consider of the sinfulness of any action which we are tempted to, and after that choose to act and perform it. Every chosen sin is a sin against Knowledge, for the will is a blind faculty, and can choose nothing till our mind proposeth it. All choice is an act of aforeign Andron. Rhod. Paraph. in Eth. Arist. lib. 3. cap. 4.Reason and Vnderstanding, a bforeign. Ibid.preferring one thing before another; and we must view and consider both before we can prefer either.
That which suggests the sinfulness of any action to us, and sets the evil of it before us when we are about to choose it, is our Conscience. For God has placed this Monitor of every mans Duty in every mans breast, to tell him upon every occasion what he requires from him. And till such time as men have debauched their understandings into a gross mistake of their Duty, so as to call Evil Good, and Good Evil; and God in his just anger has given them up to a reprobate mind, or a mind cforeign, Rom. 1.28.void of judgment; their own consciences will keep them in mind of Gods Laws, and not suffer them to transgress without reproof. So that every wilfull sin, is a sin against a mans own mind or conscience.
Nay further, so long as mens hearts are soft, and their consciences are tender, and before such time as they are wholly enslaved to their appetites, and quite hardened in sin; their consciences, especially in some great and frightfull instances, will not only suggest and represent their Duty, but argue also and debate against their lusts for the practice and performance of it. And then men are not won at the first offer, nor consent to fulfill the sin upon the first assault of the temptation; but are drawn in after a long deliberation and debate, and dispute the matter with themselves before they submit to it. For when mens consciences do not nakedly suggest, but moreover plead the cause, and urge the observance of their Duty; there are arguments on both sides to render the choice at first somewhat doubtfull. The Law of God promises an infinite reward to the action of obedience, and threatens an endless punishment if we disobey; both which are future, and to be expected in the next world. And the temptation inducing us to sin presents us with a fair shew of sensitiv pleasure, profit or honour if we practise, and threatens us with all the contrary evils if we neglect it: both which it sets before us as things present, to be felt and enjoy'd by us even now whilst we are here in this world. Now these are great motives on both sides, each of them bidding fair for our consent. Our minds or consciences suggest the first, and our fleshly appetites and carnal reason represent the latter; and for a good while these two advocates solicite the cause on both sides, and distract and divide our wills between them. So that when at last the temptation doth overcome, and the Law of Lust in the members prevails over the Law of God in the mind; yet is that after a strife and a war, after a tedious toyle and much contention. And these wilfull sins, because we underwent a great conflict in our own minds about them, and past through a long deliberation, in an alternate succession of desires and aversations, hopes and fears, imperfect choices and refusals, e're the consent of our wills was gain'd over to the commission of them, are call'd deliberate sins.
Every wilfull chosen sin then is a sin against knowledge and against conscience, when our own heart rebukes and checks us at the time of sinning, telling us that God hath forbidden that which we are about to do, notwithstanding which we presume to do it. And if it happen to be in an instance that is greatly criminal, and frightfull unto Conscience, which therefore puts us upon demurs, and creates dispute and arguing; then is it not only a known, but a deliberate sin also.
Nay, where we have time, and there is a sufficient space to consider in between the opportunity and the action; if we know that the action is sinfull, and are not in ignorance about it, by having either never heard of it, or quite forgot it; we sin wilfully whether our conscience check us for it, and we consider of it or no. For wheresoever we can consider we can choose, there being motives on both sides sufficient to determine our choice on either. And as for all those sins which we know, whensoever we have time, we can think and consider of them. For all thought is free, and if we have leisure we may employ it according to our own liking. We cannot think, 'tis true, of many things at once, but we can consider of any one, and employ our minds upon it when, and how long we please. So that in all such leisurely transgressions, if we acted inconsiderately, our inconsideration was our own fault, and entred only because we suffered it, and had a mind to it.
In all such actions therefore as we know are sinfull, every transgression with time and leisure is voluntary and chosen. For either we saw and considered it before we ventured on it, or we might have seen it if we would. Our thoughts indeed are our own, so that even at such times as we have leisure to consider, we may still, if we please, transgress without all consideration. But if we do, that is not our mishap but our fault, and we must answer for it. For where God has given us both Power and Time wherein to see and consider; he most justly expects, and will certainly exact at our hands an account of what is done as of a known and considerate action. So that not only our considerate and deliberate transgressions; but such others likewise as are unconsidered shall be judged wilfull sins, if they are acted leisurely, and are in such instances as we know are sinfull.
These sins of time and leisure, of knowledge, and of deliberation, are our voluntary wilfull sins. And as for them, they are all of a heinous guilt, and a crying nature, every commission of them is a despising of Gods Law. For when we sin wilfully, both our duty and our sin being set before us, and both being compared and thought of by us, we despise and reject obedience to the Law, and willingly and advisedly, whilst we consider both, prefer the obedience of our sin before it. Upon which account our sinning wilfully is called a despising of the Law, Hebr. 10.28. And forasmuch as such despising of the Law, (which is nothing less than the will of Almighty God, who is most extreamly offended by it, and can most severely punish it) is an act of the greatest boldness and presumption: therefore are our wilfull and chosen sins stiled, in another word, dDeut. 17.12. Will do presumptuously, is explained by will not hearken.presumptuous sins, Psal. 19.13. And since such presuming with open eyes to despise Gods Law is a profest rejecting of his Law and Authority, an open casting off his yoke, and rebelling against his Soveraignty; doing willingly and advisedly what he forbids, and setting up our own will in opposition to his, which is the highest instance of pride and insolence, and opposing God; therefore are our wilfull sins said to be acted through rebellious pride, and with a eforeign.high hand, Numb. 15.30, 31.
But now as for these sins, which, being thus considered and deliberate, are voluntary and chosen; they are not all either considered or deliberated of, willed or chosen in the same way. For even among our wilfull sins we must observe this difference.
First, Some of them are chosen expresly and directly.
Secondly, Others are chosen only indirectly and by interpretation.
1. Some sins are chosen expresly and directly. And such are all those sinfull actions whereto the consideration and thoughts of our minds are particularly directed, and which we eye and view before we choose and act them. They are such sins whereat we deliberate and pause, doubt and demur; when we have a conflict and dispute in our own minds whether we should commit or keep off from them. And such direct choice and express volition happens when men sin with some tenderness, and sense of conscience. They cannot choose the sin as soon as it is offered, but they undergo a succession of fears and desires. For the temptation solicites them to work the sin, and their conscience being awakened by Gods Law would deter them from it; so that they have a particular and express consideration of both sides, before they act either. As for this way of sinning therefore by express choice and direct volition, it is incident ordinarily, not to all sinners whatsoever, but only to those of a middle rate, whose consciences being not quite hardened as yet, make them transgress with reluctance and remorse.
But besides these there are,
2. Other sinfull actions which are not chosen directly and expresly, but only indirectly and by interpretation.
By an indirect and interpretative choice, I mean an express choice of such a state of things, as makes some sinfull actions after that to be no longer a matter of free choice, but almost necessary and unavoidable. For some things are in our power at first either to do, or omit them; but by some free actions of our own we can, if we will, put that power out of our own hands, so as afterwards we cannot, if we would, keep off from them. Thus a servant, for instance, who is strong and healthy, can, if he please, perform his masters will, and do what he requires of him. But if he choose either to maim his body, or to impair his health; he has parted with his own ability, and his omission of the things enjoyned him after that is no longer a matter of choice, but of necessity. A wealthy man can easily, if he will, give every man his own, and honestly discharge those debts wherein he may stand ingaged to other men: But if he choose to waste his estate, and to throw away his riches; he is no longer able to do what he should, but detains the goods of other men thenceforward, not because he will not, but for that he cannot help it. Now these omissions of the lame sick servant, and this dishonesty of the impoverished man, in this necessitous state of things, whereinto they have thrown themselves, are no matter of particular and express choice, because, as the case stands, it is not in their power to refuse them. But yet they were chosen by them indirectly and in the general, when they chose to put themselves into this necessitous state, wherein being once placed, they should not have the power thenceforward to avoid them. So that indirectly and implicitely they have chosen to do that, which particularly and directly it is not at their choice to avoid. And because that which they do now under this necessity of their own making, is interpreted to them, and charged upon them by virtue of their former choice, as if now in every particular, they did expresly choose it: therefore do I say it is chosen by Interpretation; (i. e.) it is imputed to them, and may be exacted of them, as if they had chosen it expresly.
This then is an indirect and interpretative choice, even in actions which in the particulars are necessary, (viz.) when that was deliberated of and chosen which made them so. All our actions in a necessitous state are indirectly and interpretatively voluntary and chosen, when the necessity it self is of our own choosing. In the particulars, 'tis true, we are not free to refuse them, but the reason why we are not, is, because we our selves chuse to be so. For although our present actions are necessary, yet once it was in our power to have kept them free: and that which causes us now to act indeliberately and without consideration, was it self once freely deliberated of and chosen. So that all those actions, which are now necessary in the particulars, were, as the Schools speak, voluntary in the cause; which is an indirect choice, and interpretative volition.
And as for those actions which are chosen only indirectly and implicitely, (viz.) in the free choice of that cause which made them afterwards to be all necessary; they may very fairly be imputed to us, and interpreted to be our own. For in all reason the natural and immediate effects of a mans own free and deliberate choice may be charged upon him, and if he chooses his necessity, it is fit that he should answer for it, and bear the punishment of those sins which he commits under it. What is a matter of any mans choice, may be an article of his accusation, and a matter of his punishment also. But now as for this necessity of sinning, it is a necessity of mens own choosing. For they wilfully threw themselves into it in choosing the cause of it; and so may very justly be made to answer for all that which they commit under it. All the effects of their present necessity, if they are traced up, will terminate upon their own will; for they hang upon that file of actions, which had beginning from their own choice; and being thus chosen by them, they may justly be charged upon them.
As for such effects indeed as are so remote, that a mans understanding, in the honest and sincere use of it, cannot see them; although he do choose the cause, yet neither God nor men will look upon him to have chosen them. For there can be no choice where there is no knowledge, because a man must see a thing before he will and choose it. But when effects lye near, and obvious to any ordinary capacity if it do but use an honest diligence, as most mens necessity of sinning doth to those free actions which produce it; there it is only mens sloth and negligence if they do not discern it; and if they chuse blindfold, when, if they would open their eyes, they might see, it is all one in God's account as if they did see it. For it is against all reason in the world that the sinful neglects of men should take away … rights of God. He has given them faculties wherewith to see things before they chuse them, and he requires that they should. And if they will not use them, that is their own fault; but what he requires of them he will still exact, and punish them for what is done as for a chosen action.
So that as for those sins which men have chosen in their next and discernable Cause, although they are not free to chuse or refuse them in the Particulars themselves, they are a part of their account at the last Judgment. What is chosen indirectly and by interpretation is looked on as their own, and, if it be evil, will be imputed to them for their condemnation.
But now several of mens sins are of this last sort. For as we saw of some particular actions, that they are chosen in the Particulars directly and expresly: so are there likewise several others, which in the Particulars cannot be refused, but were chosen in the general, in the free choice of that Cause which has made them all afterwards necessary, so that they are voluntary only indirectly, and chosen by interpretation. For there is nothing so common in the World as for men by their free choice of some sins to bring themselves into a necessity of others: they freely will and chuse some, which necessarily cause and effect more.
Now those things which may bring men into this necessity, are such, and so many, as make them inconsiderate and hasty. For therefore it is that in the Particulars we cannot expresly chuse or refuse several sins, because we cannot stay particularly and expresly to consider of them. We have brought our selves to such a pass, that they slip from us without reasoning and enquiring about them. For either our understanding is diverted that it cannot, or so well acquainted with them that it need not look upon them to observe and consider them. And since we do not particularly consider of them when they come, we cannot expresly will and chuse them: but forasmuch as we chose the cause of this inconsideration, we are said to chuse them indirectly and by interpretation.
And as for the wilful and chosen Causes of such inconsideration, I shall discourse of them under these two sorts, viz. as causing such inconsideration in sins, either,
1. Of commission, or doing what is forbidden.
2. Of omission, or neglecting to do what is commanded.
1. For those causes of inconsideration in our sins of commission, which make us venture on them without all doubt or disquisition, they are these:
First, Drunkenness.
Secondly, Some indulged passion.
Thirdly, Habit or custom of sinning.
For all these, when once we have consented to them, take away either wholly or in great, measure all further freedom, and make us will and chuse what is evil indeliberately, and without consideration.
First, As for Drunkenness; we find daily in those persons who are subject to it, that it so disorders and unsettles all the intellectual powers, that they have scarce any use of them at all. For their memory fails, and their judgment forsakes them. They have no thoughts for that present time of good or evil, of expedient or inexpedient. Their reason is overwhelmed and quite asleep, and there is nothing that is awake and active in them, but their bodily lusts and sensual passions, which then hurry them on to any thing that falls in their way without the least opposition. So that they are wholly governed by their appetites, and, for that time, unbridled passions of lust, or cruelty, or envy, or revenge. They blab out that which in their right wits they would conceal, and do what in a sober mode they would condemn. And so little is there of that reason and understanding in all their speeches and behaviour, which appears in them when the drunken fit is over, that any man may plainly see how, for that present, it is removed from them. So that they act rashly and irrationally, more like brute Beasts than men, committing rapes, or robberies, or bloodshed, or any other mad frolicks and sinful extravagancies without any deliberation or consideration at all. And,
Secondly, As for an indulged passion, we daily find that when it is permitted to grow high, it has the same effect in making a man act inconsiderately as Wine it self has. For a man may be drunk and infatuated with a violent anger, an impetuous lust, an overpowering fear, as well as with wine. It shall make him quite forget all Rules of decency and Vertue, and attend no more to them at that time, than if he had never known them. Of anger it is affirmed to a Proverb, that it is a fIra furor brev…s …st.short fit of madness. And the Case is the same in other passions when they are suffered to go on to amazing and stupifying degrees. How many things are acted in the heat of lust, of fear, of anger, &c. which the men in their sober wits condemn so perfectly, that they would account themselves to be very much injured, if any man should say that they might be insnared into them, and fall under them? Of so great power are mens passions in clouding, nay for a time quite overwhelming their reason and understanding. For such is the condition of the reasonable soul, that during its being here united to the body, it is subject to all its alterations, and liable, even in its most proper and spiritual operations of reason and knowledg, to be either improved, or hindred, or quite taken away by those changes which befal it. In a sound body, it is free and active; but if the bodily Spirits, which are those great instruments that it makes use of, are ruffled and disordered; if they are either confused and overcharged by strong drink or a strong passion; blended and displaced by a phrensie; blasted by an apoplexy; or otherwise mixed and disordered, quenched or oppressed by any other violent Disease: all use of reason and consideration is strangely hindred, if not for a while perfectly eclipsed. And this all men are so sensible of, that every one is apt to plead this in his own behalf for those faults which he commits in the height of passion; and others are as ready to admit of it. For their great excuse is, That their passion made them almost mad, and spurr'd them on to act they knew not what, without all sober thought and consideration.
Thirdly, As for the habit or custom of chusing sinful actions; it brings our wills to such an acquaintance with them, and to such an unstudied forwardness in embracing of them, that when an opportunity is offered for them we cannot refrain from them if we would, or stand to deliberate whether we should chuse them or no. For custome, as we daily see, in all sorts of actions begets such a promptness and easiness in performing those things which we are accustomed to, that we readily act them upon the next occasion without staying to think and consider of them. Vse, as was observed above, is a second Nature; and what we have been wont to do by long practice, we do as easily, as quickly, and as indeliberately, as we do those things which flow from the necessity of our very Nature it self. And as it is in all our other actions, so it is likewise in our works of sin and disobedience. By a long acquaintance with them, and practice of them, we learn at last to chuse them whensoever we meet with them, without all thought and examination. For all the little doubts and exceptions of our minds against them, all tormenting fears and checks of Conscience have been so often silenced, that now they are heard no more to make any delay in our embracing of them. And our wills have been so accustomed to strike in with them, and to chuse the sinful action upon every return of the temptation, that now they do not need to pause, but act of hand, and sin without enquiry. And our bodily powers are so naturally disposed to spring out into the commission of them upon occasion, that they hardly stay for a Command, but are as quick and hasty in the dispatch, as our wills were in their indeliberate chusing of them. So that our willing of them after a long use is not a matter of arguing and discourse, of weighing and considering; but a sudden, inconsiderate motion. It is rather turned into an act of nature than of choice, and has more in it of indeliberate necessity, than of considerate liberty. And as such the Scripture is wont to represent it. For when sin is once grown into a confirmed habit, we are told that it is not so truly an inviting temptation, as a binding Law, Rom. 7.25. It doth not then so truly perswade, as rule and command us. For we are led Captives by it, ver. 23; and sold under it, ver. 14. We submit to it out of necessity, and not out of choice; because we do not chuse where we cannot refuse, and here we must be under it, and cannot help it. For it is now become our very nature, and it is almost as much out of our power to alter it, as it is for a thing to cast off what is most natural to it. Can the Ethiopian Blackamore change his skin, or the Leopard his spots? When they can do that, then, saith Jeremy, may you also do good who are accustomed to do evil, Jer. 1….23. If men are so pleased, they may chuse to sin themselves out of their liberty, till they can no longer chuse whether they shall sin any more or no. A compleat habit, and a perfect custome shall make them sin beyond all liberty, because they will sin without all deliberation; and then they are got up to that pitch whereof St Peter speaks, Of them who cannot cease from sin, 2 Pet. 2▪ 14.
In sins of commission then, or doing those things which are forbidden, the causes of indeliberateness and inconsideration are most usually these three, viz. A drunken fit, a high passion, or a confirmed habit.
And then,
2. As for the other Branch of sins, viz. those of omission, or neglecting to do what we are commanded; Besides these three already mentioned, which have their evil influence upon sins of that kind also, there is one great and particular Cause which takes away our liberty of choice in them, and that is a neglect of those means which are necessary to the performance of the omitted Duty. For as it is in all our other actions, so is it also in those of obedience, they hang in a chain of dependance, and are helped on or hindred by several others, which, further than they influence them, are not religious themselves, nor make up any part of obedience. There is a Religion of the means, as well as of the end; and some actions are helps and preparatives to a religious Duty, but otherwise they are no Duty in themselves. Thus the not staying to look upon a woman, or to gaze upon her beauty, is one means whereto our Saviour directs a man, that he may be preserved from coveting and lusting after her, Matth. 5.28. So fasting is a furtherance to prayer and repentance, and several other instances of obedience. And the Case is the same in several other things. For meekness, and patience, and contentedness, and forgiveness, and every other Vertue, has some particular helps and furtherances, some things that promote it and dispose us for it, and others that obstruct and hinder it.
Now as there is this order in the things themselves so must there be likewise in our endeavours after them. We must take them as they lye, and use the means that we may attain the Vertue. For meekness, humility, contentedness, and the like, are not so perfectly under the power of our wills, as that they can be exerted through their bare Decree and peremptory Commandment. But if we would attain them, besides this imperiousness of Command, we must further use all those means and helps which fit and prepare for them. In habits of the mind men are sufficiently convinced of this. For it is not every one that wills prudence, who is a wise; or that wills learning, who is presently a learned man. But he who would be so, besides his willing and desiring it, must read, and study, and observe, and seek instruction: he must use all those means which lye in the way to knowledge, and those instruments which prepare for it, and are necessary to introduce it, before he can attain to it. And the Case is the same in all vertuous and moral habits, which are seated in the will likewise. For we must use those instruments which facilitate and dispose us for the Vertue, before the Vertue will become our own; and we must put in practice all the means and preservatives against any Vice, before we can in reason hope to conquer and avoid it. If we would not be proud or peevish, we must abstain from all the inlets to pride and peevishness. And if we would be meek and humble, we must not neglect the helps and instruments promoting meekness and humility. For the helps and the vertue must both go together; so that if we neglect the one, we shall certainly miss of the other also. When once we have neglected the means of any Vertue therefore, we have parted with our power of obtaining it. We have thrown away our liberty in losing of our opportunity; so that now our missing of it is not so much a matter of choice, as of necessity. We omit it and cannot help it, because we neglected to use those means whereby we should have attain'd it. And in sins of omission this is the great and special Cause which puts them without our power; for we neglect the means of doing what we should, and after that it is not so truly our free choice, as our necessity that we omit it.
These then are the causes of our want of choice in the particular instances of sins, whether of commission, or of omission. We do not chuse that evil which we commit for want of considerateness and deliberation, the freedom whereof is taken away from us by drunkenness, passionateness, and a habit or custome of committing it. And we do not chuse the omission of some Duty which we neglect, for want of power, whereof we have deprived our selves through the neglect of those means which are necessary to the performance of it. So that both in doing what is forbidden, and in neglecting what is commanded upon these Causes, we do what for that present we cannot help. For we do not chuse because we cannot refuse it; and therefore it is not so much through choice, as through necessity that we are involved in the transgression.
But although these sins are thus undeliberated in themselves, and thus unchosen in their own Particulars; yet shall we be punish'd for them as surely, as if we had expresly chosen them, because they were all chosen in their Causes. For we freely and deliberately chose that which made them necessary, and that is enough to make us answer for all those things which we acted under that necessity.
For as for drunkenness, which is one of those Causes that deprives us of all liberty by taking away all considerateness and deliberation; 'tis plain that it either is, or may be deliberately considered of and chosen. For drunkenness is a sin which requires time in the very acting of it. It is not entred on in a moment, or dispatched before a man can have time to bethink himself; for he may pause and deliberate at every Glass, and is free all along to chuse the sin before the Wine inflames him. It has nothing in it of suddenness or surprize, and therefore nothing of indeliberation. Because where a man has time, he may deliberate if he will; and if he will not, that is his own fault, and he must answer for it, and is punishable in all reason as if he did.
'Tis true indeed, to a man who has never tried, and is ignorant of the force of Wine, or of any other intoxicating Liquor, and of its sudden way of discomposing his Spirits and dethroning his Reason: Drunkenness at the first time may be a sin of surprize, and an indeliberate action. Because he suspects not that a free Draught which he takes down now, should a while hence work so great an alteration: he is unacquainted yet with the strength of it, and knows not that it will have such effects upon him. And so long as he doth not see that intoxication is at the end of his present draught, he cannot be said to deliberate of, or considerately to chuse it. It happens to him besides his expectation, and is not an effect of choice, but of surprize. And thus it was with righteous Noah, Gen. 9.20, 21. And this being unforeseen and indeliberate, what a man commits under it is the more excusable, as was the incest of Lot, Gen. 19.33. But after a man has felt by himself, or learned from others what the power of Wine, or other intoxicating Drink is, it is generally after his own fault, and his own choice if he be overcome by it. For either he doth, or may see the ill effects of it; and if for all that he chuse to go on in it, it is at his own peril: because if he chuses drunkenness, he shall be interpreted to chuse all those sinful effects whereto he may see, if he will, that Drunkenness exposes men. So that as for this Cause of indeliberate sins, viz. drunkenness; it we see is in it self deliberated of, and freely chosen.
And as for the second cause of indeliberate sins, viz. some indulged passions, which grow to such a height as to drive us on furiously into the fulfilling of them without suffering us to deliberate about them; they also are a Cause of our own free choice and deliberation. For it is in our power at first either to give way to a beginning passion, or to repress it. We can check it as we please whilst it is low, because then its strength is very weak, and our own consideration and command is the greatest. But if we slacken the Reins, and give it liberty; then it knows no bounds, but proves too strong for us, and hurries us on whether we will or no. For in every step which the passion makes, it doth still the more disturb our Spirits, and thereby disable all the power of our reason and consideration. So that proportionably as it encreases, our consideration, and, together with that, our choice and liberty is lessened and impaired. But at the first, whilst it is young and of small strength, it is in the power of our own wills either to indulge it, or to stop and repress it. And therefore if it get ground upon us, it is by our own liking, because either we expresly chuse to stay upon it, and thereby to feed and foment it, or wilfully neglect to use that power which we have over it, in curbing and straining it. And when once we have of our own choice permitted it to go too far, then is it got without our reach, and goes on further without asking our leave, whether we will or no.
And herein lyes the great errour of men, viz. in that they freely and deliberately consent to the first beginnings of sin, and by their own voluntary yielding too far, they make all that follows to be plainly necessary. For the lustful man deliberately and wilfully permits his wanton fancy to sport it self with impure thoughts, and lascivious imaginations; till by degrees his passion gathers strength, and his lusts grow so high, that all his powers of reason and Religion are scattered and clouded, and rendred wholly unable to subdue it. The angry man freely and deliberately hearkens to exasperating suggestions, and cherisheth discontents so long, till at last his passion is got beyond his reach, and flies out into all the unconsidered instances of rage and fury. And the Case is the same in fear, in envy, in love, and hatred, and other passions. Men first consent to the first steps and beginnings of a sinful lust, and when they have deliberately yielded to it a little way, they begin by degrees to be forced and driven by it. For all progress in a vicious lust is like a motion down hill; men may begin it where they please, but if once they are entred, they cannot stop where they please. All vice stands upon a gOmne in praecipiti vitium. Stat. Juv. Sat. 1.Precipice, and therefore although we may stay our selves at the first setting out, yet we cannot in the middle. But although when once we have gone too far, it be not at our own choice whether or no we shall go further; yet was it in the free power of our own wills not to have gone so far as we did. The entring so far into the passion was an effect of our own will and free deliberation; and if this make that necessary which is done afterwards, that is a necessity of our own chusing. So that whatsoever our after actions are, this cause of them is a matter of our own will, and freely chosen.
And then as for the third cause of indeliberate sins, (viz.) a custome and habit of sinning; that is plainly a matter of our own free choosing. For it is frequent acts that make a habit; and they are all free and at our own disposal. Because the necessity arises from the habit, and doth not go before it; so that all those actions which preceded and were the causes of it, were free and undetermined. Wherefore as for that indeliberateness in sinning which ariseth from an habit and custome of sin; it doth not in any wise lessen or excuse a sinfull action. Nay, instead of that, it aggravates and augments it. For this is sin improved up to the height, and become, not so much a matter of choice, as of nature. And to sin thus, is to sin as the Devils themselves do, from a natural Spring and Principle, without the help of thinking and disputing. Upon which accounts, as it is the most advanced state of sin, so must it be of suffering likewise; this state of reigning, and prevailing habits of sin being, as St Paul calls it, a body of death, Rom. 7.23, 24. All which aggravation both of sin and suffering it has, because it is an aggregate and collected body of many wilfull and presumptuous sins. For before men come so far, they have deliberately chosen, and willfully neglected to refrain from all those precedent actions which have advanced the strength of sin to that pitch, and have made it to be not so much a temptation or a refusable motive, as a binding Rom. 7.23.Law, and necessitating nature. So that although those sinfull actions which flow from us after that we are come to a habit of sin, are indeliberate and unchosen: Yet as for our evil habit it self, which is the cause of them, it was produced by a combination of wilfull sins, and was in all the antecedent degrees a matter of choice and deliberation.
And lastly, as for the cause of our involuntary omissions, (viz.) our neglect of those means which are necessary to our performance of those things which are commanded; this is clearly our own fault, and comes to pass only because we choose it and have a mind to it. For the reason why we neglect the means, is, because we will not use them. We have time enough wherein to deliberate and consider of them, and thereby to choose and practise them; but we will not use it to that purpose. The means and helps to chastity, to meekness, to contentedness, and other virtues, are all before us, and we have power to put them in practice if we think fitting. For it is just the same for that matter with the endowments of our wills, as with those of our minds and bodies. We can see and consider of the means of begetting knowledge and learning in our minds; and of those receits and rules which are to promote the health of our bodies; and upon such consideration we not only can, but ordinarily do make choice of them, and put them in practice. And although it happen much otherwise with those wise directions, and helpfull rules that are given for the attainment of virtue, which are read ordinarily only to be known but not to be practised; yet is it in the choice of our own wills to make use of them if we please, as well as of the other. The neglect of them is a wilfull neglect, for therefore we do not use them because we choose to omit them. So that although when once we neglect the means, it be not at our choice after that to attain the virtue; yet that neglect it self was. The omissions in themselves it may be are not chosen, because they cannot be refused: but that negligence, which is the cause of their being so, is plainly an effect of our own choice and deliberation.
Thus then it plainly appears, that our sinfull commissions upon drunkenness, passionateness, and custome of sinning; and our sinfull omissions upon our neglect of the means and instruments of virtue, all which are indeliberate and unchosen in themselves, were yet deliberately chosen in their causes. So that all our necessity in them is a necessity of our own making, seeing it was at our own choice whether ever we should have come under it; although, when once we are subject to it, it be no longer at our liberty whether or no we shall be acted by it.
And since all these sins which are thus indeliberate in themselves, were yet so freely chosen and deliberated in their causes, they are all imputable to us, and fit to be charged upon us. They were chosen indirectly and interpretatively in the choice of that cause which made them all afterwards to be almost, if not wholly necessary. For either we did deliberate, or, which is all one, we had time enough to have deliberated as we ought, before we chose our own necessity. So that these sinfull actions which are unchosen and unconsidered in themselves, are yet imputable to us, and fit to be charged upon us as our own, because we chose them by an indirect and interpretative volition.
As therefore there are some sins, which are expresly will'd in the particulars by an express choice and deliberation; so likewise are there several others, which are expresly and deliberately willed only in their cause, but in their own particulars are not chosen otherwise than indirectly and by interpretation.
And both these together take up the compass of our wilfull and chosen sins. For either we expresly think, and deliberately consider of the sinfull action when we commit it; or we expresly and deliberately thought upon that cause, when we chose it, which makes us now to sin without thinking and deliberation.
And by all this it appears now at length how considerateness and deliberation is implyed in every wilfull sin. For the sinfull action is seen and considered, (or it is our faults if it be not, since we had both time and powers for such consideration) either in it self, or in its cause; and being it is thus a matter of our consideration, it is likewise a matter of our choice, and a wilfull action.
And thus having shewn what sinfull actions are voluntary and chosen; I proceed now to shew,
2. That none of them is consistent with a state of grace, but deadly and damning.
As for our wilfull sins, they are all, as we have seen, of a most heinous nature; being indeed nothing less than a contempt of Gods Authority, a sinning presumptuously, and with a high hand. They are a plain disavowing of Gods will, and renouncing of his Soveraignty; they are acted in a way of defiance, and are not the unavoidable slips of an honest and well-meaning servant, but the high affronts of an open iElatio contemnentis in minimis mandatis culpam facit non minimam, & convertit in crimen gravis rebellionis naevum satis levem simplicis transgressionis. Bernard. de Praecept. & Dispens. c. 14. p. op. 931.rebel. So that no favourite or child of God can ever be guilty of them, or he must cease to continue such if he be. Because they interrupt all favour and friendship, and put God and him into a state of hostility and defiance; seeing they are nothing less than a renouncing of his Authority, at least in that instance, and a casting off his Law. And this lawlesness, or rejecting of the Law, is that very word whereby St John describes sin. For sin, sayes he, is the transgression, as we render it, but more fully it should be the kforeign not foreign.renouncing of the Law, 1 Joh. 3.4. In which sense of sin, for a wilfull and rebellious one, he tells us, that whosoever abides in God sins not, vers. 6; being indeed no longer a child of God if he do, but of the Devil, vers. 8.
They deprive us of all the benefits of Christs sacrifice so long as we continue in them, and of all the blessings purchased for us by his death. This was their effect under the Law of Moses, and it is so much rather under the Gospel of Christ. For the sentence which that Law pronounced upon all presumptuous and wilfull offenders was death without mercy. The soul that doth ought presumptuously, the same, by his contemptuous sin, reproacheth the Lord, and that soul shall be cut off from among his people, Numb. 15.30. If ever it could be proved against him, by that dispensation there was no hope for him. For he that despised, or contemptuously kIn the Syriack version, according to Tremeli…s's translation… it is transgressus est, s…l aspernanter.transgressed Moses's Law, died without mercy, saith the Apostle, being convicted under the testimony of two or three witnesses, Hebr. 10.28. For even those very sins for which under the Law God had appointed an attonement, were no longer to be attoned for than they were committed involuntarily and through ignorance. In the fourth Chapter of Leviticus we are lVers. 2.told, that as for those sins which are committed against any of those Commandments which concerned things not to be done; if they were acted mforeign in vers. 70.involuntarily and unwillingly, they should be allowed the benefit of an expiation, and the sacrifices for that purpose are there prescribed. But if they were acted wilfully and advisedly, then had they no right to the expiation there promised, nor would any sacrifices be accepted for them, but that punishment must unavoidably be undergone, which in the Law was threatned to them. For, to name no more, this we are plainly told of two instances; (viz.) the contemptuous making of perfume, and eating of blood, after both had been forbidden. Whosoever shall contemptuously make any perfume like to that (which was commanded to be made, vers. 35.) to smell thereto; that soul shall not be expiated by sacrifice, but cut off from his people, Exod. 30.38. And whatsoever man there be that eateth any manner of blood, (viz. willingly and wilfully, the ignorant and involuntary transgressions of this and the like prohibitions being attoneable, Lev. 4.) I will even set my face against that soul, and will cut him off from among his people, Levit. 17.10.
Thus severe was the sentence, and thus unavoidable was the penalty of all wilfull sins under the Law of Moses. And by how much the ministration of Christ is nobler than the ministration of Moses was, by so much shall the punishment of all wilfull and contemptuous sins against the Law of Christ be more severe, than it was for those against the Law of Moses. And this is the Apostles own argument. For if that word of the Law threatning death, which was spoken unto Moses on Mount Sinai by the mediation only of Angels, was stedfast, and every transgression of it received the just recompence of that death which it threatned, such persons dying without mercy: How shall we Christians hope to escape it, if we wilfully neglect and contemn those Laws which are published to us by so great a means of salvation as the Gospel is; which was at first spoken to us, not by Angels, but by the Lord Jesus Christ himself, who is far above all Angels, being indeed the Son of God himself, Hebr. 2.2, 3. Surely, as the Apostle argues in another place, if he who despised even Moses's Law died without mercy for that contempt; we ought to think with our selves, not of how much less, but of how much sorer punishment he shall be judged worthy, who, by wilfull sinning and despising of his Laws, doth in a manner tread under foot, not Moses, but the Son of God himself, Hebr. 10.28, 29. His punishment indeed shall be most dreadfull, being nothing less than all those woes which are denounced in the Gospel. For the Law, with all its threats and penalties, is particularly made and designed, as St Paul sayes, for the lawless (which is that very foreign.word whereby St John describes sin) and the wilfully disobedient, who when they see the Law will not be oforeign.subject to it, 1 Tim. 1.9.
As for our voluntary and chosen sins then, whether they are chosen directly, or only by interpretation, we see plainly that they are not consistent with a state of Grace and Salvation. For they subject us to all that death which the Law threatens, and deprive us of all that life and happiness which it proposes to us, which, beside all the evidence which the Scripture gives us of it, is plainly demonstrable from the very reason of the thing it self. For certainly if Christs Laws will condemn us for any actions whatsoever, it must be for those, which, being voluntary, may justly be charged upon us, and looked upon to be our own. It must be our willing what sin enjoyns, which can make us Servants of it, and subject us to that death, which God has appointed for its wages: So that both from Reason and Scripture it evidently appears, that every wilfull sin is certainly a deadly one, and puts the sinner out of a state of Gods favour and salvation.
'Tis true indeed that every wilfull sin doth not rob us of Gods favour in such measure, as to incapacitate us for regaining of it ever after. But its effect is this, before such time as we have repented of it and amended it, we are under all the threatnings of the Law, and subject, if we die in that instant, to that death which is ordained for the wages of it. We are out of Gods favour for the present, and the state of friendship betwixt him and us is interruped; and till we repent, we shall not be again restored to it. As for the state of acceptance and salvation it is broken, and destroyed for the present; for we are put under the punishing part of Gods Government, and are made subject to his vengeance by being sinners against his Law. But as for the foundation of that acceptance, (viz.) that habit of virtue and obedience, which, in the wilfull action, we sinn'd against; it is not quite destroyed, but only wounded and impaired in us. For habits are neither won nor lost by one action, but by many. It is frequency and repetition that must either produce, or destroy them. If therefore a good man is careless in some instance, and loses his innocence, and is vanquished into a wilfull sin; yet is not the habitual inclination of his soul towards that instance of obedience, against which he offended, quite extinguished in him, but only somewhat weakned and abated. Thus, for instance, a sober man, if he consent once to be drunk, doth not thereby wholly lose his sober inclination. But when the temptation is past, his habitual temper, which was foil'd and over-born, revives again, and he abhors his sin, and confirms his resolution, and so is ready at the next return of the temptation to wash off the stain of his former offence by an opposite instance of new obedience. And the case is the same in the wilfull commissions of any other sin. For although any one wilfull act be a damnable transgression, and put the sinner into a damnable condition for the present; yet doth it not destroy, but only wound and weaken that habitual temper of virtue, which, if God spare him life, may enable him with ease to act otherwise for the time to come.
Although indeed some wilfull sins have such a complication of evil in them, and are carried on against so many suggestions of the spirit, and checks of conscience, and are brought to effect through so many thoughts, and so long contrivance; that they destroy, not only that innocence which is the condition of our state of Grace; but also that habitual temper and inclination, which is the principle and foundation of it too. They unravel all, and set us to begin again the work of reformation anew. Of which sort are Idolatry, Witchcraft, Perjury, Sacriledge, Murder, Adultery, Robbery, Oppression, entring into the fields of the fatherless and widow, and such like. For these sins do not only destroy a mans acceptance with God for the present; but moreover they lay waste his conscience, and spoil all his virtuous temper and inclination, whereby he should recover himself afterwards; whence they are call'd pPeccata sanciantia, and vastantia.wounding, and wasting sins. And this effect they have, because in the very acting of them there is usually so much time and deliberation, and a succession of so many desires and aversations, hopes and fears, chusings and refusals; that the sin has had a great many imperfect consents before it come to have that which is last and prevailing. Our wills, by a number of imperfect wouldings, are in great part accustomed, and have almost wholly learned to unwill all that good, which they willed before; so that there is an imperfect habit contained in the very action. Besides, what is most of all considerable, these being such sins as are made up of several combined together, before we can bring our selves to act them, our conscience of their guiltiness must be in great part extinguished, and the good spirit of God exceedingly grieved, if not wholly quenched. For Adultery implies fornication and injustice; Sacriledge contains theft and impiety; Perjury includes lying and prophaneness; and so for all the rest. Now these being complicated sins, and crimes of an accumulated wickedness; mens Consciences are more than ordinarily afraid of them, and the good spirit of God extraordinarily concerned to keep them from them. They suggest and represent the greatness of the sin, and the greatness of the danger. Which they do with such constancy and importunity, that before men have silenced the one, and extreamly grieved, if not wholly quenched the other, they cannot overcome their own fears, and venture upon the commission of them. And here now is the danger lest their own Conscience be laid asleep, and Gods holy spirit leave them. For he will not alwayes strive with man, Gen. 6.3… and from him that hath not; that is, hath not used that talent of Grace which was granted to him, as the wicked Servant had not done who had hid it, vers. 25, shall be taken even that, sayes our Saviour, which he hath, Mat. 25.29. And when men resist the motions of the Holy Ghost to such a degree as this, and after all the repeated suggestions, and obedient inclinations which he threw into their souls during all that time wherein the sin was under deliberation, resolve still to venture on it: no wonder if, being thus grieved and rejected, he withdraw himself, for some time at least, if not for altogether.
And of all this we have a clear instance in holy David, upon that wasting sin of his in murdering Vriah, and adulterating his wife. For upon that he felt both these losses which I have mention'd, (viz.) the laying waste of the virtuous temper of his own spirit, and the deprivation of the good spirit of God. For this sin being so long in acting (as it must needs be, since it required such a train of wicked plots and contrivances to the consummation of it) he must needs feel all the opposition that could be made from the checks of his own Conscience, and from the restraints of the Spirit of God. And when he had born down both for the satisfaction of his lust, and trampled them under foot for the consummation of his sin; then doth he begin to feel the want, and to be all in fear of losing the habitual rectitude of his own spirit, (which, by so many contrary actions implyed in that one great one, he had almost quite destroyed) and of suffering the desertion of Gods spirit, which by his continued provocations contained in it likewise, he had well nigh abandon'd. For to this purpose we find him complaining and crying out in his Psalm of repentance for that great transgression, whereof, at the 14th verse, he makes express mention. Create, or new make in me a clean heart, O God, sayes he, and renew a right spirit within me. And besides that, cast me not away neither from thy presence, nor take thy holy spirit from me, Psal. 51.10, 11.
So that as for the effect of wilfull sins, it is plainly this. All wilfull sins whatsoever destroy our state of acceptance with God, and put us into a state of enmity and death for the present. But as for those among them which lay waste the Conscience, they effect not that only, but moreover they destroy that virtuous habit, and grieve, nay, sometimes drive away that good spirit, whereby we should restore our selves to it for the time to come.
And because this latter sort have the mischievous effect, in making our return thus dubious and difficult; they are particularly taken notice of in the accounts of God. Thus, for instance, David had committed several deadly sins, for some whereof he had undergone severe punishment; as particularly for that proud presumptuous offence of his in numbring of the people, 2 Sam. 24.1, 10, 13, &c. But these made no notable decay or devastation in the virtuous temper of his soul; for his own heart admonished him of the evil which he had done, and he repented quickly, and rose again without delay, and so was presently restored to what he was before. But as for his sin in the matter of Vriah, it was a q2 Sam. 11.4, 5, 27.lasting work, and took up a long rvers. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15.deliberation and contrivance. It made his Conscience hard and insensible; for his own heart did not smite him into a change, nor enable him to repent without a sChap. 12. vers. 1, 5.monitor. So that his stay in this crying sin was long, and his return both difficult and dangerous. And therefore in that character which is given of him by the Holy Ghost, when all the rest are buried in silence, this sin particularly is expresly specified. David did that which was right in the eyes of the Lord, and turned not from any thing that he commanded him all the days of his life, save only in the matter of Vriah the Hittite, 1 Kings 15.5.
Thus then, as for this first part of our enquiry, we see plainly of all our wilful sins that they are not consistent with a state of Grace and salvation, but that they are all deadly and damning for the present, if we dye under them without repenting of them; and as for the future, that they do all of them wound and weaken, but some almost quite destroy that habitual, inherent Grace, whereby we should recover our selves to the state of pardon for the time to come.