The Measures of Christian Obedience, Book 4 · Chapter 2
CHAP. II. Of the Nature of these consistent slips more particularly.
The CONTENTS.
Our unchosen sins are consistent with a state of Grace, but our wilfull and chosen ones destroy it. All things are made Good or Evil, a matter of reward or punishment, by a Law. Laws are given for the guidance and reward only of our voluntary and chosen actions. This proved, first from the clear reason of the thing. Where it is inferred from the Nature of Laws, which is to oblige; from that way that all Laws have of obliging, which is not by forcing, but perswading men; from the dueness of rewards and punishments, commendations and reproofs; from the applause or accusations of mens own consciences upon their obedience or transgressions. Secondly, From the express declarations of Scripture.
IF any man should ask which of all Christs Laws those are which he may keep or break at his own pleasure, and yet go unpunished; I must tell him, none at all. For there are no failings and transgressions in a mans life allowed of for this reason, because disobedience is warranted to some Laws, although it be not to others. No, in our whole Religion there is no one Law that is left so naked. For God has not given any Commandments with that indifference to them, as if he cared not what became of them, or were unconcern'd whether men kept or broke them; but he has established them all under the same penalty, so that he who breaks any one, is guilty, as St James sayes, and obnoxious to the punishment of all, Jam. 2.10. It is not therefore the transgression of some Laws which shall be born with, but not of others; for that which gets an allowance for the breach of one, would procure a favourable sentence for the like violation of all the rest.
That then which makes the difference of punishable and unpunishable in mens failings, is not to be sought for in Christs Laws, seeing the punishment of every one of them is the same; but in their own actions. For some sins shall be born with, not for that they are against a Law whereto no penalty is annexed, there being none such in all Christs Gospel; but for that they are such imperfect actions as the punishing Law, which they are against, will not take hold of. Every Law of Christ threatens death, but these allowed offences are not of the number of those actions which are threatned by it.
For we must take notice that those works of ours whereon Christ's Laws lay restraint, and whereto they, as all other just Laws in the World, threaten punishment, are our voluntary and chosen actions. They bind us up in all those performances which are placed in our own free power, and come from the choice of our own will; and they denounce woes to us if in them we go beyond those bounds which they have set us. So that in all our free and chosen actions we must take care to do what the Law requires, and to keep back from what it forbids; and we are sure to suffer if we neglect it. For it is among these actions of choice where the Law reigns, on which it lays Commands, and whereto it threatens punishment. If we chuse and do what is commanded, then have we a right to the promised reward; and if we chuse to do what is forbidden, then are we guilty, and obnoxious to the punishment denounced. But as for other actions which flow not from our own choice, of which sort are all our pardonable and allow'd infirmities▪ they fall not under the strict force of the Law, either in the guidance of its Command, or in the sting of its punishment; so that at the last Day it will not be judged to have been either broken or kept by them.
That I may fully clear up this, whereupon so much of that which I shall say under this Head depends, I will show concerning it these two things:
1. That all things whatsoever, which are either good or evil, and a fit matter of reward or punishment, are made such by a Law.
2. That all our actions are not governed by God's Laws, so as to be strictly and directly either enjoined or prohibited, punished or rewarded by them; but only those among them which are voluntary and chosen.
1. I say, All things whatsoever, which are either good or evil, rewardable or punishable, are made so by some Law. For good and evil, vertue and vice, obedience and sin, which are only so many different Names for the same thing, have all relation to a Commandment. Vertue and obedience is the performance, as vice and sin is the transgression of it. Where there is no Law, saith the Apostle, there is no transgression, Rom. 4.15. And no man sins, as saith another Apostle, but he that transgresseth the Law; for sin is the transgression of the Law, 1 John 3.4. And as Law is the measure of sin and Duty, so is it likewise of reward and punishment. For God never afflicts and torments the Children of men out of the inclination of his Nature, but only out of the necessity of Government. He is the Ruler of the World, and the Lord of men; and therefore he must maintain his own Laws, and punish the evil Doers. But no man is ever punished without an offence, and he must do evil before he suffer it. He undergoes nothing but that which is his own choice; for he chose rather to incurr the penalty, than to perform the Commandment. He feels no more than the Law denounced, for God the Judg executes nothing but what the Law threatens; he punishes according to it, but not without it. The Law doth always make a penalty due to an Offender, before he either can, or doth exact it.
Thus are all things, which are either good or evil, rewardable or punishable, made such by a Law. But then
2. As for our actions, all of them are not governed by God's Law, so as to be strictly either enjoined or prohibited, punished or rewarded by them, but only those among them which are voluntary and chosen. And this being a a Point whereof I shall make so much use in all that follows, I will spend the more time in clearing of it up, as I hope, beyond all question, by showing the truth of it,
1. From the clear reason of the thing it self.
2. From the plain declarations of the Scripture concerning it.
1. I say, That only our voluntary and chosen actions are under the restraint of Laws, and either enjoined or prohibited, punished or rewarded by them; is plain from the great and convincing reason of the thing it self. For let us consider,
First, The very nature of a Law, and we shall find that in all those actions whereon it is imposed, it supposes them who exert them to have a power of choice, and a free liberty of making them either a piece of service to it, or a transgression of it. For all Law is a Bond or a Tye, which lays restraint upon us, and induces Obligation. So that in all those actions whereupon the restraint is laid, we are necessarily supposed to be free before it comes. For it is an utter absurdity to bind any thing by a Law, which is before necessitated by its very Nature. Who would ever be so vain and foolish as to give a Law to a Stone, that it should not speak? or to a Tree, that it should not walk? or to the Fire, that it should not chill and freeze him? There can be no place for, nor need of an Obligation, where there is no choice and liberty. For it is only where things have a power to act on both sides, that there is room for a Law to oblige and tye them up to one. And for this reason it is, that among all that variety of Creatures which inhabit in this lower World, men alone are capable of Laws, because no Creature besides is endowed with freedom of will and liberty of choice, which is to be bound up and restrained by them.
Nay, even in men themselves, those actions and tempers which are not subject to their own choice, nor under the power of their own wills, are no fit matter of a Law, nor fall under the force of a Commandment. For who can ever be so unreasonable and void of all sence, as to command a man that he should not be born rich or poor, base or noble; that he should not be sick and weak, hungry and thirsty, sleepy or weary? No, since none of these instances is in his own choice, or under the free disposal of his own will, in none of them is he capable of an Obligation.
Seeing then that it is of the nature of every Law, to be given as a Bond and Obligation to us in such Actions, to which otherwise our will is free, and able either to chuse or refuse them; it is plain that Laws are intended for a restraint upon us only in our voluntary and chosen actions. For there are none else wherein we are free, and therefore none besides wherein they should intend to bind us.
Secondly, That only our voluntary and chosen actions are under the restraint and punishment of Laws, is plain from that way which all Laws have of obliging men. The Law is no Law further than it obligeth; and all its obligation is only upon our chosen actions. For all the force which it can possibly have upon us to bind us to the performance of any thing, is only so far as it can make us will and chuse it. And therefore as for all unchosen actions, they are not within the reach of Law, because they are not subject to the force of Obligation.
Now that this is the only way which all Laws have of obliging us to a thing, viz. their engaging us to will and chuse it, so that the force of obligation can fall upon no action which is unchosen, is evident. For that whereto they would oblige us, is such actions as they injoyn or forbid; and that power or faculty in us which they would oblige to it, is our wills. For our wills are the Disposers of our actions, seeing we work at our own choice, and do what we will and like our selves. But now as for all the obligation which any thing can possibly lay upon our wills, it is not by way of necessitating, compulsive force, but only of moving and exciting Arguments. Because from the very constitution of our nature, our will cannot be forced by any Bond, but only moved of it self to chuse that which it is intended to be bound to; so that in its nature it is capable of being obliged to nothing which is unchosen. For the will of man is not a Subject capable of natural force or bodily violence; a man may as soon hope to grasp a shadow▪ or to lay violent hands upon an Angel, as to engage it that way. No, it is no Body, nor bodily faculty; so that it is not subject to any physical force, to be bound hand and foot by a Law as a Thief is by a Chain: but the only possible way whereby to work upon it, is to win it by Arguments. It must determine its own choice, since other things cannot determine it; and therefore such things must be suggested and proposed to it as can perswade, but nothing that can force and compel it.
For this indeed is all the hold that any Law can have upon the will of man; i… naturally wills and chuses what is good, and hates and refuses what is evil. And this gives a Law some power over it, in binding it to chuse what the Lawgiver has a mind it should, if he first make it desirable. He may win it in its own way, viz. If he make obedience to become its interest, and shew it plainly that it can be no gainer by disobedience, but that it is by far the better for it to chuse what he enjoins, than to refuse it. For the wills own proper motion, and natural way of working carries it on to desire and chuse that which appears to be good, and to fly and refuse that which is known to be evil. And therefore when the things proposed in the Law have a most desirable good annexed to the performance, and a most hateful evil joined with the transgression of them; this is an engagement and tye upon it indeed to chuse the Duty for the goodness sake, and to avoid the sin for the evil that accompanies it. It binds it so far as its own desires and inclinations can bind it: it tyes it up as much as can be by its own hopes and fears: it lays obedience in the way to that which it loves and longs after; so that if it would come at that, there is no other means, but this must be the way to it.
And this is the way whereby all Laws oblige us. For they are backed with such rewards and punishments as make it every mans advantage to do what they enjoin him. The evil of disobedience is always infinitely greater than the evil of obeying; so that if the wills of men chuse in their own way, and will be wrought upon by their own motive, they must determine themselves to that whereto the Laws would bind them. And this securing of that which is commanded, by making it far worse for any man to break than to fulfil it, is absolutely necessary and naturally inseparable from all Laws. For a frightful penalty is either expresly mentioned, or, if not, it is always implyed. If the punishment is set down, then they who transgress must suffer what the Law threatens; but if it be not, they must undergo what the Legislator pleases. So that punishment can never be pulled away from Law, but if there be a Command given which makes no penalty due, nor creates a right of inflicting any; it has only the name of a Law or Commandment, but that is all, for it contradicts its nature. A request or entreaty it may be, a counsel or advice; but a Law or Command it never is.
And seeing all obligation to action, is only such a motive and convincing reason to our wills, as makes them chuse to act, rather than to omit what the Law intends to oblige them to; 'tis plain that where there is no room for choice, there is none likewise for Law and Obligation. For we cannot be moved to chuse those actions which are unchosen, and therefore we cannot be obliged to them. But all obligation being only a convincing motive to our choice, we cannot be capable of being obliged by Laws in any other than our voluntary and chosen actions.
And thus it appears both from the nature of Law, and from the force of obligation, both which are antecedently necessary to make up the nature of sin or obedience, that all the restraint which is laid, and all the punishments which are inflicted by Laws, are only upon our voluntary and chosen actions.
And this will yet further appear if we consider some other things which are consequent to sin or obedience, and ensue upon the working or commission of them; as are,
Thirdly, Rewards and punishments, commendation and reproof. Every Lawgiver commends and rewards those who keep his Laws, and punishes and reproves all such as break and transgress them. But now all this can have place only upon their voluntary actions, which were at their own choice, and in their own liberty, either to have exerted, or omitted. For no actions can be imputed to a man, either for him or against him, further than they depended on him. Because there is no thanks at all due to him for doing that which he could not avoid; nor any charge at all capable to be brought against him for failing to do what he could not do. Who would ever be so absurd as to reprove and punish a man for being low of Stature, or weak of Body, for being born of mean persons, or to a small Fortune? These, and all other things of like nature, which a man could never help, may be his misfortune, but not his fault; and whatsoever he suffers upon the account of them, may be, and often is, his calamity, but by no means his punishment. No man can justly be charged with that which was never subject to his own choice; but if any imputation is laid upon him for its sake, it rests not there, but falls all upon that Cause, whose free pleasure it was so to order him. Agreeably whereunto the Wise man tells us, That whosoever mocketh the poor, reproacheth not him, who cannot help his poverty, but his Maker, whose pleasure it was to dispose of him in that condition, Prov. 17.5. And as a man can bear no just blame for that which it never was in his power to hinder; so neither can he undergo any just punishment. Barbarous cruelty indeed he may fall under, which would have taken place without a Law as well as with it; but legal and just penalties he never can.
And seeing no action is punishable but what is chosen, it is plain that the Laws of God impose restraint, and threaten punishment, only to our voluntary actions.
Which will still further appear from another effect of every sinful and punishable action; namely this,
Fourthly, That it is such for which our own Consciences will blame and condemn us, and which we shall lament in repentance and remorse. One great part even of Hell torments is this remorse and worm of Conscience. For there is no action for which we shall there be punished, but when it is too late, we shall endlesly repent of it. Their worm there, as our Saviour saith, dyeth not, Mark 9.44. But now it is an utter absurdity and downright madness for any man to be angry at himself for that which he could never help, and to repent that ever he committed that which it was not in his power to hinder. For doth it ever repent any man that he is not tall of Stature, that he was not born as strong as Samson, or made immortal as an Angel? Was any man ever touched with remorse, because he breathes, and sleeps, and thirsts, and hungers? No man ever is, or ever can be angry at himself, but when he sees that he has been wanting to himself; when he has done that which it was in his own choice to have done otherwise. For all remorse is for a willing offence: a man chuses it when he commits it, and therefore, when afterwards he sees his errour, he condemns himself for it.
And since a mans own Conscience condemns him for all those things for which God's Law will punish him, and no man can condemn himself for doing any thing but what he chose to do: neither his own Conscience can condemn, nor the Law punish him for any, but his voluntary and chosen actions.
And thus upon all these reasons we see, That it is only our voluntary and chosen actions whereupon God's Laws lay restraint, and wherefore, at the last Day, he will inflict punishment; so that no sin is damning which is not chosen. This is a very clear and well-grounded truth. For the nature of Law which makes good and evil, of obligation which enforceth it, of rewards and punishments from God, of acquiescence and remorse from our own Conscience, which ensue upon it; all these evidently evince and prove it. For not any one of them is concerned about any actions, but those which proceed from choice, nor have to do with any works but what are wilful. So that every action whereto there is Law and obligation, exhortation and admonition, reward or punishment, commendation or reproof, acquiescence or remorse, as there are for all those which the Laws of God will sentence; every such action, I say, is an effect of our own will, or a voluntary chosen action.
Thus is it clear from the reason of the thing it self, that all our actions are not governed by God's Laws, so as to be strictly either enjoined or prohibited, punished or rewarded by them; but only those among them which are voluntary and chosen.
And this will appear yet further,
2. From the plain declarations of the Scripture concerning it.
That whereby God a1 Sam. 16.7.looks upon his Laws to be either broken or kept, is the bNon est cui recte imputetur peccatum, nisi colenti. Aug. de lib. Arbit. l. 3. c. 17.choice and consent of the heart. My Son, give me thy heart, saith Wisdom, Prov. 23.26. So long as that is pure, we can have no damning stain upon us, for out of the heart, as our Saviour assures us, all those things must proceed which God will judge to defile a man, Matth. 15.18, 19, 20. The lusts of our Flesh must gain the consent of our wills before they become deadly sins, and consummate transgressions. Lust, says St James, when (having won over the liking and approbation of our wills, and a half consent to its impure embraces) it has conceived, bringeth forth the Embryo or rude Draught (answerable to conception, which is but a half production) of sin: and this Embryo of sin, when (by being brought on to a full choice and consent, or, what is more, to action and practice) it is finished, bringeth forth its genuine Offspring Death, Jam. 1.15. The consent of our hearts then must compleat our sin, and our own bforeign. Justin Martyr, Apol. 1.wills must of necessity concurr to work our ruine. For we must wilfully reject or cast off the Law which would keep us in, and go beyond it when we behold it, before our transgression will have got up to the pitch of a damnable pollution, or a mortal crime. Nay, I add further, till we are come thus far as wilfully to reject the Law, and knowingly to transgress it; we shall not be interpreted to commit that which the Gospel calls sin, and which it strictly forbids and severely threatens under that name. For if we will take St John's word, this is his explication of it. Sin, says he, is the transgression, as we render it, but more fully, and more agreeably to the Original it should be, the cHe calls it not foreign, which is the proper word to denote a going beside the Law, or a transgression of it; but foreign, which imports a being without Law, or a renouncing of it. As foreign are the lawless and disobedient.renouncing or casting off the Law, 1 John 3.4.
And thus we see that from plain Scripture, as well as from clear reason, it manifestly appears, that all our actions are not governed, nor will hereafter be judged by Gods Laws; but such only among them as are voluntary and chosen.
And therefore although there be no Law of Christ which gives men leave to sin without fear of punishment; yet some actions there may be against many, or most of Christ's Laws, which shall not be judged to be punishable transgressions of them; as are all our involuntary and unchosen actions. And of this sort are all those consistent slips which, as I shewed before, not only are, but needs must be born with, and allowed by the Covenant of the Gospel. For it is our involuntary failings which are our unavoidable ones, because we have no power to avoid where we have no liberty to will and chuse; and since they are such as we cannot help, they are such likewise as God pities, and such as the Gospel doth not punish, but graciously pardon and dispense with.