Treatise of Moral and Intellectual Virtues, Treatise on ethics · Part 8
Of VERACITY.
OF the Converſable Virtues, Veracity is the Tye, and that, which gives 'em their real price, the Philoſopher calls it Truth, but that name is too general; for Truth is properly the Object of the underſtanding, as we are taught in the Mataphyſicks, where Ens is ſaid to have Three properties, unum, bonum, verum. For when the underſtanding doth conceive aright of Things, as they are in themſelves with their mutual reſpects and relations one to another; then (as it were by a ſecond notion) it is ſaid to conceive the Truth; and if it happen not to form a right Conception of any thing, whoſe truth was not made by the underſtanding, but was antecedent to it; there it is ſaid to conceive that, which is falſe: For the better deſcent therefore unto our matter in hand, we are to underſtand, that there is in things a double Truth, one Metaphyſical, the ſpring of all our common Notions and Principles, and upon which we ground all our Reaſonings and Diſcourſe; to this is oppoſed Falſehood and Errour. Another Truth for diſtinction ſake we call Moral, unto which is oppoſed a Lye. For when the underſtanding conceives amiſs of any thing, it doth not preſently lye, but errs, miſtakes, or reports a Falſhood. But Mendacia animo conſtant; we then Lye, when wittingly we broach a Falſhood for ſome evil end, either of gain or flattery, of fear, or ſome ſuch purpoſe: And here we find that Truth, which doth properly conſtitute this Virtue.
NOTWITHSTANDING Truth, as it is oppoſed to a lye, is ſomewhat of too large a nature to be contained under this Virtue, but it is often oppoſed unto Juſtice: But the Truth, which eſpecially belongs to this Virtue, concerns a point of behaviour in common Converſation, upon which we are frequently caſt: For foreign, that is, to ſpeak ſomewhat of our ſelves is often very neceſſary, tho it be ſeldom welcome: For a Man to praiſe or diſpraiſe himſelf is ungrateful, and quickly cloyes the hearer.
Veracity muſt govern our language, when we ſpeak of our ſelves.NOW this Virtue of Veracity teacheth how to govern our Language, in caſe we are conſtrained to ſpeak of our ſelves; yet let me be ſo underſtood, that this Virtue doth alſo reach unto other parts of our Diſcourſe; for it becomes us, whenſoever we ſpeak of any thing, to utter our Thoughts, plainly, candidly, and ſincerely: For clear and open dealing is the honor of Man's Nature; and every mixture of falſhood in the buſineſs of Life, is like Alloy in Gold and Silver Coin, which may make the Mettal work the better, but it embaſeth it: Neither is there any Vice that ſo covers a Man with ſhame, as to be found falſe.
THE two extremes of this Virtue will betray us much;Vain Boaſting is very ungrateful and ſilly. on the one hand is foreign, vain boaſting, a humor either of making Somewhat out of nothing, or of much out of little: For it is the vanity of many Men beyond meaſure to magnifie themſelves, and by thus putting forth themſelves to deſire to ſeem ſomething; ſo their imaginations are filled with ſhadows of greatneſs; an example of which vain Glory is the Fly upon the Axle-Tree, ſaying to herſelf, what a Duſt do I raiſe! Such are Mountebanks of all ſorts, which we ſeldom miſs of in any Company; Men, who are always counterfeiting the Signs of ſome Virtue, which they have not, affecting every little ſtory of themſelves, and catching at honor from their very Dreams: Like the Mountebank-Phyſician, who would fain ſupply ſome higher Ability he pretends to, with craft, and draws great companies to him by undertaking ſtrange things, which can never be effected; ſo the Politician finding, how the People are taken with ſpecious, miraculous impoſſibilities, playes the ſame game, proteſts, declares, promiſes I know not what things, which he is ſure can never be brought about; thus they are deluded and pleaſed; the expectation of a future good, which ſhall never befall them, draws their Eyes off a preſent Evil; ſo they are kept in Subjection, and He by his Boaſting is eſtabliſhed in his Greatneſs and Power.
The contrary to this Vain-boaſting is by Ariſtotle called foreign, when a man diſſembles what he knows to be in himſelf, and loves to ſpeak ſlightingly of his own real Virtues, as in old time it was obſerved of Socrates, who was the ſevereſt foreign in the World, as appears by him in Platoes Dialogues: This very thing is ſufficient to make us doubt at leaſt, whether we may number this kind of Irony among the vices; for the very Name of Socrates is the Name of Virtue: We muſt therefore with the Philoſophers leave find ſome other vice to oppoſe Veracity; which becauſe we have no name for, we muſt be contented to deſcribe it, and it is an unneceſſary, overbaſhful diſſimulation of thoſe good things, which are in us.
FOR there are many examples of Men, who are ſatisfied with the knowledg of their own good Parts; they have a Treaſure of Learning lock'd up, and they care not to diſcover it to their own great diſadvantage. If we peruſe the writings of other Men concerning the Nature of Veracity, we ſhall find them to extend it to more particulars; for according to them, all kind of Perjuries, Perfidiouſneſs, Diſſimulation, Craft, and all manner of Lyes are againſt it: So that if we would know, what Rule of Life this Virtue doth preſcribe us, we cannot expreſs it in more ſignificant Words, than Tully hath done in the Third Book of his Offices; where verſuti, obſcuri, aſtuti, fallaces, malitioſi, callidi, veteratores, vafri, are declared enemies to this Virtue, from which the ſhifting, cloſe, deceitful, malicious, ſly ſhufflers are always excluded: To which muſt be added all thoſe, who for their own advantage, keep other Men in ignorance of that, which they are very much concerned to know.
No Lye muſt be uſed in any buſineſs or contract.IT will not be therefore much beſides our purpoſe to commend unto all men a particular Care of their Language, to prevent all Deceit and Cozenage, that we never pretend one thing, and do another: Wherefore there muſt be no Lye admitted into any buſineſs or contract; and if there can be no place for colluſion or iniquity in humane Society; what ſhall we ſay of the Jeſuits Morals, who have brought them into Religion! to make this out, I ſhall inſtance in Six things, which I may call the more refined ways of Lying.
The Jeſuits Morals cenſured.Firſt, THEIR Doctrine of Probability; if a Man can find a Doctor among them, that held ſuch an Opinion, it makes that Doctrine probable; and as Tully ſays, there is nothing ſo abſurd or ridiculous, which ſome Philoſopher or other hath not maintained and aſſerted; ſo there is nothing ſo contrary to the Rules of Virtue and Conſcience, but what ſome Romiſh Caſuiſt hath reſolved to be good and practicable.
Secondly, THEIR mental Reſervation; you cannot know their names by what they ſay, becauſe you do not know, what they reſerve in their Minds, ſo that what they ſay, may be but half, or not at all, what they mean.
Thirdly, THE ſubtle trick of directing the intention; by this they may kill a Man, ſo they do not intend to Murder him, but to deliver themſelves of an enemy; they may declare that, which is falſe, and deny that, which is true, becauſe they intend the credit of their Church; therefore this mere intention ſhall excuſe them from the Guilt of downright Falſhood.
Fourthly, THEIR Practice of Equivocation; which is ſo well known among them; inſomuch that no Man can confide in any word they ſpeak; they are ſo ambiguous, and of ſuch doubtful meaning.
Fifthly, THEIR Way of Evaſion; by having their Speech to bear a double Senſe; whereas no Man ought to uſe Wit and Parts to impoſe upon another, or to make a Man believe that, which he doth not mean; for in treating with one another, we ought to take care, that there be a right underſtanding between both Parties, and that each do apprehend one anothers meaning and intent: and in caſe there be a miſtake, we ought to releaſe one another; for all agreements are only in what we mean and intend; not in that, wherein we did not conſent and agree.
Sixthly, THEIR ſhift of Prolocution, that is, to uſe Words of ſuch a ſound, when they do not intend ſuch a thing by them, as one would think, they did.
The beſt Religion ſpoiled by ſuch practices.HOW witty ill men are to ſet up a Trade of Lying, and to ſpoil the Laws of the beſt Religion, that ever was made known unto Men; For the Chriſtian Law is plain and obvious, void of all ambiguous, or enſnaring Speeches; free from Sophiſtications and windings of Language; never flies to words of a dubious and uncertain ſignification, but openly declares the Truth to men; therefore theſe practices above mentioned are contrary to that Simplicity and plainheartedneſs, which ought to be in the Converſation of every Chriſtian: Such Simplicity as was obſerved in a Groom of the Bed-Chamber to Henry VIII. who always gave his Anſwers very warily, that he might not be taken in a Lye; inſomuch that it was good Sport with the looſer Courtiers to try, if they could entrap him: It being his Lot to attend the King in his Bed-Chamber, having laid him in his Bed, He took his leave; the King ſlips out of his Bed, and ſilently went after him; the Gentleman being come among the Courtiers, He was asked, Is the King a Bed? He anſwered warily, I left him in his Bed; by which Reply he defeated all their Art; For had he anſwered poſitively, Yes, as it was expected, the King was at his back ready to have given him the Lye; This is but a merry Story, yet it doth commend to us a ſerious Leſſon concerning that care, which we ought to have in all out Diſcourſes, that we ſpeak nothing either deceitfully, or falſely.
AND by occaſion of this Story, we may without treſpaſſing againſt the Argument We handle, look into a Queſtion heretofore managed with ſome Heat betwixt Parſons the Jeſuit, a great Patron of Artificial Evaſions in Speech, and others of his time, the Biſhops of Lincoln and Durham.
THE Queſtion was, Whether or no in caſe of ſome hazard, it were lawful to uſe any fine Device of Language to abuſe ſuch as were ſet to interrogate us in thoſe Points, wherein there was evident danger of ſpeaking the Truth?
THE handling this Queſtion at large would require more time to diſpatch it,Truth is to be ſpoken in caſes of danger. than can be well afforded; yet for the preſent we will anſwer, That all theſe Shades and Illuſions, by which Men evade direct and open Language in caſe of danger, are in themſelves unlawful: For if we once ſo ſpeak, as if we accounted them lawful; that might befal us which befel Calvin in the Queſtion of Uſury: He granted indeed Uſury to be lawful; but He ſo fettered and entangled his Grant with Reſtrictions and Reſervations, that He, who practiſed according to his Rule, ſhould gain but little by it. For what will the Reader conclude upon this; by Calvin's judgment Ʋſury is lawful; This ſhall be Warrant enough for his practice, as for Reſtrictions and Reſervations, he will make uſe of them according to his own diſcretion: The ſame may chance to befal us in this Queſtion concerning the lawful uſe of Diſſimulations, Equivocations unlawful.Concealments, Equivocations, and all ſubtle Evaſions in Speech, when there is evident danger of ſpeaking the Truth directly: For Experience tells us, that Men are apt to uſe all manner of Fallacy and Artifice, to ſave themſelves and their own Stakes, not only before the Magiſtrate, but alſo in that ſolemn caſe of a Corporal Oath before God himſelf: What would they do then, if we ſhould adventure to pull up this Hedg, and pronounce it lawful to uſe all the Art of a deceitful Tongue.
INDEED Men of brave Spirits and clear Virtue, ſuch as Cato or Coriolanus, who have preciſely obſerved foreign, exact Juſtice, have made no ſcruple to uſe theſe ſhiftings to ſave themſelves or their Friends: For when we remember our ſelves, and what kind of Perſons we live amongſt, we find it true, what was wiſely ſaid, periculoſum eſt in tot humanis erroribus ſold innocentiâ vivere; The Beſt of us all are ſometimes forced to make uſe of By-ways, when the High-way is beſet with Thieves; when we deal with Children, with Fools, with ſick Perſons, with our Enemies in the Field (according as it is ſaid, dolus an Virtus quis in Hoſte requiret?) yea with our familiar Friends, we are compelled to make uſe of Art and Sleights to cozen them for their benefit; honeſto & miſericordi mendacio calamitoſi Civis Saluti conſulimus; Quod mendacium licet in genere vitioſum, eſt tamen temporibus neceſſarium.
IF we would be better informed concerning this Point,Gro. ca. 1. lib. 3. our beſt way is to conſult the moſt Excellent Grotius, cap. 1. lib. 3. de jure belli & pacis, where we find it at large diſcuſſed out of all kind of Authors both Human and Divine: But after all that can be ſaid upon this Theme, we can by no means abſolve theſe kind of Actions from Iniquity and Sin; only thus far we will go, as to declare them pardonable, when they are done upon conſtraint and high inconveniency, and take 'em to be allowed of, as Moſes permitted Divorce, only becauſe of the hardneſs of men's hearts.
BUT before we conclude, we muſt bewail the ſufferings of Truth under the hands of thoſe Teachers,The ſufferings of Truth lamented. who to all the various inclinations of Men can carve 'em out, what Religion they pleaſe: This is the fruit of a dull Superſtition, when fooliſh men are perſuaded, they need not trouble their heads with the care of Truth, but leave that wholly to the Prieſt; who will ſuffer nothing to paſs for it, but what bears his mark and Licenſe; who hath aſſumed a Power by an Index expurgatorius to blot Truth out of the beſt Books; Where this Tyranny prevails, it is a misfortune to be born with Underſtanding.
WE cannot likewiſe but lament the ill uſage of Truth, when Men labour to darken it with Metaphors, or by being too credulous, or by oppoſing the Evidence of Senſe it ſelf by Scepticiſm. Beſides for the diſcovery hereof in many matters of Controverſie, we know not, how far we may rely on the teſtimony of Antiquity, nor how far we are to follow the Tract of Human Reaſon; eſpecially when there are ſo many Miſts caſt before us by the deceits of others, that one had need of a better Eye-ſight, than what is left us by the fall of our Fore-father.Falſhood wears the diſguiſe of Truth. For all great Errours have ever been intermingled with ſome Truth; And indeed if Falſhood ſhould appear alone unto the World in her own true ſhape and Native deformity, ſhe would be ſo black and horrid, that no man would look upon her; and therefore ſhe hath always had an Art to wrap her ſelf up in a Garment of Light; by which means ſhe paſſes freely diſguiſed and undiſcerned. This was elegantly ſignified in the Fable thus; Truth at firſt preſented her ſelf to the World, and went about to ſeek Entertainment; but when ſhe found none, being of a generous Nature, that loves not to obtrude her ſelf upon unworthy Spirits, ſhe reſolved to leave Earth, and take her flight for Heaven; but as ſhe was going up, ſhe chanced, Elijah like, to let her Mantle fall; and Falſehood, waiting by for ſuch an opportunity, ſnatch'd it up preſently, and ever ſince goes about diſguiſed in Truth's Attire.
AND there is always ſome Truth, that gives being to every Errour, though ſometimes it would require a very curious Artiſt, in the midſt of all the deformities of Errour, to deſcry the defaced Lineaments of that Truth, which it did at firſt reſemble; as Plutarch ſpake of thoſe Egyptian Fables on Iſis and Oſiris, that they had foreign, certain weak appearances and glimmerings of Truth; but ſo as they needed foreign, ſome notable Diviner, to diſcover them.
Whence the difficulty ariſes to find out Truth.AND this I think is the caſe of all, that ſearch after Truth; they muſt go along and dangerous Journey; ſometimes they muſt meet with no path at all; ſometimes with ſo many, and thoſe ſo contrary in appearance to one another, that the variety confounds them; Nay, ſhe is ſo involved and interwoven with miſtake; that Mankind ſeem to have done that to Truth, which the Egyptian Typhon did to the good Oſiris, when he hewed her lovely Form into a thouſand pieces, and ſcattered them to the Four Winds: Ever ſince her ſad Friends, ſuch as dare appear in her behalf, imitating the careful ſearch, that Iſis made for the mangled Body of Oſiris, have wandred up and down, gathering up Limb by Limb ſtill as they could find them; All the parts are not yet found, nor ever ſhall be, until her Maſter's Second coming; He ſhall bring together every Joint and Member; and mould them into an immortal Feature of Lovelineſs and Perfection.
IN the mean time we muſt not be wanting in all neceſſary Care for ſo doubtful a paſſage through all the Falſhoods, as well as Vanities of this Life: For theſe are the Evils, that produce moſt of thoſe Heats that are amongſt men; And if ignorant or malicious Phyſicians in this violent Feaver, did not apply new Heats, inſtead of Julips, they might by writing and ſpeaking Truth, reduce the World in a ſhort time to its antient healthful and natural Temper: For if Truth, as Democritus fanſied,Truth muſt be ſought for not without, but within us. lies at the bottom of a deep Well, we muſt ſeek for it in the Center and heart of our ſelves; And we ſhall find her ſeated in that Dominion, which the Underſtanding and Judgment hath over the Paſſions; which are the Glaſſes, that diſcover to us all the ſecret workings of the Mind, and they are the Inſtruments too, whereby She acts either Good or Evil: For according to the evenneſs and moderation of men's tempers, ſo much the more impartial their judgments are, and conſequently ſo much the clearer Proſpect they have of all manner of Truth: This will encourage us to walk in the practice of Uprightneſs and Veracity, until we come to that other World, where are the Eternal Laws of Right and Juſtice, the immediate and moſt ſteady Principles of Truth and Goodneſs; where are infallible Rules for all caſes and Actions however circumſtantiated, from which the Will of God, though never ſo abſolute, ſhall never depart one tittle: For his Truth hath place in every declaration of his Mind, and ſignifies an exact correſpondency or agreement between his Mind and his Words, between his Words, and the truth of things; the correſpondency of his Words with his Mind, depends on the rectitude of his Will; the Conformity of Words with his Mind and with the truth and reality of things, depends not not only on the rectitude of his Will, but the perfection of his knowledg, and the Infallibility of his Underſtanding: Therefore Porphyry tells us, That this is one of the Properties of God, to have regard to the Truth, and this is that, which doth ſet men near unto God; and afterwards he adds, That Truth is ſo great a Perfection, that if God would reveal himſelf to Men, he would have Truth for his Body, and Light for his Soul.