View of Some Exceptions Made by a Romanist, Part 2 · Subpart 13 – Subpart 14
C. 6. Anſwer to the 6. Chap.
Section 1 That which you ſay to the fifth Section, is in effect the denying the concluſion, when the premiſes are either not deny'd, or not confuted; for that which his Lordſhip ſaith in that Section, you acknowledge to be a concluſion, and is ſo indeed of all that went before; all directly tending to this, That the Church provided for the guide of faith, it offered by you to be knowne by ſuch markes as the ignorant cannot ſeeke it by, and the Learned, though never ſo honeſt in his ſearch, may chance not to finde it by. This then being the concluſion of all the diſcourſe you profeſſe to deny, upon no other proofe but by affirming, that your principles of probation are certaine and manifeſt, i. e. by ſaying the direct contrary to his concluſion, but not thinking needfull to prove it; And ſo beſide that other abſurdity in Logick, there is petitio principii againe.
Section 2 In doing this you were, I conceive very much reſiſted by your owne ſpirit; for the ſatisfying of which you are faine to ſay this ſtrange thing, that your principles of probation are certaine and manifeſt, and out of them you evict the Church with certainty, though not with evidence: where either you muſt affirme to thinke that [evident] and [manifeſt] are not all one, or elſe that the concluſion is not evident, when the premiſes are; either of which you ſhall have free liberty to take the choyce of, and maintaine in your reply. And when you have ſhewed your skill in ſo doing, you then ſhall have leave to boaſt that your probations are Logicall and conformable to the rules of Ariſtotle in his Analitiques, and the Philoſophers in generall; but till then 'twas to no more purpoſe to ſay that of your ſelfe, then 'twill be to the edification of any that I have repeated it to you.
Section 3 Having thus confim'd the concluſion with that great popular argument (that prevailes with ſo many) a bare confidence of affirming it, it is very remarkable what your next attempt is; why, in ſtead of that hard taske which lay ſo heavy upon your ſhoulders, to get an eaſier, if 'twere poſſible; and therefore you foreſee that ſome may peradventure deny your Churches verity to be evidently credible. Good Sir, what is this but to ſuborne a weaker adverſary to challenge you, that you may be excuſed from fighting with the ſtronger? we deſire plaine dealing, that you will prove your principles of probation to be certaine and manifeſt (which is the thing you affirm'd) and not to thinke to put us off with more obſcure and leſſe containing tearmes of your Churches verity being evidently credible. For firſt, your Churches verity (i. e. I conceive its being the true Church for I hope you ſpeak not now of its Metaphyſicall verity, or its being truly a Church, for ſo it may be, and be very fallible, and very corrupt) is an equivocall phraſe, and, in what ever ſenſe, is not ſo much as your Churches infallibility; for it may be a true Church, and not be infallible, i. e. upon ſuppoſition, that what ever now it taught were actually true, 'twere yet poſſible it might erre, even when it doth not; nay, if its verity ſhould ſignifie that it were a true Church (as perhaps you meane) excluſively to all others, i. e. that the Catholique Church were the Roman Church, and the Roman the Catholique; yet ſpeaking of the preſent ſtate of the Church, i. e. of the preſent Roman Church, though it were ſuppoſed to be the preſent Catholique Church, yet may that be fallible again, becauſe thoſe that are now in the truth, may fall into errour, and others riſe up, as they fall, to be defendors of the truth, and ſo the promiſe of God of keeping his Church from finall or totall falling, be made good ſtill.
Section 4 As for that other largeſt notion of the Catholique Church (under which we confeſſe it to be infallible) that of the univerſall Church all the world over, without any reſtriction; I conceive it impoſſible, that by your Church (which is the Church with an eminent reſtriction) you ſhould meane that; and upon that ground it was, that I affirm'd, that the verity of your Church, in what ever ſenſe, is not ſo much as its infallibility.
Section 5 Then againe your phraſe of evidently credible, is not ſure ſo much as certaine and manifeſt; for though evidently credible ſound ſtrangely, (and if it have any ſenſe in it, hath alſo ſome obſcurity) yet I ſhall ſuppoſe you meane by it, that which is credible, or may be believed, and of which it is evident that it may, the words Grammatically can beare no other ſenſe then this, that it is evident that they are credible; now certainly to be evident and certaine, is much more then to be credible, though it be never ſo evident that it is credible. For ſuppoſe me actually to acknowledge that you have ſome probable arguments that your Church is the true Church; nay ſuppoſe it is ſo evident that you have ſuch arguments, that every man that hath common underſtanding will be ready to acknowledge you have ſo, doth it thence follow, that I, or all others, doe and muſt acknowledge that you have demonſtrated it? this is to make no difference between the two ſorts of Arguments in Logick, Topicall and Demonſtrative; or in a word, to conclude that to be infallible, which you durſt not ſay was any more then credible; for as for the word [evidently] added to it, it cannot have ſuch an influence on the word, credible, as to make that quite another, or higher ſort of things then it was; Credible in the cleareſt or higheſt degree is but credible ſtill, as the eminenteſt or excellenteſt man in the world is a man ſtill; and therefore in briefe, if we ſhould helpe you to fewer adverſaries then you have, and take off that ſuborn'd enemy of yours, whom you ſuppoſe to deny your Churches verity to be eminently credible, you would have gain'd by it but little peace from his Lordſhip, who would ſtill require you to make good your pretenſion of infallibility, which will be a much harder theme to declaime for popularly, (I am ſure Logically) then the credibility of the verity of your Church.
Section 6 As for your way of anſwering that objection, becauſe the objection is not needfull for us to make, Any reply, or confutation of your anſwer will be as unneceſſary. I ſhall onelyonly report to other men from your owne pen, one notable deciſion of yours, that in a triall of huge importance, concerning the credibility of the verity of your Church (I muſt be faine to uſe your phraſe) right reaſon and every man's owne conſcience muſt be the Judge; which being ſo great an act of complyance and favour both to thoſe which aſſert reaſon, and to thoſe that maintaine the private ſpirit to be the Judge of Controverſies, i. e. to two ſorts of men, which have hitherto beene believed oppoſite enough to your infallibility, it will be but gratitude to reward ſo great a bounty, with a favourable interpretation of a good meaning, and he ſhould be very rude and uncivill, who would not grant upon ſuch your demand, that you are no Socinian, nor inclining to that ſort of miſ-believers; for ſure he that makes right reaſon the Judge of his very principles, muſt needs be ſo rationall, and ingenuous, that he can never be an Heretique, though he ſay the very things that Heretiques doe.
Section 7 As for your very excellent ſimilie of the eies and the ſpectacles, I ſhall not have a word to ſay to it, ſave onelyonly this, that although you have gotten the incloſure and monopoly of spectacles, (I meane of impoſing of an exterior Judge upon us) yet other men may be allowed to have eies, as well as you, i. e. to have reaſon and conſcience to Judge of your Judge, and then the iſſue (according to your premiſes being granted to you) will be this, that they whoſe reaſon and conſcience tels them, that 'tis not evidently credible, that your Church ſhould be the true Church, excluſively to all others, ſhall not be obliged to believe it is ſo (for their owne reaſon, ſay you, and Conſcience is to be judge) that they whoſe reaſon, &c. tels them it is ſo credible, may believe it, if they pleaſe; nay, if they have no arguments as credible to the contrary, and upon impartiall ſearch can finde none, it is very reaſonable for them to believe what to their conſcience is ſo credible; but if they have ſuch arguments to the contrary, or if it be their fault that they have not, they are ſure no farther bound to believe it (if they are not Subjects of your Church) then thoſe dictates of their conſcience doe extend to oblige them, or (if they are Subjects, yet) no farther then the doctrine of obedience rightly ſtated (which will be too long a worke for a parentheſis) hath influence on mens opinions; but then ſtill, what ever their caſe be for believing the verity of your Church, they can no way from thence be obliged to believe your infallibility.
Section 8 You confeſſe there may farther reply be made to you, that theſe principles of yours are alſo queſtion'd, but take no notice upon what grounds of reaſon or Scripture they are queſtion'd, and ſo thinke you can deale with ſo unarm'd an adverſary, as you pleaſe, by telling him they may be certaine and evident, though they be queſtion'd; and perhaps I ſhall confeſſe to you, that if they were onelyonly queſtion'd, and no reaſon that were not by you eaſily anſwered, brought to juſtifie ſuch queſtioning, it were ſufficient which you ſay, that queſtioning doth not diſprove certainty; (and yet if every man's conſcience be the Judge, as you acknowledge, then unleſſe you can make it evident that that man's queſtioning is againſt conſcience, you will have no way to keepe it from being certaine, and evident to him) but when there be arguments produc'd to backe that queſtioning, which you have no way to anſwer, but by ſaying they may be certaine and evident for all that; he that diſputes with you, will be excus'd to thinke he hath more reaſon to ſay (and that you ſay muſt be judge) that it may be otherwiſe.
To the 6. & 7. Sections, Chap. 7.
No doubt there can be, but God will reveale his truth to all ſuch as ſeeke it with ſincerity of heart; and though both ſides, as the Enquirer objecteth, may make uſe of this for an exterior allegation, yet not as of interior helpe and preparation; and therefore this ſincerity is not a diſpoſition unprofitable, though it be a proofe inefficacious, and thus much we grant willingly, neither doe we challenge it as an argument of truth.
We grant him alſo, that before ſuch time as we can believe the Church, we are to acquire ſufficient principles for informing us which is ſhe; and alſo before we can believe upon her determinations, we muſt have principles of knowing ſhe is infallible, and all this we make profeſſion we doe, de facto, know. Neither doe we take this Church to be a Proteus, that is to ſay, ſometimes of one ſhape, ſometimes of another, but a conſpicuous body conſtantly adorned with the robes of truth, and annexed to a Succeſſion of Paſtours legitimate from one age to another.