View of Some Exceptions Made by a Romanist, Part 2 · Subpart 11 – Subpart 12
C. 5. Anſw. To the fifth Chapter.
Section 1 Your fifth Chapter is a very long one, and by that length and the contents of it, puts me in mind of him that owing his Fellow Sixpence, being not able to pay him, offered him a hundred Counters one after another in a ſudden motion of his hand, in hope that at length his eyes might dazle, and take ſome one of them for coyne, or if not, yet rather chuſe to loſe his Sixpence, than to venture ſo many cheats by awaiting that payment. For I am perſwaded that when I have but repeated to you his Lordſhips Argument in the fourth Paragraph, you will ſpare me the paines of ſhewing that you have not anſwer'd it, by confeſſing you have not ſaid one word to the foreign, or rationall importance of it.
Section 2 The intent of the Paragraph is to prove that tradition or Authority of the Antients is not a proper meanes to prove the Infallibility of the Church. The meanes of inferring the concluſion are, Firſt, the diviſion of men (to whom this Argument is ſuppoſed to be brought) into ignorant and learned. Secondly, the inſiſting on the propoſition in relation to each of them, to the ignorant becauſe they cannot know, to the learned becauſe they cannot infallibly know that tradition doth prove this Infallibility.
Section 3 Firſt, To the ignorant, proving that tradition cannot prove the Infallibility to them, becauſe the ignorant cannot know what is the voice of generall and conſtant tradition; Which if it be true, is an infallible argument to induce the concluſion; (for that tradition cannot prove another thing till it ſelf be proved, which it is not to him at leaſt, who neither doth nor can know it) and that it is not true, you doe not ſo much as pretend, but rather help to prove it more plainly, than his Lordſhip thought neceſſary to doe. And this is all that you doe returne to the firſt part of the proofe, ſave only by pretending that this knowledge or triall of tradition cannot be neceſſary to the ignorant; which as it is true, ſo is it nothing againſt his Lordſhip, who had no uſe of ſaying that it was neceſſary, but rather the contrary; and by ſaying it is impoſſible implies he cannot thinke it neceſſary; and therefore when you affirme of his Lordſhip, that by conſequence of his Doctrine he impoſes this impoſſible taske upon the illiterate, and doe not ſo much as pretend to mention that conſequence, this is ſo clear a prevarication, that you cannot take it ill at any friends hands, to call upon you to confeſſe and retract it; and of that nature is that other ſuggeſtion here, that his Lordſhip ſeems to ſay, that ignorant men doe aſſent to truth on no better grounds than others doe to falſhood,] there being no ſuch ſyllable here affirmed, (and if afterwards there be, we ſhall there meet with it.)
Section 4 The ſecond part of the Argument is in relation to the learned, proving that tradition cannot to them infallibly prove the Infallibility of your Church, or be a rule by which to ſquare your beleife in this particular, ſo farre at leaſt, as to make it to them neceſſary to be beleived, (as your friends doe and muſt ſay it is) becauſe it is poſſible they may miſtake in it, and that miſtake will not be damnable in them, if they fall into it with a good conſcience, as poſſibly they may (i. e. if they uſe their beſt diligence to find the truth by tradition, and are not kept from it either by prejudice or paſſion) though it ſhould fall out they doe not finde it.
Section 5 This argument thus drawne out at length, his Lordſhip confirmes by a cleare and pertinent inſtance; ſuppoſe me in my inqueſt, whether the Church may erre, to enquire whether it ever hath erred, and in that inqueſt ſuppoſe me to meet with ſome motives which really perſwade me that the Church hath contradicted her ſelfe, (which if ſhe hath done ſhe hath certainly, erred, becauſe both branches of a contradiction cannot be true but one of them muſt needs be falſe) in this caſe it followes, that I beleive ſhe hath erred; Wherein though it is poſſible that I may erre (becauſe the premiſes which I beleived true may be falſe) yet becauſe it is but an errour in my judgement that did ſo thinke (and that being reconcileable in this caſe with ſincerity, will not be damning to me) it will follow, that it will be pardonable in me, though never ſo learned, that Tradition doth not convince me of the truth of that, which I did really conceive it ſhewed me to be falſe; it being as pardonable in the learned to beleive that errour which they conceive Tradition tells them, as it was impoſſible for the unlearned to know what is Tradition.
Section 6 The whole weight of this part of the Argument lies in this, that what ever is neceſſary to be beleived muſt be offered to be proved by a meanes wherein the learned at leaſt cannot erre pardonably, and therefore the Infallibility of the Church offered to be proved by Tradition (that Tradition being a thing wherein the learned may erre pardonably) is not proved by that meanes to be neceſſary to be beleived. Or in a Syllogiſme thus; That wherein the learned may erre pardonably, is not a meanes to prove the Infallibility of the Church to be neceſſary to be beleived, but Tradition is a meanes wherein the learned may erre pardonably, therefore Tradition is not a meanes to prove the Infallibility of the Church to be neceſſary to be believed.
Section 7 This is the ſumme of what his Lordſhip ſaith in the other part of that paragraph; and to no part of this Syllogiſme, or of the materialls there, out of which I have formed it, doe you returne the leaſt anſwer or deniall, but rather confirme the Minor, Firſt, by uſing Arguments to prove, that it is a difficulty and knot, common to Papiſts with Proteſtants, to finde out the conformity of their doctrine with the Ancients; which difficulty being granted, will prove that in that matter the learned may erre pardonably. Secondly, by aſſerting that there be other notes of truth beſides this of conformity with the Ancients, and therefore that enquiry after that is not neceſſary to any man; which ſeemes a diſclaiming of that as of an unfit Argument. Thirdly, by ſaying that we know the conformity by the truth, much eaſier then the truth by conformity. From whence it will follow, that conformity is a very ill Argument, and the worſe the Argument the more pardonable the errour in it. And fourthly, by the profeſſed unfitneſſe of this Argument, at large dilated on by you, with this concluſion, that the conditions for the underſtanding of Tradition are ſo very hard, that certainly God never impoſed them on us. On which grounds you offer us another meanes of proving it, (which ſhewes that this was unſufficient in your opinion) viz. the conſpicuous body of the preſent Church; which if it be not a very fallible meanes alſo (as in many reſpects I might prove it were particularly by this, that the compaſſe of Chriſtians that are of that Church of yours, is not by common computation a third part of the Chriſtian world) is certainly very diſtant from Tradition; which that it is not a meanes infallible in this matter, is all that his Lordſhip now contends in that preſent Argument.
Section 8 The onelyonly thing that is by you produced againſt this difficulty of uſing this meanes, (and ſo pardonableneſſe of erring) is the laſt period of the Chapter, which commends the reading of the Magdeburgians as a readier way to know conformity, then examination of places.
Section 9 To which I anſwer, that if they have voluntarily confeſſed that there is conſtant Tradition for the infallibility of the Roman Church, then have you fitly cited them; if they have not, or if upon my preſent inſtance you doe not ſhew that they have either directly, or by certaine conſequence, then have you wronged them in this your affirmation, and left your ſelfe no meanes to prove your concluſion by that medium.
Section 10 This is all I ſhall ſay to that long Chapter, and in that I have ſhewed, that through it you much miſtooke the Argument propoſed in the title of the Chapter, the confutation of the fourth paragraph, of which there being two parts, you ſpake no word againſt either of them; and therefore if I ſhould allow every word of that Chapter to be true, though you would be beholding to me, yet would it be no advantage to you againſt his Lordſhip's preſent reaſoning, to which all you ſay is very extrinſecall and impertinent. But that I may not lay too great an obligation on you by ſo liberall a grant, I wil mention to you ſome infirm parts in that your diſcourſe.
Section 11 I have touched on three already; and your evidences (that your Church and Religion is the true) which you mention for the illiterate, and are no one of them evidences, may be added to the number; which I need not prove, becauſe you have not attempted to prove, but onelyonly aſſert the contrary. And ſo alſo your Divinity cited out of Ric: Victorinus, if applied to your purpoſe: [that whatſoever is once ſo creditable (as you have there made the Infallibility of your Church) can never be falſe] Which beſide other falſities, muſt inferre other things to be infallible, beſide that onelyonly infallible; for 'tis ſure that other things may by you be made ſo creditable, and as ſure, that what ever elſe cannot be falſe (God's veracity ſtanding engaged for it) is infallible alſo; and (not to mention your proofes of that Divinity) ſuch is your aſſertion, that the Enquirer's inference againſt the Church is, [we thinke ſhe hath erred, therefore ſhe may erre] for his inference is onelyonly this; if ſhe hath erred, certainly ſhe may; which I ſhould ſay is another great injuſtice, by changing his Lordſhip's words, but that it is repaired and expiated with another act of more kindneſſe to us, though of as little force of reaſon; that the i…ference is good, but the antecedent is infirme; whereas in t…uth the Inference had beene nought, but the Antecedent either t…ue, or onelyonly in the power of the Searcher of thoughts to diſprove in him; ſo againe, that the diſcovering the non-conformity of your Church with the Antients, may juſtly be thought impoſſible; when if we had not actually done it, yet hereafter we might; and when in the preſent buſineſſe we affirme (and you goe not about to diſprove) that your pretending to the Infallibility of your Church is inconformable to the Antients, becauſe they did not ſo pretend; and ſurely ſuch is your affirmation, that to ſend one to a witneſſe, and yet bid him not believe himſelfe in what he conceives that witneſſe tels him, is not as bad, as to ſend him in like manner, and bid him not believe the witneſſe; there being no poſſibility of believing what the Witneſſe ſaith, but by believing himſelfe, affirming that that Witneſſe ſaid it: For if you ſay it be by believing of you (i. e. another Witneſſe) that that Witneſſe ſaid it; I anſwer, that that will include a believing himſelfe alſo, viz: himſelfe affirming that you teſtified that the other Witneſſe ſaid it.
Section 12 I ſhall trouble you with no more at once, leſt you count me uncivill; one thing onelyonly more I ſhall let you know I take notice of, that in the compaſſe of very few words you caſt off much of the reſpect due to Antiquity, by ſaying, that it is ſufficient, if we can by any ſure way come to the knowledge of truth (mentioning at that time onelyonly the conſpicuous body of the preſent Church for ſuch) without taking care whether it be conforme to the Antients, or no, &c. By which as you acknowledge your preferring the conſpicuous body of the preſent Church (for the finding out of truth) before Antiquity, which is the ſtrangeſt ſpeech I could have look'd for from a defender of Tradition, ſo I confeſſe I ſee the reaſon why a Section that undertooke to prove that Antiquity was no infallible proofe of your Churches Infallibility, had in a long Chapter of anſwer to it, never a word ſaid in confutation of it; and ſo I very friendly take leave of it.
To the fifth Section, Chap. 6.
Out of that which hitherto hath beene ſaid, it appeares plainly how the concluſion which the Enquirer would inferre in this fifth Section, is no way applicable to our manner of probation of the Churches Infallibility: for we doe not, as he ſurmiſeth, maintaine that our Church the Guide of Faith, is to be knowne by ſuch markes by which the ignorant cannot ſeeke it, and the Learned may chance to miſſe, although with all diligence and without prejudice they enquire after it; for we affirme that our firſt principles of probation are certaine and manifeſt, and out of them, we with certainty, though not with evidence, evict the Church. By which manner of proceeding it is cleare, that our probations are Logicall and conformable to the rules preſcribed for the hunting out of truth by Ariſtotle in his Analytiques, and the Philoſophers in generall.
Some peradventure will deny our Churches verity to be evidently credible: If any doe it, the matter muſt be remitted to an equall triall betweene us. But, ſay you, who muſt be the Judge? I am no Socinian, nor inclining to that ſort of miſ-believers, yet nevertheleſſe, I ſay, right reaſon muſt be he, and every man's owne conſcience; and of theſe Judges, I hope all men will allow, and it is reaſonable ſure they ought to doe ſo, becauſe reaſon is in all queſtions the laſt and the interior Judge, without whoſe aſſent and approbation, no exterior is ſufficient and compleat. For exterior Judges be as ſpectacles to the eies; and as spectacles, be they never ſo good, cannot ſee without eies, ſo cannot revelation, be it never ſo manifeſt, give the laſt ſentence about any doctrine, nor be ſufficient without reaſon.
It may be further replied, that theſe principles of ours are alſo queſtion'd. Admit they be, yet nevertheleſſe may they be certaine and evident, otherwiſe we ſhould grant nothing to be certaine; for there is no one thing ſo evident, which is not queſtion'd by ſome or other.