The Obligation of Human Laws, Chapter 9
CAP. ƲLT.
THus much for his grand exception, I muſt now look out for others, or any paſſage elſe that requires Animadverſion.
At the firſt there comes to my view in General, the cavilling way which he uſes toward me, as if when a Man wanted a good anſwer, he ſhould ſhew an ill Spirit, which I would not believe in this Author. I perceive he pretends often that the Apologiſt doth wrong him and ſo accuſes him of falſifyings and impertinences, which are his frequent words: But in the mean while I wonder he ſhould not ſee how notoriouſly he is guilty of both theſe fine things himſelf. It would be no great matter (ſays he) if the Caſuiſt imitated not theſe men only in their phraſe, and not in their weak reaſonings, and then produces an obſervation I have of providence in tranſitu, as if I argued ſomething from thence, which if he could tell what, he would confute no doubt, and he well might, wherefore it is manifeſt I lay that paſſage down and make no reaſoning at all upon it, neither do I imitate any bodies phraſe, nor tye my ſelf to any part, And if this then be not falſifying neither ſhall his four or five ſides after about Image worſhip, be any impertinency: nor his ſix or ſeven pages in another place about the Taxes and Inſurrections there has been in this Nation: no though he ſhould tell you the whole Life and Death of Wat Tyler, and Jack Straw, with a more perfect Narration yet of that Dr. Standiſh, unto whom John Lincoln the Broker came when he was to preach at the Spittle on a Monday in Eaſter week. This ſhould alſo be no impertinency, but a forceable confutation of whatſoever is ſaid by the Apologiſt or me. He may next tell us any other ſtory as well out of the Chronicles. Of Jack Cad…, and his Cozen Mortimer. Of Lambert Simuel and the Lady Margret his Aunt. How might he have mauld us with the Relation of Perkin Warb…ck, and Thomas Plamm…ck, and Robert Ket with his Oak of Reformation, and then kil'd us quite dead with an arrow our of Robin Hoods bow? In the Reign of Richard the firſt there was the noble Earl Robin Hood, and one little John, and an hundred ſtout Fellows more, robbed the Paſſengers upon the High way. And what indeed is it that we may well think of ſuch a Roving faculty we ſee in this Authors laſt books, but that the Mans pen hath got a leoſeneſs, and that is the reaſon he hath ſo be ſpattered the poor Apologiſt, whoſe ill luck and my good one it was, that he came between him and me. This is the reaſon that makes him come abroad ſo often, in a Debate, a continuation of that debate, a continuation of that continuation, an appendix to that continuations continuation, and a Poſt-ſcript to that appendix to that continuation, of the continuation of the Friendly Debate. Nec dum fini…us Oreſtes. I muſt needs ſay here, I have been tempted to uſe ſome expreſſions that perhaps might be grateful to many who are willing to have a perſon (as they are apt to ſpeak) met with in his kind, but I remember there is a ſelf-denyal to be uſed in our writings as in our converſations, and there is an office of Love and honour we owe to worthy perſons; and when I may uſe ſuch expreſſions as theſe I think from the example of Elijah, I muſt uſe no bitterneſs from the command of the Apoſtle, nor any word from an offended mind from the example of our Saviour and Lord.
The next thing which preſents it ſelf to my notice is a paſſage which hath a malignant aſpect on my opinion, or on what I have ſaid, yet ſhall be found but a friend to it. I am ſenſible now and then of a learing hint from this engaged man, I chooſe to be a little free with him, ſeeing he hath chalked out that way to me, but do reflect again on that word as having too aptly or truly expreſſed the thing, whether I had beſt let it ſtand. By a learing paſſage I underſtand any ſuch as reflects any thing upon me, which ſeems to him to render me obnoxious, beſides the being ſlighted above what is juſt. Nevertheleſs when I perceive he ſpeaks out of ignorance, that is out of the want of a fuller underſtanding in this particular matter, of what he reproves, I am ſuſtained with my own opinion and the integrity of it. Although too, while he conceits his knowledge ſo ſuperior, it is all one for me, to taſt his Spirit. When I ſay ignorance, to wit hitherto, in reference to this point, I underſtand not this perſon to be an ignorant perſon. No I hold him to be a learned Man of very much ability, and the leaſt of his ſufficiency I take to be for diſpute. I compare not my ſelf with him. I know the ſhortneſs of my houſhold ſtuff yet this have I, that when a particular point gets into my head, it coſts me more thoughts uſually then others will beſtow upon it, and conſequently ought not in every thing I ſay, be ſo readily contemned. In the moſt points that ever I ſtudied I could arrive ordinarily but to this, that there is reaſon on both ſides. That to be dogmatical is not ſafe. I do ſometimes ſpeak for a thing out of courage, to bear it up againſt the ſtream, rather then out of pride. I have ſcarce ever come up to ſo much confidence in any point as I have in this in good earneſt, and if I ſhew it too much though i… be out of the ſimplicity of my heart, I could help it if I would, but that I think the world requires it, and the matter will bear it, for I am my ſelf a peice of duſt. The paſſage is this, The Caſuiſts principle if perſued will prove the very ſame with that in the perverſe meaning of it ſo much cryed up, when all our miſchiefs began, ſalus populi ſuprema lex▪ for the right underſtanding of which maxime I refer you to the laſt Lecture of Dr. Saunderſon. It is very much that this perſon ſhould ſee at firſt glimp… upon what foundation all that I ſay does ſtand and that this foundation is made good by Dr. Saunderſon, and yet that he ſhould go to put ſuch a ſlur as this on it, without any good conſideration or honeſty.
As for the maxime which in the words is fercht from Cicero de legibus, out of what o…d Roman Law ſoever he had it, in the truth it is no leſs antient then Magiſtracy or Government it ſelf, and ſhall ſtand ſo …long as there is any in the World. There be ſome have abuſed the holy Goſpel and turned it into wantonneſs, but the abuſe of the Goſpel is no cauſe ſufficient to throw off the Goſpel. No more is the abuſe of this maxime ſufficient reaſon to hinder any the patronage of it. You may as well lay aſide the Goſpel in Religion, as this truth out of Politicks, without which neither any ſociety or Common-wealth, or the World it ſelf could ſtand. I do hugely like the deſign of this Dr. in that Lecture which is the vindication of that Maxime, that every one may ſafely imbrace it, and I aſſent to all ſo far as I remember he hath ſaid of it; but yet I muſt needs ſay, I think not the Lecture moſt ſufficient of his Lectures, who appears rather as himſelf accounts, ſomething out of his proper ſtudy, when he is drawn upon it.
That which he ſayes is no leſs truth then obvious, that under the word populus we muſt comprehend the ſupream Magiſtrate as well as the Subject. It is trite, that Plebs and Populus in Political Writers are diſtinguiſhed, and this may be moſt convincing that in Ciceroes time (whoſe words theſe are) the Roman people was a Common-wealth, ſo that the ſupream Magiſtracy it ſelf lay in the body of the people, ſo far it is from any Juſtice or Right, that any ſhould make uſe of this maxime to ſuppreſs the cheif Magiſtrate by it. The good of the people in their publick capacity is the good of the Common-wealth. A Common-wealth conſiſts in the order of ſuperiority and inferiority. The Common-wealths good then is the good of Magiſtrates and Subjects, the common intereſt of one is alſo the Intereſt of the other. There being no conſequence deducible therefore from this maxime for the people to riſe up againſt the King any more then againſt themſelves, or their own welfare, There is one queſtion I think wanting in that Lecture of the Dr. whereof neither he (as the truth is) nor this man have yet caſt any right account, It is this, How comes it to paſs that when this maxime doth warrant the ſubject in not obeying ſome Laws which are made by the Magiſtrate, it will by no means warrant any ſubject to riſe againſt or reſiſt the Magiſtrate if he will execute them upon him? The anſwer to this will be like the invention of making the Egg ſtand an end, that is ſo apparent and eaſie, that you will wonder it ſhould not be ſeen already by every body. VVhen the common good then or the good of the community, is ſaid to be the ſupream Law, it muſt be underſtood moſt undoubtedly in reference to thoſe laws which are made for the community. Ex illis haec ſuprema lex eſto. If there be any one of ſuch conſequently does claſh with this, which is the cheif or ſuperior to them all, that is, if there be any law made which is not indeed for the common good, then is the ſubject manifeſtly diſcharged by vertue of this maxime from any obligation to it, in the point of equity or conſcience. But it is as manifeſt likewiſe, that we are not to underſtand this maxime in reference to Gods Laws. To wit, The common good is the ſupream Law to all other Laws of the State, to …ll human Laws, which are made to that end, the publick good of civil ſociety: but it is not ſupream to Gods Laws, or to any Law of God religious or moral which are made to another end, to wit the glorifying of God, not in order to our civil happineſs, but our everlaſting ſalvation. VVhen God ſays Thou ſhalt have no other Gods but me, a Roman or a Greek might not ſay no it is ſon the good of our Country that many Gods be worſhipped, and the common good muſt take place of other Laws. For beſides that it is falſe to think it for the good of any ſtate, to have more then one God; The Law of the common good is to take place over the Common wealths Law, or is the ſupream Law, I ſay to all human Laws, but not to Gods Laws, which comes not under any ſubordination to ſuch good but do concern the ſalvation of Mens ſouls. Now it is the Law or command of God that Magiſtracy be ſet up, that we be in ſubjection to the powers that are, that is the preſent Magiſtrate that we have, and that we reſiſt not. This is no leſs his Commandment then that we have no other Gods but him. If there be any then will argue we are not obleiged in Conſcience to obey a Law which is not for the common good upon the account of this maxime: Therefore we are not obleiged in Conſcience to ſubjection to the Magiſtrate if he rule not for the common good upon account of the ſame, he is greatly miſtaken. Becauſe this maxime as we are to know, was Originally intended ſo is to be underſtood on neceſſity, in reference to the Laws of men, or the Common wealths Laws only, and not in reference to the Commandments of God. Again, when a human Law paſſes for the good of the community, the common good being the ſupream rule and meaſure of all, every one judges and ought to judge (upon the pinch of the queſtion) whether the thing commanded be for the common good, that is, whether it be agreeable to the ſupream Law, and according as he judges and believes it to be or no, ſo is he obliged in Conſcience or not to it. But when a Magiſtrate rules not as he ought, and ſo we are free as to his inordinate commands, there is no man may judge whether he himſelf, or the Government it ſelf be for the good or no. You will ſay why? Becauſe the powers that be are of God, and his Ordinance, and whether the Ordinance of God be for our good or no, there is no mortal may queſtion or is to iudge. God hath himſelf declared this that he is the Miniſter of God for our good even Nero was, and no man may once offer to determine contrary to Gods declared word, or tell the Almighty he ſayes not truth. Conſequently when a Law ſometimes doth paſs that is not for the common good, and a man judging of it according to truth is not obliged in Conſcience to obedience, vet the Magiſtrate himſelf being for our good (God having determined ſo and mans judgement being confined by his) even by this maxime it ſelf that the common good is the ſupream Law, he muſt be ſtill bound to ſubjection. And what now is become of this mans reproach which he hath laid to my charge with ſo much falſhood, and little judgement? as if Dr. Saunderſon and he were for this maxime in the right ſenſe, and I was for it in the perverſe meaning, when it is plain that indeed neither he nor Dr. Saunderſon (how worthy ſoever in their pacts otherwiſe) underſtood this maxim… in the full import of it, ſeeing elſe he would have determined the main caſe no otherwiſe then I do.
And this brings me to another paſſage of this Debater, which I was willing to reſerve …ill now, both for the agreement of it here, …nd for making a diſcovery of ſome of this …uthours ſtrong reaſonings, who counts mine …o weak. It is reſolved by the Caſuiſt, that if the Magiſtrate command any thing for the Peoples hurt, there lies no obligation upon the Conſcience to obey, and they are made judges of what …s for their hurt. If then he require them not …o reſiſt and they find this is for their hurt, they are not bound in Conſcience not to reſiſt. Is not this very goodly? Does not the Gentleman ſhew us here indeed what a fathome it is that he has, as he ſpeaks ſomewhere? why this can be no leſs ſure then Bonaventures Son, or Bradwardines brother! What if the Magiſtrate ſhould require us not to reſiſt? If it were the Magiſtrate only required this, there were no doubt but we might reſiſt if he hurt or wrong us, as well as not obey his Laws if they be for our hurt. But it is Gods Commandment that we reſiſt not, and if he ſhall do us wrong or hurt we muſt bear it upon that account. It is but ſuffering according to his well and that is the reaſon why the Magiſtrate and Government it ſelf ſafe, when the Conſcience is yet at liberty … avoid, if we can, any unjuſt, unreaſonab… noxious, or unprofitable Law for the peop… You will ſay are we not bound to obey h… Laws, as well as not to reſiſt his authority… I anſwer, there is this difference, we ha… no command from God that ſayes you m… obey this or that particular Law of the Common-wealth, or that you muſt indefinite… obey them all ſeeing ſome may be unjuſt ſome wicked, ſome vain; But there is a La… or command from God to be ſubject to the powers that are: whatſoever they are, and … whatſoever they are, that is rightful power (for elſe the devil may come in) and th… we muſt net reſiſt. I ſay moreover that to be ruled by the common good in civil affairs deſigned by his Miniſter, I take to be a Law of God of the ſame Nature as to be ſubject to the Magiſtrate, and to fear himſelf.
After this, there is one paſſage more I will not paſs becauſe it looks lightly and is a conceſſion againſt himſelf, but does not ſatiſfie if the word may nto offend) without a farther remove upon it. It is this. It is ſuppoſed when a caſe of intollerable inconvenience happens that it being not the intention of a Prince to make his Subjects miſerable, he would not have made that Law if he could have foreſeen ſuch a miſcheif, and upon that account it ceaſes to be a Law, and looſes its obligation. I remember well that ſome indeed ſpeak thus, and when any take a Latitude in applying it to an individual caſe it will come to this, that ſuppoſing the Law-giver to conſider the circumſtances that this or that particular man is in, it is preſumed that he would conſent to the breach of his Law by that perſon, and upon this preſumption there may be many perhaps that abſolve themſelves from ſeveral peices of obedience. That which may be ſaid for this is, that if the Law-giver is to be ſuppoſed not to intend to make his ſubjects miſerable by a Law; he is to be ſuppoſed not to intend to make any one miſerable for he cannot ſimply do the one any more then the other. Eadem eſt ratio unius cujuſque & Univerſorum. If ſuch a Law makes this or that particular man miſerable if he keep it, he will judge it to be the Law-givers intention, that he be diſpenſed with, that thoſe ſhould obſerve it who are made happy, or at leaſt not ſo diſtreſſed as he by it. There is ſomething I ſuppoſe of ſolidity in this, if we can find out for it a right bottom. There is no particular perſon can ſay if the Law-giver had foreſeen this or the particular mans inconvenience he would no have made the Law, becauſe Laws in the nature are confinements and ſtreightnin… to particular perſons for the good of the community. But this he muſt ſay, th… notwithſtanding the will of the Law-giver is indeed, that the generality ſhould keep the Law being for their good, yet it is to be underſtood with exception, to ſuch a ca… or caſes, as his is. If he can give a reaſon now for this that will hold, it is well. The ſaying he made not his Law to make an… ſimply miſerable is true, but in Relation to the publick he paſſed it though ſome ſhould be diſtreſſed by it: He cannot ſay therefore that he made not this Law to make him miſerable, but this he may ſay, that he made not this Law to make him or any man miſerable, but for the advantage of the community, ſeeing for the benefit of the publick … any one may be made to ſuffer dammage, whereas to make a Law that any might ſuffer it without advantage to the publick is unjuſt. There is neceſſity then to come here to my foundation and that is this. That the general end of every Law and Law-giver is (or ought to be and ſo is ſuppoſed to be) the publick advantage. VVhen any caſe then general or particular is ſuch that it is not for the publick benefit that a Law be obſerved, or that it is more for the publick good that it be not obſerved rather then obſerved, the Law-givers intention is to be ſuppoſed from the general end, that it ſhould not be obligatory to the Subject. His intention is to oblige us to ſuch a thing for the publick good. But if ſuch a thing in ſuch a caſe be not for the publick good the obligation ceaſes being forſaken of his intention.
There is much may be ſaid here, beſide what we inſiſt on before from the will of God.
At the cloſe he preſents us with the teſtimonies of two or three learned men for obedience to all lawful commands of our ſuperiours. He might have taken the harmony of confeſſions, or moſt Diuines common places, and added as many more as he pleaſed of greater authority. He might find expreſſions too as ſtrict as any from ſome of our Nonconformiſt Divines. But that which is to be anſwered to all is this, that we are to apprehend ſuch paſſages to be ſtill ſpoken upon ſuppoſition that the Laws or commands of the ſuperiours be good and wholeſome Laws.
They may put in the word lawfull only, but under it this muſt alſo be implyed. The honeſt and learned Mr. Perkins therefore when he ſpeaks of our duty to the Magiſtrate, does judiciouſly uſe ſuch terms. VVe are bound to obſerve the good and wholeſome Laws of the Nation whe…ein we live.
When he and others ſpeaks thus it is plain that in the bottom of their minds they apprehend, that if the Laws and commands of men be not good and wholeſome Laws or commands, they are not accordingly bound to them, that is not in Conſcience bound, though the outward man be at the Magiſtrates ſervice. And this I take it is that Light which does even almoſt Univerſally flow into the Souls of men, at the firſt conſideration of theſe matters, and as it is of Nature, it is from God. But who ſhall judge whether a Law be a good or wholeſome Law or no? This I know may be again askt. It is a good and wholeſome Law I account when the thing commanded be for the common good. And I reply who ſhall judge whether that which be commanded be lawful or not? It will be a thing moſt fooliſh to ſay, that he who hath paſſed the Law as good already muſt be judge, for then it might be no queſtion. You will ſay that every man muſt indeed be judge of that. I ſay then that if every man muſt judge whether the thing commanded him in a Law be according to Gods word or not, which is a matter of ſo much more difficulty and concernment to his Soul, and where of the moſt of men are ſo much more indeed uncapable to judge with ſoundneſs, and yet every one muſt judge for himſelf according to his ability in reference to his own practice, why ſhould any ſcruple to have the ſame ſaid in the queſtion whether it be for the common good, being what is eaſier done and a leſs matter? The ſum of the whole ſheets will come to this. The moſt both of Religious and Learned men are at a loſs (through their diſpute and jangling I ſuppoſe when the matter elſe perhaps were more plain) in their conceptions about the obligation of human Laws. Two extreams we hear. The one that they bind not the Conſcience at all; the other, that they bind indefinitely, that is, all bind under pain of ſin. A middle path I have effered in reſolving the caſe. We ſee where it is the oppoſer does pinch. They will not allow the ſubject to be a reaſonable agent in Politicals, when they cannot deny him to be ſo in Morals and things Religious. If they will allow us a judgement of diſcretion in Civils, They muſt be ignorant, or conſider not, that the common good is the ſupream Law. That the ſupream muſt over-rule the ſubſervient. So long as any know not this, they are in darkneſs and bondage: But the Scintillations of this truth and Doctrine that I here have brought, are the feeds of Light and Liberty to the World. In which liberty the conſidering Chriſtian will ſtand faſt, and the tender will rejoyce in conſolation.
THE END.