Authority of Magistrates About Religion, Section 6 – Section 7
Sect. 6.
I muſt not yet leave this. There are things in their nature indifferent: and things apparently forbidden or required of God. There is no difference between us in the laſt, God muſt be obeyed in ſuch things beyond queſtion. Duo ſunt genera actuum imperii qui ad jus imperantis non pertinent, Deo vetita jubere, Deo juſſa vetare. For the other, there is a double caſe, The caſe of meer indifferency, and the caſe of doubt; That is, there are things which are indifferent in their nature, and appear ſo to us: and there are things indifferent in their nature, and yet appear to us unlawful. In the one caſe, the reſolution is plain. To do a thing whereof I am in doubt (that is whereof I am not ſufficiently perſwaded, it is lawful to do) is forbidden. Whatſoever is not of Faith is ſin. But the Magiſtrate hath not power to command me to ſin. You may ſay I had better obey doubtfully, then diſobey doubtfully. I anſwer, my doubt in the one refers unto God, in the other unto Man, and I muſt prefer God before Man. If I diſobey I doubt that I do ill onelyonly becauſe of Mans command: but if I obey, I doubt I do ill, becauſe of Gods. I muſt be reſolved that God forbids not the thing before the command of man can take place. I obey then doubtfully: but I forbear in ſaith. I believe and am aſſured that God hath not commanded the thing I forbear: but I am in doubt whether he hath not forbidden what I obey. In the other caſe the reſolution in general is, that we are bound to obedience, but it muſt be offered not indefinitely, but with the diſtinction of a Political and Moral Obligation. When Samuel tells the people the manner of their King, that he would take their ſons for his Charrets, and Daughters for confectionaries, their Fields and Vineyards to give unto his Servants: Here is a political obligation on this people to deliver their Children and Eſtates for the Kings uſe upon his command, becauſe the Government was ſuch in the Conſtitution that if he did ſo, they might not reſiſt him for all that: when yet if any of them could ſave their ſons and daughters, or goods without violence, or offending the King, no doubt but they might, and have a good conſcience to God. A political obligation then is to be bound to the thing ſo as to do it rather then reſiſt: a moral is to be bound to it ſo, as if we do it not, we ſin: We are bound to obey the King in all his commands of things indifferent with a political: we are not bound to obey them with a moral obligation onelyonly when they are for the common good. I have uſed other terms to the ſame ſenſe in my other Book, and I am free in them being explained, but it may be theſe are leſs obnoxious to cavil. The Eccleſiaſtical Polititian therefore (and the Debater both, ſo far as he goes along with him) hath made a very grievous young Determination in this buſineſs, while he ſo confoundedly aſſerts that the Magiſtrate muſt be obeyed in all things not intrinſecally and aparently evil, without any diſcrimination elſe whatſoever: whereas the holding this, is manifeſtly impious in one of theſe caſes, and tyrannous or intolerably oppreſſive to the conſcience in the other. There are ſome things indifferent I ſay in their nature, that yet to us are unlawful, while we ſuppoſe them unlawful, or are in doubt of it, and to do them in that doubt is ſin: and there are ſome things lawfull, but ſo inconvenient, ſo unprofitable, ſo grievous, that we ſhould be loath always when then outward man is, to have the conſcience alſo charged with them.
I know upon the whole matter, what it is that can mainly be urged. God commands that we honour and obey our Superiours. This is the duty of the fifth Commandment. When the Magiſtrate then does appoint this or that particular thing, an obligation to it ariſes upon us as part of that duty: and ſo the conſcience is obliged by God, and that indefinitely in all Laws. I anſwer, the Reader who hath read my other Book with this thus far, I will receive this inſtruction as one uſe of the whole, viz. how the duty which God requires of us the fifth Commandment is to be underſtood; and it is to be underſtood thus: When our Superiour commands what he ought, we are obliged by the Authority of that particular command, ſo that if the thing be not done we ſin: when he commands what he ought not, as when a Law is not for the peoples good, we are obliged only by the Authority which is in his perſon, and ſo, if that be preferred otherwiſe, we ſin not though the thing be left undone. And this is but what is ordinarily affirmed, though not ordinarily ſo well underſtood by our Divines, in their ſaying that the commands of men do oblige onelyonly ſo far as to avoid Contempt and Scandal. A determination I muſt ſay, to be received onelyonly in ſuch commands, which ought not to be commanded: but not in ſuch where the Superiour commands what he ought. I will expreſs it if you will in other words. When the Superiour commands any thing which he ought, we are obliged for conſcience ſake, and the fifth Commandment requires us to do the thing, or elſe we break that command, becauſe this thing bears in it the authority of both Commanders: when he commands any thing which he ought not, we are obliged for wrath's ſake, and the fifth Commandment requires only that we do not reſiſt, ſo that if we reſiſt not, we give that honour and pay that duty to the Magiſtrate, which we owe in this caſe. If we ſuffer with ſubmiſſion, or obey rather then ſuffer, or avoid both the grievance and ſuffering with prudence, neither bringing contempt on his Authority, or inducing our Brethren to ſin, we are to account that we anſwer the intent of this Commandment. I muſt add ſtill that this is as much too as the Magiſtrate himſelf need deſire in the Earth, ſeeing if he be ſtrict upon it, and the thing be not ſinful, he may take any body do what he pleaſe upon this account.
As for our Prefacer, it muſt be yet a greater reproof to his undertaking, that in this endeavour of his to ſet up an Authority in the Magiſtrate over the Conſcience in all matters External, he is certainly fallen in with Mr Hobs, whom yet to avoid the odium, he is fain himſelf to confute. For when that more conſiderable perſon, according to his principles of Government, makes all men by nature before they come into ſociety, to be in a ſtate of War, that gives every man right to every thing: which right upon their agreement into a Common-wealth is given up (he counts) into the hands of the Soveraign to determine Propriety, ſo that his will thenceforth becomes the meaſure of right and wrong to the Community, he proceeds ſo far upon the conceit, as to condemn theſe two poſitions. That every man is judge of good and evil Doctrine. That whatſoever a man does againſt his conſcience is ſin. See his Leviathan, C. 29. Now let us compare this ingenuouſly as we ought (ſeeing elſe it is ſo bad) with other places in his Book. That Subjects owe to Soveraigns ſimple obedience in all things, wherein their obedience is not repugnant to the Laws of God I have proved—C. 31. Again,It is manifeſt enough that when a man receiveth two contrary commands, and knows that one of them is Gods, he ought to obey that, and not the other, though it be the command of his lawful Soveraign, or his Father. C. 43. It does appear then, when the Eccleſiaſtical Polititian does confine the authority he gives the Magiſtrate over the conſcience to external and indifferent things, allowing the authority of the conſcience over the Magiſtrates in things intrinſecally ſinful, and expreſly forbidden by God, he does but the ſame which Mr. Hobs does alſo, if you compare them equally taking one place with another: But herein are they wicked companions both, that they ſhould once offer to take away from reaſonable Agents, a judgement of private diſcretion, in any concernment of conſcience whatſoever.
One may eaſily indeed perceive what the Contents of this young mans papers do amount unto. He dare not take off all obligations of good and evil from mens conſciences antecedent to humane Laws, as Hobs in that one place (though otherwhere, as it ſeems, he intended not ſo far) hath done: becauſe this were not only the way to ruine Religion, but his name, and to bring all Government alſo to ruine, which he engages to aſſert. But he would take off all obligations from mens conſciences, in the whole buſineſs of Conformity, antecedent to the will of the Parliament and Biſhops, ſo as their Acts muſt be the rule of good and evil to us, as to theſe matters. He does tell us indeed of a liberty to our Judgments and to our Faith: but when he will allow us to judge and believe of theſe things as we do, and would yet have us account that the publick conſcience, the Laws, and not the private dictates of our own muſt govern our outward actions, it does bring to my mind one paſſage more in his Friend. What if a Soveraign forbids his Subjects to believe in Chriſt? I anſwer (ſays Mr. Hobs), it is no effect, becauſe belief or unbelief never follow mans Commands. But what if we be commanded to confeſs with our Tongues? It is an external thing, and no more then any other geſture, whereby we ſignifie our obedience, and a Chriſtian holding firmly in his heart the Faith of Christ, hath the ſame liberty herein with Naaman. Leviathan. C. 42. There are no paſſages but this, and that one before cited, that in my reading over that Book, I obſerved to be ſo extream bad, as folks ordinarily talk: but this I noted for a Deviliſh Doctrine, ſeeing it is offered thus indefinitely; for it is directly contrary to all the Holy Martyrs belief and practiſe, and the expreſs inſtitution of our Lord, that he that confeſſes him before men, he will acknowledge, and he that denieth him, he will deny, before his Heavenly Father: Yet if any will be ſo kind to the old Gentleman as I have been before, to produce ſome paſſages otherwhere, that may confine h…s meaning here to ſuch compliances of the Tongue and Knee only, as are required in the impoſitions of Ʋniformity, and no other but ſuch, then ſhall the old Leviathan, and the young Leviathan agree very throughly in their opinion. And why the young one ſhould fall upon his Sire ſo foully as he hath done, whom above all men being alone of his ſide, he ſhould have rather endeavoured to excuſe, unleſs out of ſhew onelyonly and for a coulour, or out of invenility and vanity, he ſhall for me have the Tripos, or be the eighth man, who can give me a good reaſon.
I perceive indeed that two points, (and both of which I have had long in my thoughts) are harled together through the skein of this Prefacers Diſcourſe, that is the Magiſtrates Authority in Religion, and the Obligation of human Laws: It will be expedient for me to diſpatch the one quite out of my hands (being already done in another Book) to be at liberty to attend the other preſently altogether. By what hath been then laid down, it may appear that the right and relation of a Subject to his Soveraign may be held good, when yet there are, it may be, ſome of his Laws not obeyed. Some Laws there are which a man muſt rather ſuffer or dye then obey, as the Roman Emperors commanding Sacrifice to their Gods: Some we are to obey out of conſcience, ſuch are all the wholeſome Laws of a mans Countrey: Some there are that we obey out of prudence rather then ſuffer, which yet we do not judge our ſelves bound to obey for fear of ſin, or of Gods diſpleaſure. The great queſtion then ariſes what is that rule, according to which the Laws of men are to be meaſured, that we may know the kind and the degrees of their obligation. This rule I have advanced in my former Book, and I ſay that, in matters of Religion the Word of God is the Rule: in Morals the Law of Nature: in Politicals God hath appointed a Rule alſo as ſure, and that is, the common good. The Laws of the Magiſtrates, as the Sermons of Miniſters, do carry Gods Authority, and oblige the conſciences of the people ſo far, and ſo much, and no further, or more, then they are commenſurate with their Rule: in the one of the Word: in the other I ſay of the common good. But who ſhall be judge whether a Law be for the good of the publick or no? I have made it my buſineſs to ſpeak to this at large in that Book. Every man muſt have a judgement of private diſcretion, to compare the matters which are enjoyned him with the Rule, in reſpect to his own actions: or elſe he acts as a Bruite, or howſoever he acts, he cannot act out of conſcience. Conſcience lyes in this very point, my knowledge of this or that to have the authority of God, but no human law hath any authority of his any further then it agrees with his Rule. Note here, I do not reſolve my obedience, but my obedience out of conſcience into my private judgement whether the Law be, or be not, for the common good. And here I muſt ſay no more, becauſe I refer you thither, where this is made my proper work: and I find nothing remaine (after what you have here and there), that is wanting in my mind, but the ſatisfying two Objections, as to the main Determination.
The one of them is this, If the common good be Gods rule in Politicals, then how may any Law which is not for the common good be obeyed? We may not obey any command of man againſt Gods rule in Morality, and in Religion. I anſwer, if a thing be notoriouſly againſt the Common good, ſo as to be deſtructive to it, we muſt ſuffer rather then obey ſuch a command, for this very reaſon, as we dare not go againſt Gods Word, becauſe it is our rule, and Gods rule muſt be obeyed, and not Mans. But if a thing be but a little againſt the common good, or no more then that the dammage to the publick by my obeying, will not be ſo conſiderable as my own ſuffering, then is it for the common good that I obey rather then ſuffer. And I obſerve my rule ſtill; For though ſome things in themſelves be againſt the common good, yet may my obeying them commanded, be for the common good. And this is to be laid down, and ſuppoſed that in all ordinary and common matters it is better for all in general, or more for the common good to obey, then to reſist or ſuffer. It is for my good, and the common good I will ſuppoſe, that I let the thing alone if I can help it, but if I muſt ſuffer if I do it not, the thing muſt be of great moment or detriment to the publick, or elſe it is for the good of moſt in general that we obey. It is certainly beſt if a Maſter commands any thing that will hurt the affairs of his Houſe, that it be let alone, if the Boy or Man can eſcape without his anger or beating, and it is better the thing be done that hurts him a little, then that I ſuffer what hurts me more. This is yet moſt certain that a Coercive power is the hedge of all Order in any State or Family, which ſo long as that is kept whole, it is ſafe, and ſo far as that is infringed, and that only, it verges to ruine.
The other may be offered thus. The common good is not the end alone of Government, but the honour of the Magiſtrate, and the Glory of God are ends alſo, which are ſerved by our obedience, and therefore we are bound in conſcience to the Laws, unleſs they be againſt the Law of God, whether they be for the common good or not. I anſwer, the foundation of this ſuppoſition is upon a great miſtake in Policy, which is that all Societies are formed by Contract between the Governor and Governed, wherein both parties have their intereſts to ſecure, which lays the leven of Civil Wars: Whereas if it be placed in the mutual agreement of the people themſelves in chooſing their Governour and kind of Government, as they judge beſt for their general advantage, this, ſuppoſing it agreed at firſt to be abſolute, ſecures it for ever being ſet up, and anſwers the end of the inſtitution. He is the Miniſter of God to us for good. I do not like therefore the making any more then one end of Polity, as of Medicine, and Theology. The honour of the Ruler is but part of the bonum commune; and is to be diſtinguiſhed from it no more then the wealth of the Citizens. The good of one is the good of both. And as I like not the making Gods Glory, and Mans Salvation two ends of Divinity, for perplexities that have riſen from thence: ſo do I account that the glorifying God in the common good of the pars imperans & pars ſubdita, which both make up the Commonwealth, to be one end of Politicks: and the Glorifying God in mans Salvations to be the one end of Religion. Let every Art, Science, and Profeſſion be diſtinguiſhed by its proper Object and End. I muſt ſay then after this, the Magiſtrate is honoured in our ſubjection always: in obedience, when his commands are for the common good, for conſcience ſake: when they are not, in our obedience onelyonly for fear, and rather then reſiſt: or in taking heed of any contempt or provocation of him, if we leave his commands undone. So I conclude, If any receive the information I have brought him, let him give God the thanks: if any receive it not, the the wrong will be to himſelf, he ſhall do me no hurt.
Sect. 7.
And thus am I glad that I have had opportunity to ſay all I had need, and deſire, in reference to the ſubject of my other Book, which the Prefacer hath mingled with the ſubject of this. I ſhall now apply my ſelf wholly to the preſent Theme. The Magiſtrates Authority in things Sacred. I will begin as it were to diſcourſe of it afreſh, as if I had yet ſaid nothing of it; and there are two Books come out ſome few years ſince, which do ſeem to me to offer ſomething (both in their kind) very remarkable on the ſubject. The one of them owes its birth to the Author of this Preface, (who hath another alſo to the ſame effect), which I ſhall only name again in my way, (having been too long engaged with him already) as being in an extream on the one hand, while he gives not only a power to the Magiſtrate in the Religious matters, which is well, but a power over the conſcience in Religious matters: The other has a perſon of honour, and a worthy Student for its Author, who hath propoſed a ſtate of the queſtion with ſome more mature thoughts, and peculiar notion, which affording me a ground work, for further diſquiſition, hath given me both the riſe and ability to carry the point on to a full Determination. And this Gentleman I count hath given too little to the Magiſtrate on the other hand in the matters of Religion, but hath gone to make it up with giving him too much in Moral and Civil matters. I muſt be forced to tell this to my ordinary Reader, who elſe would perhaps hardly believe that it is I, who ſtand for Liberty of Conſcience, that grant the Magiſtrate his due power in things Sacred as well as Civil: and it is he, is not tender enough of it, when denying him what is his due (the uſe of his Sword or power) in things Religious, he hath left him without a rule or bounds to his commands in other matters. If I appear to drive on my purpoſe in this, and other of my Books more dryly and ſcantily, then in a Subject or Subjects ſo capacious might be expectted, let not the Judicious Reader impute that to me as a fault, which is a thing ſo much to be wiſhed in the writings of others, that I do ſingle out the foreign, the main thing altogether which is to be ſought, and I do by no means deflect from it, leaving whatſoever elſe the matter may lead to, as more copious, and where none of the knot lyes, to the Volums of others.