The Universalist Examined and Convicted, Chapter 17

The Universalist Examined and Convicted · Chapter 17

p. 192CHAP. XVII. Of the fifth Objection.

THe fifth Argument is this.

[Chriſt died and gave himſelfe a ranſome for no more then the Father elected to ſonſhip, and eternall inheritance.

But he hath not elected every man, &c. Ergo, he gave not himſelfe a ranſome for every man.

But the argument in its genuine force runneth thus.

[Chriſt gave himſelfe a ranſome to purchaſe grace and glory, for no more then his Father had elected to grace and glory.

But his Father hath not elected, All and every man to grace and glory.

Ergo, He gave not himſelfe a ranſome to purchaſe grace and glory for all and every man.]

Let us now view his anſwers.

[This firſt propoſition is contrary to Scripture, Heb. 2.9. 1 Tim 26.] But this very weakely, becauſe thoſe Texts ſpeake not of the connexion betwixt the Fathers election, and ſons redemption, wherein the ſtrength of the propoſition lyeth, and that from the oneneſſe of his will with the Fathers; therefore thoſe Texts cannot be contradicted by the propoſition.

[If to poſſeſſe men of the inheritance had been the firſt and onelyonly end of Chriſt his death and ranſome, there might have beene ſome colour to have pauſed on this falſe and bold aſſertion; but that is already proved p. 193falſe in Cap. 2.] Here he diſcovereth much ſoule dealing, for in that 2. Chap. that end, viz. to poſſeſſe men of the inheritance, is not ſo much as named: much leſſe proved not to be the maine end of his death, which I blamed in that Chap. that treateth of the ends of Chriſts death; becauſe in that diſcourſe he omits, and I thinke purpoſely, the end which Scripture hinteth ſo much upon, that is to give grace and glory, for both I make the inheritance, Iohn, 11.5.2. That he might gather in one all the children of God, John. 17.10. That they might be ſanctified through the truth. Tit. 2.14. That he might ſanct…fie a peculiar people, Heb. 9.15. That they which are called might receive the promiſe of eternall inheritance, Eph. 5.25. That he might preſent it a glorious Church; all which and many other ſhow that a maine end of his death was to poſſeſſe men of the inheritance, therefore called foreign the blood of ſprinkling, ſprinkled upon all them for whom it was ſhed. So, not ours in affirming, but his in denying the maine end of his death to be to poſſeſſe men of grace and glory, is the bold and falſe aſſertion, and therefore by his own confeſſion there is more ſtrength in the propoſition then he everteth.

But in his afterwards, we have a taſte of his reaſon.

[There belongs more then Chriſts death and ranſome, to bring men to the inheritance.]

But is this a good reaſon to prove, that to bring men to poſſeſſe the inheritance is not the maine end of Chriſt death? he leaneth to the reaſon of Corvinus, that God intendeth not mans ſalvation abſolutely, becauſe he willeth to ſave him by faith; the non ſatisfaction I have already diſcovered; ſhall we ſay that habitation and dwelling is not the maine end of laying the foundation and perfecting the outſide of my houſe, becauſe there is ſomething more requiſite to my dwelling in it, as cleanſing, adorning, furniſhing? this would he weake reaſoning.

[The Scripture ſaith he died, &c. that he might be Lord of quick and dead.]

Admit it, yet Scripture nowhere ſaith that that is the maine end of his death; nay his Lordſhip and power is but ſubſervient to a further end, viz. to bring them to glory, John, 17.2. He gave him power over all fleſh, that be might give eternall life, &c. So that hitherto whether the objection deſerve abhorring, or his anſwers hiſſing, let any judge.

But he proceeds to examine thoſe Texts that are by himſelfe produced, as proving the propoſition, as Rom. 8.28.29.30. Ephſ. 1.3. to 11. which places I have not obſerved to be applied to this article of Redemption; but in Election, there we ſhall finde this golden chaine uſed; therefore I am not engaged to juſtifie them, as holding forth the ſtrength of the propoſition; yet if any have to that end quoted them, I ſhall gueſſe at their drift herein, and free them from his reſponſory cavils.

Rom. 8.28.29.30. Their thoughts on this place I conceive to be theſe, Gods foreknowledge, praedeſtination, vocation, juſtification, glorification, yea redemption are connected in the ſame perſons, as in a chaine, and of equall latitude and extent; the top of that chain is his foreknowledge and praedeſtination, and all the reſt runnes in equipage with them; Chriſt is ſo one in will with his Father, that he would not redeem any but whom his Father foreknew and praedeſtinated to it; his Father ſo conſtant to himſelf, that he calleth, juſtifieth, glorifieth thoſe and only thoſe whom he fore knew and praedeſtinated; he worketh according to his purpoſe:

That we may underſtand this more fully, we muſt conſider that the buſineſſe which p. 194the Apoſtle is to make cleare is this. [That all things, even afflictions ſhall worke together for good to them that are called of his purpoſe,] this he layeth downe ver. 28. now the words that follow are to make this good, as appeares by the word (For) ver. 29, now that which worketh this good is this, [Such ſhall be glorified,] ſuch as are called ſhall come to glory, that all afflictions that are to them in [Serie mediorum] a ſeries of meanes to that end, ſhall further not impede their glorification, therefore ſhall worke together for good. But this then is to be proved, that thoſe that are called, ſhall be glorified, and he proveth it by this, ſuch were foreknown and predeſtinated to glory; ſo that they that are called may looke backward to Gods predeſtination, and foreward to their glorification; ſuch as were predeſtinated, ſuch ſhall be glorified; but then further this muſt be proved that thoſe that were predeſtinated, ſhall be glorified; this he proveth by the contiguity and connexion of all thoſe linkes in that golden chain; whom he foreknew, he predeſtinated, whom predeſtinated, them he called, whom he called, them he juſti…fied; whom he juſtified, them he glorified: & ſo they that love God and are called, may conclude they were predeſtinated, they ſhall be glorified; and hence conclude all things ſhall worke together for good, and therefore they conclude for many priviledges to themſelves, v. 31.32.33.34.35. ſome whereof are, he gave him for us to death, ver. 33. It is Chriſt that is dead, ver. 34. all which they had by vertue of Gods predeſtination, or election, ver. 33. Who ſhall lay any thing to the charge of Gods choſen? I ſhould willing imbrace a better coherence and ſenſe of the place, and if this be the right it doth ſtrengthen the propoſition. That ſeeing all things that are in Serie mediorum, as meanes conducing to ſalvation, beare an equipage to his election, the redemption of Chriſt is not to exceede it. And ſo for Eph. 1.3 to 11. there is an ennumeration of priviledges from election, ver. 3. to glorification, ver. 11. but election leadeth the way, and bounds all the reſt.

Now to examine what he anſwers to theſe.

[This is a far fetched inference, evading the buſineſſe in hand; for the buſineſſe oppoſed in the inference, is the redemption made by Chriſt in his own body for men; and thoſe places mentioned, ſpeak of the benefits thereof, &c. yea ſuch as many beleevers want.]

Firſt here is a falſity; becauſe it is cleare Rom. 8.32. ſpeaketh of the ranſome of Chriſt and of what he did for men in his body; He was delivered up for us, and died for us, ver. 34. and whether doth the expreſſion denote his death or the benefits thereof? (Secondly,) ſuppoſe it doe, yet cleare it is that all there mentioned, and ſo all that tend to ſalvation, are but equall with his election, which confirmeth the propoſition; and this is rather a cavill then ſatisfaction. Againe he ſaith thus,

[Neither it is ſaid doth and will juſtifie and glorifie, but did and hath predeſtinated, called, glorified, which I hope none will affirme of all the elect, much leſſe of all Chriſt died for.] Wherein he diſcovereth but a groſſe underſtanding of the Text, I hope he will not ſo limit the ſenſe of it, as that it ſhall come ſhort of truth; for all whom he hath predeſtinated, he hath not yet called: all whom he hath called, he hath not yet glorified them. Let the Author ſpeake, hath he called and glorified all whom he hath foreknowne or predeſtinated, or much more had he glorified all that he had predeſtinated, when the Apoſtle ſpake theſe words? he himſelfe granteth that it cannot be affirmed of all the elect; but how then ſhall the truth of the Text appeare, if he confine the Text to that ſenſe? certainely p. 195he hath miſſed the marke herein; for though it be in ſuch a ſenſe as may be w…ll tranſlated [hath] yet is uſed in ſuch a Text as will not ſuffer it to be confined to that ſenſe, but to be underſtood [Hath] [doth] [will.] and if this cavill had carried any weight in it, the Remonſtrants certainely would gladly have imbraced it, but they conclude the contrary. [Nota (vocavit) i. e. vocat, vocavit, aut vocabit, Cornel. A lapid in locum. Act. Syn. in locum.(Iuſtificavit) i. e. Iuſtificavit, juſtificat, aut Iuſtificabit; praeterita enim more Haebreo ponuntur pro quolibet tempore,] and the Remonſtrants joyntly agree herein. [Juſtificavit, i. e. approbavit, vel approbaturus, remittit vel remiſſurus est, glorificavit id eſt gloriae praemia donabit,] all ariſing to this, whom he (hath called,) that is (hath) (doth) or (will,) ſo in the reſt. Now the reaſon why all the words are in the perfect tenſe (hath) is becauſe the two firſt (praenotion) and (praedeſtination) are acts that are paſt, and the reſt ſhall as infallibly follow as if they were paſt already; to ſome they are all paſt; to al the predeſtinated they ſhall all be; ſo that the ſenſe is this, whom he hath predeſtinated he hath or will call; whom he hath called, he hath or will glorifie, and all certaine from predeſtination. And this is but parallell to what he muſt ſay upon that Text John. 17.2. [To give eternall life to as many as thou haſt given him.] Now by giving to Chriſt, he ſaith page 149. is meant [bringing on men to beleeve in the heavenly call,] and ſo the ſenſe muſt be this [He hath given him power over all fleſh, to give eternall life to as many as he hath given to him, that is brought in to beleeve in the heavenly call.] Now hence I queſtion, had Chriſt received power to give eternall life to no more then were at that time brought in to beleeve? let him anſwer herein, he muſt ſalve it this way or none. (He hath) that is to whom he either hath or ſhall bring in to beleeve; ſo why not this Text? and then thus we ſhall not be affraid to affirme of all the elect they either are or ſhall be called, juſtified, glorified; therefore what he ſaith herein is a wilfull perverſion, no ſatisfaction to the text.

Againe he urgeth,

[This reaſon given to fortifie the propoſition, miſtaketh the end of the Apoſtles connexion of priviledges, which is not to ſet forth for how many Chriſt hath died, or ſhall receive the fruits of his death, but it is to ſet forth the priviledges of thoſe that have begun to receive the choice fruits of both his propitiation, and advocation.] True, the end and ſcope of the Apoſtle is neither of theſe, but to ſhow and make good his owne words, viz. [that all things, and ſo croſſes and afflictions ſhall worke together for the good of them that are called of his purpoſe;] yet he doth it ſo as hit he doth in it virtually ſhow who are, and how many are elected, juſtified, glorified; thoſe and ſo many are elected, as ſome to be called and glorified, thoſe and ſo many are called as are elected; thoſe and ſo many are juſtified as are elected and called; thoſe and ſo many are glorified and ſhall be, as are elected, called, and juſtified, or ſhall be; and thus they are the boundaries of one an other; and ſo, Chriſt's being given for us, being one of thoſe connected priviledges, it followeth that thoſe and only ſuch have life procured and purchaſed for them, who were elected to it, and come in glorification to partake of it.

2. It is cleare that the Text doth not ſhow the priviledges of them onelyonly who have begun actually to receive the benefits of Chriſts oblation and advocation, becauſe it ſhoweth the priviledges of all them that are predeſtinated and foreknowne; and this the Author granteth, page 115. 116. [the concatenation of theſe high favours is the priviledge of the elect ſons of God;] but all that are foreknowne and are predeſtinated, do p. 196not yet actually partake of the choice benefits of Chriſts oblation and advocation; therefore this hitherto is perverſion, not ſatisfaction.

Againe he giveth a third Anſwer.

[This inference from theſe places deſtroyeth the diſtinction between the Goſpel and the communication of the choice benefits thereof, between the atonement made by Chriſt, and the receit of it by his choſen ones.] But this without any ſhew of truth; we plead indeed for a non diviſion or ſeparation of the one from the other, and that for whom he made an atonement, they ſhall receive it in time; and this be might have ſeen, if envy and calumny had not blinded him, and his ſufficiently confuteth him; and this we affirme from this irrefragable chaine, Rom. 8. all from election to glorification are inſeparable.

Againe he ſaith thus.

[The connexion it ſelfe is wreſted for this inference, &c. as if all Chriſt dyed for and ranſomed, muſt of neceſſity partake of all theſe priviledges; nor as if all that partake of ſome fruits of his ranſome, ſhould partake of them all; nor as if all that were called, muſt partake of them all.] But this hath as little force as any of the former words, for

1. The connexion is not wreſted if we finde the death of Chriſt one, of thoſe connected priviledges; for then it will appeare that he that partakes of any one, ſhall of all the reſt; elſe how are they priviledges connected? none ever yet doubted of this; now that this is one of thoſe connected priviledges, it will appeare if we ſeriouſly conſider the Chapter; we muſt know that under thoſe generals, many particulars are to be included: as under (vocation): he effectuall power and ſpirit of God by which we are called, and ſanctification the effects of it; under juſtification is contained the death of Chriſt the meritorious cauſe; and this is one to be included, that not only by conſequence but clearely expreſſed, as may appeare from the Apoſtles repetition of thoſe priviledges, ver. 31.32.33.34. where he reaſſumeth the election, ver. 33. [Who ſhall lay any thing to the charge of Gods elect?] Alſo juſtification, ver. 33. [It is God that juſtifieth.] He aſſumeth alſo vocation in ver. 35. (who ſhall ſeparate us from the love of Chriſt?) they were ſo far from being ſeparated from the love of Chriſt by them, that they are more then conquerers over them; and ſuch is a ſpirit befitting them that are called of his purpoſe, ver. 28. he reaſſumeth alſo the death of Chriſt, ver. 32.34 [He hath delivered him up for us, and [Chriſt hath died for us,] and that to make up the ſame confidence, with election, juſtification, and vocation; and what is more cleare then that the death of Chriſt is one of the connected priviledges? and then the connexion is not wreſted.

2. Whereas he ſaith, [As if all that partake of ſome fruits of his ranſome, muſt partake of all.] It is too generall to be pertinent; I know not what he may introduce under the notion of fruit of his ranſome; this is our inference, that whoever partaketh of any of thoſe connected priviledges, ſhall partake of all of them in time; elſe they are not connected.

3. Whereas he ſaith, [Nor as if all that were called ſhould partake of them all.] evidenceth that he doth ſteele his forehead to outface a cleare Text; doth he not ſay whom he hath called, he hath juſtified and glorified, that is, hath or will? or elſe it diſcovereth that he hath blinded his eyes ſo far as to underſtand the p. 197word (called) of outward call onelyonly: but then where is the truth of the Text, (whom he hath called, he hath juſtified) all that are outwardly called, he neither hath nor will juſtifie nor glorifie; nay all ſhould then be juſtified and glorified, becauſe in his judgement all the ſonnes of men are called; this will prove no propitious interpretation of the Text.

But fearing that what we have ſaid ſhould prove inpregnable, he hath an other aſſault, and ſeekes to enervate it, by proving though it be one of the connected priviledges, yet it followeth not that becauſe every one that partaketh of thoſe priviledges had Chriſt delivered up for them, therefore every one that have Chriſt delivered up for them, partake of all the priviledges; and this he doth thus. [Pſalm. 111. 4 5. He is gracious, full of compaſſion, giveth meate to them that feare him; it will not hence follow that he giveth meat, and is compaſſionate to no other.] Which if it had not been purpoſely produced to pervert the Text more then to ſatisfie, he could not but have ſeene this example impertinent to the caſe in hand; for this in Pſal. 111.4.5. it is cleare, it hath not ſuch a convertible connexion as that Text Rom. 8. from which convertibility the force of the argument is deduced: as thoſe whom he predeſtinateth, them he calleth all, and onelyonly thoſe, and ſo in the reſt which cannot be in the inſtance produced by him; for though he be compaſſionate to all that feare him, yet all do not feare him to whom he is compaſſionate and giveth meate; therefore that rocke is eaſily avoided, and the folly and falſehood lights upon himſelfe.

But that he might illuſtrate himſelfe in the point of election, he craveth leave to thruſt out ſome of his owne conceits about the ſame, ſome whereof that are moſt momentous I ſhall examine; Having ſpoken of the election of the man Chriſt, he ſaith h….

[So all other choſen, being affirmed choſen in him, Eph. 1.4. he muſt needs be choſen firſt, elſe how are they choſen in him?]

See how preſently he taketh leave to vary from Scripture; he ſaid as he found, ſo he beleeved; what he beleeveth I know not, but I thinke that he findeth it not ſaid that Chriſt was firſt elected; this phraſe if any ſuch be, of which anon, is ſo farre from arguing him to be elected firſt, that it doth not argue him elected at all; for when the Text ſaith, foreign Col. 1.16. In him were all things created, doth this infer, that he was firſt created, or created at all, and will he thus argue, elſe how are they created in him? 2. But it may be to this he will repoſe, that that place ſpeakes of an efficient, but this Eph, 1.4 of a meritorious cauſe; therefore to inſtance to his minde Col. 1.14. foreign, In whom we have redemption; doth this infer that either he was redeemed firſt, or redeemed at all? or will he thus argue? elſe how are we redeemed in him? So 2 Cor. 5.19. In him we are reconciled.

But (latet anguis in herbâ,) there is ſomething yet behinde which the Arminians contend for, and which I beleeve the Author in endeth, viz. Chriſt to be the firſt Elect, we elect in him as the head from which our election is conveyed and by whom procured,Exam. Perkinſ. 31. as Arminius himſelfe. [Christus ſecundum Apoſtolum non tantum eſt medium per quod ſalus obtinetur, ſed tanquam cauſa meritoria cujus reſpectu electio noſtra facta ſit;] That is, he is not only the meanes of ſalvation, but the meritorious cauſe of election; and I beleeve this is the Authors judgement; thus he [Chriſt is firſt elect, and ſo the roote in whom all are elected, page 115.] Now if we be elected in Chriſt as the roote, he p. 198muſt convey election to us, as the roote doth ſap to the branches; but this is not cleare from Scripture; for if we be elected in Chriſt as the roote, then as the ſap is firſt in the roote, then in the branches, and the ſame identicall ſap which was in the roote, is conveyed to the branches; ſo muſt the ſame election wherewith Chriſt was elected, be tranſlated upon us, and ſo our election be one with Chriſts, and Chriſt his election one with ours; but neither of theſe doe I for the preſent comprehend, for that election wherewith we are elected, is ſuch as hath ſinners for the object of it. [Electio verſatur circa bomines ut peccatores conſideratos, Ibid.] but Chriſt was never a ſinner or ſo conſidered: ſo never elected with that election that hath ſinners for the object, and as ſuch as needs pardon of ſinne, ſo that our election is not competible to Chriſt.

Againe Chriſts election in all Remonſtrants and our Author, is nothing but a deſtination to that office of a Mediator, and ſo to a Kingdome for the recompence of that ſervice. So our Author 118.119. but this election is not competible to us; for then ſhould we be elected mediatours; how then it ſhould be that we are elected in him as the roote, I ſee not.

But happily he will ſay that his meaning is thus, Chriſt was firſt choſen to his office of a mediatour, and ſo by his mediation he merited our election, as Arminius in the forequoted place; ſo that to be [elected in him,] is not onelyonly for Chriſt to be elected firſt, but that he alſo merited our election, and ſo, as reconciliation, ſanctification, adoption, glorification, flow from him as the head, ſo doth election alſo.

To wich I will reply only thus much, this is more then any Scripture ſpeaketh, it is the generall conſent of Schoolemen and moderne Divines, that praedeſtination or election hath no cauſe in reſpect of the praedeſtinator, ſo no merit to move it. But I ſhall not trouble the Author with teſtimonies of this nature, I ſhall be content with his owne words, page 119. [All that election of Chriſt and his ſons was free from eternity, and no cauſe but his will.] Which is altogether falſe if Chriſt merited our election; for that which is grounded on the death of Chriſt as the meritorious cauſe, cannot be grounded on Gods meere will.

Againe, though Arminius would have Chriſt the meritorious cauſe of our election, yet he hath much to doe ſo to temper his pen as not to betray his cauſe and ſpeak truth at once; for let us take a ſurvey of his owne words.

in Perkinſ. 31.32.[Nam Apoſtolus inquit nos in Chriſto electos eſſe tanquam in mediatore.]

Now if he had beene conſtant to himſelfe, and reſolved to make out his owne aſſertion he ſhould have ſaid, [Cujus ſanguine parta eſt electio noſtra,] that is, [by whoſe blood our election was obtained,] then he had ſpoken to the purpoſe, but then (as he knew well enough) he had ſpoken beſide Scripture, therefore he ſaith thus.

[Cujus ſanguine nobis ſalus parta eſt & vita, & ut in capite ex quo iſta bona a derivantur.]

That is, [by whoſe blood ſalvation and life are obtained, and that as head from whom thoſe good things are derived,] and is this all for us to be elected in Chriſt? as he ſaith afterward, Chriſt to be the meritorious cauſe of grace and glory; this cometh farre ſhort of his being the meritorious cauſe of our election; all they can make out is this, viz. Chriſt is the meritorious cauſe of beſtowing all good things that follow and flow from election; but there is a wide difference betwixt election and the good things communicated by vertue of it.

But ſtill the argument of Arminius and ſo of our Author is unſatisfied, viz.

[Elſe how are we ſaid to be elected in him, Epheſ. 1.4.]

p. 199To this I onelyonly advertiſe the Author that he maimeth the Text; let him produce it intire, and ſatisfaction will be more eaſie; it is thus, [He hath elected us in him that we ſhould be holy;] now it muſt be decided whether the phraſe [in Chriſt] be referred to the word (elected) as if Chriſt was the meriter of election, or to (us) as if he elected none but whom he foreſaw [in Chriſt] that is beleevers, or to the words [that we ſhould be holy,] that is he elected us to obtaine holineſſe and other bleſſings (in Chriſt,) that is [for Chriſt,] and ground there is for this Query, becauſe the Remonſtrants take the liberty to be fluctuating in their ſentence about it, eſpecially about the two firſt acceptations, ſometimes affirming the firſt, ſometimes the ſecond, ſometimes both; the Remonſtrants in their Synod. Script. appropriate it to the word (us,Synod. ſcrip. 60. in Molin. c. 25. ſ. 14. in Perk. 32.) and ſo to denote the object of election, that is ſuch as are (in Chriſt) beleevers: yet Corvinus who is one of the cited Remonſtrants, he applied it to the word (elected,) ſo to denote the foundation of election and meritorious cauſe of it. And Arminius putteth both together, and ſaith both are meant, which to me ſeems rather to ſtrangle the text then to interpret it; now ſeeing they doe ſo vary, it gives us occaſion to think that there may be a fourth interpretation, which may come as neare the minde of the Apoſtle as any of the former, and that is to referre the words [in Chriſt] to the laſt phraſe [that we ſhould be holy,] and ſo to ſhow, in whom, that is by and for whom we come to partake of our holineſſe and graces, as Col. 1.28. perfect in Chriſt Jeſus: and if thus, his argument herefrom falleth to the ground.

Indeed Corvinius ſaith, [Ista verba liquido conjungenda ſunt ad verbum elegit,] that is,in Molin. c. 25. ſ. 14. [thoſe words in Chriſt plainely appeare to be referred to the word (elected),] but his bare word is all we have for it, and to his adverſaries charge he layeth raſh bodlneſſe if he ſay otherwiſe, and I thinke his ſhare is no leſſe in ſo ſaying without ground; all his reaſon that I can conceive is thus much, becauſe they are ſo neere in place, therefore they muſt be referred each to other in conſtruction, but this is invalid, for in 2 Cor. 5.19. foreign, God was in Chriſt reconciling,] where the placing of the words are much alike with Eph. 1.4. And Ambroſe following the method of Corvinus, referring the word (in Chriſt) to the foregoing words, interpreteth it thus. [Deus erat in humanitate,] the godhead was in the manhood; but thus Gorvinus himſelfe interpreteth it not, but referreth the phraſe (in Chriſt) to the afterwords [Reconciling the world.] So Col. 1.19. foreign, &c. [In him it pleaſed the Father that all fulneſſe ſhould dwell;] why doth he not ſay that this phraſe (in him) ſhould be referred to the word [it pleaſed,] as if Chriſt was the meritorious cauſe of that good pleaſure; there is as much ground for this, as that Eph. 1.4. yet ſo he doth not I thinke; but cleare it is that though [in him] be firſt in the Text, yet in conſtruction it agreeth with the laſt [dwell,] dwell in him; let the Author rejoyne for Corvinus his friend, and ſhow me why the phraſe [in Chriſt] may not in Eph. 1.4. be refered to the afterwords, as well as in thoſe places fore-named, and ſo the ſenſe to be this, Chriſt is the meritorious cauſe of our holineſſe, not of our election.

Beſides, were it ſo that the words were to be read thus [He hath elected us in him;] yet we may finde a more commodious interpretation then this, that Chriſt merited our election; and to be elected in Chriſt, is no more then to be deſtined to obtaine grace and glory by Chriſt, and ſo Chriſt ſhall be an eſſentiall to the definition of election; but then, his place ſhall be in the good things elected to, not the election it ſelfe.

Thus Molineus interpreteth …t, elected us in Chriſt, is no more then to be elected to ſalvation in Chriſt; which Corvinus brandeth with boldneſſe, in referring the words to [ſalvation] upon this ground, [verba autem [ad ſalutem] non extant, Ibid.] that is becauſe p. 200the words [To ſalvation] are not in the Text; but then he did not remember, or not well conſider that Arminius whom he defendeth lyeth under the ſame laſh; for he ſaith,in Petk. 31. [Apoſtolus inquit nos in Chriſto electos eſſe tanquam in capite & mediatore;] that is we are elected in Chriſt as in the head and Mediatour, when yet thoſe laſt words are not extant in the Text; therefore Corvinius might have had ſo much candor as to thinke that as Arminius added theſe words not as the Text, but as the meaning, ſo doth his adverſary, and then his words are no oppoſition. And Corvinus himſelfe cannot deny, but that by [He hath elected us,] is meant to ſalvation. [Ad ſalutem electionem intelligi non nego; Ibid.] ſo that now let us take the Text as it is meant, [He hath elected us to ſalvation in Chriſt,] is no more then 1 Theſ. 5.10. appointing us to obtaine ſalvation by Chriſt, and ſo Chriſt to be meanes of ſalvation, not election; and this he might have ſeen from Arminius himſelfe, whom in that ſection he defendeth; for let it be granted that by theſe words, [He hath elected us in him,] it appeares that Chriſt is the foundation of election, yet then we muſt inquire what it is for Chriſt to be the foundation of election.diſp. theſ. 40. ſect. 5. Arminius explaineth himſelfe, [eſſe cauſam meritoriam iſtorum bonorum quae fidelibus in iſto decreto destinata ſunt,] that is, it is to be the meritorious cauſe of all good things decreed in election; and in that enumeration of good things which we have by Chriſt, he mentioneth only grace and glory, not election.ſect. 5. [Materia eſt benedictiones ſpirituales, gratiae & gloriae nominibus appellari ſolitae.] So in Diſp. pub. Theſ. 15. ſect. 5.6. Whence it appeareth that election is not any of thoſe ſpirituall bleſſings which we have in Chriſt. Hence it appeareth, that the expreſſes of our Author of Chriſt being firſt elect, or we elect in him as the head, or him to merit our election, is beſides the language of Scripture, and I feare above his underſtanding; I hold Chriſt and his members elected together in one act, and if wee ſhould be put upon a priority in nature, I thinke firſt the faithfull, then Chriſt; for it is ſuteable to Scripture, to ſay that Chriſt was elected to his office, that he might ſave his people; but we finde it nowhere ſaid, that God elected ſome to life, that Chriſt might become a Saviour; certainely the work is in intention before the workeman.

2Againe having mentioned Gods election of his Sonne, and his members, and his ſervants, and his decree to create the world, He thus ſaith

[He decreed to do all this by and through his ſon Chriſt and for him.]

Wherein he lurketh under a manifold obſcurity. For,

1. It is hard to determine to what theſe words [to do all this,] are referred, whether to all that went went before, as election of Chriſt, of his members to ſonneſhip, and the reſt to ſervice and the creation, ſetting man in a publique place, creating a world of creatures for mans uſe; all this he had ſpoken of before; or whether only to the fourth Section and the particulars therein contained, viz creation of man and a world of creatures.

2. It is hard to determine whether by [for Chriſt,] he make Chriſt the finall cauſe or meritorious of all thoſe decrees; the phraſe [for Chriſt] will admit either: and I may well-query, becauſe his quoted Texts Col. 1.16, 17, 18. Rom. 11.36. clearely import the finall cauſe; but there it ſpeaketh both of God and Chriſt, making the world for him. And his expreſſions, viz. [doing all this for his ſon Chriſt,] clearely denote the meritorious cauſe, as it is taken where ever God is ſaid to do any thing for Chriſt.

But which way ſoever he meaneth, in either there is a manifeſt falſity; for God did not elect his Sonne, for his Sonne Chriſt, nor elect the faithfull for his Son Chriſt, he merited not either of thoſe; neither did he create the world for his Sonne Chriſt, p. 101he did not merit that; he came to ſave the loſt, we finde not that he merited that the world ſhould be made; theſe are jumbled notions that he never found in Scripture.

A third particular obſervable is that he ſaith,3. page 119.

[That this decree was free without any foreſight of good and evill, or reſpect had to it, but becauſe he ſo willed.].

Herein I muſt advertiſe him of his remiſſe expreſſions; he ſhould have ſaid, [Without foreſight of good or evill as the cauſe to determine his election,] elſe his Reader may well charge him with a contradiction; for in the next Section he ſaith thus. [That God foreſeeing that Adam would fall and looſe himſelfe and his, he did elect &c.] Now for God to elect foreſeeing, and yet without foreſight of evill, is very ſtrange.

A fourth particular is that he ſaith,4. 119.

[In this praedeſtination he did praedeſtinate all his elect ſonnes to the adoption of ſonnes.] Which neither Scripture ſpeaketh nor reaſon comprehendeth, for his elect ſonnes to be the object of praedeſtination; for them that are elect ſonnes, to be praedeſtinated to the adoption of ſonnes, are new found diſcoveries: It ſeemes they were firſt elected, then praedeſtinated; many have to little purpoſe it ſeemeth perplexed themſelves with the object of praedeſtination in their ſupra, and ſub-Lapſarian diſputes, ſome for the maſſe not made but to be made, others for the maſſe made but not fallen, a third for the maſſe made and fallen; but they may leave ſuch notions; here is a new diſcovery; the object of praedeſtination, (with our Author) is the elect, but herein he is by himſelfe.

Whereas he ſaith,5. 118.

[In that election he appointed a great number of other men to be ſervants to his Sonne Chriſt, and thoſe choſen in him.]

Wherein he ſeemeth to affirme that there is an election of all to ſervice, but this without Scripture; for that there is an election of all to any thing, Scripture ſpeaketh not, nor that this deſtination to ſervice is called election; it is better ranked under reprobation or praeterition, as he himſelfe gives the hint, page, 41. premiſ. 1. Where he hath theſe words, [In that election of ſome to ſonneſhip, and praeterition or appointment of others to be ſervants;] where he affirmeth that his appointment of men to be ſervants, is rather his praeterition or non election, then his election; yet here it muſt be inſerted in his diſcourſe about election; he is not very conſtant to himſelfe.

2 He oppoſeth ſonnes and ſervants, which the Scripture owneth not; they that are ſonnes are ſervants both to Chriſt, and one to another. Eph. 6.6. Gal. 5.13.

He ſaith,6. 119. 120.

[To this end he decreed to uſe ſuch meanes, &c. to call both ſonnes and ſervants to acknowledge this their Lord that they might be happy.]

To let ſlip many particulars I ſhall pitch but on this one, his words import that God giveth meanes to call ſuch and make ſuch happy (that is eternally,) as are deſtined onelyonly to ſervice; but this is not conſonant to right reaſon or Scripture, upon this double ground.

1. For any to be Chriſts ſervants, needeth not the call of God to bring it about, becauſe the non elect are Chriſts ſervants, but either active or paſſive, to ſerve him or he to ſerve himſelfe of them, and they to be uſed as other creatures in his worke; and this they ſhall doe whether any call or no.

p. 202They that are deſtined to ſervice, are not deſtined to ſonſhip, or life, as appeareth by his diſtinction, or rather oppoſition, page 118. Nay it appeareth that ſuch in regard of ſonſhip and eternall life are paſſed by, page 41. That is he hath decreed not to bring in ſuch to the inheritance. Nay further that ſuch [being the reſidue of men not elected to ſonſhip,] are from eternity decreed to obduration, and to be given up, and that he will not overpower them, as he doth his elect; yet ſuch in his divinty God decreed in time to call that they might be happy: He bluſheth not to affirme this of God; but as well may he tell us, that when God hath decreed the world ſhall not ſee light, he ſhall create the Sunne to enlighten it; but of this more preſently.

Making cleare the buſineſſe of election, he thus ſaith,

[God decreed to overcome his elect, freely forgiving diſobedience, by his Spirit making them willing, bringing them in to beleeve. Secondly, to harden the reſidue, and give them up for contempt of means.] Wherein ſome particulars are obſervable.

1. Speaking of the firſt, he giveth the name of elect as well he may, becauſe that decree to overcome and bring them in to beleeve, conſtituteth them the elect both to grace and glory; but when he ſpeaketh of the other ſort, he giveth them onelyonly the name of [the reſidue,] as if his decree to harden did not bring them under the notion of reprobation, as well as the decree to overcome did bring the other under the notion of election; wherein he is either miſerably blind, or wilfully diſſembles, when he profeſſeth that he is ſuch a ſtranger to reprobation in Scripture. Seeing now he is able to ſee from Scripture that God from eternity did decree to harden moſt men, and reprobation is nothing elſe.

2. It is ſtrange that the Author treating of election, ſhould produce this decree in God to harden moſt men from eternity; is this a particular of election? then reprobate men, deſperate devils may be ſaid to be elected: certainely the…e expreſſions had been better reſerved till he had treated of reprobation, as he doth afterwards.

But herein a piece of his egregious diſſimulation is ſeen, in that this which is reprobation, is here ſhufled in to paſſe untaken notice of in the buſineſſe of election; that ſo when he cometh to ſpeake of reprobation, he may ſay, (as he doth,) that the Scripture ſcarce owneth a reprobation but an actuall, done in time; when he had inſerted theſe words in their proper place, he might have ſeen that there is a reprobation from eternity.

3. In the purſuance of that act concerning the reſidue that are not elect, he willingly ſtifleth a cleare truth; it is granted on all hands that election and reprobation are oppoſite, and reprobation denyeth that which election granteth: therefore when he ſaith that he did decree to overpower his elect by his grace, it muſt follow that he did deny to overpower the reſt; and ſo decreed to deny them that grace which he giveth to the reſt; and this goeth before their hardning for contempt of meanes, yea in nature before Gods decree ſo to doe, and their contempt of meanes is a conſequent of that; God denieth grace, and man contemneth it, which is an act in God, firſt in order of nature in this act of reprobation; but this he concealeth, which doth not diſcover ingenuity not to produce the ſtrength of the buſineſſe, though againſt himſelfe; for if he had done it, he would not have beene ſuch a ſtranger to reprobation in God, and that from eternity.

Many more inſtances I could produce, to ſhow his rude and impoliſhed thoughts about election, wherein he hath diſcovered much of himſelfe without any neceſſity. p. 203But to returne to the argument againe, at laſt he ariſeth to this aſſertion.

[Through this whole diſcourſe it appeareth, that the death of Chriſt for all men impeacheth not the doctrine of election.] Therefore I ſhall reaſſume ſome of his expreſſions againe which he hath granted, and then let the world judge how well univerſall ranſome intended by God or Chriſt, conſiſteth with it; he granteth,

[That God did elect but ſome, and to harden the reſidue for the contempt of meanes, and that from eternity, page. 120.]

Now conſidering ſuch a decree to harden moſt men, I gather theſe two things.

Firſt that there can be no ſuch decree in God, or will to ſend Chriſt to procure life for them.

Secondly, that there can be no execution of ſuch a decree.

Not the firſt, for then that decree muſt be either in time or from eternity; but Arminius will not ſay that Gods decrees are in time, for he granteth that his decree of election is from eternity; ſo that I doe not conclude for reprobation from their ſimultaneity, the one being done when the other is; but his reaſon given for election,Arm. diſp. de praedeſt. will reach to reprobation, and this it is [Deus nihil in tempore facit quod ab …eterno facere non decreverit, ſecus deo mutatio impingitur;] that is, God doth nothing but what he decreed from eternity to doe. And the Author grante…h, page 120. [All his decrees are done at once before the world or time was;] ſo that there is no ſuch decree in time.

Secondly, if it be ſo as the Author ſaith, then God muſt decree it from eternity; but this he doth not; for then there muſt be a decree to harden, and yet to procure life and ſalvation for them, which cannot be in God, becauſe they cannot both have their execution: the ſame man, no not by divine power, cannot be ſaved eternally and damned eternally; let us a while conſider, God willeth to harden for contempt of meanes, he muſt ſo will till they come to deſtruction, elſe he changeth. He willeth to ſave them by Chriſt, and this he muſt will till they be ſaved, elſe he changeth; which Arminius dare not admit; ſo that thoſe two decrees muſt be in God at the ſame time, ſo that either God ſhall decree and not execute, or elſe the ſame man ſhall be both ſaved by Chriſt and hardned, and ſo deſtroyed for contempt of meanes; but neither of theſe are to be granted; this controverſie, any that will, may finde ſcand by Corvinus, in Mol. cap. 5. of the antecedent and conſequent will; Molineus weighing the nature and event of ſuch warring decrees, preſſeth that doctrine with a various abſurdity; wherein I ſhall expatiate my ſelfe a little, it being of no ſmall concernement to the clearing of this point; for although the controverſie betwixt Corvinus and his adverſary, and that betwixt me and my Antagoniſt ſeeme to be diverſe, yet they come to one and the ſame iſſue; for this is the queſtion ventilated in bo…. [Au Deus ſimul vel… omnes ſalvari & aliquos da…ari,] that is whether God may or doth will to ſave all, and yet to damne ſome; and ſo by conſequence at the ſame time, will to ſave and damne the ſame perſons;Cap. 5. de vol. Antec. & conſequ. ſect. 11. the affirmative of which is adjudged abſurd by Molineus, but Corvinus by his reaſon attempts to prove it not ſo. What are his reaſons, I ſhall in part ſhow wherein they ſatisfie me not, and leave the determination to the Learned.

Abſurd. 1.

Molin preſſeth that doctrine with this firſt abſurdity, viz. [Deus flatuitur velle quod ab aeterno certus eſt non agere, (as Corvinus himſelfe relateth it);] that is,c. 5. ſect. 8. by that doctrine, (God is ſet out to will that which he at the ſame time knoweth ſhall never p. 204come to paſſe.) For in willing their ſalvation, he willed that to many to whom he knew it ſhould never come to paſſe, he having at that time appointed them to deſtruction for contempt of meanes, as our Author ſaith; now ſuch a will is not to be found (in homine inſipienti) in fooliſh man, much leſſe in the all wiſe God. I ſhall preſſe Corvinus onelyonly with this, if God will that which he foreſeeth ſhall never come to paſſe, then either his decree doth not introduce a neceſſity, or his preſcience not an infallibility into the event; either of which puts Arminius his Maſter to a loſſe, whom he defends; as for the thing it ſelfe, I tranſmit it to any Judge, how diſcrepant it is to the wiſdome of God to will, and not onelyonly ſo but to uſe meanes, and not onelyonly ſo, but ſuch meanes as the death of his ſonne, his onelyonly beloved ſon, to effect that I ſay, which he knew ſhall never come to paſſe.

To his Corvinus replieth thus.

Ibid.[Non pugnant aliquid velle agere, & ſcire te id non facturum, fed velle aliquid agere & non velle agere illud,] That is, (to will a thing and to know it not to come to paſſe, are not repugnant, but to will to doe a thing, and to will not to doe it;) which ſolution doth rather divert then ſatisfie, it being reſolved into that Logicall nicity of a verball contradiction; for though they doe not verbally contradict each other, yet they may eaſily be found joyntly to be repugnant to the wiſdome of God, as in (aliquo tertio) which is as valid as if they were repugnant (inter ſe) in themſelves; it is not ſutable to the workings of rationall agents, to have the will carried out in its acts on thoſe things which a…e knowne certainely ſhall never come to paſſe; and my reaſon doth not ſatisfie me but that the will may be as ſoon carried out on impoſſibilities, as that which the underſtanding dictates ſhall never be obtained; for though ſome difference be betwixt impoſſibility and infallibibity of not being; yet both preſent to us the non obtaining of th…t object which before we will, deterreth us from poſitive willing that thing; therefore ſuch a thing would be repugnant to the nature of God; and thus it may be demonſtrated; if he will that which he knoweth ſhall never come to paſſe, then either muſt his will not be the cauſe of things, or his preſcience not the meaſure of things, nor be infallible; both which not onelyonly the generall ſtreame of Schoolemen condemne, but Arminius himſelfe dares not owne.

He ſaith, [Intellectus dei certus est, non poteſt falli, vidit omnia in ſeipſis & in cauſis;] and thus,diſp. pub 4. ſect. 36 54. [Deus per voluntatem eſt cauſa omnium rerum mediante potentia,] that is, the preſcience of God is infallible, his will the cauſe of all things; but now let us conſider if his will to ſave them be the cauſe of their ſalvation, then it muſt exiſt neceſſarily by vertue of that decree and will.] If ſo, then his preſcience by which he ſeeth it not to come to paſſe, muſt be infallible; and if that be not fallible, then their ſalvation muſt not exiſt; if not, his will whereby he willed their ſalvation is not the cauſe of it; thus muſt it one way or other be repugnant to the nature of God.

part 1. Q. 14 Art. 8. & Q. 19. Art. 4.Certainely ſeeing his preſcience is [menſura rerum,] the meaſure of all things; and his will [cauſa rerum,] the cauſe of things, as Aquinas ſaith; needes muſt there be a due proportion and a faire correſpondency betwixt both; for God to will one thing, and to foreſee the contrary to come to paſſe, this is to overthrow both.

2. Let us againe view the reaſoning of Arminius, and we ſhall further ſee that there is a repugnancy betwixt Gods willing a thing, and his knowing ſuch a thing not to come to paſſe;in Perkinſ. 129. 142. he thus ſaith. [Infallibiliter dicitur reſpectu praeſcientiae divinae, neceſſario reſpectu decreti & voluntatis divinae;] and elſewhere, [Ex praeſcientia concluditur infallibilitas, ex decreto neceſſitas,] both come to this, that neceſſity proceeds from Gods decree, and infallibility from his preſcience. Now to ſay that he willeth the ſalvation, p. 205and yet foreſeeth it not come to paſſe, doth argue that the ſalvation of all is neceſſary; yet the damnation of ſome ſhall be infallible, and ſo the ſame thing neceſſary, and yet the not being of it infallible; neceſſary to be by vertue of the will of God, infallibly not to be by vertue of his preſcience; but certainely theſe are very repugnant; [neceſſitas eveniendi & infallibilitas non eveniendi,] a neceſſity of exiſting, and infallibility of not exiſting of the ſame thing at the ſame time, comes little ſhort of a contradiction, and ſure I am cannot both be true; And therefore as repugnant as the neceſſity of exiſting, and infallibility of non exiſting are; ſo repugnant are the wil of God of a thing to be, and his foreknowledge of ſuch a thing not to be, from which will and preſcience ſuch affections proceed and flow.

So that we ſhall need more then his bare aſſertion, (beyond which we have not in that eight ſection) to convince us that Gods willing ſome mens ſalvation,c. 5. ſect. 7. and yet knowledge that ſuch a thing ſhall never come to paſſe, are not repugnant.

Indeed ſomething more we have by way of illuſtration, but as little probation as formerly, which it is not amiſſe to rehearſe alſo; he ſaith, [Deus quando aliquid intendit & vult, non neceſſe eſt ut conſideret utrum id obtenturus ſit nec ne;] that is, when God intendeth or willeth any thing, it is not neceſſary that he then conſider whether he be to obtaine it or no,] let it be ſo; yet the impertinency of his reply is obvious; the queſtion is not whether God can will a thing, and not conſider whether he be to obtaine it or no; but whether he can will that which he knoweth ſhall not come to paſſe; now betwixt theſe is a great difference; they that have taſted of the logicall rudiments know that though we may [praeſcindere rationalitatem ab homine,] yet we cannot [amovere,] that is though we may conſider a man and not conſider his rationality, yet we cannot conſider a man, and conſider him not rationall; ſo in the caſe in hand, it is one thing for God to will a thing and not conſider whether he ſhall obtaine or no, and another to will a thing and conſider himſelfe not to obtaine it; though neither can be, yet I ſhall grant the firſt for arguments ſake: yet the ſecond he cannot; and herein this is his argumentation, God may will a thing and yet not conſider whether he will obtaine it or no; therefore he may will a thing and conſider himſelfe not to obtaine it or no:

And againe he thus ſaith, [Sicut homo poteſt deſiderare quod non ſit eventurum ſi modo ſciat ſe obtinere poſſe, ita etiam de deo dici poteſt, Ibid.that is as man may deſire a thing which is not to come to paſſe, if we know he can obtaine it, ſo we may ſay of God,] which reply labours not with a ſingle impertinency, and is unſatisfactory many wayes. For

1. The queſtion is not whether God may deſire that which he knoweth ſhall never come to paſſe, but whether he can will that which he knoweth ſhall never come to paſſe; the controverſie is not about his deſire but will, as may appeare by that poſition which his adverſary oppugneth and he defendeth, viz. [ſimul poſſit velle omnes ſalvare, ſect. 11:& aliquos damnare,] that is, God may will to ſave all, and will to damne ſome at the ſame time; as alſo the abſurdity which his adverſary faſtens on him and he attempts to remove, vïz. [Deus flatuitur velle quod ſcivit nunquam eventurum;] that is,ſect. 8. God willeth that which he knoweth ſhall not come to paſſe; as alſo his owne words, Quum deus aliquid intendit ac vult, non neceſſe eſt &c. that is, when God willeth any thing,ſect. 7. it is not neceſſary that he ſhould conſider whether it will come to paſſe or no; now for him thus to reply, brings his argumentation to this iſſue. Man may deſire that which is not come to paſſe, therefore God can will ſuch a thing; or at beſt thus, God may deſire, therefore he may will ſuch a thing as he knoweth ſhall not come to paſſe; which is no ſound reaſoning; for though deſire may be foreign attributed to God, which p. 206I grant not; yet it will not follow that if he can deſire, he may will that which he knoweth ſhall not come to paſſe, neither doth it follow in man.

2. The matter controverted, is not whether God may will that which is not to come to paſſe, but that which he knoweth ſhall not come to paſſe, which is all one in God, but not in the inſtance produced by him; he himſelfe produceth his adverſary thus ſpeaking,ſect. 8. ſect. 7. [Deus ſtatuitur velle quod ab aterno certus eſt non agere;] and thus, [Deum intendere quod novit non futurum,] both propounding the abſurdity thus, then God willeth that which he knoweth ſhall not come to paſſe; now to this he ſaith, man may will that which is not to come to paſſe, and what then? if he had been oppoſite he ſhould have ſaid thus, man may will that which he knoweth ſhall not come to paſſe; but this neither doth my reaſon comprehend, nor faith beleeve; and his ratiotination comes to this, man may will that which he knoweth ſhall not come to paſſe; therefore God may will that which he knoweth ſhall never come to paſſe, which is but a miſerable conſequence.

Ibid.Againe he ſaith, [Legiſlator deſiderat ut ſubditi omnes legem ſervent, &c. quanquam eam ab omnibus ſervatum non iri, non poſſit ignorari; quidni de deo idem dicamus?] That is, a Lawgiver may deſire that his Subjects may keepe the Law, though he know it is not to be done of all; what if we ſay the ſame of God?] Not to inſiſt upon that diverſion tranſlating the queſtion from the will of God to the deſire of God, which in rationall agents the one may be converſant about that which the other is not, for the deſire may be converſant about impoſſibilities that they might be poſſible, but the will can never; to paſſe by that, there is a manifold diſcrepancy betwixt man and God in this caſe:

1. The Lawgiver is bound by Gods revealed will to deſire that all keep good Lawes; but God no way bound.

2. The Lawgiver cannot certainely know but that all may keepe the Law, therefore may deſire, and will alſo; but God is not ſo ignorant.

3. It is not in the Lawgivers power to make all men keepe the Law, therefore he may deſire and wiſh; but not ſo of God; he may not onelyonly by his abſolute power, but modo decenti in a manner becoming himſelf and mans nature, make all to keep his Law and be ſaved; therefore no cauſe why he ſhould deſire.

4. The Lawgiver becauſe he deſireth, (and deſire accompliſhed breeds joy, but diſappointed breeds ſorrow of heart,) uſeth all poſſible meanes that lie in his power, and which he knowes are requiſite to make men keepe thoſe Lawes: but God doth not uſe all thoſe meanes which he knoweth requiſite to make men obey and beleeve, no not thoſe which he might, and neither does any indecent thing to his owne nature or mans liberty; therefore I ſee not how it may appeare that God deſireth the ſalvation of all, though that ſimilitude hold on mans part.

5. This reaſoning and argumentation from man to God, I cannot ſee to be ſafe; too faire a way is there laid open to delirate with the groſſe Anthropomorthites, and to make mans imperfection the meaſure of Gods perfection; and my Antagoniſt will tell Corvinus, Cap. 6.29.that [It is ungodly to compare God and man, to compare the workes, wordes and thoughts of man, to them of God, and to make them equall and alike.] And the argument herein comes to this iſſue. A Lawgiver that knoweth not but all may obey, hath it not in his power to make all obey; that uſeth all meanes to cauſe men to obey, may deſire that all his ſubiects doe obey; therefore God which knoweth that all ſhall not be ſaved, and in whoſe power it is to cauſe men to beleeve and be ſaved, and who uſeth not all meanes that he may to that purpoſe, may will the ſalvation of all; the validity of which reaſoning is not cleare. And in all theſe I p. 207can not conceive that his underſtanding did betray him to ſuch inconſequences, but rather he deſired to dazle the eyes of his readers with ſuch phraſiologies.

Abſurd. 2.

The ſecond abſurdity is this. If God will from eternity the ſalvation of all, and yet the damnation of ſome; then [voluntas humana efficit ut deus reſcindat voluntatem longe optimam, &c. That is,c. 5. ſ. 4. then the will of man cauſeth that God doth cut of his antecedent will; from which Corvinus himſelfe concludeth the minde of his adverſary. [Vis dicere voluntatem dei mutabilem statui;] that is, thou wouldſt ſay that we make Gods will mutable; and this indeed is the genuine abſurdity that we faſten upon their doctrine, and upon examination I thinke it will be found to be neither (invidioſe,) nor (miſere,) enviouſly nor miſerably, as he is pleaſed to reply; for let us conſider God being affirmed by them to will the ſalvation of all from eternity, either he muſt retaine and perſiſt in that will to eternity, and ſo will it even then when they are actually condemned in hell; or not retaine it. I ſuppoſe none will affirme that when men are irrecoverably in hell, that then God doth retaine his will to ſave them; if he doe not, then muſt he needs be mutable; but this Arminius himſelfe durſt not owne, but granteth that act whereby he willeth any thing is [actus aeternus & immutabilis,] eternall and immutable, and his reaſon is, [nihil poteſt de novo bonum videri, diſp. pub. Theſ. 4.5.51.& quod illi ſemel bonum viſum fuit perpetuo illi tale videtur:] that is, nothing ſeemeth anew to God to be good, and what once ſeemeth good to him alwayes appeares under that notion; therefore what ever he willeth, and however, whether upon any condition or abſolutely, he muſt ſo will to eternity, elſe is he mutable in Arminius reaſoning. Gods decrees are eternall, ſo the ſame granteth, and upon this ground [Secus deo mutatio impingitur, diſp. pub. Theſ. 15. ſect. 6.] otherwiſe a change may be faſtened upon God; now that Gods decrees may be eternall, requiſite it is that they be ſo, both [ex parte ante,] and [ea parte poſt,] that is, both from eternity, and to eternity: he muſt neither begin to will that which before he did not, or leave of to will that which before he did; if either, he nor his will can be ſaid to be eternall. So Aquinas explaineth himſelfe,part. 1. Q. 19 Art. 7. [Mutatio eſt in voluntate cum incipit velle quod alias non volebat, vel cum definit velle, &c. ſed in deo nulla talis mutatio;] that is, the will is changed either when it beginneth anew to will what it did not, or doth deſiſt to will that which it did, but no ſuch change is in God; and Corvinus himſelfe is afraid to owne any ſuch change in God;c. 5. ſ. 4. he ſaith [Non definit deus velle quod vult voluntate antecedenti;] that is God doth not ceaſe to will what he did from eternity by his antecedent wil; and ſo ſeemeth to averre that to eternity God doth wil the ſalvation of all; then it muſt follow that he willeth the ſalvation of all, either conditionally or abſolutely, when many are in hell and there irrecoverably; his reaſon is annexed, [quia voluntas conſequens est cum velleitate in contrarium;] that is, becauſe the conſequent will of God is alwayes with a velleity to the contrary; the aſſertion impious, and the reaſon miſerable: ſo that now the reader may eaſily conjecture how the caſe ſtandeth herein; their doctrine throweth them upon one of theſe two rockes; either God doth retaine that will to eternity, and ſo will to ſave many when they are in hell, which is ridiculous and impious to affirme, whether meant of a conditionall or abſolute will; or elſe God is mutable and changeth his will, ceaſeth to will that which he formerly did will; the latter of theſe Corvinus ſeeketh to remove, and thus replyeth.

Cum divinam voluntatem mutabilem eſſe objeciſti, Ibid.parum attendiſti ad ea quae â Thomâ diſſeruntur. p. 2081. Queſt. 19. Art. 7. Aliud eſſe mutare voluntatem, aliud velle retum mutationem; potest aliquis voluntate immobiliter eadem manente velle quod nunc fiat hoc, poſtes contrarium; immò de homine verum est ut abſque voluntatis mutatione deſtruat quod fecit etiam velit aliquid facere ac ſimul intendat poſtea illud deſtruere; (that is) when thou objecteſt that the will of God is mutable, thou didſt but little attend the words of Thomas, who ſaith it is one thing to change the will, an other to will a change of things; one may (the will remaining the ſame,) will that this ſhall be done, and afterwards the contrary; and it is true of man, that without the change of his will he may deſtroy that which he made, and will to doe that which he may at the ſame time will to undoe.

In all which he doth diſcover ſufficiently, that he hath not well conſidered the placita of that learned Schooleman, or however as little attended to the ſenſe, as his Adverſary to the words of that angelicall Doctor. Cleare it is to any mans reaſon, that the expreſſes of Aquinas take place in thoſe things in which there may be a change; for God to will a change of things, neceſſarily ſuppoſeth that thoſe may be changed: as to inſtance, God might and did will at one and the ſame act to create and to deſtroy the world; that change of things argued no change in Gods wil, but that he willed a change: but then it is becauſe the world was capable of that change that is, it was both created and deſtroyed, and well might be ſo, and ſo the wil of God fulfilled in both parts of it; the ſame might be ſaid of making Saul King, and taking the kingdome away; and ſo the inſtance of Corvinus, [Man may make a thing and deſtroy it;] true, becauſe that thing is capable of ſuch making, and of an after deſtruction; but all theſe are impertinent to the caſe in hand; the thing about which we treat, is not capable of any change, no not by divine power; for let a man be eternally ſaved, and there ſhall not ſucceed an other eternity in which he may be damned. Let the ingenuity of Corvinus dictate to us.

Can the ſame man be as eaſily ſaved eternally, and damned eternally, as the world be created, and ſo ſucceſſively deſtroyed; or the ſame peece of worke made by a man, may be made and then after deſtroyed? if not, why doth he darken ſuch cleare points with the miſts of ſuch empty alluſions? and herein his argumentation comes to this iſſue, God may will a change in things that admit a change; therefore he may will a change in things that cannot (no not by divine power) admit any; or thus, he may wil to create the world, and to deſtroy it without a change of his will; therefore he may will the ſalvation and eternall damnation of the ſame man at the ſame time; or thus, when he willeth to make and deſtroy the ſame thing, he willeth but a change not changing his will; therefore he changeth not his will when he willeth the ſalvation and damnation, and both eternall, of the ſame man, at the ſame ſame time; but of theſe I may ſay as he of his Adverſary, [Jnvidioſè omnia & miſere.] Thus farre I urge, ſeeing there can be no change in this, there muſt be a change in his will, in ſuch a will as that is.

Abſurd. 3.

If God will at the ſame time the ſalvation of all, and the damnation of ſome; ſo by conſequence the ſalvation and damnation of the ſame perſons at the ſame time; then [inducitur pugna inter duas dei voluntates;] that is, there is a fight and contrariety betwixt the wills of God; to will to ſave and yet to damne the ſame perſons, are repugnant diſagreeing wils, becauſe they cannot both have execution. To this Corvinus replyeth, [Diverſitas objecti tollit contratietatem voluntatis. Objectum hic non est idem & eodem modo affectum; verſatur prior voluntas circa hominem qua talem, posterior circa illum quâ p. 209fidelem vel infidelem; poteſt deus ante fidei conſiderationem velle omnes ſalvare, eâ conditione ſi oredant, & ſimul velle eos qui non credunt damnare;] That is, the diverſity of the object taketh away the contrariety of the will: the object in this caſe is not conſidered as the ſame manner affected, ſo not the ſame; the firſt lookes on man as man,c. 5. ſect. 8. & 11. the ſecond as a beleever or not beleever. God may before he conſider faith, will to ſave all, and yet at the ſame time will to damne them that beleeve not.] Which reply ſatisfi…th not upon this twofold ground.

1. Be it granted, that a diverſe manner of conſidering the object may take away the contrariety of his will, yet ſuch various and diverſe conſideration of the ſame man is not competible to God, nothing appeareth to God anew, every man appeareth to God under the ſame notion from all eternity to all eternity: there was no inſtant when God did not ſee, or not conſider every man as he is; and whereas he ſaith, God might will to ſave all, [ante fidei conſiderationem,] before he conſidered faith, that there was an inſtant before he conſidered the faith of them that come to beleeve; but this is falſe. I ſhall onelyonly herein inſiſt upon the placita of Arminius himſelfe, who is of ſome authority with Corvinus; in his publ. diſp. th. ſ. 4. he ſaith thus, [Ab aeterno novit omnia, nihil de novo; non nunc intelligit quod non intelligebat antea.] Sect. 33. That is, he knowes all things from eternity, nothing anew, nor that now which he knew not before. Againe, [Jmmenſe novit omnia ſine ſcientiae vel augmentatione vel decremento.] Ibid. That is, he knoweth all things immenſly, without increaſe or decreaſe of his knowledge. Againe, [Jmmutabiliter novit omnia non variata cognitime,] That is, he knoweth all things, immutably without variation of his knowledge. Againe, [Vno & individuo actu omnia cognoſcit non diſtractus in plurima.] He knoweth all things with one ſingle and individuall act, not diſtracted into more. Againe, [Voluntas dei eſt aeterna, quia nihil poteſt de novo deo aut eſſe aut videri bonum,] That is, the will of God is eternall, becauſe nothing can either be, or ſeeme to be good to God anew. Againe, [Jmmutabills, quia quod ſemel illi bonum fuit aut viſum fuit, ſemper illi tale eſt & videtur.] That is, it is alſo immutable, becauſe that which now is and ſeemeth good to him, ever did and ſhall ſeeme ſo; now if theſe be true, (as cleare it is they are,) that all things are preſent to God from eternity, and that he ſeeth all things with one individuall identicall act and preſcience; then muſt it follow that every reſpect or qualification in which he foreſeeth any man to be, is but one and the ſame: now in an identicall and individuall tuition or preſcience, there can be no divers reſpect or various qualifications, that may produce ſuch various volitions in God; if he doe not afterwards ſee any man incredulous whom he did not for ever ſee ſo, why ſhould he under that notion will to damne him, whom before he had willed to ſave? in this my reaſon reacheth not the depth of his aſſertions, or why he ſhould will to ſave any man upon condition of faith, whom he at that time looketh upon as incredu'ous, yea pe…ſiſting in that incredulity, I cannot comprehend.

2. Let it be granted for argumentations ſake, that ſuch various reſpects are incident to God, yet this wanteth proofe, that ſuch various reſpects tokes away the contrariety of will, which maketh his replication to labour with a ſecond disſatisfaction. And to make this good I ſhall urge him with the words of Arminius himſelfe, when the queſtion was about Gods willing of ſinne, by his will or decree, though he forbad it by his commands, which is foreign, called Signum voluntatis the ſigne of his will; this is preſſed by Bellarmin and others, with this abſurdity, then God muſt will contraries, if he determine one thing and command an other: to this Mr Perkins anſwers negatively, not contrary, becauſe it is (called) and (forbidden) under a diverſe p. 210reſpect, to which Arminius replyeth (though upon no faire occaſion,) thus,

in Perkinſ. 128.Reſponſio tua nodum non ſolvit; vella aliquid evenire & velle idem non evenire, non differunt tantum reſpectibus ſed foreign & integris eſſentils, neque ullus eſt reſpectus five modum ſecundum quem deus dici poteſt velle ut evenia… aliquid & ſimul velle ut idem non eveniat; non enim poteſt circa unu… idemque objectum, quibuſcunque reſpectibus induatur, contrari… actibus verſari divina voluntas.] That is, thy anſwer doth not unty the knot; for to wil a thing to come to paſſe, and to will the ſame thing not to come to paſſe, doth not differ in reſpects onelyonly, but in their whole and intire eſſences; neither is their any reſpect or manner according to which God may be ſaid to will that a thing ſhould come to paſſe, and yet that it ſhould not come to paſſe; the will of God cannot be converſant in contrary acts about one and the ſame object with whatſoever reſpects that object be cloathed.

Thus he venteth himſelfe againſt his adverſary, and exſpiateth himſelfe as much againſt that, as Corvinus doth for it; now why may I not ſay, that the replication of Corvinus doth not unlooſe the knot? for this is cleare, that for God to will to ſave, and yet to damne the ſame man, doth differ as much as for God to will to ſave; and not to ſave; becauſe in his will to damne, there is contained a will not to ſave and his will to ſave and yet not to ſave, are as different as his will that a thing ſhould come to paſſe, and yet will that it ſhould not come to paſſe; and theſe in Arminius his divinity doe differ in their intire eſſences; then they are not to be reconciled by their various diverſe reſpects; and if there be no reſpect, nor can be according to which God may will the ſame thing to come to paſſe, and not to come to paſſe; then there neither is nor can be any ſuch diverſe reſpect, according to which he may will to ſave, and yet not to ſave the ſame perſon at the ſame time; and herein we may ſee how inconſiſtent the ſentences of theſe two great Remonſtrants are (though one defend the other eagerly;) the one ſaith, that a diverſe reſpect doth take away the contrariety of will; the other ſaith that the will of God cannot be verſed about any one object in contrary acts, with what circumſtances or reſpects ſoever it be cloathed; the one grants that a diverſe reſpect takes away the contrariety; the other contendeth it doth not; the one ſaith, (that a diverſe reſpect maketh it not to be one and the ſame object;) the other ſaith, that it is one and the ſame object, with what reſpect ſoever it be cloathed; and ſure it is that if the expreſſes of Corvinus have weight in them, viz. [various reſpects make it not to be the ſame object;] then the words of Arminius, viz. [The ſame object what reſpects ſoever it is clothed with,] have more emptyneſſe in them then Corvinus is willing to have them charged with.

3. Corvinus ſpeaking of the diverſe reſpect which God conſiders in man (as he ſaith) maketh God not to will contraries, goes further and ſaith, [Jmmo ne quidem mutatur dei voluntas;] That is, it is ſo farre from his willing contraries, that it doth keepe his will from being ſubject to change. But this is not conſonant to reaſon; various reſpects doth not take away a change, but rather [ponere rationē …tandi,] put a reaſon of a change; if the underſtanding of God may be obnoxious to a diverſe or various reſpect or conſideration, why not his will? & if diverſity of reſpect ſhould take away mutation of will, then ſhould man never be capable of changing his will; for it is againſt the working of rationall agents, having placed the will upon an object, ever to change that will, without a variety of conſideration or reſpect; they ſee ſomething which they ſaw not before; but that man may change his will, no man yet ever hath doubted. To inſtance, a man determineth to give his eſtate to his ſonne, becauſe he is his ſonne; but afterwards this ſonne proveth diſobedient and rebellious; now under this notion he p. 211determineth againe to diſinherit him, and not to give him his eſtate; now here is a diverſe reſpect conſidered; but we need not feare to ſay, that that father changeth his minde towards that ſonne, but rather that divers reſpects ſhoweth the cauſe why he changeth his minde.

1. He willed that which he knew ſhould never come to paſſe.

2. He then muſt retaine that will to eternity, and ſo will to ſave them when they are actually damned, or elſe be mutable in ceaſing to will that which he once willed; both abſurd to affirme.

3. He then muſt will contrary things, and ſuch things as can in no wiſe (no not by divine power) be concentred in an execution; happily from the Author we may receive ſome new ſatisfaction. I ſhall expect it; ſurely if not, they will make the doctrine of election as he ſetteth it downe, and univerſall redemption to be inconſiſtent; and hereby I prove, that conſidering that will to give up many to deſtruction, there could be no ſuch will from eternity to ſend Chriſt to ſave every man.

Secondly, there is no ſuch execution in time.

Not by God, he ſent not Chriſt for that end: upon Arminius his ground, God doth not any thing in time, but what he decreed before time.

Not by Chriſt, he came not for that end, viz. to ſave them whom his Father had decreed to harden.

This would intrench upon,

1. His wiſdome, in laying down his blood a price to ranſome, that muſt of neceſſity be deſtroyed; that blood is ſhed in vaine, in regard of that end: for when God hath decreed to harden and deſtroy a man, that decree of God bringeth a neceſſity upon his deſtruction, if Arminius be right. [Ex praeſcientia concluditur inſallibilitas, ex decreto neceſſitas.] In Perkinſ. 142.

2. His oneneſſe in will with his Father, of which the Author ſpeaketh much, page. 4. Section. 8. Now how is Chriſts will and his Fathers one, and how could he ſay, I come to doe thy will O God, if he came to ſave them whom his Father had decreed from eternity to harden and give up to deſtruction? How then doe Gods decrees and Chriſts generall purchaſe agree? But he hath ſomething more to repoſe.

However all Gods councels ſtand, yet thoſe that have knowne the ſame have not ſuch uſe of it as to put any impoſſibility on God to do his creatures good. John knew ſtones were not elected, yet he ſaid (not of his will but power,) God is able of theſe ſtones to raiſe up children to Abraham.]

This being his laſt hold, if this be beat downe, where he will be next I know not: Now it is to be conſidered, that the queſtion doth not proceed upon Gods abſolute power, but his limited; as he hath limited it by his decree, we deny not but God could ſo have willed, but he did not; and willing to barden, cannot now will to ſave. It is no inconſiſtent thing with his omnipotency, to ſay that he cannot now [S…ante aeternâ electione,] ſhow the top of his mercy to every man. It is true, all things are poſſible to him; yet this is alſo true, he cannot ſinne, lye, deny himſelfe, repent, change: ſo he cannot but proceed according to the councell of his owne will, elſe he ſhould be impotent not omnipotent.

Let men underſtand the councels of God as they pleaſe, I ſhall not be afraid to affirme that as God hath ſet down his decrees from eternity, he cannot now ſhow the top of his mercy to every man.

p. 212But to his inſtances, whereby he refelleth this.

Math. 3.9. God is able to raiſe children of theſe ſtones,] And ſaith the Author theſe were not elected; true, but Iohn did not know but that God might not have willed to raiſe up children out of them; and he there ſpeaketh of his abſolute power: but had Iohn knowne that God had determined not to raiſe up to Abraham children out of them, it is queſtionable whether he would have ſo expreſt it. Rom. 11.23. God is able to graft them in againe: true, and he decreed ſo to do; we daily expect it from the promiſe: what is this to the opening a way for Gods doing of that, which he hath decreed not to doe?

Mat. 26.33. I could obtaine more then twelve Legions,] True, God could ſend ſo many by his abſolute power; but conſidering his decree, he had tied himſelfe; beſides I diſpute not about Gods power, but will; not whether he can ſave them whom he reſolved to harden, but whether he ever willeth ſo to doe; and for this that example confirmeth me, becauſe his father would nor grant, or he begge, becauſe they had determined he ſhould ſuffer. His houre was come.

Then to conclude, let the Author bend himſelfe to reconcile Chriſts will to his Fathers, if he procure life for any man, either abſolutely, or upon any condition; ſo that the Argument ſtandeth firme, that ſeeing Chriſts will is one with his Fathers: and his actions in time, doe perfect his Fathers decrees before time, his redemption but ſubſervient to his Fathers election, ſeeing his Father elected not every man to grace and glory, he purchaſed not grace and glory for every man, either abſolutely, or on condition.