The Interest of These United Provinces, To the reader
To the Impartial Reader.
ALthough in ſo ſmall a Tractate, it may be thought needleſs to give an account of the occaſion thereof; yet I think my ſelf obliged for your further ſatisfaction, to do it briefly. The Author having been lately in Holland, found what the Zeelanders had done in the late Revolutions, miſunderſtood by ſome, and variouſly cenſured by others; and therefore thought it worth his pains, fairly and modeſtly to vindicate the ſame. And the rather, becauſe he foreſees various pretexts will be deduced thence, and divers interpretations be made thereof, which the Author hopes by his declaring the true intent and meaning, to free it from. That ſo all thoſe, whoſe Curioſity or Intereſt leads them to inquire, might be acquainted with the true Grounds and Reaſons thereof; and that neither the propenſity of ſome to the French, nor the prejudice and paſſion of others againſt the Engliſh, might make us run blindfold upon our ruine; but that we may diſcern our true Intereſt, and purſue it as occaſion ſhall require. For as all affection to that which is not our real Intereſt, ſo all averſation from that which is, is madneſs and folly; which clouds Reaſon, precipitates Counſels, runs us upon extreams, and drives us into inevitable deſtruction, many times before we are aware.
I know ſome will be apt to ſay, What need of this now? The Storm is over, and the ſuppoſition of inability to defend our felves out of doors. If I thought ſo, I aſſure you I ſhould neither trouble my ſelf, nor others any further. But whether it be my love to the Countrey, and deſire of the welfare thereof; or my jealouſie over the Factions of the Rulers, and tumultuouſneſs of the people therein; or my comparing and eſtimating our own ſtrength, fidelity, and courage with our Enemies; or my obſerving, that our former Military Diſcipline (which made us renowned, and our Countrey accounted the School of War) is in a great meaſure, if not utterly decayed and loſt; or my hearing how old Officers, and Forein Forces have been ſlighted; and ſuch preferred, as are unexperienced for conduct, and untried for courage; or the difference I have obſerved in the valour of a poor and rich people; Poverty always ſtirring up and whetting Valour, out of hopes to better their condition; whereas riches makes men fearful of loſing what they have, and ſo falling into a worſe. As may be obſerved not onelyonly in different people, as between the Northern and Southern Nations, but alſo in the ſame, yea in our ſelves. For when poor in our Wars with Spain, De Mor. Gern. §. 29.we made good the old Character which Tacitus gives us, Omnium harum gentium virtute pr…ecip…i Batavi, &c. Of all the German Nations, or People, the Batavians, were cheif for valour; but now that we are grown rich, we are affraid to adventure either our Perſons or Eſtates, and readier to open our Gates, then ſhut them againſt our Enemies. Or, whether it be my Melancholly temper only; or my fears and cowardiſe, if you pleaſe to call it ſo; or my fancy from my obſervation, that the third War (as this is with England) hath ever proved fatal to the one ſide, as is apparent by many examples; or what ever other cauſe it is, I muſt profeſs freely, that I am of another ſentiment, this War having ſo black a viſage to mine appearance, that I fear we are rather in the midſt of a Tempeſtuous Sea of Troubles, then diſcovering of Land, much leſs a ſafe Harbour of reſt.
I am not ignorant upon how many pins men hang their hopes. Some upon the advancement of his Highneſs the Prince of Orange, hope all will be redreſt and well at home; and that his relation to the Crown of England, and the Elector of Brandenburgh, will capacitate him to remedy all abroad. Others upon conjectures of his marrying with the Duke of Yorks Daughter, or ſome nearly related to the Crown of England or France; which hath been an uſual way I confeſs, eſpecially among abſolute Princes, of accomodating differences. Some upon our ſufficient numbers of Men and Moneys to defend our ſelves. Otherſome upon the Aſſiſtance of the Emperor, and the German Princes, Brandenburgh eſpecially. And others upon their opinion, that now the Penſionary de Wit and his party are broken, ſo that England can confide more in our friendſhip, that the King will break with France, and afford his Nephew and theſe Netherlands aſſiſtance; eſpecially becauſe they judge, that it is the Intereſt of England and Germany, as well as Spain, not to ſee us fall into the French hands, for fear they have only Polyphemus his courteſie, to be laſt devoured. But yet all theſe grouds, and divers others, which are variouſly diſcourſed of, prevail not ſo far with me, as that my hopes can ballance my fears.
For although I grant the ſtrength of the remaining Provinces to be conſiderable both by Sea and Land; and the greateſt foundation to build our hopes upon, next under God Almighties Protection; yet if we duly conſider the ſtate and condition we are in, there is not that juſt ground of confidence, which may free us from fears; as many are apt to imagine. He is very ſhort ſighted that obſerves not,
1. That there are two different parties amongſt us, and that a Commonwealth, muchleſs then a Kingdom divided, cannot ſtand.
2. That we might do much more then we do, or (for any thing I yet ſee) will or ſhall do for our own defence.
3. That we are deſtitute of ſuccours from abroad for the preſent, except from Spain; which we may happily pay dear enough for; if we ſhould be drawn into a League Offenſive and Defenſive with them in a long and tedious War. And
4. that we are full of tumults and diſtractions at home, which is to me a greater preſage of approaching ruine, then all our Enemies weapons of War; and makes me fear that as tumults was the occaſion of our riſing, ſo they will be of our ruine.Hiſt. Gal. l. 2. And that Priols obſervation of two only Nations that have ſtood firm by defection; the Helvetians at the riſe, and the Hollanders at the fall of the Rhine; thoſe founding and defending their Liberty by the Mountains, their Poverty, and Equality; theſe by the Waters, their Riches, and the States with a Captain General; may ſhortly be contradicted in the latter, if we be not more unanimous, and perhaps ere long in the former alſo.
I grant likewiſe, That it is very conſiderable to have ſo wiſe a Conductor as the Prince of Orange is for his years, and one of ſuch near Relation to two ſuch great Potentates as his Uncles of England and Brandenburgh. But yet if we rightly conſider, we cannot but conclude.
1. That it muſt be Power, as well as Policy, that can relieve us; and that in the Affairs of the World, Intereſt is preferred above all Relations; the whole World turning upon the Hinge of Self-intereſt; and all Princes, States, Families, and Perſons eagerly purſuing that which they apprehend their Intereſt, although often miſtaking it, and oftner the means to obtain it; no wonder if they miſs thereof.
2. And that his Civil Dignities come rather to him by Popular Tumults, than Regular Proceedings: Which is found an eaſie way to riſe by, but a hard way to ſtand by, yea, Morally impoſſible, if not backed by power. For as it is with ſick Perſons, ſo with ſick States, if all things be not quickly redreſſed that is grievous to them, they preſently cry, Turn me again; and think they have power to undo, that which they themſelves have formerly done. It being a true Character which Livy gives the Common People,Lib. 24. Plebs aut humiliter ſervit, aut ſuperbè dominatur.
3. And that though the de Wits be dead, their party lives; and if things ſucceed not well under his Highneſs, will have no ſmall advantage, not only from the horrid murder of thoſe two Pillars of their party; but from the declining of Affairs, to cry him down with the people, and make him an Inſignificant Cypher of State.
4. And laſtly, There are ſo many Papiſts, and other Sects of Religion and Malecontents, who watch for opportunities to Flieblow the Common People, and ſet them upon Sedition; that I much queſtion, whether that freſh gale of Affection to the Prince, which hath blown ſo briskly through all theſe remaining Provinces, will laſt long. For if they ſee that his Highneſs cannot make Peace, as they expected; and they feel more miſerable effects of a ſtubborn and cruel War, and be forced to greater Taxes (the Common People being always covetous, what ever the cauſe or neceſſity be) and find their Trade ſtill obſtructed, and Land drowned, to the impoveriſhing both of Cities and Countrey; I fear we ſhall find the People ſo reſtleſs and unquiet, that they will neither know what to do themſelves, nor be willing to be guided by their Governors that do; but when Extremities preſs upon us, bring all into Confuſion, and conſequently Ruine.
For beſides the Jealouſies which many have of his Highneſs, which Bentivoglio long ſince foreſaw and foretold, That theſe Jealouſies betwixt the State, and their Stadtholder, would become the cauſe of our Ruine; the needy multitude, (which are alwaies enemies to good order and Government) when diſtreſſed; will ſeek occaſion to prey upon the richer, whom they conſtantly envie. And the midle ſort, which are the true Baſis of a State, whoſe principal aime is Liberty and Plenty, when they ſee theſe indangered; grow jealous of their Governours (upon whom all misfortunes are conſtantly laid) and ſeeke to pull them downe and ſet up themſeves one after another, to the ruine of all. For the pompe of Government ſo daſles the eyes of thoſe that know not the Weight of it, that when there is any ſeeming acceſs thereto, all are apt to contend for it, and every one to thinke himſelf as capable as his neighbor, and vy with one another without end: till they that were formerly good paſſengers, now turning Pilots in a Storm; through their continuall contentions and unskilfulneſs, ſhipwrack the Common-wealth, whilſt they ſincerely deſire and endeavour to ſave it. I ſhall therefore conclude, that although we have a good Head, yet except the members be at unity, and unanimouſly reſolved to give aſſiſtance to their Head and Governours; it is in vaine to thinke, we can be ſecured from ſuch potent enemies, (except any be ſo mad as to expect miracles) or that the Princes name or waying of his Flag upon our Towers can defend us.
For his marrying his Highneſs the Duke of Yorks Daughter, we may ſpeak of it here, and thoſe in England of the King of Sweden, and both be miſtaken. I can ſee little certainty thereof, and therefore can ſay leſs therein; but this I can ſay, that if a Relation would effect our deſires, there is that which is very near already; yea which many perhaps will thinke too neer, if it conduce no more to the procuring our Peace.
For our aſſiſtance from the Emperor and Germain Princes, which is ſo much talkt of, the Brandenburgs eſpecially; if I were aſſured they deſigned to ſerve us, and not themſelves of us; I ſhould have more hopes then I have. I know the Germains are a great and warlike Nation, and that none almoſt have warred with them, that have not repented it. And when we ſee them warr with France, though they directly aſſiſt us not further, ſuch a diverſion to our enemie will be a conſiderable advantage to us. But at preſent, we ſee no more of their intentions, than to defend themſelves. The Emperor is not onelyonly continually kept waking by the Turk; but at preſent diverted alſo by the diſtractions of Hungary. And the fears of Poland, will neceſſitate Brandenburg to have an eye to Pruſſia. The Princes of the Empire are many, and divided, (ſeveral of them declaring for France, others wavering and waiting opportunity to cloſe with the prevailing ſide) which makes their Counſels ſlow, and more ſubject to be diſcovered, the raiſing men and bringing them together more difficult, the commanding of them more lyable to diſcord (which hath often proved fatal in their Armies) and the providing for them very uncertaine. And I might ad hereunto (for it is well knowne) that ſome of the Germain Princes have ſo run out their revenues; that though they have men far more then their proportion, yet have not money to pay the half of their rate. So that it is well, if what was ſaid of old of the Britains, prove not true of the Germans, Tacitus in vita Agricolae.Dum ſinguli pugnant, omnes vincuntur.
As for the Intereſt of England, which we think ſhould incline them to hinder rather than further Frances growing greatneſs, and conſequently to Peace with us: I ſhall only ſay this, That as we allow all men liberty to judge of their own Intereſts, ſo muſt we much more to Kings and Rulers. And it is but reaſonable to think, that they underſtand their own Intereſt better then we, that are ſtrangers to their deſigns; except we think of our ſelves as the Perſians, who ſay that they have two eyes, and others but one. I may think, that the ſame Reaſon of State ſhould prevail now, that did formerly with the Engliſh, in the firſt War, To humble us, but not ruine us; and ſhall make it apparent, that they cannot rationally have a thought of our ruine, without thinking to follow after, yet circumſtances are ſo different, and the paſſions of men ſo various, that I am not certain to what extent and degree of Humiliation they meaſure their Intereſt, or how far England is ingaged with France for effecting of this. We may think, and the Engliſh Nation may be jealous (as I know they are) that France will couzen them at laſt, and ſerve them now as Comines tells us they have formerly,l. 3. c. 8. & l. 4. c. 9. Bodin de Rep. l. 5. c. 1. When uſually they beat the French in their Wars; but then what they had got by their Swords, they loſt by their Treaties, (even as Bodin tells us the French were ſerv'd by the Spaniards;) but if they will adventure that, who can hinder them?
Should I ſpeak my private apprehenſion, 'tis briefly this, England hath been long jealous of the growing greatneſs of this State by Sea, and find it an error of Policy in former Governors, to ſuffer us to arrive at this height of conteſting with them. From whence they have met with ſeveral inconveniences in regard of Trade, and alſo been put to vaſt expences to maintain conſtantly a Fleet to cope with us. Theſe things they would willingly eaſe themſelves of, which they know cannot be done, but by the Sword. The firſt War which was occaſionally begun, was no time to effect their deſigns, in regard the Kingdom was harraſt and exhauſted by a long Civil War, and Oliver the Protectors cheif deſign was to ſettle himſelf, and therefore made Peace. The ſecond War advantaged them nothing; for the French countenancing us (though ſecretly in League with them before the War was ended) they were not able to effect what they deſigned, having loſt their opportunity which they had after the firſt battel in their hands: That being often verified of the Engliſh, which was ſaid of Hannibal, (by whom matters not, for the Learned Hiſtorians Livie and Plutarch differ therein,) Vincere ſcis Hannibal; victoria uti neſcis. A Peace is concluded at Breda, but the War had a ſting in the tale of it, the work at Chattam, Ma…et alta mente repoſtum, and makes them more eagerly wait for an opportunity, both to revenge themſelves, and purſue their former deſigns. And now France taking occaſion to quarrel with us, they take the opportunity to oppreſs us, and bring us under; that they may free themſelves from thoſe preſent inconveniences in Trade and Expences, and will ſee how they can make it with France for the future. They know well, that if we be broken, there is no Nation elſe is able to match them at Sea, and being in an Iland, fear not invaſion by Land Forces. I might parallel this with the Peloponneſian War, the cauſe whereof was the Athenians growing greatneſs, and particularly in Power at Sea;Lib. 1. upon whom therefore, the Lacedemonians made War, as Thucydides tells us, who hath accurately writ the Hiſtory thereof. And yet though Intereſt be the moving cauſe of moſt Wars,Hiſt. lib. 3. c. 6. what ever the pretext be, (for Polybius hath long ſince taught us to diſtinguiſh theſe two by ſundry Examples) yet I am far from aſſerting it alone a juſtifieable cauſe of any War. If any deſire ſatisfaction what is, I refer them to Grotius de Jure Belli & Pac. lib. 2. cap. 1. & 22. & ſeqq. for my deſign permits me not ſuch a digreſſion. Theſe thoughts of the preſent Intereſt of England, leads me to conclude.
1. That in their League with France they have made proviſion for theſe; ſo that if the French prevail, they ſhall have ſuch Maritime places, as may be a real ſecurity to them in theſe particulars.
2. That they will never ſuffer France (if they can poſſibly hinder it) to have all theſe Maritime Provinces entirely. For if our might alone be ſuch an eye-ſore to them, how much more if it ſhould be joyned with that of France.
3. That they will not deſiſt, till they have tried their utmoſt, to obtain theſe ends which they account their Intereſt; having now the advantage of Alliance with France, their joynt Power and Prevalency, and our preſent Weakneſs and Diſtractions. So that I cannot flatter my ſelf ſo much as to hope, That either the Princes Relation to His Majeſty can procure, or Money purchaſe our Peace with them, ſo long as they ſee any probability of effecting their deſigns.
But if any hath more certain grounds of hope, which are not yet diſcovered to the World, he needs not loſe his time in peruſing this Treatiſe. It is but my loſing a few ſpare hours in compoſing, and the Printer a ſmall ſum in publiſhing this amongſt thoſe many Pamphlets, which daily flie abroad, through all corners of the Countrey. For I profeſs this once for all, That I pretend not to know (or if I did, ſhould I diſcover) any Intrigues or Myſteries of State; nor deſire to pry into the Arcana Imperii, but let them ſilently reſt in the boſome of thoſe who ſit at the Helm of Government; or to make any unworthy reflections upon any, Friends or Enemies, French or Engliſh. But only as one ſtanding upon lower ground, to take the height of the Tower of Intereſt, which is gazed upon by all, but through paſſion and prejudice rightly meaſured by few. Whether I have miſtaken it with the multitude, time will diſcover, and let others judge by the following Diſcourſe; which I fore-fee will meet with as many Cenſures, as I have Hairs on my Head, though I value them all leſs than the leaſt of them; my Conſcience bearing me witneſs, that I have publiſhed the ſame, with a ſincere affection to the Reformed Religion, and welfare of theſe Countreys.
Nov. 30. 1672. J. H.