The Interest of These United Provinces, Section 1
Sect. 1. The riſe and ſtate of the Queſtion, viz. Whether upon ſuppoſal of inability to defend our ſelves, it is our Intereſt to be under England or France, and the Zeelanders choice of the former.
HE is a Stranger to us and our Affairs, who knows not; that the late Revolutions among us, and particularly at Ʋtrechts betaking themſelves to the French for protection, were attended both with great conſternation, and various deliberations, as is uſual in ſuch diſaſters. When therefore miſery and deſtruction was approaching as a violent torrent, that bears down all before it; Self-preſervation being the Fundamental Law of Nature; every Province, City, and almoſt Village, began to conſider, what they ſhould do to preſerve themſelves, from being drowned in the overflowing deluge.
Some were of opinion, that the remaining Provinces were of ſufficient ſtrength to defend themſelves, and therefore lookt no further. Others were of a contrary judgment; and therefore thought it better, upon reaſonable terms, to put our ſelves under a Forein Power, as Ʋtrecht had done, then to be conquered by the Sword. And herein alſo mens judgments were divided, ſome thinking it better to be under the French, others to be under the Engliſh. Thoſe of Holland (as was commonly reported) were more inclinable to the former, in regard of their near approach to them in Ʋtrecht; and eſpecially out of an opinion which many have entertained, That the Intereſt of Holland, being principally that of Trade by Sea, was more competible with that of France then England, Inſomuch, that many believe, if the advice of Monſieur Pompone of the Kings ſending Charte Blanche had been followed; the Cities of Holland had at that time ſeveral of them imitated the example of Ʋtrecht; thoſe of Zealand were generally inclined to the Engliſh. But as opinions are uſually both bred and brought up by Paſſions; ſo here it was manifeſt, That the exceſſive hopes of the former, made them for abſolute defence; and the exceſſive fears of the latter, for abſolute reſignation. In ſuch caſes there are two ways have always been found ſafeſt and beſt for accommodation, viz. A due examination of the Grounds of thoſe Paſſions, and a juſt temperament or comprehenſion of the diverſity of Opinions: Which here ſo happily fell out, that it was reſolved upon and declared by many in Zeeland, firſt, That they would uſe their beſt endeavors to defend themſelves; and ſecondly, if they found themſelves unable, they Would then reſign to the Engliſh. Hereby ſhewing, that they neither did through vain fears, wholly deſpond of their own ſtrength; nor through flattering hopes were wholly fearleſs of their Enemies. They would try and uſe the beſt means they could, to ſtand of themſelves according to their hopes; and yet alſo provide againſt the worſt of their fears, which was their fall by abſolute conqueſt.
For the manner of doing this, I ſhall neither accuſe, nor defend it; though the Magiſtrate led not the Van of Conſent, according to his place and dignity,Plut. l. de fort. yet he followed cloſe in the Rear. And though it was done haſtily, yet why may not a haſty Pen, ſometimes be as happy as Apelles his Pencil, which in Paſſion being thrown on the Picture, better portrayed the Horſes foaming, then all his premeditated Counſel and Art.
It is enough to me, and to my purpoſe, that what was done is agreeable to the true Intereſt of the Countrey; which I hope to make apparent in the following Diſcourſe. But before I do that, give me leave to premiſe a few things, which tend to the clearing of the Matters in queſtion.
1. That we only ſuppoſe this inability for the preſent, to ſatisfie the curioſity of the World, which never think their teliſcope long enough, to ſee to the utmoſt end of Intereſt. For we ſhall afterwards make it apparent, that we neither are as yet come to that extremity (through Gods mercy) nor need to fear we ſhall be reduced to it, if we be not awanting to our ſelves.
2. It is above all to be underſtood, that this reſolution is abſolute for Self-defence, and conditional only for Reſignation. It is an approved maxim which every wiſe man lives by, Alterius ne ſis, ſi tuus eſſe poſſis, which holds good in Societies, whether leſſer of Families, or greater of Cities, and Provinces, as well as private perſons. If any can be free, it is folly to think, they will be ſubject to another.
3. This reſolution being conditional, upon the ſuppoſal of evident inability to defend our ſelves, it is not to be imagined, that it ſhould take place upon every Danger or Alarm of War, eſpecially ſo long as Holland and Freeſland are able to defend themſelves: States as well as Perſons, may be dangerouſly ſick, and yet recover. Differences may be accommodated with our Enemies, or aſſiſtance may be afforded us from our Friends; the Scene of War may change, the Water and Weather may be our Walls of Defence, Difficulties, Diſſentions, and Diſtractions, may befal our Enemies: One thing or other may fall out ſo far to our advantage, that we may retrench our ſelves in ſafety, though we ſhould not recover our former Greatneſs.
4. Nor can it reaſonably be thought, that any will give themſelves over to another, ſo as to part with their Religious and Civil Intereſts, and be in no better a capacity then a conquered people; who though they are not made abſolute ſlaves, yet are uſually ſore oppreſt by the Conqueror. But onelyonly to part with their Supremacy, and the Appendixes thereunto, under which they may live as free Proteſtant Subjects.
If any object this is not practicable, in regard of the Treaty betwixt the two Crowns of England and France.
I anſwer.
1. Who knows that, except a few of their Cabinet Counſel?
2. This ſuppoſes that they have divided the Lions Skin before he be ſlain, which to me is very doubtful. For although two ſuch mighty Potentates, might upon rational grounds, think themſelves able to maſter this Commonwealth, before they began the War; yet ſo many are the unexpected accidents, and the events of War ſo doubtfull, that few have bene knowne to divide the ſpoile, before they had won the battell, or the Country before they had triumphed in the War: leſt they being fruſtrated of their hoped ſucces, ſhould becom a ſcorne and contempt to the world. We have ſufficient reaſon to thinke, that neither England will permit France, nor France England, to have theſe Countries entirely; and can we then thinke that they ſhould agree upon this before hand? if others will ghues, I have the ſame liberty; whereby I thinke that when time (which is the revealer of ſecrets) brings the Treaty to light; it will appeare that the French ſhould hold us in by Land, and the Engliſh by Sea, till they had brought us to their owne termes; of France keeping ſuch places above as may be thought moſt conducible, to the inlarging his Conqueſts and keeping us under, and England by Sea, as may ſecure his deſired Trade, and Navall expences; and that neither of them ſhould have theſe Maritime Provinces entirely (for that was for the one to make the other his Maſter, and abſolute Soveraigne at Sea, by ſuch an acceſſion of ſtrength) nor yet divided; for that would be a continuall bone of contention betwixt them.
3. Thoſe that ſuppoſe this repertition, generally ſay, that Zeeland is to be Engliſh; and if ſo, the objection is anſwered. For if each muſt conquer their part by their owne Armes, as many imagine; who can thinke that any will be at the expence of ſo much blood and treaſure, beſides the hazard of ſucces, for that which they can have upon honourable termes?
Or if they proceed joyntly with their Armes, to obtaine their deſignes; we cannot thinke the one will obſtruct the other, in that which is agreed upon by them both. And this way I ſuppoſe they take; becauſe in a joynt War the ſucces is common to both, and the advantage redounds to each according to their former accord; and was it otherwiſe here, England attacquing us onelyonly by Sea, might get nothing by Land, and France all. Which I cannot imagine to be ſo agreed upon, whatſoever the iſſue may be. For I cannot thinke the Engliſh ſuch fooles to fight onelyonly for blowes, and to ſet up the French to their owne deſtruction.
But let their agreement be what it will for the places they conquer, yet it cannot bind or determine us how to diſpoſe of our ſelves before we are conquered. All free States, and Cities,v. Grot. de Jare bel. & pac. l. 1. c. 3. §. 8. l. 2. c. 6. & l. 3 c. 20. §. 5. may upon what conditions they pleaſe, yeeld the Soverainty over them, and their owne ſubjection to whom they pleaſe. And allthough ſuch proffers have ſometimes been refuſed, in regard of Wars and other evill conſequences which might attend them; yet here the acceptance is not to be doubted of, ſeeing this is the Helena for which they fight.
If any ſhall ask how this is to be effected.
I anſwer, Non eſt deliberandum de modo, priuſquam conſtat de re. If any grant that it is to be done, it is as much as I undertake. If God in his all-wiſe and righteous Providence, ſuffer us to be brought ſo low, that we cannot longer withſtand our enemies: let thoſe in ſupreme authority take care for the manner of performance, as to the time in which, treating whereby, and conditions whereupon they will yield their Supremacy and Government. It being my work only to ſhew, that it is our Intereſt in ſuch a caſe, to make choice of England rather then France, or any other Potentate whatſoever.