The Interest of These United Provinces, Section 9
Sect. 9. That we are not yet come to that extremity, but we may ſtill remain a Republick: in regard of our own ſtrength, and our neighbours intereſt, Englands eſpecially, that they had better loſe Scotland or Ireland, than let the French have theſe Provinces. This War a Game at Hazard. Being engaged will go through, and Parliament probably aſſiſt therein.
WE have hitherto diſcourſed upon the ſuppoſal of inability to defend our ſelves; becauſe it becomes wiſe men always, to ſuppoſe the worſt condition that may probably befall them; with the conſequences thereof; and accordingly to make proviſion, and in regard of the endleſs curioſity of mens minds, which are always reſtleſs under miſeries, and ſtill inquiſitive after futurities. We ſhall now proceed to ſhew, that we are not yet (through Gods mercy towards us) come to the extremity ſuppoſed, nor reduced to thoſe ſtraits, that we are neceſſitated to take either French or Engliſh for our Maſters; but that we may ſtill remain a Republick, if we be not awanting to our ſelves, or through paſſion or precipitancy betray our own intereſt, and caſt our ſelves into irrecoverable deſtruction. And this we ſhall make apparent, by ſhewing there is no ſufficient ground for us to deſpair, if we either Conſider our own ſtrength, or our Neighbours Intereſt. Let us therefore obſerve the good rule in policy, which the Poet gives,
Senec. Thyeſt.
Nemo confidat nimium ſecundis,
Nemo deſperet meliora lapſis.
Firſt lets take a view of our own ſtrength, and ſee what grounds of encouragement, that will yield us. Which though ſufficiently known to many, yet not ſo well to the multitude. Now the ſtrength of a Nation conſiſts eſpecially in theſe things following, which I ſhall briefly recite, and accommodate to our own Country.
1. The great ſtrength of a people conſiſts in the ſituation of their Country. Now concerning this both in the general,Sect. 7. and this Land in particular, I have already ſpoken ſufficiently for my purpoſe; and ſhewn that all theſe Maritime Provinces, are either Iſlands or Peninſular, and very defenſible thereby; and alſo upon extremity liable to inundation, either from the Sea, or Rivers that ſurround them, or both.
2. In the Artificial Fortification of particular places; Cities, Caſtles, Forts, Paſſes, &c. And herein theſe Countries may contend with any Nation whatſoever, Kingdom, or Common-wealth that is of no greater circumference. For the Number of their Cities, and their regular Fortification, Art herein vying with Nature, is not to be parallel'd in the world. I need not deſcend to particulars, Thoſe that deſire ſatisfaction herein, may conſult Guicciardine's deſcription of theſe Netherlands.
3. In means of defence. As ſhipping for thoſe Nations or Cities that lie upon the Sea, or great navigable Rivers, and Lakes, as theſe Provinces do, to defend their Coaſts from invaſion. And herein we are rather redundant than defective; the Number of ſhipping in Holland alone, being uſually accounted 20000. And warlike proviſion of Arms and Ammunition. Wherein alſo we abound: theſe Countries ever ſince they were a Common-wealth, having been the greateſt Magazine of warlike proviſions, as is well known, of any in the World.
4. In men; in regard of their Number, Courage, Skill, and Unanimity.
As to our Numbers, they are abundantly ſufficient for our defence. The Intereſt of Holland c. 8. from particulars, reckons the ſum of that Province alone 2400000. But if there be ſo many in them all, it is enow. Juſt how many is impoſſible to ſay, or near how many in ſuch a multitude is very difficult to gueſs, and harder with us than any other people, I think, in the World; in regard of the uncertainty of Seamen, the Number of Strangers and Travellers in peaceable times, and the diverſity of Religions, Jews, Papiſts, Anabaptiſts, &c. which baptiſe not their Children with us. But I know the Number of our men muſt needs be great; by the great Number of our Cities, theſe ſeveral Provinces being as it were nothing but Neſts of Cities, ſo many being no where to be found in ſo ſmall a circumference in any parts of the habitable World; by their largeneſs and multitude of houſes, which imply the Inhabitants to be many; by the greatneſs of their Trade, which is the lure that draws multitudes to them; and by the known Chriſtnings and burials of thoſe only of the Reformed Religion.
As to our courage, which at preſent ſuffers an eclipſe, there is more to be ſaid then the World is aware of. And indeed I wonder none of our Hiſtory Profeſſors, have given other Nations ſome ſatisfaction herein. I have not been without ſome thoughts of doing it my ſelf, having been a diligent obſerver how things have gone, but I want Authentick materials for ſuch a work. I could produce very many and very honourable teſtimonies, both ancient and modern of their valour, our of ſuch Writers as give the Characters of Nations, Republicks, Geographers, and eſpecially Hiſtorians Dion, Caeſar, Tacitus, Suetonius, Florus, Oroſius, &c. of old, the famous Italians, Guicciardine, Bentivoglio and Strada, with Spaniſh, French, Engliſh and the neighbouring Nations, even ſo many and ſuch as are ſufficient either to ſhame, or to inflame the verieſt cowards, one ſhould think, of the world into courage. But this would be too large to inſert here, and may poſſibly de done in another dreſs hereafter. Nor is the ſucceſs of France againſt us ſuch a wonder, as many make it, as I have formerly ſhewn.Sect. 7. I will at preſent only add, that which is proper for this place, and that is that the French Armies were not only ſo numerous, but alſo trained up in the School of Mars, and ours for the moſt part raw and unexperienced in War. As the Fox in the Fable, the firſt time he ſaw the Lion and heard him roar, trembled; the ſecond time, was leſs affraid, and the third grown wholly fearleſs of him: So it is with men, by being accuſtomed to dangers either at Sea or Land, they converſe with them familiary, and account them nothing at laſt. And therefore wiſe Commanders have always endeavoured to unlearn their Souldiers fear, by ſhewing them their enemies at Walls, Trenches, Paſſes, Rivers or other places, where they could not be come upon by them, and ſo harden and fleſh them by degrees, before they have adventured to fight them againſt old and experienced enemies. And I doubt not, but through Gods bleſſing, in a little time if the Wars continue, our Belgick Lion, will not be found ſuch a tame Lamb, and ſo eaſily torn in pieces, as our enemies may hope, and others poſſibly may imagin.
As for our skill ſuperadded to courage, there is no want, for the manner of defence we are to make. For beſides our able Commanders and Souldiers to defend the Poſts, and Paſſes abroad, all our Cities abound with Seamen, and ſuch as are skil'd to traverſe their Ordnance, and deſperate for ſallies, if need ſhould require.
Our unanimity, I confeſs, is that I moſt fear: and that when our Cities are threatned with danger, the Citizens ſhould grow mutinous, and fall together by the ears, and ſo let in their enemies to part the fray. And yet I have reaſon to think they will grow wiſer, by their hearing and knowing how their freinds are uſed by their enemies.
5. In money and food to maintain their men. And in neither of theſe, through Gods mercy, is there any want amongſt us: If we will lay out our ſelves, as we ought, for the publick. Aitſma's Liewe reckons the publick incoms of Holland alone A. 1643. at eleven Millions of our money, which is eleven hundred thouſand pounds Sterling: we calling every ten thouſand pound Sterling a tun of gold, and ever hundred thouſand a million i. e. of gilders. And beſides the publick incoms of every Province, every City hath their peculiar, which in ſome is very conſiderble. But if our Common Treaſuries are exhauſted in ſeveral places, it is no wonder: Yet if we conſider the Riches of particular perſons, we have enough to hold out the War, to weary our enemies out at the laſt, as muſt as they do us at the preſent. I will not now ſtand to ſhew the calculation of this, though if neceſſary, I think I can do it ſatisfactorily, comprehending the diſadvantages our enemies are under. But the late Project printed ſo often, of the Capitals of this Country, for raiſing and maintaining ſo numerous an Army, though the manner preſcribed prove not practicable, hath in part ſpared my pains herein.
And for food, our Cities are generally ſo well furniſhed, that if our enemies ſteal not ſupplies from us, it is well; we need neither ſeek to them, nor fight with them for ſupplying our ſelves. We have Bread Corn Fiſh and Oyl, Butter and Cheeſe in abundance. And if our liquoriſh Dames, want their delicacies a while, no great matter: they will value peace, and pay their Souldiers the better.
Now what can be added for the ſufficient defence of any Nation, to the particulars mentioned, I cannot imagin; and if my enumeration be inſufficient, I wiſh any wiſe man would ſhew wherein, and then I ſhall thank them. And therefore let us take courage to our ſelves, and not be frighted with vain fears; or ſcared with any vanting bravadoes; like that great Rhodomontadoe of the grand Turk, who when he heard of the long War ſuch a great Prince as Spain, made about this ſmall Country; ſaid, that before he would have kept ſuch a pottering, about a few petty Provinces, he would have taken them, and hurled them into the Sea at once: though his ſucceſſor kept no ſmall pottering about the ſingle City of Candia many years together; to which ſome of our Cities, all things conſidered, ſeem not much inferior for ſtrength: although I well know what a difference there is, betwixt the defence of one City alone without a Country, and many at once contained therein.
But though this internal ſtrength be ſo conſiderable, and with us of greateſt conſequence; yet this is not all; we have alſo an external and accidental ſtrength, by the Intereſt of our Neighbours. For this end it muſt be well conſidered, that ſome Countries and Cities, of ſmall ſtrength comparatively in themſelves, are yet very ſtrong by their ſituation among, and well ſecured by the Intereſt of other circumjacent Princes and States: who will not ſuffer, if they can poſſibly prevent it, acceſſion of ſtrength to one another, leſt their own ſcale in the ballance of powers ſhould become light and ſoon born down. What is it but this under the ſhadow of the Almighties Protection, that ſecures the ſmaller Republicks in Italy and the Empire? What Geneva, Stratsburg, Colen, Hamburg and the reſt of the free Cities, and Hans Towns, but this? God governing the World uſually, as both Comines and Cardan well obſerve, by the paſſions of men, in the ballancing of Powers; that when any one will break out into rage and Wars, others will oppoſe them with the like fury, and ſo keep the World a little quiet, otherwiſe the great Nimrods, and hunters after Dominion would ſoon, if let alone, deſtroy and devour all before them.
Now if we look about us, and ſee amongſt whom our Land lies, and well conſider their intereſt; this will be very apparent in our ſelves, notwithſtanding this War that is made againſt us, that we are not devoted by any to deſtruction, but only the French, as I ſhall ſhew hereafter.
For Spain our next Neighbours on one hand, in the reſt of the Provinces, they know this ſo well, and are ſo ſenſible of their intereſt herein; that they not only aſſiſt us what they can; but I dare ſay were it not for England, would rather break with France than ſee us endangered. But thoſe two Crowns as I have already hinted, and ſhall more fully ſhew heareafter, muſt not, and therefore will not break.
For the Empire above us, they alſo are frighted with our fears; and if the Princes thereof had money to their might, would willingly, I doubt not, aſſiſt the Emperor: leſt the Lillies of France ſhould mount above the Roman Eagle. In the year 15…4. when the States upon the death of Prince William, were a looking towards France for Protection, the Princes of the Empire ſent Malroy to admoniſh them, ut à conſilio Gallici patrocinii implorandi deſiſterent, alioqui fore, ut Germani Principes tantam domui Auſtriacae & origine & foedere arctis adeo cum Imperio vinculis conjunctae factam injuriam non negligant, as Thuanus tells us, l. 80. And if they were then jealous of France, what ſhall we think they are now? And if then zealous for the concernments of Spain, ſhall we think they will now be wholly negligent both of theirs and their own?
And France to be ſure will never ſee us entirely Engliſh: for ſo he knows, he ſhould never be able, to ballance Englands power at Sea; which he doubtleſs both hopes and aims at, by the acceſſion of ſtrength from theſe Netherlands.
Nor England ſuffer us, if they can hinder it, to be wholly French; for this they know would clearly tend, in a little time to their deſtruction. This very Reaſon of State moved Q. Elizabeth at firſt to ſupport us againſt Spain, rather than to have us fall into the Arms of France, by their becoming our Protectors. Which that wiſe Hiſtorian Thuanus faithfully relates in ſeveral places. A. 1575. ſhe told Campaniach,—ne moleſtè ferat Philippus, ſi ipſa ſecuritatis ſuae cauſa Hollandiae & Zelandiae patrocinium ſuſcipiat, antequam Galli perpetui Anglorum hoſtes cis potiantur. L. 60. A. 1576. Eliſabeth a verita ne aliorum ope deſtituti Belgae, ex deſperatione foedus nobiſcum jecerent, ſique & res ſuas Francis committerent, eos pecunia adjuvit, &c. L. 26. A. 1577. ſhe excuſes her defence of us to Philip the 2. with this very Reaſon, ne Belgae ex deſperatione pernicio ſum non ſolum ſibi, ſid vicinis, conſilium caperent, externi Principis patrocinio ſalute commiſſa. Meaning the French L. 64. And A. 1584. ſhews the emulation between the French and Engliſh herein. Ipſi ſibi invicem ſuſpecti erant. Nam Rex veterem hoſtem Belgii acceſſione Galliae imminentem reformidabat, & Angli noſtros Belgi-potentes minus aequos foederi, quod Angliae cum Burgundica domo intercedit, atque adeo commercio futuros verebantur. L. 80. And is angry with the Miniſters of State in France, for neglecting this ſingular occaſion, of enlarging their Empire by taking theſe Provinces into the French protection. And to ſay the truth, this was the greateſt error in Policy by way of omiſſion, and that of Charles the 8. concerning the Kingdom of Naples of commiſſion, that I think the Crown of France was ever guilty of. And indeed there were many of the Engliſh Nation, that judged it one of the greateſt overſights that that wiſe Princeſs ever made, not to take into her hands, as ſhe was offered, the abſolut protection of theſe Provinces. But that is not ſo clear to me, nor will be ſo I think to others, who rightly conſider the circumſtances of thoſe times; for we muſt not judge by the following, wherein this Common-wealth grew up beyond all expectation, under ſuch Wars, as many feared would have been our deſtruction. But yet though ſhe refuſed for ſeveral reaſons both of Conſcience and State (mentioned by Cambden in her Annals, A.D. 1575.) yet it plainly appears by the forementioned places in Thuanus, that rather than the French ſhould, ſhe would have done it. And could ſhe have foreſeen, what we have known, I am apt to think ſhe would have adventured it; although I muſt tell you it would have been a great venture: Spain being both ſo potent at that time, and ſpightful againſt her, as was quickly after perceived, by the Spaniſh Armado in 88. and beſides the enmity of Spain, ſhe had thereby incur'd the envy of France infallibly, and was uncertain not only of ſucceſs in the War, but of what ſupport of men, and money eſpecially the Dutch ſhould be able to contribute, for the carrying on the War, which was eaſily foreſeen would be long and bloody.
Nor can any one think, that England is not ſenſible, of the danger they are in, if we be under France, that either conſiders the Reaſons of State, or obeſerved that which was obvious to every eye: and that is how the Engliſh was ſtartled at the progreſs of France. What poſting was made too and again? Was not the Lord Vicount of Hallifax haſted over, when they feared their approach to Ʋtrecht? And hearing it was over, was not his Grace the Duke of Buckingham, the Lord Arlington, with ſeveral other Commiſſioners, poſted after? At which time having the honour to wait on my Lord of Hallifax, and telling him the Town talk of the D. of Buckingham, &c. coming through the Fleet, and being gone to the Hague; he could ſcarce credit it, having not had the leaſt notice thereof, they coming away in ſuch haſte, for fear the French ſhould overrun all.
And no wonder, if we conſider the Conſequences thereof for England, which are ſo great that they had better loſe either Scotland, or Ireland. And if any Engliſh think I overlaſh, I ſhall deſire them firſt carefully to compute theſe ſeveral particulars, and then cenſure.
1. The loſs that the King will have in his Cuſtoms, and the Kingdom in their Trade; which neither of thoſe Nations can compenſate.
2. The conſtant charges of maintaining a Navy, which that Kingdom muſt be at to maintain their traffick, far greater than will ſecure them againſt either of thoſe Kingdoms.
3. The great injuries they are always liable unto, from ſuch potent enemies by Sea as the French and Dutch conjoined: more than from the other by Sea and Land.
4. The Wars that are likely to fall upon them in a few years both by Sea and perhaps Land alſo; which would prove far heavier, than either of thoſe Kingdoms can make with them.
5. The hazard they run of being baffled and beat out of their Trade by ſuch a War. It is true, this is not ſo eaſie as many of the Dutch imagine, as I have already proved; nor yet ſo difficult, much leſs impoſſible, as perhaps ſome of the Engliſh may fancy.
I ſhall not now ſtand to draw theſe out of their cloſe order into an open, yet if any of the Engliſh think me weak in this, I have a Reſerve, which, I think, will ſufficiently ſecure me from being routed.
It will be ſaid to me why then ſhould England commence this War.
Truly let me ſay it freely, for I know it, that the ſcale of War very hardly caſt that of peace, and the difference was ſo ſmall, that it came upon two or three grains only. I have weighed this as exactly as I poſſibly could: firſt diſtinguiſhing pretexts from real cauſes, and then diſtinctly conſidering theſe one by one. There were theſe 5 variouſly diſcourſed of. His Majeſties deſigning to introduce the Popiſh Religion; to alter the government of thoſe Kingdoms; to revenge himſelf upon us, to advance the Prince of Orange; and the Intereſt of the Kingdom of England.
For the two firſt which made the loudeſt noiſe in ſome mens mouths, I ſoon found them frivolous; and only calumnies caſt out by his enemies at home and abroad, to make the King odious, and his People jealous. As to that of changing Religion I have formerly ſhewn, and I think ſufficiently, that he neither will, nor can if he would effect it.
As for the 2d. I conſidered the Kings years, as being paſt any ſuch youthful and vain ambition; his being deſtitute of a Child that can challenge the Crown; his former miſeries and ſufferings by War; and his wiſdom too great, to ſet upon a deſign, ſo wholly impracticable, eſpecially in England and Scotland. For by the conſtitution of his Kingdoms, though he have the Militis for the execution of the Laws; authority without power, being a vain ſcare crow, and inſufficient to ſuppreſs the audacious exorbitances of the multitude: yet the people have the purſe to ballance that power, and whence then would he pay his Armies? Nor let any one ſtop me with ſaying, the Long Parliament conteſted with his Father for the Militia; for that was only temporary, they challenging it only for that time of the danger they apprehended in the Kingdom, and not as their conſtant right, and not belonging to the Crown; as may be ſeen by thoſe, who will rightly read their Declarations, which they publiſhed to the world concerning that War, collected and printed together by Husbands at London, 1642. And beſides this, a Parliament in being though not ſitting, which hath ſome kind of radical power; though not to be exerted, but when legally congregated. But ſuppoſe them diſſolved, it being in the Kings power, to do it at his pleaſure; yet hath he not the City of London on his back, and both Kingdoms about him to oppoſe him? eſpecially conſidering that the jealouſie of Popery would be taken into the quarrel. And what Miniſters of State durſt ſuggeſt ſuch deſigns? they know well the maxim of the Commons and their practice (as the great means of preſerving their freedom) is to ruine ſuch as would infringe their Liberty. And that they are ſo jealous of, and zealous for their rights herein, that ſome of them ſtill have the courage, and reſolution to venture their own heads, to break the necks of ſuch men and ſuch defigns, as would prejudice their Priviledges. I have obſerved in the Hiſtories of former times, and in my own time alſo, that there were ſeldom any of the nobleſt Stags of State, how much ſoever imparked in the Kings favour, and how ſtrongly ſoever impaled with power; but if the Commons of England ſingled him out and ſet upon him, though he might hold them at an abay for ſome time, yet they ſtill hunted him down at laſt. And for the King to think of making himſelf abſolute, and govern only by an Army (like the French Kings) by an Army of French men; is ſo ridiculous, that I thought it not worthy of conſideration. Can any man in his wits, imagine his Majeſty of England ſo ſenſeleſs, as to give his Crown and Kingdoms to the French King? For that is all one with this in effect.
As for that of Revenge, either for Chattam, or the affronts mentioned in his Declaration of this War, or both: I conſidered his Temper, which hath ſo much Clemency, that it rather inclines him to lenity than cruelty and revenge. As is abundantly apparent, not only by paſſing, but even forcing (as I know he did, againſt ſome adicted to the latter extreme) the Act of Indemnity or Oblivion, for thoſe many and great injuries, he had ſuffered from his Subjects. And his government ſince, in conniving at the violation of ſuch Laws, as are thought ſevere in matters of Religion, and indulging liberty therein: which hath made ſome, that have ſufficiently heretofore cried up Parliaments, now run into the other extreme and cry them down as faſt; and inſtead of the Parliaments formerly, now magnifie the Kings favour and Clemency. And yet Kings and Princes are men, and men ſubject to like paſſions with others, liable to ſuggeſtions from thoſe about them, and tender of their honour as the apple of their eye. And therefore I will grant this might come in conſideration, but not ſo much, I dare ſay, as alone to make a War.
For the Prince of Orange, there was not only near Relation and Affection, but Intereſt alſo to be conſidered. For the Loveſteyns party having been ſo croſs to England upon his account, and the correſpondent friendſhip between us ſo uncertain, without his Headſhip; I verily believe, that if what is now done therein, had been done timouſly, it had wholly prevented this unhappy War. Yea beſides the extraordinary affection which the people have for the Prince, our very Bores had this Policy, and were more than ordinary zealous for his promotion, as the beſt means to procure their peace.
As to the further intereſt of the Kingdom of England, in regard of their Trade, and Naval expences, I have expreſſed my thoughts before in the Preface.
It is true, this War was always intricate, and hath proved a Game at Hazard for England, beyond not only theirs, I believe, but all the worlds expectation. But yet if it be ſtill notwithſtanding cautiouſly played, as they may, and ſo far as I can poſſibly diſcern, mean to play it; they can many ways come to ſave their ſtakes, at the leaſt, if not to win more than we imagine by the War: and was far fairer at firſt than France for winning by the game in all humane appearance, as I could manifeſt by many Arguments. But becauſe that concerns them two only, and us not at all further than our ſufferings, I ſhall wave them (at leaſt for the preſent) and proceed. For I will not hearken to the curious enquiries of thoſe who would here be asking, how I think England will play their game? for that let them look to it whom it concerns on all ſides, as doubtleſs they will; for me to expreſs my private thoughts, might do more hurt than good, which is the only thing I aim at: and what I think the iſſue will be, I ſhall declare hereafter in my Conjectures.
But here it will be asked, ſeeing it is Englands intereſt that we fall not into the hands of France, and that the Prince is now promoted, will they not make peace with us this Winter?
I muſt needs ſay, I fear they will not, except we ſhould give them ſuch terms, as I ſee we ſhall not; we thinking our condition far better, and they thinking it far worſe, than really it is. For the cauſe of this, as of moſt Wars, is complex, as I have ſhewn; ſo that though two of thoſe I aſſigned may be paſt, yet the 3d of the Kingdoms intereſt, not. They are already too far ingaged in the War, and with France. The Kings Honour is at the ſtake, and the Kingdoms expectation of another iſſae than the laſt War. And beſides all theſe, how can any wiſe man imagine, now that they are engaged with France, and have an advantage againſt us, as well as a Hazard from France; that if they know how to ſecure themſelves againſt the latter (as I ſuppoſe they do) they will let go the former? For we muſt needs think they will be at a certainty on one ſide or the other; and not part with France's friendſhip, till they be ſure of our ſatisfaction. What it is they demand, or how rightly, is not now our deſign to diſcourſe, but only matter of Intereſt all along. And yet I can eaſily foreſee that the danger of our becoming French, will be a ſingular advantage to us, as an inducement to them, for a more eaſie compliance with us. But at preſent I ſee no probability of Peace, but that they will go through with the War: or continue it ſo long, till they have tryed their utmoſt to obtain their ends.
I know there are many wiſe men amongſt us, that think the King cannot carry on this War: as there was that thought he could not begin it. The former they find themſelves deceived in, and will be ſo in the latter alſo. I have diſcourſed this with ſeveral in Government, who argue that the King hath not money of himſelf to go through with the War, and that he will not convene the Parliament, or if he do they will not ſupply him. I grant the firſt, but deny the others. For if we rightly conſider their defign, the Parliament muſt meet, and the repreſentation that will be made thereof, and the conſtitution of the Parliament, they will grant him ſupplies; though perhaps not with that facility, that they did it with in the former War. And therefore let us neither flatter nor deceive our ſelves with vain hopes herein; but rather ſeek timely to accommodate differences, before their preparations in the Spring; for I fear the longer we delay, and the worſe it will be with us.