The Interest of These United Provinces, Section 5
Sect. 5. The ſecond Argument taken from Liberty. Wherein the different kinds, and degrees of Liberty under all ſorts of Governement, are declared; and the probability of our enjoying greater freedome under England than France, argued.
IT will further appeare our intereſt, to be under England rather than France, in regard of our Liberty. Which next to true Religion and life, is the greateſt bleſſing beſtowed on man-kind. Now for our clearer proceeding herein, we muſt
1. Shew what kind of Liberty is here meant.
2. Wherein it conſiſts, and the meaſures thereof.
3. Accommodate theſe to the matter in hand.
For the firſt. We meane not here Perſonall Liberty: either morally conſidered in oppoſition to coaction; or civilly; either in oppoſition to confinement, as we uſually take it; or to ſlavery, as the Civilians. 2. Nor Civil Liberty, as oppoſed to Monarchie; Inſtitut. l. 1. tit. 32as the Greeke and Latin Hiſtorians frequently: with which Tacitus begins his Annals, Ʋrbem Romam à Principio Reges habuere, libertatem & conſulatum L. Brutus inſtituit. For I well know, that to whomſoever we ſubmit, this liberty is loſt. Much leſs 3. For Licentiouſneſs. For ſubjection to Lawes and Government, is ſo far from being inconſiſtent with liberty; that it is the onelyonly means of its preſervation. For without this; what are Kingdoms and States, but great butcheries of men, and publick robberies of propriety, where the ſtrongeſt arme and longeſt ſword ſweeps away all? So boundleſs is mans villany; and his luſts ſo ragingly reſtleſs: that we have no other choyce left us, but either be ſubject to Law, or ſlaves to licentiouſneſs. As Tully ſayes well,Pro Cluent. Legum ideirco omnes ſervi ſumus, ut liberieſſe poſſimus. But 4. That publick liberty which a people have under their Government, (of what kind ſoever it is) as it is taken in oppoſition to publick oppreſſion. Which is of divers ſorts, and different degrees, in regard of our perſons, priviledges, and proprieties. When a people are neither oppreſſed by uſurpation, without colour of Law; nor by extortion, under pretext thereof. Which is an invaluable mercy to thoſe that injoy it: though rightly valued by few, except thoſe that want it. And hath been ſo highly praiſed by all ſorts of writers: hat it is better to be ſilent, then briefe in its commendations.
Now Secondly wherein this conſiſts, and how to meaſure the ſame, is harder to diſcover and determine; in regard we can meet with no guides, that have gone this way. For the Civil Law, which is copious concerning all other Dominions, is ſilent in this of Soveraignty; and being calculated for the Meridian of Monarchs, leaves them free to make their Subjects ſo, more or leſs at their pleaſure: Hiſtorians onelyonly relate what freedom ſuch and ſuch people had under ſuch and ſuch Rulers: and the Writers of Policy, and particular Republicks, compare the peoples liberty under the ſeveral forms of Government, and commend this or that State for the ſame. And theſe are all the helps we have: which are in the next degree to nothing We will therefore paſs them all by, and freely follow our own judgment; in ſhewing joyntly both the nature of liberty, and the meaſures thereof. But we muſt neceſſarily here premiſe.
1. That though all ought to pay the homage of ſubjection, to that lawful government under which they live; yet none ought ſo to be wedded to any forme, as to think the ſubjects of all others not free. Which Ariſtotle long ſince obſerved,Politic. l. 6. c. 2. V. Arniſoeus de rep. l. 2. c. 7. §. 2. n.75. to be the vulgar error in Democracy. For though it well becomes a vertuous Wife, to eſteem her own Husband, the beſt head ſhe can have; and accordingly to be guided by him: yet if ſhe will cenſure all other Wives, for meer ſlaves; all her neighbours round about her, will ring her a peale of indignation.
2. That the beſt way to judge of peoples liberty is by conſidering it in reference to Soveraignty. For all ſubjection and government being relatives; and Subject, liberty conſiſting, in ſuch a manner of ſubjection to the Supreme Powers, as is free and not ſlaviſh; the one is eaſily knowne by the other. So that if we duly conſider Supremacy, we may diſcerne, whether the Subjects be free or no by the manner, and the degrees of their freedom, by the meaſure of their ſubjection.
3. That we muſt diſtinguiſh between actual liberty. or freedom from oppreſſion; and legal liberty by conſtitution. For freedom may be conſidered either in regard of morall power, or government which is the exerciſe thereof; and that both ſeverally, and joyntly. For a people free by Law, may be oppreſſed by their Rulers; and a people not legally free, may be actually ſo by their Governors grace. So that actuall liberty alone, is onelyonly under abſolute Powers, legal under limited and mixed, and both under Governments which proceed regularly, in the Sphere of Power wherein they are placed, and are not planetary in their motions. Having premiſed theſe things; we ſhall now proceed to lay down certain rules, whereby every vulgar capacity may judge, of the nature of liberty and the degrees thereof, under any kind of Soveraignty whatſoever. Whether it reſide in a ſingle perſon, or in a plurality; either abſolute, or limited in regard of its meaſure; or for the manner ſimple or mixed; either of two or three eſtates, equally or unequally, and from whatever priority or predominant part denominated, Monarchy, Ariſtocracy, or Democracy, according to the conſtitution of every Nation.
And the general rule is this. The greater power in the Soveraignty, the leſſer liberty in the Subjects; and the leſs power in the Soveraignty, the more liberty in the Subjects. It is not my preſent work to determine, whether of theſe is better for the whole. The Polititians pens have ſufficiently ventilated that queſtion; uſually aſcribing more ſtrength and ſtability to the former, and more common proſperity to the latter; though often concluding, either through favour or fear and fl…ttery, that that Government under which they live, deſerves above all to weare the garland I ſhall therefore onelyonly ſay this, that ſeeing extreames are alwayes dangerous; a golden meane is that, which makes a golden age, both to Soveraigns and Subjects.
Now although I judge this rule alone, ſufficient for our preſent purpoſe; yet in regard ſome perhaps, may be pleaſed with ſo large a proſpect, as the liberty of all Nations in all ages of the world; we ſhall take a fuller view thereof; and the rather, becauſe it will be of uſe to us hereafter, not onelyonly in this but the following Sections. And for this end will begin at the bottom, that ſo aſcending by degrees, we may behold both it and them the better.
1. A people under abſolute power, are not truly and legally free, but onelyonly permiſſively and precariouſly. Becauſe their liberty is not from Law, but onelyonly founded in their Governors favor. So that they are liable to all oppreſſion, although they are ſometimes as actually free, and little oppreſſed, as thoſe that live under other Governments.
And this liberty, as to the certainty thereof, is more or les according to the degrees of abſolute power. Where the Rulers will, is the peoples Law; freedom is an Embryo, rather than formed: when they make Laws, whereby Subjects are at more certainty; it then becomes a foetus: and when they oblige themſelves, to rule by thoſe Laws; the child is borne, and may cry out of violence and oppreſſion. This liberty, how ſmall ſoever, and uncertaine of life, hath yet many witneſſes to avouch its name; which we find alſo regiſtred in Antiquity. So that whoſoever denies the ſame; muſt call all thoſe ſlaves, who lived under the Eaſtern and Roman Empires of old, and the Turks and Perſians at this day.
2. Under limited power, the people have a legall liberty, which is greater or les, according to the Laws, conſtitutions, or contracts, whereby the power is limited. Whether originally and antecedently; or by after condeſcent, betwixt thoſe in Supremacy and them in ſubjection; is not much materiall. This liberty being ſupported by Law, not voluntarily made by the Governors themſelves, and alterable at their pleaſure (as in abſolute power) but neceſſarily condeſcended to by them that will governe, makes the ſubjection of a people tolerable And if the Fathers in power pleaſe to foſter them, they want not for neceſſaries, though they abound not in ſuperfluities. But I confes, if this freedom meet with a churliſh ſtepfather, and hath neither guardian not friends to maintain its right; then its forced to keep private at home, and dare ſcarce appear in publike; which makes their preſent condition miſerable. For liberty once lamed by power, is not unlike to a labouring man, that hath his leg broken; who till it be ſound, Is thereby confined to his own cottage, or cralls but abroad to beg with his crutches.
3. Thoſe that live under a mixed power, have more or les liberty according to the temperament thereof.
If mixt of Monarchie and Acriſtocracy onelyonly, the common peoples liberty is according to their Laws. And is more ſecured by this compoſition, than in a ſimple governement, though limited; becauſe one is a check to the exorbitancy of the other. For though every mixt power be limited, yet every limited power is not mixt. In this Government, though the Nobility, ſhould as Cedars ſhelter the underſhrubs, from the ſtorms of the ſuperior order; yet both Hiſtorie and experience ſhews us, that often times (I ſay not allwayes) the Peeres care not to be their Princes Vaſſalls, that ſo the reſt of the people may be theirs.
If mixed ſo that the common people have a ſhare in the Supreme Power, they are abſolutely free; and their liberty is more or les, according as their ſhare is. Whether it be mixed of all the three kinds of Government, viz. Monarchie, Ariſtocracy, and Democracy; or onelyonly of the two latter; for I never read or heard of a State compounded of the two extreames.
Now the Supreme Power conſiſts eſpecially (I ſay not onelyonly)
1. In enacting, interpreting, and repealing of Laws.
2. In electing and appointing ſubordinate Magiſtrates and Miniſters of State for Government.
3. In judging and determining all crimes and controverſies amongſt their Subjects, ultimately without appeale.
4. In leavying of taxes to defray publick expences.
5. In the power of Armes for defence of the whole.
6. In making War and Peace with others. So then as a people partake in theſe, their freedom is accordingly to be accounted of. And here liberty is come to maturity; and if ſhe be modeſt, and keep within her bounds, and fall not into wanton licentiouſneſs; raviſhes the eyes of all ſpectators, filling their mouthes with her praiſes, and their mindes with admiration.
But it is high time that we haſten unto the third particular propoſed, which is the accommodation of theſe, to the ſubject matter we have in hand.
Firſt then, it is well known, that there is a very vaſt difference in the liberty of the Subjects of theſe two Crowns. The common people under the King of England have 1. A part in the legiſlative power, which is the chief authority in all Governements. For the Commons make a third State in all the three Kingdoms; and have their repreſentatives freely choſen by themſelves in all Parliaments; which are the true Conſervatories of publique liberty and particular propriety. Whereas the common people in France either never had this priviledge; or if they had, have long ſince loſt it That they had it formerly,Francogallioe. c. 10.11.15. Derepubl. l. 2. c. 6. §. 6. Hottoman endeavours to prove, which Arniſoeus denies, (and anſwers his reaſons,) nor that only, but all mixture in the French Monarchy either with Princes of the Blood, Peers, or any other State whatſoever. But whatever was the Governement, under the two firſt lines of the Kings of France; it is generally agreed, that in the beginning of the third under Hugh Capet, (who cantond out France about the yeare 990) the peoples liberty was devoured by the Dukes and Earles of the Provinces, and the Monarchie allmoſt turned into a Toparchie, by reaſon of their hereditary right. Which the after Kings ſoone perceiving, to be too great a ballance to the Crowne, broke down by degrees; and ſo became the only Atlas's that have ever ſince ſuſtan'd that Government. For the Aſſembly of the three Eſtates, which were the only bulwark of the publick liberty, that was left undemoliſhed by deſpotical powers; if they ever had any ſhare in the legiſlative, loſt it long before Capets time, (for from Charles the great the Kings Edicts have paſt for Laws.) and being diſcontinued in their Wars with England, and their remaining power (whatever it was) broke down by the policy of Lewis the eleventh; they were finally laid aſide by Lewis the laſt. And although Philip the fourth fixed that Court of Judicature at Paris, that was formerly ambulatory and uſually accompanied the Kings Court, which became a pattern to the reſt of their Provincial Parliaments; yet both that and theſe have only the name and ſhadow; not the nature and power of the Parliaments under the Crown of England. The Members being neither choſen by the people, nor repreſenting them; but Lawjers, that uſually either purchaſe theſe places of the Crown, or pay an annual penſion for the ſame; having no legiſlative power, nor indeed any other but derivative from the King, and alterable at his pleaſure. They tell the Academy of Paris; Guagnin. in Ludovic. 12.ſe à Rege juſſos promulgare leges, quas ipſi viſum fuerit ferre. Apud illum authoritatem eſſe, &c. But theſe things are ſo well known, that I will not ſtand to alledge Authorities to prove them; although, if it were neceſſary, I could bring as many as would fill the page even to oſtentation. But let us brieſly run over the reſt. Thoſe 2. under the Crown of England have the election of Magiſtrates generally in Corporations, and ſome under Officers in the Country, which cannot be removed without due proceſs of Law. 3. Have a ſhare in the Judicature, by the Juries (in England) for matter of fact, together with the Kings Judges for matter of Law, and their laſt appeal to Parliaments. 4. The original power of raiſing Taxes. For the propoſal and grant muſt come from the Commons, and the other two States only conſent. 5. The liberty of bearing Arms. Whereas in France, all Promotions, Governments, Judicatures and Taxes, are in the Kings power; who permits not the vulgar uſe of Arms, or a ſtanding Militia in his Kingdom; but only ſuch as are in his pay, and thereby entirely at his devotion. So that there is no Communalty that lives more happily than that of England, nor none more miſerably than the poor paiſantry of France.
2. Hence we may infer a fair probability, of enjoying more liberty under the Crown of England than France. I know our freedom will not neceſſarily follow from the premiſes; for that which is legal, will depend upon ſuch conditions, as ſhall be either previouſly agreed upon, or after conſented unto: yet I leave every one to judge, which is likelieſt to grant us the beſt; not only for our Religion, but liberty in our Perſons, Priviledges and Eſtates; as alſo whoſe Government is moſt likely to defend the ſame, and make us thereby alſo actually free.
If it be argued, that the French King may give us more liberty than his other Subjects; and the King of England leſs. The reply is eaſie; that we reaſon not from the power of either, or what they can and may do; but what in all appearance they will do. Although thoſe that hold it for a fundamental in the French Government, that whatever is conquered by them or acquired, muſt be incorporated with the Kingdom of France; and that this is as indiſpenſable for the body politick, as the Salick Law is for the head; ſcruple much, whether the King de jure, can make us freer than the reſt of his Subjects. But we neither deſire to diſpute the Prerogative of Princes, much leſs of ſuch a mighty Monarch; nor indeed are we of their opinion herein, and therefore take it for granted, that he as well as the King of England, may grant us as full and ample liberty, as He ſhall think fit in His Royal pleaſure. We only profeſs our fears what he will do, and ſuch as are rational and becoming men; not groundleſs fancies, or frivolous reports, which are the uſual Bugbears, that affright only fearful women and children.
1. We cannot flatter our ſelves into hopes, that our condition ſhould be better than either of thoſe two Kings (which ſoever we ſubmit unto) natural Sujects. If it be equal, it is well; and all that we can rationally expect. And therefore we judge, that England will eaſier be induced to this, which is ordinary unto that Government; than France, to indulge us of extraordinary favour, unleſs we had merited ſuch a priviledge, as to be made an exception from the general rule. And that Governors under them will willingly and readily maintain, that which they are accuſtomed unto; but very hardly ſuch immunities, as tranſcend the bounds which are ſet to others.
2. The many examples we have before us, of ſuch Countries as France hath gained, keeps our fears continually waking. For by whatever Title they have been acquired, we find them all generally in the ſame condition. Whether by right of donation, as Daulphiny and Provence, or purchaſe as Berry Montpelier &c. or marriage, as Bourbon, Champagne, Languedock, Bretaigny, &c. or by conqueſt and powerful ſeizure, as Normandy, Aquitane, Poictou, Anjou, and whatſoever held on England by Charles the ſeventh, and Burgundy with thoſe that depended thereon, by his ſon Lewis the eleventh; all theſe being incorporated with France, (what ever their former immunities were, and whatever leſſer they ſtill injoy) are all equally ſubject to all Laws, Governments, and Impoſitions from the Crown, without diſpute and contradiction. And can we then be ſuch fools, as to think, that though we come under France, yet we ſhall be free? But now on the contrary we know, that whatſoever acceſſion hath been made to the Crown of England, either by mariiage as Scotland, or conqueſt as Ireland, that they have all their Laws, Priviledges, Governments, and Immunities remaining entirely, as inviolable from the Crown, and unalterable without their own conſent. Nor do they only injoy theſe, but make Laws for ſupporting them, according to their particular intereſts; yea croſs and oppoſite to the other, which yet are ratified by his Majeſty, or at leaſt by his Royal authority and pleaſure.
3. If any have neither liſt nor leiſure, to look into the Hiſtories of former times; the preſent age will furniſh them ſufficiently, with examples both foreign and domeſtick. Let them enquire of Lorraign and Flanders, how they fare with their new Maſters. Or let them but paſs into the adjacent Provinces, and inform themſelves of the French Government; and then they may ſee as in a Glaſs, the face of their own future condition, And if any be reſolvedly blind, that they will not ſee, except they be deaf alſo, or ſtop their ears; they may hear enough, (if the tenth part of reports be but true) to warn them ſufficiently to look to themſelves. But if they remain ſo incredulous, that all the Beacons that are fired about them, makes them not fear; and that they will believe nothing, which they themſelves do not feel: I wiſh that experience (which wiſe men call the Miſtreſs of Fools) convince them not of their folly, when it is too late; and their condition become ſo miſerable, that its fitter to be drawn covered with a ſorrowful veil, by ſome Timanthes's Pencil, than to be lively ſet forth in its ſad colours, or deſcribed by the Pen of an impartial Hiſtorian. For my part I profeſs that none honours the worth and gallantry of the French Nation more than my ſelf, yet I would loth come under its power: for the reaſon which the Fox gives the Lion in the Fable,
—quia me veſtigia terrent, Omnia te adverſum ſpectantia, nulla retrorſum.
Horat. Epiſt. l. 1. Ep. 1.4. We think we have reaſon to be afraid not only for our perſons, and purſes; but even for our lives, and all thoſe things which may make us miſerable; not only in regard of the French, but our ſelves. For we know that a people accuſtomed to liberty, who have had enough given them and taken much more, when once they come to be reſtrained, and ſtrictly held in by the rains of Government; are very apt to break out into mutinies and miſchiefs; and like wild Colts in their firſt managing, ruſh deſperately into ruin, that they may throw their Riders. Yea when Conquerors think they have ſo harnaſſed the multitude, that they dare not but draw their triumphant Chariots; and doubt not but they themſelves ſit ſo faſt, that they may drive them out of breath, and ſo tame them at their pleaſure: they uſually Phaëton like, ſet all on fire; and if they eſcape the popular fury by running away in the ſmoak, meet with his fate, to be ſtruck wit the Thunderbolt of their Soveraigns juſtice. Innumerable are the examples for the confirmation of this; but we will confine our ſelves to our own Country; and content ourſelves with two only. When Philip the fourth had beat the Flemmings, united Flanders to France, and ſet Governours over them; who erected Citadels in their ſeveral Towns, Garriſoned their Citics to keep them in aw,Serres in Phil. 4. and arbitrarily charged them with great contributions; the people that were uſed to Freedom, would not be brought into this yoke of bondage; but deſperately revolt, maſſacre the French, and involve all in confuſion and miſery. Nor is this all; for, (though the baſer ſort begin, yet great men uſually end ſuch quarrels) a War followed, which coſt both France and Flanders dear, in the vaſt expence both of blood and treaſure. And when Duke d' Alva attempted the like upon our Anceſtors in theſe Provinces, who were a free people and not uſed to ſuch ſeverity; how did the ſparks of mutiny in the beginning break out into great flames at laſt, which ſet the whole Country on fire? No pen is able to expreſs the miſeries of thoſe Times; nor Tragedy repreſent the things that were perpetrated. How were moſt mens hearts filled with fear, many with horror, and ſome with deſpair; to ſee their Country become an Aceldama; and ſo many thouſands forced through a Red Sea of blood, to find their paſſage to the Land of Canaan! I conclude therefore, that if they who enjoyed leſs liberty than we, could ſo little endure Servitude; we ſhall be much leſs able to endure it, who have enjoyed far more freedom then they. So that we may eaſily foreſee, without any Prophetick Spirit, what a flood of calamities is likely to break in upon us; when ever any ſhall break down the banks of our liberty.