The Interest of These United Provinces, Section 7

The Interest of These United Provinces · Section 7

Sect. 7. The fourth Argument from Trade. This (viz. Merchandiſe and Navigation) our chief ſecular intereſt: and friendſhip with England to ſecure the ſame. England and we Corrivals herein, the probability of getting more, as alſo enjoying the ſame with greater Peace under France, with other Arguments: largely debated, and the contrary evinced under England.

WE are now come to the Acropolis of the cauſe; Trade being the great Tower of ſtrength, to which the Adverſaries of our opinion, having deſerted the former out-works, uſually ſly unto our refuge. We ſhall therefore perſue them; but orderly, firſt making our approaches by degrees; and them raiſing ſuch batteries, and planting ſuch reaſons, as are forcible, either to beat this down, or at leaſt make ſuch breaches therein, as ſhall render it untenable for their defence; and ſo compel the moſt pertinacious of our enemies, either to ſubmit, or to fall before us.

But before we begin this work, we muſt acquaint you, that when we mention Trade, we mean not every particular kind of negotiation, wherein the ſeveral ſorts of Artificers and Shop-keepers are imployed; to ſpeak of which would be both an endleſs, an a bootleſs work. Herein perhaps ſome might fare better with the French, the Mercers and Tailers eſpecially; for the à la mode Monſieurs when they have money, affect to change their faſhion as often as the Moon doth her face; and to wear as many ribbands on their breeches, as ordinary Pedlers bear on their backs; as if all the fortunes of France hung at their ends, and all their own happineſs followed their heels. And happily Butchers and Cooks would fare better with the Engliſh, for a piece of good Beef or a Shoulder of Mutton. And we might inſtance in many others with merriment; but we have no mind to be pleaſant upon ſo ſerious a Subject. In ſhort therefore, we mean Maritime Trade (as our Adverſaries do) this being the great Diana of the Netherlands, which brings them in their Silver Shrines.

1. Then we ſhall lay down this as a fundamental and undoubted Maxim, (which all I think will take for granted) that trade by Sea is the great ſecular intereſt of theſe Provinces, the Maritime eſpecially, by which they moſt flouriſh, and without which they cannot ſubſiſt. Let Amſterdam and the other Cities be as rich, or richer then they are imagined; yet will they in a few years, if their Trade be obſtructed, become as poor as their Neighbours at Gant, or Antwerp. For who will build at ſuch exceſſive charges (where the foundation ſometimes is half to the ſuperſtructure) or pay ſuch rents for their habitation, and live in ſuch expenſive places, if there be not freedom of Trade? But thoſe that can, will remove; ſome hither and ſome thither, as their intereſt and affection ſhall incline them;Eſſay (or Sermo fidelis) 19. rather then ſpend their Capitalls here. If ever Merchants were, or are in any place of the world, the vena porta (as Bacon ſtiles them) of any publick body, it is certainly the Belgick. If they fraight not their Ships, whereby the Marriners may be imployed; if they furniſh not the Tradeſmen ſhops, whereby they may follow their Vocations; if they lade not the poor mens backs, whereby their Families may fill their bellies; finally, if they diſtribute not their Merchandiſe through the various Seas and Rivers of the Ʋniverſe: we may linger a while, but it is as impoſſible we ſhould live long, as for a body deprived of food, whoſe parts languiſh for want of nouriſhment, which ſhould be brought them in the veins, by the bloods regular circulation.

2. Merchandiſe being our chief concernment, it will neceſſarily follow that that Nation that can moſt obſtruct the ſame, can do us moſt injury. Now that England can do this more than France, or any other whatſoever, I think none will deny; if any do, there is enough ſaid hereafter, that will make it ſufficiently apparent.

3. Of all our neighbouring Nations, England being moſt potent by Sea, and France by Land, it will clearly follow, that a Peace with theſe two above all others, is our great concernment, With the former for getting, and with the latter for keeping and enjoying our Eſtates. But if we cannot have this from them both, which of them is to be preferred comes next in conſideration.

4. This Common-wealth conſiſting of Maritime and Inland Provinces, the former being by far the moſt conſiderable, the friendſhip of England is more to be valued than that of France. And this the wiſeſt men that this Republick ever had, formerly never doubted. of Prince William the Firſt founder of this Common-wealth, laid down theſe three principal maximes of State, which were approved by all, as ſound and rational beyond contradiction.

1. To do juſtice to Strangers. For great Nations may be upheld by Power, but ſmall Territories muſt be maintained by Juſtice.

2. To hold a fair correſpondence with France. For Spain being then the grand Monarchy of Europe, and our dreadful enemy; the aſſiſtance of France was greatly neceſſary for our ſupportation.

3. To preſerve an inviolable Peace with England, In regard that this is abſolutely requiſite for our freedom of Commerceby Sea; and the Engliſh were our friends in affection as well as Intereſt, whereas the French only upon the latter account. For the greateſt obſtacle that ſtood in the way of France's greatneſs, was the Spaniſh power in theſe Netherlands; which being once broke down, they well knew they could dilate their Empire at their pleaſure, as we ſee it now to our ſorrow. It is true of later times, the Loveſteiners to free themſelves, from the Headſhip of the Orange family; which ſought (as they imagined) either an abſoluteneſs, or at leaſt to infringe the liberty of the Common-wealth, have been rather inclined to France and England: but they were not ſo blinded with paſſion, but that having a Peace with Spain, and being ſenſible of France's prevalency, and raiſing their Fortunes upon the Spaniſh ruines, it was their Intereſt to comply with England rather than France. Which plainly appears, in that no ſooner was thoſe unhappy differences between us and England compoſed at Breda, but immediately the Tripple Alliance was deſigned and concluded upon by that great States-man de Witt the Head of their party, and Sr. William Temple, on purpoſe to put boundaries to the boundleſs ambition of the French Nation.

5. To the reaſon of State already mentioned, together with the judgment of our greateſt Politicians both in former and later times, let me add; that Terreſtrial war hath always been accounted more eligible than a Naval; yea by ſome our abſolute intereſt, as the Duke of Rhoan obſerves. In ſo much that Zeeland never to this day conſented unto,l' Intreſt des Prine. & Eſt. diſcour. 6. but abſolutely proteſted againſt, theſe Provinces making Peace with Spain. And here it is obſervable, how our Adverſaries prevaricate; in granting this Aſſertion, and yet preferring France. I foreſee their evaſion, of conceding a Land-war with a leſſer Potentate, & denying it with France. But this is both eaſily obviated and outed; for as I am well aſſured, that if England had not aſſaulted us by Sea, France had never done it by Land; ſo I have reaſon to believe, that if he had, we ſhould have found him ſufficient work. If we had the Sea free for our inferior Provinces, the charges of a Land-war for the ſuperior were eaſily borne. And we ſhould not want men enow for our money, to fight for them with France, or any other whatſoever, ſo long as we ſhould think them worth the fighting for. Nor let any wonder that I inſert ſuch a conditional; for I ſhall afterwards make it appear, how the Common-wealth may be well ſecured, though theſe Provinces ſhould be let go or loſt. And as for the inferior, they are ſo ſituated in the water, and thereby ſo inacceſſible; that we need not fear, what all the force of France can do, if we be reſolved to defend them. It being therefore apparent that Traffick is our principal concernment, and England of all others moſt able to obſtruct it; we may conclude in point of intereſt, as Prince Maurice (I have heard) uſed to ſay, that were the Engliſh Devils, we muſt have peace with them.

Theſe being the Approaches, (which I think) no ſallies of our Adverſaries can prevent; we ſhall now, being got nearer them, take a better view of their ſtrength. Were we free and had our choice, whether we ſhould war with France or England, you ſee our intereſt ſhould carry us againſt France. But the caſe (alas!) is far otherwiſe with us, for they both make war upon us: by what error of policy one of them, which could beſt, was not taken off and diverted, if it had been poſſible, or whether it was impoſſible, and ſo no error or omiſſion in us, is not now our enquiry. But ſeeing they both threaten us with deſtruction, upon ſuppoſition that we are unable any longer to reſiſt them both, whether of them we ſhould chooſe to be under in regard of our Trade.

This then being the Queſtion; our Adverſaries give their ſuffrage for France; and think themſelves impregnable in this point of intereſt. Let us therefore impartially repreſent the ſtrength of their reaſons, and weigh them duly in the true ballance of intereſt, and then we ſhall find them you ſhall ſee, not only many grains but ounces too light.

1. It is better for us, ſay they, to be under France, becauſe England and and we are Competitors for Trade.

It is very true, England and theſe Countries by their ſituation, genious, and intereſt are ſet for Trade: and this naturally begets an enmity between us, and a vying with one another for the ſame. But this was always, and will be ſo whilſt men are men: and what will follow hence? Surely one of theſe things, either that we muſt willingly yield to them, or they to us, which is madneſs to imagine; or that we muſt fight with them for the whole, which if they mean of our ſelves, is the next degree to dotage, ſeeing we are about matches, and Peace in their trade is always the intereſt of a trading people; if they mean jointly with France, we ſhall ſpeak to that in the following Argument, and ſhew what a hazard even that will be, and much more ſingly: or that we muſt compound with them for our ſhare, that ſo each Nation may have, what Gods bleſſing may give, and their own induſtry may procure them. And this in my opinion will have the vote, not only of all the Cowards, but all the wiſe men of both Nations. But becauſe this Argument is much inſiſted on, both in former times and this juncture of affairs; we will more particularly conſider the ſame, in reference to this Common-wealth as to England abſolutely without reſpect to France. And thereby we ſhall ſee what corrivals in Trade implies in point of Intereſt, whether the power be about equal, (as we ſhall here ſuppoſe England and this Common-wealths) or unequal, and in point of inference. Now in regard of Intereſt, we ſhall find in my judgment, that 'tis clearly this for us as equal in power.

1. That we muſt vigorouſly defend our Trade, as that on which our temporal welfare depends.

2. That we muſt for this purpoſe, maintain a naval power, equal at leaſt to theirs. That ſo we may hold them up, to the juſt and due terms, and bounds, of Commerce and Navigation.

3. That for this end the league of the Maritime Provinces be kept inviolable. If the band of the bunch of arrows be either cut or broken, ſo that they fall out of the Lions paw; he will ſoon have his skin pull'd over his ears. So that to make ſeveral Common-wealths of them, is but to make them ſo many morſels to be the eaſilier devoured by their enemies. And therefore I wonder at the Author of the Intereſt of Holland herein, who, c. 41.42. &c. aſſerts the power of that Province ſufficient by Sea, and jointly with Ʋtrecht by Land, to wage War with all other Potentates. Seeing theſe Maritime Provinces entirely conſidered, are but the match at Sea for England. And the reaſons that he gives, c. 37. are now refuted by experience. I acknowledge it alſo an error in policy, for Zeeland to break this bond of Amity, if poſſibly they can help it. But if their Enemies ſword cuts this aſunder, what ſhall they do? And this is the caſe only that I defend.

4. That we ſhould rather yield to them in Punctillioes of honour; that being a Crown, this only a Common-wealth. Such I mean as the Flag; although I reckon not that any diſhonour to us, ſeeing they have not only always challenged it, but our Anceſtors alſo given it: and other Nations as well as we, pay the ſame acknowledgment to that Crown. The firſt time that we have ever refuſed it, was in the time of King James; the circumſtances whereof Sr. Anthony Welden in his Court relates, and the effects both their and our Hiſtorians. It is not my deſign to ſpeak of this particular, which would ſwell to a diſcourſe larger then this whole Treatiſe; but only inſtance therein, as a known example; concluding that if they will War for it, it is our wiſdom to yield it, and except we were far ſtronger than they, folly to fight for it.

5. Rather to diſſemble leſſer injuries than ſeek to revenge them. Which holds in all equalities of power whatſoever.

6. But if they will unjuſtly incroach upon us to ruine our Commerce, then to War with them. For

1. Our traffick being our ſubſiſtence, who ever would ſpoil us thereof, neceſſitates us to defend it, and gives us a juſt cauſe of conteſt,

2. We being a match for them in power, may in point of wiſdom as well as juſtice, try it out with them, and leave the iſſue to Gods Providence; Wars being the laſt appeal to Heaven, when juſtice cannot be had on earth.

3. If ſucceſs attends our Armies, we ſecure our ſelves at leaſt, if we better not our condition; and if the contrary, we do but drown and die a little the ſooner. A deſtructive peace and unſucceſsful War are both fatal in the iſſue; the former being a Chronical, the later an acute diſeaſe of State. It is not ſo material, whether by a lingring Conſumption of Peace, or by the Hectick Fevor of War, the gray hairs of Government, be brought with ſorrow to the grave.

7. Yet if we can enjoy the freedom of Commerce, and fruit of our labours, upon reaſonable terms; it is better to ſit down contented with our ſhare, then to War for the whole. For

1. What wiſe man ever doubted, but that Peace is the intereſt of a rich and trading People; if it can be had upon tollerable conditions.

2. Is not a competent certainty preferable to a greater good that is wholly hazardous and uncertain? for how often doth that happen to men, which did to the greedy and covetous dog in the Fable; who let go that he had, to catch at the ſhadow thereof in the water, and ſo loſt all!

I know ſome that have more of Mars than Mercurie's temper, are all for fighting, and therefore I ſhall deſire them calmly to conſider, theſe few particulars following.

1. What either we or England have gotten by our former Wars, when matcht in power. I partly know what it hath coſt us both, in treaſure and blood: and can demonſtrate that if either hath gotten, 'tis England, though not to countervail the coſt. Let's but reckon (as we muſt if we go rightly to work) the lucrum ceſſens, and damnum emergens, or the profit that ceaſes, and loſs that accrues, and vvhat vve have got, vve may put in our eye, and not ſee much the vvorſe, But if any one ſay who can reckon that, or how? I ſhall freely acknowledge that to pounds and perſons we cannot, nor no man alive; yet in the general we may, ſo far as to make a judgment. I have done it for my own ſatisfaction, and ſhall tell you how; that ſo thoſe that are curious may ſatisfy themſelves therein, and not take it upon my credit. By the publick Cuſtoms; the Number of ſhips, the Capital wherewith Trade is driven; and by the riches of the Merchants. Of theſe, the two former are more eaſie and certain, wherein England hath increaſed: the two latter more conjectural, wherein this Republick hath the ſuperiority. But hath not gotten it by the wars, but ariſes from ſeveral other cauſes, (which I could mention) and eſpecially from theſe two following, which I think will ſatisfy any intelligent man. As to the Capital, ours comes to be greater, in regard that as the Merchants grow rich in England, they buy land, and breed up their ſons to be Country gentlemen; whereas we, eſpecially in Holland, continue the ſtock and our children in the Trade. Land being here at 35 and 40 years purchaſe, and in England at 15 or 20 ordinarily. And that the Merchants here ſhould be richer than there, is no wonder to me; who know ſo well the frugality of the one, and the prodigality of the other.

2. Let it be conſidered how difficult and hazardous it is for equal powers, to deſtroy one another; and therefore how litle likelihood there is, of any thing to be gotten by conteſting. Nay there are ſeveral circumſtances in our ſituations, imployments, and people, that render abſolute conqueſt almoſt impoſſible. We may like Cooks fight, and breath, and fight again, and crow over one another for ſome victories, but far from a conqueſt. And this we might both have ſeen long ſince in the glas of policy: which clearly ſhows, that ſuch equal powers fighting for profit, is but like Nero's fiſhing with a golden hook, wherein more is adventured, than ever is likely to be gotten. We have had a Comick-tragedy, and a tragick comedy of two wars, and England the contrary; wherein our enemies indeed have been pleaſant ſpectators, and ſatisfied their envious eyes, but what have either of us got, but blowes? Paſſion and prejudice are ſo prevalent in the World, and ſo blind the eyes of men, that often they will not ſee the truth, till dear-bought experience makes them even to feel it. And this we now both ſee, and therefore England takes this opportunity of breaking down the equality of power, and bringing us lower, that ſo we may truckle under them, and they be at reſt in the bed of ſecurity.

3. Thoſe that are ſo much for Mars, might do well to conſider, the advantages and diſadvantages of both Nations, for carrying on, and ſubſiſting under long wars. In ſome things we may happily have the advantage, as in bearing the charges, number of ſhipping, Caping by Letters of Marque &c. And in others England, for they have a great and rich Inland Country,l'Intreſtdes Princes. Diſcours 7. an Hand that cannot be eaſily diverted by a Land-war, ſo that as the Duke of Rhoan ſaith right, l' Angleterre eſt un grand animal, qui ne peut jamais mourir, ſ'il ne ſe tuë luimeſme. We ſubſiſt wholly on Trade, and fetch all things from abroad, they have ſufficiency of neceſſaries from their own growth at home. When Trade ſtands ſtill, they have cloths for the back, and meat for the belly, better cheap for the poorer people: here not only ſuch accommodations are far dearer than there, which can well be born when Trade flouriſheth; but when that is ſtopt, and it can worſt be endured, then are they deareſt of all. Our Seamen which come moſt from the Northern quarters about the Baltick Sea, to ſerve us in Navigation; when they ſee no hopes of gain, but only venturing their lives for the pay of the Wars, will remove and ſerve other Nations: whereas the King of England hath three Kingdoms to preſs out for his aſſiſtance, according to the cuſtom of the Crown there, which is not practiſed nor indeed practicable in this Free State. And although at the firſt ſuch as are preſt be averſe to the Wars; yet we find and feel by experience, that what through the Officers and Gentlemens careſſing and encouraging them, what through company and converſing with others before-hand, this reſtineſs is worn off by degrees; and through the principles of ſelf defence, and ſome ſparks of the honour of their Country, they fight well enough, whatever the cauſe or the quarrel be.

4. I wiſh both Nations would well conſider, whether whilſt we two are ſo eagerly conteſting for Trade, others may not carry it away. I have reaſonably conſidered what Nation can bid the fareſt for this, in regard of their Situation, Havens, Genious, &c. the ad vantages of the Mediterranean and Baltick Seas, and let my thoughts ſtretch themſelves as far as both the Indies: have obſerved the French Fleet, the darling of the King and Kingdom, their hopes with the grounds of them, and the probable ſucceſs thereof, as alſo the communication of Spain with America; and find no one Nation alone capacitated to carry away our Commerce; but ſeveral to have greater ſhares than they have at preſent. Yea, to ſpeak my mind freely, I have had far further contemplations, and of a far different kind from theſe upon this Subject, in reſpect to future times. And indeed ſuch as have often made me both very ſorrowful to ſee the Chriſtian world ſo mad and quarelſom about their Commerce, and very fearful that God would either blaſt it to us, by taking it away and giving it to Turks and Heathens; or not bleſs us with it, giving us herein our hearts deſire in his wrath, and them the Goſpel in exchange thereof. As I clearly ſee he hath done to the Jews, the generalleſt and greateſt Merchants of the World: and as I think he threatens us Chriſtians in ſeveral places of holy Scripture, if they be duly conſidered. But becauſe I love not dogmatizing, or to be poſitive in things I am not ſo fully ſatisfied in; I ſhall at preſent ſay no more of this, but leave it to every good Chriſtians conſideration.

Having thus declared what corivalſhip implies as to equal powers, we ſhall now ſee it in unequal. And here Intereſt ſhews us,

That if we decline and become inferior in ſtrength, if they were ſo injurious to us, that we had a juſt cauſe of War, yet muſt we not adventure it at fighting, but uſe policy to procure a Peace. And in my opinion this Piety and Wiſdom is taught us by our Saviour Chriſt in the Goſpel; for where Soldiers are alike, and no advantage of ground, &c. what is it but tempting of God & mere folly,Luc. 14.31.Luke 14:31 for ten thouſand to encounter twenty thouſand? Yea though the diſparity was not ſo great; Wars being always hazardous to the weaker ſide, though they often be victorious: it being frequently ſound (as Pyrrhus ſaid of his warring with the Romans) that their very Victories do undo them. In ſuch caſes, old mens heads are better helps than young mens hands. To ſhew the refuges of weaker powers when threatned with Wars, would be a large diſcourſe. I ſhall therefore only hint ſome few generals, of many which I have obſerved.

1. To gain all time poſſible.

2. Therein to break down the ſtrongers deſigns, and weaken them at home as much as may be.

3. To raiſe them up enemies abroad by making them jealous of their power.

4. By alliance with others to ballance their might.

5. To prepare for a divertive rather than a direct War.

6. By propoſal of Marriages, &c. to make up the breach.

7. By procuring foreign Potentates mediation, and appealing to their Arbitration.

8. To make the beſt Peace they can, when beſt provided with power for War. For otherwiſe nothing is to be expected, but either an unſafe or a ſhort Peace, little better than a Truce or Holy-day of War.

Beſt is that Peace, whoſe Articles are made

Ʋnder a Shield, and written with a blade.

Allen.Now all theſe have many particulars conteined in them. For example in the firſt to gain time, by ſending Embaſſadors, and ſo ſtill that as one is returning another may be ſent: whereby a fair pretence of ignorance of tranſactions may be pleaded, and time ſpun out in further debates. By conceding one thing after another by degrees, ſtill reſerving the principal point of Intereſt entire, &c. And ſo of the reſt within the bounds of honeſt Policy. The reaſon of the caſe is ſo clear, that were it not for mens paſſions, inferiors in power would not be ſo ready to fight. For let them either be beaten or beat, it will redound at laſt to their own deſtruction. If the former, why ſhould they ſpend their blood and treaſure to make themſelves more miſerable? and if the latter, they do but enrage their enemies the more, who being more powerful will not for two or three Battells end the War, and come to a Peace to their great diſhonour. So that we may lay down this as a general rule for the weaker ſide, That ſelf defence muſt be firſt for preparation, but laſt for execution. Of all the Princes of Europe in our age, the Duke of Lorraign hath been the cunningeſt gameſter, but the fouleſt player with ſtronger powers. But oh, how is he catched in his own craftineſs! Although I confeſs I could not ſee him and his Court (as I have done ſince his diſaſter) without great commiſeration; to think that one of the ancienteſt Families and greatlieſt allyed of all Europe, ſhould fall into that condition. Of the former age the Verinians, who being oppreſt by their Neighbours the Venetians, that were more powerfull, would notwithſtanding needs War with them; wherein though they were often victorious, yet it proved their ruine at laſt, for which they are ſtigmatized for Fools to all ſucceeding Generations. And many other examples might be produced, but I think them needleſs in ſo plain a caſe.

And thus you ſee what our being competitors for Trade implies as to Intereſt in regard of War and Peace. Which I have been the larger upon, becauſe I know what work fools make wiſe men in both Nations. I have many times been put to it for patience, and ſometimes into a Paroxiſm of paſſion, to hear the ſenſleſs clamors of men. We are Competitors for Trade! It is our Intereſt! Our Intereſt! Down with the Dutch! Down with the Engliſh! Let us but conſider who theſe are, and we ſhall find them. Men that have a pound of paſſion, for one ounce of reaſon. Men that never ſaw, or at leſt not well obſerved both Nations. Men that never beſtowed one calm hour to ballance their powers. For wiſe men that knew both well, was but grieved to hear, or pleaſantly merry with ſuch madneſs. I publickly decryed ſuch folly in the firſt Wars, and had ſeverely chaſtiſed ſuch fools in the ſecond, if I had not been ſeveral ways hindred. Let me ſay it freely (I think I have ſome reaſon, for I believe there are few men that have better viewed both Nations with their eye, to that end which I have had, nor ballanced their power with greater accuracy) that if either the King of Great Britain, or the States, or both require it: I am ready to demonſtrate, that for theſe 20 or 30 years laſt paſt, there was nothing of advantage rationally to be expected on either ſide, that can countervail a War: nor as both might manage their power, likely to be, ſo long as both continued in that condition, for in powers about equal, all the difference is in the management thereof. And becauſe I ſee what work is made in the world, if I live to ſee the ballance come ſo even again, (though I think I never ſhall) I do here engage, for the publick peace of Proteſtants, and good of both Nations, to ſatisfie all rational men herein, I hope even to curioſity. And ſhall, if God ſpares me life and health, defend the ſame, againſt all the State-tinkers of both Nations; although I well know, they have great ſtore of ſmall Tools, with which they make a ratling in their Budgets.

Let us now proceed to ſuch inferences as our Adverſaries make from this competition in Trade.

Some argue thus, the Engliſh minding Trade more than the French, they may come and live among us and carry away our Commerce.

In my apprehenſion, there's more fear of their Souldiers coming hither than their Merchants. But ſuppoſe more Merchants did come, would that be any worſe for us? I have heard ſeveral of the greateſt Merchan…s of both Nations ſay, the more in a place and better, though I confeſs it is not ſo for Shopkeepers. But for this they may reſt ſecure, thoſe that knovv the cheapneſs of living in England, in compariſon of theſe Countries, will abundantly ſatisfie them that fear this. Yea I ſhall ſhew hereafter that the Engliſh would have more reaſon to fear, that we ſhould come thither, and deprive them of their Trades. Yet to ſay the truth, I ſee not that either need fear, were we under the Engliſh, that either Nation ſhould ſuffer hereby; ſeeing all have had freedom that will to remove formerly, and that hath made ſo ſmall an alteration as to the ballance of Trade, that it is inconſiderable. For if I make my calculation right, there is not much difference, of the Engliſh here, and the Dutch in England.

Others argue we are Corrivals for Trade, that is the Miſtreſs we both Court, and therefore one muſt marry it.

But this is but a toyiſh Sophiſm, when men will compare Commerce to a Miſtreſs, that one only can marry. For

1. The world is wide enough, and the Sea large enough for both Nations to exerciſe their skill and induſtry.

2. If we think to betroth all Trade, and ingroſs it to our ſelves alone; other Nations will come in and forbid the banes, as well as England, as I ſhall ſhew hereafter.

3. If we two could ſo happily agree, and ſo ſettle Commerce as it might perhaps be ſetled; we might bid fair for carrying it, or at leaſt for retaining it betwixt us And ſo far as my ſhort ſight can reach, this ſeems to me the mark aimed at on both ſides, by thoſe who have the direction of affairs, which I do not deſpair to ſee effected.

Seeing then we are in as much danger, that I ſay not more, to loſe that part of Trade we have, as to gain more by our conteſting; I hope all rational men will grant it our Intereſt, that England and we ſo compound for it, that each of us may have what Gods bleſſing, and juſtice, and equity gives to eithers induſtry. And this I am ſure was the wiſdom of former times. I have ſhown it already in part on our ſide, and could much more largely both for us and the Engliſh. In Queen Elizabeths time we were not grown up to our preſent greatneſs. In King James's time, who all the world knows was no Martial man, but in his temper as well as motto truly pacifick, the Cautionary Towns that England poſſeſt in theſe Countries, were A. 1616. ranſomed, and we grew up to that greatneſs of being an equal match for them in power at Sea. And this the Engliſh account the great error of Political Intereſt; although they muſt needs acknowledge it but fair and honeſt dealing. King Charles the Firſt, that Prince of bleſſed and immortal memory, ſeeing how he grew up, not only kept a fair correſpondency with us, but having experience how croſs Parliaments were to the Court, ſo that no^o War could be carried on, did by a fair correſpondence keep friendſhip with us; and not only ſo, but married his eldeſt Daughter to the Prince of Orange for this reaſon of State amongſt others. For being jealous of this Common-wealth's favouring that party in his Kingdoms, which was then called by the Court Puritans, and ſeeing the growing greatneſs of this State by Sea, did for theſe two reaſons of State, engage the Prince and this Common-wealth by that Marriage. And this was alſo the reaſon of State in Oliver's time when Peace was made, that we muſt accord for our mutal Trade. How it hath been ſince we all know, and therefore I need not mention it. And this is the firſt weapon our enimies uſe, which you ſee if we meaſure rightly, is too ſhort to touch, much leſs mortally to wound, the truth of that cauſe that we maintain.

Yet we muſt do our Adverſaries right: the wiſer ſort of them upon the ſuppoſal of equal powers, (as we have formerly been, and which is that I have hitherto ſpoke of) are for peace, and judge it the Intereſt of both Nations; but they think our coming under France will render England ſo unequal and inferior a match for us, that we cannot in all humane appearance miſs of marrying our beloved Lady Trade, and clearly carrying her from our Corrival. And I confeſs ingenouſly if there be any thing of moment to be ſaid for France, 'tis this.

2. Therefore our Adverſaries are for France, becauſe thereby we ſhould be able to beat England out of their Trade, and ſo become maſters of the whole, or the greateſt part at leaſt of the Sea negotiation.

Now becauſe they ſo much triumph in this, though before the victory; we will examin it thorowly, and ſee what probability there is of obtaining the greateſt part of Trade by this means.

1. We grant that England and this Republick being about an equal match at Sea; the acceſſion of France would clearly make us an overmatch for England, if all was true which they ſuppoſe.

2. But therein is their miſtake, that they take theſe two things for granted, which are both falſe. Firſt that theſe Maritime Provinces ſhould entirely become French. And ſecondly that all other Nations will ſtand neutral; ſo that we ſhall have no more to do, but France and we entirely to deal with England alone.

Now how far this is from truth, we ſhall make abundantly apparent, and by ballancing of powers how little probability there is, of theſe their deſignes becoming practicable, and ſuch as will effect their deſires.

1. Hereby they ſuppoſe a War, and ſuch a long and tedious one, as perhaps we may not live to ſee ended. For we cannot rationally imagine the Engliſh ſuch tame animals, that they will eaſily part with their Trade: but muſt ſuppoſe they will ſet all at ſtake, before that jewel of the Land be loſt. Now let us but calmly conſider, how deſtructive ſuch a War will be to our Trade, and what advantages they have above us of ſubſiſting under a long War, ſome of which we have before mentioned; and I do believe no wiſe man will think this our Intereſt, except there was a greater likelihood of a ſudden ſubduing them, then is rationally to be exſpected, as we ſhall preſently make apparent. Now on the contraty, if we come under England, there is no fear of a War with France at Sea; that Kingdom being ſo much inferior in maritime power to either of us, and much more to both. And ſhould we have a Land-war with France, yet that is more eligible for us than one by Sea, in the opinion of all wiſe men, as we have formerly ſhown, and ſhall have occaſion hereafter more fully.

2. A War with England being ſuppoſed, as it muſt, (for we muſt either ſay we can and will have the Trade alone or the greateſt part thereof invitis Anglis, or we ſay nothing to the purpoſe) the readieſt way to ſee what probability there is for conquering them, and conſequently carrying the Trade; will be firſt by ballancing of powers, and then by ſome other Conſideratitions. The former of theſe we ſhall do with reſpect to Zeeland, and then with reſpect to other Nations.

For the firſt it muſt be conſidered that Zeeland hath expreſly decare that they will not come under France, but that if they cannot defend themſelves, they will then ſubmit to England. It is true (as I have ſaid) it is the intereſt of theſe maritime Provinces to keep their League; but if their enemies Sword cuts it aſſunder, and they will not venture the loſs of their Religion and Liberty under France, who ſhall hinder them? They are free ſurely to diſpoſe of themſelves as well as Ʋtrecht, or the other Provinces. For in coordinate Powers, when their confederacy is broken, either by themſelves or their enimies; each are at liberty, and in their former freedom, to diſpoſe of themſelves, as they ſhall think fit. And though Freeſland hath not declared, ſo that if they ſhould come to the utmoſt extremity, we know not but they might happily incline to England alſo; yet becauſe that is uncertain, we will be liberal in granting our Adverſaries even that which they cannot prove, and take to our ſelves only that we can, and ſo proceed upon infallible grounds.

Nor let any one here ſtop me, and ſay that in taking it for granted that Zeeland will be Engliſh, I may be miſtaken, for they may beat off their enemies and defend themſelves. I grant it, although by the way let me ſay it, I ſee but little likelihood of that; for of above 100 Companies they pay, there is as yet not one in their principalleſt Ilands (though how it comes ſo, becomes not me to enquire) but the thing is to me matter of admiration. But I will ſhew you how I reaſon; not from the War, that England will conquer Zeeland, nor from the Agreement betwixt the two Crownes, which yet is generally ſaid brings us under that: but upon ſuppoſal that we are tired out with the War, and come to treat with our enemies (for I hope no man is ſo mad, as to think theſe Provinces will as Ʋtrecht, call them in, and after make what tearms we can get, but treat with them with our weapons in our hands) Zeelands not only Declaration, but Inclination carries them for England. So that which way ſoever we take conqueſt by our enemies, their diſpoſing of us, or our own diſpoſal of our ſelves, Zeeland is ſtill Engliſh. So that upon the ſuppoſition of inability to defend our ſelves, we are morally certain, that Zeeland will fall to England: and our Adverſaries uncertain, that Holland and Frieſland will chooſe France. But we will grant them all they can reaſonably deſire, viz. that theſe two Provinces make ſuch a choice, and thereupon proceed to the ballancing of Powers.

Now in Naval ſtrength, Zeeland hath the proportion of a ſixt part in this Republick; there being 5 Admiralities, wherein Amſterdam hath a double rate, we will ſuppoſe any number for a Fleet greater or leſs to be ſet out by them. For example, the States equip a Fleet of 72 Sail herein.

Yea in the laſt War I find in the Liſt A. 1666. (which by the way, I wonder any Admiralities ſhould publiſh, and perceive there is none now) that Zeeland, was a greater ſhare than Frieſland both in Ships and Men.

Although I know in the quota or Tax to the Publick, Frieſland is more: but that is becauſe of their greater ſhare in the Land, which is a certain revenue, and Trade only a contingency. In ſtrength then at Sea we ſee, that Zeeland, at leſt ballances Frieſland if not more, ſhould that Province prove French, and this is ſufficient for my preſent purpoſe.

Now let us look abroad, and we ſhall as clearly find, that Spain comes into the Engliſh ſeale. For which way ſoever France take, Spain muſt take the contrary. Nay in this caſe, Spain is as much concerned as England. For if France have theſe Provinces entirely, how ſhall they alone be able to bring home their American Treaſure? They know to their ſorrow, what they have loſt formerly by the Dutch taking their Plate-fleets; and what an extraordinary charge and hazard they had to defend them. And ſhall we not then think, that they will rather venture to the utmoſt with the Engliſh; than let us intercept their Treaſure, and after ſome years be maſter of their Mines? It is true, if I was led as the world is uſually, to judge by news, which hath been for ſome months that Spain and England are breaking, all this was frivolous; but I make my meaſures from reaſons of State, which tells me, that they will not, becauſe they muſt not, and they muſt not, becauſe it is their mutual Intereſt, and it is their Intereſt, becauſe otherwiſe they cannot ballance France, but will both in time be ruined. So then you ſee clearly, that upon ſuppoſition that Holland be French, it will be England and Spain againſt France and Holland, and ſo we are again ballanced.

We are thus far upon ſure grounds, we ſhall now proceed to that which is not much leſs certain, if we rightly conſider. And that is, that Denmark in all probability will become alſo our Enemies, if we take France ſo far for our Friends, as to make him our Maſter. Let us but well obſerve a few fundamental Maxims of State, which every Nation according to their Intereſt frame for their Government, and it will much help us to make a right judgment in all ſuch caſes. Now this is one of that Kingdoms, Not to ſuffer any one to be abſolute Soveraign of Trade and Navigation if they can poſſibly prevent it. For the revenues of that Crown moſtly conſiſting of toll in the Sound; we cannot imagine the Danes ſuch dullards, but they know who ever is ſo, will ſoon open that paſſage, and make it as free as the water it ſelf between the North and Baltick Seas. And then the King may ſit in's houſe at Gluckstadt, and take toll of Boats that paſs in the Elve; inſtead of Copenhagen, and his Caſtle of Croneberg, where now he takes toll of all ſhips in the Sound.

I foreſee it will be ſaid, that Sweden will ballance Denmark, if that ſhould be ſo. But ſee then what work this Trade will make in the world. And this is wholly uncertain: nay, Intereſt will rather incline to the contrary. For though Sweden be none of the richeſt in Trade, yet have they their ſhare to loſe as well as the reſt. And the Revenues of that Crown conſiſting much in Copper, (which hath occaſioned their Armies ſpoiling all the Mines of that Metal in Germany, and whereſoever they could, on purpoſe to enhance their own) they know very well that pains might have been ſpared, if Commerce ſhould have an abſolute Monarch; and that with all the Chimiſtry that they can uſe, they ſhall not be able to extract ſilver and gold out of that Mettal, when one only Chapman comes to the market. Beſides their Bremiſh and other Territories on this ſide the Baltick, will ſoon lye a bleeding, they know; if France's Sword comes to wound the Roman Eagle, and his race. It may be ſome may ſay the Dane dares not for fear of loſing that we are indebted to him. But who knows not that it is better to loſe a part, than the whole. And if blows be a way of paying of debts, we may happily have Portugal ſo to pay us.

3. Having thus ballance the apparent ſtrength of both ſides, we ſhall proceed to ſome other conſiderations, concerning the ſame. For it is not enough to conſider power abſolutely, but alſo the management thereof; for leſs powers well managed, are uſually prevalent above greater. And herein are many things, which in my judgment, were we an over-match for them, which you ſee is not ſo, would render our ruining their Naval power, and conſequently their Traffick impracticable. As 1. Suppoſing we are under France, ſhall their whole Fleet conſtantly be here, and leave the French Coaſt naked, or ſhall they from thence come to joyn with us for our Sea expeditions? If the former, France is ſubject continually to be moleſted and diverted from England; and if the latter to be intercepted, by reaſon of their ſituation. 2. Who ſhall have the direction of Naval Affairs, is to me very conſiderable. Whether the French alone, or conjoyntly with the Dutch; for that the latter only ſhould be intruſted, is not to be imagined. The former way is liable to miſcarry through unskilfulneſs, the latter through jealouſies and diſſentions. 3. Where ſhall Mariners be had for our Fleets? ſhall the French preſs here as in their own Kingdom? If ſo, I foreſee, we ſhall ſoon loſe our Sea-men. Or ſhall they only uſe Volunteers? Then their number will be ſmall, becauſe the French pay is not great. I might mention other particulars, as the French and Dutch Officers diſcord. The manner of payments, and from whence, &c. But theſe are enow to ſhew us, that which way ſoever we look there's nothing but difficulty and danger ſtares us in the face.

4. But we have yet that which is more momentous, and that is the ſituation of Great Britain. For could we knock their men in the head, as eaſily as our Borinne's their eggs; and ſink their Ships, as if they were ſhells; yet we cannot poſſibly remove the Iſland. Which is,

1. Not only nigh unto us, but over againſt us, ſo that we cannot look out, but we are upon them.

2. So ſituated, that ſhould we bear them and their Aſſociates, (which is not eaſie in equal powers) they can ſtill manage a War deſtructive to us. And what good will it do any but the envious, to ruipe others, if they be ruined themſelves? For with a few Ships in the Chanel, wherein they have Harbours all along, to go in and out at pleaſure; they will force us continually to ſail with great Convoys, or we ſhall be forced to fall into their hands. And the like may be ſaid of the Northern paſſage by the Orcades, where a few Ships will obſtruct our Trade. Now how great a prejudice this is to Traffick, I leave all knowing men to judge. For by this means. No ſingle Ships, nor ſmall numbers can ſail. Reſtraint will be laid upon going out but in great Fleets, and with ſufficient Convoys. Many will be neceſſitated to lie idle, and at great expences to wait for their Company, whilſt they could ſometimes have performed their voyage. And Merchants loſe particular deſigns, which are uſually the greateſt profit, to ſuch as are able rightly to manage them.

3. In ſtorms and tempeſts we ſhall be frequently forced into their Harbours, and ſo fall as a prey into their mouths.

5. Britain and Ireland being Iſlands, are not eaſily invaded, and ſo diverted by a Land War, but that they may ſolely attend to a Maritime, when they are once engaged therein. Whereas France being on the Continent, is ſubject to invaſion from Spain on ſeveral ſides. Which was one reaſon, why our Anceſtors preferred the guardianſhip of England, before that of France.

6. Tangier in the mouth of the Streights, will be no ſmall prejudice to our Mediterranean Trade. Which if the mould or harbour can be made firm, will prove of great concernment to the Engliſh Crown, and a ſtrong curb to all their enemies Traffick. And here I might adde, Cadiz, and all the Coaſt of Spain; for if we be French, no wiſe man (I think) will doubt, but we ſhall have Spain our enemies again.

And theſe things I think are abundantly ſufficient to diſmount our Adverſaries confidence, of carrying away the Trade from England, if we ſhould come under the power of France.

3. Another grand Argument againſt us is, that we are more likely to enjoy Peace under France than England.

Peace (I confeſs) is an invaluable bleſſing. How many and great miſeries doth it free us from! Bloodſhed, violence to our Perſons and Eſtates, unquietneſs, and almoſt all manner of troubles. How many and great mercies doth Peace bring along with it! It is both the mother that bears, and the nurſe that brings up all our temporal bleſſings. It gives us mercies, the freedom of enjoying them, and ſweetens their enjoyment. It contains liberty, plenty, equity, tranquility, pleaſure, and ſafety. So that he was a mad man that ſhould not chuſe Peace. But I fear our coming under France, is neither the way to procure Peace, nor the means to preſerve it. And that we by ſo doing, ſhall but have Ixions fate in the Fable, embrace a cloudy and tempeſtuous War, inſtead of the fair and beloved Juno of Peace.

1. Let it be conſidered; that if we have Peace by Land, we have War by Sea: which is to leap out of the frying-pan into the fire. It is an old and a good political axiom, Ex duobus malis minus eſt eligendum; Theological it was never, for in Divinity, Nullum malum eſt eligendum. Now if we rightly meaſure our Intereſt, we ſhall find a Land War much more eligible for us upon many accounts, which I need not here to mention, they being eaſily imagined by all wiſe men. For ſhould it be granted, that for the preſent the two Crowns accord and we have Peace: it will either be ſuch a one as will ruine us, or cannot be laſting to be ſure; but in a very few years will neceſſarily come to the ballance I have mentioned of Spain and England againſt France and Holland.

2. Let us therefore examine their grounds; that ſo we may ſee before us, and not run our ſelves blindfold into deſtruction. Which ſo far as I can diſcern are theſe four. The power and prevalency of his Arms. His treaſure to maintain them. His nearneſs to us. And his Allies.

Firſt for the power and prevalency of his Arms. 1. It is true his numbers are great, both in Arms and in the Kingdom of France. The great advantages he hath, by the largeneſs, compactneſs, ſituation, and ſoil of his Dominions; the infinite number of Nobility and Gentry for Cavalry, and the populouſneſs of his Cities and Provinces for Infantry, which capcitate him above all the Princes of Europe, to enlarge his Empire; I well know, and willingly grant.

But what relates to the Kingdom of France concerns not us Netherlanders in this caſe further than as to his Arms and power to defend us. Now in my reaſon the greater power in the Soveraign, Sect. 5.the leſs liberty in the Subject, as we have already ſhown. So that the more numerous his Armies, and ſo much the worſe. Doth not France groan under this burden, and ſhall we deſire to do ſo, or help to eaſe them by bearing part thereof on our backs? If we be ſo kind, I dare engage we may have it all, and a thouſand thanks from that Kingdom. Which is ſo wearied with it, that above one half of them (if my intelligence greatly deceive me not) would rejoyce to ſee it leſſened, though it were with ſome loſs to the honour of the Nation. But becauſe I write not to be known, but to better the world, and with my bucket of water to help to quench the Flames, that threaten deſtruction to the Proteſtant Intereſt; I ſhall deſire all intelligent perſons to enquire of thoſe that underſtand France, or have come lately thence; and then let them conſider if their condition be deſirable. If a numerous Army lies quartered upon us, ſhall we not both be kept under by them, and eaten up of them? And although they be paid in the Kings name, yet muſt not we find our ſhare of the money? I never yet read or heard of any wiſe people, that deſired their Prince ſo potent, for fear he ſhould oppreſs them. A due Mediocrity hath always been counted beſt. Let any one read the Greek and Roman Hiſtorians, or any others that are wiſely writ: and he ſhall find, if he duly obſerve, that the Princes Potency hath always been the peoples jealouſie.

2. It is alſo true, that he hath been ſucceſsful in his Arms againſt us, beyond moſt mens imaginations, and perhaps even his own hopes and expectations. But if all things be rightly conſidered, it is no ſuch wonder as the world makes it. Our Wars by Sea; our inteſtine Diviſions; the cowardiſe of ſome; the corruption of many; and our multiplicity of Garriſons, whereby our Forces were ſo parcel'd, that fighting ſeverally they were eaſily vanquiſhed; together wi… ſeveral other cauſes which concurr'd under the hand of Divine Juſtice, makes it no wonderment to wiſe and conſiderate men. Nor is it any new thing in the world, but that which hath befallen moſt of the Nations in Europe, as all their Hiſtories abundantly witneſs.

3. Nor will this evince our defence. For it hath often been experimented, that thoſe that have won much in a little time, have loſt it again in leſs. How did the ſame French Nation under Charles the 8. over-run moſt part of Italy in a little time, and quickly loſt it, as the many Hiſtorians of both Nations relate! And in our days, how did the Swede like lightning paſs through Poland; which was quickly extinct and came to nothing! And ſo may this (if it pleaſe God, and we manage our work wiſely) like a thunderclap and ſudden flaſh of lightning, afright and aſtoniſh us, more than hurt us, as I ſhall ſhew hereafter.

4. If France goes on, the world grows ſo jealous of their greatneſs, that they may poſſible have work enough; when their hand is againſt every one, and every one againſt them; and then where ſhall be our peace and defence? It is known by all that know former times, how in the Roman Monarchy when they were diſtreſſed at home, they ſtill called their Forces from abroad, and left their conquered Provinces to ſhift for themſelves, as I might inſtance in Spain, France, England, and many others both Eaſtern and Weſtern. And indeed it always is thus; ſo that ſhould France be fallen into by Spain, or England, or the Empire, or Italy, or other ſeveral of theſe joyntly, or ſhould they fall into Civil Wars, which are more frequent there than any, yea I think I may ſay all the Kingdoms in Europe; in what condition ſhould we then be? Truly I will tell you, I think fighting with the French, and more eager to be rid of them, then many are now to receive them. If any one ſay, but would you have us entertain the Engliſh? I ſay no, but preſerve our own freedom by complying with them as I ſhall ſhew hereafter.

5. If we will eſpouſe all the quarrels of France we may poſſibly have more than enow; and ſuch as may prove our ruin, rather than ſafety and ſecurity. Our Marriners have their Wars by Sea, our citizens and Souldiers by Land. Our Merchants Trade to pay their money, and all to raiſe France to the univerſal Monarchy, to the ruin of the Reformed Religion, and alſo the greateſt part of Chriſtendom. And though now his friends be many, yet if he once comes to receive a check his enemies will be more.

6. I ſee no need we have to fear all his power and prevalency, if we will do our duty, and quit our ſelves as men for our Country. And if we do, upon our friendſhip with the Crown of England, we may have Souldiers enow out of thoſe 3 Kingdoms, which are as good Infantry ſurely as French, by their own Hiſtorians Confeſſion, and it is Foot we want (if any) for the defence of our Garriſons. And beſides that they are not ſo likely to be remanded, as thoſe of France; thoſe Kingdoms being Ilands, leſs liable to invaſion, and leſs likely to be engaged in foreign, or to be involved in Domeſtick Wars.

Secondly, for his treaſure, it cannot be denied to be very great. But this is rather againſt, than for our Adverſaries. For the richer the Soveraign the poorer the ſubject. And I never knew any people yet, that deſired to have their Prince ſo rich, eſpecially when it comes out of their own pockets. I will not meddle with the diſpute of the Greeks Oſtraciſme, nor that of Politicians, whether poverty or riches in the Soveraign be better for the ſubject. A due mean wiſe men have allways accounted beſt. When neither the Prince may be jealous of his people for their Riches, nor they of him for his Treaſures; but that they may mutually depend on each other, for the good of the whole. For as it is difficult to determin, what the Magiſtrate may not demand, in caſe of neceſſity; ſo is it eaſie to conclude, that he ought not to impoveriſh his people when there is none, and make himſelf rich by their ruins. That being tollerable, but this intollerable oppreſſion.

Nor is it imaginable, that he will make France poor, to make us rich. Nor is it credible that if they remain poor, we ſhall remain rich. For in all Princes there remain ſome jealouſies of a conquered people, that they may, upon ſome revolution of affaires or other, revolt. And therefore it is their uſual practice, by all ways poſſible to drain them, and draw their riches home; as the Romans into Italy, and other Conquerors their own Kingdoms; either by bringing it into their own Treaſuries, or Native ſubjects purſes, or rather both, that ſo they may command it upon all occaſions.

Thirdly, for their nearneſs unto us, we know it too well. And if the ſubdued Provinces remain in their hands, ſhall find what it is to have ſuch neighbors. But otherwiſe England is nearer us than France, and can eaſilier come to our aſſiſtance. For the French have not only a long march, but through part of the Empire, which is their enemie, and ſo liable to obſtruction. As to the Prince of Liege (or Archbiſhop of Colen) Duke of Newburg and others that have permitted this paſſage, they may pay dear enough for it hereafter; as their ſubjects, are paying for it at preſent, even to the French themſelves. Who are ſo weary of their Company, that I perſwade my ſelf, they will be the firſt that will endeavour, to drive them out, when they ſhall find an opportunity.

But we are not affraid of all our Adverſaries weapons, and therefore will enforce their Argument, by ſuppoſing all they can deſire; That France will keep theſe conquered Provinces, and in all probability make new acqueſts, by ſubduing of the Spaniſh Netherlands. So that if we be not ſubject to him, we ſhall never be at quiet, but they will continually be as Thorns in our ſides.

1. And why may we not as well ſuppoſe, that if we be under him, we ſhall never be at reſt for others? For no Potentate in Chriſtendom hath more jealous eyes upon him, nor likelier to be continually imployed in Wars. Now what will changing help us, if we better not our condition? For we may eaſily foreſee, that if we come under France, we ſhall have England and Spain againſt us by Sea (as we have ſaid) and the Germans and Spaniſh Provinces by Land, and ſo ſhall be in the ſame condition, though not by the ſame enemies, that we are now; ground like Corn betwixt the Mil-ſtones. Yea it is more than probable, that knowing the tickliſh condition and mutinous temper of the French Nation, he will bring his Wars into theſe Countries and their conſines, and ſo we ſhall again become, the Cock-pit of War for all Europe.

2. I doubt not but he will attacque the Spaniſh Provinces and ſeek to connect them with his conqueſts, and then incorporate all with France. But it is uncertain what time this may require before they be all under his power. We know not the Articles between the two Crowns, nor are we ſure that England and Auſtria will ſee this work. Many things may fall out, which no mans eye can foreſee. The King of France is mortal and may die, and the Dauphin young and ſo uncapable to carry on ſuch mighty deſigns. Or he may meet with a check in his enterpriſes, and be ſtopt in his further progreſs of glory. France is harraſt, and weary of Wars, may fall to their former mutinies. The King of Spain may grow more potent. England, Sweden and the Cantons of Switzerland may think themſelves concerned, as well as the Empire and Spain, to ſtop the growing greatneſs of France. The Spaniſh may divert him in Catalonia and elſe where. Sickneſs and mortallity may ſeize upon his Armies. Factions in his court, diſcontents in the Country, tumults in his Kingdom, and many other Accidents may happen, to call him off us, or at leaſt neceſſitate him to give us reaſonable conditions, and confine him to his own Kingdom. So that 'tis madneſs to avoid a preſent miſchief, to run our ſelves upon certain ruine.

3. If we had the friendſhip of England, we might ſoon be in a capacity to defend our ſelves againſt France, and need not fear the power of their Arms. I do not ſay that we alone are able to recover at preſent what we have loſt, without the aſſiſtance of others: But that theſe remaining Provinces are able to defend themſelves, and either let go the other, or in time poſſibly regain them, as we ſhall ſhew hereafter.

Fourthly, For his Allies, they need not fright us. For all friendſhip of the World, and eſpecially publick, proves often times like winter brooks, which run freely when we have leaſt need of them, but fail us in drought when we want their Water. If the fortunes of France ſhould once decline, we ſhould ſee thoſe that now adore them, readily renounce this their idolatry, and not only confeſs their former fault, but help to turn the Wheel about, and bring them under whom they now exalt.

And thus we ſee what ſmall grounds there are of enjoying ſuch great Peace under France, as our Adverſaries flatter themſelves withal, and would perſwade the World of; which will never find credit with wiſe men, who are uſed to judge by Reaſons of State, and not by the vain arguments of fancy.

4. The fourth argument for France is, their having the upper Provinces already, which are of ſuch concernment to the Nether, that they affirm we cannot want them, and therefore we muſt call in France that he may have them all, that ſo they may be joyned under one Head.

We cannot want them ſay they.

1. For our Security, and

2. for our Commerce.

Let us therefore examine theſe things, and having ſo done, we ſhall give a releaſe to your patience in this great Argument of our Adverſaries concerning Trade.

Firſt that we cannot want them for our Security, is apparently falſe. Nay upon a Politick account we had better part with them, though not in point of Honour and Religion.

1. They were a continual charge to thoſe inferior Provinces, which yet was willingly born, in regard of their being an out Sconſe to us, which many ſuppoſed ſufficiently ſtrong for our defence. Which yet others have always doubted of, and now we find they had ſufficient reaſon. Seeing then ſome of them willingly deſerted us, and others ſlightly defended themſelves, and us conſequently, and thus laid us open to the invaſion of our enemies: if we let them go, and they ſuffer thereby, they may thank themſelves, and we muſt otherwiſe ſecure our Country.

2. I wonder men ſhould think they can ſecure us, when we ſee the contrary by our experience. Nay indeed this was the great miſtake that had like to have ruined us all. For we relying on them, was unprepared for our own defence, whereby the whole was greatly endangered. Yea ſo greatly, that if the French had fallen into Holland, when they came to Ʋtrecht, I tremble to think, what work they might have made amongſt us.

3. It was apparent that the boundaries of the Common-wealth, was too great, and our Garriſons too many, to defend againſt ſuch powerful Armies. Which at the ſame time are not only Maſters of the Field, but able to aſſault what Places they pleaſe. This War being far different from our former with Spain (or leſs Potentates) wherein we had an Army to ballance theirs, for relief of ſuch Garriſons as were at any time attackt by them. And this the Author of the Intereſt of Holland, hath long ſince well obſerved, and experience now ſhews us. Wherein I dare be his ſecond, againſt any combatants that dare encounter him.

4. Let any man but recount our Garriſons with their greatneſs, and compute what number of men is requiſite for their defence; and he will ſoon ſee, whether I have not clear reaſon on my ſide. I ſhall not now ſtand to do that, though if any be obſtinate, I can do it ſufficiently to convince him: that though the States in times of Peace maintain 60000, and in this War above 100000 men by Land; yet were they not half enow to defend all our Garriſons, and keep an Army in the Field to relieve them. And therefore I never expected any better ſucceſs of the War, than now we ſee; though my judgment was entertained by many with merriment, and of others with fears it might prove Prophetical. For we muſt either have diſmantled moſt of the weakeſt, and ſupplied a few of moſt conſequence for a ſtrong reſiſtance; or it was never likely it ſhould be otherwiſe than it is; it being always found true by experience, that multiplicity of weak powers prove none againſt ſtrong, for dum ſinguli pugnant, univerſi vincuntur. And therefore we ſee our enemies, had the wiſdom to wave Maeſtricht, that was provided with men to give them work; and fell upon ſuch places, as they either knew their money had, or their Swords could moſt eaſily conquer.

5. Many of our outmoſt Garriſons lying in a champaign Country, cannot be relieved, without a powerful Army of Cavalry. And theſe Countries are very uncapable many ways both for keeping and marching great numbers of Horſe. In theſe lower Provinces Land being ſo dear, and more profitable for Cows than Horſes; and ſo many great Rivers, which cannot be paſt with Bridges, except we make them of Boats continually, is ſufficient demonſtration that they cannot be here. And in the upper Provinces there is not forrage for ſuch a body of Horſe, as we muſt have if we will relieve our outmoſt Garriſons. And this thoſe that know them knows. Let us from Bergen op Zoom paſs along the coaſt of Brabant by Breda and our other Garriſons even as far as Maeſtricht, and from thence back to the Buſs which is the greateſt part of the open Country we have (for Gelderland, Ʋtrecht and Overiſſel are full of Rivers) and we ſhall find that which belongs to us, inconſiderable for this purpoſe; the greateſt part of that Country being heath, and barren ground.

I know well that moſt of the Cities lie upon Rivers, but I know alſo and ſo do all of ordinary underſtanding, that a Fort on either ſide commands them, and ſo bars our paſſage by water to them.

But let us inſtance in one for all. I wiſh mine adverſaries would ſhew us any way to relieve Maeſtrecht if it ſhould be aſſaulted and diſtreſſed by the French. I mean that is practicable, for we are not now diſcourſing of Mathematical powers, which demonſtrate motions as ſwift as the Sun's, and the plucking up Oaks with a ſingle hair, and ſuch like curioſities that can never be done; but of Martial powers, which are not for ſpeculative notions, but practical performances.

6. Let us but conſider who hath paid thoſe great Armies we have conſtantly kept, and muſt pay many more both Foot, and Horſe (which are much more chargeable) that we muſt keep, if we will defend theſe out-Provinces againſt powerful enemies; and we ſhall ſoon ſee that we muſt pay very dear for their uncertain and weak defence of us. For this purpoſe I ſhall ſatisfie the curious with inſerting the proportion of Taxes which each Province pays to the Publick for the Armies and other expences: whereby it will appear that the quota of theſe ſuperior Provinces, Gelderland, Over-Iſſel, and Ʋtrecht (which the French now poſſeſs) is very inconſiderable, wherein alſo they have often been behind, and will be much leſs able now to pay it, being ſo much impoveriſhed.

7. If they be regained, we muſt pay for it, they being now under our enemies. And what an infinite of blood and treaſure that will coſt, if our enemy will not quit them on reaſonable terms in treaty, I leave any man to judge.

8. If we rightly conſider, great Territories are for Kings, ſmall only fit for Common-wealths. This we may obſerve in the Hiſtories of former times, in the Grecian Republicks and their neighbour Kingdoms. For the Roman was mixt of Monarchy and Ariſtocracy, by the great power of their Conſuls ruling as Monarchs by their turns, and eſpecially in dangers by Dictators. Yea our own experience hath ſhown us this in the neighbouring Kingdoms. But what ſhall I ſay, many men are like the Judges Statues at Thebes; have their eyes blinded and hands lamed, though not for Juſtice but for judgment, they can neither ſee nor feel before them. In 59 being then in England, in ſome Gentlemens Company, where there were ſome zealous Republicans, and I from Hiſtory and obſervation ſhewing them, that in great Dominions, eſpecially, where there are many Nobility, a Common-wealth could never ſtand long, that if there, it muſt be from the City of London managing it as Rome had done, and not as they went to work, and ſeveral other things, ſhewing the impracticableneſs of their notions, (which I have reaſon to remember, for I was complained of to Lambert, and was in danger of being called before the Council of State) In the year 60. ſome of them took me for half a Prophet, and ſo perhaps may ſome hereafter, for what I ſhall now ſay: That if we affect great Territories by Land we ſhall loſe all. It is our Sea affairs, that we are ſet for by our Country, made for by our genious, and fit for eſpecially, by our imployment. And we may as well think to turn our Rivers, as change theſe things, nay, indeed, if we could, it would quickly turn to our deſtruction: Traffick by Sea, as I formerly have ſhown, being our chief ſecular intereſt.

But I foreſee what will here be ſaid, that a weak defence is better than none, and how all theſe Inferior Provinces be otherwiſe ſecured.

And it is very true indeed, better a weak wall, than none at all. And if we could not build a ſtronger, and at leſs charges, and with far leſs coſt for reparation and defence againſt the violent ſtorms of our Enemies, (for none can ſecure us againſt Heaven) we ſhould be aſhamed to have thrown down the old, which (in my judgment) is by the former Conſiderations levelled with the ground. For as it is folly to pull down before we conſider how to build better, ſo we muſt take heed that therein we commit not thoſe errors which many wiſe men (though that was none of their wiſdom) have frequently (as I have often obſerved) fallen into in their building, To beſtow as much in piecing and patching an old houſe, as would build a new one far ſtronger and better: and when they have built either old or new, to find ſeveral inconveniencies therein, which a provident fore-ſight might have prevented. As the ingenious Mathematician Dr. Wren hath demonſtrated (as I hear) in England, that they had better build S. Paul's in London anew, than repair the old. So I think I am able to demonſtrate, that we had better make a new defence for theſe inferior Provinces, than that of the ſuperior. But it muſt be well conſidered of l…ſt we find inconveniences therein afterwards. And as in Architecture I pleaſantly play with dice and cards alone (which others do in company) making my walls of the former, and floors and covering of the latter, to ſee the conven…ences and inconveniences therein, better than in plain figures; and eſpecially to demonſtrate the ſame to others that will adviſe with me therein, and are no Mathematicians: ſo here I muſt confeſs I have ſeriouſly palled down and ſet up ſeveral defences for us, which are too long to relate. But I will briefly touch of ſome things, which are ſufficient (I think) to ſilence mine Adverſaries.

There are 5 or ſix ways of Natural Fortification and defence of a Country.

Seas for Iſlands, which are the beſt. For though they are thereby incapacitated to enlarge their Empire abroad, being by the Sea as it were confined to home, yet have they great advantages thereby, not only of Maritime Negotiation, but alſo ſecurity from Invaſion. So that they are at ſmall charges for maintaining Armies; which thoſe that live on Continents, muſt conſtantly do for their defence: otherwiſe the door ſtands open for the firſt that comes, to enter in and take poſſeſſion.

Great Mountains that are unpaſſible for Armies, or ſuch paſſes as the famous Thermopyles, which are eaſily defended, and theſe are next to Seas the beſt defence.

Vaſt Wilderneſſes where Armies can have no Proviſion to march, but what they carry along with them, as in Africa.

Peninſular Countries, which are eaſily retrencht within lines of ſecurity, as the famous Wall in the North of England, firſt made by Agricola, Nero's General there, repaired by Hadrian, and after by Severus againſt the Picts, the ruines whereof are ſtill apparent. And Scotland often alſo againſt England hath thus retrencht themſelves, even in our days with great ſafety againſt the Engliſh Army; which if they had had the wiſdom to have kept within, they had ſaved themſelves and the Kingdom: but their adventurous folly in forſaking them, was dearly paid for by the loſs of both.

Great Rivers which cannot eaſily be paſt. As Euphrates in the Eaſt, and the Rhyne in the Weſt, defended thoſe Nations beyond them, from the great power of the Romans.

And laſtly inundations by Water, mariſh and boggy grounds, &c.

I might be large in examples of all theſe in ſeveral Kingdoms of the World; and alſo in the wonderful Providence of God, who hereby ſets bounds and limits to the mighty Nimrod's of the World, ſaying unto them by the voice of Nature as to the great Seas and Waters, hitherto ſhall ye go and no further: but I will confine my ſelf to our own Country.

Now theſe Provinces if we conſider them aright, are naturally fortified moſt of theſe ways. Not by Mountains, for we live in a level Country; nor by Deſarts and barren Wilderneſſes, for we have a fruitful Land, like Canaan flowing with milk and honey. But all the other ways we are defenſible; ſo that if we can but defend our ſelves by Sea, and keep that for our Commerce; we need not fear all our Enemies by Land. We have the Sea to guard us below, mighty Rivers not only within, but on both ſides theſe Provinces to defend us: we are either Iſlands as Zeeland; or Peninſular as Frieſland and Groeningen together, and Holland and Ʋtrecht, by reaſon of the Sea and great Rivers that almoſt ſurround them. And let it come to the utmoſt extremity, we can by Water drown our Enemies, and ſave our ſelves in our Cities. So that they that talk of conquering us, muſt either be fools, or ignorant of the Country: and thoſe that fear to be conquered, puſillanimous and frighted with vain bravadoes.

But we will be a little more particular, in running over brieſly the ſeveral Provinces.

Zeeland conſiſting wholly of Iſlands, is thereby well fortified, and the Inhabitants ſo uſed to the Water, that they are not eaſily maſtered therein.

Frieſland and Groningen together, are almoſt ſurrounded with the North and South Seas, together with the River Emes, and ſcarce acceſſible by Land in regard of the mariſh or boggy grounds, if Coeverden and ſome other ſtrong places on the paſſes be kept.

Holland will prove the greateſt difficulty, and of moſt conſequence; that Province being the Head and Heart of this Republick. For this end I muſt ſuppoſe that we muſt have part of the Province of Ʋtrecht, which we muſt either regain by Treaty, or by ſtrength, let it coſt what it will, both for our communication, and future ſafety. And then we have theſe two again almoſt environed with the North and South Seas and ſeveral branches of the Rhyme and Maes. Only one neck of ground between the Leck and South Sea of 5 or 6 miles, where a River might be cut to carry water from the former, as ſomething higher, into the latter: from between Viana and Twael, from whence downwards the River is deep, and hath the Tyde flowing up, by Houten, Heer, Melis waert, Melaeten, and ſo along the low grounds to Pynenborch into the R… Eem to the South Sea. Which will make the whole adjacent Country being low, ſtagnate with water, and ſo defend theſe two Provinces from their enemies incurſions. And the reſt are done to our hands, by the ſeveral foldings of the Arms of thoſe two great Rivers, the Rhyne and the Maſe, whoſe ſeveral denominations I need not mention, nor the places where, theſe being ſufficiently known to thoſe that know theſe Countries.

But oh Ʋtrecht! Ʋtrecht! I foreſee there will ſo much depend upon that one City, that I fear the greateſt Affairs of Europe will hang, and turn upon that ſingle hinge. I know we flatter our ſelves they will part with it, and I wiſh we may not be deceived; but I fear far other things, not ſo much from what I have ſaid, as from other reaſons of State. But if any will ask what thoſe are: I ſay Ho-la, I am ſo far from publiſhing them, that if the ſhirt on my back knew the thoughts of my heart herein, it ſhould be my firſt work to burn it.

But our Adverſaries will fight it out to the ſtumps both of their ſtrength and weapons. They ſay the French in the Superior Provinces hath the command of our Rivers, and ſo will be able to ruine our Trade.

Truly I am tired with this long diſcourſe of Trade, and therefore for a divertiſement I will tell you a ſhort and pleaſant ſtory. Upon a time King James of Great Britain, was angry with the City of London, and ſent for ſome of the Aldermen and Common Council, whom he firſt chid, and then threatned that he would take away their Charters, ſpoil them of their Priviledges, and ruine the City, that he would. An old Fox that ſtood behind, perceiving the King in a paſſion, and the reſt of the Ruffs in a ſilent fright, pretended deafneſs; and induſtriouſly that his Majeſty might obſerve him, enquired firſt of one and then of another; What ſays his Majeſty? what? Doth he ſay he will turn the River of Thames? The King perceiving it, would needs know what he ſaid, and being told, burſt out into laughter, and ſwore in his Scottiſh dialect he was a fauſe loune, and packt them away. So let me merrily ask mine Adverſaries one after another, what? will the King of France turn the Rhyne? will he turn the Maes? Will he cut off the arms of thoſe mighty Rivers? Or will he riveletiſe them into more hundred furrows than Hiſtorians tell us Cyrus did Gyndes when he went to take Babylon? Will he chaſtiſe the South Sea, and fetter it, as Xerxes did the Helleſpont, making Harderwick and Hoorne as S…ſtus and Abydus of old, now the ſtrong Caſtles the Turks have made in the Dardanels? Let the old rich Merchants that have more money to loſe than I, fear that, I do not. And except he can, ſo long as we keep the mouth of the Rivers where they exonorate themſelves into the Sea; let the French keep them above, and ſee what they can make of them.

But to be ſerious. I had thought our Trading had been in Ships at Sea eſpecially, and not with Boats in Rivers. And that it is theſe inferior Provinces, and our Sea Traſſick that France aims at; though in regard of our Naval ſtrength, he comes do… upon us by Land; thinking that way to carry the Country. For his …pping the Boats paſſing up and down the Rhine and Maes, there is no fear if we rightly conſider, that that will ruine the French themſelves more than us. In regard we can ſubſiſt without this, and they cannot. We have Corn in abundance from Dantſick and other places, with which we ſupply others in want: but they muſt have theirs from above, by theſe Rivers. How can we think that he ſhould ſtop the Commerce betwixt Germany and theſe Countries by the Rhyne; and they not ſtop his Proviſions at Colen and other places? Or that he intercept the Traffick by the Maes; and Leige, or at leaſt Namurs under the Spaniſh, ſhould not prohibit his ſupplies from France? There are two ways of dealing with Enemies. If ſmall to beat them, if great to pine them. They dare not but leave a conſiderable Army in thoſe Provinces, for fear of the former; and they muſt be ſupplied from abroad, for fear of the latter. Now if they be not from us beneath, they muſt be by theſe from above; for thoſe Provinces alone are not able to provide for them; and why then ſhould we trouble our ſelves with ſuch fantaſtical fears? Were it not that I thought theſe things ſufficient, and that I have been already ſo prolix in this Argument; I would ſhew at large that thoſe above depend on us for our Money and Commodities, more than we on them for theirs. But to do this ſatisfactorily, would be a large diſcourſe, and therefore I diſmiſs it, at leaſt for the preſent.

Our Adverſaries having thus ſpent their Cannon upon us ineffectually, will needs try a Volly of ſmall ſhot: That we muſt have theſe out-Provinces, for the quartering our Army, that ſo our Cities may be free from their diſturbance in Trade.

But this reaches us not. For we have out-Garriſons enow upon the Conſines of theſe inferior Provinces, as Sluys, Bergen op Zoom, Breda, Buſs, &c. well known, that are of leſs Trade, and capable to quarter 100000 men if need was, as I can eaſily make apparent. Nor do I imagine Souldiers prejudicial to any trading City, if they be not too numerous; but rather helpful, by the Exciſe they pay, the work when off the watch they cheaply perform, the ſpending their money with the poorer ſort, and ſeveral other ways which might be mentioned.

And thus you ſee in point of profit, or worldly Intereſt, that we can want the ſuperior Provinces, (excepting the City of Ʋtrecht, and a little of the Circumjacent Country) yea had better quit them upon ſeveral accounts; and though our boundaries be leſs, yet if we be more compact and ſtronger, that will abundantly compenſate our greatneſs: beſides the vaſt expence which is ſpared thereby, not only of blood, but treaſure, in maintaining conſtantly ſo great an Army as we muſt, if we will recover and defend them. The only advantage that I can foreſee by them is, to have bad neighbours further off: but whether that will Countervail the coſt, may be a queſtion to others, but is none to me.

But if we value our honour at ſo high a rate, and will pay ſo dear for it, that if the French will not part with them upon fair terms, we will wage war for them; I heartily wiſh we never repent it. For I have obſerved that Common-wealths are fitter for ſelf defence, and Kingdoms for conqueſts. Which is ſhaddowed out by the Venetian Statue, holding a Shield in the right hand: that ſome unskilful Travellers condemn, as an error in the Statuary. Whoſe yet ambitious ſwerving from this Common-wealths maxim, coſt them very dear: and ſeeing it is the neareſt parallel to our caſe I know, I ſhall briefly relate it, becauſe I think it may be uſeful for us. The Venetians having long warred with the Genoneſe at Sea, afterwards caſt an ambitious eye on the Continent of Italy, and by one means or other (too long to relate) became Maſters of many conſiderable places. This made them envied by their neighbouring Monarchs, who entred at Cambray A. 1508. into a league to war againſt them. Maximilian the Emperor, firſt of that name, recovered Padua, Vineentia, Verona, &c. belonging to the Empire: the Pope Ravenna, Cernia, Ariminum and Faventia: Lewis the 12. then poſſeſt of Millain in right thereof, Bergamum, Crema, Cremona and Brixia: Ferdinand the King of Spain in right of Naples, Manfredonia, Trano, Barlet and Manopoli, all of them Havens on the Adriatick: the Duke of Ferrara, Rovigo: and the Duke of Mantua, Aſula: in ſo much that the Venetians were forced to betake themſelves to the Iſlands and Mariſhes of their City. And yet in a ſhort time by compliance with the Pope, they broke the confederacy, and by one means or other regained the reſt, except thoſe belonging to the Realm of Naples. The queſtion is debated in the Senate, whether they ſhould war for theſe or no? And wiſely concluded in the negative, That although they were commodious Havens for them, yet better to part with them, than war with ſuch a potent Prince as Spain. And let me ſay it freely of our ſelves, that had we ſerved God, followed our Trade, and kept our ſelves more off the Stage of Honour, as our Anceſtors did: We had leſs occaſioned our neighbours envy, and not been reduced to thoſe Strates we are in.

But if our Senators be of Naſica's judgement, and would have this foil for our Martial valour, and this exerciſe to rub of the ruſt, our Arms have contracted by their long reſt. If our Cavalry are ambitious to have the Trumpet of Fame ſound their praiſes, and the Infantry to have their marches beaten, through ſucceeding Ages and Generations. I wiſh that the eccho of Fame may follow them, with a clearer ſound than the hoarſe clamour of the People; and hope that the imbellick Bores that are ready to ſtart at the report of a Gun, and ſtoop at the whiſtling of a Bullet, may, by having dangers familiarized to them, become (as the Fox did with the Lion) undaunted at laſt, and under their brave General and Commanders regain our reputation; and ſhall heartily pray both for our Senators proſperity, and Souldiers ſucceſs.

The only conſideration that ſways with me for conteſting for them, if we cannot have them otherwiſe, is that of Religion. If therefore this policy, I have pleaded ſhould prove Apocryphal; and that our League and Alliance with them, obliges us for them recovery; or that the rules of Chriſtian Charity require us, to adventure our own loſs for their ſafety: God forbid that I, or a any man elſe ſhould be againſt it; and I hope there are none ſo degenerate, but will contribute their beſt aſſiſtance both in purſe and perſon to ſo good a work. If the Turks will redeem the caged birds to ſet them at liberty, let us much more willingly our Chriſtian Brethren, and ſo committing our cauſe to God, paſs thorow the Temple of Vertue, that we may happily come to that of Honour.

Having thus ſhewn the impregnableneſs of the truth of our cauſe, againſt the aſſaults of its Adverſaries; and fought it out with them, in their repreſenting the Advantages of being under France, and diſadvantages of being under England, and our Replying: It comes now to our turn to be Aſſailants, wherein we hope to obtain an abſolute conqueſt, by ſhewing them the quite contrary.

Now herein we might be very large, if we would argue from all the ſuaſory and diſſuaſory topicks; as the Honeſty of being under England rather than France for the common Intereſt of the Proteſtant Religion; the Honorableneſs thereof for the common good of Chriſtendom, whoſe Intereſt it is to oppoſe the greatneſs of France, as we ſhall ſhew hereafter: the Equity of this for aſſiſting our Allies againſt France: the poſſibility or practicableneſs of this only, now that his Highneſs is both General and Stadt-holder: and alſo from the contrary of theſe if we ſeek to come under France. But we ſhall only inſiſt upon that of Ʋtility, becauſe that is moſt petſwaſive; and that with reſpect to our ſelves only, the moſt part of men being ſo ſelfiſh, that they prefer their particular before the publick good.

The diſadvantages of being under France, and advantages of being under England.

1. Our being under France brings us infallibly unto a War with England and Spain, in ſome ſhort time at leaſt, if not preſently, as we have already ſhown. Now how deſtructive ſuch a War is to our maritime Negotiation, I leave all wiſe men to judge, and Merchants eſpcially who have the experience thereof.

Whereas on the contrary our being under England, gives us Peace and freedom of Trade by Sea; at leaſt inconſiderable diſturbance in compariſon; yea very probably by Land alſo; in regard we can ſpoil France's Trade, diſturb his coaſts, divert his deſigns, and ballacne his power. For France cannot fight with all Europe. If we be under England, we have Spain, the Empire &c. with us: and if France will fight, we need not fear him. But if that which is ſaid be not ſufficient (as I ſuppoſe it is) I am ready to make it apparent, that a Land War is more eligible for this Republick, then one by Sea with ſuch potent enemies, and take the utmoſt interruption France can make of our Sea-traffick into the ballance.

2. If we come under France we ſhall either do it entirely, or partially.

If the former we are ruined in a great meaſure in our Commerce, for ſuppoſing that the Spaniſh Netherlands fall under France alſo, as in all probability they will, and that ſpeedily, as even our Adverſaries themſelves take it for granted; the Scheld will be open and free, and ſo Antwerp, Bruxels, Mechlin, Loven, Lier and the other Cities of Brabant, by this means recover part of their former Commerce; which now we deprive them of by Vliſſing and Rammekens below, and Lillo above on that River: and Ghant, Cortrick, Riiſſel and other Cities of Flanders a part, by the former River being free, and by opening the other paſſage to them, which is now obſtructed at the Sas van Ghant.

Now of how great conſequence this is to us, eſpecially in regard of Amſterdam, which bears now a double proportion in the Admiralties, and almoſt the half of the burden of the Taxes of Holland, which is almoſt the half of the whole Republick, I leave any one to judge, and eſpecially thoſe that know the principles of intereſt for that great and flouriſhing City. I could be very large upon this, in ſhewing how the fall of Antwerp was the riſe of Amſterdam; how this City prevailed that the other ſhould not be taken by the Arms of this Republick; as alſo what ſome ſay it coſt them to prevent it; that this was a great inducement to the States, not to enlarge the Republick on the ſide of Flanders and Brabant; and what a great motive it was to make peace with Spain, that ſo they might prevent ſo Potent a Prince as France, from coming ſo nigh them upon that quarter, and doing it by power, and how Holland gave ſecurity for maintaining the peace, when Zeeland proteſted againſt the ſame: But theſe are ſo well known in Holland, and the objections againſt it ſo anſwered,Schookius de Pace., that I need not lanch into this Ocean. Now who is ſo purblind but he may foreſee, that if we come under France, the Flemiſh Merchants, eſpecially Papiſts, will return and carry their Trade to Antwerp, and many French alſo ſetle themſelves there; the River being much better, the City fit for traffick every way, and having the Popiſh Religion publickly profeſt, ſo that it will ſoon conteſt with Amſterdam for Trade, and carry it ere long; and then Amſterdam may ſay of Antwerp, as the Ice of the Water, Mater me genuit, mater mox gigniture exme. For we muſt think thoſe Cities, and particularly Antwerp, are nearer the Confines of France than Holland; and will be more confided in, being Papiſts; ſo that they will become both the care and Crown of that King and Kingdom, for their Trade in theſe Northern parts of the World. Yea let me ſay it, for I know it to be true, this is that the Trading Flamens long for, ſeek for, and ſhould above all things be glad to ſee: ſo that in ſtead of hindring, they ſhall help, all they dare, Frances conqueſt for this their Intereſt.

And if ſome of theſe Provinces only come under France, and otherſome under England; what a miſerable condition ſhall we be in; by having two ſuch potent Princes continually conteſting in the midſt of us, ſo that by ſuch ſtrong fits of Colick in our bowels, and Convulſions in the whole body, our diſeaſe muſt needs become mortal, and our wounds incurable. Let us ſuppoſe that which is likelieſt, both by the beſt intelligence, inclination of the people (as we have ſaid formerly) and intereſt as we ſhall ſhew hereaſter, that Zeeland become Engliſh, and Holland, ſhould chuſe France; and conſider the ſituation of Zeeland, neer the Sea, and allmoſt right over the River of Thames, and both between France and Holland, and betwixt Holland and the Chanel; the Harbours of Vliſſing and Ter Vere, into which, the latter eſpecially, all Winter long, no withſtanding the Ice, is ſafe arrival; their genious as well as commodiouſneſs to Cape: and then judge in what a perilous condition the Trade of Holland will be under France, and what miſerable work will be made amongſt us. Or let it be ſuppoſed that there is frendſhip between France and England in the enjoying their ſeveral ſhares (for we will grant all poſſibilities, and much more probabilities, our Adverſaries can reaſonably deſire) and how will our mutual traffick be ſpoiled, by the impoſitions of both Crowns upon commodities; if we ſhould pay to the one in Holland and the other in Zeeland, as undoubtedly we muſt. For it is a certain truth, that multiplicity of impoſitions, eſpecially when great, ſpoils merchandiſe. And will it not be in Englands power, to open the River, and make it tree for Antwerp, &c. as we have ſaid? and in that caſe, where will the vaſt Commerce of Holland then be?

Whereas on the contrary were we either of theſe ways under England, we exclude France and Flanders, and preſerve our Trade to our ſelves.

If we be entirely under England; we may ſave the Spaniſh Netherlands, whoſe Governors are contented with what Commerce they have, rather than loſe all; we may preſerve our ſelves from the French neighbourhood; and thereby alſo our Trade from them both.

Or if we be but in part ſo; we preſerve the friendſhip of theſe Provinces, the Trade betwixt us, ſecure our intereſt both at home and abroad, and command the Commerce of Europe at our pleaſure.

3. If we come under France, we have not only Spain our Enemy by Sea and Land (as we have ſhewn) but the loſs of our Spaniſh Trade, and the hazarding of our whole Levant Traffick: And if we rightly calculate, that amounts to no ſmall part of our Commerce. The Spaniſh Netherlands, Spain, and their Dominions in Italy, taking off much of our Eaſt India and Weſtern-wares. For as Muſcovy and the other Nothern Nations conſume much of our Pepper, and ſome hotter Spices, ſo the Southern, and Eaſtern in the Mediterranean, much of our other Commodities. Now with what ſecurity can we either carry them through the Sea, or bring our Silks, Camels-hair, and other of the richeſt Commodities we have, from Aleppo, Egypt, and our other Factories for the Turkie Trade, and maintain our Traffick with Venice, Leghorne, and other places in Italy: Seeing the Spaniards beſides the ports of Spain, have ſo many Havens, and ſome Iſlands in the Adriatick; Sicilia, Sardinia, Majorca and Minorea in the Midland Sea; and Cadiz ſo commodiouſly ſituated at the mouth of the Straits; ſome of which have been famous in all Ages for the Archeſt Pirates in the whole World. Betwixt theſe therefore and the Turks, we are certain of nothing, but of bad Trading, and they good Caping. So that I may conclude with the Poetical Proverb, that he that deſires to flie from England, and fall under France for Traffick, Incidit in Scyllam, cupiens vitare Charybdim.

Whereas on the contrary, if we come under England; we certainly ſecure our Commerce with Spain, and all the Territories belonging to that Crown. And not only ſo, but againſt the Turkiſh Pyrates which infeſt thoſe Seas, which would be of no ſmall advantage to us. For beſides that England is at peace with ſome of thoſe places on the African Coaſt, and is in friendſhip with the Turkiſh Empire; how eaſie a thing was it for us joyntly, to bring the reſt to our own terms? Yea, ſo to ſubdue them all, and keep them under, that they ſhould never be able to diſturb us, no nor Chriſtendom more by their Caping? And how generous a deſign this is and how deſtructive to that great and common Enemy of all Chriſtians, I leave all wiſe men, and well-wiſhers to Chriſtianity to conſider and judge.

4. Our Eaſt India Trade, the richeſt jewel of this Republick, which hath occaſioned us ſo much envy, and cauſed ſo many quarrels and conteſts; if we come under France, will run a great Risks to be ruined. Hath not this been their great deſign of late years? Have they not for this end erected a Company? And now got footing there, and follow it further, even in this laſt year, as we hear, with their greateſt endeavours? Nay, is not this the principal motive, which induces them to make this War? I know we need not fear them there, nor all Europe if we have peace here, and can ſend them ſupplies; We are ſo far advanced in that Negotiation; ſo ſtrong in Forts, Shipping and Souldiers; our men ſo accuſtomed to the heat of thoſe Countries; our Mariners to thoſe Coaſts; and Merchants to the Languages and Trade of thoſe parts. But if we come under France, will not England and Spain ſeek continually to intercep our ſupplies thither, and our Returns from thence? Will not this put us to vaſt Charges of Convoys to defend our Ships going and coming in ſecurity? Will not ſome through ſtorms and other accidents when ſeparated, unavoidably fall into their hands, as we have often experienced? And will they not always be in one hazard or other from them for ſafety? Yea let us ſuppoſe that all ſtands well there, and none of our Ships miſcarry through our Enemies, but ſafely Arrive both there and here; where ſhall we vent thoſe Commodities from thence at the prices they now yield us; when we have ſuch Enemies at home, and ſuch dangers in carrying them abroad, as we have formerly ſhown? Nay, can we rationally think otherwiſe, than that the Kingdom of France will have ſhare with us there, and the Crown the greateſt profit here? So that our Eaſt India Actions, as high as they are now may in a little time come as low as thoſe of the Weſt India Company; which was once thought equal with the other, and are now next to nothing: and then many of us, who have moſt of our eſtates adventured in the Eaſt-Indies Trade, may loſe that we have leſt, as we have formerly loſt by the Weſt-Indies; and no remedy but patience, for we muſt ſit down in a ſorrowful filence. Herein I have reaſon to ſpeak feelingly of my fears, being ſo concern'd according to the proportion of my ſmall eſtate; how much, matters none but my ſelf, but were it ten times more, I muſt tell you; that though the Actions at this preſent are conſiderably above three hundred, I ſhall the firſt day I ſee we come under France, ſell mine willingly for two, rather than keep them, and render many thanks to the buyer into the bargain.

Whereas on the other hand if we come under England, they have formerly had, and ſtill have a conſiderable ſhare in the Eaſt India Trade. Their Company and ours accord well, and frequently accommodate each others correſpondence. His Majeſty in the former War, in his Declaration, and the Papers paſt between the States General, A.D. 1664, 1665and his Envoy Sir George Dawning, infiſts upon Poleron one of the Banda Iſlands, ſatisfaction for injuries paſt, with deduction of what we had ſuffered, and regulation of Trade for the future;A.D. 1671/2 and his Majeſty in his Declaration of this preſent War only mentions the laſt, The Regulation of Trade in the Eaſt-Indies. Now I perſwade my ſelf, that neither the States, nor Eaſt-India Company will ſtick upon theſe. For Polleron, if they have it, it can now neither be any great profit to them, nor prejudice us: For a juſt accompting with them, what juſt man can be againſt it? Or againſt a due and equal Regulation of Trade? that ſo all occaſions of conteſts between the two Nations may be cut off, and wholly prevented for the future. It is true, that reaches not the ſuppoſal of our being under them, but only ſtanding upon equal terms with them for Trade: and therefore we will come cloſe up to the ſuppoſition in hand.

And herein we ſhall proceed with ſuch franckneſs, that we ſhall grant more than our adverſaries can reaſonably be jealous of; and that is, that the Engliſh ſhould have half of that Trade with us; and yet ſhew that it is better for us then to take in France. For, 1. The Engliſh have a conſiderable part already, and France but an inconſiderable: ſo that we muſt, in all probability, part with much more to the latter, and need part with leſs to the former. Our firſt capital of the Eaſt-India Company, is 64 Tun of Gold, and the Engliſh 40. It is true we have Traded both longer and more, and ſo have a greater improvement: ſuppoſe 70 Tun of Gold there, which ordinarily is reckoned about three times in the value when returned hither; and ſuppoſe as much or more here in goods or money; which vaſtly exceeds the Engliſh: yet it muſt be conſidered that we are at greater expences there ſeveral ways than they; that we have money at intereſt, though inconſiderable to what formerly, having pay'd off the laſt year above 50, ſome ſay 60 Tun of Gold. I muſt here ingenuouſly confeſs, that I have but the forementioned calculations from the cur…oſity of diſcourſe, and the credit of others; not upon the authentick authority of the books of both Companies; which I have not leiſure now, nor indeed pleaſure to enquire into; and yet I think I am near the truth, having had theſe things from very good hands. I will therefore proceed, and here we are certain, that beſides a great ſum of money, our Company hath lent the States to carry on this War, which I reckon as an honourable gift, we are like to part with a far greater to purchaſe our peace. And though our Actions be far more worth than theirs, for example, a capital Action that gives right to a ſuffrage, in the election of the Directors of that Trade being originally 100 l Vlamiſh, (or 1800 g) and in times of peace 400 l Vl. (or 2400 g) and ſometimes 500 l Vl. (or 3000 g) and with them not worth two, or twelve: yet this ariſes not ſo much from the great emolument, that the Participants here receive more than there, as from the plenty of money here, which ſeveral have and know not how otherwiſe to improve, the ſmall Intereſt (uſually under 4 per Cento to thoſe of good credit) and the dearneſs of Land; all which are contrary in England. So that I leave it to any competent and impartial man to judge, (ſhould it be ſo, which yet, I think, none need to fear) whether it is better for us to ſupply the Engliſh with a leſs part, or the French with a greater of that our Trade. For I dare ſay, that if England hath a fourth of ours, France hath not an eighth part thereof.

2. How eaſie is it for us and England to beat France out of the Eaſt-India Traſſek? if we have Wars, or if the French ſeek to incroach upon us.

3. Under England we keep our own Chambers of Trade; whereby thouſands of Families ſubſiſt in our Cities. All manner of Trades for Shipping and navigation, Carpenters, Smithes, Sail-makers, &c. All manner of Tradeſmen for victuals, Bakers, Brewers, Butchers, &c. by their labours at leaſt. All manner of Shopkeepers for ſelling them Proviſions that are ſent, and buy commodities that return. Beſides the poorer ſort, as Boatsfolk, Labourers, &c. which are exceeding many that wholly depend on the Company for their livelihood. Whereas if we come under France, and the Spaniſh Provinces alſo, as we may reaſonably ſuppoſe; a great ſhare will be removed to Antwerp, there being ſo large and magnificent an Eaſt-India houſe, and that being nearer France by far. Whereby our Trade being taken from us, our Cities will be impoveriſhed beyond imagination.

4. The impoſitions of the Crown of England is with conſent of the people in Parliament; the rates both inward and outward being ſet by law: and ſo would be here with conſent of the States. Thoſe of France arbitrary, and inhanſible at pleaſure. And how great an alteration Cuſtoms make in Commerce, I leave all knowing Merchants to judge.

I foreſee it will be ſaid, that were we under France, we ſhould beat England out of the Eaſt India Trade, and ſo have it wholly to our ſelves.

If they would make either the …ntecedent or Conſequent good, the Argument deſerved conſideration; bue I know they cannot; for they are both impracticable.

Firſt, We cannot beat them out there, till we have conquered them here: for how ſhall we in Wars with them, ſpare Ships, Souldiers, &c. to do that? Now what probability there is of conquering them, is formerly declared. The Engliſh are reaſonably fortified and provided, and will doubtleſs be better, if they ſee danger approaching. And not only ſo, but being in good amity (as I have heard) with thoſe Nations where they reſide, they would never ſuffer our enmity to prevail ſo far againſt them. Nor thoſe Nations with whom we both Trade: for knowing how low one chapman makes the market, they will aſſiſt the weaker, rather than loſe their advantage by them.

Nor if we ſhould conquer them there, will all the ſpoils fall to our ſelves; as ſome may poſſibly think, whoſe hopes are poſtilion to the Sun, and therefore fancy things beyond the Moon; and bring ſuch booties from Eaſt to Weſt upon the wings of their windy imaginations. For inſtead of hoping to have half, we have reaſon to fear, ſhould it be ſo, that France. will have all the parts of the Prey.

5. If we be under France, what ſhall become of our Fiſhery upon the Coaſt of England, and thoſe multitudes of Families that depend thereon? I might be large herein from my own Obſervations, having had the humour or curioſity (call it what you pleaſe) to view all the Rivers, Harbors, and almoſt Creeks on both the oppoſite Coaſts, from Thames to Tinmouth, and from the Elve to Ooſtend. And particularly Yarmouth and Flambroughhead, as the greateſt Promontories of England, and whereabouts there is the beſt fiſhing. But I will only ſpeak to thoſe things which concern the preſent Argument. A diligent perſon calculated in the Year 62 the dependants on the Fiſhing-trade (I mean not Fiſhers only, but alſo all employed about their ſhipping, Nets, Cask, Salt, &c. with their Attendants at Sea) and reckoned them above 400000. Yea ſome have made their number far greater, particularly that learned, wiſe, and valiant Knight Sir Walter Rawleigh (whom I parallel with Sir Philip Sidney) in his information of King James, reckons our Veſſels that fiſh on the Coaſts of Great Britain 3000 and every 20 Buſſes to maintain 8000, which will amount to 1200000. But this is incredible. He muſt either be miſtaken in the number of Ships, or the proportion he alots them, or both. For upon diligent enquiry I cannot find half that number either of Ships or Men in ſome years laſt paſt. If he mean of the three ſeveral ſeaſons of fiſhing; in Autumn for Herrings, Spring for Cod-fiſh, and Summer for Salmons; we ſhall not conteſt with him; nor concerning the number he ſays attends them, viz. 9000 other Veſſels, and 150000 Men. It is ſufficient for my preſent purpoſe, that I ſhew, that our Fiſhery is very conſiderable, and the friendſhip of England for the ſame, of far more conſequence to us than that of France.

Guicciardine, Deſcript. generalis Belgii.a very diligent Writer, A. D. 1587 reckons the Herring-Buſſes, that fiſh on the Britiſh Coaſts at leaſt 700, and ſome ſaid many more: and though he include Flanders, yet not the other Fiſheries, as Rawleigh doth, and doubtleſs of all the Maritime Provinces of this Republick; which the Author of the Intereſt of Holland c. 5. erroniouſly appropriates to that Province alone, through inadvertency, that Foreigners frequently call all theſe United Provinces Hollanders, that being the principal, and all the Spaniſh, yea formerly all the 17 by the name of Vlamens. And not only ſo, but tells us the Fiſhery is increaſed ſince a third part, which I cannot credit, not only in regard that the Engliſh, but French and Flemiſh whom we uſed to ſupply for the greateſt part, now fiſh themſelves. Yea I rather think, that ſince our Merchandiſe hath ſo much increaſed, our Fiſhery hath decreaſed.

And what conſiderable profit redounds to us thereby, appears by the computation which Guieciardine makes very particularly, that thoſe 700 Buſſes take annually 49000 Laſt of Herring, which he reckons at 10 l. Vl. or 60. Guldens the Laſt; which amounts yearly together with the other Fiſheries to the following ſums.

The uſual reckoning of ſalt Fiſh that is yearly taken, and either ſpent or ſold by Hollanders, if you will believe the Intereſt of Holland c. 5. is 300000 Laſt. So that the families that are maintained, the money that is gotten, and food that is eaten from Fiſhing is almoſt incredible.

Now that it will be in Englands power and not in Frances to ſpoil us of this Fiſhery, or at leaſt the greateſt part thereof, I think no rational man will deny, that conſiders the only fiſhing for Herring in theſe parts or perhaps in the whole World, is upon the Britiſh Coaſt; and moſt alſo for Cod-fiſh northward of Scotland and on the Dogger-ſands, and other places where they can eaſily interrupt us. Thoſe therefore that are ſo forward for France, might do well to conſider, what they will do with all theſe families, or how they ſhall be maintained when they are deprived of their Trades.

Other Arguments which might here be added I ſhall not now bring into open view, but keep them as a Reſerve, in caſe our Adverſaries ſhould rally and make head againſt us, having ſufficiently rooted them (we think) by theſe five, wherewith we have already fought them.

But yet there remain ſome advantages under England, which we cannot expect under France, ſome of them more general for the Republick, and otherſome more particular for Provinces and Perſons. In the handling whereof, we ſhall deſire to uſe, now that we are got within our enemy, the ſhort and pungent dagger of Demoſthenes, rather than Cicero's long ſworded eloquence.

Advantages under England, not to be expected under France.

1. By being under England, we retain and encreaſe our friendſhip with the Empire, German Princes, and free Cities: which are not jealous of Englands affecting the Imperial Crown, as they are of France: and therefore will not prejudice us under the former, as they will certainly in a little time under the latter. Nay I doubt not, but were we under England, they would take courage, and generally appear againſt France. So that we ſhould hereby greatly promote the common Intereſt of Europe.

2. Under England we might have the freedom of the Weſt-Indie Trade, which would be of great profit to us, many ways. Now how great a ſhare England hath in the Weſt-Indies, and how ſmall and inconſiderable France, is well known. Theſe having only the Iſland Terre Neuf, for fiſhing, and ſome of the moſt Northerly Continent, unpeopled, not cultivated, and improfitable, as may be ſeen in de Laet, Deſcript. Ind. occid. L. 2.by thoſe that know it not: part of St. Chriſtophors, and ſome other places of ſmall concernment, in compariſon to what the Engliſh profitably poſſeſs.

3. By being under England, we might ſhare at leaſt with the Engliſh thoſe Plantations we have in the W. Indies; Holland in their New Netherland, and Zeeland in Surinam, &c. Which would be of eminent advantage for Colonies, either there or to be ſent thither; beſides the profit we might have from thoſe Plantations; as Zeeland (or ſome at leaſt therein) even in theſe firſt years and beginning thereof, have pretty well experienced, and know how greatly it is further improvable. Now what a ſingular benefit it is for a full and populous Common-wealth, now and then like the ſedulous Bees, to caſt a ſwarm of their pooreſt and moſt laborious people, is apparent from the Hiſtories of all Ages. And though I confeſs the Dutch are not ſo good Planters, as the Engliſh, being more uſed to the Water, and the other to Land: yet in regard all thoſe Plantations are upon the Sea Coaſts and Rivers, the Dutch might be uſed for building of Ships or Boats, Houſes &c. and eſpecially for fiſhing, carrying and recarrying goods by Water on the Rivers, and to and from the Ships, and in navigation; and the Engliſh for planting and working in the ground; and ſo, in mine opinion, would make an excellent temperament, and very profitable for both Nations.

4. Expences might be ſaved in ſeveral Conveys, and particularly of the Eaſt India Companies. I know very well they will have them return round about, on the back of Ireland, leſt they ſhould touch at any of theſe Northern places, eſpecially in the Chanel, and ſo Trade; and will ſend out Ships with freſh men, and take out the Mariners that return, to prevent their trading for themſelves: but yet the extraordinary Charges of our men of War might be ſpared. Nay the States General bring in theſe, to be diducted in the Accompt with England, as the occaſion thereof, in their Liſt of damages Article the 5. before the laſt War, A. D. 1664.

5. Such as are Rich, and weary of Trade, or love their eaſe, honour, or pleaſure; may if we were under England, more eaſily remove thither, and be made liege ſubjects, and free Denizens of England by the Crown; or be naturalized by the Parliament; and ſo buy poſſeſs, and inherit Lands and revenues at half the price here; and live upon their Rents as Country Gentlemen, in a cheap and pleaſant Land, enjoying as great civil Liberty as any where in Chriſtendom, and alſo the freedom of their Religion. Or let out their money not only at far greater intereſt, but alſo upon bypothece or real ſecurity. I have often thought this 20 years, whether it might not be better for England, to give this Liberty by Law to ſtrangers, eſpecially thoſe of the Reformed Religion, and of theſe Countries; and of which ſide the intereſt lay betwixt us for this: Now that England hath ſo many and great Plantations in the Weſt Indies for their poorer people, now that money is ſo plentiful, now that this Common-wealth was ſo increaſed upon them, now that the Number of Merchants is every where ſo multiplied, and now that Trade is beaten ſo low, almoſt in all the known parts of the World. But this would be both a large, and unneceſſary digreſſion, and I am very ſenſible that I have been already too long in this Argument. Yet induſtriouſly I confeſs, becauſe I foreſee, that many will diligently peruſe this, who perhaps will negligently paſs by the reſt: and mine Oppoſites ſo much glorying herein, I thought beſt to give them full meaſure, and rather abound to curioſitie, than be deficient in ſatisfying the leaſt nicity; Trade being the Crown of that Kingdom and this Common wealth.