The Court of the Gentiles Part 4, Part 4 · Book 1 · Chapter 3

The Court of the Gentiles Part 4 · Part 4 · Book 1 · Chapter 3

p. 73CHAP. III. Of Virtue, and Moral Libertie.

Moral Virtue an habitual Perfection. Moral Libertie as to ſtate in virtueſe Habits. Virtue gives, (1) Dominion, (2) Life, Health, Vigor, (3) Amplitude, (4) Nobilitie and Dignitie, (5) Beautie and Glorie. Moral Libertie as to Exercice conſiſtes in virtuoſe Acts. (1) The Contemplation of the first Truth. (2) Adherence to the chiefeſt Good. (3) Total actual dependence on the first Cauſe. (4) Conformitie to the divine preceptive Wil, as alſo ſubmiſſion to his providential Wil. (5) Ʋſing althings in ſubordination to the Fruition and Service of God. Moral Libertie as to p. 74exercice the greateſt; becauſe it brings (1) Order, (2) Spontaneitie and ſuavitie, (3) A Divine Life, (4) Amplitude, (5) Freedom from Sin, (6) Stabilitie of Spirit, (7) Improvement of Virtue, (8) Formal Beatitude.

§. 1.Moral Virtue an habitual Perfection. THE general Idea and Nature of Moral Bonitie having been diſcuſſed, we now procede to the diſcuſſion of Virtue, as it is the origine and cauſe of moral Libertie. Plato diſcourſeth of Virtue in his Meno, the title of which is foreign. Virtue properly, according to its orgination, ſignifies a Power or Efficace; it being derived from Vir, which primarily ſignified among the Ancients a ſtout valiant man; anſwering to foreign among the Hebrews. So the Greek foreign primarily and properly ſignifies warlike Virtue or Courage, from foreign, Mars; and this from foreign arits, terrible, valiant, potent; or, as Voſſius, from foreign, marats, to waxe ſtrong. Hence in the N.T. foreign is uſed to expreſſe the Divine power and efficace of God, as 1 Pet. 2.9. and 2 Pet. 1.3. foreign, i.e. by his glorioſe power. Thus foreign is expounded by Heſychius foreign, a divine power. So the LXX. tranſlate foreign, which ſignifies the glorioſe power of God, foreign, as Hab. 3.3. Zach. 6.17. Neither is foreign uſed in the N. T. more than once, if ever, to denote a virtuoſe diſpoſition of mind, namely Phil. 4.8. So curioſe were the ſacred Pen-men in avoiding philoſophic termes, which had been ſo much abuſed. But by moral Virtue we here underſtand an habitual diſpoſition of Soul conforme to the Rule of Moralitie, the Divine Law. In which ſtrict notion it has one and the ſame formal idea or reaſon with ſupernatural Grace, as Janſenius, Ameſius, and others underſtand it. For that there is no real moral Virtue but what is ſupernatural, has been ſufficiently demonſtrated in the precedent Section, §. 4. Whence true moral Virtue is nothing elſe but a certain perfection, whereby man is ordained and diſpoſed towards God, as Aquinas, 1. Quaeſt. 95. Others cal Virtue, the moſt regular and beſt ſtate of a rational Creature. Whether Virtue be a Power, Affection, Habit, or merely Act, has been diſputed among the ancient Philoſophers,Gratia non eſt habitus propriè, ſed habitudo ſive ſanitas mentis. Aq. 1.2. Quaest. 100. Art. 3. as wel as Schole-Divines. But the communly received opinion is, that it is an Habit, or as Aquinas expreſſeth it, an Habitude of the Soul. That Virtue is an Habit Ariſtotle largely demonſtrates, Eth. l. 2. c. 4. as Philoſ. General. P. 2. l. 1. c. 1. ſect. 4. §. 3. An Habit properly is of a middle p. 75nature between a Power and an Act, which gives the power an accidental facilitie of acting. foreign, a power, Definit. Platon. is defined, foreign, that which is of it ſelf effective, or operative: but foreign, an Habit, is deſined, pag. 414. foreign, a diſpoſition of the Soul, whereby we are ſaid to be ſo or ſo qualified for acting. So that every Habit is in order of nature at leaſt, if not of time, before the Act, but ſubſequent to the Power. For the Soul by its Habits is made more facile or capable to act. The definition and cognition of Habits depends on the cognition of their proper Object, Subject, Mode of exiſting in their Subject, and Acts. For the forme of the Act follows the forme of the Agent: and ſuch as the Habit is in relation to its object, ſuch is the Agent. Hence, by how much the more noble and perfect the habit is, by ſo much the more noble and perfect is the Agent and his operation. Whence Virtue is a ſupernatural Habitude, Habit, or active Forme, whereby the Soul is elevated to ſupernatural Acts. Thence Virtue is termed by Baſil, foreign, Completive of Nature. This indeed might be evinced out of Plato's Definition of Virtue, drawen into forme by Serranus, Meno, pag. 68. Virtue is foreign, the habit of the Soul rationally operating by the natural power, the beſt worke, and aiming at the beſt end. So that al Virtue requires not only the beſt mater or object, but alſo the beſt end. And indeed ſuch as the habitual aptitude or diſpoſition of the Soul is, ſuch wil the end be, as Ariſtotle, Eth. l. 3. c. 10. pag. 160. wel obſerves: foreign, The end of every action is ſuch as the habit is: as an habit of fortitude makes men affect valiant acts. Again, lib. 4. cap. 13. pag. 254. foreign, Such as every man is, ſuch is his action, and ſpeech, and ſuch is his life: i.e. ſuch as a mans habitual frame of Spirit is, ſuch is his end, acts, and life. Al habits are as a Pondus affixed to the Soul, whereby it is ſtrongly bent and inclined towards objects, ends and acts, ſuitable thereto. Al habitual Vertues are one and the ſame in regard of principe and ſeed, though different as to their proper objects and acts. The ſame habitual Entitie as it facilitates to know God, is called Divine Knowlege; but as it facilitates to love God, it's called Divine Love; and ſo in the other virtuoſe Habits. That Supernaturalitie is a Mode intrinſecally and eſſentially included in al virtuoſe p. 76Habits, is evident, becauſe human Nature, ſpecially as now corrupted, cannot reach an end or act ſupernatural: For if a natural power ſhould have any activitie in reſpect of a ſupernatural act and object, it may, by a paritie of reaſon, by degrees attain to the higheſt ſupernatural objects and acts, as Alvarez, de Auxil. Diſp. 65. demonſtrates. Of the nature of Supernaturalitie, and how it is intrinſecally and eſſentially included in the ſubſtance of al gracioſe Habits, ſee Choquetius, de Grat. l. 1. Diſp. 7. & 12. Alſo Thomas Hurtado, Praecurſor Theologus, de Supernaturalitate Entis, Diſp. 1. Controverſ. 1, &c.

§. 2.Moral Libertie as to ſtate in virtuoſe Habits. From what has been laid down touching the nature of Virtue it evidently follows, that al moral Libertie ariſeth from thoſe virtuoſe habits the Soul is clothed with, and agreable exercices flowing therefrom. What Natural Libertie is, has been fully explicated Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. C. 9. Sect. 3. §. 11. How much moral Libertie differs from natural may eaſily be diſcerned by any that impartially conſiders the ſame. The later indeed is eſſential to and inſeparable from man as man, and al human acts; but the former is proper to man as virtuoſe, as wil ſufficiently appear by what follows. Every man is ſo far morally free as he is near to God. Althings aim at Unitie: God, who is the ſupreme Unitie, convertes althings to himſelf: and every thing is ſo far free and perfect, as it comes near to God. The human Soul has a twofold approche to God, (1) by Similitude, (2) by actual real Ʋnion and Fruition. (1) The more like the Soul is to God, the more one it is with him, and free: al ſimilitude is a kind of Unitie: and whence ſprings the Souls ſimilitude to God, but from virtuoſe habits? (2) The Soul has actual real union with, and fruition of God by virtuoſe exercices. Hence ariſeth a twofold moral Libertie: (1) As to State, (2) As to Exercice in that ſtate. The former depends on habitual Virtue; the later on virtuoſe exercices. Of each in their order.

Moral Libertie as to ſtate conſiſtes in virtuoſe diſpoſitions of Soul, whereby it is capacitated for and made like to God. Thus the ſpurious Dionyſius, Eccleſ. Hier. cap. 2. foreign, Seing the Divine Nativitie or Regeneration is a certain Divine ſtate, certainly he that has not attained to that divine ſtate, ſhal never know, much leſſe do the things delivered by God. Whence alſo he concludes: foreign. p. 77The principal progreſſe of divine dilection in the ſacred obſervation of divine Commands conſiſtes in the moſt ineffable framing of our divine ſtate. This Athanaſius, Dialog. 1. contr. Macedon. termes, foreign, The participation of ſanctitie by Grace. And the ſuppoſed Ignatius, ad Magn. foreign, the forment of Grace: i.e. that which gives a forment or principe of operation to the whole Soul. And Greg. Nyſſenus ſtiles this State of Virtue or Grace foreign, Tranſelementation, or Reſtauration of the Principes of the divine life, or of the Soul, whereby it is made like to God, and capable of adhering to him. Whence Damaſcene, Orthodox. Fid. lib. 2. cap. 12. gives us this excellent Character of Man, as inveſted with the Image of God: God made man a little world in the greater, another Angel, an Inſpector of the viſible Creature, and Diſciple of the intellectual; King of thoſe things that are on earth: both terrene and celeſte, temporal and immortal, and that which is ſupreme, foreign, by acceſſe to God to be deified: but to be deified not by tranſalition into the Divine Eſſence, but by participation of the divine irradiation. Thence Auguſtine ſtiles Libertie the best diſpoſition of Soul. Similitude to God is the higheſt Libertie as to ſtate: ſo far as any is made virtuoſe, ſo far he is made free: The connexion between Pietie and Libertie is ſo intimate, as that indeed they have one and the ſame beginning, progreſſe, and conſummation. By how much the more ample, ſpiritual, pure, and perfect the Soul is, by ſo much the more free it is: and whence ſprings the Amplitude, Spiritualitie, Puritie, and Perfection of the Soul, but from virtuoſe habits? Indeed Plato eſtimed nothing good but Virtue, and moral Good: whence Antipater the Stoic writ three Books with this Title, foreign, That according to Plato Virtue only was good. That Virtue is the moſt perfect ſtate of the Soul, and that which brings with it moſt moral Libertie is moſt evident; becauſe hereby it is rendred capable of adhering to its firſt Cauſe, and laſt End, which is the top of moral Libertie. For wherein conſiſtes the perfection of moral Libertie, but in its conformitie to its moſt perfect Exemplar, which is the Divine Bonitie? And is not this the privilege of moral Bonitie or Virtue? Hence Virtue is defined by Aquinas, Diſpoſitio perfecti ad optimum, The Diſpoſition of a perfect Subject, to p. 78the moſt perfect Exemplar and End. Virtue indeed is more perfect than the Soul it ſelf: ſo Aquinas: Grace, ſaith he, in it ſelf and according to its eſſence, is more noble than the nature of the Soul; becauſe it is an expreſſion or participation of the divine Bonitie: and that which is ſubſtantially in God, is accidentally in the Soul participating of the divine Bonitie. That which belongs to God by nature, belongs to us by Grace. And Suarez ſaith: That Grace is the Bond, whereby man is conjoined to God, his laſt end. Now by how much the more the Soul is conjoined to God, by ſo much the more ſublime, free, and perfect its ſtate and condition is. In ſum, Libertie of ſtate conſiſtes in a virtuoſe or gracioſe diſpoſition of Soul, whereby it is enabled to underſtand, embrace and adhere to what is good, in that manner and meaſure as it ought. Take al the notions of true moral Libertie, and they agree to none but the virtuoſe man.

1.Virtue gives Deminion. Libertie is defined by the Platoniſt, foreign, a Principalitie or Dominion of Life: alſo foreign, a plenary power over althings. Which the Stoics interpret, foreign, a ſelf-moving autoritie or power. And whence ariſeth this Dominion of the Soul over it ſelf and other things, but from virtuoſe habits? Plato aſſures us, That a virtuoſe temperate man is foreign, ſtronger than himſelf: i.e. by virtue he has dominion over his ſenſitive part. Again, Repub. 9. he inſtructes us, That he who is beſt is moſt happie and august or royal; becauſe he is able to governe himſelf, foreign: But he that is moſt wicked is moſt miſerable, becauſe he is a Tyrant over himſelf. May we account him a man fit to governe himſelf, who is a ſlave to his unlawful paſſions and luſts? The Orator defines Libertie, a power of living as men liſt: and who hath this power to live as he liſt, but the virtuoſe man, whoſe wil is conformed to the divine Wil? Doth the voluptuoſe ſenſual man live as he liſt, whoſe mind is diſtracted and torne in pieces by unbridled luſts, as by ſo many wild Horſes? Can it be imagined, that the ambitioſe man lives as he liſt, whoſe mind is ſtil on the rack of ambitioſe deſignes? Doth the avaricious man live as he liſt, who the more he has, the more he wants? It's moſt evident, that no man lives as he liſt, but the virtuoſe man, who has a wil ſlexible to the divine Wil. This Dominion that attends moral Libertie is wel expreſſed in ſacred Philoſophie:Hoſ. 11.12.Hos 11:12 So Hoſ. 11.12. But Judah yet ruleth with God, and is faithful with the Saints. (1) Obſerve, p. 79That Judah's ruling with God is oppoſed to that of Ephraim, who ruled alſo, but not with God, as v. 7. Ephraim endeavored to exalt himſelf on the ruines of Gods Worſhip, by erecting Calves at Dan and Bethel, &c. But Judah ruled with God, and was faithful with the Saints. (2) Judah rules with God: i.e. by ſerving and obeying God obtains Dominion and Rule over himſelf and al lower things: he lives as he liſts; becauſe his wil is conformed to the Divine Wil.

2. Moral Libertie conſiſtes in the moral Life, Health, Vigor, Virtue gives life, health, vigor and force.and Force of the Soul, which alſo ariſeth from virtuoſe Habits. Al natural freedome ſuppoſeth a vital ſubject in which it inheres: and ſo, by a paritie of reaſon, al moral ſpiritual Libertie ſuppoſeth a moral ſpiritual life and vital ſubject: and indeed life renders every thing moſt beautiful, active, and perfect. Whence, by how much the more noble, excellent and perfect the life of any thing is, by ſo much the more raiſed, noble, and excellent is its ſtate, and al its operations. Life is that which ſeaſoneth every thing: and every life draws to it things ſuitable to its nature: ſo the ſpiritual, divine, virtuoſe life has Principes above human Nature, more noble and excellent: and herein conſiſtes moral Libertie as to ſtate. Plato, Repub. 4. pag. 444. informes us, That the health of the bodie conſiſtes in the equal temperament of al humors, &c. So in the Soul, foreign, Virtue truly is a certain health, pulchritude and good habitude of Soul: but ſin is the diſeaſe, turpitude and infirmitie thereof. Health, according to Auguſtine and Janſenius, conſiſtes in the vigor, force and ſtrength of Nature: and what makes the Soul more vigorous and ſtrong than Virtue? Whence is the vigor and force of any Creature, but from its Spirits? And are not virtuoſe Habits the Spirits of the Soul? That Virtue is the vigor and force of the Soul, Plato once and again aſſertes. So in his Gorgias, pag. 467. foreign, Power is of good, &c. Alſo pag. 470. he ſaith, foreign, To be able to do much is to be good. And in his Hippias, pag. 375. he ſaith, Righteouſneſſe is the vigor and power of the Soul: for the more righteous the Soul is, the more potent it is. Divine Light and Virtue is the ſtrongeſt thing in the World. In the ſenſible World nothing is ſo ſtrong as Light: and in the rational World nothing ſo ſtrong as Truth and Virtue. Al the force and vigor of luſt comes from impotence; but Virtue is as a Pondus or p. 80weight on the Soul, which ſtrongly impels it to its laſt end. What more potent than Love, whereby the Soul adheres to its laſt end? By how much the more ſpiritual and pure any facultie is, by ſo much the ſtronger it is: and is not Virtue the puritie of the Soul? Again, the ſtrength of every thing conſiſtes in its adhence to its firſt Principes, and laſt end: departure from our firſt Principe and laſt end ſpeaks impotence: And what is it that enables us to adhere to our firſt Principe and laſt end but Virtue? The ſtrength of the Soul lies in its abilitie to do good and ſuffer evil: and whence is this but from Virtue? The better any thing is,Prov. 3.7, 8.Prov 3:7Prov 3:8 the ſtronger it is. Thence Prov. 3.7, 8. The fear of the Lord is ſaid to be health to the navel, and marrow to the bones. The navel is the great organ, which conveighs both food and phyſic to the infant inthe womb: alſo marrow gives ſtrength and vigor to the bones, as Job 21.24. Such is Virtue to the Soul, both health and ſtrength.

e. Moral Libertie as to ſtate conſiſtes chiefly in a divine Amplitude and Enlargement of Soul, The Amplitude of virtuoſe Habits.whereby it is made capable of enjoying its firſt Principe and laſt End. Indeed al Libertie, both natural and moral, implies Amplitude. Thence, amongſt the Hebrews, foreign ſignifies both Libertie and Amplitude, as Pſal. 119.45. And whence comes al moral Amplitude as to ſtate, but from virtuoſe habits? The firſt moſt ample Being is God, who has no limits to his Being, or his Felicitie: and ſo far as man is like to God, ſo far he enters into this Divine Amplitude of ſtate. Hence the Platoniſts aſſert, that Amplitude is founded in Unitie, namely God, and from this divine Unitie it takes its origine and meaſures. For every thing is by ſo much the more ample and extenſive, by how much the nearer it comes to pure Act. Al mater and paſſive power brings with it limits and coarctation: every thing is ſo far ſtraitned and narrowed in its being and appetite, as it partakes of mater either phyſic or metaphyſic: but on the contrary, ſo far as things approche unto pure Act, which is God, ſo far they rejoice in Amplitude and Enlargement, either of Being or Appetite: and who approche nearer unto God, who is pure Act, than virtuoſe Souls, who partake of the Divine ſimilitude? Do not theſe then partake moſt of divine Amplitude as to ſtate? How miſerably is the Soul ſtraitned, pinioned, and cooped up by ſin? But O1 what a boundleſſe moral Amplitude do virtuoſe habits bring with them? Subjection and Adheſion to God by Virtue p. 81brings the higheſt Amplitude and Dominion. For God being the first Efficient, that gives Being, and the last End, that gives bleſſed Being; it hence neceſſarily follows, that Subjection and Adheſion to God, in both theſe reſpects, muſt bring the higheſt Amplitude and Dominion with it. As man, by departure from God, is ſubject to a miſerable neceſſitie, and coarctation of ſin; ſo by regreſſe and returne to God he paſſeth into Divine Amplitude. Is not the Aſſimilation of the Soul to God by virtuoſe habits, its ultimate perfection as to ſtate? Muſt not then al divine Amplitude take its origine hence? This is wel illuſtrated by Plato, in his Theaetetus, pag. 176. We may not preſume, that ſin finds place with God: wherefore we must endeavor to flie from it, as much as may be: foreign. But this flight conſistes in this, that we are aſſimilated and conformed to God, ſo far as poſſiby we may be: and that which aſſimilates us to God is Juſtice and Sanctitie conjoined with divine Wiſdome. His mind is, that Aſſimilation to God by virtuoſe habits puts the Soul into a ſtate of diſtance from ſin, and conjunction with God, whence al moral Amplitude doth emerge. Thence Cyrillus, lib. 1. in Joan. termes Grace, foreign, Sanctitie infuſed from without by Grace, according to the divine and ſupermundane Image. And Greg. Nazianzen, in Apolog. termes it foreign, Deification; alſo foreign, the Appropinquation of God. And the ſpurious Dionyſius, Eccleſ. Hierar. cap. 2. ſaith, That in the divine Regeneration men attain, foreign, to a divine ſtate or existence. Whence Virtue is termed by Ammonius, foreign, as it were a Qualitie of the Divinitie in us. Indeed what is the pious virtuoſe Soul, but an immenſe boſome and living receptacle of the chiefeſt Good? And O! what an infinite Amplitude muſt ſuch a Soul rejoice in? It's a commun Saying among the Platoniſtes,Bonitas eſt nexus cum unitate. That Bonitie is a nexe or conjunction with Ʋnitie, i. e. God. And muſt not ſuch an intimate conjunction neceſſarily bring with it the higheſt Amplitude? Again, Plato and his Sectators generally informe us, that al Virtue is foreign, a participation of the divine Nature. So Plato, in his Phaedo, aſſures us, That a virtuoſe man is foreign, akin to God, becauſe partaker of the divine Nature, as the ſacred Philoſophie, 2 Pet. 1.4. This he explicates at large, Repub. 6. pag. 501. as Gen. 1.26. Now then, if Virtue be ſuch an expreſſion and p. 82participation of the divine Nature, muſt it not of neceſſitie alſo partake of the divine Amplitude and Libertie? In ſhort then, the nearer and more like to God the Soul is, the more ample and capacious it is: and by how much the more virtuoſe it is, by ſo much the nearer, and more like to God it is: doth it not then neceſſarily follow, that according to the degree and meaſure of Virtue, ſuch is the degree and meaſure of divine Amplitude as to ſtate? Conſinement to what is good, gives the greateſt amplitude and enlargement of heart, for the knowlege, love, and imitation of God, as Pſal. 119.45. foreign in Amplitude, &c. The Soul never walkes in greater amplitude and libertie of ſpirit, than when it moſt firmely and inviolably adheres to God and his Divine Wil.

4. Moral Libertie as to ſtate importes Nobilitie, Dignitie, Eminence, Excellence, Nobilitie, Dignitie, Greatneſſe from Virtue.Singularitie, Separation, and Magnitude or Greatneſſe of Diſpoſition, and Condition of Life. And are not al theſe eſſentially and intrinſecally included in Virtue, both as to name and thing? foreign, Virtue is derived from foreign, Mars; as this from foreign, arits, a potent valiant man: which notes, that Virtue is moſt potent and great. So Plato, in his Cratylus, makes foreign, Good, to be the ſame with foreign, excellent, eximious, preeminent. And indeed al the notions of Virtue or Sanctitie in ſacred Philoſophie import Diſcretion, Separation, Singularitie, Preeminence. Thus foreign, holy, is derived from foreign, to ſeparate from commun uſe: and it is ſometimes ſynonymous with foreign, which ſignifies peculiar, moſt pretioſe, excellent, &c. Whence foreign, an holy people, Deut. 7.6.Deut. 7.6.Deut 7:6 & 14.2. is there interpreted foreign, a most excellent, eximious, noble people: by the LXX. as alſo, Tit. 2.14. foreign, a ſelect, peculiar, ſuperexcellent people. And Pſal. 16.3. foreign,Pſal. 16.3.Ps 16:3 Saints, is interpreted inwhat follows, foreign, magniſicent, eximious: which ſhews that none are truly magnificent but virtuoſe holy perſons. Thence alſo foreign, holy, pure, is deduced from foreign, veneration, worſhip; and this from foreign, to worſhip: which they alſo derive from foreign azaz, to honor. That Sanctitie and Virtue is the Crown of al other Excellences, is evident from Zach. 9.16.Zach. 9.16.Zech 9:16 For they ſhal be as the ſtones of a Crown, lifted up as an Enſigne on his land: i. e. God wil deliver his Saints out of their dangers and troubles; as alſo lift them up to that honor, which pretioſe ſtones have in the Kings Diademe. The word foreign ſignifies both Separation and a Crown: which notes here, that every p. 83Saint is ſeparated by God, as a Jewel in his Crown. Thence God termes them, Mal. 3.17. My Jewels. Which notes both ſeparation and proprietie, as alſo dignitie and excellence. Indeed Sanctitie and Virtue is the Glorie and Crown of al other Excellences; becauſe it implies ſeparation from al impurities, and a comprehenſion of the higheſt perfections: It raiſeth things and perſons, otherwiſe commun and vulgar, to the higheſt degree of excellene, even to the Image of God, which is the perfection of human Nature. Thus Plato, Leg. 4. pag. 716. largely demonſtrates, That conformitie to the divine Image is the higheſt perfection of human Nature: Of which ſee Philoſ. General. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. ſect. 3. §. 5. But more particularly, That Virtue brings with it the higheſt Nobilitie, Magnificence, and excellence, is evident from many Platonic Philoſophemes. Thus Definit. Platon. pag. 413. foreign, Nobilitie is deſined, foreign, a Virtue of generoſe manners. So foreign, Magnificence, is pag. 412. defined, foreign, a Dignitie according to the moſt auguſt or venerable right Reaſon: i. e. according to Virtue. For indeed al the ancient Philoſophers made Honor and Nobilitie to be but the ſhadow and reward of Virtue. A free man, according to the Hebrews is ſtiled foreign, nadib; which ſignifies alſo a Prince or Noble man, one endowed with noble, generoſe, virtuoſe diſpoſitions. What more ſublime and noble than Vitue?Ut foelicitatis eſt, quantum velis poſſe; ſic magnitudinis, quantum poſſis velle. Plin. ad Trajan. Is not that a generoſe Soul, that is wel-diſpoſed and inclined to generoſe heroic deeds? Is any Soul more great than he, who can deſpiſe great mundane things for Virtues ſake? It is accounted by ſome a great piece of felicitie to be able to do what they wil: but is it not a greater piece of libertie to wil what we ought, which alone belongs to virtuoſe perſons? Is he not truly great, who has a great meaſure of Virtue? Hence among the Heroic Virtues, there was found out an Apotheoſis; which was nothing elſe but an extenſion of Virtues and human conditions to a perfection not human. Virtuoſe perſons are the greateſt men in the world: they have the greateſt Souls: yea nothing is really great, but what is good. The beſt Nobilitie lies in the mind indued with Virtue: what mind more great than that, which is ſubject to the great God? Who is greater than he, who is leaſt in his own eyes? Is not ſuch a Soul moſt great in divine favor? It was a great Saying of Zeno the Stoic: You are not therefore good, becauſe great; but you are therefore great beauſe good.

p. 845. Moral Libertie as to ſtate implies Splendor, Beautie, and Glorie. The Splendor, Beautie and Glorie of Virtue.Plato makes Beautie to ariſe from the predominance of the forme over the mater, which otherwiſe is diſtorme. By the forme I underſtand the ſpirituoſe active Principe; and ſo indeed it holds true of the Soul, the Beautie whereof conſiſtes in the predominance of virtuoſe habits, which are as the ſpirits, and forme of the Soul. For look as the Soul, which is the forme of a man, gives life, vigor, perfection and beautie to the human bodie; ſo proportionably virtuoſe habits give life, vigor, perfection and beautie to the human Soul. Plato abounds much in this argument, that Virtue is the Beautie of the Soul. So in his Phaedrus, pag. 279. O Friend Pan [the Ape of the Meſſias] give me to be beautiful within: i.e. in my Soul. Thence pag. 250. he ſaith, The Beautie of divine Wiſdome [which is the Spirit of Virtue] is ſo illuſtrious and amiable, that if it were ſeen with eyes it would ſtir up wonderful Loves. Al Beautie ariſeth from Light, spirits, and proportion of parts: and what gives Light, Spirits, and proportion to the Soul but Virtue? Some define Beautie, the fulgor, or bland face of Goodneſſe: and doth not this ſpeak Virtue moſt beautiful? Cicero defines Beautie, a due congruence with ſuavitic of color: and what hath a more due congruence and ſweet color, than Virtue? Among the Beauties of Nature nothing more beautiful than Light: and O1 what a glorioſe illuſtrious Light attends Virtue? Is not divine Veritie the Spring of Virtue, the moſt virgin, unſpotted, glorioſe, affective Light? Plato, in his Philebus, pag. 64. ſaith, That foreign, the Idea or face of Good is compoſed of three things, foreign, Beautie, and Symmetrie, and Truth. Yea, he ſaith, foreign The very Images of things beautiful, are beautiful. And is not God moſt beautiful, yea the firſt Beautie, as before Chap. 2. §. 2. And what is true Virtue but the glorioſe Image of this firſt Beautie? Muſt it not then be moſt beautiful? Aristotle, Eth. lib. 1. cap. 8. aſſures us, foreign, according to the Delphic Inſcription, That which is most juſt is most beantiful. And Seneca, Epiſt. 115. addes: If it were lawful to look into the mind of a good man, O! what a beautiful face ſhould we ſee? How holy, how reſplendent a mind, compoſed of a magnific and placid countenance? yea, ſaith he, Virtue is ſo gracioſe and beautiful, that it is natural even to wicked men to approve better things: neither has any one ſo far baniſhed the p. 85natural Law, or put off humanitie, as to eſpouſe wickedneſſe for wickedneſſe ſake. So Plato and Aristotle: foreign, No man is voluntarily wicked for wickedneſſe ſake. Which ſhews, that Virtue in it ſelf is moſt amiable. Greg. Nyſſenus, Hom. 2. in Cant. termes Virtue, foreign, the Grace of the Beautie of the Soul flowing from God, the ſupreme Beautie. And Baſil, in Pſal. ſaith, That Grace is, foreign, the Beautie of the Soul. Alſo Coryſoſtome, ad Theodor. Paraen. 1. tels us; That a deformed bodie cannot be made beautiful, but a deformed Soul may be rendred ſuch by Grace: foreign, &c. To render the Soul beautiful, although it be fallen into extreme turpitude, to reduce it to the moſt excellent pulchritude, and ſo to make it amiable and deſirable, &c. In ſum, what is Beautie but the ſplendor and luſtre of thoſe perfections, which are loged in any ſubject? And thence is not God the firſt Beautie, becauſe moſt perfect? And are not althings ſo far beautiful as they partake of his Divine Perfection and Goodneſſe? For what is al created Beautie, but a ray of the Divine Beautie? And among created Beauties, doth any thing more reſſemble the Divine Beautie than true Virtue? 'Plato, in his Phaedrus, pag. 250. ſaith, That Juſtie and Temperance and other Virtues in this our imperfect ſtate have little Light and Beautie: but in the future ſtate, foreign, then we ſhal contemplate the most perfect Beautie, &c. And then he concludes: foreign, But now Beautie [of things divine] has gained this dignitie, that it is the most illuſtrious and amiable of althings.

§. 3. Having explicated and demonſtrated moral Libertie as to ſtate, we now deſcend to conſider it as to its Exercice, Moral Libertie as to Exercice in virtuoſe Acts.which conſiſtes in virtuoſe Acts. For it is a good Theoreme in Philoſophie, That the ſecond Act follows the first: ſuch as the ſtate is, ſuch are the Exercices in that ſtate: As in natural and civil Libertie, ſuch as the ſtate is, ſuch are the Exercices in that ſtate: if a man be, ſui juris, a free man, he may act as ſuch in that Corporation wherein he is free: Thus in moral Libertie, ſuch as are free as to ſtate, by having their Souls clothed with virtuoſe habits, they wil exert and put ſorth virtuoſe Exercices in that ſtate. So that moral Libertie as to Exercice is nothing elſe but a libertie to act according to that dignitie of ſtate they are inveſted with. p. 86Now for the more ful explication and demonſtration of moral Libertie as to Exercice, we are, (1) To explicate what it is, and (2) To demonſtrate, that it is the ſupreme Libertie of a rational Creature. As for the explication of moral Libertie as to Exercice we may comprehend it in the following Propoſitions.

1. Moral Libertie as to Exercice conſiſtes in the ſpiritual, affectionate, permanent Contemplation of the first beautie or Truth. To contemplate the first Truth, The Contemplation of the first Truth.as wel according to ſacred, as Platonic Philoſophie, is one of the ſupreme parts of moral Libertie as to Exercice. Contemplation, according to the Platoniſt, is the Exercice of the mind on things intelligible: and what more intelligible, than the firſt Truth? Thence Plate, in his Phaedrus, pag. 247. tels us, That the mind foreign, beholding for ſome while the first Being, and ſatiating it ſelf in the contemplation of Truth, and giving up it ſelf thereto, is thereby nouriſhed and recreated with the higheſt pleaſure. As ſight is of al the moſt noble ſenſe, and moſt quick in apprehenſion; ſo contemplation or the ſight of the firſt Beautie and Truth is one of the higheſt Exercices of moral Libertie; that which brings in moſt tranquillitie, ſatisfaction and pleaſure to the mind. Of al Contemplations there is none ſo powerful, ſo ſweet, ſo free, as the contemplation of the firſt Cauſe and laſt End. As God is infinitely better than al Creatures, ſo the contemplation of God is infinitely better than the contemplation of al the Creatures. That the contemplation of the firſt Being is one of the higheſt Acts of moral Libertie is moſt manifeſt; becauſe (1) Contemplation is the higheſt Act of the Soul; and therefore when placed on the ſupreme Being and higheſt Object, muſt needs bring the higheſt Libertie and Perfection with it, Joh. 17.3. (2) The mind of man, when rectified, has a flagrant ardent deſire to contemplate the firſt Beautie and Truth. Ariſtotle aſſures us, foreign, That thoſe who are converſant in the inquiſition of truth have been ſweeteſt manner of life. How ſweet and free is it then to contemplate the firſt Truth? (3) The contemplation of the firſt Being gives a wiſe emprovement of al other Beings and Objects which occur. This ſpiritualiſeth and draws out the Elixir of al objects, providences, perſons and things we converſe with. (4) The contemplation of the firſt Beautie is that which moſt aſſimilates the Soul thereto. If there were a beautiful Picture, which perſons by looking on, p. 87ſhould gradually be made like unto, who would not gaze thereon? And is not the firſt Beautie ſuch, which makes al thoſe as ſpiritually contemplate thereon, beautiful, and free? Joh. 1.14.Joh. 1.14.John 1:14 foreign, We have diligently and attentively beheld his glorie, as on a Theatre. The Human Nature is that glorioſe Theatre, on which the Deitie deſcends and offers himſelf to our contemplation: and O! what a glorioſe contemplation is this, to behold the Deitie in the golden Arke of Humanitie? How is the Soul hereby transformed into the ſame glorioſe Image, as 2 Cor. 3.18? (4) Spiritual contemplationof the firſt Being gives poſſeſſion therefo. Truth is made one with the Mind by contemplation: and doth not the firſt Truth become one with the Mind, by lively affectionate contemplation thereof? (5) Contemplation of the firſt Beautie is moſt influential on the divine Life, and therefore a main Spring of Moral Libertie. Is not this a great Source of Divine Wiſdome? Are not contemplative perſons in things natural and moral the wiſeſt of men? And is not this moſt true in things moral and divine? Was it not a great Saying of that great Divine, The greatest Muſers are the beſt Artiſts? and doth not this hold moſt true here? yea, doth not the Pſalmiſt aſſure us,Pſal. 39.3.Ps 39:3 Pſal. 39.3. That whiles the heart muſeth, the fire of divine affection burneth? Doth not contemplation on the firſt Beautie fortifie the heart againſt every tentation, tune it for every ſervice, and ſweeten every croſſe? Is it not both food and phyſic to the Soul, the life of our life, yea univerſally uſeful in every ſtate and condition.

2. Another Exercice of moral Libertie conſiſtes in an intimate and inviolable Adherence unto the laſt End and chiefeſt Good. Adherence to the last End and chiefest Good.What the laſt End and chiefeſt Good is, with the proper Characters of each, we have, §. 1. of this Chapter, fully diſcuſſed: our preſent worke is to explicate what moral Libertie the Soul acquires by adhering thereto. The laſt End poſſeſſeth the greateſt Amplitude, Univerſalitie, and Libertie imaginable, as to al means: it is, as an infinite Ocean, an immenſe univerſal Principe, that conteins al Morals in its boſome: althings receive bounds and limits from their laſt end: but this receives bounds and limits from nothing. Now the laſt end enjoying ſuch an infinite Amplitude and Libertie, it neceſſarily follows, that the more intimately and firmely the Soul adheres to it, the more libertie as to exercice it is poſſeſſed of. Thence Plato, Leg. 4. pag. 715. ſaith, That God p. 88(according to the ancient Tradition, I ſuppoſe Judaic) is the Principe and End of althings. And then he addes, pag. 716. That he, who adheres, with a compoſed mind and ſirme purpoſe, to this laſt end, is most bleſſed and free. And in what follows, he lays down the manner how the Soul adheres to God, namely, by conformable Acts of Pietie, &c. And herein indeed his Philoſophemes are conſonant to ſacred Philoſophie; which frequently placeth moral Libertie as to exercice, in inviolable cloſe Adheſion unto God, as our laſt End.Pſal. 63.8.Ps 63:8 So Pſal. 63.8. My Soul adheres cloſely to thee, as the Original foreign importes. We find the ſame word in the ſame ſenſe, Deut. 10.20. Ruth 1.14, 16. Job 41.17. Pſal. 119.31. and it primarily denotes, that intimate inviolable conjugal Adherence, which is or ought be between man and wife, who are, by Law of Nature, one fleſh, as Gen. 2.24. And that this Adherence to God as our laſt End, and chiefeſt Good is a main part of moral Libertie,Pſal. 73.28.Ps 73:28 as to exercice, is further evident from Pſal. 73.28. But it is good for me: i. e. it is my chiefeſt Good, that wherein my higheſt libertie conſiſtes. To draw near to God, foreign. Appropinquation, Acceſſe, Adherence to God. Thence the LXX. render it, foreign, To adhere to God, to be as it were glued to God: So the word, in its primary notion, ſignifies. Thence it is frequently uſed to expreſſe that intimate conjunction that ought to be between man and wife, as Mat. 19.5. yea Epheſ. 5.31. it ſignifies the conjugal adherence and union between Chriſt and his Church.1 Cor. 6.17.1 Cor 6:17 And we find foreign uſed in the ſame ſenſe, 1 Cor. 6.17. foreign, He that is glued, or conjugally united to God as his chiefest Good, as the precedent words import. And O! what an high piece of moral Libertie is this, intimately and inviolably to adhere to God, as our laſt End and chiefeſt Good? Is the heart ever more free, than when it doth moſt ſtrongly, by al manner of affectionate exercices, adhere to its chiefeſt Good? So many grains as there are of a bended wil for God, ſo much moral Libertie. A tenacious, reſolute, invincible adherence unto our laſt end, by acts of love, deſire, and other affections, makes the Soul exceding free in al its motions.Pſal. 73.26.Ps 73:26 Thus Pſal. 73.26. My fleſh and my heart faileth, foreign ſignifies to conſume with deſire, or, to fail with long expectation. This poor mans caſe was thus ſtated: He ſaw the wicked to flouriſh, and the godly oppreſſed, which brought him under anxious diſputes about the chiefeſt Good: but, upon inquirie in the Sanctuarie, he was reſolved to adhere p. 89inviolably to God as his chiefeſt Good So it follows: But God is the ſtrength of my heart, and my portion for ever. Some render it, the reck unto which my heart adheres: others, the firme adheſion of my heart is to God, my chiefest Good. Whence follows his libertie v. 28.Pſal. 86.4.Ps 86:4 Thus Pſal. 86.4. Rejoice the Soul of thy ſervant: i. e. make me free for and in al moral exercices: and why? for unto thee, O Lord, do I lift up my Soul: i.e. unto thee as my chiefeſt Good do I adhere. So Pſal. 25.1. This tenacious adherence of the Soul to its laſt end, is lively illuſtrated by our Lord, Mat. 6.20-24. v. 20. He exhorts them,Mat. 6.20-24.Matt 6:20–24 To lay up treaſures in Heaven: i. e. to make God their laſt End and chiefeſt Good: to cleave to himwith an inviolable intime bent of wil: and he gives the reaſon of it, v. 21. For where your treaſure is there wil your heart be alſo. the heart and the Treaſure are ever together. This our Lord illuſtrates by a lively notion, v. 24. He wil hold to the one, and deſpiſe the other, foreign, mordicus adhaerebit. foreign properly ſignifies, to hold fast a thing, in oppoſition to thoſe that would pluck it from us: Thence, to be very tenacious in adhering to perſons or things: So in Plato, Xenophon, and Iſocrates. It's emphatically here, as Luk. 16.13.Luk. 16.13.Luke 16:13 applied to the Souls tenacious adhering to its laſt End and chiefeſt Good. Whence it's added, and deſpiſe the other. A Soul that tenaciouſly adheres to its chiefeſt Good, deſpiſeth al frowns or blandiſhments that may aſſault it. Thence v. 25. our Lord concludes, foreign, Therefore: i. e. If you adhere to God as your chiefeſt Good, you will not be ſo anxiouſly concerned about the goods of Time. To ſum up this Argument. Every Creature has an Element to live in: and when it s in that Element it is moſt free: The Souls Element is its laſt End and chiefeſt Good: and every man is more or leſſe morally free, as he more or leſſe adheres thereto. For ſuch as a mans laſt end is, ſuch is the motion of his Soul as to moral good or evil, and moral libertie or bondage. By how much the more we love, delight in and enjoy our laſt end, by ſo much the more free we are in al our ways. The libertie of a rational Agent conſiſtes, not in having varietie of objects to adhere to, and take complacence in, but in tranſmitting al to his laſt end, which is his beſt good.

That a Wil actually and ſtrongly bended to adhere to its laſt End and chiefeſt Good is moſt free, wil appear by the following Particulars. (1) The more the Wil is fortified by true Virtue to adhere to its laſt End and chiefeſt Good, the more free it is p. 90from ſin, which is the worſt ſervitude. He indeed is truly noble and generoſe, who is not a vaſſal to any baſe luſt. Al power to ſin is the diminution of libertie. Impeccabilitie or an utter impoſſibilitie of ſinning is ſo far from deſtroying libertie, as that it is perfected hereby. The ſweeteſt and higheſt libertie is to have no power to ſin. Now the more the Wil actually adheres to its laſt end, the leſſe power it has to ſin. (2) Moral libertie conſiſtes in the Souls being preſerved from whatever may damnifie or prejudice it: and wherein conſiſtes the preſervation of every things, but in its Ʋnitie? Doth not diviſion ever bring diſſolution? And what preſerves the Souls unitie ſo much, as actual adherence to God, the firſt Unitie? (3) The moral libertie of the Wil conſiſtes chiefly inhaving al inferor things ſubject to it: and when are althings more ſubject to the dominion of the Wil, than when it is, by a reſolute actual adherence, ſubject to the Wil of God? (4) The more harmonious and uniforme the Souls acts are, the more morally free they are? And whence ſprings this harmonie, but from actual regard and adherence to the laſt end? (5) Where ever the Soul finds reſt and ſatisfaction, there it finds moral libetie: and doth not the Reſt of the Soul ariſe from its adherence to its chiefeſt good. Thence that great Eſſate of the ſpurious Dionyſius: foreign, Bonitie [or the chiefest Good] convertes althings to it ſelf: i. e. althings tend to and acquieſce therein as in their Centre or ultimate perfection. (6) The more the Wil is conformed to the Divine Wil, the more free it is: and whoſe Wil is more conforme to the Divine Wil, than his, who actually and reſolutely adheres to God? Doth not ſuch a Wil touch the Divine Wil in every point, as two ſtrait Lines?

3. Moral Libertie as to Exercice conſistes in an actual, Dependence on the first Cauſe.total, and immediate Dependence on the first Cauſe of althings. Every Creature having ſomething of Nothing, or paſſive Power, either phyſic or metaphyſic and obediential; it thence fals under the Law of Mutabilitie, which is the root of Dependence. Novitie of Being, Deficience and Dependence is eſſential to the Creature, as Eternitie of Being, Immutabilitie, and Independence is to the Creator. For every Creature being only Being by participation; hence Dependence becomes intrinſecal to it, and inſeparable from its nature, as Suarez, Metaph. Diſp. 20. Sect. 5. acutey demonſtrates. Yea, Diſp. 31. Sect. 14. he further demonſtrates, That Subordination p. 91or Dependence of a created Being, both in acting and cauſing, formally belongs to its eſſential reaſon as ſuch; becauſe this dependence is founded, not in any qualitie or proprietie of the Creature, extrinſecal to its Eſſence, but in the very intrinſecal limitation thereof. So that the very Eſſence of the Creature, as ſuch, is the root of this dependence: and to ſuppoſe a Creature, and not to ſuppoſe it to be dependent in eſſence and operation, implies a contradiction. Neither has the rational Creature a natural dependence only, but alſo moral on its firſt Cauſe. We find both mentioned by Plato, Leg. 4. pag. 715. where he ſhews, That God is foreign, the Principe and End of al Beings, whoſe conduct he that follows, ſhal be happy. And Epinom. pag. 980. he aſſures us, That he, who praying to God doth truſt in his Benignitie, ſhal act wel. So in his Timaeus, pag. 27. he tels us, That al, who have any thing of an awakened mind, when they attemt any mater either great or ſmal, are always wont to cal on God. Which is an high act of Dependence. Thence Theages, pag. 128. he brings in Socrates philoſophiſing of his Dependence on God, thus: foreign, ▵AIMONION, For there is a certain DEMON, which has followed me with a Divine Afflation even from my childhood This is a voice that ſignifies to me what I must do, &c. What this Demon of Socrates was, is greatly controverted by the ancient Philoſophers, who have written Books concerning it. That it was ſome Divine Afflation or Inſpiration they generally grant, as Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. C. 1. §. 4. It certainly importes his great ſenſe of Dependence on ſome Divine Power, either Real or Imagiuary. Yea, Planto, in his Timaeus, ſaith, That Beatitude or moral Libertie is nothing elſe but to have foreign, a Demon dwelling in him. Whereby peradventure he may allude to the Hebraic foreign Shekinah, i.e. the Divine Habitation of Gow with men. Thence the Greek Fathers terme efficacious Grace and our Dependence thereon, in imitation of ſacred Philoſophie, foreign, the inhabitation of the holy Spirit, alſo foreign, indwelling Grace. Which alludes to that of Paul, 2 Cor. 12.9. foreign,2 Cor. 12.9.2 Cor 12:9 that the power of Chriſt might tabernacle or dwel on me. It evidently alludes, both name and thing, to the Divine foreign, or habitation of God with and in men; which denotes the higheſt Dependence. And indeed herein conſiſtes one main part of moral Libertie as to exercice. Look p. 92as the beams of the Sun touch the Earth, yet hang on the Sun as their original Cauſe; ſo doth al true moral Virtue on its firſt Cauſe. Virtuoſe perſons, who are moſt feeble in themſelves, are moſt ſtrong and free by dependence on their firſt Principe. Where there is a ſubordination of Cauſes, either moral or natural, it is the libertie of the inferior to depend on, and receive from the ſuperior. Doth not the firſt Cauſe give forth actual aſſiſtances uſually according to the meaſure of our actual dependence on him? If he drop not in every moment new ſpirits and influences, how ſoon do al moral Virtues wither and die away? What more natural than for the ſecond cauſe to depend on the firſt? Where there is a limited eſſence, is there not alſo a limited dependent Activitie? Can a dependent cauſe produce any more than a dependent effect? Muſt not every mutable, variable, defectible Being he reduced to ſome immutable indefectible firſt Cauſe? That which had not Being from it ſelf, may it have Operation independently from it ſelf? Is not the operation of the ſecond cauſe founded on the operation of the firſt? If the created Wil cannot ſubſist of it ſelf, may it expect the privilege of acting from it ſelf, independently as to the firſt Cauſe? Is not the human Wil a mere paſſive, though vital, inſtrument as to the reception of divine influences, albeit it be active as to its own operation? Muſt not then its dependence on the firſt Cauſe be abſolute and total? Yea, is not this Dependence immediate? And, O! how is the Soul enlarged, according to the meaſure of its actual dependence on the firſt Cauſe? Without this dependence the moſt facile moral duties are moſt difficult; but with it the moſt difficult are moſt facile. The Soul is wel compared to a Glaſſe without a foot, which ſo long as the Divine hand holds there is no danger of its being broken; but if God withdraws his hand, it ſoon ſals to the ground, and is deſhed in pieces: he need not take it, and throw it againſt the wal; it wil break of it ſelf. Hence the efficacious Grace of God is termed by the Ancients, foreign, Munudaction; alſo foreign, aſſiſtent Grace: Again, foreign, the energie and cooperation of God: Baſil termes it, foreign, al manner of energie: Cyril, foreign, the aide from above: Chryſoſtome, foreign, the auxiliant or aſſiſtent Power. Greg. Nyſſen. in Pſalm. ſaith: foreign, The Aide of God is the Head and Sum of Virtue. And Chryſoſtome, in Gen. foreign, p. 93The whole of good is from the Grace of God. Whence God is termed by Cyril, in Eſa. foreign, the Creator and Framer of al good: and his efficacious Grace is termed, by him, foreign, the multiforme Energie: also foreign, the efficacious Aide: as by Chryſoſtome, foreign, the invincible Aſſiſtence. Of which more hereafter. The moral divine Life is nothing in regard of the firſt Cauſe, but continual effuſions and inſuſions into the Soul, and in regard of man nothing elſe but conſtant regard towards God, and continual dependence on him. As the excellence of the Angelic nature could not preſerve them, when ſelf-dependent; ſo the impotence of Human nature cannot prejudice us, ſo long as we are dependent on the firſt Cauſe. True moral Virtue is a celeſtial Plant, fed by ſome inviſible root in the celeſtial World; from which it derives its influences. Members and branches live no life, but the life of their head and root: al divine and moral Reſpirations toward the celeſtial world, are from ſweet Inſpirations of divine Concurſe. We cannot actively draw down divine influences, but we may enlarge our paſſive receptive capacitie by actual dependence thereon. Al moral Beings, even the Angels themſelves, as they have new ſervices to do for God daily, ſo they are dependent for new aſſiſtances; and herein conſiſtes a main part of their moral Libertie. Thoſe who are ſtrongeſt in ſelf dependence, are ſooneſt foiled; as Peter.

4. Another Exercice of moral Libertie conſiſtes in actual conformitie unto God, and imitation of him, both by obedience to his preceptive, Conformitie to the Divine preceptive Wil.and ſubmiſſion to his providential Wil. (1) It's a great eſſential part of moral Libertie, to conforme to the preceptive Wil of God. God being the prime Exemplar and Meaſure of al Libertie, it neceſſarily follows, that the more we imitate and follow God, the more freedome we obtein: and who imitate and follow God more, than they, who conforme moſt to his Divine preceptive Wil? Nothing more commun in ſacred Philoſophie than this, That Adherence, Conformitie and Subjection to the Divine Law is the top of moral Libertie. Thus Pſal. 119.45.Pſal. 119.45.Ps 119:45 I wil always walk at libertie; becauſe I ſeek thy precepts. foreign, in amplitude: i. e. I wil walk in al manner of Amplitude and Libertie both of heart and ways; becauſe my heart adheres inviolably to thy royal Law of Libertie. The Law of God written on the heart is no other than the very Image of God, a bond or cord of Love, whereby the heart is knit to God, and ſo made free for the fruition p. 94of him. Delight in and conformitie to the Divine Law, by al manner of virtuoſe exercices, is the higheſt libertie. O! what a regal, glorioſe libertie is this, to be always found in ways of obedience to the divine Wil? What a practic contradiction is it to expect moral Libertie in ways of ſin? When the Spirit of God takes the Law of God, and tranſcribes it on the heart, and thereby makes it free to performe actual conformitie to the externe Law,Rom. 8.2Rom 8:2 what a ſoverain Libertie is this? Thus Rom. 8.2. For the law of the Spirit of life, i. e. engraven on the heart, as 2 Cor. 3.3. hath made me free from the law of ſin and death: i. e. enabled me freely and chearfully to conforme to the Divine Law, &c. Thus alſo,Jam. 1.25.Jas 1:25 Jam. 1.25. But whoſe looketh into the perſect law of libertie: foreign denotes (1) an accurate inſpection or prying into a thing, as they who bring their eye cloſe to an object, in order to a more diſtinct perception thereof. (2) A dwelling on an object: as ſome curioſe perſons, who ſpend much time in dreſſing themſelves, do, as it were, let their eye dwel on their glaſſe; juſt ſo the eye of the mind ſhould dwel on the Divine Law, which is the glaſſe, wherein we contemplate the Divine Wil, Image and Sanctitie. Thence follows the object, the perfect Law of Libertie. (1) The Divine Law is called perfect, as it is an abſolute perfect Miroir or Glaſſe, wherein we contemplate the Image and Wil of God, and whereby the mind is perfected. (2) It is termed a Law of Libertie, [1] As evangeliſed and ſweetned by evangelic Grace. [2] As it makes thoſe free, that conforme to it. So far as the heart is made conformable to divine Commands, ſo far its actings in conformitie thereto and free and chearful. Hence a godly man is ſaid to be a Law unto himſelf: i. e. if there were no Law extant, yet he would do the ſame virtuoſe acts, from that inward Law engraven on his heart. Whence Jam. 2.8. it's ſtiled the Royal Law: and v. 12. The Law of Libertie: becauſe conformitie thereto, from an inward principe of Virtue, is the higheſt Libertie, according to Divine eſtimation.

And as ſacred Philoſophie, ſo Platonic placeth much of moral Libertie in actual conformitie to the divine Law. Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 592. aſſures us, that in Heaven there is foreign, a perfect Exemplar, for him that wil behold it, and by beholding be conformed thereto. Meaning God the original eſſential Exemplar of al Sanctitie, whoſe ſacred Wil is the grand Patterne of our Conformitie. p. 95And leg. 4. pag. 716. he largely demonſtrates, That by how much the more conformable the Soul is to the Divine Wil, by ſo much the more perfect and free it is. It is moſt evident, ſaith he, that every man ought moſtly to attend this, how he may be of the number of thoſe that follow God. What action therefore is it, that is most beloved by God, and most conſentaneous to his Wil? Truly but one, according to the old Proverbe, foreign, becauſe like is beloved by lie, whereunto it is conformable, &c. Wherein he ſhews, that moral Libertie conſiſtes chiefly in following God; which is performed by actual conformitie unto his Wil. Thence Philo Judaeus, that great Platoniſt, in his Book, That every virtuoſe man is free, demonſtrates at large, That to be free is to follow God by conformitie to his divine Wil. And indeed what is Libertie as to exercice, but adhering unto God? and who adhere to God, but they who conforme to his divine Wil and Law? Doth not moral Libertie ariſe from ſubjection to God? And are not they moſt ſubject to God, who conforme moſt to his Law? It was a great Saying of Pythagoras, foreign, Follow God. Thus alſo Epictetus, in Arrian. lib. 1. cap. 20. foreign The end of Philoſophie is to follow God, i.e. to conforme to his divine Law. And the ancient Philoſophers, ſpecially Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato, made Aſſimilation to, and Imitation of God the main end of al Philoſophie.

(2) This actual Conformitie unto God implies ſubjection and ſubmiſſion to his providential Wil, both Afflictive and Diretive. Conformitie to Gods providential Wil.And herein alſo much of moral Libertie doth conſiſte. Is not that mind moſt noble, great, and free, which can bear great croſſes with equanimitie and patience? Doth not this give more libertie and enlargement than any temporal affliction can deprive us of? O! what a ſweet thing is it to have a free generoſe mind under a ſtraitned conſined condition! How facile are burdens made hereby! A virtuoſe Spirit, that follows God in afflictive providences, becomes a King over his croſſes: his loſſes prove his gain; his reproche, his glorie; his confinement, his libertie. This is incomparably wel expreſſed by Epictetus, in ſeveral Philoſophemes. So Enchirid. cap. 38. Know, ſaith he, that this is the main part of Religion towards God, that thou conforme thy ſelf, foreign, to obey him, foreign, and to acquieſce in althings that happen, and willingly to follow, as that which is beſt governed by the most excellent Mind. Thus alſo in Arrian. l. 1. p. 96c. 12. foreign. To ſubmit the mind, to the mind that governes althings, as good Citizens to the Law of the Citie, this is libertie in its perfection. So lib. 3. cap. 7. foreign, &c. I always rather wil what happens; for I eſtime what God wils, better than what I wil. I adhere to him as a miniſter and ſectator: I deſire what he deſires, and ſimply wil what God wils. thus Seneca: That is a great and free mind, which has given up it ſelf to God.

5. Moral Libertie as to exercice importes the uſing and referring althings in order to the ſervice and fruition of God. The reference of althings to God.Libertie, according to both ſacred and Platonic Philoſophie, conſiſtes foreign, in the concent, harmonie, ſymmetrie, and right order of althings: i. e. when al ſubſerve our laſt end. And what is the laſt end of man, but to ſerve and enjoy God? Whence Plato, Protag. 3. pag. 326. ſaith, That the whole life of man ſhould be compoſed of harmonie and uniformitie: i. e. al actions, means, occurrences ſhould ſweetly conſpire and agree for the promoting our ſupreme end. The mind is morally free, not by extending it ſelf to varietie of objects, but by reducing al to unitie, or God, who is the ſupreme Unitie, which reduceth althings to it ſelf. Again, Libertie implies Election: and is not that the beſt election, which refers al to its laſt end? the reſpect we have to Creatures depends on the reſpect they have to God: and ſo far as we refer them to God, ſo far we are free in the uſe of them. By ſubjecting our ſelves, and al enjoyments to the ſervice of God, we gain dominion and freedome over althings: but if the heart be irregular and inordinate in adhering to the uſe of the moſt lawful comfort, it is immediately captivated thereby. This is moſt evident from ſacred Philoſophie: as 1 Cor. 6.12. Althings are lawful to me. 1 Cor. 6.12, 13.1 Cor 6:121 Cor 6:13Paul ſeems to have taken up the commun Phraſe of thoſe Corinthian Libertines, who under a pretexte, that althings were lawful, did abuſe their juſt libertie to the grieving of their weak Brethren. It's true, ſaith he, althings are lawful: I grant it: yet withal remember, that althings are not expedient: if you have not a great care, your deſires and uſe of things lawful wil ſoon prove unlawful. For my part, addes he, althings are lawful for me, but I wil not be brought under the power of any: foreign. Here is an elegant Paronomaſie between foreign, which the Corinthian Libertines boaſted of, and foreign, which ſignifies primarily, to be brought into bondage, under the power of p. 97another. They that uſe things lawful, without regard to their expendience and ſubſervience to the ſervice of God, are brought under bondage to them. Thence the Apoſtle addes, v. 13. Meats are for the belly: i. e. for the ventricule or ſtomach and inteſtines, to ſupplie them with nutriment: and the belly is for meats: i.e. to receive and digeſt them. But God ſhal deſtroy both it and them: i. e. take away the uſe both of meats and ventricule in Heaven. The Apoſtle brings this as an argument to prove, that our Chriſtian Libertie doth not lie ſimply in the uſe of theſe things; becauſe when we are moſt free, there wil be no uſe of them. God gives not men libertie to enjoy what they liſt, but what they ought: the free uſe of Creatures conſiſtes in this, to make us more free inthe ſervice of God: herein lies the goodneſſe of any Creature, in our being thereby enabled to do good. Thoſe that ſubject their hearts to God in the uſe of Creatures, are moſt free therein: yea, you are never free longer than you ſerve God by them.

That to ſerve God is the higheſt Libertie that human Nature is capable of, ſacred Philoſophie doth abundantly aſſure us. It's an old Saying, but moſt true, that To ſerve God is to reign. This is a Kings life. Every one hath his Talent from God; and as he doth more or leſſe employ it for God, ſo he is more or leſſe free. It's honor enough for the Creature to be employed by his Creator. Yet over an above this God rewards every degree of ſervicer with ſome degree of libertie, tranquillitie and peace. There is nothing that has greater dignitie and libertie entailed on it, than the ſervice of God. Thus Luk. 22.29.Luk. 22.29, 30.Luke 22:29Luke 22:30 And I appoint unto you a kingdome, as my Father hath appointed unto me. foreign ſignifies to appoint or diſpoſe by Wil and Teſtament. The mind of our Lord is, that, as the Father appointed to him a Kingdome to be acquired by ſuffering and ſervice; ſo in like manner he appointed to his Servants a Glorie and Dignitie next to his royal Majeſtie, to be acquired in the ſame manner and way. This our Lord addes to give check to their carnal ambitioſe humor, v. 24, 25. It follows v. 30. That ye may eat and drink at my table, and ſit on thrones judging the twelve Tribes of Iſrael. There are two things wherein the preeminence of Nobles and Peers is moſt illuſtrious. (1) In the honor vouchſafed them by their Prince. (2) In their Power and Autoritie over others. Both of theſe are here mentioned, as belonging to Chriſts Servants. (1) Their p. 98honor conſiſtes in ſitting at Chriſts table. (2) Their power, in ſitting on Thrones, &c. Yea, we find a ſtrange and unuſual honor vouchſafed by Chriſt to his Servants, Luk. 12.37. He ſhal gird himſelf, and make them ſit down to mean, and wil come forth and ſerve them. Joh. 12.26.John 12:26O1 what an incomparable honor is this! The like Joh. 12.26. If any man ſerve me. Our Lord here ſpeaks of himſelf as a great King, who hath many Miniſters of State to order his Affairs: and every Miniſter of his is a King in his place. Thence he addes: And where I am, there alſo ſhal my ſervant be: i. e. in my Kingdome of Glorie, if he follows me in the Kingdome of my Patience. yea, he addes: If any man ſerve me, him wil my Father honor: i. e. he ſhal not only be happy, but moſt honorable. Neither is this Dignitie and Libertie reſerved only for Heaven, but even in this life God inveſtes his ſaithful Servants therewith. Thus it was with Joſhua, Zach. 3.7. And I wil give thee walkes among thoſe that ſtand by: i. e. among the Angels, that ſtand by and miniſter to me, and my Church, as Tarnovius.

§. 4. Having explicated what moral Libertie as to Exercice is, we are now to demonſtrate,Moral Libertie of Exercice the highest. that this is the ſupreme Libertie that a rational Creature is capable of.

1. The more ordinate and regular human Acts are, the more morally free they are:Its Order, for al moral freedome denotes order and reference to our laſt End: and are not virtuoſe Acts moſt ordinate and regular? Thus Plato, Gorg. pag. 504. foreign, The Soul and its acts receive order and ornament from the Law: whence men are made regular and orderly: which belongs to Juſtice and Temperance: i. e. al Acts are ſo far regular, as they partake of Justice and Temperance, which give order and harmonie to al our Exercices. Juſtice and Temperance, according to Plato, are univerſal cardinal Virtues, which regulate and diſpoſe al human Acts according to the beſt order, wherein their freedome chiefly conſiſtes. Whence Plato makes mention of foreign, a Chorus of Virtues, wherein al move in the most regular orderly manner. Yea, he affirmes, That the whole life of man ſhould conſiſte of Harmonie, Order, and Ʋniformitie. And Rep. 3. pag. 412. he informes us, That a life compoſed of Contemplatives and Actives, foreign, is most muſical and harmonious: i. e. The whole life of a virtuoſe man muſt be compoſed, foreign, of Symphonie p. 99or Concent and muſical Ryme: ſo that Thoughts and Affections muſt anſwer to Rule, Words to Thoughts, and Actions to Words: and herein conſiſtes the foreign, good Order and Libertie of human Exercices. So again, in his Laches, pag. 188. he aſſures us,Non eſt hujus animus in recto, cujus acta diſcordant. Omnia facta dictá que tua inter ſe congruant ac reſpondeant ſibi, & una forma percuſſa ſint. Virtus aequalitas ac tenor vitae per omnia conſonans ſibi. Sen. Epist. That is the beſt Muſic, when words and life concord, or agree among themſelves, as alſo to the Rule. Virtuoſe Exercices conſiſte in all equal tenor of life, agreable to it ſelf, and to the Law; which is always attended with a good order, and libertie. It is an excellent Character of Padre Paul the Venetian, mentioned in his Life, pag. 133. That his life was ſingularly compoſed of active and contemplative: he always yielding to God what he could, to his Prince what he ought, and of that which belonged to his own Dominion more than he ought by any Law, but that of charitie. Again, pag. 175. That which made him moſt admired, was the coupling together of Virtues, and with conditions that are not uſually met in one and the ſame ſubject: as Knowlege and Humilitie; Prudence with Meekneſſe; Retiredneſſe and Officiouſneſſe; Seriouſneſſe and Pleaſantneſſe; Arguteneſſe without offence; Brevitie and Perſpicuitie; Sweetneſſe and Soliditie. So great was the concent and order of virtuoſe Exercices in this great Soul. Indeed order is the life and perfection of moral Acts: and the more of order the more of libertie. Now virtuoſe Acts are of al moſt regular and orderly; becauſe they are meaſured by the exacteſt Rule, and directly tend to the laſt End, which is the first Principe in Morals. Thus in ſacred Philoſophie, Gal. 6.16.Gal. 6.16.Gal 6:16 And as many as walke according to this rule peace be unto them. foreign ſignifies a Reed whereby Geometers meaſured their ground: alſo the white Line in the Grecian Race. And foreign here ſignifies, ſo to walke as to keep an exact order, not to deviate the leaſt from the white Line in our Race. And what is the privilege of thoſe who thus walke? Peace be to them: i.e. moral Libertie and Tranquillitie.

2. The Libertie of an Act both Natural and Moral is to be meaſured by its Spontaneitie, Connaturalitie, Facilitie, and Suavitie. Virtuoſe Exercies most ſpontaneous and ſweet.For al Libertie conſiſtes in an foreign, a ſelf-motion: and by how much the more ſpontaneous, connatural, facile and ſweet the ſelf-motion is, by ſo much the more free it is judged to be. And what motions of the Soul are more ſpontaneous, ſpiritually connatural, and ſweet, than ſuch as are virtuoſe? Plato, in his Lyſis, aſſures us, that foreign, Good is moſt proper to our nature, p. 100and what is better than virtuoſe acts? are they not then moſt proper or connatural? Thence Definit. Platon. pag. 411. Temperance is defined, foreign, a ſelf-motion according to nature: i.e. connatural, or agreable to rectified human Nature. And Plato, in his Timaeus, tels us, That the beſt motion of the Soul is in it ſelf; becauſe this is moſt akin to rational Nature. And when doth the Soul move more in it ſelf, than when it moves virtuoſely towards its laſt end? Is not the laſt end the beſt part of our ſelves? Therefore when the Soul moves virtuoſely towards it, doth it not move moſt in it ſelf? It's a great Notion among the Platoniſts, That Virtue is, foreign, most proper and congenial to man; but ſin is foreign, moſt aliene and repugnant. And Bradwardine ſtrongly demonſtrates, That to adhere to God, as our firſt Cauſe and laſt End, is the moſt natural act of a rectified Soul: and is it not then moſt free? Every motion of the Soul is ſo far free as connatural and proper: O! then how free are virtuoſe Acts? The Platoniſt inſtructes us, That to a good man God is a Law, but to the wicked Luſt is a Law: Now if God be a Law to a good man, then al his motions toward God are moſt free. There is indeed a divine Sympathie between a virtuoſe Soul and the divine Law:Repugnanti non volenti neceſſitas eſt. In volente neceſſitas non eſt. Sen. and therefore he moſt freely obeys it: for al obey what they love, as Plato aſſures us: Hence a virtuoſe man is a Law to himſelf: he has the divine Law impreſſed on his Soul: and thence the Law of God is to him a Law of Love and Libertie: ſo that he obeys it not out of force, but choice: for foreign, force cannot touch love. There is a ſervice of Love which is moſt free: by how much the more cloſely and inviolably the Soul is, by virtuoſe acts, ſubjected to God, by ſo much the more free it is: for the very act of love, as terminated on the Creator, is formal moral Libertie, as Janſenius acutely demonſtrates, Auguſt. Tom. 2. pag. 41. Yea virtuoſe exercices are not only ſpiritually natural to the virtuoſe Soul, but alſo moſt facile, ſweet and delicious. Plato, Timae. pag. 81. tels us: Whatever is repugnant to Nature, is most irkeſome; foreign, but what is conſentaneous to Nature is moſt ſweet. Now that virtuoſe acts are moſt agreable to rectified Nature has been already demonſtrated. What can furniſh us with greater dexteritie, facilitie, and alacritie in acting than virtuoſe Principes? foreign, Alacrite is defined, Definit. Platon. pag. 413. foreign, A manifeſtation of practic election: and who manifeſt more free practic p. 101election, than ſuch as act virtuoſely? Frequence of exercices both in Nature and Virtue give a great facilitie. foreign, Cuſtomes are defined by Galen, foreign, ſuperadded Natures: and Ariſt. Rhet. l. 1. c. 11. pag. 57. ſaith, foreign, Cuſtome is akin to Nature: whence he addes, foreign, Cuſtome makes every thing ſweet. Now virtuoſe exercices frequently repeted breed a divine ſpiritual cuſtome, which is attended with divine ſuavitie and delight. The frequent repetition of the ſame exercice makes it more facile, dexterous and ſweet. Experience teacheth us, that whatever is long cuſtomary, turnes into our natures, even diſeaſes and poiſons. How much more then ſpiritually natural and ſweet are divine cuſtomes and habits attending virtuoſe acts? Thence Heb. 5.14. foreign.Heb. 5.14.Heb 5:14 Virtuoſe cuſtomes and habits make the exercices of ſpiritual ſenſes moſt familiar, pleaſant and ſweet, and therefore moſt free: for the freedome of an act is much to be meaſured by the delight and pleaſure that attends it. And what acts of the Soul have more of true pleaſure and delight attending of them, than virtuoſe exercices? O! what ſweet inſpirations, what divine ſuavities are infuſed into the Soul upon virtuoſe actings? Frequence of acts makes bitter things ſweet: and is not the bitter croſſe ſweetened by virtuoſe exercices? are not the moſt difficult ſervices made facile hereby? Doth not every act of Virtue carry ſome degree of pleaſure, and therefore of libertie in it? And by how much the more pure and ſpiritual any virtuoſe act is, by ſo much the more pure is that joy which attends it. For al joy and pleaſure is the effect of ſome operation: and the more raiſed and ſpiritual the operation is, the more refined and ſtrong the pleaſure and joy is. The pureſt and ſtrongeſt pleaſures are ſuch as attend the Souls actual adheſion to its firſt cauſe and laſt end: for the nearer things come to their firſt Principes, the more joyful and free they are: and what brings the Soul nearer its firſt Principe than virtuoſe Acts? Is not then a virtuoſe life the ſweeteſt and moſt free? Do not acts of Virtue bring with them the moſt judicious, real, ſolid, pure, ſpiritual, ſtrong, ſelf-ſufficient and permanent pleaſures and delights, as Pſal. 119.14, 16, 20, 35?

3. The Libertie of moral Acts conſiſtes much in their Vitalitie. Virtuoſe Exercices most lively.The more excellent and noble the life is, the more free the acts are: and the more virtuoſe the acts are, the more of the divine life they carry in them. Thus Plato, Charmid. pag. 171. Sin being p. 102baniſht from the Soul, and Rectitude preſiding in every act, it's neceſſary, that thoſe who are thus diſpoſed, foreign, do act wel: foreign, and that thoſe who act wel, do live happily. The ſame pag. 173. But rather let us endeavor diſcretely to lead our lives and act, that ſo we may live bleſſedly. Whereby he intimates, that virtuoſe Acts are always bleſſed and free: no man that acts virtuoſely can live miſerably. Thus alſo Ariſtotle, Eth. l. 1. c. 4. foreign, To live wel is to act wel. The life of every living Creature exerts and manifeſts it ſelf moſt in that operation, which is moſt proper to it, and unto which it is moſt naturally inclined: and are not virtuoſe Acts moſt proper and natural to man conſidered in his beſt ſtate? What is life, but the Actuoſitie of the Soul informing the bodie? And what more promotes this Actuoſitie than exercice? Is not alſo the life and Actuoſitie of the Soul morally conſidered improved by virtuoſe exercices? Where there is natural life there wil be ſome pulſe and motion of the Spirits: So where there is a moral life of Virtue there wil be exercice.Quantò perfectiùs quis à ſe movetur, tantò perfectior eſt modus vivendi. Aquin. By how much the more perfectly any thing is moved by it ſelf, by ſo much the more perfect it; mode of living is: and are not thoſe who act virtuoſely moſt perfectly moved by themſelves? Plato tels us, Phaedr. pag. 245. foreign. Again, foreign. By which he ſhews, That it is proper to life, to move it ſelf by it ſelf. And when doth the Soul moſt freely move it ſelf by it ſelf, but when it acts virtuoſely? And as al life conſiſtes in action, even the life of God in a pure Act of underſtanding and willing; ſo in like manner the divine moral life in virtuoſe actions. A virtuoſe Soul, as it has Principes of life above Nature, ſo alſo actings: for by how much the more noble and excellent the life is, by ſo much the more excellent is the operation. The life and motion of virtuoſe hearts, is upward, like that of fire, which is of al the moſt noble, active, and free life. Thence in facred Philoſophie, Life is frequently put for a noble, comfortable, free, bleſſed condition of life, Pſal. 34.12, 13.Ps 34:12Ps 34:13conſiſting in virtuoſe exercices. So Pſal. 34.12. What man is he that deſireth life, i. e. a bleſſed, free, ſweet life. And how may ſuch a life be acquired? That he tels you, verſ. 13, 14. Depart from evil and do good, &c. The like, Pſal. 22.26. & 69.33. & Pſal. 119.77. Eccleſ. 6.8. 1 Pet. 3.10. And Auguſtine gives us the true reaſon of this facred Phraſeologie; namely, becauſe there is no true life, but what is virtuoſe, bleſſed, and free. So p. 103that as there is no moral libertie without a divine life; ſo there is no divine life without virtuoſe exercices. Whence by how much the nearer the Soul comes to God by virtuoſe Acts, by ſo much the more divine and free its life is.

4.Virtuoſe Exercices most ample. The moral Libertie of human Acts may be much meaſured by their Amplitude and Magnitude. And are not virtuoſe Acts of al moſt ample and great? Actual adheſion to God and his divine Law importes not only ſubjection, but alſo enlargement and libertie. Thence Pſal. 119.96. the divine Law is ſaid to be exceeding broad or ample: and why? becauſe it is the expreſſion and Character of the divine Sanctitie and Wil, which is moſt ample. Whence the Soul, by actual adherence to the divine Law, rejoiceth in the divine Amplitude and Libertie. Thus Pſal. 119.165. Great peace have they who love thy law. Or,Pſal. 119.165.Ps 119:165 ample peace, with libertie as to walking. Thence it follows: and nothing ſhal offend them. Or, they ſhal have no ſtumbling block: ie. They ſhal walke in the Kings high-way, according to the royal Law of Libertie, with al manner of libertie and boldneſſe.Liber ab infinito, ad infinitum, ſuper infnitum movetur. It's a great Saying of the Platoniſts, That one free is moved from infinite, to infinite, upon infinite: i.e. a virtuoſe man, in al exercices of Virtue is moved, (1) From God, as the firſt Cauſe and original Spring. (2) To God, as the laſt End, and infinite Good. (3) Ʋpon, or according to the infinite Wil and Law of God, as the meaſure and rule of al his virtuoſe exercices. Whence alſo they tel us, That the motion of a free Soul is circular, from God, as the firſt Cauſe; to God, as the laſt End; and by God, and his divine Wil, as the meaſure. Such is the amplitude and magnitude of the Soul in al the exercices of Virtue: So that it fals under no coarctation or confinement, either in regard of Principe, or End, or Rule; but partakes in its meaſure, of that Amplitude, which its Principe, End, and Rule rejoiceth in. For ſuch as a mans first Principe, last End, and Exemplar is, ſuch is he as to libertie, or ſervitude.Quantò finis altior, tantò actus volun… eſt libe…. By how much the more ample and ſublime the end is, by ſo much the more ample and free is the Act. Again, the virtuoſe Soul adhering to and depending on God as the firſt Cauſe obteins great enlargement. Whereas ſin, being an averſion from God our firſt Principe and laſt End, puts fetters, chains, limits and confinement on the Soul.

5. Moral Libertie as to exercice conſiſtes in the freedome from vitiofe Inclinations, Affections, and Motions. Plato, in his Timaeus, p. 104…perſuades us, That the culture and cure of every thing conſiſtes in giving it, foreign, its proper diet and exercices: and what more efficacious to cure the Soul of its vitioſe humors and maladies, than to give it its proper virtuoſe exercices? When is the Soul more vigorous and healthful, than when it is moſt in virtuoſe exercitations? Althings are purified by perfective fermentation: and is not the Soul alſo purified from its noxious peccant humors by the divine fermentation of virtuoſe affections? Thus Rom. 12.11.Rom. 12.11.Rom 12:11 foreign, fermenting or boiling in ſpirit. Syr. foreign, which is ſpoken of boiling waters, Job 41.22. So Job 30.27. LXX. foreign, My bowels fermented or boiled. The more the affections ferment and boil by virtuoſe exercices, the more free they are to ſerve God, and leſſe obnoxious to the ſervice of ſin. By how much the leſſe we ſerve ſin, by ſo much the more free we are: And who ſerve ſin leſſe, than they who are moſt deeply engaged in virtuoſe exercices? Plato, Tim. pag. 89. tels us, That the most healthful purgation is by Gymnastic exercitation. What is health but the ſpirituoſe vigor of Nature? And what more promotes this ſpirituoſe vigor than exercice? And doth not this hold true as to the Soul? Is not its moſt healthful purgation by virtuoſe exercitation? Doth not this moſt promote the ſpirituoſe vigor and health of the Soul? What makes the fire to conſerve it ſelf in its puritie, but its grand and perpetual activitie? Doth not alſo the running ſtream keep it ſelf pure, whiles the ſtanding Pool gathers mud? Are althings in Nature purified by motion?Quantò virtus aliqua intenſiùs tendit in aliquid, tantò fortiùs repellit omne contrarium. Aquin. and ſhal we not alſo allow the ſame efficace to virtuoſe exercices? It's true, virtuoſe exercices do not purge out ſin by their own innate force, as Phyſic purgeth out il humors; but by the divine promiſſe, concurrence, and benediction. By how much the more intenſely the virtuoſe Soul actually tends to its laſt end, by ſo much the more ſtrongly doth it repel whatever is contrary thereto.

6.Virtuoſe Exercices moſt ſtable and permanent. Virtuoſe Exercices are moſt ſtable, firme and permanent: Therefore moſt free. Moral Libertie as to exercice conſiſtes much in the firmitude, ſtabilitie, and permanence of ſuch exercices. Whence Plato, in his Cratylus, pag. 415. derives foreign, Virtue, foreign, becauſe it is always in fluxe or motion: whence he makes it to be ſynonymous to foreign, a facile and expedite progreſſe: For, ſaith he, it always flows in an equal ſtable manner. The Soul, according to Plato, is foreign, an ever-moving Principe; and therefore it p. 105ought foreign, to be always in action. Now it is moſt certain, that no acts of the Soul are more ſtable, firme and permanent than virtuoſe acts. Thus Ariſt. Eth. l. 1. c. 10. foreign, Virtuoſe exercices are most permanent. And he gives this reaſon of it: Becauſe bleſſed Souls live and dwel always in ſuch Acts, without tediouſneſſe or oblivion. And Plato, in his Cratylus, tels us: foreign, Sloth is the greateſt bond and fetter of the Soul, which obſtructs al virtuoſe exercices. The firmitie and ſtabilitie of every thing ariſeth from its adheſion to its firſt Principe and laſt End: and by how much the more the Soul departes from theſe, by ſo much the more inſtable and ſluctuating it is: To ſtand invariable and immutable in adhering unto God, under al the viciſſitudes and various changes of this World, argues great moral libertie as to exercice: and wherein conſiſtes the Souls adheſion to God as its firſt Principe and laſt End, if not in virtuoſe exercices?

7. Virtuoſe Exercices do greatly improve and advance Virtue, Virtuoſe Exercices improve Virtue.and ſo by conſequence moral Libertie. Plato, in his Timaeus, pag. 90. aſſures us, That when the faculties of the Soul grow ſluggiſh and lazy, they are rendred more infirme and impotent; but by continual action they are made more robust and vigorous. And doth not this Philoſopheme hold valid in Morals, as wel as Naturals? Doth any thing render the virtuoſe Soul more robuſt and vigorous, than virtuoſe exercices? So pag. 103. The Soul is nouriſhed and corroborated, foreign, by labors and exercices. And are not virtuoſe labors of al moſt nouriſhing and corroborative? Thence, ſaith Seneca, Labor nouriſheth generoſe minds. O!Generoſos animos labor nutrit. Sen. then how are virtuoſe minds nouriſhed by the labors of Virtue! As the native heat is preſerved by the Pulſe, or twofold motion of the heart; ſo is Virtue by its exercices. It's a trite Saying in the Scholes, Ceſſation from acts diminiſh habits, but continuance therein emproves the ſame. It's true, there is a difference in this regard between acquired habits, and virtuoſe, which come by infuſion; becauſe acquired habits are the natural products of their acts, but virtuoſe habits are not naturally produced by virtuoſe acts, but given in by God of mere Grace. God rewards virtuoſe exercices with farther degrees and advances of Virtue, or Grace, and that of mere Grace. So Mat. 13.12.Mat. 13.12.Matt 13:12 For whoſoever hath, to him ſhal be given. foreign here doth not ſignifie the mere having of a Talent, but the employing, uſing, or occupying the ſame: p. 106for it is a good Rule among Grammarians, That Verbes, which primarily ſignifie to have or poſſeſſe, oft denote the uſing of what we have. So here Hath notes to uſe, occupie, or traffic with what we have. To ſuch it ſhal be given, and he ſhal have more abundance: i. e. God wil reward his diligence in uſing and occupying his Talent, be it natural or ſupernatural, with much more in the ſame kind. If his Talent be natural gifts or commun illuminations, he ſhal receive more in that kind: if true moral ſupernatural Virtues, his ſtock ſhal encreaſe in its kind. Whence it follows: But whoſoever hath not, i. e. employes not by exercice: from him ſhal be taken away even that he hath: i. e. his Talent ſhal be taken from him: his commun gifts and ſeeming virtues ſhal wither. Yea, virtuoſe exercices in the ſharpeſt winter of affliction make Virtue to flouriſh and proſper.Heb. 12.11, 12.Heb 12:11Heb 12:12 Thus Heb. 12.11. Every chaſtiſement for the preſent ſeems not to be joyous, but grievous; but afterward it yields the tranquille fruit of righteouſneſſe, to them that are exerciſed thereby. foreign, exerciſed as in the Gymnade: whence it follows, v. 12. Wherefore lift up the hands that hang down. foreign, ſignifies ſuch a remiſſion or diſſolution as is oppoſed to intenſion, firmitude, ſtrength. It here denotes ſloth and remiſneſſe as to labor, whereof the hand is the inſtrument. Thence he addes: and the feeble knees. foreign, the paralytic knees, ſuch as are as it were ſtruck with a Palſie, and therefore unapt for motion. This later clauſe ſeems to refer to the Race, which required the exercice of the knees; as labor, that of the hands.

8.Formal Beatitude in virtuoſe Exercices. A great and main part of moral Libertie conſiſtes in virtuoſe exercices; becauſe herein conſiſtes formal Beatitude. Both Plato and Aristotle place formal Beatitude in virtuoſe operations. Thus Plato, in his Conviv. pag. 211. makes the perfection of human Felicitie to conſiſte in contemplating, foreign, &c. the most ſincere, uniforme, divine Beautie, &c. of which before Chap. 1. The like in his Phaedrus, pag. 250. So Ariſtotle, Eth. l. 1. c. 7. defines formal Beatitude, the exercice of the rational Soul, according to the beſt and moſt perfect Virtue, in the most perfect life. And Cap. 8. he addes, That to act wel and live wel makes man happy. And the demonſtration hereof is moſt evident. For (1) Operation and exercice is the end of al virtuoſe Habits and Principes, and therefore their perfection: for every Forme, Power, or Habit is ordained to its act, as to its perfection. Whence Baſil termes Grace, foreign, completive p. 107or perfective of Nature. Which chiefly belongs to gratioſe Acts. Thence Aristotle ſtrongly argues, that formal Beatitude cannot conſiſte, foreign, in poſſeſſion of objective Beatitude and habitual union therewith, but foreign, in uſe and exercice. For a man may poſſeſſe the chiefeſt good, and have habitual likeneſſe thereto, and yet not formally happy, as virtuoſe men aſleep. (2) The more Virtue is in exercice, the more it reſſembles the Divine Libertie and Perfection. The Divine Being and Libertie is a pure ſimple Act, without the leaſt habit or paſſive power, either phyſic or metaphyſic: and therefore the more actuoſe Virtue is, the more like it is to God. (3) Virtuoſe exercices bring moſt ſatisfaction with them. Both Plato and Aristotle inſtruct us, That virtuoſe Acts are of themſelves foreign, ſelf-ſufficient. They inſpire ſweet ſatisfaction into the Soul, as before Chap. 1. §. 6. And this is very commun in ſacred Philoſophie. Yea we are herein aſſured, that by virtuoſe exercices we may have ſome prelibations of formal Beatitude, even in this life. This ſeems the import of that Exhortation,1 Tim. 6.12.1 Tim 6:12 1 Tim. 6.12. foreign, Exerciſe thy ſelf in that famoſe conteſt of Faith. Our Apoſtle alludes to thoſe famoſe Olympian Games, ſpecially that of the Race, wherein they contended for a Crown. Thence he addes, foreign, lay hold of eternal life. foreign here, as v. 19. is of the ſame import with foreign, 1 Cor. 9.24. Phil. 3.12. in which places the Apoſtle ſeems to allude to ſuch as ran in the Race, who, when they came to the end thereof, laid hold on the foreign or Crown on the top of the Goal. Thus Chriſtians, by virtuoſe exercices, lay hold on eternal life, as the Crown at the end of their Race. Thus he ſpeaks of himſelf, 2 Tim. 4.7, 8. foreign,2 Tim. 4.7, 8.2 Tim 4:72 Tim 4:8 I have exerciſed my ſelf in that famoſe conteſt. The double Article addes a great Emphaſe, and ſhews with what vigor and activitie he had diſpatcht his Chriſtian race, and therefore now was in expectation of the Crown. Such efficacious and ſoverain influence have virtuoſe exercices on mans formal Beatitude and moral Libertie.