The Court of the Gentiles Part 4, Part 4 · Book 1 · Chapter 2

The Court of the Gentiles Part 4 · Part 4 · Book 1 · Chapter 2

p. 43CHAP. II. Of the Moralitie of human Acts, and Moral Bonitie.

The Moralitie of human Acts. Moral Goodneſſe in Conformitie to the Divine Law. The meaſure of moral Goodneſſe perfect. The Ʋniverſalitie of a perfect Law. Subjective right Reaſon not the meaſure of Moral Good, but the Moral Law. Right Reaſon among the Philoſophers the objective Law of Nature. The Moſaic Law a perfect Rule. The Parts and Cauſes of moral Bonitie. (1) The Mater: Things indifferent in genere & ſpecie: Nothing indifferent in individuo. A virtuoſe Wil the Principe of Moral Good. The best End eſſential to Moral Good. The forme of moral Good Conformitie to Gods Law. How foreign gives Forme. How far Circumſtances formaliſe Moral Good. The Ʋnitie and Ʋniformitie of al Moral Good. There is no real, moral, or natural Good, but what is ſupernatural. Moral Good most difficult. The Virtues of Pagans leſſer ſins only. The diſtribution of Moral Good into Pietie and Justice.

§. 1. HAving diſpatcht the generic Idea and last End, The Moralitie of human Acts.which has the place of a firſt Principe in Ethics, we now paſſe on to the Moralitie of Human Acts, and their Bonitie. And here we ſhould firſt treat of the natural interne Principes of human Acts; namely the practic Judgement or Knowlege, Volition, Conſultation, and Election: But having diſcuſſed theſe more largely in Court of the Gentiles, P. 1. B. 4. c. 1. §. 24. we ſhal not here undertake the diſcuſſion of them. As for the Moralitie of human Acts, there are great diſputes in the Scholes, Wherein the Eſſe morale of human Acts doth conſiſte? Suarez, in 1.2. (which vulgarly they ſtile his Ethics) Tract. 3. Diſp. 1. pag. 207. diſcourſeth largely of the Moralitie of human Acts under theſe heads. (1) He makes the formal denomination, or that forme whereby an Act is denominated moral, to be more than an Ens rationis properly ſo termed, or a figment of mens minds, ſomething in or appendent to the things themſelves. This we grant. (2) He thence deduceth, That the Eſſe morale in the act of the Wil, beſides its Entitie and ſubſtance, addes a certain mode of emanation or moral p. 44dependence on the Reaſon adverting, and the Wil freely working. This Hypotheſis needs animadverſion and reſtriction. It's true, the Moralitie of human Acts hath dependence on the Reaſon and Wil as the ſubject of thoſe Acts: for al moral Acts depend on the phyſic Principes of thoſe Acts: there is no moral Being but has its foundation in ſome phyſic or natural Being: As al moral capacitie is ſubjected in natural, ſo al moral Acts. Virtue flowing from God has its ſeat in the Creature, and ſo ſuppoſeth a create intelligent Nature as antecedent thereto. Thus Cyril Alexandr. Compend. Dialog. de S. Trinit. Tom. 5. part. 1. pag. 673. foreign, That which is holy by participation, being the receptacle of adventitious Sanctitie, that of it ſelf exiſtes primarily in proper nature: namely as Man and Angel, or any other rational Creature. So Damaſcene, Dialect. cap. 59. foreign, That is first by nature which is inferred, but infers not, i.e. ſecundùm exiſtendi conſequentiam: if there be Grace there muſt be human Nature wherein it is ſeated; but if there be human Nature, it doth not neceſſarily follow, that there muſt be Grace. Thus the human Underſtanding and Wil precede Virtue, as the ſubject thereof. Yet hence it follows not, as Suarez ſeems to conclude, that moral Acts receive their formal denomination from their relation to the Underſtanding and Wil. (3) Hence Suarez concludes, that the Eſſe morale is a mode not phyſically and intrinſecally inherent in the moral act; but in the externe act it ſpeaks denomination from the free act of the Wil: and in the very act of the Wil, beſides its phyſic emanation from the Wil, it ſpeaks denomination from the reaſon directing, and the Wil acting with a plenarie power. Though, as it has been granted, al Moralitie of human Acts doth preſuppoſe the emanation of thoſe acts from the Underſtanding and Wil, as their main Principles; yet it follows not hence, that the formal reaſon of their Moralitie muſt be taken from this mode of emanation. May we not as wel argue, that al virtuoſe acts are formaliſed by their relation to the natural Principes of human acts; becauſe they flow thence? But there lies a myſterie in this Jeſuitic Hypotheſis, which when laid open wil ſoon evidence its vanitie and falſhood. The Jeſuites, and ſome other Schole-men, in imitation, yet on miſtaken grounds, of the ancient Philoſophers, p. 45place the formal reaſon of al moral Virtue in conformitie to right Reaſon. Hence no wonder if they make al Moralitie, formally conſidered, to be a mode dependent on Reaſon and Wil. But the falſitie hereof wil appear by what follows.

If we conſider the Moralitie of human Acts as ſtated by Plato, it cannot be denied but that he alſo makes mention of an foreign, a right Reaſon, which he ſeems to make the meaſure of al Moralitie, Bonitie, and Vice. But what a vaſt diſtance there is between Plato's foreign, right Reaſon, and that maintained by the Jeſuites and ſome other Schole-men, we ſhal, when we come to diſcourſe of moral Bonitie, ſufficiently evince. For the preſent we ſhal endeavor to determine the true nature of Moralitie, ſo much darkened by ſcholaſtic niceties, in the following Propoſitions. (1) Prop. Al Moralitie of human Acts ſpeaks ſome fundamental ſubjective dependence on the natural Principes of human Acts. For there is nothing in Moralitie but has ſome relation to, yea dependence on human Nature as its ſubject and fundament. Moralitie is but a mode or relation, which cannot ſubſiſt of it ſelf, without a ſubject and foundation in Nature. Can a man know and love God, without reaſon and wil? (2) Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts is not formaliſed or ſpecified in genere moris by the relation ſuch Acts have to Reaſon or Wil. For every thing is ſpecified and formaliſed by its formal reaſon: and what is the formal reaſon of any thing but the Idea of its Eſſence? And wherein conſiſtes the eſſence of moral Acts, but in their conformitie to, if good, or difformitie from, if bad, the perfect meaſure of Morals? and what is the perfect meaſure of Morals, but the moral Law? (3) Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts is a real mode, not abſolute but relative, appendent to thoſe Acts. That Moralitie is not a mere figment of Reaſon, but ſomething real is generally confeſſed, and that on invincible grounds; becauſe it has real influences and effects. Moreover, that Moralitie is not an abſolute mode, but relative, is as evident; becauſe the whole of its eſſence ſpeaks a relation to ſomewhat elſe. Hence, (4) Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts ſpeaks ſome relation to the laſt end. For the laſt end in Morals hath the force of a firſt Principe, Forme, and Meaſure. It's a great Effate in the Scholes, That the End ſpecifies in Morals. Althings are defined and meaſured by their laſt End, but this by nothing. The laſt end, as a pregnant univerſal Principe, conteins al Morals in its wombe. (5) Prop. p. 46The object mater doth alſo in ſome degree concur to the formaliſing of moral Acts. Thence, ſaith Aquinas, A moral Act receives its ſpecies from the object and end. And Petrus à Sancto Joſeph, Theſ. 165. addes, That an Act is moral from the order it has to its object, not conſidered in its being but morally, as ſubject to the Rules of Moralitie. To this of the object we may adde al eſſential moral circumſtances, which oft adde much to the being and intenſion of Moralitie. (6) Prop. But yet we muſt conclude, That the adequate exemplar and perfect meaſure of al Moralitie, formally conſidered, is the Law of God: This comprehends and gives meaſure to al other Rules of Moralitie: the laſt end, object, and circumſtances are al meaſured hereby. Thus Scotus, and other of the Schole-men determine, That the Eſſe morale, or Moralitie of an Act as ſuch is its relation to that Law, unto which it is referred. And the reaſon is moſt evident; becauſe al Moralitie ſpeaks a foreign or relation to ſome Rule: And what adequate perfect Rule is there of moral Acts, but ſome moral Law? And thus we muſt underſtand the ancient Philoſophers, as alſo ſome late Divines, who make foreign, right Reaſon the only foreign or meaſure of moral Acts. That by right Reaſon we are to underſtand an objective Reaſon or a divine Law wil be moſt evident by what follows touching moral Bonitie and its meaſure.

§. 2.Moral Goodneſſe in conformitie to the Divine Law. Having inquired into the Moralitie of human Acts in the general, we deſcend to examine their moral Bonitie and Pravitie. Every thing is ſo far good as it anſwers to its proper meaſure and rule; but evil, ſo far as it comes ſhort thereof: And what is the meaſure or rule of moral Bonitie, but the divine Wil and Law? Thus Plato, Repub. 9. foreign, That is moſt diſtant from reaſon, which is moſt remote from Law and Order: i. e. Things are ſo far conformed to reaſon and good, as they are conformed to Law and Order. Whence, Definit. Platon. pag. 4.13. foreign, a Law, is defined, foreign, that which puts an end to controverſies about what is unjuſt or juſt. Thence foreign is alſo defined, foreign, an obedience of virtuoſe Laws. And on the contrarie, foreign, Injuſtice is defined, foreign, an habit that over looks Laws. This Plato more fully explicates, Gorg. 504. And truly that wherein the order of the bodie conſiſtes may, as it ſeems to me, wel be termed Salubritie; whence the bodies health ariſeth: foreign, but thoſe things p. 47wherein the order and ornament or goodneſſe of the mind conſiſtes, we cal legal and Law: whence men become legitime and orderly. He compares the Bonitie of the Soul to the ſanitie or health of the Bodie; which as it conſiſtes in the order and regular temperament of al humors; ſo the goodneſſe of the mind doth in like manner conſiſt in its order or conformitie to Law. This is wel explicated by his Scholar Aristotle, Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 9. art. 9. pag. 44. foreign, Righteouſneſſe truly is a virtue by which al have what is their own, and as the Law eſtabliſheth: But Injuſtice, by which men poſſeſſe what is not their own, against the precepts of the Law. What he here determines of Juſtice and Injuſtice in particular holds true of al other Virtue, and Bonitie, or Vice. But to bring Plato's Philoſophemes to ſacred Philoſophie, touching the conformitie of al moral Good to the divine Law, we ſhal determine the whole in the following Propoſitions.

1. Prop. Al moral Bonitie, Moral Bonitie in conformitie to a Law.whether objective or ſubjective and formal, denotes a conformitie to ſome Law. The Scholes diſtinguiſh moral Bonitie or Honeſtie into objective and formal. The former is that which conſtitutes a thing morally good as an object; but the later, that which conſtitutes an act as an act morally good. (1) In the objects of human Acts there is neceſſarily required a moral goodneſſe, which agrees thereto as objects, as Suarez 1.2. Tract. 3. Diſp. 2. ſtrongly proves. And the reaſons are demonſtrative: For [1] If the object or mater be not morally good or lawful, the act converſant thereabout can never be good: becauſe al moral good requires an integritie of cauſes: an irregularitie in the object wil render the act irregular. [2] The object of the Wil is good as good: therefore that Bonitie which moves the Wil cannot ſlow from it, but muſt be ſuppoſed as inherent in or appendent to its objects. [3] This moral goodneſſe of the object doth not only agree to human Acts, but alſo to al other things which may be lawfully loved and embraced. [4] This moral objective Bonitie ariſeth from the mater as clothed with al its conditions and circumſtances, whereby it is rendred a meet object for the Soul to cloſe with. [5] The moral goodneſſe of any object conſiſtes in its conformitie to or agreament with the Divine Law. (2) There is alſo formal Bonitie or Goodneſſe, which conſtitutes a man formally good. For [1] An object, though never ſo good, cannot conſtitute a man or his act formally good. It's p. 48true the Act receives ſome goodneſſe from its object, yet only materially and terminatively, not formally, ſo as to conſtitute the Act formally good. [2] The Act is ſo far formally good as virtuoſe, i. e. proceding from right Principes, tending to a right end, and meaſured by a perfect Rule. Al which preſuppoſe ſome divine Law as the meaſure.

2.The Meaſure of Moral Good perfect. Prop. That Law, which is the meaſure of moral Bonitie, must be perfect. This Hypotheſis is moſt evident, and wil appear to be ſuch, if we conſider either the nature of a meaſure, or the condition of the thing meaſured. (1) As for the nature of a meaſure, Plato, Repub. 6. wel explicates the ſame: foreign, A defective meaſure of ſuch things is no meaſure; for that which is imperfect cannot be the meaſure of any thing. Every Meaſure or Rule is indiviſible, and therefore capable neither of addition or ſubſtraction. Thus Phavorinus: foreign, A Canon or Rule is an infallible meaſure, admitting neither addition nor detraction. And thus much indeed is formally included in the notion Canon: for foreign, as the Hebr. foreign Canna, whence it is derived, primarily denotes a reed of ſuch a juſt longitude, whereby they meaſured their Lands: and thence it was uſed in the general for an exact meaſure: as foreign Job 38 5. is rendred by Aquila foreign.2 Cor. 10.13. Phil. 3.16.2 Cor 10:13Phil 3:16 Thus foreign, 2 Cor. 10.13. is explicated by foreign ſuch is its uſe, Gal. 6.16. Phil. 3.16. whereby the perfection of the Divine Law is illuſtrated. (2) That the meaſure of moral Bonitie muſt be perfect, is eaſily demonſtrated from the condition of moral Bonitie: for a plenitude of being, or integritie of Bonitie is eſſential to al moral good. Moral evil ariſeth from the leaſt defect, but moral good requireth an integritie of cauſes and parts. If there be the leaſt circumſtance miſplaced or miſtimed, it renders the act vitioſe. Now if al moral good muſt be thus perfect and entire, then it neceſſarily follows, that its meaſure and rule muſt be perfect and entire. But of this more in what follows.

3.The Ʋniverſalitie of a perfect Law. Prop. The perfection of a Law, as it is the meaſure of moral Bonitie, conſiſtes in its comprehenſion of the most perfect objective mater, end, and principes. The explication and demonſtration of this Propoſition depends on the explication of moral good, as to its conſtitutive parts and cauſes. It was ſaid before, that al moral good requires an integritie of Being and Cauſes. In the Scholes p. 49they make four Cauſes of moral Good, proportionable to thoſe in natural productions, namely Mater, Forme, End, Efficient. We ſhal not at preſent think our ſelves obliged to examine or defend the legalitie of this diſtribution; but endeavor to demonſtrate, that a perfect meaſure of moral Bonitie comprehends each of theſe Cauſes and Principes. (1) It muſt comprehend the objectmater of al moral Bonitie in its fulleſt Amplitude, Extenſion, and Ʋniverſalitie. Thus Plato, Leg. 1. pag. 630. Truth and Equitie require that they who wil diſcourſe of a divine Republic, determine, foreign, that the Legiſlator has reſpect, not to one only particle of virtue, and that truly the leaſt; but rather to al virtue, and that he find out Laws according to thoſe ſeveral Species of Virtue: i. e. The Law of moral Bonitie muſt extend it ſelf to al the various Species and Offices of Virtue. If there be any moral Dutie, which the Law of Moralitie extends not to, it is no perfect meaſure. And this argues the imperfection of Natures light in us, and al human Laws, as hereafter. (2) As for the Forme of moral Bonitie, it conſiſtes in conformitie to the Rule or Law of Moralitie; which if perfect, exacts the moſt perfect conformitie. Thus Plato, Leg. 1. pag. 630. Our whole diſcourſe tends to this, to ſhew, that this Legiſlator, and al other who wil institute utile Laws, foreign, ought, in framing Laws, to aim at the highest Virtue, i. e. at the higheſt conformitie to the beſt Law. (3) That a perfect Law of Moralitie comprehends the moſt perfect End is alſo moſt evident; becauſe the end is as the Soul and Spirit in Morals: al offices of virtue are but as a dead Corps, without a ſpirituoſe perfect end, as Janſenius demonſtrates out of Auguſtine. Thence Plato, Repub. 5. pag. 444. foreign, Good Institutes or Laws make way for Virtue, but bad precipitate men into vice. Now he elſewhere aſſures us, That the end gives life and perfection to al virtuoſe Acts. Yea, Leg. 1. he openly ſaith, foreign, Al Laws are to be ſo conſtituted, as that they may promote the best end. (4) The Law of moral Bonitie muſt be perfect as to the Efficient or Principe of Moralitie: i. e. it muſt extend it ſelf to the qualification of the ſubject, and its virtuoſe diſpoſition: for as the end directs the act, ſo the principes or diſpoſitions of the ſubject direct the end. Ariſt. Eth. lib. 3. c. 10. p. 50aſſures us, That foreign, the end of every act is according to the habit: i. e. if the mind be not wel-diſpoſed, or clothed with virtuoſe habits, it wil never aim at a virtuoſe end. Thence that great Saying of Augustine, The intention of the best end makes the worke good, and Faith directs the intention. So that the Law of Moralitie, if perfect, extends it ſelf to al virtuoſe principes and moral habits, which the ſubject ought to be inveſted with.

3.Subjective right Reaſon not the meaſure of moral Good. Prop. Subjective right Reaſon, or objective human Laws are not a perfect Rule of moral Bonitie. There are two parts in this Propoſition to be examined: (1) That ſubjective right Reaſon is not a perfect Rule of moral Bonitie. To explicate and demonſtrate this Hypotheſis we grant, [1] That Reaſon is the Organ of apprehending, albeit not the meaſure of our dutie. [2] That practic Reaſon or Conſcience, ſo far as illuminated by the Spirit of God, is the regula regulata of our dutie: for Conſcience is God's Deputie, and a Law unto a mans ſelf. Yet we denie that there is an foreign, or right Reaſon in nature corrupted, which may ſuffice as a Rule of moral Goodneſſe. I am not ignorant how much the Light of Nature, or, as ſome terme it, Right Reaſon is cried up by ſome as the only Rule of Moralitie. Thus Seneca would needs perſuade us, That we have this merit of Nature, that virtue doth premit its light into the minds of al: yea thoſe that wil not follow, yet ſee it. And not only ſome vulgar capacities now a-days, but alſo the Stoics of old generally cried up the Light within them, as the Rule of Moralitie. The Schole-men alſo, in imitation of Aristotle their Oracle, generally proclaim right Reaſon to be the formal Rule of moral Good. But that Aristotle and Plato by their foreign, right Reaſon, underſtood the objective Law either of Nature or Moſes, I no way dout but hereafter to demonſtrate. Indeed al our ſubjective Light by Nature is no other than a nocturne, dreaming, tenebrous knowlege, as Plato ſtiles it. (2) That no human Law or Laws is the perfect meaſure of moral Bonitie, No human Laws a perfect Rule of moral Good.is alſo evident; becauſe al human Laws are extreme defective in their extenſion and preſcripts as to al the Cauſes and Principes of moral Goodneſſe: how deficient are they both as to the Mater and Manner of moral Good! What Reſtrictions, Emendations, and Alterations do they need? What an infinite number of particular caſes are there, which no human Law can reach? Wel therefore doth Androcles, in Ariſtotle, Reth. l. 2. c. 25. p. 51informe us, That al human Laws need another Law to correct them, as fiſhes need ſalt, to preſerve them from putrefaction. This corrective Law they terme foreign, Equitie, which indeed is no other than the Law of Nature, as hereafter, cap. 5. §. 5.

4.The Divine Law the Rule of moral Good. Prop. The adequate perfect rule and meaſure of moral Bonitie is the Divine Law. This Hypotheſis being the main wil require more ample explication and demonſtration. (1) The Divine Being is foreign, the first eſſentially just and holy Being; and therefore the firſt eſſential rule or meaſure of al Juſtice and Sanctitie. (2) But the Divine Eſſence being too remote and diſtant from the Creature, he hath therefore given us a divine Law, as the Miroir and Idea of his eſſential Sanctitie, to be the rule of al moral Bonitie as to us. (3) This Divine Law given us, as the Rule of moral Bonitie, was concreate and connatural as to Adam, it being impreſſed and engraven on his nature, and ſo needed not any further promulgation. (4) Hence the objective and ſubjective Law or Light of Nature was to Adam, in his innocent ſtate, one and the ſame; he having a perfect underſtanding and comprehenſion of the whole Dutie of man, and ſo became a Law unto himſelf. (5) But lapſed man having loſt his ſubjective Law and Light of Nature, as to ſupernaturals, and very far as to naturals and civils, retaining only ſome fragments or broken notices, our moſt benigne Lord, out of his great clemence and pitie to lapſed man, gave a new Edition of that natural Law, and therein freſh notices of his ſoverain. wil and pleaſure, touching mans dutie. So that the World was never without an objective Law and Light of Nature, albeit the ſubjective was loſt in Adam. Yea, ſome Divines of great note conceive, that thoſe very commun natural Notions, communly called the Fragments or Remains of the Image of God loſt by Adam, are vouchſafed to us by the Covenant of Grace in and by the Mediation of Chriſt. Thus they interpret, Joh. 1.9. of Chriſt's illightening every man: Joh. 1.9.John 1:9i. e. not only ſupernatural light vouchſafed to the Elect, but even the natural notices or Light of Nature vouchſafed to the lapſed Sons of Adam is the effect of the ſecond Covenant and Chriſt's Mediation. And the reaſon ſeems demonſtrative; becauſe our very Beings and al the comforts of our Beings having been forfeited by the breach of the firſt Covenant, whatever good we enjoy on this ſide Hel, is but the overflowing of the Grace of the ſecond Covenant, and Chriſt's Mediation, by which the p. 52whole World ſtands. So far are we from any real claim to a ſubjective Light of Nature, by virtue of the firſt Covenant, as that both ſubjective and objective Light is from Chriſt. The objective Light or Law of Nature is ſtiled by the Hebrews, foreign; and its Offices, foreign, the knowen Duties, i.e. by nature: to which they oppoſed foreign, the Divine, namely Institutes, or poſitive Commands of God. For Jus naturale, the natural Law is not oppoſed to ſupernatural, but to poſitive Laws, as Grotius hath wel obſerved.Right Reaſon the objective Law of Nature. (6) This objective Law of Nature, in its ſecond Edition, as conteined in divine Revelations of moral Bonitie, was not altogether unknowen to the wiſer of the Heathen: and that Plato's foreign, Right Reaſon, was but an Imitamen hereof, we now undertake to demonſtrate. He diſcourſeth hereof profeſſedly in Minos, pag. 317. foreign, That which is Right, is the Royal Law. (1) That by foreign he means the ſame with foreign, is to me unqueſtionable, and I think it wil clearly appear ſo to others by what follows. (2) He ſaith this foreign, the Royal Law, which is the ſtile the Hebrews gave their moral Law, as Jam. 2.8. foreign.Jam. 2.8.Jas 2:8 And why doth he terme it the Royal Law, but becauſe it was the ſupreme Law of God, the King of Kings? Thence Socrates addes, We therefore rightly granted, foreign, that this Law was the invention of Being it ſelf, or of the firſt independent Being. For this generally he underſtands by his foreign. Thence, Defin. Plat. pag. 416. foreign, Sin is defined, foreign, an operation againſt right Reaſon, i. e. the objective Law and Light of Nature. Thus alſo Ariſtotle, Eth. l. 2. c. 2. art. 6. pag. 76. foreign, And truly this, to act according to right Reaſon is commun to al, and let it be fixed as a Canon. So again, Eth. l. 3. c. 8. pag. 153. he ſaith, Virtues are mediocrities freely undertaken, foreign, and ſo as right Reaſon ſhal preſcribe. This right Reaſon he elſewhere termes, foreign, the univerſal commun Law, which al by nature are ſubject to. So Rhet. l. 1. c. 14. art. 3. pag. 69. foreign, &c. I ſay, Law is either proper or commun: proper or private Law is that written Law, which belongs to particular Nations. foreign, The commun Law I cal that which is according to nature: for there p. 53is a certain commun Juſt and unjuſt, which al conſent unto, albeit there ſhould be no ſocietie, or confederation of men. This commun Law of Nature is the ſame with his foreign. For look as in ſpeculative Sciences there are certain firſt Principes, which are the foundation of al demonſtration; ſo in Practics and Morals, there is an objective Law or Light of Nature containing certain practic Principes, which are the Rule of Converſation. Thus alſo we are to underſtand the Stoics, if we wil make a right uſe of their foreign, of which Diog. La…rt. in Zeno: The Stoics ſay, that to live according to nature, is, foreign, to do nothing that the commun Law prohibits, which is right Reaſon diffuſing it ſelf throughout althings. Where it deſerves a remarque, That they make the commun Law of Nature the ſame with right Reaſon. Which cannot rightly be underſtood of ſubjective right Reaſon, but of objective it may. Again, they ſay, This right Reaſon diffuſeth it ſelf throughout althings. Which cannot be underſtood of any ſubjective reaſon, which is confined to individuals; but muſt be applied to the commun objective Light and Law of Nature, which is diffuſed throughout the whole Creation, according to the various conditions of things. Thus Hierocles in Pythagor. Carm. pag. 106. ſaith, That the vices of the mind are, foreign, Averſions and Errata from right Reaſon: And pag. 209. he addes: This right Reaſon is the great Legiſlatrix and Judge of al human affairs, &c. And Stobaeus, de Virt. Serm. 1. pag. 9. alſo informes us: foreign, Virtue is a Syntaxe, or orderly contexture according to right Reaſon; but Vice a Tranſgreſſion against right Reaſon. Where by right Reaſon we muſt neceſſarily underſtand the commun objective Light or Law of Nature, not that darke ſubjective Light in the minds of blind Mankind. Thus alſo we muſt underſtand Parker, Amyraldus, and other Divines, who make foreign, right Reaſon the unic Criterion or Rule of moral Virtue. Though I denie not, but that the Stoics generally, and perhaps Aristotle, as many of his Followers among the Schole-men, by right Reaſon underſtand the ſubjective Light of Nature in mens minds; yet I am very apt to perſuade my ſelf, that Socrates and Plato, who ſeem to be the firſt Promulgators of this foreign, meant thereby no other than the objective Light and Law of Nature, whereof ſome more p. 54commun Precepts were conveighed down by the poſteritie of Noah; but thoſe irradiant and bright notices thereof, which ſhone among them, they received by oriental Tradition from the ſacred Books of Moſes, wherein Plato was not a little verſed, and which by his foreign, royal Law he ſeems to allude unto.

5.The Moſaic Law a perfect Rule. Prop. That Divine Law, which is the adequate perfect Rule and Meaſure of moral Bonitie, is no where to be found but in the ſacred Philoſophie or Scriptures. Here, and here only is extant Plato's foreign and foreign. This ſacred Rule, whereof he had great notices, he ſometimes cals foreign, the Divine Word. Here alſo Aristotle's foreign, Commun Law of Nature in its perfection is alone to be found. Hence likewiſe it was that Pythagoras, Lycurgus, Solon, Minos, and Plato borrowed the principal heads of their beſt Laws, as we have at large proved, Court Gent. P. 1. B. 3. C. 9. The ſum of the Law of Nature, and al divine Precepts is conteined in the Decalogue or Moral Law delivered by Moſes, which is thence ſtiled by the Hebrews foreign, the matrices of the Law and its roots. And indeed what are the Ten Commandments, conteined in the moral Law, but a Tranſumt, Compend, Abſtract, or rather extended Copie of the Law of Nature given to man in the beginning, from that firſt original Exemplar the eternal Law? Is not the formal reaſon of al Equitie preſcribed and expreſſed in the moral Law? Ought not this then to be the terme, meaſure, and ſcope of al Laws? To clear which we are to remember, that the Ten Commandments, conteined in the moral Law, muſt not be taken literally as ten Words, but in a more ample extenſive notion, as Chriſtian Pandects, or commun heads of al moral Duties towards God and man, to be explicated and extended accordingly to the Illuſtrations and Commentaries of the Prophets, our great Lord, and his Apoſtles. Though the Decalogue doth not mention each particular Dutie in the Goſpel, yet it doth command obedience to al that are or ſhal be ſpecified; and expreſſeth every particular Dutie generically or ſynecdochically: and although it were not a Dutie from the general Precept, til it was ſpecified in the Goſpel, yet when it is once a Dutie, the neglect of it is a ſin againſt the Decalogue. Indeed are there not almoſt in al the Precepts manifeſt Synecdoches? Is it not then ridiculous for men to reſtrain the moſt ample ſenſe of the moral Law to the narrow p. 55confines of its words? Doth not the great Legiſlator take the blackeſt ſins, as Murder, Adultery, Theft, &c. and place them, as ſo many commun Heads, in the Decalogue, that ſo by theſe we may be inſtructed, how black and odioſe al thoſe other ſins, reducible to thoſe heads, are? Wherefore to penetrate and dive into the nature and contents of the Ten Commandments, we muſt in a particular manner inquire (1) What in every Command is treated of, (2) The end for which it was given, (3) What therein is diſpleaſing or pleaſing to God. And after al we ſhal find, that the moral Law is ſpiritual, holy, juſt and good, as Rom. 7.12, 14. reaching al the motions and diſpoſitions of the heart. And indeed how abſurd is it to conceit, that he, who made the heart, and knows al the diverticules, or turnings and windings of it, ſhould make a Law to reach only the outward acts, and not the inward principes and motions? May we not then conclude, that the Decalogue and moral Law of the ſupreme Legiſlator extends its Precepts to the whole Soul, and al its Principes, Powers, Inclinations, Thoughts, Affections, and Operations interne and externe; directing the ſame to their right objects and ends; affecting them with their inſeparable Accidents and Modifications; clothing them with their immutable circumſtances; in ſuch ſort, that the action good by this Law can never be made evil; that which is evil by this Law can never be made good; that which is good or evil by this Law can never be made indifferent? Hence Plato brings in Pindar ſpeaking thus of the regal Power, as I take it, of the Law of Nature: foreign, The Law is King over al both mortals and immortals. And Aristot. Pol. l. 4. c. 4. affirmes: foreign, That the Law ought to command al. Which is moſt proper and peculiar to the moral Law, that lively Idea and Image of the Divine Sanctitie and Wil, the original and univerſal Exemplar of moral Bonitie, that great bond of union, by conformitie whereto mans Wil becomes one with the Divine Wil; yea, man himſelf one with God. Whence, as Tyndal, pag. 83. wel obſerves, Mans imagination can make the Law of God neither greater nor leſſer: neither can it adde to or diminiſh from the Law of God: Gods Commandment is as great as himſelf. Such is the Amplitude of the moral Law as the immutable, univerſal Rule of moral Bonitie.

§. 3. Having conſidered the Meaſure and Rule of moral Bonitie,The parts and cauſes of moral Good. p. 56we now paſſe on to examine the Nature and Cauſes thereof. It was before ſuggeſted, that al moral Bonitie requires a plenitude of Being, and integritie of Cauſes; albeit any defect render an action morally evil. This Canon holds true whatever diſtribution we give the cauſes of moral Bonitie. Janſenius, in imitation of Augustine, makes two eſſential conſtitutive parts of al moral Good, (1) The Office or Mater of the Act, which he makes to be as the Corps: and the End, which he makes to be as the Forme that ſpecifies. (2) Plato, in his Theaetetus, pag. 187. and Arist. Eth. l. 2. c. 4. ſeem to diſtribute moral Good into the good deed done, and the foreign, the wel-doing of it: i.e. into Bonum, and Bene. The good deed-done is as the mater: and the bene or wel-doing of it, as the forme. (3) Others, according to the Ariſtotelian diſtribution of the cauſes, make four cauſes of al moral Good, the Mater, Efficient, End, and Forme. Albeit I judge this diſtribution of Cauſes, as to Naturals, every way abſurd, and that which can never be defended; becauſe it makes the ſame things both conſtitutive Parts of the whole, and yet alſo Cauſes thereof: ſo that it hence follows, the mater and forme are cauſes of themſelves, which conſtitute the whole: yet in Morals, where the cauſes need not ſuch an accurate diſtinction from the parts, we may admit this diſtribution: or elſe we may take the mater and forme as parts, and the efficient and end as cauſes of moral Good. This being the commun and received diſtribution, I am not ſcrupuloſe in following the ſame, yet ſo as not to exclude the two former diviſions.

1.The Mater of moral Good. If we reflect on the Mater of moral Good, it comprehends al human Acts, with the Objects and Circumſtances relating thereto, whether things neceſſary or indifferent. It's true, as to the Circumſtances of moral Good, there are ſome that relate to the forme; others to the efficient and end; yet ſome alſo that regard the mater. The mater of every good action is either good or indifferent: it is good when commanded by and conforme to the moral Law, the meaſure of objective goodneſſe as before: it is indifferent when neither good nor evil, but as it were in the middle between both. Here that which chiefly requires an examen and diſcuſſion is the nature of things indifferent; which, ſo far as it may concerne moral Good, we ſhal inquire into. Plato, in his Gorgias, Things indifferent.cals a thing indifferent, foreign, neither good nor evil, but a middle between theſe. So p. 57Diogenes the Cynic taught, foreign, That things between virtue and vice were indifferent. And the Stoics held, foreign, Of things ſome were good, ſome bad, ſome neither good nor bad, i. e. indifferent. Theſe neuters, or things indifferent, they ſaid, were ſuch as neither profited, nor did hurt. Again, they affirmed, That things might be termed indifferent two ways. (1) foreign, &c. Such things as pertein not either to felicitie or miſerie, as Riches, Glorie, &c. (2) foreign, &c. Such things as men act neither with an Impetus, nor averſation: as the extending the finger, or numbering the hairs of the head, &c. as Laertius, in Zeno. But the more fully to explicate the nature of things indifferent, we are to conſider, that things are ſaid in the general to be indifferent, which in themſelves are neither good nor evil, but equally inclined to either. Now this indifference of actions or things, may be conſidered phyſically or morally, according to the generic, ſpecific, or individual nature of Actions and Things.

1. If we conſider Actions and Things in genere & abſtracto, Phyſic Indifference in Genere.in their generic abſtract nature, without the ſupervenient determination of the moral Law, ſo they are in themſelves nakedly conſidered indifferent: For althings phyſically conſidered, without their moral eſtimation and reſpect to the Law, are neither morally good nor evil. Thus al our Thoughts, Words and Actions nakedly and phyſically conſidered, without reſpect to the moral Law, (which is the rule and meaſure of moral Good and Evil) are ſaid to be indifferent.

2. Actions and Things are ſaid to be indifferent in ſpecie, Moral Indifference in Specie.when the mater of them is neither commanded nor forbidden by the moral Law. For as althings are of God, through God and for God, ſo it belongs to his regal Wil to give moral or ſpiritual determination to them, whereby they are made good or evil in ſpecie, as to the mater of them. Neither can any created limited power make that which is good, evil, or that which is evil, good, or that which is indifferent, good or evil, except on ſuppoſition of predetermination from him, who, being Creator of al, has an abſolute dominion over al. Every Creature having termes to its Eſſence, has alſo termes to its dominion and operation: a limited Cauſe muſt neceſſarily have a limited power and activitie. Except man had being of himſelf, p. 58and a World of his own framing, he could not be a rule to himſelf, for the determination of his actions; but muſt be determined by the Law of his Maker, for the ſpecific nature or qualitie of his acts as good,Quando dicimus, dari actus indifferentes quoad ſpeciem, qui non ſunt boni nec mali, id intelligendum eſt negativé. Petr. à Sancto Joſeph, Theſ. 167. or evil, or indifferent. Thence a thing is ſaid to be morally indifferent in ſpecie, when it is neither commanded nor forbidden by God, and ſo neither good nor evil: for al moral determination ariſeth from the Divine Wil expreſſed in the moral Law. Whence it appears evident, that The reaſons of good and evil are not eternal, as ſome Platoniſts would fain perſuade us; but dependent on the divine Wil and Determination: for althings are therefore good or evil in ſpecie, becauſe ſo determined by the ſoverain Wil, promulgated in the natural or moral Law. Whence alſo we may eaſily perceive the danger of that commun Notion, among ſome Divines, That ſomethings are good becauſe commanded, other things are commanded becauſe good. Indeed this Maxime may be of uſe, to expreſſe the difference between moral and poſitive Precepts, with this limitation, that poſitive Precepts, which regard Worſhip, &c. are good becauſe commanded; but moral Precepts are commanded becauſe good, i. e. agreable to human Nature, not that they have any moral goodneſſe antecedent to the divine Wil and Determination. Hence,

3.No Action indifferent in individuo. No Action conſidered, in individuo, in its individual nature is morally indifferent: i.e. every individual action conſidered as clothed with its Circumstances, and in relation to its Principes, Manner, and End is either good or evil. That moral Indifference hath place only in ſpecie, in the ſpecific nature of Acts, not, in individuo, in their individual nature, is generally avouched by the Orthodoxe, yea among the more ſober of the Schole-men. This was one of John Huſſe's Articles, condemned in the Council of Constance, Art. 16. Quòd nulla ſint opera indifferentia, ſed haec ſit diviſio immediata humanorum operum, quòd ſint virtuoſa vel vitioſa, That there are no workes [in individuo] indifferent; but this is an immediate diviſion of human workes, that they are either virtuoſe, or vitioſe. This indeed we may argue from Plato's Placites, who ſtrongly proves, That al our Acts ought to tend to ſome good end. So Gorg. pag. 499. foreign, It ſeems, that althings muſt be done for good, &c. So elſewhere he ſaith, That God is the marque and ſcope, unto which al our Acts, as ſo many arrows, ought to tend. This is wel determined p. 59by Aquinas, 1.2. Quaeſt. 18. Art. 9. It happens ſometimes that an Act is indifferent as to its Species, which yet conſidered in individuo, is either good or evil: and that becauſe every moral Act receives its Bonitie not only from its object, but alſo from its circumſtances— And it's neceſſary, that every individual Act hath ſome circumſtance by which it is drawen to good or evil; at leaſt as to the intention of the end. For in as much as it belongs to Reaſon to order al human Acts; if any Act be not ordered to its laſt end, it is ſo far evil: if it be ordered to its laſt end, it is then good, &c. Thus Gibieuf de Libertat. pag. 74. We moſt evidently gather from the ſubordination of our Wil to its laſt end, that there are no human Acts indifferent in individuo; but al are good or evil: for it is not lawful for a rational Creature, ſo long as he is ſuch, not to returne that back to God which he received from God. Again, p. 77. Every thing ought to act according to its nature: and he that doth otherwiſe is deficient; becauſe nature is the meaſure of other things. If therefore man puts forth an human Act, he ought thereby to be converted towards God. Indeed Indifference can no more be found in individual Acts, than it can be denied as to ſome Acts conſidered in their Species. Al Acts of Man in Innocence were good: al the Acts of man under the dominion of corrupt Nature are evil: al the Acts of man in Glorie ſhal be good: al the Acts of man under Grace are either good or evil: not one of al theſe indifferent. Were al our actions regulated by the Divine moral Law, they would be al good. Yea our very natural and civil Acts, as to their manner, ſo far as they are morally good or evil, are al regulated and determined by the moral Law. For albeit the Divine Law be not, as it ought not to be, a general ſum of Arts and Sciences; nor yet a particular Directorie for the Government of States or Politic Acts; yet the particular determination of al our Acts fals under the Divine Law, ſo far as they are moral and Chriſtian; according to the nature of al Profeſſions and Sciences, coincident for the moſt part in the mater, but diſtinct in the manner of conſideration. Thus much Petrus à Sancto Joſeph, that late compilator of Schole-Divinitie, Theſ. 167. acknowledgeth: There is not, ſaith he, any Act indifferent in individuo; but every ſuch Act, if it procede from ſufficient deliberation, is either good or evil, although not as to its object, yet in regard of its circumſtances. The p. 60ſcratching of the head, or the taking up of a ſtraw, is either good or evil. This ſeems a Paradoxe to ſome that are ignorant, and diſguſtful to Libertines, who would be ſo; yet generally granted by Philoſophers and Divines, yea ſcarce ever profeſſedly denied by any, ſave ſome ſew, who diſtinguiſh between Acts proceding from mere Imagination, and ſuch as are deliberate. That no Acts in individuo are indifferent, ſee the Commentators in Sent. lib. 2. diſt. 41. and in Thomam, 1.2. Quaeſt. 18. Art. 9.

2.A virtuoſe Wil the Principe of moral Good. Having diſcuſſed the Mater of moral Good, we now procede to its next efficient Cauſe or Principe; which is the Wil, or rather Soul clothed with ſupernatural Habits of Virtue or Grace. The moral Law requires, that to the conſtitution of an Act morally good, there concur a good Principe: now the Wil or Soul as willing being the fountain of al moral efficience and operation, its rectitude is neceſſary to conſtitute an Act morally or ſpiritually good. Such therefore as the diſpoſition of the Wil is, ſuch wil the action prove as to its goodneſſe or pravitie. The bent of the Wil is as a Pondus that carries the whole Soul either to good or bad: when the deliberation and intention of a bended Wil concurs in a good mater for a good end, the action is good: And what bends the Wil in this manner,Actio recta non erit, niſi recta fuerit voluntas: ab hac enim eſt actio. but virtuoſe habits? So many degrees as there are of a ſanctified Wil in any Act, ſo many degrees there are of moral Good therein. Moralitie, as wel as Divinitie, is in a more ſpecial manner converſant in ruling the Wil, which is the meaſure of good and evil. The bent of the Wil makes a good or bad man, as alſo act. Thus Plato, Meno: foreign, Virtue is to wil, and to be able to performe good. Again: foreign, If he wil not to do unrightcouſly, this is ſufficient; he ſhal not do unrighteouſly. But more particularly Plato, Leg. 3. thus philoſophiſeth: This is not to be deſired, foreign, that althings follow his Wil, but that his Wil follow Reaſon: i.e. that it proſecute what is good. This is wel expreſſed by Simplicius, in Epich. c. 1. pag. 14. foreign, For when the Wil is free and pure in the power of Reaſon it ſelf, on which our nature dependes, then it is carried to things truly eligible; yea, to truth it ſelf. Wherefore p. 61the proper good of the Soul is called foreign, Virtue, becauſe foreign, properly deſirable, and attained by real election. Simplicius here, in imitation of Plato, (whom he much follows) aſſerteth, (1) That the moral Goodneſſe of human Acts dependes on the puritie and goodneſſe of the Wil. (2) That moral Good is called foreign, Virtue, becauſe moſt eligible. Which derivation he borrowed from Plato. What Virtue properly is, and how it diſpoſeth the Wil to what is morally good, wil hereafter §. 4. and ſect. 3. §. 1, 2. come under contemplation: at preſent this may ſuffice to demonſtrate, that al moral Good requireth a moral Principe virtuouſly inclined for the production thereof. And had we no other evidence hereof but what ſacred Philoſophie doth aſſord, it might ſuffice. Thus Solomon (the wiſeſt of mere men, ſince the Fal) Prov. 4.23. Above al keeping keep thine heart: Prov. 4.23.Prov 4:23for out of it are the iſſues of life: i. e. al ſpiritual life and moral good iſſueth from the heart rightly diſpoſed and qualified with virtuoſe gracioſe Principes: where the heart thus qualified is not the Spring, there no Act is morally or ſpiritually alive towards God, but dead. Be the actions never ſo ſeemingly ſplendid and glorioſe as to the mater of them, yet if they flow not from this living Fountain, they are but as your Automata, thoſe artificial Machines or Images called Puppits; which ſeem to move their eyes, hands, feet, &c. whereas indeed they are moved only by artificial forrein impreſſes: ſuch are al moral Acts that flow not from a vital Principe virtuoſely diſpoſed, morally dead, albeit they may ſeem to have ſhadows of life. Or look as no member of the bodie performes any action of natural life, wherein a pulſe derived from the heart beats not; ſo no action is morally good, wherein there beats not ſome pulſe of a virtuoſe rightly diſpoſed Wil. Actions are conformable to the fountain whence they ſpring: no living virtuoſe Act can procede from a dead corrupt Principe: Being, life, and motion go together in Morals, as wel as in Naturals: ſuch as the Facultie, Spring, and Principe is, ſuch wil the motion and operation be, both in Grace and Nature, as Medo has wel obſerved, on Prov. 4.23. Thus Auguſtine, on Mat. 7.18. where by the good Tree he underſtands a believing Wil, which he makes eſſential to every good Act: for if the Wil be bad, the Act cannot be good: and every unbelieving Wil is a bad Wil: for where there is no Faith in Chriſt as the firſt Principe of life, there can be no love to God as the laſt End: as the end formes p. 62the Wil, ſo Faith formes the End. Thence that of the ſuppoſed Ignatius: foreign, Faith is the Principe of life, Love the end: theſe two in unitie perfect the man of God. And Chryſoſtome ſaith: foreign, Nothing is good without Faith.

3.The best End eſſential to moral Good. To the Conſtitution of moral Good there is alſo eſſentially requiſite the beſt End. Thus Plato, Gorg. pag. 499. aſſures us, That al Acts must be undertaken for the last end and beſt good, as before, Sect. 1. §. 2. This is wel explicated by Aquinas, 2.2. Quaeſt. 2.3. Art. 8. It muſt be ſaid, that in Morals the forme of an Act is principally to be attended in regard of its end: and the reaſon is moſt evident; becauſe the Wil is the Principe of moral Acts, and the End the main Object, and as it were the forme of the Wil: but now the forme of an Act always follows the forme of an Agent: whence in Morals it is neceſſary, that what gives an Act its order to an end, give it is alſo forme, &c. This is more nakedly laid down by Anguſtine: Whatever good is done by man, but not for that end for which it ought to be done, albeit the office it ſelf [i. e. the mater of the Act] ſeem good, yet the end being not right, it is ſin. This is wel explicated by Janſenius, Auguſt. Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 10. Two things are to be regarded in every act of a virtuoſe Wil; (1) The office or worke it ſelf done: (2) The cauſe for which it is done, or the End. In the weighing the Bonitie of any Virtue, our main regard muſt be to the End. This is as it were the laſt reſt and ſcope of the mind in acting, that which the Wil, its habit, and act moſt incline unto. This deſervedly rules al Offices, which flow from its Empire, are tinctured with its color and ſapor, and ought to be referred to it. This is the genuine cauſe why ſo many vexatious litigations were found among the Gentile Philoſophers, touching the chiefeſt Good. So again he ſaith, That the Office it ſelf is but as the Corps of Virtue, which is animated by the End, which gives forme and life, without which the office is but as mater without forme, or a carcaſſe without Soul. Ariſtotle wel inſtructes us, That the end is the meaſure of althings: which is true as to moral Good. Thence Petrus à Sancto Joſeph, Theſ. 166. aſſertes, That an human action takes its Bonitie or pravitie, not only from the intrinſec end of the worke, which is coincident with the object; but alſo from the extrinſec, which is the end of the Worker. Certainly Offices are to be weighed not ſo much by p. 63their Acts, as Ends: And what is the laſt end of al good workes, but the Glorie of God? which, though laſt in Execution, yet ought to be firſt in Intention, at leaſt virtually, if not formally, in al we do. Thence, ſaith Anguſtine, That is not true Virtue, which tends not to that end, wherein the beſt Good of man conſiſtes. And Gregor. Ariminenſis, 2. Sent. Diſt. 29. Quaeſt. 1. proves that, Every volition, which refers not to God for himſelf, or to other things for God, is vitioſe.

4. The laſt Cauſe,The Forme of moral Good conformitie to the moral Law. or rather conſtitutive part of moral Good is its Forme, which conſiſtes in its Conformitie to the divine moral Law. This may deſervedly be termed the Forme of moral Good; becauſe it gives forme and meaſure to al the former Principes and parts: For wherein conſiſtes the Goodneſſe of the Mater, Principes, and End, but in their Conformitie to the Divine Wil and Law? This therefore is the formal Idea or Reaſon of al moral Good, whereby al difference and perfection is to be meaſured. Arist. Eth. lib. 5. cap. 2. tels us, foreign, That the great difference of things is according to their Idea or formal Reaſon. Hence Conformitie to the Divine Law being the formal Reaſon or Idea of al moral Good, by this we are to take our meaſures of al differences or perfection therein. This Conformitie of moral Good to the Divine Law is deſcribed by Plato, under various emphatic notions: as (1) it is termed foreign and foreign. So Protag. pag. 326. foreign, Al the life of man ought to conſiſt of Concent and Harmonie: i. e. of Uniformitie and Conformitie to the Divine Law. Hence (2) In his Phaedo, he ſaith, foreign, Al Virtue conſiſtes in Harmonie: whereas vice is a confuſed inordination or irregularitie. So in his Timaeus, pag. 47. he ſaith, That Harmonie being very near akin to the motions of the Soul, it is given us to reduce the diſorders of the Soul to a decorum. So Stobaeus, Serm. 1. de Virtut. pag. 15. foreign, &c. Virtue has for its rule a decorum, or that which is most convenient, i.e. agreable or conformable to the Law of Nature. Hence (3) This Conformitie is ſtiled by Plato foreign, Symmetrie and Symphonie. Al theſe notions Aristotle comprehended under his foreign, Mediocritie, of which more fully B. 4. C. 1. §. 30. and Philoſ. General. P. 2. l. 1. c. 1. ſect. 4. §. 4.

Others place the Forme of moral Good in the mode or manner of doing, namely that it be done wel: How the Forme of Good conſiſtes in the foreign, wel doing.and we find ſome foundation p. 64for this Hypotheſis in Plato's Theaetetus, pag. 187. foreign, It's better to a little wel, than much il. Where he ſeems to make the foreign, the w…l doing, the forme and meaſure of good. So Ariſtotle, Eth. lib. 2. cap. 3. pag. 83. foreign, &c. He therefore ſhal be a Grammarian, who doth what is Grammatic, Grammatically, i.e. according to Rules of Grammar. But yet he addes, by way of caution, That foreign, the wel-doing of Arts is not the ſame with that of Virtues: for the perfection of Arts is included in themſelves, without regard to the perfection of the Artificer: but the perfection of Virtue requires, that the ſubject be ſo and ſo qualified. And then he concludes: foreign, He is a righteous and temperate man, not that doth thoſe things, but doth them in ſuch a manner as righteous and ſober men do them, i.e. rightcouſly and ſoberly. Hence that vulgar Effate, That good workes are to be judged by Adverbes: for al muſt be done with thoſe adverbial conditions of ſacred Philoſophie, Tit. 2.12. foreign, ſoberly, and righteouſly, and piouſly. This is in a peculiar manner true of good actions, where the mater is indifferent; becauſe ſuch have no goodneſſe at al, but what is from the Adverb. So that it ſufficeth not that the Act be foreign, good, but it muſt have foreign, a right manner of being done: and herein, according to ſome, the Forme of its goodneſſe doth conſiſte, even in the manner of it; and any defect herein wil render the action evil: according to thoſe ſcholaſtic Maximes, The forme gives being, and any omiſſion or defect therein gives millitie as to moral Good. So in the Canon Law they tel us, That the forme must be preciſely and punctually obſerved. And indeed this notion of the forme of moral Good amounts to the ſame with the former, and muſt be reſolved thereinto. For a moral Act may be ſaid then to have its foreign, or bene factum, wel done, when it is in al points exactly conformable to the moral Law: for al moral Good is a relation of conformitie with the rule of Morals; but the leaſt privation thereof is ſin.

But,How far Circumstances formaliſe moral Good. to deſcend to particulars, an human Act is then conformable to the Law and wel done, when it is not only good for the mater, but alſo clothed with al thoſe Circumſtances, which neceſſarily attend its moral goodneſſe. The particular forme of moral Good conſiſtes much in the Circumſtances that attend it. p. 65The Circumſtances oft formaliſe and ſpeciſie the Act, making it good or evil: ſometimes they only make it better or worſe. But the Circumſtances have the greateſt ſway in things indifferent, where the manner of doing doth chiefly ſpecifie the Act. We find the Circumſtances of human Acts wel expreſſed by Aristotle, Eth. l. 2. c. 5. Virtue, ſaith he, conſiſtes in the wel doing of things: for we may fear, truſt, deſire, hate, deſpiſe, be angrie, pitie, rejoice, and grieve, foreign, not duely. foreign, But truly to be moved with theſe affections, when, and in what things, and towards whom, and for what end, and in that manner as we ought, this is the golden mean, and that which is beſt, wherein Virtue conſiſtes. Whence alſo Aristotle, Eth. lib. 3. cap. 10. art. 5. pag. 160. aſſures us, That a defect in any one Circumstance renders an Act evil: foreign, But ſins may be committed, ſome, when that is done that ought not; others, when not as it ought; others, becauſe not at that time when it ought, or the like. Thence, art. 10. he addes: foreign, For a valiant man ſuffers and acts according to the dignitie of the mater, and when, and in that manner as reaſon [or the Law of Nature] dictates. Thus we ſee how Plato and Aristotle require to the conſtitution of moral Good, not only a right mater, but that it be clothed with al due Circumſtances, whereby it may be rendred conformable to the Law as to manner. This Hypotheſis has been generally maintained among the more ſound Schole-men. Thus Aquinas, 1.2. Quaeſt. 7. Art. 2. A Circumſtance is a condition or accident of an human Act, which toucheth it extrinſecally. And ſeing human Acts are diſpoſed towards their laſt end by circumſtances, the contemplation hereof greatly concernes Theologues. For a Theologue conſiders human Acts, as a man is thereby ordained to Beatitnde: Now whatever is ordained to an end ought to be proportionate thereto: But Acts are rendred proportionable to their end by a certain commenſuration, which they receive from due circumſtances: whence the conſideration of circumſtances chiefly belongs to a Theologue. What theſe circumſtances are he addes, Art. 3. In human Acts, Who did it; By what aides or inſtruments; What, Why, How, When, and Abour what he did it, are to be inquired into. Some explain theſe Circumſtances thus: (1) Quis, who, muſt not be taken for the p. 66efficient cauſe, but for his condition and qualitie, as a private perſon, or public, &c. (2) Quid, what, muſt not be underſtood of the mater or object, but of the qualitie thereof. (3) Neither muſt Quomodo, how, be taken for the forme or manner, but whether it be done openly or ſecretly, &c. Greg. Ariminenſis, 2. Sent. Diſt. 38. Quaeſt. 1. Art. 1. ſtrongly aſſertes and proves, That no moral Act wanting its due Circumstance is morally good. By an Act morally good, I underſtand, ſaith he, no other (according to the Doctors) than an Act conforme to right Reaſon, [objective, i.e. the Divine Law] according to al circumſtances requiſite to this, that the Act be truly virtuoſe. When therefore a moral operation is not conforme to right Reaſon, [or the Law] according to al due circumſtances, it is vitioſe and morally evil. This his Hypotheſis he proves by two Concluſions. 1. Concluſ. That no moral Act wanting any one due Circumstance, is truly virtuoſe. This he proves by ſhewing that the contrary implies a contradiction. For if a moral Act want any one due circumſtance, it is not as it ought to be: therefore it is evil. Due circumſtances are communly ſaid to be ſuch things, as are required to this, that the Act be truly virtuoſe: and if an Act be truly virtuoſe it is conforme to right Reaſon, or the moral Law: and if ſuch, then it wants not any due circumſtance: wherefore if any Act wanting a due circumſtance ſhould be truly virtuoſe, it wil then neceſſarily follow, That it doth want, and yet that it doth not want a due circumſtance: or, That it is truly virtuoſe, and yet that it is not truly virtuoſe. 2. Concluſ. That every ſuch Act as wants its due Circumſtances is morally evil and ſin. It is evil becauſe it wants its due bonitie or goodneſſe, namely its due circumſtance. For ſin is nothing elſe but the want of a due good, or voluntarily to act againſt the Divine Law. Thus much alſo Suarez grants us, That ſome conditions that are only circumſtantial and accidental to an Act in eſſe rei, as to the phyſic being, are yet eſſential in eſſe moris, as to its moral being. So Suarez, 1.2. Tract. 2. Diſp. 5. pag. 169. The firſt opinion, ſaith he, is, That an human Act may be conſidered in its natural or moral being: and that circumſtances are ſo called in relation to the natural, not the moral being of the Act; but that al theſe conditions are ſubſtantial Principes or proper Cauſes of the moral action as ſuch. He mentions this as the opinion of ſome Scholemen, namely, that there are no accidental circumſtances of human p. 67Acts morally conſidered; but that al theſe Circumſtances are eſſential and properly influential on the ſaid moral Acts. Which indeed is a great truth, whereunto, though not fully, yet thus far he aſſents: It is true, ſaith he, what the firſt opinion aſſerted, That ſome conditions may be accidental to the act, in eſſe rei, as a natural act, and yet eſſential to it, in eſſe moris, morally conſidered. And the reaſon, addes he, is taken à priori, becauſe the eſſe morale or moral being of an Act primarily dependes on the order of Reaſon; (we ſay of the Law:) but now it oft happens, that an act or object hath a diverſe order to reaſon, by reaſon of diverſe conditions of thoſe things that concur to the moral Act. Thence pag. 174. he tels us what Circumſtances are eſſential. Right Reaſon, (which muſt be underſtood objectively) is the rule of human acts and their circumſtances: therefore the affection or reaſon of theſe Circumſtances cannot be better explicated, than by their order or regard to right Reaſon, (I would ſay the Divine Law.) And the ſame rule is to be uſed for the underſtanding when the conditions of moral Acts are not properly Circumſtances, but eſſential, namely when they are ſuch as, according to right Reaſon, are altogether neceſſary, not only as to degrees, but ſimply as to the honeſtie or turpitude of the act. For when a Circumſtance altogether changeth the conformitie or difformitie of an human act, it changeth its Species. In which he plainly grants, That al thoſe Circumstances which change the conformitie or difformitie of an human act, are ſpecific and eſſential: Which is al that we need contend for; becauſe the Controverſie is not about natural or civil Circumſtances, but ſuch as belong to the act morally conſidered: which if good requireth an integritie of Cauſes and plenitude of Circumſtances: ſo that if one Circumſtance due to the moral bonitie of the act be defective, the whole act is changed and rendred morally evil. By the whole of which it is moſt evident, that al Circumſtances due to the moral goodneſſe of an human act, are eſſential and ſpecific, ſuch as concur to formaliſe moral Good; which requires a complete conformitie to the Divine Law, not only in Mater, Principes, and End, but alſo in al Circumstances morally due to the integritie of ſuch an Act: For al good (as has been ſufficiently demonſtrated) requires an integritie of Cauſes; whereas ſin ariſeth from the leaſt defect: according to that knowen Effate of the ſpurious Dionyſius, Divin. Nom. cap. 4. foreign, p. 68Good is from one and complete cauſe, but ſin from many and ſingular defects.

§. 4.The Ʋnitie and Ʋniformitie of al moral Good. Having conſidered moral Good in its Cauſes and conſtitutive parts, we now deſcend to the contemplation thereof in its proper Adjuncts, and Attributes, which we ſhal deduce and draw forth in the ſubſequent Corollaries. 1. Al moral Good, Virtues, and virtuoſe Acts have one and the ſame ſimple uniforme Idea and Nature. For al moral Good and virtuoſe Acts flow from one and the ſame virtuoſe Principes, tend to one and the ſame End, and are formaliſed by one and the ſame conformitie to the Divine Law. Thus Plato, Repub. 5. pag. 445. It appears to me, as it were in a Watchtower, foreign, that the face or forme of Virtue is one; but that of Improbitie, manifold and almost infinite. His mind is, that al Virtues have one and the ſame formal Idea or face; but ſins have varietie, yea almoſt infinite deformed ſhapes. This Aristotle, Eth. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 89. having proved, that al moral Virtue conſiſtes in a Mediocritie and Ʋniformitie, he addes: foreign, Moreover we may ſin many ways: (for as the Pythagoreans conjecture, ſin is infinite and boundleſſe; but good is terminate and bounded) but there is but one way of doing good. Wherein we may obſerve, (1) That al ſin is difforme, boundleſſe and endleſſe: it hath no forme, meaſure or number. (2) But Virtue and moral Good is bounded and uniforme. Whence he concludes with a Verſe out of ſome ancient Poet, foreign, For good men truly are ſimply and uniformely ſuch; but wicked men are difformely and variouſly ſo. Thus alſo Aristotle, Mag. Moral. lib. 1. cap. 25. affirmes, That al Good is foreign, uniforme; but al Vice foreign, multiforme. Hence Plato aſſerted, foreign, That which is just, is equal and uniforme. Whence that Stoic Hypotheſis, foreign, Al moral goods are equal and uniforme, i.e. conforme to the rule of Moralitie. Al this is wel expreſſed by Augustine, who makes al Good to conſiſte, in Modo, Specie, & Ordine, in Mode, Species, and Order, i.e. in a uniforme conformitie to the rule of Moralitie. Hence,

2.Al moral Good and Virtue ſupernatural. There is no real moral Good, or natural Virtue but what is ſupernatural. This Corollarie evidently follows from the former, and indeed from the whole of this diſcourſe about moral Good. p. 69For if al moral Virtue or Good requires an integritie of cauſes, and is formaliſed by conformitie to the Divine Law, thence it neceſſarily follows, that moral Good or Virtue can be but one uniforme ſimple thing. Thence Chryſoſtome, Hom. 4. in Gen. cals Grace, foreign, a gift above nature, overcoming nature. And Cyril in Eſa. termes it, foreign, above proper Nature; as elſewhere, foreign, a Prerogative above Nature. I am not ignorant that many of the Scholemen, and too many of our Divines, in imitation of them, make a twofold Good and Virtue; one natural and moral: the other ſpiritual and ſupernatural. The natural Virtue and moral Good they make to be that which a man may, by the force of natural Conſcience and other natural Principes, attain unto: The ſpiritual and ſupernatural Good or Virtue they make to be infuſed. Albeit this diſtinction may, with due limitations, paſſe for orthodoxe; yet in as much as it was at firſt framed by the Pelagians, and taken up by their Sectators in the Scholes, I ſhould be glad if Janſenius's advice for the utter extirpation of it, were embraced: who, in his August. Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 14. pag. 256. gives us the origination of this Diſtinction, which he makes to be firſt taken up by the Pelagians from the Gentile Philoſophers, ſpecially the Peripatetics and Stoics; who held, that there were in men natural ſeeds of Virtue, which being wel cultivated, might ariſe up to perfect Virtue. Theſe natural ſeeds of Virtue, addes he, firſt the Pelagians and Semipelagians brought into their Hereſie; and afterwards the Schole-men introduced the ſame into the Chriſtian Scholes, to the great prejudice of our Doctrine. For thoſe Heretics held, that out of thoſe philoſophic ſeeds true Virtues-might be educed by the alone power of the human Wil. But becauſe the Schole-men ſaw that this Dogme was openly contrary to the conſtantly received Doctrine, they therefore framed a double man in one man; and thence a double Charitie, double Virtues, double Workes; ſome natural, others ſupernatural; of which there is not the leaſt footſtep in the whole Doctrine of Auguſtine. As if thoſe very Virtues, which the Philoſophers and Schole-men cal Natural, were not, by Auguſtine, ſtiled Vices. And Tom. 2. lib. 2. cap. 2. pag. 326. he aſſures us, That he has oft greatly wondred, that many of the Philoſophers had more truly, accurately, and holily philoſophiſed of the main Heads of moral Doctrine, than many Schole-men; who would p. 70fain frame two men in one; the one a Philoſopher, and the other a Chriſtian: whence they alſo coined a twofold Charitie, twofold Virtues, twofold Workes, and a twofold Beatitude, the one natural, the other ſupernatural. Hence,

3.The difficultie of moral Good. To performe any moral Good or virtuoſe Act is most difficult and rare. O! how difficult and rare is it for men to performe what is good, from good Principes, Ends, in a good manner as to Circumſtances, and univerſal Conformitie to the Divine Law! Thus Plato, Repub. 5. pag. 476. foreign; But of ſuch as can arrive to the first Beautie, and contemplate him in himſelf, are there not very few? So Phileb. pag. 16. he ſaith, foreign, To explain Wiſdome is not very difficult, but to reduce it to practice and uſe most difficult. So again: foreign, What way men may attain to be good is most difficult, i.e. to underſtand and practiſe Again, he ſaith: foreign, It is difficult for a man to be made good, and to continue ſuch. Whence in his Cratylus, pag. 385. he ſaith, foreign, According to the old Proverbe, things good are very difficult. Thence alſo, in his Epinomis, pag. 973. foreign, I ſay it is not poſſible for men to be bleſſed and happy here, except ſome few only. Laſtly Plato, in his Repub. 6. ſaith, That Virtue hath the most perfect accurate forme, and therefore it requires, foreign, the most perfect exactitude and diligence for the acquirement thereof: for foreign; Do not the greateſt things require the greateſt exactitude? And what things greater than moral Goods and Virtues? Thus Ariſtotle alſo, in imitation of his Maſter, once and again demonſtrates the difficultie and raritie of moral Good. So Eth. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 89. having ſhewed, That there were varietie of ways, wherein men might ſin; but one only way of doing good; he addes: foreign, Therefore it is most eaſie to offend, but moſt difficult to do good: for to erre from the ſcope is most-facile, but to hit it, is moſt difficult. So in like manner, c. 9. pag. 108. he ſaith, Virtue conſiſtes in mediocritie, i.e. in one indiviſible point of conformitie. Whence he concludes: foreign, &c. Wherefore to acquire Virtue is moſt difficult and laborious: for it is an hard worke p. 71to attain to the middle of any thing. As every one cannot find out the point of a Circle; but only the intelligent Mathematician: So to be angrie, to give money, or the like, is eaſie; but to be angrie, to give money, &c. to whom, and in ſuch a meaſure, and at ſuch a time, and for ſuch an end, and in ſuch a manner as we ought, this is not eaſie. Thence he concludes: foreign, The bene or manner of doing good, is difficult, laudable, and beautiful. Wherein indeed he gives us an excellent account of the nature and difficultie of moral Good. (1) He ſuppoſeth al moral Good to conſiſte as it were in one middle indiviſible point; ſo that the leaſt deviation therefrom deſtroys it.Quò enim magis ſtrenuè currit extra viam, eò longiùs à ſcopo recedit, ideó que ſit miſerior. Calvin. (2) That it is very difficult to find out this golden mean, but much more difficult to reach it by our actions. True indeed it's no difficult worke to performe the act materially good, as to give almes, or the like; but foreign, the wel doing of it, i.e. from thoſe Principes, for thoſe Ends, and with thoſe Circumſtances, that the Act requires in regard of its formal conſtitution, this is moſt rare, difficult, and only laudable. Hence,

4. The ſplendid Heroic deeds of Pagans, The Virtues of Pagans leſſer ſins only.and al ſuch whoſe minds are not virtuoſely diſpoſed, are but leſſer Sins. This is moſt evident by the confeſſions of the Philoſophers themſelves, who require to moral Good an integritie of Cauſes and conſtitutive Principes: ſo that it ſufficeth not, that the Mater or Office be good, but there is alſo required a good diſpoſition and habit, the best end, and al ſuch Circumſtances as eſſentially concur to formaliſe the Act, or denominate it morally good. Now let us inquire, did ever any Pagan or man in his natural ſtate performe any one Act thus morally good? What? can we produce any Pagan or natural man, who had his mind ſo far ſanctified by Faith and Love, as to act by force received from God, out of love to God and his Glorie? Truly Augustine, and Janſenius out of him; are not afraid to declare, that al thoſe Heroic Acts and Exploits, which the Philoſophers and Schole-men honor with the title of natural or moral Virtues, are indeed but more ſplendid ſins; becauſe poiſoned with pride and vain-glorie. Yea, they riſe higher and affirme, that the Stoics themſelves, who ſeemed to be the greateſt admirers and ſectators of Virtue, did indeed come under the Apoſtles condemnation, Rom. 8.6, &c. of living after the fleſh; becauſe they made their carnal Reaſon, Free-wil and Self the only meaſures and ſprings of their pretended Virtue. Laſtly, al moral Virtue, according p. 72to philoſophic Placits, is but one: ſo that the Virtues of Pagans muſt be ſupernatural, or none at al, as before. Thence Greg. Nazianzen, Orat. 3. in Julian. ſpeaking of the Platonists, Stoics, and peripatetics, ſaith: foreign, Virtue to them is only a ſpecioſe name, and in nothing more laſting than this life. Thus Chryſoſtome, Hom. 27. in Joan. It is not yet apparent to me that the Gentiles lived wel— For if the hope of the celeſtial Kingdome, and the commination of Hel, with other ſuch like ſollicitude, foreign, can ſcarce keep men in Virtue, thoſe who are perſuaded of none of theſe things, wil not embrace Virtue. But if ſome of them counterfeit the ſame, this they do out of deſire of Glorie, &c. This Hypotheſis is frequently inculcated by Augustine; and he grounds it on that eternal Veritie of our Lord,Mat. 7.18.Matt 7:18 Mat. 7.18. Neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. So contra Julian. l. 4. c. 3. The unbelieving wil, as every Chriſtian grants, is an evil tree, which cannot produce any other than evil fruits, i.e. ſins only. The like Cyril, in Hoſ. foreign, &c. Probitie in thoſe that God hates is without its reward, and good manners tending not to true good ſhal be always reprehended by him. Not but that many Heathens, as Chriſtian Hypocrites, may performe Acts and Offices materially good, which yet may be deſervedly (as they are by the Ancients) termed Sins, as they procede not from Faith in Chriſt, and Love to God, the main Principes of al true moral Good. So Chryſoſt. (Tom. 17. Hom. 17. Edit. Pariſ.) foreign, They are good workes (i.e. materially) but dead, becauſe they have not Faith.

5.The diſtrioution of moral Good or Virtue into Juſtice and Pietie. Albeit al Virtue, according to its formal Idea and Reaſon, be but one; yet, according to its objective material conſideration, it may be variouſly diſtributed. Thus in ſacred Philoſophie moral Good or Virtue is diſtributed, as to its object or mater, into Holineſſe and Righteouſneſſe, Epheſ. 4.24. foreign, In Righteouſneſſe and Holineſſe. Righteouſneſſe comprehends al Second-table-duties, which regard men; and Holineſſe, al Firſt-table-duties, which regard God. This diſtribution is moſt ancient, and, I preſume, was communly received among the Jews. Sure I am Plato has it, and, as I conjecture, from the Moſaic Inſtitutes. Thus in his Gorgias, pag. 507. foreign, p. 73But now he that comports himſelf decently towards men, doth righteous things; but he that behaveth himſelf aecently towards God, doth holy or pious things: but he that doth both rightcous and holy things, must neceſſarily be righteous and holy. Wherein obſerve, (1) That he diſtributes al moral Good into juſt or righteous, and pious or holy. (2) That he makes Justice or Righteouſneſſe to regard men, but Pietie or Holineſſe to regard God. (3) That ſome may ſeem to be righteous towards men, who yet are not pious or holy towards God; as on the other hand, ſome may pretend to be pious towards God, who yet are not juſt and righteous towards men. But (4) he that is juſt and righteous towards men, in giving them their due, as alſo pious and holy towards God, in giving him his due, ſuch is indeed a virtuoſe man, morally good, juſt, and pious. Thus alſo Serranus, on Plato, Alcibiad. 2. pag. 136. takes notice, how Plato diſtributes Virtue, foreign, into Pietie and Justice; the former relating to the Worſhip of God, the later to men; whereby our whole life is duely framed and regulated; theſe being two ſeminal roots or commun heads of particular Offices and Duties. Laſtly Plato, in his Minos, pag. 319. ſaith, That we ſhould take diligent heed firſt that we offend not in word or deed against God: and then that we offend not againſt men, ſpecially ſuch as are divine. A Golden Rule for moral Duties.