The Court of the Gentiles Part 4, Part 4 · Book 1 · Chapter 1

The Court of the Gentiles Part 4 · Part 4 · Book 1 · Chapter 1

p. 1CHAP. I. Of Prudence, the laſt End and chiefeſt Good, Uſe, Fruition, and Delectation.

Moral Philoſophie, (1) Its Genus, foreign, which connotes Prudence: wherein conſider its Objects, Offices, and Acts: which are, [1] foreign, [2] foreign Dexteritie, [3] foreign Sagacitie, and foreign, [4] foreign. (2) The ſubject of Moral Prudence, foreign, and particularly the Conſcience: Plato's foreign, Law of Conſcience, [1] In the foreign, which is the ſeat of Principes. (2) In Syneideſis, which is a reflexive Light, and ſprings from foreign ſenſation. (3) The Rule of Moral Prudence foreign, which is either ſubjective, or objective: foreign, p. 2Rom. 2.14, 15. James 2.8. The laſt End, its Influence in Morals: the chiefeſt Good, its Characters, (1) The Idea of Good. (2) The firſt Beautie. (3) Moſt proper. Ʋſe, its Regulation and Intention. Fruition, its parts, (1) Love, (2) Ʋnion, (3) Communion, (4) Delectation, conſidered [1] In its Cauſes, a ſweet Good, Poſſeſſion and Action. [2] In its Adjuncts, Realitie, Connaturalitie, Ʋniformitie, Puritie, Force, and Infinitude. [3] In its Effects, Enlargement, and Satisfaction.

§. 1. HAving diſcuſſed Plato's Natural Philoſophie, we now deſcend to his Moral, which regards the Morals of ſingle Perſons, Families, The Idea of Moral Philoſophie.and Cities, or Republics. We find the Idea of Philoſophie, as it relates to Morals, and Active Sciences, in the Platonic Definitions, pag. 414. foreign, Philoſophie is a prudent or ſtudioſe conſideration of the Soul according to right reaſon. Wherein we may conſider, (1) The Genus, (2) The Subject, (3) The Meaſure, or Rule of Moral Philoſophie.

1. The Genus, 1. Its Genus. Moral Prudence.in this Platonic Definition of Moral Philoſophie, is foreign, which ſignifies a prudent Inſpection, ſtudioſe Conſideration, and ſollicitous Care, communly ſtiled by Plato foreign, Prudence, or Moral Wiſdome; which we have thus copioſely deſcribed in the Platonic Definitions: foreign, Prudence is a facultie of it ſelf effective of human Happineſſe. Prudence what.Wherein we have, (1) The Specific reaſon, whereby it is differenced from contemplative Science, expreſſed by that notion Effective. (2) Its Ʋltimate End, which is to make men happie. Again, Prudence is defined in the ſame Platonic Definitions, foreign, A Science of good and evil. Again, foreign, A Diſpoſition, whereby we judge what is to be done, and what is not to be done. In al which Definitions laid together we have theſe Conſiderables.

1. The Ʋltimate End, Its Object.and ſupreme Object of moral Prudence or Philoſophie, namely human Happineſſe, which is the meaſure of al moral Acts, and the firſt thing treated of in moral Philoſophie, according to that of Aquinas: The end of moral Virtues, is the chief principe of Prudence, as Luke 10.41. Of which Chap. 2.

2. We have here the intermediate Objects of moral Prudence, which are in general al Agibles or Practicables. (1) Singulars. (2) Things preſent. (3) Things in our power. (4) Things good, or evil.

p. 33. Here is alſo conſiderable the proper Exercices or Offices of Prudence, which are according to Plato, (in his Charm.) (1) foreign,Its Offices. To do what belongs unto us. (2) foreign, To underſtand a mans ſelf. (3) foreign, To uſe al things wel, i. e. with reſpect to our ſupreme end. (4) Rightly to diſtinguiſh 'twixt good and evil. (5) To conſerve the rectitude of the Wil. (6) To moderate the Affections. (7) To governe the whole Life. Of which ſee more fully Philoſ. Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 6. ſ. 3.

4. This moral Prudence may be conſidered in its Integrals;The parts of Prudence. which are, according to the Platonic account, four: foreign. (1) foreign, Providence, which,1. foreign, Providence. in the Platonic Definitions, pag. 414. is thus deſcribed: foreign, Providence is a preparation (or proviſion) for ſomewhat future. Which implies, [1] An univerſal comprehenſion of al circumſtances, means, difficulties, encouragements, which may make for, or againſt our end. [2] Serious conſultation about, and prudent determination of what is to be done. [3] Prudent precaution of what may impede, &c. this is termed foreign, Caution, according to that of the Stoics, foreign, A wiſe man ought never to fear, but always to uſe caution, &c.2. foreign, Dexteritie of Judgment. (2) Another part of moral Prudence is foreign, a Dexteritie in judging things: which in the Platonic Deſinitions, pag. 413. is thus defined: foreign, Facilitie of judgment, is a connate abilitie of reaſoning, or diſcerning. And Plato, de Repub. 4. pag. 428. ſaies, foreign, Facilitie of judgement is certainly ſome kind of Science, &c. (3) foreign, Sagacitie or perſpicacitie of finding out things, 3. foreign, Sagacitie.which Plato makes to be an excellent kind of Prudence, or a natural Invention, which directs the Reaſon to find out things wrapt up in Nature: which he elſewhere cals a Sagacitie of Nature. So in his Epino. pag. 976. There remains a marvellous facultie, whereby we eaſily and expeditely learne any thing; and having learnt it can faithfully commend it to memorie, and as occaſion ſerves, by an happie celeritie recal it, which ſome cal Wiſdome, others good Nature, but others, foreign, Sagacitie of Nature. This foreign, or natural Sagacitie, Plato makes to be the ſame with his foreign, good Nature: So Plato, Defin. pag. 412. foreign, Sagacitie is a natural generoſitie of mind, whereby a perſon is enabled happily p. 4to conjecture what ought to be done. Again 'tis ſtiled foreign, an acumen of judgment. This natural Sagacitie, Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 376. makes very eſſential to a Magiſtrate, in order to his more exact judging of perſons and things, and final deciſion of Controverſies. Solomon we know was endowed with this natural Sagacitie, even to admiration; which diſcovered it ſelf in the deciſion of that arduous caſe between the two Harlots, 1 Kings 3.23, 24, &c. as alſo in reſolving the Queen of Sheba's queſtions, 2 Chron. 9.1. which kind of Sagacitie Politicians cal King-Craft. This natural Sagacitie is elſewhere ſtiled foreign,foreign. a facilitie of judgement: which in the Platon. Defin. pag. 414. is defined foreign, A good judgement tenacious of what is determined by reaſon. Again, this natural Sagacitie paſſeth ſometimes under the notion of foreign, which is defined, Platon. Defin. pag. 412. foreign, An habit elective of what is beſt. One great office of this natural Sagacitie, conſiſtes in the knowlege of men, their ſeveral Humors, Inclinations, Deſignes, Intereſts,4. foreign, Experience. and Combinations, &c. (4) Another part of moral Prudence is Experience, which Plato cals foreign, and makes very eſſential to a true Philoſopher. So Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 582. foreign, The experienced perſon endowed with prudence is the only true Philoſopher. Then he addes: foreign. Thence (in the ſame Repub. 9.) he joyns Prudence and Experience together with Reaſon, which he makes the beſt Judges of human Affairs: foreign, We rightly judge by Experience joyned with Prudence and Reaſon. And Plato, in his Gorgias, gives us the reaſon, why Experience is ſo eſſential to Prudence: foreign, Experience makes our life to paſſe away according to Rules of Art; whereas inexperience makes us live caſually. Again: foreign, There are many Arts experimentally found out among men, from ſeveral Experiments, &c. And becauſe experimental Prudence is gained by ſenſe and ſenſible obſervation; thence Plato Timaeus, pag. 103. defineth it a ſubtiltie of ſenſe, or good ſenſation of the Soul: foreign, Prudence is a good ſenſation of Soul. Expetience is indeed the main Seminarie of human Prudence. (1) In that it furniſheth us with the choiſeſt obſervations of paſt and preſent times, whereby we are capacitated to make ſome prudent p. 5conjecture of what is likely to ſuccede. (2) Experience draws down general Rules and Precepts of Wiſdome to particular and proper uſe. (3) Experience gives men a more inward feeling and lively apprehenſion of themſelves and others. Thence Plato makes this ſelf-knowlege the higheſt piece of Prudence; which he cals foreign, a good ſenſation. (4) Experience does much greaten and adde to the quantitie of our knowlege, by furniſhing the mind with freſh obſervations: whence Plato brings in Solon ſpeaking thus, (foreign, The longer I live, the more I know and teach. (5) Experience addes not only to the quantitie, but alſo to the qualitie of our knowlege, by rendring it more clear and diſtinct. For experience reduceth particular obſervations, in themſelves confuſed, unto a regular Series and Order; whence general Rules are framed, which makes our knowlege more diſtinct and certain. (6) Experience greatly fixeth and confirmeth our Notions of things.

2. Having finiſhed the Generic Notion of moral Philoſophie,2. The Subject of Moral Prudence the Soul, and particularly the Conſcience. which is moral Prudence, we now procede to the Subject thereof, expreſſed in the Platonic Definition by foreign, the Soul: for indeed moral Prudence moveth and influenceth the whole Soul, and therefore it is not unjuſtly ſeated therein; though the proper ſeat thereof be the practic Judgment, which Divines terme Conſcience; which is a petty God, or God's Vice-gerent, and Vicar in the Soul, to command, or threaten; to accuſe, or excuſe; to juſtifie, or condemne. This Vicarious Divine office of Conſcience, Plato ſeems to have had ſome Traditional Notices of: whence he termes Conſcience foreign Fame; and makes it to be a kind of Demon, or petty God in men. So de Leg. 8 foreign, This Law of Fame partakes of a marvellous facultie, ſeing no one durſt to breathe otherwiſe than according to the Dictates of her Law. Serranus here acquaints us,Plato's foreign, Conſcience's Law. That Plato cals foreign, his Law of Fame, that Imperial power of Conſcience wel known to al; which comprehends thoſe commun Principes, That God is to be feared, &c. This Law of Conſcience he ſaies is unwritten, yet notwithſtanding there is in al mens minds, foreign, a Sacred Law, whoſe force and efficace tames every Soul, and compels it, by fear, to obey poſitive Laws. From the authoritie of this Law it is, as the Philoſopher teacheth, that men come to underſtand the difference p. 6of good and evil. Again Serranus addes: Our Philoſopher cals this Divine Law of Conſcience, foreign, the Law of Fame; and ſaies, that it is connate in al men, it being a Science that teacheth the difference of good and evil; and the Conſervator and Vindictor of al Laws; and the foreign, or Precurſor of that moſt excellent Chorus of Virtues; whoſe admirable faculties and actions flow from no other Fountain, than the ſparks of this foreign, &c. This Law or Light of Conſcience is twofold. (1) Habitual, which is called in the Scholes foreign, Syntereſis. (2) Actual, which is termed foreign, Syneideſis.

(1) The Syntereſis, 1. Syntereſis, the Habit of Principes.or habitual Light of Conſcience is defined, in the Scholes, a natural habit of active Principes. For as ſpeculative Reaſon diſcourſeth of Speculatives, ſo practic Reaſon of Practics: as therefore there are naturally implanted in us certain ſpeculative Principes, which appertein to Intelligence; ſo alſo are there certain active Principes, which belong to that natural habit of Conſcience, called foreign, Syntereſis, as Aquinas, Part. 1. Q. 79. And this habitual Light or Law of Conſcience, is the ſame with Plato's foreign, a Law of Fame, which is elſewhere by him termed foreign,2. The Syneideſis, ſelf-reflexion. Right Reaſon, as anon. (2) The actual Light or Law of Conſcience called by the Ancients foreign, is Conſcience ſtrictly taken. So Aquinas, Part. 1. Quaeſt. 79. Art. 13. Conſcience taken properly is not a power, but an Act; whereby we apply our Science to what we undertake; which application is followed by Teſtification, or Ligation, or Excuſation, and Accuſation. By which it appears, that the proper office of this Syneideſis is ſelf-reflexion; whence follows accuſation, or excuſation, &c. as Rom. 2.15. And becauſe this reflexive Light of Conſcience does neceſſarily ſuppoſe inward ſenſe, hence 'tis oft called foreign, ſenſation, alſo foreign, Syneſis, or ſenſate judgment. So Aquinas, Syneſis, or ſenſate judgment imports a right judgment about particular operables. So Plato, in his Theaet. makes al true Science to be a kind of Senſation, foreign, Science is nothing elſe but Senſation. And more particularly, in his Timaeus, pag. 103. he cals foreign, Prudence, foreign, a good Senſation: which exactly anſwers to the Scripture Phraſeologie, which ſets forth this reflexive act of Conſcience by foreign, as Phil. 1.9. foreign. and thence Heb. 5.14. we read of foreign,Phil. 1.9.Phil 1:9 &c. The life of the new Creature, as wel as of the old, conſiſtes in theſe ſelf-reflexive Acts of Conſcience, p. 7which ſpring from inward ſenſe and feeling. And Plato, in his Alcibiad. pag. 133, 134. tels us, That he that reflectes upon himſelf, his own Soul and Wiſdome, thereby becomes as it were omniſcient: whereas they, who know not themſelves, know not what is good or evil for them; nor yet what belongs to themſelves, or to other men: ſuch therefore can never make good Politicians, or Occonomiſts, &c. In brief; Self-reflexions, or our actions upon our ſelves, are of al the higheſt and nobleſt, and thoſe by which we live and worke as men, and perfect that part of the Soul called Conſcience; which directs al we do, according to right Reaſon, &c.

3. As for the Meaſure or Rule of Moral Prudence,3. The Rule of Prudence, foreign Right Reaſon. we find it expreſſed in the fore-mentioned Platonic Definition under this notion, foreign, according to right Reaſon. This Platonic foreign, (which is aſſerted in like manner by the Stoics, and others) right Reaſon is the ſame with the Light or Law of Nature, which is twofold. (1) Subjective. (2) Objective.

1. As for Subjective Right Reaſon, Light or Law of Nature, Right Reaſon is 1. Subjective.it is no other than thoſe commun Principes of Moralitie, ſeated in that part of Conſcience which they cal Syntereſis, of which in the foregoing §. 6. This Seminarie of engrafted active Notions, or moral Principes is ſtiled by the Stoics foreign, the Commun Law; alſo foreign, right Reaſon; againſt which, ſay they, nothing is to be done; as Diog. Laert. in Zeno. 'Tis termed by Plato foreign, the Law of Being. So Minos, pag. 315. foreign, where, ſaies Serranus, by this appellation foreign, Plato underſtands the Eternal Law of Nature, which, amidſt the various Laws of Nations and their viciſſitudes, continues uniforme and the ſame; and thence is truly termed foreign, Being; therefore he cals it, foreign, the right Reaſon of the Eternal Law: and becauſe our actions are to be meaſured by the Rule of theſe commun Notions, therefore Plato names this Law foreign, the Royal Law. So again, Serranus in Plato de Legib. 8. The foreign, Delineation of this Eternal Law is this. There is in the minds of al, as ſoon as they are borne, a certain foreign, Sacred Law. He that conſecrates this Law in his mind, as a certain ſacred, is thereby furniſhed with an excellent remedie againſt the inſolence and impotence of human luſts; as it was ſaid of the Tyrant, foreign. Theſe active Principes, conteined in this interne Law of Conſcience, are generally p. 8ſtiled foreign,foreign, commun Notions: they were named by Zeno foreign, Comprehenſions; becauſe they comprehended the firſt ſeeds or principes of knowlege. Cicero tels us, that Epicurus called them foreign,foreign. Anticipations, (as he tranſlates the word) becauſe they ſuppoſed a Previous formation of things in the Soul. The Stoics uſed the ſame terme likewiſe. Chryſippus defined this natural Law, or Conſervatorie of commun Principes, a natural Intelligence of thoſe things, which univerſally are. Cicero ſtiles theſe commun Notions, Inchoate Intelligences, of which ſee Lud. Vives in August. Civ. lib. 8. cap. 7. The Scripture alſo ſtiles theſe commun Principes fixed in Conſcience, a Law; ſo Rom. 2.14, 15. where the Gentiles are ſaid to be a Law to themſelves, &c. And indeed theſe commun ſeeds of natural light are a private Law, which God has deeply engraven on mens Conſciences, and is univerſally extenſive unto al, though with a latitude of degrees; it being in ſome more, in ſome leſſe, but in al in great meaſure obliterated, and defaced ſince the Fal. It is alſo by Divines generally termed the Light, or Law of Nature; becauſe it flows in, and with, and from human Nature, either immediately, or mediately.

2. As for the Objective foreign,2. The Objective foreign Law of Nature. Right Reaſon (which Plato ſeems to have had ſome traditional notices of) it contains thoſe broken Traditions of the Moral Law, which were ſcattered up and down among the Gentiles. That Plato had received ſome fragments of Gods Law; and that by his foreign, Right Reaſon, he does import the ſame, ſeems very probable, both from that expreſſion in his Minos, pag. 315. foreign, The Law of Being, i. e. of the firſt Being, as he uſually ſtiles God: as alſo from that other expreſſion of his, Minos, pag. 317. foreign, This right Reaſon is the Royal Law, i. e. Gods Divine Law, which is ſo ſtiled Jam. 2.8. In this ſenſe right Reaſon may be ſaid (as the Scholes wil have it) to give foreign eſſe morale, or Moralitie to human Acts: ſo Stobaeus de Virtut. Ser. 1. fo. 9. foreign, Virtue is a conformitie according to right Reaſon, and Sin is a tranſgreſſion againſt right Reaſon. Where, by right Reaſon we muſt underſtand not the ſubjective Light, or Law of Conſcience, which is imperfect; but the objective Light of Nature compriſed in the Moral Law. In this ſenſe we muſt underſtand that Principe in the Scholes, That right Reaſon gives the eſſe morale to moral Beings. p. 9Thus much for the Platonic Definition of Moral Philoſophie.

§. 2. Next to the generic Notion of Moral Philoſophie,The last End its Influence in Morals. the firſt thing that comes under conſideration is the laſt End, which is firſt in intention, though laſt in execution. Yea, indeed the laſt End is the firſt Principe of moral Prudence: For what is Prudence, but the right diſpoſition and ordination of al means and actions? And is not the laſt end the rule and meaſure of al order? Is not every thing then rightly diſpoſed, when it is conveniently brought into a ſubordination to its laſt end? Wherefore the contemplation of the laſt end is of greateſt moment in Moral Philoſophie. And they ſay, that Plato was the firſt that uſed the Greek foreign in this philoſophic and ſtrict Notion: for Homer and other of the Ancients uſed the word to expreſſe an Effect in its accompliſhment and perfection; but Plato reſtrained it ſo, as to ſignifie thereby a final Cauſe, or that which is laſt in the ſeries of things deſired, yet firſt in intention. This Cicero interprets extreme, last, chiefeſt. What force, efficace and influence the laſt end has in Morals, Plato frequently inculcates. So in his Theaetetus, he aſſures us, That al Science is inutile, yea noxious, without the notice of the beſt End. This laſt End he makes to be, foreign, the principal End of althings: which Proclus cals, foreign, the End of Ends. And for the more ful and clear explication of this laſt End, its univerſal influence and excellence, the following Propoſitions are diligently to be conſidered.

1. Prop. It is neceſſarie, that we conſtitute ſome laſt End, as wel poſititively as negatively, in every Series of Actions. This Hypotheſis is wel argued by Suarez, Metaph. Diſput. 24. Sect. 1. And the reaſon is moſt evident: for look as in Deſcent from the intention of the end to the election and execution of the means, we muſt neceſſarily at laſt ſtop in ſome one or more means, which are firſt in execution, though laſt in intention; ſo in Aſcent from the means to the end, it is as neceſſary that we at laſt ſtop in ſome laſt end, which is firſt in intention and laſt in execution. Again, as there is a ſubordination of ſecond Cauſes to the firſt Cauſe; ſo in like manner of inferior Ends to the laſt End. For in Ends, and thoſe things that conduce thereto, there cannot be a progreſſe into infinite; but as there is a firſt means from whence the motion begins; ſo there muſt be a laſt end, in which it terminates. In Ends there is a twofold order, (1) of Intention, p. 10(2) of Execution: and in both orders there muſt be a firſt and a laſt. That which is firſt in the order of Intention is as it were the Principe, which moves the appetite, and gives bounds to it; and therefore can be no other than the laſt End: that which is firſt in the order of Execution, is the firſt means conducing to the laſt End. So that a progreſſe into infinite is on neither part poſſible: if there were not a laſt end, nothing could be deſired, no action of the appetite could be terminated, neither would the intention of the Agent ever ceaſe: if there were not a firſt means, from whence the execution ſhould begin, no Agent could begin to worke, &c.

2. Prop. The laſt End of althings muſt be as extenſive and ample, as the first Principe or Cauſe. Thus Plato, de Leg. 4 p. 715. foreign, God, (as the old Tradition teſtifies) having in himſelf the Principe, and End, and Medium of althings. In which he plainly indigitates, That God is the first Cauſe and last End of althings. That the laſt End is as large as the firſt Principe is evident, becauſe the order of Ends muſt correſpond and anſwer to the order of Agents: as they who are under God, ought not morally, neither can they phyſically move, but as dependent on the motion and concurſe of God, the firſt Cauſe; ſo neither ought they to deſire any thing under God, but what may conduce to God as their laſt End. Such as the Univerſalitie of the firſt Cauſe is in giving Being or Welbeing; ſuch is the Univerſalitie of the laſt End in requiring and calling for the emprovement of al. Neither doth man pay the homage due to his firſt Cauſe, farther than his regreſſe thereto anſwers his progreſſe therefrom. God as the firſt Principe gives Being, and as the laſt End terminates and ſixeth the Being conferred. Wherefore the Creature that dependeth on God as the firſt Cauſe, muſt tend to him as his laſt End.

3. Prop. The laſt End of althings can be but one. This Hypotheſis both Plato and Ariſtotle concord in. And the reaſon is moſt apparent; becauſe althings deſire their utmoſt perfection, which conſiſtes in their tendence to the moſt perfect Being. Now the moſt perfect Being can be but one: For if there ſhould be more than one moſt perfect, then the one would have ſomewhat which the other hath not; and ſo neither would be moſt perfect. Every good by the addition of ſome other good is p. 11made better and more perfect, except the moſt ſimple and perfect Good, by the participation whereof al other goods are made better. Hence

4. Prop. Every man, in every human Act, virtually, if not actually, intends ſome laſt End. This is manifeſt; becauſe in every human Act ſomething is deſired for it ſelf, which cannot be referred to any other thing: and what is this but ſome laſt end? Again, man naturally deſireth the complement of al good: and albeit there may not be an actual elicite intention in every man as to his laſt end, yet there is a natural propenſion thereto; whence procede al Acts about particular goods.

5. Prop. The last End is deſired infinitely, without end or termes. Thence Ariſtotle, (following Plato herein) in his Magn. Moral. lib. 1. cap. 1. defines the laſt End thus: foreign, The perfect End is that, which being obtained, we neither deſire nor need any thing beyond it. So the Stoics, who were akin to the Platoniſts, define the laſt End, foreign, That for the ſake of which al offices are performed, but it for nothing elſe. So that the laſt End gives termes and bounds to althings, but admits no termes or meaſure. As to take away the firſt Cauſe of our Being, ſuppoſeth us not to be; ſo to take away the laſt End, ſuppoſeth a confuſed infinitie as to acting. Therefore ſomething muſt be ſimply deſirable for it ſelf and for no other: For that which a man deſireth in order to a further end, the ſame he deſireth in ſuch a meaſure as is moſt conducible to that end: but what he deſireth for it ſelf, towards that his deſire is infinite: for the better it is, the more deſirable: therefore if infinitely good infinitely deſirable, without termes or bounds. The only meaſure of loving our laſt End is to love it without meaſure: for the laſt End being the terme of the appetite, it may not receive termes or limits from any other thing; but by how much the more it is loved, by ſo much the better is the love. In althings appetible the laſt End gives meaſure but receives none; becauſe the proper reaſon of althings we deſire is taken from the End. Hence

6. Prop. The last End is the terme and meaſure of althings. What Principes are in Demonſtration, the ſame is the laſt End in Action: for al means receive their Neceſſitie, Goodneſſe, and Specification from the laſt End. Whatever is ordained to an end p. 12ought to be proportioned thereto, and ſo meaſured thereby. The laſt End has the ſame influence on the means, as the Ariſtotelean Forme is ſaid to have on the mater: They ſay the forme gives the main of Eſſence, Diſtinction, Virtue, Operation, and Perfection to the bodie; and doth not the End give the ſame to the means? How little deſirable are the means, as means, without their reference to the End? Is not the diſtinction and perfection of althings, morally conſidered, taken from their End? This is wel expreſſed by Plato, Phileb. pag. 25. foreign, Al theſe things muſt be referred to the one infinite, i.e. the laſt End. So again, de Leg. 4. pag. 716. foreign, But truly God is to us the chief meaſure of althings, i.e. God, as our laſt End, is the meaſure both of eſſence, facultie, and operation: al the multitude of means ought to be reduced to and governed by the Unitie of our laſt End: which is the true meaning of that moral Axiome, Al multitude ought to be governed by Ʋnitie. Thus alſo Ariſtotle, Eth. l. 3. c. 10. foreign, Everything is defined or bounded by its End. Hence the End is ſtiled the Terme, which confines and fixeth the fluxe of things, which without it are ful of confuſion and indetermination. And therefore by how much the more the Soul departs from God, its laſt End, by ſo much the more inſtable, confuſed, and vagrant it is. Hence

7. Prop. God is the laſt End of althings. This Hypotheſis reſultes out of the former, and is in it ſelf moſt evident: for every thing is ſo far only an end as it is good: wherefore the laſt end muſt of neceſſitie be the chiefeſt good: and what is this but God? Is not God the prime Cauſe of al goodneſſe in every good? And is he not thence the Cauſe of every End? Muſt he not then of neceſſitie be the laſt End of althings? For that for which every thing is ſuch, muſt needs be more ſuch. Again, is not God the ſupreme and firſt in order of Cauſes, and therefore the laſt in order of Ends? Thence Plato, Gorg pag. 499. foreign, Althings ſeemed to us to be undertaken for good. Art thou of the ſame opinion with us, that the end of al actions is good, and that althings elſe are undertaken for its ſake; but the end it ſelf is not undertaken for any thing elſe? Wherein he proves, (1) That every end is good, and the laſt end the chiefeſt p. 13good. (2) That althings elſe are undertaken for the laſt end, but it for nothing elſe. Whereby it's evident, that God is the laſt end of althings; becauſe the chiefeſt good, for which althings elſe are deſired. Thence Proclus, that great Platoniſt, Theolog. Plat. lib. 2. cap. 4. cals God foreign, The End of Ends, who convertes al Ends to himſelf, and ſubſiſtes in or about himſelf. Hence

8. Prop. The ultimate formal Reaſon or proper Motive of loving things is, not their own goodneſſe, but the Divine Bonitie. For the end having the reaſon of good, and the laſt end of the chiefeſt good, hence althings are ſo far deſirable as they refer to the laſt end and chiefeſt good, which is God. The end as compared with its means has the ſame regard, that the formal reaſon has to its object: now is not the object ſpecified by its formal reaſon? and muſt not the means alſo be ſpecified, determined, and ordered by their laſt end, which is God? Althings are ſo far good as they come from and tend to the Divine goodneſſe; which is the firſt effective Principe, Exemplar, and final Cauſe of al good. So Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 357. tels us, That the chiefeſt good, which makes althings elſe good, is, foreign, that which is deſired for it ſelf: yea, foreign, Goodneſſe it ſelf and Being it ſelf. Whence it neceſſarily follows, that nothing can be the ultimate formal reaſon of love or deſire, but the Divine Bonitie. For the neceſſitie and goodneſſe of al means is taken from their laſt end, which is the firſt Mover in the order of Ends, as the firſt Cauſe is in order of Efficients. Hence

9. Prop. Aſſimilation to the Divine Bonitie is the laſt End of althings, ſpecially human operations. For ſo far as any thing participates of the Divine Bonitie, ſo far it is made like unto the ſame: if therefore althings tend to God as their laſt end, that ſo they might participate of his Divine Bonitie, it neceſſarily follows, that the laſt end of althings is Aſſimilation to God. What are al Creatures but Imitamens of the Divine Bonitie? And is not every thing ſo far participant of the Divine Bonitie, as it is aſſimilated thereto? Do not althings then in their motions tend to the divine ſimilitude, as to their laſt end? It's true, the tendence of inanimate Creatures and Brutes, yea of al Minkind in their natural ſtate is only paſſive and remote: they are reduced to their laſt end the Divine Bonitie, but they have no active power of adhering thereto. Hence al lower Creatures, yea man himſelf in p. 14his apoſtate ſtate, have only ſome veſtigia or dark ſhadows of the Divine Bonitie; the bright image thereof being peculiar to pious Souls, and good Angels. That foreign, Aſſimilation to God is the laſt end of human Nature, Plato frequently inculcates. Thence ſaith he, foreign, The end of good men is to be aſſimilated to God. So in his Theatet. pag. 176. he makes Aſſimilation to God the end of his Philoſophie; which he elſewhere makes to be Contemplation, Love, and Imitation of God. Hence

10. Prop. Adherence to God as our laſt End importes not only ſubjection and dependence, but alſo the beſt Conſtitution, Complexion, and Perfection of a rational Creature. For by how much the higher the end is, by ſo much the more noble and perfect is the act: as the intention regulates and qualifies the Action; ſo the end regulates and qualifies the intention. Now Aſſimilation to the Divine Bonitie being the ultimate end of the rational Creature, it neceſſarily follows, that Adherence to this Divine Bonitie be his ſupreme perfection. The Divine Bonitie, ſaith Proclus, Theolog. Platon. l. 1. c. 21. is conſcrvative of althings, conſtitutive and fundative of althings, impletive of althings, and converſive of althings to it ſelf. Such as the laſt end is, ſuch is the wils motion: that is the beſt election, which doth moſt actually intend God as its laſt end. The nearer the Soul approcheth to God, the more perfect it is: the laſt end attractes the appetite to it ſelf: for to tend to an end is to be drawen by that end: and by how much the more ſtrongly the Soul is drawen by God as its laſt end, by ſo much the more intimately it adheres to him. The motion of the Soul towards its laſt end is much ſtronger than that towards the means; and therefore the adherence is the greater. What more natural than for a rational Creature to adhere to its laſt end? And O, what perfection ariſeth hence! To be drawen by God as our laſt end, is to be drawen by our moſt noble, perfect, and beſt ſelf; and therefore this ſpeaks not only Subjection, but bleſſed Conſtitution and Perfection.

§. 3. Having ſummed up Plato's Philoſophemes of the laſt End,The chiefest Good, its Proprieties. we now procede to his Contemplations of the chiefest Good; which hath intimate connexion therewith. His main Diſcourſes of the chiefeſt Good he layes down in his Philebus, his Convivium, 1. It is the Idea of Good.and de Repub. l. 26. c. 9. we ſhal reduce the whole to theſe following proprieties. 1. Plato ſtiles the chiefeſt Good foreign, p. 15the Idea of al good. So in his Philebus, having propoſed this Queſtion, Wherein the chiefeſt Good conſiſtes? he reſolves it into the Idea of Good. Which he elſewhere ſtiles foreign, the Good, meaning the chiefest. He termes the chiefeſt good, the Idea of al good, (1) becauſe it is foreign, a ſelf-ſufficient Good, yea Goodneſſe it ſelf, in the abſtract: i. e. al Good, pure Good, Good by himſelf, and ſo foreign, perfectly Good. The chiefeſt Good is Good by his own Goodneſſe, and not by any participated Goodneſſe. Whence ſome of the Platoniſts ſtile him foreign, ſupereſſential Goodneſſe. Where ever is the chiefeſt Good, there is the Eſſence of Good: Goodneſſe in the abſtract, and the chiefeſt Good are convertible: you cannot find the one, but you'l find the other alſo. Whatever good is predicable of any Creature is in the chiefeſt Good in the abſtract: and al know, that Abſtracts ſpeak Formes and Eſſences. So that the chiefeſt Good muſt needs be eſſential Goodneſſe in the abſtract, and thence by conſequence al Good in Idea. Thus Baſil, in Pſal. 1. foreign, The ſelf-good [or Ideal good] is really bleſſed, unto which al look, and which al deſire, as the meaſure of al good. (2) Plato ſtiles the chiefeſt Good the Idea of Good; becauſe he is both the prime Efficient and Exemplar of al Good. [1] He is the prime Efficient of al good. As al Creatures flow from and reflow to God, as the Ocean or plenitude of al Being; ſo alſo their Goodneſſe participates of the like fluxe from, and refluxe to the Divine Goodneſſe. No Creature hath any good in it, further than it partakes of the chiefeſt Good: whatever you poſſeſſe, if you want the chiefeſt Good, you poſſeſſe nothing. Hence, (2) the chiefeſt Good is the meaſure of al Good. Every thing is ſo far good to us, as it correſponds with and refers to the chiefeſt Good. So Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 357. foreign, We love the chiefeſt Good for its own ſake, as alſo althings elſe that flow from it: meaning the chiefeſt Good is the only meaſure of our love. So Arist. Rhet. l. 1. c. 7. makes that the chiefeſt Good, which is choſen for it ſelf, and thence the meaſure of al good.

2. The chiefeſt Good, according to Plato, is foreign,2. The chiefest Good the first Beautie. Beautie it ſelf: or foreign, the first Beautie. So in his Conviv. pag. 210. Whoſoever is brought thus far, to contemplate things beautiful rightly and in their order, arriving to the end of things p. 16lovely, foreign, he ſhal immediately contemplate that wonderful native Beautie, for the ſake of which we have hitherto undertaken al our labors. Wherein he teacheth us, that we may not fixe our eyes only on theſe inferior Beauties, but by them, as by ſo many aſcents, mount up to the contemplation of the first ſupreme Beautie, which is our chiefeſt good. That the prime Beautie is the chiefeſt good wil be moſt evident, if we look into the nature of Beautie as opened by Plato, who makes al Beautie to conſiſte, (1) in Symmetrie and Proportion. So in his Timaeus, pag. 87. foreign, Every Good is beautiful: and what is beautiful cannot want meaſure, order or proportion. Aquinas makes this difference between Bonitie and Beautie, that Bonitie or Goodneſſe properly regards the Wil, but Beautie the Eye and Underſtanding: thence beautiful colors ariſe from that varietie and convenance, which is in them to pleaſe the eye. That Symmetrie is eſſential to Beautie, Timaeus tels us, p. 103. foreign, &c. The Principes of Beautie are Symmetrie or proportion of parts, &c. Thence Plato, Leg. 3. makes Wiſdome to be most beautiful: becauſe foreign, the chiefest of Symphonies, or Harmonies. So Conviv. pag. 205. foreign, Wiſdome is the greatest of Beauties. Now Plato, Conviv. pag. 211. ſaith, The chiefest Good is, foreign, of it ſelf, with it ſelf, the most uniforme and ſimple Being; and therefore most beautiful. Again, is Wiſdome moſt beautiful, becauſe moſt concordant with it ſelf? And is not God the chiefeſt Good alſo the moſt uniforme Wiſdome? The proportion required to Beautie is wel expreſſed by Sales, de l'Amour de Dieu, l. 1. c. 1. Union, ſaith he, eſtabliſht in diſtinction makes order: order breeds convenance, agreament, and proportion: and convenance in things entire and accompliſht makes Beautie. An Armie is beautiful, when it is compoſed of al its parts, ſo ranked together in their order, that their diſtinction is reduced to that agreament, which they ought to have together. To make Muſic beautiful, there is required not only that the voices be clear and wel diſtinguiſhed, but alſo that they be conjoined in ſuch ſort one to t'other, that they make one juſt conſonance and harmonie, by means of the union that is in the diſtinction, and the diſtinction that is in the union of the voices, which may deſervedly be called a diſcordant Accord, or rather an accordant Diſcord. Hence (2) Al Beautie ariſeth from Perfection and Integritie of parts. Thoſe p. 17things are moſt beautiful in their kind, which are moſt perfect: And is not the chiefeſt Good moſt abſolutely and ſimply perfect? (3) The laſt and main Cauſe of Beautie is Splendor, Light and Claritie. Thence Beautie is defined by Plato the Fulgor and Luſtre of Good. Splendor and Brightneſſe is eſſential to Beautie, to the end that it may be viſible or intelligible. Obſcurities, Shadows, and Darkneſſes are deformed, and render althings deformable; becauſe nothing in them is viſible or intelligible: neither order, nor diſtinction, nor union, nor convenance. So Job 10.22. in the deſcription of the grave, he ſaith, It is a land of darkneſſe, as darkneſſe it ſelf, and of the ſhadow of death, without any order, and where the light is as darkneſſe: i.e. There is no light, therefore no order and beautie. Light gives life to brightneſſe; which is but a dead inutile thing, if ſplendor and beautie give not life and efficace to it, as we ſee in lively colors. So in man, his beautie is not accompliſht without a good grace and luſtre, which is the life of beautie. Thus in the ſoverain Beautie of God, the Splendor and Brightneſſe of his Perfections renders him moſt beautiful. Whence Beautie and Glorie, both in profane and ſacred Philoſophie, have one and the ſame Idea: for what is beautie, but the effulgence, or ſhine of al perfections in any object? And if this fulgor or ſplendor be illuſtrious and moſt bright, it's termed Glorie. So the beautie of the Sun, what is it but the glorioſe effulgence or brightneſſe of its light? Whence it being a grand Queſtion among the Ancients, What in Nature was most beautiful? it was anſwered, Light. Hence beautie is defined by the Orator, A due congruence, with a certain ſuavitie of color. This ſuavitie of color is nothing elſe, but the light or ſplendor of that perfection or goodneſſe which is in the ſubject. Whence Aquinas defines Beautie, A certain bland face of Bonitie or Goodneſſe. And do not al theſe notions of beautie greatly illuſtrate the ſurpaſſing heart-raviſhing Beautie of God the chiefeſt Good? What more glorioſe, reſplendent and effulgent than the chiefeſt Good? Where may we expect more glorioſe light and beautie, than with the Fountain of Light, in whoſe light alone we behold light? Has not the chiefeſt Good the moſt ſweet color and bland face of goodneſſe? Yea Plato, Repub. lib. 6. pag. 509. diſcriminating foreign thoſe things which are good by participation only, from foreign, the chiefest Good; he addes, That this has foreign, a certain infinite immenſe Beautie. So Conviv. pag. 211. he aſſures p. 18us, That althings elſe are beautiful, foreign, &c. by participation and in ſome certain mode only; but the firſt Beautie is, foreign, &c. moſt ſincere, pure, immixed; not contaminated with human colors, or other trifles. And then he breaks forth into this rapture of Admiration: O what a bleſſed ſight would it be, to contemplate this divine, ſincere, incontaminate, ſimple, uniforme Beautie! Yea, he poſitively affirmes, That God, who is the chiefest Good, has foreign, the most illuſtrious and amiable Beautie. Thus the ſpurious Dionyſius, de Nom. Divin. cap. 4. ſaith, That God, as the ſoverain Beautie, is the Author of the ſoverain Convenance, beautiful Grace and luſtre, which is in althings, making the diſtributions and departments of his rayes, by which althings are made beautifully to ſhine forth. God intending to render althings beautiful and good, hath reduced their multitude and diſtinction to a perfect unitie, i. e. to ſubſerve the enjoyment of himſelf as the firſt Beautie.

3. Plato makes the chiefeſt Good to be foreign,The chiefeſt Good most proper, &c. moſt proper. So Repub. 9. pag. 586. foreign, That which is beſt for every one, that is moſt proper. Thus Conviv. pag. 205. foreign, The chiefeſt Good is moſt proper to every one, and yet commun to al: Proprietie with Communitie is proper only to the chiefeſt Good. There are ſeveral other proprieties of the chiefeſt Good mentioned by Plato, namely that it is the moſt pleaſant, ſolid, ſubſtantial, vital, uniforme, agreable, infinite, eternal, neceſſary, divine Good: which by his own conceſſion are applicable to none but God. Of which hereafter more in Ariſtotle's Philoſophie, B. 4. c. 1. §. 22.

§. 4. Next to the laſt End,Of Ʋſe and its Regulation. and chiefeſt Good follows Ʋſe and Fruition; the former belonging to the Means, the later to End. Ʋſe properly conſiſtes in the ſubordination and reference of althings to our laſt end, which alone is the object of Fruition. The whole life of man is diſtributed into Ʋſe and Fruition. Ʋſe is a tendence or referring thing to our end. This by Plato is oft expreſſed under the notion of Temperance, which he makes to be the moderate uſe and reference of althings to our laſt end. So in his Gorgias, pag. 507. he begins thus: foreign, The temperate Soul is good. Thence he collects, That the intemperate Soul is foreign, mad and diſſolute. Whence he addes: foreign, The temperate man wil do that which has a decorum both towards God and men. And he gives the reaſon of it: foreign, p. 19For it is not the part of a temperate man to proſecute or flie from what he ought not; but to flie from and proſecute both things, perſons, and pleaſures as need requires; as alſo patiently to tolerate the ſame. Thence he concludes: foreign, &c. This ſeems to me to be the primarie and chief end of a regular life, that Juſtice and Temperance be always preſent. In which we have theſe obſervables. (1) That the temperate Soul is the beſt, and the intemperate the worſt. (2) That Temperance formally conſiſtes in giving al perſons and things their juſt decorum, and meaſure. (3) That we then give althings their juſt meaſure, when we proſecute, or flie from them, in that manner and meaſure as we ought. (4) That we then proſecute and flie from things as we ought, when we uſe, or uſe them not in ſubſervience to our laſt end, which is the meaſure of althings. This is wel expreſſed by Aristotle, (who followed Plato herein) Eth. l. 3. c. 15. foreign, Wherefore in a temperate man the concupiſcent part ought to conforme to reaſon: for moral good is the end of both. Thence a temperate man deſires what he ought, and in that manner as he ought, and when he ought: which is the Conſtitution, Law, and Order of Reaſon. Whereby he fully confirmes Plato's ſentiment, that Temperance gives althings their juſt number, weight, and meaſure, by reducing al to ſuch an Order, as may render them ſubordinate to the laſt end. The Stoic expreſſeth this Temperance in the uſe of things by foreign, ſuſtain what is grievous, and abstain from what is delicious. Which is thus expounded: The temperate man, foreign, ſustains without grief the abſence of pleaſures, and abstains from the fruition of them when preſent. This ſome make to be a great degree of fortitude: for the valiant man foreign, bears things terrible, and forbears things audacious. The ſum of al is, that the temperate man is not inordinately afflicted for the loſſe, or exceſſively affected with the preſence of any inferior good, but uſeth althings in meaſure and ſubſervience to his laſt end.

This Temperance in the uſe of things Plato alſo illuſtrates by the notions of Order and univerſal Justice. So Gorg. pag. 506. The p. 20virtate of every thing is its order: foreign, That therefore which is conſtituted and conformed by order, is the virtue of every thing. Wherefore the Soul that keeps its order is better than that which wants it. And what is it, in Plato's ſenſe, for a Soul to keep its order, but to uſe althings, ſervato ordine finis, in ſubordination to its end? This is wel illuſtrated by Janſenius, Auguſt. Tom. 2. l. 2. c. 19. where he proves out of Auguſtine, That virtue is nothing elſe but the order of Love. For by Love, as a Divine Pondus, the Soul reduceth althings to its laſt end, namely God. This is incomparably wel expreſſed by Plato, in his Philebus, pag. 24, 25. Whatſoever things ſeem to have exceſſe or defect, more or leſſe, foreign, al thoſe ought to be referred to the infinite Being, as the only meaſure. This he more openly expreſſeth, Leg. 4. pag. 716. foreign, &c. God is to us the meaſure of althings, unto which ſcope and mark al our actions, as ſo many arrows, ought to tend. So Repub. 1. pag. 331. foreign, I count the poſſeſſion of things of great uſe, yet not for every man, but he who is moderate and temperate, i. e. who refers al to his laſt end. Thence he addes: foreign, That riches are moſt uſeful for a wiſe man, who can and wil uſe al in ſubordination to his laſt end. Whence a thing utile, Definit. Plat. p. 414. is thus deſcribed: foreign. Again, foreign, A thing utile, is that which renders us capable of ſuffering wel, or doing good, in order to our laſt end. So alſo foreign, conducible is defined, foreign, that which conduceth to good, namely our laſt end. Theſe and ſuch like are Plato's Philoſophemes about Ʋſe, which may be al reduced to theſe following Propoſitions.

1. The Ʋtilitie of any created good conſiſtes not in its own goodneſſe, but in its reference to our laſt end. Herein conſiſtes the good of every inferior good, when it ſubſerves and tends to our chiefeſt good. The good and evil of althings is to be judged by their relation to, or diſtance from the laſt end. Things are ſo far good as they enable us to do good by ſerving God. Al that we have, or can do is of God, and therefore ought to be for God. Nothing is to be loved or enjoyed for it ſelf, but the chiefeſt good. Thus Ariſtotle, Eth. l. 4. c. 1. foreign, p. 21Thoſe things that come under Ʋſe, we may uſe either wel or il. Thus Riches are reckoned among utile goods. Now he that is endowed with virtue for the uſe of any thing, doth uſe that thing in the beſt manner. Therefore he uſeth riches beſt, which hath attained to that virtue, which belongs to the uſe thereof. Thus riches and al other lower goods muſt be referred to God. Hence

2. To uſe any thing, is to refer it to ſome other thing ſuperior in our eſtime. Herein conſiſtes the formal difference between Uſe and Fruition: Things are enjoyed for themſelves their own goodneſſe; but they are uſed in order to ſomething elſe. We do not properly enjoy, but uſe the means, neither uſe but enjoy our laſt end. Hence it follows (1) That al Uſe of God as a means for the obtainment of ſome other end is inordinate. (2) That al Uſe of the Creature, which is not referred to God, is alſo ſinful. This perverſitie and inordination is found in every ſin, whiles men enjoy what they ought to uſe, and uſe what they ought to enjoy. This Auguſtine makes to be the perverſion of al order, fruendis uti velle, at que utendis frui: When men enjoy the means and uſe the laſt end. But of this more, Prop. 4.

3. Things are then uſed orderly when they ſubſerve and are ſubordinate to our laſt end. Herein chiefly conſiſtes the order of Love, when it reſolves al lower goods and actions into the chiefeſt Good. Al lower goods are to be deſired not for enjoyment, but uſe; and when we have them, we muſt uſe them wel. This is wel explicated by Simplicius, in Epictet. cap. 1. pag. 2. where he tels us, This is the Spirit of Philoſophie, foreign, to keep the force of the mind free from the bodie and brutiſh affections, and to refer the uſe of al to the chiefeſt Good. Wherefore it doth allow the moderate uſe and fruit of externe things, which are eſtimed as good, ſo far as they agree with the true or beſt good: but yet ſo far as they differ therefrom, [i. e. ſubſerve not the chiefeſt Good] ſhe commands, that they be rejected. A Philoſopheme worthy of a Chriſtian mind. This is the import of that Divine Admonition, 1 Cor. 7.31. And they that uſe this world as not abuſing it: 1 Cor. 7.31.1 Cor 7:31foreign, as not overuſing it. When ever we overuſe any lower good, we abuſe it, i. e. turne it off from its proper uſe. Man has p. 22a great libertie to uſe althings indifferent indifferently, yet ſo as al muſt conduce to his laſt end. And indeed we are no further maſter of any thing, or free in the uſe of it, than it is brought into ſubſervience unto God. Hence,

4.Concupiſcence. To uſe or enjoy any inferior good for it ſelf is to abuſe it. This lower Univerſe and each part thereof was not made for mans Fruition, but Ʋſe. It's true, Brutes have libertie to enjoy the good things of ſenſes; becauſe they are not capable of any higher good: but mans libertie lies in the uſing theſe inferior goods for an higher end, the enjoyment of God: and when he perverts this order, he fals under miſerable curſed bondage. Thus Plato, Gorg. pag. 507. having laid down this Hypotheſis, That Temperance conſiſtes in the regular uſe of althings, he concludes: foreign, And thus he muſt act, leſt giving the rains to luſts, and ſuffering them to wander where they liſt, whiles he thinkes to ſatisfie them, he fal into an infinite evil, and live a robbers life. Whereby he means, that when mens luſts grow irregular in the uſe of things, they ſoon prove infinite and inſatiable. This inordinate love to the Creature for it ſelf is uſually ſtiled Concupiſcence and Luſt: which is nothing elſe but a brutiſh deſire after, and fruition of the Creature for it ſelf, without reference to God, the chiefeſt Good. This tyrannic Concupiſcence Plato accurately philoſophiſeth on, Repub. 9. pag. 574. where he deſcribes it, as the greateſt Tyrant in the world: Of which ſee Philoſ. Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. ſect. 5. §. 2. This perverſion of the order of Love, and abuſe of inferior goods Auguſtine ſadly complains of, in that men hereby uſe what they ſhould enjoy, and enjoy what they ſhould uſe, i. e. they uſe God and what belongs to him as means to promote their inferior goods, the object of their fruition; and that againſt the order of true Charitie, yea of human Nature, which requires, that we ſhould uſe al lower goods in ſubordination to God the chiefeſt Good. Creatures, when they are uſed in ſubſervience to God their laſt End, they are then in their proper place and amiable; but when they are made the object of Fruition, they are then in the place of God, and ſo moſt abominable. Janſenius, Auguſt. Tom. 2. de Nat. lapſ. l. 2. c. 19. pag. 156. gives this reaſon à priori, why it is unlawful to love or enjoy any Creature for it ſelf; becauſe it is againſt that natural order, which is eſtabliſhed by the eternal Law. For ſuch is the natural condition of a rational p. 23Creature, that, according to the order of Nature, he is placed beneath God, coordinate with intellectual Creatures, but above corporeous Creatures. Wherefore ſeing God alone is ſuperior to the rational Creature, he ought, according to the Law of Nature, by the Pondus of Love to ſubject himſelf to God only: which ſo long as he continues to do, he remains juſt and virtuoſe, and moſt ordinate in his kind; ſithat virtue is the beſt ſtate of a rational Creature; or, according to Auguſtine, nothing elſe but the order of Love: and by Love, as by a weight, the Soul is kept in this middle ſtate, under God the moſt ſupreme Being, and above inferior Creatures. This therefore is the bitter root of al inordinate motion, when the Soul doth by its love, as a terrene Pondus, move inordinately towards the Creatures, ſo as to become ſubject to them. Yea, doth not this perverting the order of Love bring the whole Creation under bondage, as Rom. 8.21,Rom. 8.21, 22.Rom 8:21Rom 8:2222? Wherein conſiſtes the preſent bondage of the Creatures, but in this, that they are perverted and turned aſide from that Order for which they were made, namely from the ſerving their Creator, to feed the luſts of men? The Creatures are not put to that uſe for which they were made by God, and this makes them groan to be delivered, &c. Herein conſiſtes the Libertie of al Creatures, and our Libertie in the uſe of them, that we are thereby made more free in the ſervice and fruition of God; by ſubjecting our ſelves and al inferior goods to God, for the ſerving and enjoyment of him, we gain dominion over our ſelves and althings elſe. But if the heart be inordinate in adhering to or uſe of the moſt lawful comforts, we immediately fal under bondage to them. The way to have the Spirit free in the uſe of any created good, is not to uſe or enjoy it too much, by letting the Spirit to run too far into it, or loving it for it ſelf: for thereby we become ſlaves it.

5. The more actually the Soul intends God as its laſt End, Intention.in the uſe of inferior things, the more perfect is the uſe of them. It's a great Saying, The moſt actual Intention is beſt: Intention is the moſt eminent act of Love: and the moſt perfect intention is that which moſt eyes God in the uſe of althings. To intend any thing, as Suarez wel obſerves, is to tend towards it by al manner of vehement deſires, and important endeavors. Indeed intention differs not from efficacious deſire of the end, together with the means conducing thereto: whereby it is differenced from Velleitie; p. 24which is only a conditionate, ſaint, imperfect volition of an end, without regard to the means. The more ſtrongly and actually we intend our end, the ſooner ſhal we arrive thereto in the uſe of means:Mat. 6.22.Matt 6:22 a ſingle ſtrait intention keeps the Agent ſtrait in its way to its end. Thus Mat. 6.22. If therefore thine eye, i.e. the intention of thy wil, be ſingle, i.e. if it hath a ſingle end, namely God. Janſenius, out of Augustine, Tom. 2. l. 2. c. 20. pag. 162. informes us, that althings are to be referred to God, not only by habitual Intention, as the Scholes determine, but alſo by an intention virtually actual. And he thus demonſtrates it: becauſe the mind, when it acts, muſt requieſce in the love, not of the Creature, but of God. For this is moſt certain, according to Auguſtine, that an habitual Intention only without actual or virtual wil not ſuffice; becauſe the juſt, when aſleep, have habitual intention, yet they cannot then be ſaid to refer their actions to God. Wherefore there is always neceſſary an actual, or at leaſt virtual intention of referring althings to God. A virtual intention in human acts hath the ſame force as actual intention: for it acts in virtue and force received from ſome former actual intention. As when a man in a journey is carried on towards his end by a virtual intention, influenced by ſome former actual intention. A right intention is the deliberation of a bended wil towards God as the laſt end: for where the intention is right, God is the predominant end. The end of an action diſcovers its kind: and the intention diſcovers the end: For intention properly belongs to the Wil, whoſe office it is to refer al to the laſt end. The intention is the guard of the thoughts and deſires, that which girds up the mind, and keeps it fixed on its laſt end, in the uſe of al means. He that doth not intend and eye God in his worldly concernes, wil not intend him in his beſt duties and ſervices. To have the intention of the Wil actually directed towards God in al inferior goods is the Spirit of right Uſe. And herein indeed conſiſtes much of the Souls libertie as to means, to intend God in al. It's a good Notion of Aquinas, That the Soul, by intending temporals in order to God, is elevated and advanced; otherwiſe it is depreſſed and brought down, namely when it intends any temporal thing for it ſelf. Thus alſo Janſenius, in his Auguſt. Tom. 2. l. 1. c. 6. pag. 40. where he gives this difference between Ʋſe and Fruition: Whatever is loved as an end, which a man deſires to enjoy and to be bleſſed therein, that rules over the Lover: for this is the difference p. 25between Uſe and Fruition, that the Wil depreſſeth it ſelf under what it enjoys, but it elevates it ſelf above what it uſeth: ſo that it is a Servant of that which it enjoys, but Lord over what it makes uſe of. This inferior viſible World what is it but a Map of things inviſible? And ought we not then firmely to intend God in al theſe lower things? And is not this the moſt perfect uſe, when the Soul doth ſpiritually and actually contemplate, intend, and adhere to God in al theſe lower goods of time? As Intention directs the Wil, ſo Faith directs the Intention in the uſe and proſecution of al means: it is the Intention that regulates the qualitie of the action in the uſe of things; and it is divine Faith and Love that regulate the Intention. This is wel explicated and demonſtrated by Greg. Ariminenſis, 2. Sent. Diſt. 38. Quaeſt. 1. Art. 1. where he proves, That according to the bonitie or pravitie of the Intention of the Worker, we are to meaſure the bonitie or pravitie of the worke. Which he demonſtrates by theſe Concluſions: (1) That Intention only is right or morally good, whereby that is intended or loved for it ſelf, which ought to be loved for it ſelf. (2) Every Intention of a Worker, whereby any thing beſides God is intended for it ſelf, that Intention is evil. And the reaſon is invincible, becauſe every rational Creature ought to refer al his acts to God as his laſt end. Hence, according to the bonitie or pravitie of the Intention, we may take a meaſure of the bonitie or pravitie of Uſe: Every Intention of the Agent, wherein any thing but God is intended as the laſt end, is a depraved Intention: becauſe nothing is to be intended for it ſelf but the laſt end. Whence it follows, that no Intention is right or morally good, but that whereby we intend or love for it ſelf, that which ought to be intended or loved for it ſelf, namely the laſt end and chiefeſt good, uſing and referring althings elſe, as means ſubordinate thereto, as it is acutely demonſtrated by Ariminenſis, in 2. Sent. Diſt. 38. Quaeſt. 1. Art. 1.

§. 5. Having explicated the nature of Ʋſe, Fruition.we may with more facilitie and expedition examine what Fruition imports. As to uſe a thing, is to intend, elect, and imploy it for the acquirement of ſome other thing; ſo to enjoy a thing, is by love to adhere unto it for it ſelf, without reference to any other thing. Thus Janſenius, Aug. Tom. 2. l. 1. c. 6. gives us this difference between Ʋſe and Fruition. He that uſeth a thing has dominion over it, to refer it to this or that end; but he that enjoys any thing doth bring down his Soul p. 26by love unto a ſubjection thereto, and is in that regard inferior to it, though ſuperior to whatever he doth uſe. This Ariminenſis, in Sent. Part. 1. Diſt. 1. Quaeſt. 1, 2, 3. has acutely determined: where he gives us the nature of Fruition, and its difference from Ʋſe in theſe Concluſions. (1) No Nolition is Fruition: becauſe every Nil is the ſlight of the wil, and that which is ordained for ſome other. (2) Every Volition is either Ʋſe or Fruition: becauſe every thing is willed either for it ſelf or ſome other. (3) No Ʋſe is Fruition: becauſe no one that wils a thing for another, can be ſaid to wil that thing as his laſt end: becauſe the volition of the laſt end is the cauſe of the volition of that which refers to that end: but nothing can be the cauſe of it ſelf: Ergo. (4) Fruition and Ʋſe may conſiſt together in the Wil, as to different objects. (5) The Wil ought not to Ʋſe God: i. e. as a means conducible to ſome other end. (6) A Love of Fruition muſt terminate no where but on God. (7) To love any thing for God, is nothing elſe than to love it, becauſe God is loved: i. e. to love it as conducible to God. In Fruition there are four conſiderables, (1) Love. (2) Poſſeſſion of and Ʋnion with the Object beloved. (3) Communion. (4) Delectation and joy. Of theſe in their order.

1. Al Fruition imports Love. For no man can enjoy what he doth not love: al Love tends to Union, ſpecially with its laſt end: Yea, according to the Scholes, there is a mutual Inheſion between the Lover and Beloved. The Lover lives in the Beloved, and the Beloved in the Lover: which is moſt true in regard of that Love of Fruition, whereby the Soul enjoys God: for God lives in the Soul that loves him, and the Soul lives in God, who is eſſential Love. This Love of Fruition is wel expreſſed by Plato, Repub. 6. pag. 485. foreign, But in that man, whoſe affections are greatly raviſhed with one object, they are infirme and remiſſe towards other things, as rivers, derived elſewhere. His mind is, that Love of Fruition is properly towards one object, namely the laſt end. But more expreſſely, in his Phaedo, he ſaith: foreign, He that is wiſe deſires always to be with and enjoy that which is better or his best good: i. e. Union and Fruition is the main thing his Love aims at. Every one is ſtrongly carried forth by Love towards his laſt end: yea thoſe very acts of love and deſire are fruition in part. Thence Arist. Rhet. lib. 2. p. 27cap. 18. foreign, Becauſe al are wont to be converſant about what they love. This intime connexion between Love and Fruition is excellently wel explicated by Janſenius, August. Tom. 2. l. 1. c. 6. pag. 40. Love of Fruition ordains and diſpoſeth the Love towards its Beloved: whom it regards as its firſt Principe or Cauſe, and its laſt end, in the fruition of which it expects perfect felicitie. For what is Fruition but this, to adhere to and acquieſce in another as its firſt principe and laſt end? But now every thing that is ordained to another, is in that reſpect neceſſarily inferior to that other. Whence Love of Fruition keeps the Soul in ſubjection to God its laſt end, but gives it dominion over every inferior good. This Janſenius more fully explicates, Tom. 2. l. 2. c. 16. pag. 149. Many, ſaith he, thinke they love not ſuch things, to which they are indeed intimately and ſtrongly united: but this is with facilitie detected by Fruition: for Love cannot be wel underſtood without Fruition, nor yet Fruition without Love; becauſe Love is the beginning of Fruition, and Fruition the end of Love. No man enjoys but what he loves; and no man loves any thing as his laſt end, but what he would enjoy: whence, as there is no Fruition but what is ſweetened with Love, ſo there is no Love but what tends to Fruition. Therefore Love, according to Auguſtine, is nothing elſe but the Wil, by its Pondus, tending to Fruition. What is Love, but a ſecret Fountain ſtreaming towards Fruition? And what is Fruition, but an Ocean of ſatisfaction, in which Love is immerſed and ſwallowed up? Is not then Fruition near akin to Love? Thence Augustine, explicating the nature of Fruition, tels us, that to enjoy, is to adhere to a thing for it ſelf: for if it be not adhered to for it ſelf, it is not properly loved or enjoyed, but that other thing, for whoſe ſake it is embraced. But to ſpeak preciſely, every kind of Love is not Fruition, but that only which ſolaceth it ſelf in the embracements of its beloved: which if abſent, the wil moves towards it by deſires. This is wel expounded by Plato, Phaedro, pag. 251. foreign, &c. Wherefore every Soul, ſo long as it is pricked and wounded with deſires, it feels grief, and is enraged thereby; and then again it is recreated with the memorie of that first Beautie it once beheld. And thus variouſly affected, by reaſon of impatient furie, it cannot ſleep, but wanders up and down with deſire to ſee the first Beautie: which when it has once got a glance of, then breaking al p. 28bounds of Modesty it ſolaceth it ſelf in the embraces thereof, &c. By al which it is apparent, (1) That al Fruition of, or love to any Creature for it ſelf is ſinful concupiſcence. (2) That God alone is to be embraced with a love of Fruition as our laſt end; becauſe he alone is to be loved for himſelf. He that loves any thing with God, and not for God, loves him not as he ought.

2.Ʋnion. The next part of Fruition is Poſſeſſion of and Ʋnion with the Object beloved. Al complete Fruition ſuppoſeth Poſſeſſion and Ʋnion: Frui eſt terminus deſiderii. Suar.for if the object be abſent, there can be only love of deſire, not perfect Fruition: becauſe to enjoy a thing is the terme of deſire. Plato, in his Timaeus, informes us, that foreign, Beatitude, conſiſtes in nothing elſe but foreign, to have a good Demon dwelling in himſelf, &c. whereby he underſtands God. The like alſo in his Politicus, pag. 309. he ſhews how the Soul being united to the first Beautie or chiefest Good, it thereby becomes happie. And Thales being asked, What was moſt ſweet? anſwered, foreign, to poſſeſſe, meaning the chiefeſt Good. This poſſeſſion of the ſupreme Good, which belongs to Fruition, is wel expreſſed by Ariſtotle, Eth. lib. 4. cap. 4. art. 37. foreign, For the virtue of poſſeſſion and of worke is not the ſame: For the virtue of poſſeſſion is that it might be moſt eſtimed, precious and dear. Where by Poſſeſſion he ſeems to mean Fruition, as by worke, Ʋſe. So Ariſtotle, Rhet. lib. 2. cap. 18. ſpeaking of Rich men, their Fruition of riches as their laſt end, ſaith, foreign, They receive a great impreſſion from the poſſeſſion of riches: for they are ſo affected as if they enjoyed al good: i. e. poſſeſſing Riches they enjoy them as their chiefeſt good; and ſo have their ſpirits formed by, yea transformed into them: for althings are faſhioned and framed into the image and idea of thoſe good things which they poſſeſſe and enjoy as their laſt end: Fruition breeds firſt imitation of or likeneſſe unto, and then union with what we enjoy. Neither doth Fruition import poſſeſſion only, but alſo union with its laſt end, i. e. moral and objective union at leaſt, if not phyſic and real: for without union there can be no Fruition of that good we poſſeſſe. Now the union which the Soul has with its chiefeſt Good is moſt intimate, firme, and inviolable. For the Union of Spirits is far more intimate and firme than that of bodies among themſelves, or with Spirits. The p. 29ſenſes in extracting pleaſures out of ſenſible good are converſant only about the externe accidents: Moreover the pleaſures taken in by the ſenſes come not in altogether, but gradually and by parcels: therefore the union of object and ſubject is more remote and partial only: But the Soul, in the Fruition of the chiefeſt ſweeteſt good, being ſpiritual, and of the ſame nature with its object, has a more complete reception thereof, and intimate union therewith: whence the pleaſures that attend the ſame are of al the moſt ſpiritual, pure, intenſe, and permanent, as hereafter.

3. Al Fruition importes Communion with our chiefeſt Good.Communion. Frui, ex vi nominis eſt, capere fructum à re. Suar. For to enjoy a thing, according to the origination of the word among the Latines, is to participate of the fruits thereof. And may any participate of the fruits of the chiefeſt Good, without communion therewith? Indeed al union, at leaſt with the ſupreme Good, is in order to communion; which doth formaliſe, yea conſummate the Souls Beatitude in its moſt perfect ſtate. It is not the poſſeſſion of any good can make them happy that have it, unleſſe they enjoy what they poſſeſſe. This is lively illuſtrated by Plato in his Phaedo, pag. 80, &c. This Phaedo coming to Socrates at the time when he was ready to die, Socrates philoſophiſeth, even to admiration, on the Souls immortal ſtate after death, and its felicitie in communion with the chiefeſt Good. His words are theſe: foreign, But the Soul, being a thing inviſible, departs to ſuch a place, as is moſt generous, pure, and inviſible, namely to the ſtate of the dead, where it enjoys God the moſt wiſe and choiceſt Good; where, if God wil, my Soul muſt immediately go. Thence he addes, pag. 81. foreign; Doth not therefore the mind thus qualified go to that divine Being like it ſelf? I ſay, that divine, immortal, and wiſe Being? Where when it arrives, doth it not evade altogether happy, being freed from Error, Ignorance, Terrors, wild Loves, and other human Infirmities; and as we ſay of thoſe who are initiated in Sacreds, ſpend the reſt of its time in communion with God? This he makes to be the ſtate of pure Souls ſeparated; whereas impure polluted Souls p. 30paſſe unto their place of puniſhment as he in what follows demonſtrates.

This Communion with God Plato, Contemplation.Tim. 90. makes to conſiſte, foreign, in giving the Soul its proper food and motions: which he chiefly placeth, (1) in the Contemplation of God. This he more fully explicates, Conviv. pag. 211. where he makes, The Contemplation of the firſt Beautie, foreign, &c. that divine, ſincere, uniforme, ſimple, pure, incontaminate, perfect Beautie, to be the moſt raviſhing ſpectacle; and that which makes us perfectly happie. Acts of Contemplation on God are moſt tranquille, pleaſant, congenial to the Soul, uniforme, ſelf-ſufficient, and permanent. Thus Aquinas, 2.2. Quaeſt. 179. Art. 1. Every thing manifeſtes its life by that operation which is moſt proper to it, and whereunto it is chiefly inclined: Now, in as much as Contemplation is the proper act of man whereunto he is moſt inclined, and wherein he delights moſt, it follows, that herein the main of his life conſiſtes. To contemplate the firſt cauſe and laſt end of althings how delicious and agreable is it! Contemplation binds the mind to its object, and thence inſenſibly transformes it thereinto. Is it not ſweet to the eye to contemplate light? And is not the laſt end the prime light of the Soul? Doth not the contemplation of our laſt end give us a divine light to improve al other objects we converſe with? And are not althings hereby turned into God? Doth not the Contemplation of God, as our choiceſt Good, enable us to live in God, and to him?

(2) But yet together with Contemplation there muſt be divine Love and Complacence, Love.which is another part of the Souls communion with its laſt end. Contemplation brings in the chiefeſt Good into the Soul; but divine Love carries out the Soul to it, by adherence to, and delight in it. The amorous Soul living in God by love, dies in it ſelf. How many artifices doth divine Love uſe for the enjoyment of its choiceſt Good? As man loſt God by loving the Creature more than God; ſo by loving God more than the Creature he again finds God, and ſatisfaction in him. Love to God ſettles the Soul in one point, out of which it needs not ſtir to find Felicitie.Dulcius eſt amare quàm amari. Sen. A Soul thus inſpired with the flames of divine Love has a little Heaven in it. The Stoic thinkes it ſweeter to love than to be beloved. Certainly divine Love is moſt unitive and perfective: it has a violence and pain, which is p. 31moſt ſweet and delicious. The Soul by loving its laſt end poſſeſſeth, enjoys, and lives in it. Have not althings a deſire of union and communion with what they love? And the more vehement our love is, if it be of the chiefeſt good, the ſweeter our fruition thereof is. This love gains ſtrength by oppoſition: it makes the moſt difficult ſervice ſweet. The only limits this victorious divine Love propoſeth to it ſelf, is to have no limits. Where ever the Soul turnes it cannot but feel dolors, if it acquieſce not in God; but ſo far as it adheres to God, it feels no pain. Auguſtine, that great Doctor of Love to God, compriſed al Chriſtian Morals in Love; which is the plenitude of the Law and our beſt Inſtructor in every Dutie. It is a luminous fire that diſcovers things moſt ſecret, and penetrates things moſt profound: it is an incomparable Antidote againſt human corruption. Whence alſo Auguſtine termed al Virtue but the order of Love: and its admirable efficace is ſeen in this, that it doth lift the heart above al things create, and yet at the ſame time depreſſe it at the loweſt centre of ſelf-nothingneſſe. Al the labors of this Love are ful of divine ſuavities, and carrie their rewards in them: Afflictions blunt not its edge: caſt it into an ocean of miſerie, and it ſwims above al: it eſtimates its miſerie only by the loſſe, and its Beatitude only by the fruition of its laſt end. Mediocritie, which in other things is eſtimed Vertue, is a Vice in Love to God, which admits no exceſſe. Theſe and ſuch like are the Acts of the Soul in Communion with God, as our laſt end. This Communion with God, the Romans, in their manner and according to their obſcure ſentiments, expreſſed by their Lectiſternia, or Beds placed in their Temples, whereon they conceited they feaſted and had communion with their Gods: Of which ſee Lud. Vives in August. Civ. lib. 3. cap. 17.

§. 6. Laſtly,Delectation and Joy. Fruition of the choiceſt Good carries with it ſatiſfying Pleaſures, Suavities, and Delights. No one properly enjoys a thing, who hath not ſome joy in the Fruition thereof.Frui, eſt cum gaudio frui. August. The Quietation, Delectation, and Satisfaction, which the Soul finds in the enjoyment of its laſt end is greatly illuſtrated by Plato, in his Philebus, where he treats profeſſedly of this ſubject. So pag. 15. foreign, He that being young having taſted thereof, like one overjoyed, as if he had found a treaſure of wiſdome, leaping for joy, and as it were under a divine p. 32Enthuſiaſme or rapture, he moves every diſcourſe chearfully and orderly. This Tranſport of divine Joy is proper to no act but the Fruition of our laſt end. Thence Phileb. pag. 40. he thus diſtinguiſheth between true and falſe pleaſures: There are in the minds of wicked men foreign, painted pleaſures, but ſuch as are altogether falſe. Whence he concludes: foreign, Wherefore wicked men for the moſt part are glutted with falſe pleaſures; but virtuoſe men with ſuch as are ſincere and genuine. Wicked mens pleaſures are ſucked from ſome dirtie terrene goods; and therefore only imaginarie and ſpurious; but the virtuoſe mans pleaſures are formed out of the chiefeſt good, and therefore genuine and ſatiſfying. But to philoſophiſe more diſtinctly of that Delectation, Joy, and Pleaſure, which attends the fruition of the chiefeſt Good, we ſhal examine and inquire into, (1) The Cauſes, (2) The proper Adjuncts, (3) The Effects thereof; and that according to Plato's Philoſophemes.

1.1. The Cauſes of Delectation. Three things are eſſentially requiſite to the conſtitution of true Delectation and Joy. (1) A ſweet Good. (2) Poſſeſſion of that Good.(1) A ſweet Good. (3) Actions conſequent to that poſſeſſion. (1) There muſt be a ſweet Good, out of which al true pleaſure is formed: and by how much the more ſweet and pleaſant the good is, by ſo much the more perfect is the delight. Satisfying joy is formed out of nothing but the moſt amiable beſt good. This Plato frequently inculcates. Thus Phaedr. pag. 251. treating of the Contemplation of the chiefeſt Good, he ſaith: foreign, Whom when it ſhal ſee, and inſtil the deſire of him into it ſelf, it ſhal then break al bounds of modeſtie, and having got libertie of breathing, it ſhal ceaſe to be exagitated by pricking dolors. This moſt ſweet pleaſure it enjoys in the preſence of its ſweetest good, ſo that it can never depart from its embraces, neither doth it value any thing more than its beloved. Such infinite pleaſure flows from the preſence of the ſweeteſt Good. Perfect Joy cannot forme it ſelf out of any inferior good: it ſprings only from the beſt ſweeteſt good, which infuſeth its divine ſuavities into the Soul. What but the firſt eſſential, univerſal, Soul-ſatisfying good can feed immortal Souls with perfect delights? (2) Another p. 33Spring of Delectation is Poſſeſſion; (2) Poſſeſſion.which as it is eſſential to al Fruition, ſo in a particular manner to Joy that attends the ſame: for every one is delighted in the obtainment of what he loves: and by how much the ſweeter the object beloved is, and the poſſeſſion more intimate, by ſo much the greater is the delight.Generatio voluptatis ex copulatione finiti & infiniti. Thence it is a great Philoſopheme with Plato, That true Joy iſſueth from the copulation of finite and infinite, i. e. to ſpeak nakedly, from the Ʋnion of the Soul with God. This Plato, according to his allegoric mode, expreſſeth, Conviv. 206. Al men, ſaith he, in their manner conceive and are pregnant; and when they have gone their time, Nature deſires to bring forth. Thence he concludes: foreign, Therefore as oft as that which is pregnant adheres to the first Beautie or ſweetest Good, it is affected with joy, hilaritie, and pleaſure; and brings forth and generates: but on the contrary, when it adheres to what is baſe and fordid, it is contracted by ſorrow and grief; and thence, being not able to bring forth, it is tormented with pains and dolors. By which he deſcribes to the life the different effects which follow on the Souls adhering to God, and to inferior Goods: upon the Souls adherence to God follows the generation of Soul-raviſhing pleaſures; but upon adherence to baſe worldly good no true pleaſure follows, but vexatious dolors and torments. This pleaſure, that follows on adherence to, and poſſeſſion of God, is wel expreſſed by David, Pſal. 25.13.Pſal. 25.13.Ps 25:13 His Soul ſhal dwel at eaſe: Heb. loge in goodneſſe. When God dwels in the Soul, it then doth loge in goodneſſe, or dwel at eaſe: where there is want, there can be no perfect eaſe and delight: but when the Soul logeth in divine Goodneſſe, it then finds eaſe and pleaſure. Every want wrings and pincheth the Soul: it can never loge with eaſe, til it loge in the chiefeſt Good by poſſeſſing the ſame, whereby al its wants are ſupplied. The Soul, when it ſits moſt uneaſie as to inferior goods, ſo far as it dwels in God, and God dwels in it, ſo far it finds eaſe. Properly we never enjoy any thing, til we find reſt in it: this the Soul finds ſo far as it poſſeſſeth God. Whence ſprings delectation and pleaſure: Poſſeſſion gives the obtainment of deſires: and deſires ſo far as obtained fil with joy proportionable to the deſires.

p. 34(3) The immediate effective Spring of Delectation and Joy is Motion or Action. (3) Action a cauſe of Joy.Whence Joy is defined by Cicero, a ſweet motion in ſenſe. Yea, things in themſelves bitter and irkeſome, how ſweet are they oft made by exercice! It is generally determined in the Scholes, That operation and motion is the proper cauſe of Delectation: and is not the operation and motion of the Soul in the fruition of the ſweeteſt good of al the moſt noble and perfect? Actings of the Soul on the chiefeſt good, O what ſweet inſpirations of Divine ſuavities are they attended with! Thus Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 582. foreign, &c. How great pleaſure the contemplation of the first Being brings with it, none but a Philoſopher can taſte. So in his Phaedrus, pag. 249. ſpeaking of the Contemplation of the firſt Being, he addes: foreign, This is the most raviſhing ecſtaſie and compoſed of the best things. That al true pleaſure ariſeth from virtuoſe exercices about the ſweeteſt good, Ariſtotle, in imitation of his Maſter Plato, has wel demonſtrated. So Eth. l. 1. c. 9. p. 43. As in the Olympian Games not he that is most beautiful, or moſt valiant carries away the Crown; but foreign, but they that contend for Victorie: So in this human life, they that do good, are made partakers of good things. And then he addes the reaſon: foreign, Their life is indeed ſweet and joyous of it ſelf—He is delighted or recreated in juſt things, who by love embraceth juſtice— To thoſe that are ſtudioſe of virtue, virtuoſe acts are of themſelves pleaſant and delicious: i. e. they carrie in them their own reward, a divine ſuavitie. And he ſubjoins the reaſon: foreign, &c. But their life needs not pleaſure as an additament or appendix, but has pleaſure included in it: For beſides what has been ſpoken, he is not a good man, who is not delighted in good actions. Neither doth any cal him juſt, who doth not take pleaſure in juſt deeds: or liberal, who is not delighted in liberal acts. So in other Virtues. Whence he concludes: If ſo then, foreign, virtuoſe acts are of themſelves ſweet. Whence he collects this general Concluſion: foreign, formal Beatitude is the beſt, faireſt, and ſweeteſt thing: i. e. Nothing ſo ſweet as by virtuoſe acts to adhere to, and enjoy the ſweeteſt and beſt good. And indeed herein Plato and Ariſtotle accord and agree with ſacred Philoſophie. For David aſſures p. 35us, that nothing was ſo ſweet to him, as the Contemplation and Fruition of God, by acts of Faith, &c. So Pſal. 27.4.Pſal. 27.4.Ps 27:4 One thing have I deſired— to behold the beautie of the Lord: Heb. to behold with ſingular delight. For foreign conſtrued with foreign in ſignifies, to ſee with great pleaſure and delectation, as v. 13. O! how ſweet and delicious was it to David to look on the golden Arke, the Symbol of Chriſts Humanitie, and there by Faith to adore the Deitie! So Pſal. 106.5. That I may ſee the good of thy choſen, Pſal. 106.5.Ps 106:5that I may rejoice in the gladneſſe of thy nation: Heb. to ſee in good, i. e. to enjoy the good ſeen with pleaſure and ſatisfaction: for foreign conſtrued with foreign ſignifies, to enjoy with pleaſure. O! how delicioſe is the fiducial contemplation of the ſweeteſt Good! What is formal Beatitude, but the immediate, glorioſe, perfect Intuition or Viſion of the ſupreme Beautie? And what infinite delectation enſues hereon? What a joyous contemplation is it to behold the Deitie in the Arke of Chriſts Humanitie? What infuſions of Divine ſuavities flow hence? Doth not the Beautie of the firſt Cauſe and faireſt Good captivate al hearts that behold it? How much ſpiritual delectation is there in one glance on the ſweeteſt Good? How ſoon is the holy Soul filled with divine ſuavities, when it can, in any meaſure, contemplate the Glorie of the prime Beautie. Thus Pſal. 104.34. My meditation of him ſhal be ſweet: Pſal. 104.34.Ps 104:34I wil be glad in the Lord. Yea, would not an appropriating view of the admirable perfections of God, the ſweeteſt Good, turne Hel it ſelf into Heaven? Such are the divine ſuavities, which attend virtuoſe acts, in the Fruition of the ſweeteſt Good.

§. 7.2. The Adjuncts of Delectation. We now deſcend to diſcourſe of and explicate the nature of Delectation in regard of its proper Adjuncts, which are various. (1) Al Delectation and Joy muſt be real and ſincere: (1) It is real.and the more real and ſincere it is, the better it is. And doth not this give a great advance to thoſe joys and ſuavities which attend the fruition of our laſt end and ſweeteſt good? May any delices be compared with theſe, in point of ſinceritie and realitie? What are al other pleaſures in compariſon of theſe, but painted ſhadows, yea mere lies? This is lively illuſtrated by Plato, Phileb. pag. 40. where he ſtiles al terrene pleaſures, foreign, Phantaſmes or Imaginations painted in our minds: as when a man conceits he has a vaſt treaſure of gold in his poſſeſſion, which he has not, yet takes pleaſure in ſuch a ſick dream. Whence he addes: There are falſe pleaſures in the minds of men, which yet, by mens ridiculous p. 36figments, imitate true pleaſures. And then he concludes: foreign, Neither do I judge, that we may conſider pleaſures in any other regard evil, but as they are falſe. B… which he invincibly demonſtrates, that no pleaſures are truly …ch, but thoſe that are ſincere, real, and ſubſtantial; which he makes proper to virtuoſe men, who adhere to the ſweeteſt Good. This real pleaſure is elſewhere ſtiled by him foreign, ſincere genuine pleaſure; which he makes to be peculiar to the fruition of the beſt Good. This he more openly expreſſeth, Repub. 9. pag. 580. where he aſſertes, That a wiſe or virtuoſe man only, foreign, doth taſte of the moſt genuine and true pleaſures. So pag. 583. foreign, Neither is there any true pleaſure, but that of a wiſe man. Whereby he, (as Solomon) underſtands a virtuoſe man. Thus Plato the Jew, that great Platoniſt: foreign, &c. Becauſe al genuine and ſincere joy is found only in the minds of good men; therefore every wiſe man rejoiceth in himſelf, and not in things forrein. Thence, ſaith Seneca, Thoſe things in which the vulgar ſort delight themſelves, have only a thin ſuperficial pleaſure; and ſometimes an adventitious joy, which hath no funde or bottome. There is no ſolid ſubſtantial joy, but what ſlows from, and ſome way refers to the fruition of the ſweeteſt good: al other pleaſures are only opinionative, and grounded on falſe imagination.

(2) The Delectation that flows from the Fruition of the ſweeteſt Good is moſt congenial, (2) Congenial Pleaſures.and proper to the Soul; and therefore moſt perfect. Thus Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 585. foreign, If therefore to be filled with things conſentaneous to nature be ſweets then that which is indeed filled with the firſt Being, and thoſe things that partake moſt of Being, is more truly affected with true pleaſure. His Argument lies thus: Nothing is more delicious to human Nature, than to be filled with ſuch things as are moſt conſentaneous and agreable to its more noble part the Soul: Now to be filled with the fruition of the firſt Being and ſweeteſt Good is moſt proper and agreable to the Soul: therefore this is moſt delicious to human Nature. So Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 580. ſaith, A wiſe man from the contemplation of God enjoys, foreign, p. 37pleaſures proper to himſelf, and therefore the beſt. The perfection of al human pleaſures and joys ariſeth from their connaturalitie to the Soul: for this being mans moſt noble part, yea indeed (according to Platonic as wel as ſacred eſtimation) a mans ſelf, the more congenial our pleaſures are hereto, the more perfect they are: Now the pleaſures and ſuavities, which flow from the fruition of our ſweeteſt good, are of al moſt connatural and congenial to the Soul. For by how much the more immaterial, ſpirital, and intellectile our joys are, by ſo much the more agreable they are to our Spirits: and are any joys more ſpirital, than thoſe that flow from the fruition of our laſt end and ſweeteſt good, which is God? Can any thing affect the Soul with higher delectation, than the fruition of the chiefeſt good, which is ſo agreable to it, and which ſhe receiveth immediately without the miniſterie of her externe ſenſes? This is wel expreſſed by Digby, of the Souls Immortalitie, pag. 459. We are ſure that what pleaſure a man receiveth, he receiveth by means of his Soul, even al corporeal pleaſure: for be the working object never ſo agreable and pleaſing unto him, he reapeth thence ſmal delight, if his Souls attention be carried in the mean time another way from it. Certainly then thoſe things affect the Soul moſt powerfully, which are connatural to her, and which ſhe ſeizeth on and reliſheth immediately; rather than thoſe impure ones, which come ſophiſticated to her, through the muddy chanels of the ſenſes. Obſerve but the different comportment of an ambitioſe and ſenſual man, and you wil eaſily perceive this. Are not mental pleaſures, ſpecially in the contemplation of the firſt Beautie, moſt ſavorie and delicious? Yea, do not theſe by exercice become as it were one with the Soul? Again, are not ſpiritual pleaſures moſt rational, judicious, diſcrete, and wiſe? O! what a world of folie and indiſcretion, yea, may I not ſay, for the moſt part, brutiſh paſſion lies wrapped up in ſenſual pleaſures? Laſtly, theſe pleaſures, which flow from the fruition of the ſweeteſt good, do moſt elevate, dignifie, and ennoble the Soul; and therefore are moſt agreable thereto: whereas ſenſual pleaſures degrade and bring down the Soul, yea place it below the ranke of Brutes, as Hoſ. 4.10, 11.

(3) Another proper Adjunct of that Delectation,(3) Ʋniforme Pleaſures. which attends the Fruition of the ſweeteſt Good, is Ʋniformitie and Harmonie. By how much the more uniforme and concordant pleaſures p. 38are, by ſo much the better they are: what makes Muſic ſo ſweet and delicious, but its Concent and Harmonie? Hence Plato makes this a character of true pleaſure, that it be foreign, uniforme: and the Stoics, who were enemies to pleaſure, yet allowed an uniforme regular joy, which they made to attend, foreign, the tranquillitie and undiſturbed ſtate of the Soul. And where may we expect this regular tranquille ſerene Joy, but in the enjoyment of the chiefeſt Good? Plato, in his Philebus, pag. 26. makes theſe pleaſures to be foreign, ſymmetrous and harmonious, but terrene joys to be foreign, a diſcordant jarring paſſion. And he gives us a lively illuſtration, by the ſweet Harmonie that is in Muſic; which, ſaith he, is compoſed of Acutes and Graves, ſwift and flow, with other infinite Tones, which conjoined make a complete Harmonie: So, addes he, True pleaſure is foreign, ſymmetrous; whereas petulant falſe pleaſure is foreign, diſſonant, foreign, circumſcribed by no bounds, without meaſure or order, &c. And indeed al ſenſual pleaſures are extreme jarring and repugnant, not only to human Nature, but amongſt themſelves. Doth not the pleaſure of Senſualitie fight againſt the pleaſure of Avarice, and both againſt that of Ambition? This is wel illuſtrated by Aristotle, Eth. lib. 1. cap. 9. pag. 43. foreign, Thoſe things which ſeem ſweet to the multitude, have an inteſtine war among themſelves; becauſe they are not ſuch by nature: i. e. The pleaſures of the multitude are difforme and repugnant each to other; becauſe they are opinionative, artificial, and inordinate, not natural and regular. There is no joy uniforme, regular, or natural, but that which flows from, or tends to the fruition of our laſt end, which is the meaſure of uniformitie and harmonie in Morals. Again, this delectation is by Plato made to be foreign, impaſſible, i. e. ſuch as receives not impreſſion from, and therefore admits not conformitie to the various mutations of terrene objects. For whatever receives impreſſion from ſenſible objects, muſt needs fal under the ſame variations and viciſſitudes, that thoſe objects are obnoxious unto. And this is the true reaſon why al ſenſual pleaſures are ſo variable, difforme and diſſonant; becauſe the objects, by which they are impreſſed and influenced, are moſt mutable and difforme. But now thoſe pleaſures that attend the fruition of God the ſweeteſt Good partake of his Simplicitie, Immutabilitie, and Ʋniformitie. p. 39No Joy ſo regular, uniforme and harmonious as thoſe that procede from the fruition of God.

(4) The Delectation that attends the fruition of the ſweeteſt Good is moſt pure and immixed, and therefore moſt perfect.(4) Pure immixed Pleaſures. Thus Plato, Repub. 9. pag. 583. makes the Pleaſure of his wiſe man to be foreign, pure; but that of other men to be, not pure, but foreign, only an umbratile pleaſure. The delectation which follows the enjoyment of the chiefeſt Good rejoiceth in a twofold Puritie, (1) Objective, as it is fed and maintained by pure objects; whereas al the pleaſures of ſenſe are but ſeculent and dirtie; in that their mater is only ſenſible terrene good: but the joys and pleaſures, which flow from the ſweeteſt original good, partake of the cryſtalline puritie of their object, which is moſt pure. (2) Effective, as it doth baniſh al ſorrows and grief. So Plato, Phileb. 53. foreign, Al pleaſure ſo far as it is free from grief, it is more pleaſant, true, and fair. Thus Repub. 9. he makes foreign, Pleaſure to be the ceſſation of grief, and grief the ceſſation of pleaſure. So alſo, Phileb. pag. 66. he avoucheth true pleaſures to be foreign, without mixture of ſorrow, and pure. Which is the peculiar privilege of thoſe pleaſures that attend the fruition of the ſweeteſt Good: for al other pleaſures are mixed with much grief and ſorrow; they being indeed but bitter-ſweets; yea more bitter than ſweet.

(5) The Delectation which attends the fruition of the ſweeteſt Good are moſt intenſe and ſtrong. Thus Plato, (5) Strong Pleaſures.Phileb. p. 44. foreign, We must look, not to the least pleaſures, but to ſuch as are ſupreme and moſt vehement, if we wil make a true judgement of pleaſure. For the ſtronger any pleaſures are, the better they are: and the more pure they are, the ſtronger they are Senſual pleaſures are feeble and impotent, becauſe impure and mixed; but ſpiritual joys are moſt potent and vehement; becauſe moſt pure. Again, the vehemence and intenſneſſe of any pleaſure is proportionable to the energie, power, and activitie of the ſubject, which is aſſected with ſuch pleaſure, and to the Pondus, Bent, or Impetus that it hath to the object it takes pleaſure in. Now how vehement is the Pondus, Impetus, and Energie of the Wil, whereby it ſhooteth it ſelf into its ſweeteſt Good; which when it enjoyeth, what an ecſtaſie, rapture, and tranſportt of joy is it affected with? Doth not Plato ſtile this, p. 40foreign, The best and ſtrongest of al Ecſtaſies?

(6) The Delectation which attends the fruition of our laſt end is infinite and without exceſſe. (6) Joys without Exceſſe.Thus Plato, Phileb. pag. 27. foreign, For pleaſure is not al good, unleſſe it partake of an infinite nature. His deſigne is to prove, that pleaſure is not the chiefeſt good; becauſe it is not in its nature infinite, ſo as to partake of al good: yet ſo far as it is a conſequent that attends the fruition of the chiefeſt good, ſo far it is infinite. For as the chiefeſt good admits of no exceſſe in our fruition; becauſe it is in it ſelf infinite and al good; ſo, by a paritie of reaſon, the joy and pleaſure that attends the fruition of the chiefeſt good is infinite without exceſſe; becauſe the object is infinitely ſweet and amiable. The pleaſure the Soul takes in the fruition of inferior goods ſoon admits exceſſe, which it endeavors to cure by change of objects. Thus Aquinas, 1.2. Quaeſt. 33. Art. 2. Corporal delectations, when augmented and continued, do excede the natural habitude, and therefore become nauſeous; as it is evident in the delices of food: whence the appetite deſires change and varietie. But ſpiritual delectations never excede the natural habitude, but perfect nature: whence the more they come to a conſummation, the more they delight us. How ſoon are men glutted with the beſt of pleaſures that ſenſe can afford! And what remedie have they but intermiſſion or exchange of objects? But now in the fruition of the ſweeteſt Good there can be no exceſſe, either in the act of fruition, or in the pleaſures that attend it; and therefore there is no need either of intermiſſion or exchange.

§. 8.3. The Effects of Delectation. Having explicated Delectation in its Cauſes and proper Adjuncts, we now procede to the Effects thereof, thereby to demonſtrate that the moſt perfect delectation is that which attends the fruition of the ſweeteſt Good. There are two great Effects of this divine Delectation, (1) Amplitude and Enlargement, (2) Quietation and Satisfaction.

1.1. Enlargement. The Delectation that attends the fruition of the ſweeteſt Good brings with it Amplitude and Enlargement. Indeed al delight and joy brings Enlargement; which ariſeth from the Sympathie between the object and the ſubject, or ſacultie; ſpecially if the object be ample, how doth the facultie ſpread it ſelf to enjoy the ſame? When the animal or vital Spirits are recreated, what p. 41enlargement follows thereon? How diffuſive are they? Whereas Grief and Sorrow contracts and coarctates the Spirits. This is in an higher degree verified of that ſpiritual Joy, which attends the fruition of the beſt Good. There is a twofold Enlargement that follows ſpiritual Delectation in the fruition of the chiefeſt Good. (1) There is an Enlargement of the Facultie or Subject. The more pleaſure the Soul finds in the enjoyment of its laſt end, the more its deſires are enlarged. Thus Plato, Phileb. pag. 45. foreign; But what? are not thoſe pleaſures most excellent, whereof the greatest deſires are kindled in us? Whereby he ſhews, that thoſe are the greateſt and beſt pleaſures, that moſt enlarge the heart in deſires after them. Indeed there is an intime connexion between true joy and enlargement; and therefore in ſacred Philoſophie one word is expreſſive of both. So Pſal. 4.1. Thou hast enlarged me when I was in diſtreſſe. foreign ſignifies both to exhilarate and dilate: or to dilate by exhilarating. His ſpirit was ſtraitned, narrowed and confined by diſtreſſe; but dilated and enlarged by ſpiritual joys from Gods preſence. This Dilatation or Enlargement, which follows on ſpiritual Delectation, is wel explicated by Aquinas, 1.2. Quaeſt. 33. Art. 1. Dilatation is a motion unto Latitude; and it agrees to Delectation both in regard of its apprehenſive and appetitive virtue: for as man apprehends the conjunction of ſome convenient good, ſo his Soul is dilated towards it, in order to its perfect fruition thereof, and ſatisfaction therein, &c. (2) Spiritual Delectation in the fruition of the ſweeteſt good brings with it alſo enlargement in Operation and Acting. Al joy is vigorous and active: as it is the effect of precedent, ſo the cauſe of ſubſequent operation. Delight is the Spring of motion: it puts the Soul into a continual agitation: for by how much the more we delight in any object, by ſo much the more vehement and ſtrong are our operations about it. Delectation makes us ardently and vehemently to move in the fruition of our ſweeteſt good, and in al acts that tend thereto. What divine ſuavities doth it infuſe into al our acts? Thus Plato, Conviv. pag. 210. The mind that converts its eyes to that ſo great amplitude of the first Beautie, doth no longer regard human affairs, but is as it were captivated thereby, &c.

2. The Delectation which attends the fruition of the ſweeteſt Good, brings with it infinite Quietation and Satisfaction. Satisfaction.Theſe p. 42ſpiritual pleaſures do not only amplifie and widen the Soul, but alſo bring ſatisfaction. Carnal joys breed a vexatious enlargement of the deſires, but never ſil them with ſatisfaction: they may ſlater and tickle the ſenſes, but never quiet the appetite: the beſt they leave behind them is repentance. This is wel explicated by Digby, of the Soul, pag. 460. The violence of fruition in thoſe foul puddles of fleſh and bloud preſently glutteth with ſatietie, and is attended with annoy and diſlike: and the often uſing and repeting it, weareth away that edge of pleaſure, which only maketh it ſweet and valuable, even to them that ſet their hearts upon it: and nothing heighteneth it but an irritation, by a convenient hunger and abſtinence. Contrary, in the Soul, the greater and more violent the pleaſure is, the more intenſe and vehement the fruition is; and the oftener it is repeted, ſo much the greater appetite and deſire we have to returne unto the ſame. Spiritual Delectation in the fruition of our laſt end doth not only widen, but fil the Soul, and crown its deſires with ſatisfaction. Delectation is the quiet of the Appetite in the fruition of its end: where there is no reſt, there can be no perfect delight or ſatisfaction: and where there is want, there can be no reſt: every want wrings the Soul, and keeps it in a reſtleſſe condition. So that Quiet and Satisfaction is appropriated to the fruition of the laſt end and ſweeteſt good. Thence Plato, Conviv. pag. 211. aſſures us, That the contemplation of the first, ſincere, most perfect Beautie is formal Beatitude, that which brings with it perfect Delectation and Satisfaction: for they who arrive hereto, are content to live alone, in converſation with this first Beautie, &c. Of which ſee Philoſ. General. Part. 1. lib. 3. cap. 3. ſect. 1. §. 2.