The Court of the Gentiles Part 4, Part 4 · Book 2 · Chapter 8

The Court of the Gentiles Part 4 · Part 4 · Book 2 · Chapter 8

p. 430CHAP. VIII. Of Creation, and Providence in the General.

Creation proper to God: the production of ſomething out of nothing: Active Creation the ſame with the Divine Wil: Paſſive Creation what. Gods Providence demonſtrated: The Explication of it: The Wiſdome and Eternal Law of Providence. Providence an Act of the Divine Wil. The Spirits Efficience in Providence. Providential means. Fire the create mundane Spirit. The Object of Divine p. 431Providence. Its Adjuncts: (1) Efficacitie. (2) Immobilitie. (3) Connaturalitie. (4) Perfection. (5) Myſterious. Miracles. Providential Conſervation, immediate and mediate; Ordinary and Extraordinary.

§. 1. HAving examined Divine concurſe in its object,Gods Creation demonſtrated and explicated. effective principe, and Adjuncts or various modes of operation, we now deſcend to the contemplation of it in regard of its Effects. The Efficience of the firſt Cauſe in relation to its effects is uſually diſtributed into Creation and Providence. Creation is the Efficience of the firſt Cauſe, whereby he made althings at firſt, and ſtil continues to make ſome things out of nothing. What lively Notices we have of Gods Creating althings out of nothing, both in Sacred and Platonic Philoſophie, hath been ſufficiently explicated and demonſtrated in Plato's Phyſics, Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. Chap. 9. S. 1. &. Our preſent taske wil be to give ſome general Ideas of the Creation as it appertains to Gods prime Efficience. 1. It's moſt evident, that no finite Being can be eternal or from eternitie. Al the Philoſophers before Ariſtotle generally aſſerted the production of althings by God: but he, from a confined miſtaken notion of Gods infinite Effcience, fondly conceited the firſt mater to be eternal; becauſe he could not imagine, how ſomething could be educed out of nothing. But true Philoſophie, as wel as Divine Revelation teacheth us, that althings were made by God, and nothing beſides himſelf is eternal. That the world was not from eternitie we have ſufficiently demonſtrated, in what precedes touching the exiſtence of God, C. 2. §. 2. This Argument is wel managed by Derodone, l'Atheiſme Convaincu, C. 1. And Suarez, Metaphyſ. Tom. 1. p. 536. ſtrongly demonſtrates, That it is intrinſecally repugnant to Creation that it be eternal. Yet the Jeſuites generally grant, That it is poſſible for the world to be from eternitie. Which Hypotheſis comes not ſhort of a virtual contradiction: for what difference can be rationally imagined between being eternal, and being from eternitie? Is not that which is without beginning eternal? And can we imagine that to have a beginning, which is from eternitie? Can any effect and product of the Divine Wil be commenſurate to it in point of Duration?

2. To Create is the ſole Prerogative of God. For (1) the order of actions muſt be according to the order of Agents: the moſt Noble and Supreme Action cannot agree to any but the moſt Noble p. 432and Supreme Agent: And is not Creation the moſt Noble and Supreme of al Actions? Can it then agree to any but the moſt Noble and Supreme Agent, God? Creation is the moſt perfect of al actions, by which a participate Being may be communicated; becauſe it primarily ſpeakes the production of the whole entitie in its ful latitude:. whence it is manifeſt, that this action cannot be appropriated or attributed to any, but the firſt cauſe, who is Being eſſentially and of himſelf: no participate being has force enough to produce the whole of Being. (2) That Creation is proper to God may be argued from the Mode of Efficience. For Creation ſuppoſeth an Omnipotence and Independence in the Creator; in as much as he has no paſſive power or mater to worke on, but only an objective power or poſſibilitie of the object to be Created, which requires an infinite active power in the Agent. For by how much the more remote the paſſive power is from Act, by ſo much the greater ought the active power of the Agent to be: whence where there is no preexiſtent mater to worke upon, but a mere obediential objective power or nothing, there the diſtance between the Power and Act is, as to efficience, infinite, and impertranſible by any finite power: therefore nothing but an infinite power can bring the extremes Nothing and Something together. (3) From the Nature of Creation; which is, not a ſucceſſive but a momentaneous Action: but al the productions of ſecond cauſes, as they are inferior to, and Inſtruments of the firſt cauſe, are ſucceſſive motions: for al Inſtruments act and move in a way of ſucceſſion. (4) From the limitation of al ſecond cauſes. For the moſt perfect of Creatures have only a precarious and Participate Being; and therefore have not in themſelves virtue or force enough to Create the leaſt of Beings. To Create requires a virtue of the moſt Supreme Order, inveſted with an Active Power in the moſt univerſal latitude. And the reaſon is evident; becauſe the Creative Power extendes it ſelf to every thing creable: neither doth it expect on the part of its object any thing, but a non-repugnance or obediential power that the effect may be. This wil more fully appear from the following Theſis.

3.Creation the production of ſomething out of nothing. Creation is the production of Something out of Nothing. When we ſay Creation is the production of Something out of Nothing; the particle out of muſt not be underſtood as denoting any ſucceſſion of one thing after another, (for Creation is but an inſtantaneous p. 433eduction) but only the negation of a material cauſe. Now that God Created althings without any preexiſtent mater may be demonſtrated, (1) From his Independence and prime efficience as the firſt cauſe. For the firſt Independent Cauſe being a pure ſimple act, muſt neceſſarily precede al mater, and thence be the cauſe thereof: that which is the firſt in Beings muſt neceſſarily be the cauſe of al the reſt: whence it follows, that the firſt mater was produced by God out of no preexiſtent mater but out of nothing. (2) From the univerſal efficience of God, as the firſt cauſe. Every Agent, ſo far as it is confined to mater, ſo far it is particular and limited: for to be confined to mater in acting, is to act in order to ſome determinate ſpecies, whereunto that mater refers: wherefore that Agent which is univerſal, and commenſurate to al effects poſſible, cannot be confined to mater: ſuch is the firſt cauſe. (3) From the univerſalitie of Effects produced by Creation. By how much the more univerſal the effect is, by ſo much the higher the cauſe is: and by how much the higher the cauſe is, by ſo much the more it is extended to al effects. Whence the effects of Creation being of al moſt univerſal, and the cauſe moſt high, there cannot be ſuppoſed any preexiſtent mater out of which they are educed. (4) Al productions out of mater ſuppoſe ſucceſſive motion and Tranſmutation: but Creation is not a ſucceſſive but momentaneous motion all at once. Al ſucceſſive motion and mutation muſt neceſſarily precede, as to Duration, the effect produced by ſuch a mutation or motion: but Creation doth not by any kind of Duration precede the things created: therefore it cannot be ſucceſſive, out of preexiſtent mater.

4. Active Creation is nothing elſe but the Act of the Divine Wil, Active Creation the Act of the Divine Wil.as the effective principe of althings. This Hypotheſis has been fully explicated and demonſtrated, Chap. 5. §. 4. of Gods executive power, as c. 7. §. 3. And albeit it may ſeem to carrie a novitie with it, yet it has ſufficient foundation both in Sacred and Scholaſtic Philoſophie. As for Sacred Philoſophie, its very mode of expreſſing Gods active efficience in creating althings plainly ſhews that it was no other than the Act of the Divine Wil.Gen. 1.3.Gen 1:3 Thus Gen. 1.3. and God ſaid, Let there be light. Which Word or ſaying of God can be underſtood of no other than the Act of his Divine Wil. For Speech is foreign here, and elſewhere aſcribed to God, thereby to expreſſe the efficacions efficience of his Divine Wil in the production of althings. Thus Maimonides, More Nevochim, p. 434Part. 1. c. 65. demonſtrates, That this Speech or Word, whereby althings were made, muſt be underſtood of the Divine Wil, not of any proper Speech; becauſe al Speech, whereby any thing is commanded, muſt neceſſarily be directed to ſome Being exiſtent, and capable of receiving ſuch a command: but there was no Being then exiſtent; therefore it muſt be underſtood of the Divine Wil. Thus Hebr. 11.3. The world was framed by the Word of God. So 2 Pet. 3.5. By the Word of God the Heavens were of old. An why is the efficience of the Divine Wil in creating althings expreſſed by the Word of God, but to ſhew, that as we, when we wil have any thing done, expreſſe our Wil by our word of command; ſo God expreſſed what he wil have accompliſht, by his Fiat or Creative Word. See more of this effective Word in the Providence of God, §. 3. This Hypotheſis of Gods Creating althings by his Wil hath found Patrons not a few among the moſt accurate Scholaſtic Theologues. Thus Joan. Major, Sentent. 2. diſt. 1. q. 3. proves, That God produced the World by his mere Intellection and Volition, without any other productive power. And his Arguments are theſe: (1) The Human Wil doth not want any other executive power to execute its commands, unleſſe it be in ſuch things as it cannot by it ſelf reach: but the Divine Omnipotent Wil reacheth althings: therefore it can execute its own commands, without the mediation of any executive power. (2) The Efficacious Wil of God touching A. gives exiſtence to A. otherwiſe the Efficacious Wil of God were impedible; and ſo ſome one might reſiſt his Wil. (3) Our Wil can by its mere volition produce ſome effects, namely Habits; it can alſo move other Powers by its Empire: Therefore the Divine Wil can by its ſole volition produce al effects. Thus Auguſtin, on Pſal. 144. With God to Wil in to do; becauſe althings receive Being from his Wil. The like Damaſcene, Orthod. Fid. l. 2. c. 29. foreign, Althings that the Lord hath willed, he hath done, and no man hath reſiſted his Wil: he willed that althings were made, and they were made: and he wils that the world conſiſtes, and it conſiſtes: and al that he wils he can do, and they are done. From this Active Creation of the Divine Wil God is ſaid by ſome to be a Creator from al Eternitie. Thus Gregor. Ariminenſis, Sent. l. 1. diſt. 28. q. 3. fol. 122. This denomination is not extrinſec p. 435but intrinſec to the Divine Eſſence and Wil. Hence Plato ſtiled the World in regard of this active Creation, Eternal, as it lay, from al Eternitie, in the Divine Wil and Ideas. For the Active Efficience of the Divine Wil is every way ſufficient to denominate the Paſſive Power of the World as creable.

5. Paſſive Creation is ſomething in the thing created, not really, Paſſive Creation a Mode of the thing Created.but mentally or modally only diſtinct from it. For the explication of this Propoſition we are to note, (1) That Paſſive Creation doth not ſo much regard God as the thing Created. God in Creating the World was not reduced from Power to Act, as al Creatures are when they act: for Gods Active Efficience was, as has been demonſtrated, from al Eternitie, and no other than his Divine Wil: neither was there, at the paſſive Creation of the World, any new act in God, which was not before in him: but there was an acceſſion of an act or exiſtence to the things Created, which was not before: whence, by an extrinſec denomination, God is ſaid to be Creator at the paſſive Creation of things; as, by an intrinſec denomination, he was Creator from al Eternitie in regard of his Active Efficience or Decree. (2) Albeit we conceive and expreſſe Paſſive Creation under the notion of a mutation, yet it is not properly ſuch; becauſe al proper mutation implies a ſucceſſion of one thing after another; which Creation admits not, being momentaneous and al at once, without any terme from which, or fluxe, which al mutation includes. (3) Some, and thoſe not vulgar Scholaſtics hold, That paſſive Creation is no way really but only mentally diſtinct from the Creature. So the Paſſive Creation of a Man is really and eſſentially the ſame with a Man. Thus Ocham, in Sent. 2.q. 9. and Greg. Ariminenſis, in Sent. 2. diſt. 1. q. 4, & 5. with the Nominals generally; who preſume that Action is not a middle thing between the Cauſe and Effect. And their Arguments in this Caſe are not to be contemned; for they prove it, [1] From the ſpecial Reaſon of Creation, which is not an Accident, but the very ſubſtance or Eſſence of the thing Created: for if it were ſome middle thing between God and the Creature, diſtinct from both, it muſt be a Creature, and ſo the terme of ſome other Creation; and this of ſome other: which would open a door for a progreſſe into Infinite. [2] From the Eſſential Reaſon of a Creature: for Dependence on the firſt Cauſe is of the Eſſence of the Creature; therefore it is in the Creature, and not really diſtinct from it: Now the prime and eſſential dependence of the Creature p. 436on the firſt Cauſe is Creation: wherefore it can be no more diſtinguiſhed from the Creature, than the Eſſence of a thing is diſtinguiſhed from it ſelf. That the Dependence of a Creature on its Creator is not diſtinct from its Eſſence, they prove by many and ſtrong Arguments, of which hereafter, C. 11. §. 6. (4) Suarez, Metaphyſ. Diſput. 20. S. 5. p. 529. with others, aſſert, That Creation is ſomewhat in the thing Create, not really diſtinct, as a proper entitie, yet, ex natura rei, as a mode thereof. But this Controverſie is not material, neither doth it want an eaſie way of reconcilement: for Suarez's modal diſtinction in effect, as he limits it, amounts to little more than a mental diſtinction, at leaſt that which they ſtile rationis ratiocinatae, which has ſome foundation in the things diſtinguiſhed. However they both agree in this, that Paſſive Creation is in the thing Created. Hence it follows,

6. That the Relation of the Creator to the Creature doth not-ſuppoſe any mutation in God. For Creation may be conſidered either actively or paſſively: if we conſider it actively; ſo it is attributed to God by an interne denomination, it being the ſame with the Wil of God: if we conſider it paſſively; ſo it is the ſame with, or not really diſtinct from the Creature, and aſcribed or attributed to God only by an extrinſec denomination and relation, which ſpeaketh no mutation in God. See what precedes of Gods Immutabilitie, C. 4. §. 1.

§. 2.The Providence of God demonſtrated. From the Creation of God we paſſe unto his Providence, whereof we find Illuſtrious Ideas and Notices both in Sacred and Platonic Philoſophie. As for Sacred Philoſophemes touching the Divine Providence we ſhal give the mention thereof in the particular Ideas of Providence; we ſhal here begin with Plato's demonſtration of Gods Providence, which he gives us largely, De Leg. 10. p. 900, &c. where he propoſeth the blaſphemous Antitheſis. of an Atheiſtic Spirit denying the Providence of God in this manner: But thou indeed being carried away with a certain blind and raſh madneſſe, becauſe thou canſt not belch forth thine Indignation againſt God himſelf, neither can the venome of thine enraged Mind reach him, therefore thou falleſt into this Affection, foreign, That albeit thou granteſt there is a God, yet thou denieſt that he takes care of Human Affaires. This Antitheſis, which Epicurus afterward eſpouſed, Plato greatly oppoſeth, as that which is moſt unworthy of the Divine, Infinitely wiſe, Bountiful, and Soverain p. 437Being. In the general he affirmes, That it is not difficult to demonſtrate this, foreign, That Gods Providence is as wel occupied about the leaſt, as about the greateſt and moſt excellent things. But p. 901. he deſcendes to particular Arguments: foreign; Wherefore whether it be God, or whether it be Man that neglectes any affair, is it not for one of thoſe two cauſes? foreign; Either becauſe he conceives it no way refers to the whole, if ſmal things are neglected: or, if he thinkes it doth refer, yet, his Mind being detained by ſupinitie, ſloth, and delicace, he neglectes it? In what follows he amply demonſtrates, (1) That Providence even about the ſmallest things greatly conduceth to the good of the whole. And (2) that the least ſloth, ornegligence of human affaires may not be imputed to God. Of which ſee more fully Philoſoph General. P. 1. l. 3. c. 4. S. 2. §. 1. The more fully to demonſtrate the Providence of God, againſt the Epieurean Antitheſis, we ſhal draw forth Plato's Arguments into the following particulars. (1) The Providence of God may be demonſtrated from his pure Actualitie and Activitie. Every thing is ſo far perfect as it is Active: to ſuppoſe a firſt perfect Being, and yet to conceit him to be an idle ſpectator of human affaires, it no leſſe abſurd than ſacrilegious. So Plato, Leg. 10. p. 901. foreign, God cannot be corrupted with ſloth or negligence: for a remiſſe timiditie can no way befal God. Contrary to this Platonic Demonſtration Epicurus held, foreign, The bleſſed immortal Being neither hath any employment of his own, neither doth he trouble himſelf with the affaires of others. But what more abſurd than this Hypotheſis of Epicurus, aſſerting a Deitie and yet denying his Providence? Doth he not hereby diſcover the infirmitie of his Reaſon, in ſuppoſing a moſt Supreme bleſſed Being, who yet ſtandes as an idle ſpectator of al natural and human occurrences? May we not juſtly conclude, that Epicurus, by denying the Providence of God, had a ſecret deſigne to undermine the very exiſtence of the Deitie? For he could not but know, that if the perſuaſion of Divine Providence were rooted out of mens minds, the thoughts of a moſt bleſſed immortal Being would little overawe or influence mens hearts. Wel therefore might Plutarch, Tullie and other Moraliſtes degrade p. 438him from the Title of a Philoſopher, ſithat by denying Gods Providence he cut the ſinews of al Moralitie. Do but grant then that there is a God, and it wil neceſſarily follow, that his Providence extendes to althings. (2) The Providence of God may be demonſtrated from that admirable Order, Concent and Harmonie which is moſt illuſtrious in al parts of the Univerſe. Thus Plato, in his Philebus, tels us, that God put into althings, foreign, a ſymmetrie and concent, or foreign, a Right Communion, Harmonie and Agreement, whereby they are admirably chained together. The admirable order of althings and affaires both Natural, Politic, and Moral ſtrongly evinceth a moſt wiſe Providence ordering al. Is not one thing ordered and diſpoſed for ſome other? Doth not the Sun by its warme influences ſhine on the earth, that ſo it may be fruitful? And why is the earth fruitful but to feed the Beſtes? And are not the Beſtes fed to nouriſh and ſerve Man? And why doth the wiſe God take ſuch care of Man, but that he might be more capable to ſerving his God?Hoſ. 2.21, 22.Hos 2:21Hos 2:22 Thus Hoſ. 2.21, 22. I wil hear the Heavens, and they ſhal hear the Earth: and the Earth ſhal hear the Corn, and the Wine, and the Oil: and they ſhal hear Jeſreel. Here, beſides the gratioſe Benediction of God, the harmonious connexion of the firſt and ſecond cauſes is ſet forth by a lively Proſopopoeia; Jeſreel, i. e. the People of God, they cal on or expect relief from Corn, Wine, and Oil: theſe cal on, or expect nouriſhment from the Earth: the Earth cals on or expects ſupplies from the celeſtial bodies: and theſe cal on and expect ſupplies from God. Now where there is ſuch an exact ſubordination between varietie of things, which underſtand not themſelves, is it not neceſſary, that there be a wiſe Mind, that ſets al theſe things in order? If there be Order in things that have no Underſtanding, muſt not the ordering of them come from an Underſtanding infinitely wiſe? Is there not an admirable Intelligence even in the Natural and Animal world? What a wonderful Inſtinct is there in the little Bee, as in other Animals? And yet theſe ſilly Animals underſtand not themſelves: muſt there then not be an higher underſtanding that orders al? And that which yet addes to the Order of althings and proves the Providence of God, is, that al theſe various parts of the Univerſe ſweetly conſpire to promove the Glorie of their Creator. Is there not an infinite varietie of different ſpecies, and thoſe of different orders, in the Univerſe? And do not al theſe tend to, and in p. 439their rankes ſubſerve the honor of their Creator? Is there not a world of Plants and Vegetables, which ſubſerve Brutes? And is there not a world of Brutes, which ſerve man? And is there not a world of men, which either actively or paſſively ſubſerve the Glorie of their Maker? And doth not this Tendence and Conducence of althings to one firſt Being ſufficiently demonſtrate an infinitely wiſe Providence ordering al? Indeed al order preſuppoſeth intelligence and ſapience: For order being nothing elſe but a convenable or agreable diſpoſition of things, according to the dignitie of each, it's neceſſary for the diſpoſing of things agreably, to compare them among themſelves, and to underſtand their dignitie and ranke, which is proper to intelligence, and then to range them according to their dignitie, which is proper to ſapience or prudence: Whence the moſt perfect order preſuppoſeth the moſt perfect intelligence and prudence. (3) Plato proves the Providence of God from his wiſe and potent Gubernation of althings, even the leaſt, to their reſpective ends, of which hereafter. (4) From Gods Juſtice in puniſhing the wicked, and rewarding the righteous. (5) From Gods Benignitie and Liberalitie towards al. (6) Laſtly he concludes, that to denie Gods Providence towards the leaſt things, foreign, it a cogitation both nefarious or blaſphemous and erroneous, as Leg. 10. pag. 903. Thus alſo the Rabbines terme him. foreign an Epicurean, or a profane perſon foreign, who ſaith, that the holy and bleſſed God doth not take care of human affaires. And indeed we have reaſon to believe, that moſt of thoſe, whether ancient or moderne Atheiſtes, who have eſpouſed this Epicurean Hypotheſis, whereby the Providence of God is denied, have taken it up rather out of prejudice or paſſion, than from any rational conviction. So it's ſaid of Diagoras, that he took up this perſuaſion, out of a mere humor, becauſe the perjured perſon was not ſtrucke dead by God.

§. 3. Having given the Demonſtration of Gods Providence,The Wiſdome of Divine Providence. we now procede to the Explication thereof. The Divine Providence in the general is that efficience of God, whereby he conſerves and governes althings, according to the eternal moſt wiſe counſel of his own Wil. Thus Damaſcene, Orthod. Fid. l. 2. c. 29. foreign, Providence is the Wil of God, whereby althings receive their moſt exact Order and Regiment. In our definition of Divine Providence there p. 440are many things conſiderable. 1. It includes an eternal Wiſdome and Counſel as the origine thereof. Thus Damaſcene, Orthod. Fid. l. 3. c. 29. explicates the precedent definition: foreign, Butaf al Providence be the Wil of God, it's neceſſary, that althings ordered or made by Providence be, according to right Reaſon, beſt and most becoming God, and that nothing may be better done. In the Scholes, Providence, according to its generic Idea, is ſaid to be the Reaſon of Order, whereby al means are duely diſpoſed towards their end: what then is the Providence of God, but a Divine Reaſon eminently ſubſiſting in the ſupreme Rector of althings, whereby althings are moſt wiſely diſpoſed to their laſt end, by moſt apt means? Thus in ſacred Philoſophie the Providence of God is deſcribed as inveſted with infinite wiſdome and counſel.Pſal. 139.1, 2.Ps 139:1Ps 139:2 So Pſal. 139.1. O Lord thou hast ſearched me. foreign, thou hast ſounded me, and penetrated into my moſt intimate parts. Whence he addes: and known me: i. e. moſt intimately. Thence he procedes to particulars, v. 2. Thou knowest my down-ſitting and up-riſing, &c. Of which before in the Divine Science, Ch. 5. §. 2. We find Gods providential knowlege as to Celeſtial bodies wel illuſtrated,Pſal. 147.4, 5.Ps 147:4Ps 147:5 Pſal. 147.4. He telleth the number of the ſtars: he calleth them al by their names. Termes borrowed from Generals muſtering or taking an account of their Soldiers: or elſe from Maſters of Families taking account of al their Domeſtics: or from Kings numbering their Subjects. And what mean theſe expreſſions, but to illuſtrate and expreſſe the moſt particular Providence of God, founded on his infinite knowlege of althings, which are in apparence innumerable as the Stars in the Firmament, Gen. 15.5? So v. 5. his underſtanding is infinite. Heb. foreign, of his underſtanding there is no number. The reaſons of his Providence are more in number than the things he provides for, yea every way infinite. Theſe infinite Reaſons and Intelligences of Divine Providence are expreſſed by Plato under the terme foreign, Intelligence. Thus in his Philebus, pag. 28. Al the wiſe conſent in this, foreign, that the Divine Mind it King of Heaven and Earth. So in his Phaedo, pag. 97. foreign, &c. It is the Divine Mind that diſpoſeth and directes althings according to their due orders, and is the cauſe of althings. And that this providential Intelligence and p. 441Wiſdome extendeth to althings, even to the moſt minute and leaſt Beings, Plato aſſertes, Leg. 10. pag. 902. foreign, &c. To conceit that God, who is most wiſe, and both wil and can provide for his own creatures, ſhould take care only of greater maters, but not of the least, whereof the care is more facile, how abſurd is this!

But to treat more accurately and philoſophically of the infinite Reaſons and Wiſdome of Divine Providence,The eternal Law of Providence. we muſt run it up to the Spring-head of that eternal Law, conſiſting in thoſe Divine Ideas loged in the mind and wil of God. The Scholes philoſophiſe much of the eternal Law, whereby althings are governed to their reſpective ends: yet they ſpeake ſo confuſedly, as that it is difficult to underſtand what they mean thereby; whether the Law of Divine Decrees, or the Law of Nature inherent in the things governed. Plato ſeems to ſpeake more intelligibly than many Scholaſtics touching this eternal Law, making it to be no other than the foreign, the eternal Exemplar of Divine Ideas or Decrees, according to which God frames and governes althings. So in his Timaeus, pag. 28. he ſaith, That God in the framing the World had his eye foreign on the eternal Law or Exemplar. Hence Plato cals Fate, (whereby the Ancients expreſſed Providence) foreign, the Law of Adraſtie: which Cicero interpretes, the eternal Law. And Apuleius, a great Explicator of Plato, ſaith, Fate was that by which Gods inevitable cogitations and undertakements were accompliſht. And Pindar ſang: foreign, That the eternal Law was Queen of althings both mortal and immortal. This eternal Law, as it regardes Providence, is nothing elſe but that order, method, purpoſe or counſel, which the moſt wiſe God hath from al eternitie determined with himſelf in his Divine Decrees, as the rule of his Gubernation and Diſpoſition of althings for his own Glorie. Have not althings that are ſome operation, and that not violent or fortuitous, but regular and orderly? And can any thing exert any regular operation, but in order to ſome end preconceived by ſome intelligent Agent? And what is that which directes, moderates, regulates and orders althings to their reſpective ends, but the eternal Law? Thus Auguſtin: The eternal Law, ſaith he, is nothing elſe but that increate Divine Reaſon or Wil of God, commanding that the natural order be conſerved. Every action wil not ſerve for every end: therefore there muſt be foreign, a Rule p. 442or Law to ſuit actions to their ends: Do not then althings ſo far as they tend to their laſt end act and move by ſome Law? And what is the ſupreme Law, whereby al the Divine operations of Providence are regulated, but the eternal Exemplar of Divine Ideas or Decrees? It's true, every particular ſingular Creature has a Law impacted and impreſſed on its Being, which is an irradiation or beam of the eternal Law, and therefore called by ſome, though improperly, the eternal Law; by others more properly the Law of Nature. For the eternal Law properly reſpectes the workes and operations of God; who is both Worker, and the Law of his working: the perfection of the Divine Eſſence and Wil gives perfection and meaſure to al his workes: al Gods providences and workes own him, not only for their Worker, but alſo for the Law whereby they are wrought: his Divine Wil and Decrees being the meaſure of al his Operations. So that by this eternal Law althings are bounded and limited not only in their Eſſences, but alſo in their Operations: and al the Divine reaſons of Providences are to be reſolved into this eternal Law, which is ful of infinite Reaſons, Wiſdome, and Counſel; albeit our ſhallow capacities cannot comprehend, no nor apprehend the ſame alwaies, in al workes of Providence.

Hence it follows:The Wiſdome of Providence active. that the Divine Reaſon, Wiſdome, and Counſel, that attendes the Providence of God, is not merely ſpeculative, but practic and active: for al Laws properly and primarily tend to action. Whence in ſacred Philoſophie the wiſdome of Divine Providence is illuſtrated by that of a wiſe Builder, skilful Phyſician, expert diſcreet Maſter of a Familie, &c. Thus alſo Plato, Leg. 10. pag. 902, &c. iſtuſtrates the ſame by much the ſame reſſemblances, namely by the wiſdome of a skilful Phyſician, alſo of an expert Gubernator of a Ship, of a prudent Imperator, of a diſcreet Maſter of a Familie, of a skilful Architect, and of an expert Artificer: al which denote active Science, as it wil hereafter appear, when we deſcend to the Gubernation of Providence. And that the wiſdome of Divine Providence is indeed moſt active is evident, in that God by his Providence directes althings to their proper end, namely the Divine Bonitie, which is the laſt End and firſt Principe in Morals. Hence it is that al the workes of Divine Providence are ſaid to be diſpoſed in Meaſure, and Number, and Weight, i. e. in the moſt exact order and manner that may be. That Providence belongs to practic cognition Aquinas p. 443largely demonſtrates, contra Gent. l. 3. c. 75. & 97. Hence,Providence is an Act of the Diviue Wil.

2. Divine Providence includes alſo the Act of the Divine Wil Yea, if we wil ſpeak formally and diſtinctly, the Providence of God primarily regardes the Wil of God: for al the Divine Reaſons, Ideas, Decrees, and the eternal Law of Providence muſt be reſolved into the Divine Wil, which is the ſole meaſure of Gods Operations towards his Creatures. Thence Providence is defined by Damaſcene, Orthod. Fid. l. 2. c. 29. foreign, &c. the Wil of God, by which althings that are receive their convenient Gubernation, as before. And he demonſtrates it thus: It's neceſſary, that he who made althings, ſhould provide for them, in the ſame manner as he made them, i. e. by his Wil. Whence he concludes: foreign, God therefore is the Maker and Proviſor: and his good Wil is the effective, contentive, and proviſive Virtue. (1) Indeed the whole of Divine Efficience procedes immediately from the Divine Wil, as we have before once and again demonſtrated. (2) That Providence belongs to the Divine Wil is manifeſt from its very nature, which conſiſtes in a wiſe ordering althings for its laſt end: now there can be no diſpoſition or ordering of means for an end, without the volition of the ſaid end. Divine Bonitie being the end unto which althings are directed by the Providence of God, it's neceſſary, that both end and means be willed by God. Yea, (3) It belongs to the intrinſec Reaſon of Divine Providence, as Divine, not only to intend and order al means towards its laſt end, but alſo infallibly to attain its laſt end: which implies an abſolute, efficacious, omnipotent Wil. For albeit Providence, in its generic notion regardes not ſo much the end as the means, it being the ordering of means to an end, yet it includes an abſolute efficacious volition of the end: but now it's ſimply impoſſible, that God ſhould wil any end, and yet that end not be attained. Wherein Divine Providence greatly differs from human, which oft wils an end and provides means in order thereto, and yet fals ſhort of its end. (4) That Providence belongs to the Wil of God is evident from the formal parts thereof, Conſervation and Gubernation, which are Acts of the Divine Wil. (5) The Mode of Divine Providence, as expreſſed both in Sacred and Platonic Philoſophie, clearly evinceth, that it formally belongs to the Divine Wil. In ſacred Philoſophie the Mode of Divine Providence is p. 444expreſſed by the Word of God. Deut. 8.3.Deut 8:3So Deut. 8.3. Man doth not live by bread only, but by every word that procedeth out of the mouth of the Lord doth man live. By Word here, (as Vatablus wel obſerves) we may not underſtand any preceptive or reveled word, but the providential Word of God, or good pleaſure, which provides means, either ordinary or extraordinary, for the ſuſtenance of man. And that this is the genuine ſenſe ſeems apparent from the deſigne and ſcope of Moſes; which is to ſhew, that when bread failed, God by his omnipotent Word, or Wil, in a miraculoſe manner, provided Manna for them, as an experiment to teſtifie in al Ages, that man lived not by bread only, but by every word that procedeth out of the mouth of God: i. e. by the ſoverain pleaſure and providential wil of God, which is frequently in ſacred Philoſophie termed, the Word of God. In this ſenſe this Texte is cited and interpreted by our Lord,Mat. 4.4.Matt 4:4 Mat. 4.4. But by every word, &c. Moſes's words are repeted by our Lord, and oppoſed to Satans tentation, to ſhew, that man lived not by bread only, but by the providential word or wil of God, who provides means either ordinary or extraordinary for the relief of man, ſpecially of ſuch as truſt in him; and therefore there is no reaſon why we ſhould diſtruſt his Providence, or make uſe of any unlawful means. In this ſenſe the Word of God is taken,Pſal. 107.20.Ps 107:20 Pſal. 107.20. he ſent his word and healed them: i. e. his providential Word, or his omnipotent efficacious Decree and ſentence.Pſal. 147.15, 16.Ps 147:15Ps 147:16 So Pſal. 147.15. He ſendeth forth his commandement upon the earth: his word runneth very ſwiftly: i. e. his providential Word, or the efficacious efficience of his Divine Wil.Heb. 1.3.Heb 1:3 Whence it follows: v. 16. He giveth ſnow like wool, &c. the effects of his providential word. Thus Heb. 1.3. Ʋpholding althings by the word of his power: i. e. by his providential word, or omnipotent efficacious wil. So 2 Pet. 3.5, 7. In al which Textes, with ſome others, we muſt underſtand Gods providential word; which is no other than the efficacious Decree and efficience of the Divine Wil, for the ſuſtentation, conſervation, and gubernation of althings; as the ſame efficacious efficience of the Divine Wil, put forth in the creation of althings, is in like manner expreſſed by a word, Gen. 1.3, &c. And it is wel obſerved by Maimonides, More Nevoch. Part. 1. c. 65. that by Word here, as elſewhere, muſt be underſtood not any formal word, but the Act of the Divine Wil, as before of Creation, §. 1. Thus we find other Decrees and Acts of the Divine Wil expreſſed by the Word of God. So p. 445Gen. 1.26. And God ſaid, Let us make man. Gen. 8.21. And God ſaid in his heart, I wil not again curſe the ground: i. e. God decreed and determined with himſelf, and declared this his Decree to Noah. The efficience of the Divine Wil, in governing althings is expreſſed in Sacred Philoſophie by the Word of God, to denote the efficace of his Wil: mans word is oft Preceptive, but not Operative: we declare our wils by our words, but cannot effect what we wil thereby: but Gods Providential Word is ever operative: whatever he wils, doth immediately exiſte, in that time and manner as he wils it: his Words and Deeds are reciprocal: and therefore he expreſſeth his Divine Providential Efficience by his Providential Word. Thus alſo Plato ſometimes expreſſeth the efficience of Divine Providence by foreign, the Word of God. So Plotinus his Sectator: foreign, from one Mind and Word, which ſprang from it, this whole Ʋniverſe was conſtituted and diſpoſed. Which poſſibly may relate to the Increate Word, or Second Perſon in the Trinitie, who made althings, as John 1.1-4. and whereof the Platoniſtes in the Schole of Alexandria, who ſucceded Ammonius, had great notices, as before in the Platonic Trinitie, C. 6. §. 4.

3. But yet the immediate Efficience of Divine Providence is in a more peculiar manner, both by Sacred and Platonic Philoſophie,The Spirit the immediate efficient of Providence. aſcribed to the Spirit of God. For the clearing whereof we are to conſider, that albeit al Divine Operations are uſually aſcribed to God abſolutely, becauſe the ſame Divine Nature is the individed principe of al; yet ſithat, as to the manner of ſubſiſting, there is ſome Diſtinction, Relation, and Order between the three Perſons, hence the Divine Operations are in Sacred Philoſophie diſtinctly aſſigned to each perſon, and eminently to ſome one. And in as much as the Order of Operation among the diſtinct perſons dependes on the Order of their Subſiſtence, thence the Concluſive and perfective Efficience in al the great Divine Operations is aſſigned to the Spirit of God, as peculiar to him, according to the mode of his ſubſiſtence in the Trinitie. Thus in the Creation, the completive and perfective efficience of althings is aſcribed to the Spirit. So in the Fomentation and Formation of althings out of the rude Chaos, it's ſaid, Gen. 1.2. The ſpirit of God moved on the face of the waters: i. e. in order to the Eduction and Efformation of althings: for foreign properly notes the fomentation and gentle motion of an Hen, communicating vital heat to its egges: and it's p. 446applied, Deut. 32.11. to the motion of an Eagle over its young ones, for their protection and perfection. This efficience of althings is wel expreſſed,Pſal. 33.6.Ps 33:6 Pſal. 33.6. By the Word of the Lord were the Heavens made, and al the Hoſt of them by the breath of his mouth. By the Word of the Lord, we may underſtand, (1) The Creative Efficience of the Divine Wil, as before §. 1. or (2) Christ, by whom althings were made, as Joh. 1.3. Thence it follows: by the Breath of his mouth: whereby we muſt underſtand the Spirit of God, who is called the Breath of his mouth, to note the manner of his proceſſion, which is in a way of Spiration, as the Scripture aſſures us.Job 26.13.Job 26:13 Thus Job 26.13. By his Spirit he hath garniſhed the Heavens. Or, according to the Hebrew, His ſpirit hath garniſhed, [or adorned, beautified] the Heavens, i. e. decked them with thoſe eye-pleaſing glorioſe lights.Pſal. 8.3.Ps 8:3 Hence Pſal. 8.3. the Sun, Moon, and Stars are ſaid to be the worke of Gods fingers, i. e. curioſely wrought by the Spirit of God. For by the finger or fingers of God, the ſpirit of God is in a more peculiar manner denoted, as is evident by comparing Mat. 12.28. with Luk 11.20. where the ſpirit of God in Matthew is called the finger of God by Luke, as Owen, On the ſpirit, B. 1. C. 4. Neither did the Spirit's efficience extend only to the production of the Inanimate and Animal world, but alſo to Man and his more noble part the Soul, as Job aſſures us, Job 33.4. The ſpirit of God hath made me, and the breath of the Almighty hath given me life. Anſwerable to Gen. 2.7. And as the firſt Efformation and Perfection of althings in the Creation is aſcribed to the Spirit of God, ſo the Suſtentation, Conſervation, and Gubernation of althings in the courſe of Divine Providence is in a peculiar manner aſſigned to the ſame Spirit. Thus Pſ. 104.27.Pſal. 104.27-30.Ps 104:27–30 Theſe wait al upon thee, that thou mayest give them their meat in due ſeaſon. 28. Thou openest thine hand, they are filled with good. 29. Thou hidest thy face, they are troubled: thou takest away their breath, they die, and returne to their duſt. Thou hidest thy face: i. e. withdraweſt the providential influence of thy Spirit, and althings returne to duſt: the Earth it ſelf, the commun Mother of al corporeous Creatures, ſeems to be dead, 'til the ſpring come, and althings receive a new face. Thence it follows, v. 30. Thou ſendest forth thy Spirit, they are created: and thou reneweſt the face of the earth. Thou ſendest forth thy Spirit: whoſe office it is to conſerve, foment, actuate, and to give vivific heat, life, and influence to althings. Whence it follows: they are Created. p. 447This Creation is not to be taken ſtrictly of the Eduction of things out of nothing, as at firſt; no, nor principally of the production of new individuals, though this be included in the Spirits Providential Efficience; but of the Spirits fomenting, vivifying, and renewing things under a kind of natural death or decay. Thence it follows: and thou reneweſt the face of the Earth. i. e. Whereas the Earth in the winter ſeaſon is as it were dead; the Trees and other Plants diveſted of their verdure, flouriſhing beautie, leaves, fruits; yea the very juice and radical moiſture is retired unto the root; ſo that the whole ſeems dead: And as for Animals and Brutes, the greateſt number of thoſe we cal Infects are either really or ſeemingly dead, being without motion: and as for the more perfect Brutes, they are likewiſe under a kind of partial death; yea the human bodie alſo in the more cold Northerne Climate: Yet when the Spring comes, the Spirit of God, that Supreme Increate Ʋniverſal Spirit, making uſe of the warme benigne influences of the Sun, together with ſubterraneous fire, that great create mundane Spirit, reneweth the face of the Earth: i. e. puts new vital Spirits and vivific heat into al parts of the Univerſe, both inanimate and animate, 'ſpecially Plants and Animals; ſo that there is a new face, or verdure, flouriſhing Beautie, Vivacitie, Activitie and Fructification in things. Thus, according to Sacred Philoſophie, the Spirit of God is ſaid to be that Ʋniverſal Spirit, by whoſe Providential Efficience and Concurrence al Creatures are conſerved, ſuſtained, actuated, propagated, animated, fomented, diſpoſed, and governed to their proper ends and uſages.

And we find Philoſophemes not a little conformable hereto in Platonic Philoſophie. What Plato's Contemplations were concerning foreign, the Soul of the World, we have before examined, Part. 2. B. 3. C. 9. S. 1. §. 5. We ſhal now treat of the ſame Ʋniverſal Spirit, or Spirit of the Ʋniverſe as to his Providential Influence and Concurrence. Plato in his Cratylus, p. 396. cals this Mundane Soul, or Ʋniverſal Spirit, foreign Zena, Jupiter from foreign Zen, to animate or vivifie: and he gives this reaſon of the Origination: foreign, There is no other cauſe of life to us Men, and other Animants, than that Prince and King of althings. Whence he addes: Rightly therefore is God honored with this name; becauſe it demonſtrates, foreign, That God is he, by whom Life is communicated to al p. 448Animals. This notion of the Mundane Soul anſwers to Job 33.4. and Pſal. 104.30. of which before. Thus Plato, Leg. 10. p. 896. foreign, But it has been ſufficiently demonſtrated, that the Soul is more ancient than althings, ſithat it is the principe of motion. His deſigne is to demonſtrate the Providence of God from the Soul of the Ʋniverſe, which moves, agitates, foments, viviſies, influenceth, orders, and governes althings. And he demonſtrates this Univerſal Spirit or Soul of the Univerſe to be more ancient than althings, i. e. Eternal and Increate; becauſe it gave forme, life, and motion to althings. Thence he addes in the ſame page: foreign; Therefore ſhal we not neceſſarily acknowlege, that the Soul doth univerſally governe and inhabit in althings that are moved, yea that it governes Heaven? Whence he concludes: foreign, &c. This Soul therefore actuates and impels by its motions, althings that are contained in the Ʋniverſitie of Nature, namely of Heaven, Earth, Sea, &c. So pag. 898. foreign &c. Sithat this Ʋniverſal Soul moves the Sun. Again he addes: That the Soul of the Ʋniverſe, which is in that round ſplendid bodie of the Sun, moves it every where, as the Soul which is in our bodie leads it every where. He gives us in theſe three pages ſeveral great Philoſophemes to prove, That God is the Soul of the Ʋniverſe, who actuates, viviſies, conſerves and governes althings, as our Souls do our Bodies. Thus Proclus, in Plat. Timae. p. 93. explicates the Platonic Mundane Spirit: After Amelius, ſaith he, Porphyrie thinking to agree with Plotimes, foreign, &c. cals the Supermundane Soul, the Opificer or Framer of the world. The Spirit of God is called by theſe Platoniſtes, foreign, the Supermundane Soul of the Ʋniverſe, as being elevated above the Univerſe, yet animating, actuating, and influencing the whole, and each part thereof. Others terme him, foreign, the Mundane Soul, or the Soul inhabiting the Ʋniverſe. Al theſe Platoniſtes make the Univerſe to be as it were a great Animal, and the Spirit of God to be the Soul that animates, vegetates, actuates, and perfectes this Animal. Thus Origen, foreign, l. 2. c. 1. As our Bodie is made up of many members and contained by one Soul; ſo do I conceive, that the whole world is to be looked on as one huge great Animal, which is contained as it were by one Soul, the Virtue and Reaſon of God. And p. 449ſo much ſeems to be intimated in Scripture. Thus alſo the Pythagoreans held, as we are aſſured by Minutius Foelix, That God was the Soul diffuſed throughout the whole Ʋniverſe, from whom althings received Life, Being and Motion. So the Stoics ſaid; That the Divine Mind is diffuſed throughout al parts of the Ʋniverſe, as our Soul throughout our bodie, as Laertius in Zeno. And that theſe Philoſophemes touching the Spirit or Soul of the Ʋniverſe, muſt be underſtood of the Spirit of God, and were ſo intended, though imperfectly, by the wiſer Heathens, we are aſſured by Cyprian, Sermo, de Spiritu Sancto, p. 329. Edit. Baſil. 1558. This Holy Spirit from the beginning of the World is ſaid, Gen. 1.2. to be ſuperfuſed on the waters: not as if he needed the material waters as a vehicle, which he rather ſuſtained, and gave congruous motion, and fixed limits to what comprehended the firmament. The Eternal Virtue and Divinitie of this Spirit, albeit the Ancient Philoſophers, thoſe Inquiſitors of the Univerſe, could not find him out, in his proper nature, yet by their ſubtile conjectures they conceived him to be preſent with althings, giving Life, Motion, Termes, Stabilitie and Uſe to every thing. This Life, this Motion, this Eſſence of things the Philoſophers ſtiled THE SOUL OF THE WORLD: conceiving, that al Celoſtial Bodies, I mean, the Sun, Moon, and Stars, yea the very Firmament was moved and governed by the virtue of this Soul; and, that the Waters, Earth and Air were impregnated by the Seeds hereof. Who if they had believed that this Spirit is both Lord, and Creator, and Vivificator, and Nutritor of althings that are under him, they might have had ſome convenient acceſſe to life. But the Majeſtie of ſo great a Myſterie was hid from the wiſe and prudent of this world; neither could the pride of human Ingenie concerne it ſelf in ſuch celeſtial ſecrets, and penetrate the altitude of this ſupereſſential nature: and albeit they underſtood, that the Divinitie was the Creatrix and Gubernatrix of things, yet they could no way diſtinguiſh what was the Trinitie of the Deitie, or what was the Unitie, or what the proprietie of perſons—This is the Spirit of Life, whoſe Vivific heat doth animate, foment, advance and make fruitful althings, &. See Philoſoph. General. l. 1. c. 2. ſect. 3. §. 3. and l. 3. c. 2. ſect. 1. §. 4.

4. Albeit the Efficience and Concurrence of the Spirit in al Providential Operations be, as to its manner of working Immediate, p. 450Providential means uſed by the Spirit.yet this hinders not but that ordinarily he makes uſe of means for the execution thereof, not from any defect of his Divine Efficience, but from the abundance of his Benignitie, that ſo in and by the mediation of Inſtruments he might render his own Efficience more illuſtrious and conſpicuous, and leave ſome marque of honor on the means. Whence oft times the Spirit of God uſeth the moſt unapt and unlikely means for the production of the moſt Noble Effects. Yea, oft God brings about the Iſſues of his Providence by contrary means, which carry in them a ſeeming contradiction to what God intends. By how much the more potent the virtue of any Agent is, by ſo much the more doth it extend its operation unto things remote. Now is not the virtue of Divine Providence moſt efficacious? May it not then extend its efficience to means and effects moſt remote? Doth it not belong to the Majeſtie, Splendor, and Dignitie of a Prince to have many Miniſters of State under him, for the execution of his Soverain Wil and Commands? And doth it not in like manner appertain to the Majeſtie of God, the Supreme Lord, to have varietie of inſtruments and means for the execution of his Providence? Al Providence, according to its formal Idea, includes two things Ordination and Execution: The Ordination, being an Act of Intelligence and Sapience, belongs to the Supreme Ordinator; who, by how much the more judicious and prudent he is, by ſo much the more capacious he is to order al means and affaires in ſubſervience to his end and deſigne: But the Execution, requiring only Force and Power, may as wel and oft more aptly be tranſacted by inferior Agents or Miniſters, inveſted with executive force in order thereto. Thus in Divine Providence the Ordination and Diſpoſition of al means the moſt wiſe God reſerveth to himſelf, as a Prerogative peculiar to his Imperial Crown; but the execution he frequently commits to ſecond cauſes and inſtruments, furniſhing them with executive Forces for the production of the effect, and moreover working immediately, both by the immediation of Virtue and Eſſence in and with thoſe means. Hence Eſa. 28.26. God is ſaid to teach the Husbandman to plough, i. e. how to cultivate and manage his Ground, as alſo to ſow his Seed, &c.

That no inferior Agent or ſecond cauſe can execute any piece of Divine Providence,No ſecond cauſe can act, but in ſubordination to God, and by his Providence. but in Virtue received from, and ſubordination to God the prime Cauſe, is moſt evident: (1) Becauſe, where diverſe Agents ſubſerve one Supreme Agent, it's neceſſary p. 451that the effect be produced by them in commun, as they are united in the participation of motion and influence from the Supreme Agent: For many cannot produce one effect but as one: Now the ſubſervient Agents of Providence are ſo far one in their executions, as they are ſubordinate to and influenced by God the Supreme Agent. (2) The complement of the Virtue and Efficace of the Second Agent is from the Virtue and Influxe of the Firſt Agent: and is not God the firſt Agent in al executions of Providence? (3) Al Operation conſequent to any influence is aſcribed to that which gave the influence, as the proper cauſe thereof: And do not al ſecond Cauſes receive their influence from God? Muſt not then al their Executions and Operations be aſcribed to him as the prime Cauſe? (4) Al Actions that cannot ſubſiſte without the Impreſſion and Influence of ſome Agent muſt be attributed to that Agent as the cauſe thereof: Now can any executions of ſecond Cauſes ſubſiſt without the impreſſion of the firſt Cauſe? muſt they not then al be attributed to him? (5) Whatever applies the active Virtue or draws it forth to act, may be ſaid to be the cauſe of that Act: as an Artificer, by applying the virtue of any natural thing to any action, is ſaid to be the cauſe of that action: Now is not al application of any Virtue in providential executions from God? Is he not then the cauſe of al ſuch executions? (6) Doth not the Virtue of every inferior Agent depend on the Virtue of the Superior Agent as ſuch? And are not al ſecond Cauſes in providential executions inferior Agents as to God the Supreme Agent? (7) Is not every Worker by its operation ordained to its laſt end? And who, in al Providential Operations, ordains things to their laſt end, but God the firſt cauſe of al? (8) As particular Cauſes are referred to particular Effects, ſo the univerſal Cauſe to univerſal Effects: and is not God the Univerſal Cauſe of al Effects? (9) To ſubſtract or withdraw any providential execution from Gods Ordination and Efficience, what is this but to ſubvert the beſt Order, even the ſubordination of ſecond Cauſes to the firſt? (10) God is intimely preſent with and in al providential executions; and therefore cannot but influence the ſame. The mover and moved are always together: God is the prime mover in al motions, and therefore preſent with al: the application of Actives unto Paſſives is by him. That there is not the leaſt execution of Providence but what is influenced by God, ſee Aquinas, p. 452contra Gent. Lib. 3. Cap. 67, 68, 70, 76, 77.

Not to mention the various means,Fire the Create Ʋniverſal Spirit. inſtruments and ſecond cauſes, which God employs in his Providential Efficience, there is one which deſerves a particular diſquiſition, namely Fire; which is in its kind an Ʋniverſal Mundane Spirit, the moſt potent Inſtrument of Nature and Art, and that which ſubſerves the Spirit of God (the Supreme increate Univerſal Spirit) in al material productions of Providence. As for the Origine of this create Mundane Spirit, Gen. 1.3.Gen 1:3Moſes gives it us, Gen. 1.3. under the notion of foreign Light or Fire, part of which was diſperſed among the Celeſtial Lights or Fires, and part diffuſed into the bowels of the Earth, for the Conſervation, Animation, Vivification, and Nutrition of al parts of the Univerſe. Plato makes frequent mention of Fire, as the moſt potent natural principe or Mundane Spirit, whereby althings are fomented, agitated, animated, and perfected. So in his Timaeus, p. 31. foreign, &c. Nothing ſeems void of Fire, &c. So p. 56, & 58. he makes Fire to be the Univerſal Spirit diffuſed throughout al parts of the Univerſe. And elſewhere he cals Fire foreign, the great Opificer of various effects. And not only the Chymiſts, but alſo the Stoics and moſt of the Ancient Philoſophers aſcribe to Fire an Univerſal Efficience, as to al corporeous Effects. Whence do al Minerals, Metals, and Stones receive their Origine but from ſubterraneous Fires? What gives riſe to al Vapors and Fountains but Fire? Whence procede the Fluxes and Refluxes of the Sea, with its ſaltneſſe, but from Fire? What gives Life and Motion to al Inſects, but Fire, either Celeſtial or Terreſtrial? Whence ſpringeth the fermentation of humors in the bowels of the Earth at Spring, with the vegetation and fructification of Plants, but from Fire? What are the Animal Souls of Brutes and of Mans Bodie, but a more pure aethereous Fire? Theſe things are more largely demonſtrated in our Philoſoph. General. P. 1. l. 3. in Plato's Phyſics. May we not then hence conclude, That Fire is a ſecond Mundane Ʋniverſal Spirit, under the Spirit of God moſt Efficacious and Potent in al natural corporeous productions and executions of Providence?

§. 4.The Object of Divine Providence Ʋniverſal. Having finiſht the principal and inſtrumental effective Principes of Providence, we now procede to its Object, which, according to ſacred Philoſophie, is of the moſt univerſal latitude, according to the extenſion of Divine Omnipotence and Efficience. p. 453There is nothing ſo high, as to be above Divine Providence; nothing ſo low, as to be beneath it; nothing ſo ample and extenſive, as that it cannot be limited by it; nothing ſo free as to ſecond cauſes, but it is neceſſarily determined by it; nothing ſo natural and neceſſary, but its operation may be ſuſpended by it, as the fiery Furnace, wherein the three Children were; laſtly, nothing ſo evil, but this Divine Providence can bring good out of it. Among the ancient Philoſophers there were different perſuaſions about the object of Divine Providence, and its latitude. Epicurus and ſome before him altogether denied the Providence of God, as before: Ariſtotle, as Grotius affirmes, confined the Providence of God to Celeſtial bodies; yet Laertius ſaith he held, That the Providence of God did reach foreign, &c. even to things celeſtial, and that he diſpoſed things terreſtrial according to the Sympathie they have with things celeſtial. Some among the Hebrews held, that Gods Providence extended to men, but not unto beſtes: which ſentiment ſome impute to Pythagoras, who much imitated the Hebrews. Some alſo among the Arabians aſſerted a Providence about Univerſals, or things in commun, but not about Singulars: which ſentiment Justin Martyr, in the beginning of his Colloque with Tryphon, reprehendes in ſome of the Grecian Philoſophers as impious. But Plato ſtrongly demonſtrates, That the Providence of God extendes to althings, even the most minute. So Leg. 10. pag. 902. But what? if a Phyſician be willing and able to cure the whole bodie, if he ſhould provide for the greater diſtempers, but neglect the leſſer, would the cure be ſucceſſeful? No ſurely. So in like manner neither Gubernators of Ships, nor Imperators of Souldiers, nor Maſters of Families, nor Miniſters of State, nor any ſort of men can wel manage their affaires, unleſſe they provide for ſmal things as wel as greater. Thence Architects denie, that great ſtones can be wel cemented, or joined together in a building without ſmal. foreign, &c. Let us not then conceit, that God is more vile than mortal Opificers; who, by how much the more skilful they are, by ſo much the more exquiſitely and accurately, by the benefit of their own Art, they conſider both great and ſmal things, in ſuch workes that belong to their Art. Thence he concludes, pag. 903. It ſeems to me, foreign, that God doth most eaſily and opportunely provide for althings. This alſo the Stoics generally aſſerted, whereof we find an excellent account in Arrianus, his Collections of Epictetus's Philoſophie, p. 454l. 1. c. 12. pag. 118. There are ſome, ſaith he, who aſſert there is no God: others, that grant there is a God, but, foreign, that he is ſlothful and negligent, and provident of nothing: [I ſuppoſe he means the Epicureans:] a third ſort, who hold that there is a God, and that he is provident, but only of greater and celeſtial things, not of terrene: a fourth ſort allow him a Providence over terreſtrial as wel as celeſtial, but only in commun, not as to ſingulars and particulars: a fifth ſort, of which number was Ulyſſes and Socrates, aſſerted, that a man could not ſo much as move without God. Thence he goes on to demonſtrate Gods Providence over al things. That Gods Providence extendes it ſelf univerſally to al and ſingular Beings, Actions, Subſtances, Accidents, Modes, &c. may be demonſtrated, (1) From the infinite Omniſcience and Preſcience of God, which extendes it ſelf to the moſt minute ſingulars. (2) From the omnipotent Wil of God, which gives Futurition, Determination, Limits, Activitie, and Operation to althings. (3) From the prime and univerſal Efficience of God as the firſt cauſe of althings. Whatever is Ens by participation muſt procede effectively from God, who is Ens by Eſſence: and if it procede from him, it muſt neceſſarily fal under his Providence. (4) From the certain Determination, Futurition, and Order of al effects. Either althings muſt fal under the Providence of God, or ſomethings muſt happen merely by chance, without any certain cauſe of their Futurition. (5) From the Justice of God in rewarding what is good, and puniſhing what is evil: for the executions of Divine Juſtice depend on his Providence. That Gods Providence extendes to al ſingulars, even to things moſt contingent and minute is acutely demonſtrated by Aquinas, contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71, 72, 73, 75, 76. So De Potentia Dei, Quaeſt. 20. he proves, that God is the cauſe of every action both natural and voluntary five ways: [1] By giving virtue to act. [2] By continued conſervation of that virtue. [3] By moving the Agent to act, and applying the virtue to the action. [4] As he is the principal Agent in every Act, and al other Agents but Inſtruments. [5] As he actes immediately in al Acts of ſecond Agents.

As for the particular Objects unto which Divine Providence extendes it ſelf they may be thus diſtributed.The particular Objects of Providence. (1) Al natural Beings even the moſt minute and imperceptible fal under the Providence of God. Sacred Philoſophie makes mention of the hairs of the head, which are vile and contemtible even to a proverbe. p. 455Yea, al natural Generations, Corruptions, Alterations, Motions, and Actions are ſubject to Gods Providence. Not only the Generic natures, and Species of things, both Subſtances and Accidents, are determined by God, but alſo al Individuals and Singulars, with al their Circumstances and Modes, yea things moſt minute. Thus Bradwardine, pag. 7, 25, 291. proves, That the least things come under Gods Preſcience and Providence. (2) Althings neceſſary or contingent. There is nothing ſo contingent or free as to any ſecond cauſe, but it is determined and fore-ordained by Divine Providence, as Aquinas accurately demonſtrates, contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71, 72, 73. So Bradwardine, pag. 271, 274. What more contingent than the Lot? and yet this fals under the Providence of God, as Prov. 16.33. The lot is cast into the lap; but the whole diſpoſing of it is of the Lord. (3) Althings politic. Al Revolutions, Alterations, Advances, Declinations with al other politic Concernes of State are ordered and governed by Divine Providence. (4) Althings human. Al mans thoughts, inclinations, intereſts, deſignes, and undertakements are ſubordinate to Providence. Hence, (5) Al ſinful acts fal under the ſame. (6) Eccleſiaſtic Affaires and ſupernatural Acts, Ends and Effects are ordered by Divine Providence, of which hereafter. In ſum, Gods Providence extendes itſelf to al thoſe things, unto which his omnipotent Wil, Efficience and Cauſalitie extendes: i. e. unto whatever comes within the notion of real Entitie: it reacheth al natural, preternatural, ſupernatural and moral actions and events. When men contradict Gods Wil of Precept, do they not obey or ſulfil his Wil of Providence? Is any thing ſo great, that it comes not within his power, or ſo ſmal, that it comes not within his care? I am not ignorant how much ſome of late, as wel Divines as Phyſicians, have eſſayed to exemt the period or terme of human life from the immutable determination of Divine Providence: but how much this Hypotheſis contradictes both Pagan and Sacred Philoſophie, wil be more fully evident by what follows.

§. 5. From the effective principes and object of Divine Providence,The Adjuncts of Providence. as before ſtated, there follow many eſſential Adjuncts and Characters thereof. As 1. Providence is not merely permiſſive, 1. It is efficacious.but energetic and efficacious. For (1) Divine Providence neceſſarily ſuppoſeth not only an intention of an end, and the ordering or diſpoſing of means, but alſo the aſſecution and attainment of the end. It's true, human providence as ſuch may provide p. 456means moſt proper and expedient, and yet, by the interpoſition of other ſecond cauſes, come ſhort of its end; but Divine Providence always reacheth its end. Thus Homer: foreign, Gods Counſel and Decree is always fulfilled. (2) Al ſecond cauſes are ſubject unto, and therefore can no way impede or hinder Divine Providence. Whence ariſeth al active and paſſive virtue in ſecond cauſes, but from Divine diſpoſition? Is it poſſible then that the executions of Divine Providence ſhould be hindered by the force or defect of any inferior Agent or Patient? Are not al natural Agents inſtruments of Divine Providence? And can the inſtrument act without the concurrence of the principal Agent? What then can we ſuppoſe ſhould impede Divine Providence? (3) Al providence ſuppoſeth an Act of the Wil: and are not al Acts of Divine Volition efficacious? Bradwardine frequently aſſertes and demonſtrates, That God permits nothing but what he wils. It's true, man oft permits things, that he neither wils nor doth, becauſe he cannot hinder them; but there is no mere permiſſion with God, without ſome Act of his Wil. This is proved from the infinite Actualitie, Efficacitie, and Omnipotence of the Divine Wil. Thus Bradwardine, l. 1. c. 32. pag. 282, &c. ſpends a whole Chapter to prove, That althings fal out and are governed by the Providence of God, not only permitting, but actually diſpoſing al. And his arguments are demonſtrative. As [1] Otherwiſe the Univerſe ſhould not be diſpoſed and ordered in the beſt manner. [2] The Scripture gives God active names as to al parts of providence, &c. And then Cap. 33. he demonſtrates, That where-ever there is any permiſſion of God, there alſo is his actual Volition. Hence,

2.2. Immobile and fixed. Gods Providence gives to al ſecond Cauſes and Events a moſt immobile, immutable, fixed and certain order: things moſt contingent and free, as to ſecond cauſes, are neceſſary and fixed as to Divine Providence. Hence the Stoics, as alſo Plato, expreſſed this fixed order of providence by Fate, which they made to be an immutable connexion or ſeries of things determined from eternitie, whereby althings are infallibly directed to their ends, of which hereafter in the Gubernation of Providence. That providence puts into things a fixed, immutable order is evident; becauſe, (1) nothing fals out, but what was fore-ordained from al eternitie by infinite Wiſdome and an omnipotent Wil. (2) Al particular cauſes and effects are contained under and ſubſervient p. 457to the Univerſal Cauſe; and therefore ſubject to his Order. Yea, this Order muſt neceſſarily be moſt indiſſoluble and certain; becauſe it is founded in the Efficacitie of the Divine Wil, Efficience and Gubernation, as more fully anon.

3. Divine Providence is moſt Connatural and Agreable to the exigence and condition of the ſecond cauſes or ſubjects it workes upon. The Neceſſitie and Immobilitie, 3. Connatural and agreable.that attendes the Providence of God, doth no way infringe or impair the Contingence and Libertie of ſecond Cauſes, but confirme the ſame. Therefore men act freely, becauſe the Providence of God determines them ſo to act: So that nothing more conduceth to the natural libertie of the Wil, than the neceſſary Determination of Divine Providence, becauſe it determines althings to act according to their Natures: it offers not the leaſt force or violence to the Human Wil, but ſweetly, though neceſſarily moves it to the end appointed. Gods manner of ordering and conducting ſecond Cauſes is without the leaſt prejudice to their proper manner of working: he guides them ſweetly according to the principes and inſtincts he has put into them. For (1) Doth not Divine Providence furniſh every ſecond Cauſe with its Power, Virtue, and Efficacitie to worke? (2) Doth not the ſame Providence maintain and conſerve that Power and Vigor imparted? (3) Is not alſo the actuation of that Power from Providence? (4) Doth not Providence alſo moſt wiſely and ſweetly, yet powerfully order the manner of working, as alſo perfect the ſame? Is it not then moſt ſweet and connatural in al its Executions? Hence,

4. Divine Providence is moſt Beautiful and Perfect: 4. Beautiful and perfect.al its executions are in Number, Weight and Meaſure. Doth not the Wiſe Man aſſure us, Eccleſ. 3.11. That every thing is beautiful in its ſeaſon? Is not every execution and particular event of Providence moſt beautiful and proper at the ſeaſon allotted it by God? What are al the travels and births of time, but the Eternal and wiſe Decrees of Providence brought forth into light? Have not al iſſues and events, not only natural and neceſſary, but alſo the moſt contingent and voluntary their fixed time and limits conſtituted by Divine Providence, which renders them moſt beautiful and perfect? Are not thoſe very products, which in their own nature ſeem moſt monſtroſe and deformed, moſt beautiful in their time and place, as they relate to Divine Providence? Is not God infinitely wiſe to order althings in the beſt manner? And is he p. 458not alſo infinitely powerful to execute whatever he ordaines and decrees? Is not that, which in regard of mans Providence and Execution is moſt ſinful and deformed, in regard of Gods Providence and Execution moſt beautiful, as Chriſts Crucifixion? What muſt we ſay of al that confuſion that ſeems to be in States and Churches, Perſons and Things? Doth it reach the Providence of God? Is it not only in regard of ſecond cauſes, and our miſtakes as to the firſt cauſe? Cannot, yea, wil not Divine Providence bring a beautiful order out of al this confuſed chaos? It's true, Sacred Philoſophie tels us of evil dayes, which ſhould come to paſſe in this laſt Scene of the World: but whence ſprings the evil of theſe later days? Is it not from the Luſts of Men, not the Providence of God? Are not the worſt of days Naturally good, yea Morally alſo to thoſe who are good and do good? Is it not the Moral Evil of Men that makes al Times Evil? If Men were better, would not the Times ſoon prove better? Yea, are not thoſe very Diſorders and Confuſions, that ariſe from the Luſts of Men, ordered by Divine Providence in the beſt manner for the good of the whole? As in Nature varietie addes Beautie, ſo in the Providence of God varietie of changes renders it more beautiful. It was a great ſaying of a Stoic: He that wil take upon him to mend things, let him first take upon to mend God. Certainly nothing is done by God, but that which to leave undone were not ſo good: Many things that ſeem diſorderly and confuſed as to parts, are not ſo if we conſider the whole. Thus Damaſcene, Orthod. Fid. l. 2. c. 29. having proved, that God provides and governes althings according to his moſt wiſe Wil, he addes: foreign, Therefore God ſolely is good and wiſe by nature, or Eſſentially: As therefore he is good, he provides: for he that provides not, [for ſuch as are under his care] is not good: but as he is wiſe, he takes care to provide the best things. Therefore it becomes us, attending to theſe things, to admire al, to praiſe al, to receive, without curioſe inquiſition, al the workes of Providence, albeit they may ſeem to many injust; becauſe incognite, and incomprehenſible, as in what follows. That the Providence of God is moſt perfect, ſee Aquinas, contra Gent. l. 3. c. 94. Alvarez, de Auxil. Diſput. 28. p. 270.

p. 4595. Divine Providence is moſt myſterious and incomprehenſible. 5. Myſterious.The Providences of God are much like his Being, very ful of myſteries. So Pſal. 36.6. The Judgements of God are ſaid to be a great deep. And Pſal. 97.1. The Lord reigneth, let the Earth rejoice: Pſal. 97.1, 2.Ps 97:1Ps 97:2becauſe al his Judgments and Executions of Providence are moſt Equal and Righteous. Yet it follows, v. 2. Clouds and darkneſſe are about him. i. e. Albeit his Government is moſt Righteous, yet much darkeneſſe and myſterious Providences attend it: there are deep myſteries in his Providential Procedures, albeit Righteouſneſſe and Judgement are the habitation or eſtabliſhment of his Throne, as it follows. Gods Providences are always mater of our Admiration, but not of our Comprehenſion, or Imitation: To meaſure Providence by our ſhallow Reaſon, what is it but to ſet the Sun by our falſe Dial? It's wel obſerved in the Life of Padre Paul, p. 114. In the ſucceſſe of human things Divine Providence is ever to be admired, where human prudence vaniſheth out of ſight: it being moſt certain, that in actions there is an eternal force, and a long chain of Cauſes, ſo far without us, that neither our knowlege, or any conſideration of ours can ever come near. The workes of Providence are much like many curioſe pieces of Nature and Art; whereof we ſee the frame and operations, but that which is the interne moving principe, and gives the greateſt force to the operations we ſee not: So in the workes of Providence, we ſee the Executions and Effects, but O! how myſterious are the interne Reaſons? Is there not a particular though myſterious Providence ordering and directing the Operations of every individual and ſingle Eſſence? And is there not in every worke of Providence ſomething Divine, which doth puzle the moſt ſharpe-ſighted Reaſon, and hath more in it, than the moſt acute Philoſopher can diſcover? And why is it that the moſt of men miſtake and cenſure Providence, but becauſe they caſt their eye on ſome few particulars, but conſider not the whole frame and complexe? It's above our narrow Capacities to contemplate the whole frame of Providence, and is not this the genuine reaſon, why we misjudge and miſtake the parts? That is not diſorder in the whole, which ſeems ſo in ſome one particular, as in the motions of a Watch. Theſe myſterioſe procedures of Divine Providence are wel expreſſed by Damaſcence, Orthod. Fid. l. 2. c. 29. We must, ſaith he, admire al the workes of Providence, foreign, p. 460albeit they may appear to many injuſt; becauſe Divine Providence is unknown and incomprehenſible; and our cogitations, and actions, and things future are known to it only. Thence he addes, towards the cloſe of the Chapter: foreign, But we muſt know, that there are many modes of the Divine Providence, which can neither be explicated by ſpeech, nor comprehended by mind.

§. 6.The diſtributions of Providence. From the Adjuncts of Divine Providence we paſſe on to its various Diſtributions, which are for the moſt part Modal only, not Specific. As (1) Providence in regard of its Object is diſtributed into General and Special: General Providence is that which reſpectes althings in general: Special Providence, that which reſpectes ſome under a ſpecial relation to God, as his people. (2) Providence in regard of its manner of working is diſtributed into Mediate and Immediate: Mediate Providence is that wherein God makes uſe of Means for the execution thereof, of which before. Immediate Providence is, when God produceth Effects without the uſe of Means. (3) Providence is diſtributed into Ordinary and Extraordinary: Ordinary Providence is, when God in the production and governing of things obſerves that Order, which was conſtituted at firſt by himſelf. Extraordinary Providence is when God in the Production, Conſervation, or Gubernation of things breakes that natural Order conſtituted by himſelf.Of Miracles. The Effects of ſuch extraordinary Providences are, by a Metonymie of the Effect, termed Miracles. A Miracle properly is a Specimen of Creation; becauſe the conſtituted order of Nature being broken, the Mater has only an Obediential Power for the production of the Effect. Hence nothing but Omnipotence or Infinite Power can properly and phyſically, in a way of principal efficience, produce a Miracle. It's true the Miniſters of God have, when called to it by him, been Inſtruments of doing Miracles; yet their concurrence or efficience was only Moral and Inſtrumental: they wrought al in the Name of God, in a way of faith and dependence on him, and for the manifeſtation of his Glory. Wherefore our Lord Chriſt, by working Miracles in his own Name and Autoritie, without any moral dependence on another, gave an evident Conviction and Demonſtration of his being God. For no Creature can worke a Miracle by its own Principal and Phyſical Efficience: p. 461No; this is the Prerogative of the firſt Cauſe and Omnipotent Deitie; becauſe every Miracle is educed out of nothing, either as to the thing it ſelf, or at leaſt as to the mode and manner of its being wrought. In Nature, and according to the ordinary courſe of Providence every paſſive power has an active power ſuited to it: and by the application of Actives to Paſſives the effect is produced: where therefore there is a defect of paſſive or active power, and yet the effect is produced, that we cal a Miracle: which may be ſaid to be wrought out of nothing three manner of ways. (1) When there is no ſubſtrate mater at al to worke on. (2) If there be a ſubſtrate mater, yet when the mater is ſo inhabile and unapt, as that it has no natural paſſive power or capacitie for ſuch an effect. Or (3) when there is a natural paſſive power and capacitie in the ſubſtrate mater, yet there wants an active Principe or Efficient for the educing the effect out of that mater. In al theſe regards a Miracle may be ſaid to be produced out of nothing, and ſo the peculiar effect of Divine extraordinary providence. And indeed the very names, both Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, import a power extraordinary and Divine. To let paſſe the origination of the Latin, which is obvious, Miracles are called by the Greeks, (1) foreign, as they are Signes of the Divine Efficience and Preſence, given for the ſuccur of our Faith; (2) foreign, Powers, as they are manifeſtations and demonſtrations of Divine Omnipotence, which is moſt illuſtrious therein; (3) foreign, Hebr. foreign, Prodigies, or tremendous Signes, ſuch as not only raviſh men into admiration, but leave alſo a terror and aſtoniſhing ſtupor on the mind. So Phavorinus: foreign, A Prodigie is a thing that leaves an aſtoniſhment on the Beholders, by reaſon of the Miracle that is wrought. Whence foreign is deduced from foreign, q. foreign, that which terrefies and aſtoniſheth. Al which note, that Miracles are the peculiar effects of extraordinary Providence.

The former Diſtributions of Providence ſeem only modal, Providential Conſervation proper to God.its formal, eſſential, and ſpecific diſtribution is into Conſervative and Gubernative. Conſervation and Gubernation are uſually eſtimed the proper adequate ſpecies of Providence. Providential Conſervation is that Act of Gods Wil, whereby he makes things to perſiſt and perſevere in their individual Exiſtence, Vigor, Acts, and ſpecific Eſſences or Species. As for the particular Ideas of providential Conſervation we ſhal draw them forth in the following Propoſition. 1. p. 462Prop. God is the neceſſary Conſervator of althings. No Creature is ſufficient to conſerve it ſelf, or any thing elſe: no particular Agent as ſuch can be properly ſtiled a conſervant Cauſe; becauſe conſervation is but a kind of continued Creation. That no Creature is ſufficient to conſerve it ſelf, without the immediate conſervative influxe of God, is evident, (1) becauſe every Creature has but a fluid tranſient nature: wherefore it needs the conſervative concurſe of the firſt cauſe to fixe its fluxible Being. It was a great and good Effate of Heraclitus, foreign, Althings are in fluxe, nothing is permanent: i. e. the natures of things create are like a river, the parts whereof are always in fluxe; neither doth the ſame part ever returne again, but emties it ſelf into the Sea, where it is ſwallowed up: ſo al Creatures are in continual fluxe; and if God, who alone is pure Act and immutable, did not fixe their Beings by his conſervative influxe, they would ſoon drop into their primitive nothing. (2) It implies a contradiction, that a Creature ſhould perſevere in its being without Gods conſervative concurſe. Doth it not implie a contradiction, to ſay, that God made a thing, and yet that thing was not made and cauſed by God? Now to ſay God hath made a Creature, which needs not his conſervative influxe, what is this but to ſay, that God made a Creature, which yet was not made by him? So eſſential is Divine Conſervation to the very eſſence and exiſtence of a Creature, as Bradwardine, pag. 162. Thus alſo Aquinas, 1. Quaeſt. 104. demonſtrates, That it is not a thing communicable to any Creature, that it ſhould conſerve it ſelf in Being without God. (3) Whatever is Ens by participation neceſſarily dependes on that which is Ens by eſſence for its exiſtence and ſubſiſtence. Al create Beings in their very eſſence depend on Divine Conſervation; becauſe every effect that dependes on any cauſe directly and of it ſelf primarily for eſſence, muſt neceſſarily alſo depend thereon for conſervation: But now God is ſo the cauſe of al effects, that they from their very nature and by an intrinſecal neceſſitie depend on him for Being; therefore alſo for conſervation, as Suarez, Metaph. Diſput. 21. pag. 540, &c. God is foreign Jehovah, in ſome ſenſe Al Being, as Exod. 3.14. I am: i. e. nothing hath eſſence, exiſtence, and perſiſtence in Eſſence, but from the pure Actualitie and Efficience of God. (4) If God educed althings out of nothing by his efficacious Wil, then it neceſſarily follows, that the Wil of God muſt be the Conſervatrix of p. 463althings: For althings are ſo far, and ſo long exiſtent, as God wils they ſhal be. Indeed what is conſervation but continued creation, or the continuation of a thing made in Being? Is it not neceſſary then, that the ſame Divine Wil, that at firſt gave Being to any thing, conſerve the ſame thing in Being? Thence Aquinas, 1. Quaeſt. 104. proves, That God conſerves every thing by the ſame virtue and operation, by which he produced it, i. e. by the efficience of his Wil. (5) There is great proportion and Analogie in point of conſervation between the workes of Art and Nature. For look as every worke of Art doth preſuppoſe a principe and worke of Nature, as wel for its conſervation as firſt production; ſo every worke of Nature doth preſuppoſe a Divine Efficience for its conſervation as wel as for its firſt production. Is it impoſſible that a piece of Art ſhould conſerve it ſelf without mater? and is it poſſible, that any worke of Nature ſhould conſerve it ſelf without Divine Efficience? (6) No impreſſion can remain on any effect, longer than the vis impreſſa, or force and action of the Agent continue: and what is the eſſence of any Creature but vis impreſſa, or force impreſſed by God thereon? Al create Eſſences are but impreſſions or participations from God, and therefore eſſentially require new force and efficience every moment for their conſervation and continuation. (7) Unleſſe God conſerve althings, how can he order, diſpoſe, and governe them to their reſpective ends? Not only the operations, but the very eſſences of things are ordered by God to his own Glorie: and how can this be, if the eſſences of things are not conſerved by God? That God is the neceſſary Conſervator of althings, ſee Aquinas, contra Gent. l. 3. c. 65. Bradward. l. 1. c. 2. pag. 146, &c.

2. Prop. Gods conſervative Influxe and Efficience is most intime and immediate in althings. This Propoſition is moſt evident,Gods conſervative Influxe immediate. (1) From Gods power to annihilate althings. For if things were conſerved by God only mediately, he could not annihilate them ſo long as that intermediate conſervant Cauſe ſhould concur to their conſervation, as it's wel demonſtrated by Ariminenſis, Sent. 1. Diſt. 45. pag. 160. (2) From the paſſive power or potentialitie of al Creatures. For every potential or thing in power muſt be actuated by ſome Act immediately: now every Creature in reſpect of God is but a potential Being; and therefore muſt be actuated immediately by God, who is a pure Act, and that not only in its operation, but alſo for the conſervation of its Being. (3) From p. 464the Omnipreſence of the Divine Eſſence. God being not circumſcribed or defined to any ſpace, but immenſe in his Being, it thence follows, that he is intimately and immediately preſent to al Beings, and by this his immediate preſence and volition conſerves the ſame. As the creatrix Eſſence was immediately preſent by the Divine Volition in the firſt Creation of althings; ſo the conſervatrix Eſſence is alſo immediately preſent in the conſervation of althings. God is not more diſtant and remote in the conſervation, than he was in the firſt cauſation of things: God is more intimate to every thing, than the moſt intimate part of its own Eſſence is. Thus Suarez, Metaphyſ. Diſput. 30. Sect. 7. pag. 70. proves, That God doth not diffuſe his creative or conſervative Action, but is intimately in every thing, conſerving of it, &c. So Bradward. pag. 164. (4) From Gods prime Cauſalitie, and the ſubordination of al Creatures to God. Every ſecond cauſe, whether cauſant or conſervant, cannot cauſe or conſerve any effect, but in dependence on and ſubordination to God, the firſt Cauſe: Hence the Efficience of God muſt intervene between it and the effect, whether it be for cauſation or conſervation: whence it follows, that the Divine Efficience, both in cauſation and conſervation, is more immediate than the efficience of any ſecond cauſe. Again, the cauſalitie of the firſt Cauſe is more eſſential and neceſſary than that of the ſecond cauſe: there is no effect, which the ſecond cauſe produceth, but the firſt cauſe can produce it by itſelf. So alſo as to conſervation. The firſt cauſe workes by its own proper virtue, and therefore more intimely and immediately than any ſecond cauſe: The virtue of an inferior cauſe is not conjunct with the effect, but in and by the virtue of the ſuperior. (5) From the efficacitie and vehemence of Gods conſervative Influxe. By how much the more vehemently and efficaciouſly any cauſe worketh, by ſo much the more penetrant, intime, and immediate is its influxe. Now God, as the firſt conſervant Cauſe, doth more vehemently adhere to and efficaciouſly influence the effect, than any ſecond cauſe can do. Concerning the immediate Conſervation of God, ſee an excellent Diſcourſe in Bradwardine, de Cauſ. lib. 1. cap. 2. pag. 164, &c.

3.Gods Conſervation by his Word or Wil. Heb. 1.3.Heb 1:3 Prop. God conſerves althings by the word of his Power or immediate Volition. Thus Heb. 1.3. Ʋpholding althings by the word of his power. The Apoſtle aſcribeth unto God infinite power in and for the conſervation of althings, whether great or ſmal. It is infinite p. 465power that upholdeth the Earth, that ſtretcheth out the Heavens, &c. And yet the ſame infinite power is put forth in the conſervation of the leaſt things, as alſo for their motions. The ſame power that moves the Heavens, is alſo exerted in cauſing a feather to move: the ſame power that ſhakes a leaf, can ſhake yea rend the mountains: the ſame ſtrong arme that upholds a duſt or atome, can and doth uphold the Earth. And he ſaith al this is by the word of his Power: i. e. by his omnipotent Volition. So 2 Pet. 3. having old us, v. 5. That by the word of God the Heavens were made: he addes, v. 7. But the heavens and earth, 2 Pet. 3.7.2 Pet 3:7which are now, by the ſame word are kept in ſtore: i. e. by the omnipotent Wil of God. Gods Word being put for his Wil, becauſe we uſually expreſſe our wils by our word. That Gods Word or Wil is the immediate cauſe of althings and their conſervation, we have before fully demonſtrated, §. 3. of this Chapter.

4. Prop. Albeit the conſervative Influxe of God be immediate, Gods Conſervation by means.yet in the ordinary courſe of Providence he makes uſe of means for the conſervation of his Creatures, at leaſt ſuch as are corruptible. So Hoſ. 2.21,Hoſ. 2.21, 22.Hos 2:21Hos 2:2222. I wil hear the heavens; and they ſhal hear the earth; and the earth ſhal hear the corne, and the wine, and the oil; and they ſhal hear Jezreel. (1) In this gradation we have a lively deſcription of Divine Conſervation, both as to the whole Univerſe, as alſo in regard of the principal part thereof, man, and more ſpecially the Church of God. (2) Neither doth this Proſopopoeia only point out to us the Divine Conſervation of althings, but alſo their cauſal connexions and ſubordinations each to other. Jezreel [i. e. according to its proper origination, the ſeed of God] cals on corne and wine and oil for ſuſtenance and food: and theſe liquors cal on the Earth for fructifying juices and vigor, in order to their production: and the Earth cals on the Heavens, i. e. [1] on the Aereous inferior Heaven, where the Clouds, Snow, Rain, Dew, and Vapors are, for moiſt influences; [2] on the Ethereous Heaven, where the Sun and Stars are, for warme influences: And then laſtly the Heavens cal on God; who gives out both vigor and heat to the Celeſtial Bodies; and theſe influences to the Earth; which thence gives juices and vigor to the Plants; whence Corne, Wine, and Oil is given forth to Jezreel. Such is the admirable gradation and ſubordination of althings, as means of Divine Conſervation. Thus Pſal. 65.9, 10, 11, 12, 13.Pſal. 65.11, 12.Ps 65:11Ps 65:12 Thou viſiteſt the earth, &c. Thence v. 11. Thou crowneſt the year with p. 466thy goodneſſe. i.e. Thoroughout the whole year thou doeſt abundantly do good to thy poor Creatures, and ſo doeſt as it were adorne, beautifie, and make glad the year. Whence he addes: and thy paths drop fatneſſe. Thy paths, orbitae, i. e. the clouds, which are the paths wherein the chariot of thy Providence moves. Drop fatneſſe: i. e. Rain and Snow, which by their ſulphureous nitroſe efficaces make the Earth fat and flouriſhing, whereby Man and Beſtes are conſerved. Whence it follows: v. 12. They drop on the paſtures of the wilderneſſe, and the little hils rejoice on every ſide. Or are girded with joy. Some underſtand this of metallic venes, which are in the boſome of the Earth, and do as it were gird it with joy, or metals that cauſe joy. We find mention alſo of the providential proviſion that God makes for his Creatures, Pſal. 145.15 The eyes of al wait upon thee, Pſal. 145.15.Ps 145:15and thou giveſt them their meat in due ſeaſon. 16. Thou openeſt thy hand and ſatisfieſt the deſire of every living thing. We have here a lively Image of Gods providential conſervation, who is brought in as a great Maſter of a Familie, largely diſtributing Food, even from his own hand, to al under his care. Such abundant proviſion doth the Benigne Lord make for the conſervation of his Creature. Whence ſome derive foreign Shaddai the name of God from foreign a dug or teat that yields milk, implying that God feeds al, and ſupplies them with nouriſhment. Others deduce Shaddai from foreign dai ſufficient, q. foreign Scheddai, who is ſufficient: becauſe God is Alſufficient to ſupplie al his Creatures.

5. Prop. When ordinary means fail, God oft provides extraordinary for the relief of his Creatures. Gods extraordinary proviſion for ſome.Thus God provided for Eliah, and many other of his Servants in their exigences, whereof we find abundant inſtances in Sacred Philoſophie and Hiſtorie. Yea how oft doth our liberal Lord make extraordinary proviſion for mere Brutes in their indigent caſes?Pſal. 147.9.Ps 147:9 Thus Pſal. 147.9. He giveth to the Beſte his food, and to the young Ravens which crie. The laſt clauſe,Job 38.41.Job 38:41 and to the young Ravens which crie, is taken out of Job 38.41.Luke 12.24.Luke 12:24 Who provideth for the Raven his food? When his young ones cry unto God, they wander for lack of meat. So Luk 12.24. Our Lord makes mention of Gods feeding the Ravens. Which places put together ſeem to note ſome more than ordinary proviſion that God makes for them. The Rabbines, Raſi and Kimhi, with ſome others tel us, that the young Ravens, by reaſon of their white color, are left by their Parents to ſhift for themſelves; whence the p. 467Providence of God, in an extraordinay manner, cauſeth flies or wormes to ariſe out of their dung, by which they are nouriſhed. Plinie and Albertus Magnus incline much to this Opinion of the Hebrews. Others refer this not to the young Ravens newly hatcht, but to ſuch as are ready to flie: which being caſt out of the neaſt by their Parents, and very much affected with hunger ſlie up and down the Air, making loud cries. Which ſeems to agree to that of Job 38.41. Thus Ariſtotle and Elian tel us, that the young Ravens are expelled from their neaſt by the old ones. To this ſenſe Voſſius, Mcy, and others incline. The former ſenſe of the Hebrews is refuted by Calvin, as alſo by Bochart, de Animal. Tom. 2. p. 203, &c. who makes this caſe of the young Ravens the ſame with that of the young Lions, Job 39.39. Pſal. 34.10. and 104.21. both of which by reaſon of their vehement appetite, and unskilfulneſſe to acquire food ſuffer great hunger, and are in a more than ordinary manner ſupplied by the Providence of God. What extraordinary proviſion God makes for the conſervation of his own People wil hereafter occur in the Gubernation of God.

6. Prop. The Conſervation of a Creature and its firſt Creation or Production, as they refer both to God, differ only mentally. Conſervation continued Creation.Creation gives Being and Exiſtence unto things, Conſervation, Continuation in Being. Somethings are conſerved immediately by God, becuaſe ſubject only to him, as Spirits: That the conſervation of ſuch differs only mentally from their Creation is evident: Other things are conſerved by God not ſo immediately as to exclude Means, yet ſo as that God conſerves them immediately in and by thoſe means. Now that the conſervation of ſuch things alſo, as to Gods immediate conſervative influxe, differs not really, but only mentally from thier firſt production is manifeſt; becauſe conſervation as to God, whether it be by means or without means, is but one act continued from the firſt inſtant of its Creation or Production: not that there is any real intrinſec ſucceſſion in Gods Active Conſervation, which is no other than his moſt ſimple volition; but we conceive Gods Paſſive Conſervation as ſucceſſive in regard of the Creatures Duration. Thonce Aquinas and his Sectators hold, That Conſervation is a continued Creation. Which muſt not be underſtood of proper continuation, but according to our manner of underſtanding, or by reaſon of its coexiſtence to true continued ſucceſſion: For continuation properly ſo termed is only in things diviſible: but Creation and Conſervation are one p. 468indiviſible act, without any ſucceſſive duration or real continuation as to God, but only a moſt ſimple indiviſible permanence, as Suarez, Metaphyſ. Diſput. 21. Sect. 2. p. 343. demonſtrates. Hence we may eaſily underſtand, how Creation or the firſt production of things, and their Conſervation as to God differ only Mentally. For the difference is only according to the different mode of our conception, and expreſſion: Things are not ſaid to be conſerved in the firſt moment of their production, nor to be Created in regard of their ſubſequent continuation: For Creation connotes a negation of precedent Being, but conſervation on the contrary connotes the poſſeſſion of Being before produced. Creation includes a Novitie of Eſſence, which conſervation excludes; and conſervation includes precedent Exiſtence, which Creation excludes.Nehem. 9.6.Neh 9:6 Thus Conſervation is continued Creation, as Nehem. 9.6. where God is ſaid to preſerve althings made by one and the ſame Act.John 5.17.John 5:17 So John 5.17. My Father hitherto worketh and I worke: i. e. for the Conſervation as wel as the firſt production of things; neither are theſe Acts as to Divine Efficience really diſtinct, albeit we may diſtinguiſh them as to ſecond cauſes and means uſed by God, for the production and conſervation of things.

7. Prop. Divine Conſervation as to its Objects and Effects is various. The Object of Divine Conſervation.Albeit the Conſervation of God be in it ſelf one ſimple Act, not different from the firſt production of things, ſave by ſome connotation only, yet it admits various Objects and Effects. (1) God conſerves Individuals, ſome to al Eternitie, without the leaſt corruption or alteration: as Angels and Human Souls: Other Individuals ſhal be conſerved for ever, yet not without ſome alteration and reſinement, as the celeſtial Bodies, &c. 2 Pet. 3.10, 12. (2) Such Individuals as are the effects of Natural Generation or Production God conſerves in their Species, and in the whole: for the corruptions and defects of ſome parts belong to the Conſtitution and Continuation foreign of the whole Ʋniverſe, unto which there is more regard to be had, than to any part: albeit the parts alſo are conſerved in their Species, when they decay as to their individual Natures. (3) God conſerves alſo the vigor, virtue and efficacitie of al ſecond cauſes, together with their Operations ſo long as they are exiſtent.