The Court of the Gentiles Part 4, Part 4 · Book 2 · Chapter 9

The Court of the Gentiles Part 4 · Part 4 · Book 2 · Chapter 9

p. 469CHAP. IX. Of Divine Gubernation in general; and as to Sin.

God the Supreme Gubernator. The end of Divine Gubernation. Its Order moſt perfect, and immobile. It hath the force of a Law. Its uſe of means. Its extent to althings. Gods Gubernation as to Men: particularly as to Sinners, and Sin. The Origine of Sin, and its cauſes. God not the Author of Sin. How God is the cauſe of the material act of Sin. How far Sin fals under the Divine Wil. Gods Wil about Sin Permiſſive; not merely Negative, but Ordinative. Gods Judicial Gubernation of Sin. What Attributes of God are most illuſtrious in the Gubernation of Sin.

§. 1. HAving diſcuſſed the Conſervation of God,Divine Gubernation. we now deſcend to his Gubernation, whereof we find illuſtrious notices both in Sacred and Platonic Philoſophie. As for Sacred Philoſophemes touching Divine Gubernation they are very many and great, as it may appear in the particulars thereof. I ſhal at preſent give only the mention of Platonic Contemplations concerning it. Thus Plato, Phileb. p. 28. What, O Protarchus, may we determine, that althings, and this which is called the Ʋniverſe, are governed by a certain temerarious power void of Reaſon, as Fortune wil? Or rather on the contrary, ſhould we not affirme with our Anceſtors, foreign, that the eternal Mind, and a certain admirable Wiſdome, ordering al in the moſt accurate manner, doth governe? He ſaith, that according to the Opinion of the Ancient Wiſe Men, the Providence of God governes and moderates althings in the wiſeſt manner, and with the beſt order. Thus alſo Iamblichus ſaith, That the Egyptians, when they introduce God under the Symbolic Image of one that governes a Ship, thereby ſignifie his Domination and Empire as Gubernator of the Univerſe. For as a Gubernator of a Ship in one moment doth eaſily move, governe, and direct the Ship; ſo doth God the world. We find the ſame ſimilitude uſed by Plato, Leg. 10. p. 902, as before. Hence, this Gubernation of God is that act of Divine Providence, whereby he directes, governes, and brings al his Creatures to their proper ends, in the moſt orderly p. 470manner. This general Idea of Divine Gubernation may be reſolved into the following Propoſitions.

1. Prop. God is the Supreme Moderator, God the Supreme Gubernator. Eccleſ. 8.4.Eccl 8:4Soverain Gubernator, and abſolute Rector of althings. Thus we may applie Eccleſ. 8.4. Where the word of a King is, there is power; [or Domination] and who can ſay to him what doeſt thou? i. e. by how much the more Soverain any perſon is, by ſo much the greater is his Domination. God being King of Kings, and Lord of Lords muſt neceſſarily be moſt Abſolute in Power and Domination. This is oft inculcated by Plato, and carries with it its own Evidence. For (1) althings receiving their Being, Perfection, Virtue and Operation, from God, it cannot be, but that he ſhould have an Abſolute Dominion and Soverain Empire over them. (2) Althings tend to God as their laſt end: therefore he is the Supreme Rector of al. For when many things tend to one laſt end, it's neceſſary that there be ſome Supreme Rector and Moderator that ordaines them thereto. For Gubernation is nothing elſe but the directing the things governed to their laſt end. Thus Aquinas, 1. q. 103. a. 3. Seing the end of the Gubernation of the world is the beſt good, it's neceſſary, that the Gubernation of the world be beſt: But now the beſt Gubernation is that which is by one, &c. (3) God is infinitely wiſe to order althings, and potent to bring them to their ends; therefore he is the Supreme Moderator of al. So Plato, Leg. 10. p. 902. foreign, But that God who is moſt wiſe, both can and wil take care of his own Creatures, &c. (4) The Bonitie of God argues him to be the Abſolute Rector of althings. For it belongs to Divine Bonitie to reduce althings made by him to thoſe proper ends for which they were made. Whatever flows from God as the firſt Cauſe, muſt returne to him as the laſt end. (5) This is the great concerne of Divine Gubernation, to ſee that althings reach the end for which they were made. For things wil never certainly and infallibly reach the end for which they were made, unleſſe they be directed and governed by the ſame power which made them. It argues imperfection in an Artificer not to direct the worke he made, to the end for which it was made. And may we impute ſuch an imperfection to the firſt Framer of althings? Hence,

p. 4712. Prop. Divine Gubernation propoſeth the Glorie of God as the last end of a things. The last end of Divine Gubernation.What is al Gubernation but the directing althings to ſome laſt end? And what is the laſt end of althings, but the Glorie of God? Thus Plato, Leg. 10. pag 903. foreign, Let us perſuade this young man, that he, who by his providence takes the care of the whole, that he may conſerve and adorne it with neceſſary virtue, doth wiſely diſpoſe and order althings to this end: the force and efficace of whoſe Providence doth diffuſe itſelf into al parts of the Ʋniverſe, according to their nature. Whereby he explicates to us, how God doth order and diſpoſe althings for the good of the whole and his own Glorie. This he more fully lays open in what follows: foreign, &c. But thou knoweſt not, that al generation of ſingulars is for this, that the life of the whole may be bleſſed: his Eſſence is not for thy ſake, but thou wert made for his ſake. For every Phyſician, and every skilful Artificer, makes al for the ſake of the whole, aſpiring after the commun utilitie. Thence he makes not the whole for the ſake of the part, but the part for the ſake of the whole. But thou art ful of indignation, becauſe thou canſt not ſee, how that which is best may accord with the commun good, and thy proper interest. Here are ſeveral things remarquable for explication and demonſtration, that the Glorie of God is the laſt end of Divine Gubernation. (1) He ſaith, Al ſingulars are for this, that the life of the whole may be bleſſed. Why may we not by foreign, the whole underſtand God? That Plato ſometimes underſtandes God by this notion, ſpecially in his Timaeus, pag. 90. foreign, the contemplations of the whole, &c. I could eaſily perſuade my ſelf. (2) But grant, that we muſt underſtand this of the Ʋniverſe ſtrictly taken, yet it muſt at laſt be reſolved into God: for is not the Univerſe and althings elſe for Gods ſake, not God for the ſake of the Univerſe? (3) Plato illuſtrates this by the Symbol of a wiſe Phyſician and skilful Artificer, who workes al for the ſake of the whole: and is not the Divine Bonitie and Glorie that great Ʋniverſitie or whole, into which p. 472al lower ends muſt be melted? (4) Plato blames his young Atheiſt, and in him the moſt of men, for preferring their private good before the good of the whole; which Theologie teacheth is no other than the Glorie of God. That althings are ordered and diſpoſed by Divine Gubernation, for the Glorie of God is manifeſt, (1) From the prime motion and cauſalitie of God. For God being the prime Motor of althings, and moved by nothing, it thence neceſſarily follows, that by his Providence he governe and move althings to himſelf, as the laſt end. The order of ends neceſſarily anſwers the order of Agents: the firſt Cauſe and Motor muſt needs be the laſt end of althings. (2) From Gods Dominion over althings. Every Agent has power to uſe his own workes for the end he made them: and are not al Creatures the workes of Gods hands? Has he not then power to uſe them for his own Glorie? (3) From the perfection which althings acquire by ſubſerving the Glorie of God. By how much the nearer any Creature approcheth to the Divine Bonitie, by ſo much the more perfect it is: and is not every thing by ſo much the nearer the Divine Bonitie, by how much the more ſubſervient it is to the Glorie of God? It was a good Saying of the ſpurious Dionyſius: The ſupreme Bonitie convertes althings unto itſelf, which al deſire as their laſt end, and by which they al ſubſiſt as their moſt perfect end. Hence,

3. Prop. The order whereby Divine Gubernation diſpoſeth and reduceth althings to their laſt end is most fixed, The Order of Divine Gubernation fixed. Eſa. 40.26.Isa 40:26immobile, and perfect. This according to ſacred Philoſophie is wel expreſſed, Eſa. 40.26. Lift up your eyes on high, and behold who hath created theſe things; that bringeth out their host by number: he calleth them al by name: by the greatneſſe of his might: for that he is ſtrong in power not one faileth. Obſerve here; (1) he cals on mankind to lift up their eyes for the contemplation of the Creatures thereby to inſtruct themſelves in the Gubernation of God. (2) He founds Divine Gubernation on omnipotent Creation. (3) He expreſſeth Gods fixed admirable order in governing things, ſpecially the Celeſtial bodies, by bringing out their hoſt by number. O! what an accurate order do al the Celeſtial bodies obſerve in their motions! Is not every one numbered and ranged in its proper place by Divine Gubernation? Doth not every one keep its ranke and ſlation, performe its office, and move moſt regularly, according to that Law which Divine Ordination has appointed it? Thence it follows: And calleth them al by name: i. e. has an accurate knowlege of and p. 473command over al, as a wiſe General that can cal al his Souldiers by name, whoſe beck and nod every one obeys. Such is the admirable Dexteritie and Domination of Divine Gubernation. But whence ſprings al this? that follows: By the greatneſſe of his might. The magnitude of Divine Power is the cauſe of his admirable fixed Gubernation: becauſe he is omnipotent, therefore it is impoſſible that he ſhould fail in his Gubernation. Thus it follows: For that he is ſtrong in power not one faileth. foreign, faileth, or is deprived, i. e. of that fixed order and ſtation, which Divine Gubernation has allotted to it: there is not one that detractes its office, but al ſubſerve the Divine order. Thus Plato, in his Phado, p. 97. foreign, It is the eternal Mind that diſpoſeth althings in the best order, and is the cauſe of al— And thus I determined with my ſelf, if it be ſo, that this gubernative diſpoſitive Mind doth thus diſpoſe althings, then althings are placed in that ſtation and ranke, where they may be most rightly conſtituted. The Stoics alſo, as Laertius in Zeno aſſures us, held, foreign, That the world was governed and ordered by the Divine Mind and Providence, which diſpoſeth althings in the beſt manner. This gubernative Providence, as it includes a fixed order and ſeries of cauſes and effects, they called Fate; which they made to be a connexe ſeries of things, or reaſon, whereby the world was governed. So Chryſippus ſaid: foreign, &c. That Fate was a natural Syntaxe or regular connexion of althings, mutually following each other from al eternitie, by an immutable and inviolable complication. Whereby indeed they ſeem to underſtand no other than the ſeries and order of Divine Gubernation, decreed by God from al eternitie. So Stobaeus, in his Phyſics explicates their mind: foreign, The reaſon of thoſe things, which are governed in the world by Providence. And that this was the original import of the Stoic Fate we are aſſured by Seneca, Minutins Faelix, Lud. Vives, and others. Thus Robert Groſſeteſte, that great Philoſopher as wel as Divine, in his Tractate de Libero Arbitrio, (to be found in MSS. in Exeter College Librarie:) We muſt know, ſaith he, that Fate may be taken for Providence, according to Boetius, Lib. Conſol. Philoſ. 4. who ſaith, that Fate is the ſame with Providence, yet they may admit different conſiderations; becauſe Providence is that Divine Reaſon in the Soverain of althings, p. 474which diſpoſeth althings; but Fate is the diſpoſition inherent in things mobile, by which Providence knits them together in their proper orders. In what follows he proves out of Cicero, Boetius, and others, that Fate is really the ſame with Providence: of which ſee Philoſ. Gen. P. 2. l. 1. c. 3. §. 5. Hence,

4.None can avoid Divine Order and Gubernation. Prop. No ſecond cauſe can totally decline the order prefixed by Divine Gubernation. And the reaſon is evident; becauſe this Gubernation of God intrinſecally includes, not only a prudent proviſion of the beſt means, but an efficacious execution of them, ſo as they ſhal infallibly reach their end. It's true, wicked men oft do ſubſtract and withdraw their neck from the obediential yoke of Gods preceptive Gubernation, but yet they cannot totally withdraw themſelves from the order of Gods providential Gubernation: whiles they violate the moral and ſacred order of Divine precepts, do they not fal into the penal order of Divine puniſhments? Yea, oft do not thoſe very means, which they uſe to violate the Divine order,Gen. 11.4.Gen 11:4 promove the ſame? Thus Gen. 11.4. And they ſaid: Go to, let us build us a citie, and a tower, whoſe top may reach unto heaven; and let us make us a name, leſt we be ſcattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth. You ſee their deſigne in building the Tower of Babel was to prevent the judgements of God, or to ſecure themſelves againſt a diſperſion and ſcattering: and yet, lo! the wiſe Gubernation of God made this very Tower of Babel, v. 8.which they intended as a means to prevent their diſperſion, the cauſe thereof, as v. 8. So the Lord ſcattered them abroad, &c. And yet out of this very diſperſion which they feared and felt, Divine Gubernation brought another ſacred order, even for the peopling the whole Earth. Thus the moſt unnatural confuſions are ordered by Divine Gubernation: the order of Divine Providence is frequently advanced by that which may ſeem to obſtruct or pul it down: whiles men endeavor to eſcape one order of Divine Gubernation, they fal into another.

5.The Order of Gods Gubernation a Law. Prop. The order of Divine Gubernation, whereby althings are appointed and reduced to their end, has the force and efficace of a Law. Thence Plato termes this Order of Divine Gubernation, foreign, the Law of Adraſtie, i. e. Gods fixed Order. So Pindar: foreign, the Regal Law of althings: i. e. that Order which the Eternal Law of Divine Decrees has conſtituted for the Gubernation of althings. This Law, whereby Divine Gubernation orders and diſpoſeth things, as it refers to things p. 475inanimate and Brutes, comprehendes in it al thoſe Natural Inſtinctes, Inſtigations, Inclinations, and Propenſions, whereby they are conducted to their proper ends and uſages. Do not things Natural, which are not inveſted with rational notices, or ſpontaneitie certainly obſerve ſome Laws and Dictates of Nature, which, you may aſſoon baniſh them from their Natures, as diveſt them of? Are not the ſeveral kinds of their Operations conſtantly framed and determined according to this Order or Law of their Natures? And do they not hereby follow Divine Gubernation towards their end, albeit they know not what they do nor why? Doth not the ſilly Bird curioſely frame its neaſt, and the ſimple Bee its cel always after the ſame forme and figure? and ſo in al other natural operations and productions of mere Brutes, what a fixed Order is there agreable to the Law of their Beings? And whence comes al this, but from the infinite Wiſdome and Gubernation of the Divine Mind, who conductes things moſt irrational in the moſt intelligent prudent manner to their ends? May we not then conclude, that the Natural Generations and Operations of althings procede from that Univerſal Law engraven on their Beings, whereby they are, by the wiſe Conduct of Divine Gubernation, directed to their reſpective Ends? In ſum, this Natural Law of Divine Gubernation conſiſtes, (1) In the Natural Principes of things. (2) In their Natural Inclinations. (3) In al Natural Inſtinctes, and Impulſes of Nature. (4) In their Obediential Capacities or Powers, whereby they are ready to receive any extraordinary Impreſſions, which Divine Gubernation ſhal offer to them.

6. Prop.Gods Gubernation by ſecond Cauſes. The Executions of Divine Gubernation are oft committed to ſecond Cauſes and Inſtruments, yet ſo as it actes immediately in and with them, yea ſometimes contrary to their natural Inclinations. Thus Plato, Leg. 10. p. 903. ſpeaking of Gods Soverain Providential Gubernation, ſaith: That albeit God takes the care of the whole Ʋniverſe himſelf, yet foreign, And over al theſe parts [of the Univerſe] are ſet Rulers and Moderators, who conſtantly governe althings, even the moſt minute parts; that ſo by theſe they may governe al, even to the laſt part, unto their end. By thoſe Rulers under Divine Gubernation, I preſume, he underſtandes al ſecond Cauſes made uſe of thereby. Divine operations do not exclude the operations of the ſecond p. 467cauſes, but theſe include ſubordination to Divine operations. Divine Gubernation orders and governes Inferior Creatures by Superiors, Corporals by Spirituals; and Inferior ſublunary bodies by Superior and Celeſtial. Thus he governes althings immediately as to the manner of Order, and yet many things mediately as to the execution thereof: So that nothing can fal out againſt or beſide the Univerſal Order of Divine Gubernation, albeit many things do contrary to the order of particular Cauſes. Touching the Executions of Divine Providence, ſee §. 3. Prop. 4.

7.Gods Gubernation reacheth althings. Prop. The Object of Divine Gubernation is althings in their most extenſive latitude. Thus Plato Leg. 10. p. 902, 903. proves, That nothing is ſo minute and inconſiderable, but it fals under Divine Gubernation. But to deſcend to particulars. (1) Divine Gubernation diſpoſeth of al Seaſons, both Natural and Politic. [1] Natural Seaſons, Eccleſ. 3.1.Eccl 3:1as Eccleſ. 3.1. To every thing there is a ſeaſon, and a time to every purpoſe. A Seaſon: i. e. a certain fixed, determinate time. [2] Politic Seaſons, for Human and Politic Actions. (2) Gods Divine Gubernation orders al Viciſſitudes and Changes in the world, without the leaſt viciſſitude or change in himſelf.Dan. 2.20, 21.Dan 2:20Dan 2:21 So Dan. 2.20. For Wiſdome and Might are his: i. e. for the Gubernation of althings. Whence it follows, v. 21. And he changeth the Times and the Seaſons: he removeth Kings, and ſetteth up Kings. (3) Divine Gubernation orders al the Meteors, Snow, Job 37.6, 7.Job 37:6Job 37:7Rain, &c. So Job 37.6. For he ſaith to the Snow, be thou on the earth: likewiſe to the ſmal Rain, and to the great Rain of his ſtrength. Whence it follows, v. 7. He ſealeth up the hand of every man, that al men may know his worke. He ſealeth up the hand of every one. Elibu's meaning is, that when God ſendeth his Snow and ſhours of Rain, he thereby ſeals up, or ſhuts up the hand of the Husbandman, that ſo he may retire out of the fields home, and conſider his worke. Then the Beſtes go into Dens, as v. 8. (4) God governeth al motions of ſecond Cauſes, even ſuch as are moſt contingent and voluntary, in the moſt certain manner. (5) God governes al Events of things. It was a great ſaying of Julius Caeſar, which he gained by experience, That Fortune, (whereby the Ancients expreſſed Divine Gubernation) has great force in althings; but more particularly in the affaires of war: wherein oft the moſt inconſiderable rencontres or occurrences produce the greateſt changements. Such is the wiſe and potent Gubernation of God in Military Affaires.

p. 477§. 2.Divine Gubernation as to Man. Having diſpatcht the Gubernation of God in the general notion thereof, we now deſcend to conſider it in its ſpecial relation to Man, both in his ſinful and renovate State. Gubernative Providence doth reach the whole Univerſe; but in a more ſpecial manner Man and his Affaires. So Plato ſaith, Leg. 4. p. 709. foreign, That God truely, and with God Fortune and Opportunitie governe al human affaires. By Fortune and Opportunitie we muſt underſtand Divine Gubernative Providence, which in a more peculiar manner regardes Man; becauſe he is capable not only of Natural, but alſo of Moral Gubernation. God governes every Creature according to its capacitie, whether Natural or Moral: but now al Creatures inferior to man are capable only of Natural Gubernation and Paſſive Reduction to their laſt end: they may be governed and directed to their laſt end, but they cannot governe or direct themſelves thereto. But Man being inveſted with a Natural, Paſſive, remote capacitie of underſtanding and Wil, can, when in a ſpecial manner aided and aſſiſted by ſupernatural Gubernation, actively conduct and direct himſelf to his laſt end. Hence Divine Gubernation as to Man is either Moral, 1. Moral by Law.or Efficacious. (1) Gods Moral Gubernation is by Laws and Inſtitutions. Look as irrational Creatures are governed by natural Inſtinctes, and Inclinations, which are to them a Law directing them to their end; ſo Rational Creatures have a more expreſſe formal Law, which was at firſt impreſſed on their Beings, but now under a new Edition by Divine Revelation, whereby they are directed to their laſt end. For a Law being nothing elſe but a certain Reaſon or Rule of operating, it properly only can belong to intellectual rational Creatures, who alone can underſtand the reaſon of their operations. And that this Law is given to Man principally to direct him to his laſt end is evident, becauſe the Supreme Intention and Efficace of the Divine Law is, to bring Man into ſubjection to God: and who are ſubject to God but thoſe, who refer al to him as their laſt end? Is it not the Intendement of every Lawgiver to make thoſe good, to whom his Laws are promulgated? And wherein conſiſtes the goodneſſe of Man, but in ſubjection to God, and adhering to him as his laſt end? So that the main end of al Laws both Poſitive and Moral is to direct man to his laſt end. (2) This alſo is the main deſigne of Divine Efficacious Gubernation, 2. Efficacious.namely to reduce man unto p. 478to a ſubordination and ſubſervience to his laſt end. Only it has a different ay of operation as to wicked and pious men. Wicked men, if they perſevere in their wickedneſſe, are by Divine Gubernation reduced to their laſt end only paſſively, by penal executions, in order to the vindication of Divine Juſtice: but elect pious Souls are actively reduced and directed to their laſt end, by the ſupernatural Gubernation of the Divine Spirit. Of both theſe in their order.

That wicked men,Wicked men fal under Gods Gubernation. and al their ſinful Acts and Deeds are, by Divine Gubernation, reduced to the laſt end of al, the Glorie of God, wil appear evident, if we reflect on what was before hinted, that if the Creature withdraw it ſelf from one order of Divine Gubernation, it immediately fals under another: if lawleſſe irregular men ſubſtract and withdraw themſelves from Gods gracious and eaſie yoke of obedience in order to life, they deſervedly fal under Gods Iron Yoke of vindictive Juſtice, and Eternal Death: and ſo whiles they violate one Wil and Order of Divine Gubernation, they fulfil another: If they wil not willingly do Gods Wil of Precept, which brings happineſſe with it, what more juſt, than that they ſuffer Gods Wil of puniſhment, againſt their Wils? Thus wicked men fulfil Gods providential Wil, whiles they break his preceptive Wil. Yea, Satan himſelf is under chains of irreſiſtible Providence: He is not an Abſolute, much leſſe a Lawful Monarch, but Uſurper; who has a reſtraint upon his Power, though not upon his Malice: He cannot Act as he would.

And as the perſons of the wicked,Gods Gubernation about ſin. both Men and Devils, fal under the Providential Gubernation of God, ſo alſo their Sins. And here we are inevitably engaged in that grand Philoſophic and Scholaſtic Queſtion, How far Sin fals under the Providential Gubernation of God? For the ſolution whereof we ſhal firſt premit ſome Diſtinctions: and then reſolve the whole into certain Propoſitions. As for Diſtinctions, (1) We may conſider Sin [1] in regard of its Cauſes, Eſſicient and Final: or [2] in regard of its Eſſential and Conſtitutive parts, Mater and Forme. (2) We may conſider the Permiſſion of Sin; which is either merely Negative or Poſitive: and both, as belonging to a Legiſlator, or to a Rector. (3) We may conſider the Providence of God as to its Natural Efficience or Judicial Gubernation. Theſe Diſtinctions being premiſſed, we ſhal reſolve our Queſtion in the following Propoſitions.

p. 4791. Prop. Al Sin, as other things, has its Origine, Cauſes, and Conſtitutive parts. The Cauſes and parts of Sin.The Ethnic as wel as the Chriſtian Scholes have admitted many Debates, touching the Origine of Evil, or Sin: and we have this copioſely ventilated by Simplicius, an acute Philoſopher, in his Commentaric on Epicterus, C. 34. p. 175. &c. And he ſeems to ſtate it thus: That Sin, being a privation, has no proper principe or cauſe, though as to its ſubſtrate mater it may fal under ſome cauſalitie. Thus Plato, Repub. 2. p. 380. and Proclus on him, denie, that there is, foreign & foreign, any Cauſe or Idea of Evils; becauſe, foreign, Evil is an irregular paſſion, or foreign a privation of Being; which muſt be underſtood of the formal Reaſon of Sin: for as to is ſubſtrate mater, Plato and his Followers grant, that al good has its Cauſes. Suarez, Metaphyſ. Diſp. 11. Sect. 3. p. 251. proves wel, (1) That al Sin muſt have ſome Cauſe: [1] Becauſe nothing is Evil of it ſelf: therefore from ſome Cauſe. [2] Becauſe nothing is Evil, but as it recedes from ſome perfection due to it: but nothing fails of its due perfection, but from ſome cauſe either Agent, or Impedient: Now (2) this being granted, That al Sin has ſome Cauſe, it thence neceſſarily follows, That ſome Good must be the Cauſe of Sin. For in as much as we may not procede into Infinite, nor yet ſtop at ſome Sin that has no Cauſe, we muſt neceſſarily ſtop at ſome Good, which is the cauſe of Evil. Hence, (3) to explicate in what kind Sin may be ſaid to have a Cauſe, we muſt know, [1] that Sin formally as Sin requires not a final Cauſe, yet it may admit the ſame in regard of the extrinſec intention of the Agent. That sin formally as ſin requires not a final Cauſe, is evident; becauſe conſiſting in a privation and defect, it is not properly and of it ſelf intended in things. Thus Simplicius in Epictet. C. 34. pag. 174. tels us, That al Act, foreign, does participate of Good, and therefore Evil can have no end. And yet that Sin may have a final Cauſe, in regard of the extrinſec intention of the Agent, is as evident; becauſe the Agent may intend what is Evil for ſome end: for what is Evil in one kind, may be conducible, or utile in ſome other. [2] As to the Efficient Cauſe, al Sin has ſome Efficient Cauſe, yet not per ſe, of it ſelf and properly, but by Accident, and beſide the primary, intrinſec intention of the Agent. Man is ſaid to be Efficient or rather the Deficient Cauſe of Sin, by producing that Action, to which Sin is appendent or annexed. God is ſaid to be the Efficient, p. 480not Deficient Cauſe of the material Act of Sin, by reaſon of his immediate Univerſal Efficience to al real Entitie. (4) As for the conſtitutive parts of Sin, namely its Mater and Forme; [1] Al Sin as ſin has a Material Cauſe, or Subſtrate Mater, which is alwayes naturally Good. Whence that great Effate in the Scholes: Al Evil as Evil has for its fund or ſubject ſome good. Thence Auguſtin ſaid, That Evil cannot be but in ſome Good: becauſe if there were any pure Evil, it would deſtroy it ſelf. And the Reaſon is manifeſt; becauſe Sin, as to its Formal Reaſon, is not a thing purely Poſitive, neither is it a pure Negation; but a privation of debite perfection: therefore it requires a ſubject to which ſuch a perfection is due: And muſt not this ſubject then be ſomething naturally good? Is not every real poſitive Being naturally good; becauſe the Effect of Divine Efficience? Can any perfection be due to any Subject, unleſſe that Subject be naturally good? [2] As for the Forme of Sin, ſuch as it has, it conſiſtes in the privation of that moral Rectitude which is due to the Subſtrate Mater or Subject. Thus Damaſcene, Orthod. Fid. Lib. 1. Cap. 15. foreign, Evil is the privation of Good, or ſubſtance. So Lib. 2. Cap. 30. foreign, Sin is nothing elſe but a ſeceſſion from Good, as Darkneſſe is a ſeceſſion from Light. Of which ſee more, B. 1. C. 4. §. 1. and Philoſoph. General. P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. ſect. 4. §. 2. Indeed, to ſpeak properly, Sin hath no Formal Reaſon or Cauſe; becauſe it is a privation. Thus Plato, Rep. 2. and Proclus, denie, that Sin has any Formal Idea, as before: Yet, according to the commun acceptation of a Formal Cauſe or Reaſon, we make its Deordination, or Difformitie from the Law the formal reaſon thereof. Hence,

2.God not the Author of Sin. Prop. Gods providential Efficience and Gubernation about ſin doth no way denominate him the moral cauſe or Author of ſin. Thus Plato, Repub. 10. ſaith, That God is the principal cauſe of al good: but as to ſin he is, foreign, no cauſe thereof: becauſe foreign, he is properly the cauſe of ſin that chooſeth it. So Repub. 2. pag. 380. foreign, &c. We must with al manner of contention refute that opinion, that God who is most good, is the Author, or moral cauſe of ſin: neither must we concede, that any ſpeak or hear p. 481any ſuch opinion in the Citie, if we deſire to have it wel conſtituted and governed. That this Platonic Sophiſme cannot be wel underſtood of Gods natural Efficience to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, but only of a moral Cauſalitie as an Author, is evident from the very reaſon that he gives thereof; namely, becauſe God is most good: which only excludes Gods moral Efficience from ſin as ſin, not his natural Efficience from the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act of ſin, which is in itſelf good, and therefore from God, the Cauſe of al good. So that Plato's argument is ſo far from denying Gods natural Efficience to the entitative act of ſin, as that it confirmes the ſame. The holy God, in al his providential Efficience and Gubernation about ſin, whether it be permiſſive or ordinative, is glorioſely vindicated from being the Author or moral cauſe of ſin; becauſe he doth nothing deficiently, as failing from that eternal immutable Law of Righteouſneſſe. This is incomparably wel explicated by Simplicius, in Epictetus, cap. 1. pag. 24. Our Souls whiles good deſire good: but when they are ſinful, ſinful objects: foreign, And both, [i.e. good and bad] act from their own election, not as being compelled by any violent neceſſitie. Wherefore God may not be ſaid to be the Author of ſin: for he made the Soul, which is naturally capable of evil— as being good according to the riches of his Bonitie. In which he clears God from being the Author or moral cauſe of ſin; becauſe al his providential Efficience about ſin is only as he is good. An Author' properly, as the Civil Law teacheth us, is he that gives command, Is à quo conſilium accepimus, Auctor noſter tranſlatè dicatur. Unde Tutor propriè Auctor pulillo dicitur cui conſilium impartit. Juſtin. Inſtitut.counſel, or encouragement to an Act. So a Tutor is ſaid to be the Author of what his Pupil doth, by giving him counſel. So again he is ſaid to be an Author, who doth approve what another doth. In Philoſophie, he is ſaid to be an Author, who by ſuaſive or diſſuaſive reaſons, doth exhort the principal Agent to, or dehort him from any action. The ſame they cal a Moral Cauſe, as oppoſed to effective. Now in no one of theſe reſpects can God be ſaid to be the Author or moral Cauſe of ſin: for he neither commands, nor counſels, nor encourageth, nor approves ſin, nor yet diſſuades from virtue. Neither doth God violently neceſſitate or compel men to ſin; but concurs only to the material entitative act of ſin, as the prime univerſal Efficient, not as a particular deficient moral Cauſe.

p. 4823.God the prime Cauſe of the entitative Act of Sin. Prop. Albeit God be not the moral deficient Cauſe or Author of ſin, yet he is the efficient and prime cauſe of the material entitative act of ſin. This is evident both from Sacred and Platonic Philoſophic. Thus Amos 3.6. Shal there be evil in the citie and the Lord hath not done it? I acknowlege this primarily to be underſtood of the evil of puniſhment; yet we are to remember, that evils of puniſhment in regard of ſecond cauſes are evils of doing: Gods puniſhing Iſrael, albeit it were good as from God, yet it was uſually ſinful as to the inſtruments made uſe of therein: and yet in this very regard God was the prime Efficient of the material entitative act, albeit he were not a moral deficient cauſe of the obliquitie. Thus Plato, Repub. 10. pag. 896. foreign; Must it not then neceſſarily be conceded, that the Soul [of the Univerſe] is the cauſe of althings good, both honeſt, and evil, and baſe: of althings juſt and unjuſt, and of al contraries; in as much as we aſſert him to be the cauſe of althings? Wherein obſerve, (1) That he philoſophiſeth here of God, as the univerſal Soul or Spirit of the Univerſe, influencing and governing althings. (2) He ſaith, this univerſal Spirit or Soul is the prime Efficient of althings good. Yea, (3) not only of things honest or morally good, but alſo of things evil, baſe, and unjust, i. e. as to their entitative material act: becauſe in this regard they are good. (4) He grounds this Hypotheſis on the univerſal Cauſalitie of God, as the prime Cauſe of althings. Thus alſo Plato, in his Timaeus, pag. 28. foreign, It's neceſſary, that whatever is produced, be produced by ſome cauſe. If ſo, then al natural products muſt be produced by God, the firſt Cauſe of althings: and is not the entitative act of ſin a natural product? That the ſubſtrate mater, or material entitative act of ſin fals under the providential Efficience of God, as the firſt univerſal Cauſe of althings, has been univerſally avouched and maintained in al Ages of Chriſtians, both by Fathers and Schole-men, Papiſts and Proteſtants, excepting only Durandus, and two or three more of his Sectators. Thus Augustin, de duab. Anim. contra Manich. c. 6. about the end, where he proves againſt the Manichees, [who held two firſt Principes, one of good and another of evil] That whatever really is, as it is, muſt procede from one God. Thus alſo Bradward. de Cauſ. Dei, pag. 739. where he ſtrongly proves, That God neceſſarily p. 483concurs to the ſubſtance of the act of ſin, albeit not to its deformitie. The like pag. 289, 290. Gregor. Ariminenſis, Sent. 2. Diſtinct. 34. Art. 3. pag. 110, &c. gives us potent and invict demonſtrations, That God is the immediate cauſe of the entitative material act of ſin. Not to mention Alvarze, de Auxil. l. 3. Diſp. 34. and other late Dominicans, who, as I conceive, are unjuſtly loaded with prejudices, by a Divine of name, in this particular. Indeed the very Jeſuites and thoſe of their Faction concur with us in this Hypotheſis. Thus Suarez, Metaph. Diſput. 22. Sect. 1. pag. 551, &c. where he ſtrongly demonſtrates, That every action both natural and free, good and evil, as actions, are produced immediately by God, as the firſt cauſe. This Hypotheſis he maintains ſtoutly againſt Durandus and his ſectators, and as I judge with arguments never to be anſwered. Thus alſo Ruiz, de Voluntate Dei, Diſput. 26, 27. Yea Penottus, de Libertat. l. 8. c. 11. aſſures us, that al Divines accord, That God is the cauſe of the natural Entitie of Sin. Among Reformed Divines this Hypotheſis is generally maintained. I ſhal mention only Davenant (who was not rigid in this way) in his Anſwer, to Gods love to Mankind, pag. 143, 147, 174, &c. alſo de Reprobat. pag. 113. where he greatly explicates and demonſtrates our Hypotheſis.

But to explicate and demonſtrate our Propoſition by force of reaſon, take notice, that we ſay not, that God is the cauſe of ſin, Gods Concurſe to the entitative Act of Sin demonstrated.but that he is the cauſe of the material entitative act of ſin. For the clearing of which we are to conſider, That many things, which are true under an Hypotheſis, and in a limited ſenſe, are not ſo abſolutely. Thus here we may not ſay ſimply and abſolutely, that God is the cauſe of ſin: yet we may not denie, but that he is the cauſe of the ſubſtrate mater, or material entitative act of ſin. This was long ago wel obſerved by Aquinas, who tels us, that al locutions, in which it is ſignified, that God is the cauſe of ſin, or of moral evil, ought to be avoided, or very cautelouſly limited; becauſe names that implie deformitie conjunct with the act, either in general, or in particular, it cannot be ſaid of them, that they are from God: Whence it cannot be ſaid of ſin abſolutely and ſimply, that it is from God; but only with this addition or limitation, that the Act, as it is a real Entitie, is from God. This being premiſſed, we procede to demonſtrate our Propoſition, That God is the prime efficient cauſe of the material, entitative Act of Sin. This may be demonſtrated, (1) From the ſubordination of al ſecond cauſes to the firſt p. 484Cauſe. Whatever is produced muſt have ſome cauſe of its production, as Plato, Tim. 28. and if it have a cauſe, muſt it not alſo have a firſt cauſe? And what can this be but God? unleſſe we wil, with the Manichees, aſſet two first Cauſes, one of good, and the other of evil. (2) From the Participation and Limitation of every finite Act and Being. Muſt not every participate, finite, create, dependent Being be reduced to ſome eſſential, infinite, increate, independent Being, as the prime Efficient thereof? (3) From the conſervation of the material entitative Act of Sin. Is not the material entitative act of ſin a create Being? And can any create Being conſerve itſelf? Doth not Durandus and his ſectators grant, that the conſervation of Beings is from God? And if Gods providential Efficience be neceſſary to the conſervation of the material entitative act of ſin, is it not as neceſſary to its firſt production? What is conſervation, but continued production, as to God? This argument is wel improved by Ariminenſis, Sent. 2. Diſtinct. 34. Art. 3. pag. 110. and by Suarez, Metaphyſ. Diſp. 22. Sect. 1. pag. 552. (4) From the Determination of the ſecond cauſe of its particular effect. Every ſecond cauſe being indifferent to varietie of effects, cannot be determined to any one individual effect, but by the immediate cooperation of the firſt cauſe. Thus Suarez, Metaphyſ. Diſp. 22. Sect. 1. pag. 552. (5) From the ſubſtrate Mater of al evil, which is phyſically and naturally good. There is no moral evil, which is not founded and ſubjectated in ſome natural good: even hatred of God, albeit the higheſt moral evil, yet as to its entitative material act it is naturally good: which is evident by this, that if that act of hatred were put forth againſt ſin, it would be morally good. (6) From the Ordinabilitie of al evil to ſome good. There is no act ſo evil, but the wiſe God can turne it to ſome good: the Crucifixion of our Lord, which was one of the higheſt evils, what good was by Divine Gubernation brought out of it? Doth it not much exalt the skil of a wiſe Phyſician ſo to order poiſon, as to make it medisinal? So it exalts Divine Gubernation to bring good out of evil: as it aggravates the impietie of wicked men, that they bring evil out of good. (7) Doth it not take from God the main of his Providence, to denie his Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin? What more conduceth to the Amplitude of Divine Providence, than to allow him a Concurſe to and Gubernation of al real Acts and Events? (8) To denie Gods Concurſe to the p. 458material entitative Act of Sin, doth it not, by a paritie of Reaſon, ſubvert the ſupernatural concurſe of God to what is good? For if God can make a Creature that ſhal be Independent as to any one natural Act, why may he not alſo make a Creature that ſhal be independent as to good Acts? Hence,

4. Prop. The ſubſtrate mater, How Sin fals under the Divine Wil.or material entitie of Sin fals under the Divine Wil. This follows on the former; becauſe the whole of Divine concurſe or efficience muſt be reſolved into the Wil of God, as before once and again. But more particularly, (1) The Futurition of Sin, as to its ſubſtrate mater, fals under the Eternal Decree of the Divine Wil. Whatever Good or Evil there is under the Sun, as to its real Entitie, muſt have its futurition from the Divine Wil.Immo & peccatum, quatenus à Deo juſtè permittitur, cadit in legem aeternam. Auguſtinus, de civitat. Dei, L. 19. C. 22. sin it ſelf ſo far as it is juſtly permitted by God fals under the Eternal Law of the Divine Wil, as Auguſtin wel obſerves. Sin in its own nature, as Antecedent to the Divine Wil, was only poſſible: now how could it paſſe from a condition of mere poſſibilitie to a ſtate of futurition, but by ſome intervening cauſe? And what can we imagine to be the cauſe hereof, but the Divine Wil? May we not then hence conclude, that Sin was future; becauſe the Divine Wil determined, for juſt ends, to permit its futurition? (2) The Divine Wil is not only the cauſe of ſins futurition; but it has moreover a providential Gubernation and Efficience about the actual exiſtence of ſin. [1] As for the Natural Entitie of Sin the Divine Wil is the total immediate efficient thereof, as Ariminenſis, Sent. 2. Diſt. 34. Ar. 3. pag. 110. [2] The Divine Wil alſo phyſically permits the moral pravitie and obliquitie of Sin, as that which may conduce to the advance of Divine Glorie. For this greatly conduceth to the illuſtration of Divine Providence, to permit ſome defects that may render the whole more beautiful, as Aquinas at large demonſtrates, contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71. of which hereafter. Hence,

5.Gods wil about the Obliquitie of Sin permiſſive. Prop. Gods Wil about the formal reaſon or obliquitie of Sin is not effective, or defective, but only permiſſive. (1) That Gods wil about the obliquitie of Sin is not effective is evident, becauſe Sin as to its obliquitie has no effective cauſe. (2) That the Wil of God is not a defective cauſe of Sin, is as evident; becauſe the ſame act which is defectuoſe and ſinful in regard of the ſecond cauſe, is not ſuch in regard of God: Man breakes a Law, and therefore ſins, but God breakes no Law: al his Actions are conforme to the p. 486Eternal Law. Whence, (3) Gods Wil about the obliquitie of Sin is only permiſſive. But now to clear up Gods permiſſive Wil about Sin, we are to conſider [1] That permiſſion properly as to men is not an action of the Law, but a negation of action: when any permits another to do, what he might hinder, but is under no obligation to hinder. Hence no man may permit Sin; becauſe he is under an obligation to hinder it: but God may; becauſe he is under to obligation to hinder it; as alſo becauſe he can bring good out of it. [2] That Permiſſion is either of a Legiſlator, or Rector. Gods permiſſion of Sin is not as he is Legiſlator, but only as Rector and Governer of the World. God gives no man a legal permiſſion of ſinning, but as Rector he doth providentially permit Sin. [3] That Gods permiſſion of Sin as to the event is nothing elſe, but the privation of that aſſiſtance, which being granted would efficaciouſly impede and hinder the exiſtence of ſin. [4] That Gods permiſſion of Sin can be no way ſinful; becauſe he has an abſolute Dominion over his own Influences, and may exert them as he pleaſeth, without injurie to his Creature: whereas al Mankind are bound together by ſuch a mutual ſraternitie and cognation; as alſo by that obedience they owe their Creator, as that they cannot permit Sin without being partakes thereof. Al men are under a communion of Natures, and therefore bound by the Law of Nature to afford relief and aid each to other ſo far as they may for the avoiding of ſin. Again, al men are under an eſſential obligation of ſubjection to their Creator, and ſo far as they may to prevent ſin in others: therefore they cannot permit ſin, without being guilty thereof. But the Supreme Rector, being under no Law or obligation of ſubjection, may, for the illuſtration of his own Glorie, permit Sin.

6.Gods permiſſive Wil about Sin Efficacious. Prop. Gods permiſſive Wil about Sin, is not merely Negative, but Efficacious, Bradwardine, l. 1. c. 33. p. 289. demonſtrates, That unto whatever Gods permiſſion extendes, unto that his actual volition extendes alſo. And his Reaſons are invict; becauſe God permits nothing, but what he wils to permit, &c. So again, C. 34. he thus argues: (1) either God wils or nils the permiſſion of Sin: he doth not nil it; for then it cannot be: therefore he wils it. (2) God voluntarily provides for al voluntary workes with al their circumſtances: therefore he voluntarily orders and permits ſin. (3) That Sin is, is a true Propoſition: and whence p. 487comes the truth of this Propoſition, but from the firſt truth? Thence doth not God wil, that this Propoſition, Sin is, be true? Whence God wils the permiſſion of Sin. He gives us many other Arguments to demonſtrate, that God has an actual Efficacious Wil about the permiſſion of Sin, p. 295, &c. In the permiſſion of Sin God doth not only nil to hinder it, but he alſo wils not to hinder it. Divine permiſſion in this regard differs much from human: Men therefore permit things to be; becauſe they neither wil that they be, nor yet wil that they be not: whence many things fal out beſides what they intend or wil. But it is not ſo with Divine Permiſſion: nothing fals out, but what God intendes ſhal be; and therefore there can be no Negative Permiſſion aſcribed to his Providence about ſin. To aſcribe unto God a mere Negative Permiſſion about Sin, what is this, but to make God a mere idle ſpectator of Human Affaires? And is not this unbecoming the Supreme Rector of the Univerſe, to ſtand and look on, but not to concerne himſelf about the Gubernation of ſinful Acts? Surely if the permiſſion of God be merely a negation of Wil, it wil neceſſarily follow, that thoſe things that fal out by the permiſſion of God, be either against, or beſide his wil: if against his Wil, then he nils them: if beſide his Wil, then he wils them not: But now Sin fals out neither against the Wil, nor beſide the Wil of God, but according to it. Yea indeed to ſpeak properly and ſtrictly there is no ſuch thing as a Negative Wil of God: the Wil of God taken properly for his immanent volition is always efficacious.

7. Prop. Gods Providential Gubernation of Sin is not only Permiſſive, Gods Gubernation of Sin Ordinative.but alſo Ordinative. Thus Plato, in his Politicus, tels us, there is a twofold motion of the Univerſe, one Ʋniforme and Regular: the other difforme, irregular, and defectuoſe. And he expreſſely faith, that theſe foreign, Parallaxes or foreign circumvolutions and irregularities are governed and ordered by God. i. e. foreign. Albeit Sin be in regard of the ſecond Cauſe a defect, yet Gods Gubernation of thoſe defects, ſo as that they may ſubſerve his own Glorie, argues no defect in him: al defects as ſuch belong to the particular cauſe as defectuoſe, not to the firſt Univerſal Cauſe, who orders al thoſe defects to the beſt end: And that the Ordination of thoſe defects belongs to the Gubernation of God is moſt evident, (1) becauſe this greatly conduceth to the Order and Beautie of the whole Univerſe. There p. 488would be no perfect Bonitie in things create, unleſſe there were an order of Bonitie: now the order of Bonitie in things human doth ſuppoſe worſe and better; and that the worſe be ordered for the Better: And to whom doth it belong to order the worſe for the better, but to the moſt wiſe God the Supreme Rector of al? It's a great Platonic Philoſopheme, That Luſt never uſeth Luſt wel, but Reaſon doth. Meaning the Divine Reaſon in the Gubernation of Evils. May we not then allow this wiſe and potent Gubernator of althings this Prerogative, to order al ſinful defects to the beſt end?Libidine non bene utitur Libido, ſed Ratio. Janſen. Auguſt. (2) Are there not many Heroic Virtues and good Qualities, which would finde no room in the univerſe, were there not ſome human ſinful defects? What room would there be for the patience of the Juſt, if there were no malignitie in the unjuſt, as Aquinas obſerves? As in Naturals, the corruption of one thing is the generation of another, ſo in Morals, oft the corruptions of wicked men are ſo ordered by Divine Gubernation, as that they tend to their Regeneration. Therefore if Sin were totally excluded from the Univerſitie of Nature the wiſdome of Divine Gubernation, in the bringing good out of evil, would not be ſo illuſtrious and refulgent. (3) The beſt and moſt perfect mode of Gubernation is, ſo to provide for the things governed, as that they be permitted to act according to their natures: for herein conſiſtes the due order of Regiment. Now Divine Gubernation in permitting men to ſin, and ordering the ſame to the beſt end, doth but leave men to act according to their natures. See this Propoſition more fully demonſtrated by Aquinas, contra Gent. L. 3. C. 71.

8.Judicial Gubernation of Sin. Prop. Gods Providential Gubernation of Sin is not only Permiſſive and Ordinative, but ſometimes alſo Judicial. Gods Judicial Gubernation of Sin conſiſtes in the leaving men to judicial Occecation and Induration in, and by, and for Sin. Of this Judicial Blindneſſe and Hardneſſe in and by Sin we find frequent mention in Sacred Philoſophie, and ſomewhat alſo in Platonic. So Plato in his Gorgias; p. 472. foreign, The Injuſt Man is of al moſt miſerable; yet he is more miſerable, who acting injuſtly avoids puniſhment. So in his Theaetetus, he tels us, that a licence to Sin is the greateſt puniſhment of Sin: for a power to do Evil is the worſt deſtruction. Now this Judicial Gubernation of Sin conſiſtes of theſe ſeveral particulars. (1) God ſuſpendes and withdraws the Celeſtial Influences of Divine Grace, and p. 489means of reſtraint. Thus Gen. 6.3. My Spirit ſhal not always ſtrive with man. How ſoon wil the ſofteſt heart grow harder than the Adamant, if God withdraw his celeſtial dews of Grace, as Zach. 7.12. & 14.17, 18? Hence, (2) God leaves men to the plague of their own corrupt hearts, which is, Plato notes, is the worſt judgement. (3) God leaves Sinners to the heart-betwitching allurements and blandiſhments of this World. Thus Balaam, Num. 22, &c. 2 Pet. 2.14, 15. (4) God delivers Sinners up to the power of Satan, 2 Cor. 4.3, 4. 2 Tim. 2.26. (5) God ſo orders and diſpoſeth his providences, as that al do accidentally, by reaſon of their corrupt hearts, tend to their induration. Rom. 11.9, 10, 11. (6) Yea, God permits that the very means of life be to them the ſavor of death, 2 Cor. 2.16. Eſa. 28.12, 13, 14. (7) Yea, the Prince and Mediator of life is to ſuch a ſtrumbling-ſtone and occaſion of death. Eſa. 8.14, 15, 16. & 38.13. (8) God leaves them to a ſpirit of ſlumber, or ſpiritual occecaſion. Rom. 11.8. Eſa. 19.11-14. & 44.18, 19. & 60.1, 2. 2 Theſ. 2.10, 11.

9. Prop. In the whole of Divine Gubernation about Sin his Wiſdome, Juſtice, and Sanctitie, Gods Attributes illuſtrious in his Gubernation of Sin.with other Attributes are most illuſtrious and reſplendent. (1) Gods Wiſdome is eminently manifeſt in his gubernation of Sin, in that he brings the greateſt good out of the greateſt evils: thoſe very ſins whereby wicked men endeavor to darken the Glorie of God, he turnes to the advance of his Glorie. We have a good Philoſopheme to this purpoſe in Plato, Theaetet. pag. 167. foreign, A wiſe man makes thoſe things which are in themſelves evil turne to good, and to ſeem ſuch, as a wiſe Phyſician turnes poiſon into a medicament, which ſimilitude he uſeth. (2) The Juſtice of God is moſt reſplendent in the puniſhing that ſin he permits to be. (3) Gods Sanctitie is alſo moſt conſpicuous, in that thoſe very acts, which are morally evil in regard of God, are both morally and naturally good in regard of Divine Gubernation. The ſin which God governes is not ſin in regard of God, but of the Creature, that comes ſhort of the Divine Law. The holy God violates no Law by concurring as an univerſal Cauſe with the Sinner, that violates his Law. The ſinful qualitie of a moral effect may not be imputed to the firſt univerſal Cauſe,Duo cùm faciunt idem, non eſt idem, Proverb. but only to the ſecond particular cauſe. Here that commun Proverbe holds true: When two do the ſame, it is not the ſame: i. e. the ſame ſinful act, whereto God and the Sinner both concur, is not the p. 490ſame as to both; but morally evil as to the Sinner, and yet naturally yea morally good as to Gods concurrence. Sin as to God ſpeakes a negation of his concurſe, not a privation of any thing due: neither doth God wil ſin ſimply as ſin, under that Reduplication, but only as good and conducible to his Glorie. The reaſon of Gods willing and governing ſin, both in the Elect and Reprobate, is univocally one and the ſame, namely the advance of Divine Glorie: For the greateſt evil of ſin has ſomething of good mixed with it; which God wils and orders for his Glorie. There is nothing in the world purely, ſimply, and of it ſelf evil: if there were, God, who is the chiefeſt good, could not wil it. Laſtly, man only is the proper and formal cauſe of ſin or moral evil; becauſe he alone comes ſhort of the rule of moral good: ſo that Divine Gubernation both as permiſſive, ordinative, and judicial about Sin is ſufficiently vindicated from the leaſt imputation thereof.