The Court of the Gentiles Part 4, Part 4 · Book 2 · Chapter 6
CHAP. VI. Of Gods Juſtice, Veracitie, and Sanctitie: alſo of the Trinitie.
Gods Juſtice, Abſolute and Ordinate. How far Gods punitive Juſtice is neceſſary. How far Gods Juſtice regards the Qualities of its object. Gods Veracitie explicated and demonſtrated. Alſo his Sanctitie. Platonic Philoſophemes of the Trinitie, with their Ʋſe and Abuſe in Theologie.
§. 1. THe next Attribute, that occurs to be diſcourſed oſ,The Juſtice of God. is the Juſtice of God; whereof we find great characters both in Sacred and Platonic Philoſophie. As for Sacred Philoſophie it ſets forth the Juſtice of God in lively colors, Pſal. 19.9. The Judgements of the Lord are true and righteous. Pſal. 36.6. Thy righteouſneſſe is like the great mountains: Pſal. 119.137.and Pſal. 119.137. Righteous art thou O Lord, and upright are thy judgements. Here are two diſtinct particulars aſſigned to the Juſtice of God. (1) He is righteous, and (2) his judgements are upright. Men may be juſt, and lovers of Juſtice, and yet their Judgements not upright. But it is not ſo with God. The like Pſal. 50.6. and 96.10. and 98.9. and 99.4. Thus alſo Eſa. 28.17. Judgement alſo wil I lay to the line, and righteouſneſſe to the plummet. Eſa. 28.17.A Metaphor taken from the practice of Maſons or Carpenters, who, when they wil have a thing done exactly, are wont to do it by line and level, as Amos 7.8. ſo accurate and exquiſite are the Judgements of God.Rom. 2.2, 11. So Rom. 2.2. But we are ſure that the judgement of God is according to truth. foreign. Reaſon it ſelf dictates ſo much to us: were he not juſt, he were not God. foreign, according to truth, or juſtice: for ſo foreign here importes: and it is oppoſed to the Roman Judgements, which were at this time moſt unjuſt. And he addes the reaſon, v. 11. for there is no reſpect of perſons with God. foreign ſignifies the face; from foreign aph the face, or from foreign: Thence foreign ſignifies, (1) That which, foreign, is admoved to, or bound about the face: a Larve, Perſon, or Maſque. For perſona, q. foreign, from foreign and foreign, according to its primary notion ſignifies a viſard, or one that wears it. (2) The face, that part foreign, which was covered, foreign, with the larve or viſard. Thence, (3) The whole man, or perſon, conſidered eſſentially and ſubſtantially. (4) Alſo the externe Figure, Forme, Qualitie, or Diſpoſition of a perſon conſidered accidentally. Whence foreign, to accept the perſon, is to accept or regard any externe Qualities, Relations, Diſpoſitions, or Conditions of the perſon, which ought not to come under conſideration in Judgement.Mat. 20.21. So Mat. 20 21. foreign anſwers to the Hebr. foreign, lifting up the face: and foreign, to lift up the face is the ſame with foreign to accept the face or perſon. For in thoſe times, the ancient geſture of ſalutation was by caſting the face down on the earth: and he that was ſaluted lifted up the face of him that ſaluted; as David Saul. Which cuſtome yet continues in thoſe Oriental parts. And from this cuſtome of Salutation foreign was traduced to ſignifie the acceptation of the perſon, contrary to the merits of the cauſe or thing. For to reſpect a perſon is when that in judgement is reſpected, which ought not to come into judgement. When God is ſaid, not to reſpect perſons, the notion Perſon doth not denote a man, but the condition of a man, which ought not to be regarded. Acceptation of perſons is only when favor or affection, or the like extrinſec conſiderations prevail, contrary to Equitie: in which regard God cannot be ſaid to accept perſons, becauſe he is under no obligation or Laws of Juſtice, more than what his own Free-wil has brought him under.
Plato diſcourſeth accurately of Gods Juſtice, Leg. 10. pag. 904. There being an Objection raiſed by a juvenile Wit, That albeit God regards Human Affairs, yet it were an eaſie matter for wicked men, by gifts and favors, to gain his favor. To which Plato thus replies: foreign, &c. But neither thou, nor cory other may be thought ever ſo far to prevail with God by prayers, that he ſhould exemt himſelf from Divine Judgement, or decline the Tribunal of God: for he hath firmely determined, that no mortal ſhal eſcape it. For thou art never neglected by this Judgement; no, albeit thou wert ſo ſmal as to creep into the profunditie of the earth: nor yet if thou wert ſo ſublime, as being elevated with wings to flie into the Heavens: but thou ſhalt ſuffer deſerved puniſhment, either here or in Hel. Then he addes, p. 906. This Oration is uſurped by him, who affirmes, that God can be eaſily reconciled to unjuſt men, as if he ſhould couſent to divide the ſpoil with ſinners, even then when they ſin: juſt as if the Wolves ſhould give a ſmal portion of their prey to the dogs; and theſe being pacified with their gifts, ſhould give the Wolves leave to devour the ſheep. Is not this the import of their Oration, who conceive God to be eaſily reconciled to wicked men? Then he concludes, pag. 907. foreign; Is not God of al keepers the greateſt, and emploied in the greateſt affairs? Can we then imagine, that he, who keeps the beſt things, and doth infinitely excel in the Art and facultie of keeping, is worſe than Dogs or poor Mortals, who yet cannot be bribed by rewards from wicked men, given with an il intent, to do what is unjust? Plato here compares God to a Sheepherds Dog, which cannot be bribed by the Wolves to deliver up the Sheep for a prey: much leſs, ſaith he, can God be bribed to do unjuſtly. So Leg. 4.716. foreign, Juſtice is the avenger of thoſe that come ſhort of the Divine Law.
The more fully to explicate the Juſtice of God,Gods Abſolute Juſtice we muſt diſtinguiſh between his Abſolute Juſtice, and that which is Ordinate. 1. Gods Abſolute Juſtice is founded on the infinite perfection of his Eſſence, and has one and the ſame Idea with his Soverain Dominion over his Creature. For ſo great is the Majeſtie of God, and ſo Abſolute his Dominion, as that he is obnoxious to no Laws, Obligations, or Ties from his Creature: this Abſolute Juſtice or Dominion regards not any qualities or conditions of its object; but God can by virtue hereof inflict the higheſt torments on his innocent Creature, and exempt from puniſhment the moſt nocent. as to afflicting the Innocent.(1) By this Abſolute Juſtice and Dominion God can inflict the greatest torments, even of Hel it ſelf, on the most innocent Creature? For every Creature as ſuch is ſubordinate to God both in ſuffering, as wel as doing what he pleaſeth, as Suarez in 1. 2ae. Tract. 5. Diſp. 7. p. 418. We muſt denie, ſaith he, that God, as Supreme Lord, cannot inflict on an innocent man al that Evil that is in the torments of Hel. Thus in his Metaphyſ. Diſput. 31. Sect. 14. God hath a ful Dominion over his Creature, to uſe it as it pleaſeth him, for any uſe that involves not a contradiction. For that Dominion is not in al regards perfect, which includes not a Power to diſpoſe of its object unto every poſſible uſe. Again, God cannot make a Create Being, whereof he has not the ful and perfect Dominion. To this ful and abſolute Dominion in God there correſponds a ful and abſolute ſubjection in the Creature: for theſe two are correlatives. Hence, there is no Juſtice properly ſo termed in reſpect of the Creatures, whereby God ſtands obliged to them, antecedent to the conſtitution of his own Wil. Nothing more unjuſt than to denie unto God an abſolute Dominion to diſpoſe of the Creature made by him as it pleaſeth him. And that God did de facto inflict the higheſt torments on an innocent pure ſpotleſſe Creature, even the human Nature of his own Son is moſt evident. They who denie Gods abſolute Dominion over the Creatures, denie him to be their Creator. Muſt we not allow God, who made althings, a power to order al to the ends he made them for? Doth not God give to every Creature what ſhape he pleaſeth? and may he not then appoint them to what end he pleaſe? Is it not an end ſufficient for the Being of a Creature to be the objective glorie of any Divine Attribute? And therefore if God ſhould make an innocent Creature to deſtroy it, thereby to illuſtrate the Glorie of his Power, who can ſay he is unjuſt? The greateſt notions that our minds can frame are too narrow to expreſſe the abſolute Dominion of God over his Creature.
(2) God, How far Gods punitive Juſtice is neceſſary.by reaſon of his abſolute Juſtice and Dominion, could, if it had-ſeemed good to him, have freely pardoned ſinners without ſatiſfaction. And here I find my ſelf involved in that grand Queſtion, Whether the vindictive or punitive Juſtice of God, as to its egreſſes, be neceſſary? I am not ignorant that great and holy Divines are divided in their thoughts and determinations hereof: Some ſtrongly defending the Affirmative; others the Negative. I may not be ſo far mine own flaterer, as to preſume my ſelf to be capable of reconciling ſuch extremes, yet may I not humbly offer ſomewhat tending thereto? And firſt we muſt diſtinguiſh the termes, and then we ſhal with more facilitie determine the queſtion ſo as to include the ſenſe of both extremes. We muſt diſtinguiſh, (1) between the merit of puniſhment, and the actual adjudging ſinners unto puniſhment. (2) Between the obligation on God to puniſh, and the obligation on the ſinner to receive puniſhment. (3) Between Natural Neceſſitie and Moral. (4) Between natural Congruitie and natural Neceſſitie. (5) Between Gods abſolute Juſtice or Dominion, and his ordinate Juſtice. Theſe diſtinctions premiſſed, we offer theſe following Propoſitions for the determining the queſtion and reconciling the extremes. (1) Prop. Al ſin neceſſarily merits puniſhment, albeit actual punition be not an effect abſolutely and phyſically neceſſary for the vindication of Divine Juſtice. Al ſin has guilt neceſſarily appendent thereto: and al guilt neceſſarily implies a merit of puniſhment: for guilt is but a middle between ſin and puniſhment; it neceſſarily follows ſin, and bindes over the ſinner, or makes him obnoxious unto puniſhment: yet actual punition is not abſolutely neceſſary for the vindication of Divine Juſtice. (2) Prop. There is a neceſſary debt or obligation on the ſinners part to receive puniſhment, albeit there be not a debt or obligation abſolutely and phyſically neceſſary on Gods part to puniſh the ſinner. Guilt is not a phyſic but moral Accident; or mode, or debt improperly ſo termed, whereby the offender is bound over to ſuffer ſuch puniſhment, as the merit of the ſin requires: whence on Gods part it implies a certain moral right or power of puniſhing: not that God is bound by a neceſſitie of nature to puniſh, although the ſinner be bound by a neceſſary obligation of his nature to receive and ſuffer puniſhment. Hence, (3) God has a natural right to puniſh ſin, yet he doth not puniſh it from a neceſſitie of nature, but freely. God moſt juſtly puniſheth ſin, yet he would not be unjuſt, if we conſider his abſolute Juſtice, if he did not puniſh it. If Gods puniſhing ſin be from a neceſſitie of nature, and not from the free conſtitution of his Wil, he muſt puniſh ſin as neceſſarily, as he loves himſelf: and then it wil follow, that God cannot relaxate his penal Laws, as to the time, meaſure, and manner of puniſhing: yea he cannot accept of the ſatisfaction of a Mediator: for that is a degree of relaxation. It's true, God neceſſarily loves his own Glorie which is darkened by ſin: but yet it is not Gods eſſential Glorie, but only his manifeſtative Glorie which is hurt by ſin, as Elihu, Job 39.6. Hence Gods puniſhing ſin is not from a neceſſitie of nature, ſuch as that whereby the fire burnes, or God loves himſelf: For in al the Acts of God ad extra there is not only a concomitant but alſo antecedent Libertie, or Libertie of Election, which ſuppoſeth ſome poſſibilitie of rejection, at leaſt according to the prioritie of reaſon or nature, as before, Chap. 5. §. 3.8. Prop. Whence Gods puniſhing ſin being an act ad extra dependent on the free conſtitution of his Wil, it cannot be from a neceſſitie of nature. (4) Albeit, God be not under a natural neceſſitie of puniſhing ſin, yet he is under a moral neceſſitie to puniſh the ſame. By moral neceſſitie I underſtand that moral obligation he is under for the vindication of his Juſtice as Rector of the World. This ſome cal a natural congruence or condecence, which obligeth God to vindicate his own Juſtice, and declare his infinite diſpleaſure againſt ſin, by puniſhing of it. (5) Laſtly, Albeit God might, by his abſolute Dominion, conſidered antecedently to his Wil, let ſin paſſe unpuniſhed, yet by his ordinate Juſtice, he neceſſarily puniſheth the ſame. In the conſideration of Gods moral efficience on his Creature, we are not to conſider what God can by his abſolute Juſtice or Dominion do, but what by his ordinate Juſtice and moral Conſtitution he can do. And in this regard it is moſt true, that God is under a neceſſitie of puniſhing ſin, without a ſatisfaction: and he were inevitably unjuſt, if he ſhould not puniſh it. And thus, as I humbly conceive, both opinions, though ſeemingly oppoſite, may be eaſily reconciled. And indeed we find this very Controverſie on foot many hundred years ſince. For Auguſtin held, That God could ſave ſinners without a ſatisfaction: and Anſelme held, he could not. And Bradwardine, l. 2. c. 52. pag. 841. undertakes my taske, to reconcile both, by the diſtinction of Gods abſolute Power, and his ordinate Power, as Rector of the World. In the former ſenſe he can, but in the later he cannot ſave ſinners but by Chriſt. Hence,
2. We paſſe on to Gods ordinate Juſtice, Gods ordinate Justice from his Wil.which has a neceſſary relation to ſome qualitie in its object, in this or that manner affected or conſtituted; which qualitie being ſuppoſed, its egreſſe to or execution on its object is neceſſary, not by any phyſic neceſſitie of nature, but by a moral neceſſitie or natural congruitie, ſubſequent to the free conſtitution of the Divine Wil, in order to the manifeſtation of the Divine Glorie. And in this ſenſe the Juſtice of God, in ſacred Philoſophie, is uſually taken, namely for that Attribute whereby God executes the Decrees and Conſtitutions of his own ſoverain Wil and Word, for the manifeſtation of his own Glorie. So that this ordinate Juſtice of God implies ſeveral particular Ideas, which we ſhal endeavor to explicate in the following Propoſitions.
1. Prop. Gods ordinate Juſtice ariſeth from the free Conſtitution and Determination of his own Wil. Antecedently to the Wil of God nothing is ſo far juſt, that it ought to be, but only that it may be juſtly and conveniently done, if God wil it: there is no Law of Juſtice in the actions of God, but what his own Wil preſcribeth: the Wil of God is not circumſcribed by his Juſtice, but his Juſtice by his Wil: for nothing is juſt in Divine Actions, but what he wils, yea becauſe he wils it. Thus Carthuſianus, in 4. Diſt. 46. Quaeſt. 1. The whole order of Juſtice is originally reduced to the Divine Wil: whatever God wils is juſt, neither is his Wil properly reſtrained by Juſtice. So Scotus, l. 4. Diſt. 46. Quaeſt. 1. That is always just, which is actually willed by the Divine Wil; and becauſe it is actually willed by the Divine Wil. The Rule of Juſtice, whereby men are to act, ties them up to one part of the contradiction, ſo that they are unjuſt if they act not ſo; but there is no ſuch Rule of Juſtice to be affixed to God, farther than the free conſtitution of his own Wil has tied him up. Gods Wil reveled is a Rule of Juſtice to us his Creatures, but his abſolute ſoverain Wil is that alone that regulates him in al his actions. Therefore learned Davenant ſaith, That God cannot wil any thing but ſalvâ juſtitiâ, i. e. he can do nothing contra justitiam; yet he may wil and do many things praeter juſtitiam: i. e. he may freely decree and do many things, where ſalvâ juſtitiâ, he might as freely have decreed and done the contrary. So Lombard. l. 1. Diſt. 43. God could have omitted what he doth, and have done what he omits, without injuſtice. Hence,
2. Prop. Gods ordinate Juſtice towards the Creature has one and the ſame Idea with his Veracitie or Fidelitie. Gods ordinate Justice the ſame with his Veracitie. Pſal. 119.123.Thence in ſacred Philoſophie the Righteouſneſſe of God is oft put for his Veracitie and Fidelitie in making good his word. So Pſal. 119.123. For the word of thy righteouſneſſe: i. e. the word of thy promiſſe, which thy righteouſneſſe or fidelitie is obliged to make good. So Pſal. 31.1. & 89.14. There is indeed in God no Juſtice properly ſo termed, in which reſpect he may be ſaid to be obliged to his Creature: but that which we ſtile the Juſtice of God towards his Creature, is no other than his Fidelitie, which preſuppoſeth ſome conſtitution of the Divine Wil: wherefore, abſtracting ſuch a conſtitution, God cannot be ſaid to do any thing repugnant to his Juſtice. For what is Juſtice, according to its general Idea, but to give every one his own? And what has the Creature that it may claim as its own, but what it receives from the Divine Wil? Again, Juſtice is a Conformitie or Equalitie, according to the obligation or debt which every one fals under:Juſtitia Dei eſt agere ſecundum condecentiam Bonitatis aut Veracitatis ſuae. Albert. p. 1. tract. 19. q. 77. and what obligation or debt can there befal God, with relation to his Creature, but what his own goodneſſe and wil laies upon him? How can God be obliged to any, but by his own wil and word? What then is his Juſtice, but to act according to the condecence or congruitie of his own Veracitie or Bonitie, as the Schole-men determine? Hence in things where there is no expreſſe declaration of the Divine Wil, Covenant, or Promiſſe on God part, if he ſhould pretermit that which he doth, or do that which he pretermits, if he ſhould deal more ſeverely, or more mercifully with any than he doth, there could be no injuſtice faſtened on him. Hence,
3. Prop. There can be no foreign,No acception of perſons with God. or Acception of perſons charged on God. This is expreſſely laid down, Rom. 2.11. of which before: And the reaſons are moſt evident, (1) Becauſe Acception of perſons has place only in him, who is under an obligation to diſtribute juſtice, not according to his pleaſure, but according to certain Qualities, Reaſons, or Conditions inherent in or appendent to the perſons, to whom the ſaid juſtice is to be diſtributed. But now God is under no obligation, but what flows from his own ſoverain pleaſure, to diſtribute rewards or puniſhments to any. (2) Acception of perſons cannot have place in the diſtribution of good things merely gratuitous and free; but only in ſuch as are of debt: But now Gods diſtributions of good things are merely gratuitous. Thus Aquinas: Acception of perſons is only of a thing due; and therefore it cannot be aſcribed to God. None can owe any thing to another, but by this, that he doth in ſome manner depend on, or hath received ſomething from another: but God dependes on no one, neither doth he receive any thing from any other. Acception of perſons has place only where, in the diſpenſation of things due, any favors one more than another, with reſpect to ſome circumſtance of the perſon, contrary or beſide the merits of the cauſe. Therefore, albeit God give, out of his mere liberalitie, inequally to perſons equal, yet this is not Acception of perſons; becauſe there is nothing due. Hence,
4. Prop. There is an infinite diſtance between the Juſtice of God, The difference between the Juſtice of God and Men.and of men. (1) Al human Juſtice ariſeth from an obligation and debt; but Gods Juſtice from the mere free conſtitution of his Wil: Man wils things, becauſe they are juſt; but things are therefore juſt with God, becauſe he wils them. (2) Many things that are injuſt with men, are juſt with God. The rule of Juſtice which tieth men to do juſtly, doth alſo render them injuſt, when they do otherwiſe: But now God, where he hath not brought himſelf under an obligation by his own free conſtitution and promiſſe, hath a libertie of acting or not acting, of doing this or the contrary in the diſtribution of rewards, and gifts. If he ſhould not do what he doth, or if he ſhould do what he doth not, his Juſtice were the ſame. If God ſpoil the Egyptians to enrich his people, or if he enrich the Aſſyrians by the ſpoils of his people, he is juſt ſtil. Where God hath not obliged himſelf by his own Word, he has a libertie of doing one thing or the contrary without injuſtice. Yet,
5. Prop. So far as God hath obliged himſelf by the conſtitution of his own Wil and Word, Gods Juſtice regards the Qualities of its object.his ordinate Juſtice ever regardes the Conſtitution and Qualities of the object. Gods ordinate Juſtice being the ſame with his Veracitie and Fidelitie, it alwaies reſpects ſuch Qualities and Conditions as its object, by reaſon of his own conſtitution, is inveſted with. For God, in the executions of his ordinate Juſtice, aſſumes the qualitie of a Judge: and a Judge cannot duely abſtain from the adminiſtration of Juſtice: neither is Juſtice duely adminiſtred, unleſſe the Qualities of the objects, and merits of the cauſe be fully inſpected and conſidered. Gods ordinate Juſtice as Rector and Judge of the Al is chiefly exerciſed in the reduction of althings to that equalitie and order, which his Divine Wiſdome and Wil has preſcribed unto them. Hence theſe two things neceſſarily follow this Divine ordinate Juſtice: (1) It never exerts it ſelf, but where thoſe Qualities and Conditions, which it has preſcribed its object, be found. As it never puniſheth any but for ſin; ſo it never rewards any but the Godly, &c. (2) Whereever theſe Conditions or Qualities are found, it neceſſarily exerts it ſelf. It cannot but puniſh ſin whereever it be; neither can it but reward holineſs if ſincere. There is a neceſſitie, not Phyſic but Moral attendes al its egreſſes; and that from the free Conſtitution of the Divine Wil.
§. 2. Next to the Juſtice of God we are to diſcourſe of his Veracitie and Fidelitie, Gods Veracitie and Fidelitie.which is not really diſtinct from his Ordinate Juſtice. Thence we find the Juſtice of God frequently put for his Fidelitie. So Pſal. 31.1. Deliver me in thy Righteouſneſſe, Pſal. 31.1.i. e. according to thy Righteouſneſſe, whereby thou doeſt declare thy ſelf juſt in making good thy promiſſes. Some make this diſtinction between Gods Veritie, Fidelitie, and Juſtice: Gods Veritie obligeth him to this, that he promiſe ſincerely: his Fidelitie, that he keep his promiſſe: and his Juſtice, that he performe his promiſſe by giving the thing promiſſed. Touching the veracitie of God we find lively Illuſtrations and Notices both in Sacred and Platonic Philoſophie. As for Sacred Philoſophie, it is moſt expreſſe in the aſſerting Gods Veracitie.Gen. 22.16. So Gen. 22.16. By my ſelf have I ſworne, aſſuredly ſaith Jehovah. Aſſuredly ſaith: or, the faithful ſaying. foreign neum is peculiar to Gods Oracles, which are al faithful ſayings, 1 Tim. 1.15. and 3.1. Of the ſame letters tranſpoſed comes alſo foreign Amen, which notes the faithfulneſſe of God. Thus Eſa. 25.1.Eſa. 25.1. For thou hast done wonderful things, thy counſels of old are faithfulneſſe and truth. foreign In faithfulneſſe and firmneſſe. Gataker conceives the word here to note firme or firmneſſe, rather than true or truth; becauſe the word, in the ſingular no where elſe found, is uſed in the plural for pillars, 2 Kings 18.16. The Veracitie of God is farther explicated,1 Sam. 15.29. 1 Sam. 15.29. The Eternitie or ſtrength of Iſrael wil not lie. foreign ſignifies both eternitie and ſtrength, which are both great pillars of the Divine Veracitie. So Pſal. 33.4.Pſal. 33.4. The Word of the Lord is right, and al his workes are done in truth. foreign in truth, veracitie, or conſtance. So Pſal. 18.20.Pſal. 18.20. As for God, his way is perfect. This ſeems to be meant of the veracitie and conſtance of his promiſſes. Thence it follows: The Word of the Lord is tried. foreign examined, i. e. pure, ſincere, like Silver wel refined, neither do they ever fail, as Pſal. 12.6.Pſal. 36.5. So Pſal. 36.5. Thy faithfulneſſe reacheth to the clouds: i. e. it is Immenſe and Infinite. The ſpace between us and the Clouds is vaſt,Pſal. 89.1, 8. and ſeemingly immenſe. Thus Pſal. 89.1. I wil ſing of the mercies of the Lord. By Mercies Kimhi and Ezra underſtand Gods free Conſtitution antecedent to his promiſſe. Whence it follows: With my mouth wil I make known thy faithfulneſſe. MercieMercy makes the promiſſe, but Fidelitie is ingaged for the performance of it. So v. 2, 3. and v. 8. O Lord God of Hoſts, who is a ſtrong God like unto thee? or, to thy faithfulneſſe round about thee? He ſtiles God moſt potent, in regard of his Veracitie and Fidelitie in making good his promiſſes: and then he addes, that Gods faithfulneſſe is round about him, which is a Poetic deſcription, denoting that God is alwaies and in every poſture or regard moſt faithful. And he procedes, in the following Verſes, lively to deſcribe the Fidelitie of God:v. 33, 34, 35. particularly v. 33. Nor ſuffer my faithfulneſſe to fail. foreign Neither wil I lie againſt my Truth, or in my Truth: i. e. I wil not violate my Veracitie, by not performing my promiſſe. So v. 34. My Covenant wil I not break. foreign, I wil not profane my Covenant, or offer violence to it. Again, v. 35. Once have I ſworne by my Holineſſe, that I wil not lie unto David. foreign once, i. e. irrevocably, as Kinthi and Ezra. foreign, if I lie to David. The particle if, being uſed as a formule in ſwearing, doth greatly denie. For the ancient Patriarchs were wont, under this formule, by a kind of Apoſiopeſis, ſilently to couch an Imprecation of evil on the head of him that ſwore, if he did violate his faith. The great God aſſumes this formule of ſwearing from human cuſtome, thereby to declare the firmitude of his Veracitie and Fidelitie in performing his oath. Al this is lively explicated, Hebr. 6.17, 18.Heb. 6.17, 18. God being willing more abundantly to ſhew to the heirs of promiſſe, the immutabilitie of his counſel, engaged his fidelitie by an oath: That by two immutable things, in which it was impoſſible for God to lie, or to deceive: for ſo Grotius conceives foreign ought to be rendred, which ſignifies an event that fruſtrates expectation, as Lev. 6.2. Joſ. 24.27. Eſa. 58.2. Hoſ. 1.2. Hab. 3.17. Gods Providences oſt ſeem to croſſe his Promiſſes, and ſo to fruſtrate our expectations, but really there is not the leaſt mutabilitie on Gods part: he cannot lie or deceive, being bound by two immutable things, his Word and Oath, which give abundant aſſurance of his Fidelitie.
Plato alſo gives very great and illuſtrious notices of the Veracitie of God, and thoſe not a little conſorme to Sacred Philoſophie. Thus Repub. 2. p. 382. foreign; Doest thou not know, that both God and men do truely hate a lie? And then he addes the Reaſon: foreign, That there is no mortal who would in his ſoul either deceive, or be deceived, or be ignorant, or be involved in the darkneſſe of a lie, as to Supreme Beings. Thence he ſubjoins: foreign, Truely a lie ſhould be hated, not only by God, but alſo by men. Then he addes: ſhal we imagine, foreign; that a lie is utile to God? What, therefore becauſe he underſtandes not ancient things, &c.? Whence he concludes: foreign, &c. Wherefore God is both ſimple and faithful, both in work and word: neither is he himſelf changed, neither doth he deceive others, neither by phantaſtic deluſions, neither by words, neither by ſignes, neither by viſions, neither by dreams. Plato here enumerates the ſeveral waies, whereby God reveles himſelf, in each of which his Veracitie is moſt illuſtrious. Whence p. 383. he makes this Law for the right eſtabliſhment of Religion, That men ſpeak and believe touching God, that he is no Deceiver, or Seducer of others, either by Words, or otherwiſe.
But to diſcourſe more Philoſophically of the Veracitie of God, we muſt firſt diſtinguiſh of Veritie in the general; which is either ſimple or complexe. (1) Simple veritie is either in the mind, or in things themſelves. [1] Simple Truth in the mind conſiſtes in the conformitie of our Notions unto things. And in this regard the Truth of God importes the veritie of his Ideas, or knowlege of things. [2] Simple Truth in Things, is nothing but their conformitie to their ſpecific Idea, or formal definition and nature. So we ſay, that is true Gold, which conformes to the ſpecific Idea of Gold. This ſome Ariſtoteleans ſtile Metaphyſic or tranſcendental Truth: others Phyſic Truth; it being no other than the real exiſtence of things. For, as Ariſtotle, (or whoever were the compilator of that Book) Metaph. min. l. 1. c. 1. obſerves, foreign, every thing has ſo much of truth, as it has of exiſtence. Now the veritie of God in this regard, is nothing elſe ſave the ſimple pure actualitie of his eſſence and exiſtence. (2) Complexe Truth is either Mental, or Oral. [1] Complexe mental Truth is the conformitie of complexe mental Ideas, Notions, or Propoſitions unto things: which cannot be aſcribed to God, becauſe he has no complexe knowlege, but only ſimple: albeit he knows al propoſitions, yet it is not by any complexe notions, but in the moſt ſimple glaſſe of his own eſſence. [2] Complexe Oral Veritie is either Logic or Ethic: Logic Oral Veritie is when Propoſitions or Diſcourſes agree with things: Ethic Oral Veritie is when our words agree to our thoughts, which is termed Sinceritie; or our deeds to our words, which is Veracitie.
This Veracitie as to God regards al his words;Gods Veracitie in fulfilling but in a more particular manner his Comminations or Threats, and Promiſſes; yet with this difference.(1) Promiſſes. (1) Promiſſes give a right to the perſons to whom they are made, which cannot be taken from them without injurie: for albeit it be free to any to make a promiſſe; yet having made it, his fidelitie is obliged to ſee it performed. So that in Promiſſes there is no room for Relaxation or Diſpenſation; but the words muſt be taken in the largeſt ſenſe, and as moſt favorable for the perſons to whom the Promiſſe is made: according to that commun maxime in Civil Law, Favors must be amplified. And that which addes to the obligation of promiſſes is when they are confirmed by an Oath, which renders them every way Immutable and Irrelaxable. Such are al the Promiſſes of God, as Hebr. 6.17.Heb. 6.17, 18. Where God is ſaid to confirme his promiſſe by an Oath, whereby it became every way immutable, as verſ. 18. (2) But now as to Comminations or Threats, (2) Threats.there is no right or debt accrews to the perſons, to whom they are made, ſave only a debt or merit of puniſhment: the threat renders them obnoxious to puniſhment, if they break that Law whereto the threat is appendent: yet in many Caſes, 'ſpecially as to circumſtances, the Superior, who made the Law and affixed a threat thereto, has a libertie of relaxing, or diſpenſing with the penaltie of his Law. The Commination declares the Merit of puniſhment in the offender, and the Power of puniſhing in the Superior offended; but yet it doth not alwaies ſuppoſe a neceſſarie egreſſe or execution of vindictive juſtice for the puniſhing the offender; at leaſt not as to al circumſtances threatned; but ſtil there remains place in the breaſt of the Judge, or Superior, 'ſpecially if he be Abſolute, and Soverain, either to relaxe or diſpenſe with the penaltie of his Laws, either in whole or part. Thus in Gods Threats and penal Laws, he reſerves to himſelf a libertie of Relaxation or Diſpenſation in many Caſes, thereby to make way for his Clemence or MercieMercy, without the leaſt violation of his Veracitie or Juſtice. So in the firſt commination or penal Law, Gen. 2.17. Thou ſhalt ſurely die. Gen. 2.17.Heb. in dying thou ſhalt die. Which Hebraiſme denotes a certain, immediate, perfect, and conſtant death. And yet our Soverain Lord, out of his Soverain rich MercieMercy, was pleaſed very far to relaxe and mitigate the rigor of this commination or penal Law, as to many circumſtances, by admitting of a Mediator, and new Evangelic Covenant. In this regard God is ſaid to repent or turne from the ſierceneſſe of wrath, as Jonah 3.9. Who can tel if God wil turne, Jonah 3.9.and repent, and turn away from his fierce anger, that we periſh not. God by reaſon of their legal imperfect faith and repentance, turned away his fierce wrath for that time, albeit afterward it came down with vengeance, as Hiſtorie aſſureth us. Neither is it to be feared, leſt the Veracitie of God ſhould receive any injurie, if al his Threats are not alwaies in al circumſtances or parts fulfilled: becauſe al comminations and threats, which have not ſome character or ſigne of irrevocabilitie aſſixt to them, are, according to their own nature, ſo to be underſtood, as not to diminiſh the right of the Superior, who makes them, to relaxe the ſame. Thus we ſee what latitude the Divine Veracitie admits in the fulfilling Comminations and Threats, beyond what can be admitted in fulfilling Divine Promiſſes, as Grotius wel obſerves.
Gods Veracitie and Fidelitie in fulfilling his word,Gods Veracitie demonſtrated. is founded in and may be demonſtrated by, (1) his eſſential Veritie. Plato makes God to be foreign, the first Truth, yea, foreign, Truth it ſelf; whence he cannot but be true and faithful in his words. God is Truth eſſentially, not participatively, therefore nothing but Truth can paſſe from him. Again, God is pure Truth or Veritie, with whom not the leaſt ſhadow of Falſitie, Hypocriſie, or Fraude in word or deed can mingle. Pure Truth and falſitie are incompatible. There are no thoughts or ideas of mans heart ſo true, but there is ſome mixture of error or falſitie in them: no words or deeds ſo ſincere and faithful, but ſomething of hypocrifie and falſitie mixed with them: becauſe there is no pure truth in mans thoughts or words. But God being the first, pure, eſſential Veritie, his Veracitie is moſt pure and perfect, without the leaſt ſhadow of falſitie. (2) Gods Veracitie is founded on, and may be demonſtrated by his Eternitie and Omnipotence. Thus in ſacred Philoſophie,1 Sam. 15.29. 1 Sam. 15.29. The Eternitie or ſtrength of Iſrael wil not lie. Al lies are from impotence and infirmitie: Truth and Veracitie is ever potent and ſtrong; but falſitie moſt impotent. (3) From the Holineſſe of God, of which we ſhal immediately diſcourſe. I ſhal conclude this Divine Attribute with a pleaſing obſervation I long ſince met with in the Life of Janſenius, Biſhop of Ipre, that great Patron of Divine Grace, who being demanded, What Attribute of God was most in his heart, whereby he was most awed? Replied, The Truth or Veracitie of God. And he that writes his Life, prefixed to his Auguſtinus, aſſures us, That in his Garden-walkes, and ſolitary Meditations, with his eyes fixed on Heaven, he was oft ſeen and heard to break forth into this acclamation: O Truth! So great an Admirer was he of Divine Veritie and Veracitie: and indeed no wonder, ſeeing it is the great Spring of the Divine life and conſolation both here and hereafter.
§. 3. The laſt Divine Attribute,The Sanctitie of God. we are to diſcourſe of, is the Sanctitie or Holineſſe of God, whereof we find great and illuſtrious Characters in ſacred Philoſophie. (1) We find the Sanctitie of God ſet forth in Scripture in a way of eminence and diſtinction from al created Sanctitie.Exod. 15.11. So Exod. 15.11. Who is like unto thee, O Lord, amongst the Gods, or mighty men! Who is like unto thee glorioſe in Holineſſe, &c! Where he placeth Gods tranſcendent Eminence and Elevation above al Creatures, as that wherein his eſſential Sanctitie chiefly conſiſtes. And indeed the peerleſſe Eminence of Gods ſacred Majeſtie is that wherein his Sanctitie chiefly conſiſtes, as we intend anon more fully to demonſtrate. Thus 1 Sam. 2.2. There is none holy as the Lord: 1 Sam. 2.2.for there is none beſides thee: neither is there any Rock like our God. Hannah here, as Moſes before, placeth the Sanctitie of God in his Supereminence above al Creatures. (2) Hence God is frequently brought in, as an object of Divine Worſhip, with regard to his Holineſſe. So Pſal. 30.4. Give thankes at the remembrance of his Holineſſe: i. e. of his peerleſſe Eminences. And Pſal. 71.22. Ʋnto thee wil I ſing with the harpe, O thou holy One of Iſrael. Alſo Pſal. 92.12.Pſal. 92.12. And give thankes at the remembrance of his Holineſſe: or celebrate the memorial of his Holineſſe: i. e. Lift up his foreign, or tranſcendent Excellences. Again, Pſal. 98.1. O ſing unto the Lord a new ſong; for he hath done marvellous things: his right hand and his holy arme hath gotten him victorie. His holy arme, or the arme of his Holineſſe: i. e. of his holy power ſo much above al other powers. The like Pſal. 99.3. Let them praiſe thy great and terrible name; for it is holy. Alſo v. 9. Exalt the Lord our God, and worſhip at his holy hil: for the Lord our God is holy. The like v. 5. As God is a tranſcendent ſuperlative Majeſtie, exalted above al other Gods, or Majeſties, as Exod. 15.11. ſo in al Acts of Worſhip we muſt exalt him, by giving him a ſingular, incommunicable, peculiar Worſhip. Whence in Scripture thoſe that give that Worſhip which is due to God, to any beſides him, or in conjunction with him, by way of object, either mediate or immediate, are ſaid to profane his holy Name, Ezech. 20.39. & 43.7, 8. becauſe Gods Holineſſe, conſiſting in a ſuperlative incommunicable Majeſtie, admits no corrival in point of Worſhip. Hence, to ſanctifie the holy Name or Majeſtie of God, is [1] to ſerve and glorifie him; becauſe of his tranſcendent foreign or Eminence; and [2] to do it with a peculiar, ſeparate, incommunicated Worſhip; becauſe he is holy and ſeparate above althings elſe. Not to do the former, is Irreligion, Profaneneſſe and Atheiſme; not to do the later is Idolatrie and Superſtition, as judicious Mede wel obſerves. Hence (3) God is ſaid to ſit on a Throne of Holineſſe, Pſal. 47.8. God ſitteth upon the Throne of his Holineſſe. Pſal. 47.8.Alluding to the Thrones of Princes, which were in the midſt of the people, exalted and lift up, that ſo their Majeſtie might appear more illuſtrious. God being, by reaſon of his tranſcendent Eminences, exalted infinitely above al Creatures, he is therefore ſaid, to ſit on the Throne of his Holineſſe. (4) We find Gods Holineſſe, in a moſt eminent manner and with emphatic Characters, proclaimed by ſuch as have any views of God. Thus Eſa. 6.3. Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of Hoſts. So Rev. 4.8. (5) The Sanctitie of God is ſometimes deſcribed by puritie. Hab. 1.13.Hab. 1.13. Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil, and canſt not look on iniquitie. foreign prae videndo. foreign here is comparative: as if he had ſaid; O! how pure are thine eyes? how impoſſible is it for thee to behold ſin, with the leaſt delight or approbation? So 1 Joh. 3.3. As he is pure. (6) The Sanctitie of God is ſometimes deſcribed by Rectitude. Pſal. 25 8. Good and upright is the Lord. So Pſal. 92.15. To ſhew that the Lord is upright.
We find alſo in Plato many great notices of the Sanctitie of God, conformable to thoſe of ſacred Philoſophie. So Theaetet. pag. 176. foreign, Evils find no place with God. Again, foreign, God is in no manner unrighteous, but as it ſeems most righteous. So Repub. 2. pag. 379. he ſaith, That in Theologie we ſhould uſe ſuch modules, as come neareſt to the Nature of God, and demonſtrate what God is. Thus we must conſtantly aſcribe to God things conſentaneous to his Nature. Whence he ſubjoins: foreign; Must we not determine then, that God is indeed good? foreign, But no good is noxious. foreign; But that which hurts not, doth it do any evil? No ſurely. Whence he concludes: foreign, Good therefore is not the cauſe of althings; but of thoſe things that are good it is the cauſe; but of evils it is not the cauſe: i. e. God is the firſt Cauſe and Author of al natural and moral good, but as for moral evil he is not the Author or Cauſe thereof as it is evil; becauſe moral evils as ſuch have no efficient cauſe but only deficient. Thence he addes: foreign, Of good things we must own no principal cauſe but God: but as for evils we must inquire after ſome other cauſes of them; for God must not be eſtimed the cauſe of them. His mind is, that God muſt be owned as the cauſe of al good, both Natural and Moral; yea, of the materia ſubſtrata, or the material entitie of ſin, which is a natural good: but as for the proper Moral cauſe of Sin, as Sin is a deordination or difformitie from the Divine Law, that is proper to the ſinner: for God muſt not be thought to be the Author or Moral cauſe of ſin. This he farther explains, p. 380. Either we must not at al attribute evils to God, or if we do, it muſt be in that manner as before, namely, foreign, we muſt ſay, that God hath acted wel and juſtly, and has inflicted thoſe puniſhments on them, that thereby he might bring ſome profit. Wherein he informes us, that God is the cauſe of penal evils, not as evils, but as conducing to good. Whence he concludes: foreign, &c. That God, who is good, ſhould be the Author or Moral Cauſe of Evil to any, this we muſt with al manner of contention refute, and not ſuffer any in the Citie to ſpeak or hear ſuch things. Plato ſtrongly aſſertes, that God is foreign, the principal cauſe of al good, but not of ſin as ſin; i. e. he neither commands, invites, encourageth, nor by any other Moral cauſalitie produceth ſin: albeit God doth concur to the material act or phyſic entitie of ſin, which is naturally good, yet he doth not at al concur to the moral production, obliquitie or deordination of ſin, which has indeed no real efficient cauſe, but only deficient, according to that of Proclus: There is no foreign, Idea of moral evils. But the more diſtinctly and yet conciſely to explicate the ſanctitie of God, we are to know that his original Eſſential and Abſolute Holineſs is nothing elſe but the incommunicable ſuperlative foreign or ſupereminence of his Divine Majeſtie, as ſeparate from althings elſe. For al Sanctitie, and al the notions thereof, ſpecially Grecanic and Hebraic, implie ſeparation and diſcretion. Whence the Sacred Majeſtie of God, being, in regard of its infinite Perfection and Dignitie, infinitely exalted above al Beings and Dignities whatſoever, it muſt neceſſarily be the prime ſanctitie. Yea, Holineſs is ſo far appropriated to the firſt Being, as that the Heathens aſcribed a fictitious ſanctitie and eminence to al their ſpurious Deities: whereby they generally acknowleged, that the prime Holineſſe belongs only to the firſt Being. It's true, good Angels and Men are Holy by participation and derivation; but they are not Holineſſe in the abſtract: this appertains only to he prime, original, eſſential Holineſſe, who is infinitely ſeparate from al other Dignities and Eminences: in whom al Holineſſe is in the abſtract and eſſentially; from whom alſo al Holineſſe flows as from the ſource and ſpring.
§. 4. We find in Plato not only Characters of the Divine Eſſence and Attributes, Platonic Philoſophemes of the Trinitie.but alſo ſome dark notices of the Trinitie; which, I no way dout, were originally traduced from the Sacred Fountain of Hebraic Philoſophie. We have Plato's Sentiments about a Trinitie mentioned more expreſſely in his Sectators, Plotinus, Porphyrie, Iamblichus and Proclus. And the whole is wel explicated by Cyril Alexandr. Contra Jul. l. 1. p. 34. Edit. Pariſ. 1638. thus: foreign, For Porphyrie, expounding the Sentiment of Plato, ſaith, that the eſſence of God procedes even to three Hypoſtaſes; but that the Supreme God is, foreign, The Supreme GOOD; and that after him, the ſecond is, foreign, the prime Opificer or Creator; moreover, that the third is, foreign, the mundane Soul: (or Univerſal Spirit:) For the Divinitie extended it ſelf to the Soul of the Ʋniverſe. This Platonic Trinitie Cyril refutes, as that which gave Spawn and Seed to Arianiſme, as hereafter. I am not ignorant, that Learned Cudworth, in his New Book, againſt Atheiſme, B. 1. C. 4. §. 34. p. 590, &c. endeavors to apologiſe for this Platonic Trinitie, and reconcile it with the Chriſtian: Yet he ingenuouſly acknowledgeth, pag. 580, and 601, &c. That the moſt refined Platonic Trinitie ſuppoſeth an Eſſential Dependence and Subordination of the ſecond Hypoſtaſis, to the Firſt, and of the Third to the Second: Yea, he grantes, that the Platoniſts generally held theſe three Hypoſtaſes to be three distinct Gods, as in what follows. I conceive thoſe endeavors to reconcile the Chriſtians Trinitie with the Platonic, to be of moſt dangerous conſequence, and that which proved Origen's Peſte, as Part. 3. B. 2. c. 1. §. 8.
The chief place I find in Plato, wherein he gives us ſome dark adumbration of a Trinitie, is Epiſt. 6. p. 323. Let this Law be conſtituted by you, and confirmed by an Oath, not without obteſting, foreign, both God, the Imperator of althings, both which are, and which ſhal be; and the Father of that Imperator and Cauſe: whom indeed, if we truely Philoſophiſe, we ſhal al diſtinctly know, ſo far as that knowledge may fal within the power of bleſſed men. This deſcription of God Clemens Alexandrinus and others interpret of God the Father, and God the Son, who is indeed the Imperator of althings. We find alſo in Plato's Epinom. mention of foreign, as elſewhere of foreign, which they attribute to the ſecond perſon in the Trinitie. Whence the Poets make Minerva to be foreign, the mind of Jupiter, or his Wiſdome, produced out of his head, without Mother: as the true Meſſias was ſtiled by the Hebrews, The wiſdome of God, without Mother. Plotinus, Ennead. 5, Lib. 1. Philoſophiſeth copioſely of this Platonic Trinitie; the Title of which Book runs thus: foreign, Of the Three Principal or Cauſal Hypoſtaſes. And he begins, Cap. 2. with the foreign, the Mundane Soul, its Dignitie and Office: and Ennead. 5. l. 5. c. 3. ſpeaking of foreign, Mind, the ſecond Hypoſtaſis in the Platonic Trinitie, he ſaith, that he is, foreign, the Second God. And En. 5. l. 1. c. 7. p. 489. he ſaith, That this Second God, the First Mind, foreign, &c. Being now begotten [by the first God] begot alſo al entities with himſelf, namely the whole pulchritude of Ideas; which were al intellectile Gods. Furthermore we must conceive that this [Begotten Mind] is ful of althings begotten by him, and doth as it were ſwallow up althings begotten. Thence he addes: foreign, But the progenie of this Mind is a certain foreign and Hypoſtaſis conſiſting in cogitation, &c. Proclus, in Plat. Timae. p. 93. cals this Platonic Trinitie, foreign, the tradition of the Three Gods; and he makes, according to Numenius, the Firſt God, to be the Grandfather, the Second to be the Son, the Third to be the Grandſon: i. e. the Second God to be begotten by the Firſt, and the Third by the Second. Porphyrie alſo, explicating Plato's mind, cals God the Creator of althings, foreign, the Paterne Mind: who alſo makes three ſubſiſtences in the eſſence of the Divinitie; the firſt he cals the Supreme God; the ſecond, the Creator; the third, the Soul of the Ʋniverſe. The like Iamblichus his Scholar, concerning the Egyptian Myſteries: The first God, the prime being, the Father of God whom he begets, remaining in his ſolitarie unitie, &c. And Plotinus writ a Book of the three Perſons or Subſiſtences: whereof the firſt he makes to be the Supreme Eternal Being, who generated the ſecond, namely the eternal and perfect Mind, as before. So in his Book of Providence, he ſaith, That althings were framed foreign, by the Divine Mind. Thus Plato in his Phaedo ſaith: foreign, The Divine Mind is the framer and cauſe of althings. That theſe Platonic Philoſophemes were the Seminarie of Arianiſme, we have endeavored to demonſtrate, Part. 3. l. 2. c. 1. §. 9. And this is wel obſerved by Cyril, contra Jul. l. 1. p. 34. Edit. Pariſ. 1638. where ſpeaking of Plato, and his Trinitie, he ſaith: foreign, Truely he contemplated not the whole rightly, but, in the ſame manner as they who follow Arius, he divides and ſuppoſeth Subjects, inducing Hypoſtaſes ſubordinate among themſelves, and conceits the Holy and Conſubſtantial Trinitie to be three diſtinct Gods. And albeit Learned Cudworth, B. 1. C. 4. p. 590. againſt Atheiſme, endeavors to wipe off this aſperſion, yet he grants the concluſion, as hereafter. But to ſpeak the truth, I find no expreſs mention of a foreign Trinitie in Plato; only he ſpeaks confuſedly of a foreign Father Lord, and of foreign the Mind, &c. But among the later Platoniſtes of the Schole of Alexandria, 'ſpecially thoſe of the golden ſucceſſion, the Sectators of Ammonius, Plotinus, Porphyrie, Iamblichus, Proclus, we find frequent mention and notices of a Trinitie, which they thus diſtinguiſh. (1) foreign the Supreme ſelf-being: whom alſo they ſtile foreign, the one, and foreign, the Good. (2) foreign, the Divine mind, the Creatrix or Framer of althings: who is alſo termed by them, foreign, the Word, and foreign, the ſeminal Word or Reaſon, that gives Being to althings. (3) foreign, the Soul of the Ʋniverſe: and foreign, the first Soul, as c. 8. §. 2. Theſe more diſtinct notices of a Trinitie, I am very apt to perſwade my ſelf they received not ſo much from Plato, but from Ammonius, the famoſe Head of that Succeſſion; who was either a Chriſtian, or a friend to their Sacred Philoſophie, out of which he ſtole moſt of his choiſeſt Philoſophemes, and incorporated them into the bodie of his Platonic Philoſophie, in order to a refinement thereof: which, albeit his deſigne might be good, yet it proved the peſte and ſubverſion of the Chriſtian Theologie, at leaſt among thoſe of that Schole. For Origen, his Scholar, following in his ſteps, out of too fond a love for Platonic Philoſophie, reduced Sacred Philoſophie to Platonic Dogmes: which proved the original cauſe of the greateſt Errors that befel the Church in ſucceeding Ages. Thus he makes the Three Perſons in the Trinitie, to be, according to the Three Platonic Hypoſtaſes, One, not in Eſſence, but Wil only. So Origen. contra Celſum, l. 8. p. 386. (Edit. Cantabr. 1658.) Where having cited that, Act. 4.32. There was of al the Believers one Heart and one Soul, he brings it to prove what our Lord affirmes, Joh. 10.30. I and the Father are one. And thence in what follows concludes thus: foreign, &c. Therefore we religioſely worſhip the Father of Truth, and the Son who is Truth, as being truely two in Hypoſtaſe, but one in concord, conſent, and identitie of Wil: So that whoſoever ſees the Son,—ſhall in him ſee God, as in the Image of God, &c. Hence Origen, in imitation of theſe Platoniſtes ſuppoſed an eſſential dependence of the Son, the ſecond Hypoſtaſis, on the Father; as alſo of the Spirit, the third, on the Son: of which eſſential dependence and ſubordination, ſee Cudworth againſt Atheiſme, L. 1. C. 4. p. 581, &c. Yea Origen, in his Comments on John wil needs perſuade us, That the Word in Divine things is taken only metaphorically. How far Origen's Platonic Philoſophemes laid the foundation for the Arian and other Hereſies touching the ſecond and third Perſon in the Trinitie, ſee Court Gent. p. 3. l. 2. c. 1. §. 8, 9. Samoſatenus alſo had his peſtiferous infuſions from Plotinus's Philoſophemes about the Divine foreign: and Arius his from the ſame Schole, as we have more fully proved in our Diſcourſe of the Vanitie of Philoſophie, B. 2. C. 1. §. 8. But whereas Amelius of old, and ſome late Socinians would fain perſuade us, that John borrowed his foreign, Joh. 1.1. from Plato, it's evident, that he had it from the Sacred Philoſophie among the Hebrews: for in the ancient Chaldaic Thargum we find frequent mention of foreign the Word of Jehovah, whereby they underſtood the Meſſias, as Gen. 3.8. Pſal. 2.12. and 27.1. as elſewhere. Yea Celſus would needs perſuade us, That the Chriſtians came to cal their Jeſus, foreign, THE SON OF GOD, from their Pagan Anceſtors, who called the World made by God, the Son of God: But this is refuted by Origen, Contra Celſum, l. 6. p. 308. Edit. 1658. Where he proves, that this Character of Jeſus was to be found in the Writings of Moſes and the Prophets, who writ long before the Grecian Philoſophers. That al thoſe confuſed notices of a Trinitie among the Platoniſtes were originally traduced from Sacred Philoſophie, ſee Clem. Alexandr. Strom. 5. p. 436. Euſebius, praepar. Evangel. l. 11. from cap. 14. to 23. Philoſ. General. Part. 1. l. 1. c. 2. ſect. 5. §. 2. and l. 3. c. 4. ſect. 1. §. 13. alſo Court. Gent. P. 1. B. 3. c. 5. §. 7.
Learned Cudworth, in his Book againſt Atheiſme, B. 1. C. 4. ſect. 35. p. 548. ſaith: We may reaſonably conclude, that which Proclus aſſerteth of this Trinitie, as it was contained in the Chaldaic Oracles, to be true, that it was at firſt foreign, a Theologie of Divine Tradition or Revelation, or a Divine Cabala, viz. amongſt the Hebrews firſt, and from them afterwards communicated to the Egyptians and other Nations—However, addes he, we freely acknowledge, that, as this Divine Cababa was but little underſtood by many of thoſe who entertained it among the Pagans, ſo was it by diverſe of them much depraved and adulterated. For (1) the Pagans univerſally called this their Trinitie, a Trinitie of Gods, foreign, & foreign, the First, the Second, and the Third God. (2) Whence, p. 557. he procedes to demonſtrate, that the direct deſigne of this Platonic Trinitie was nothing elſe but to lay a foundation for infinite Polytheiſme, Coſmolatrie, and Creatureworſhip. Where by the way he wel obſerves, That theſe Pagans (who ſo much cried up this Platonic Trinitie) were the only public and profeſſed Champions againſt Chriſtianitie, and the Chriſtian Trinitie. (3) He addes, p. 559. That the Three Hypoſtaſes or perſons aſſerted by the Chriſtians are truely and really one God; and not one only in Wil, as Origen and the Platoniſtes avouch. (4) He informes us, p. 564. That Proclus and other of the Platoniſtes intermingle many particular Gods with thoſe three Ʋniverſal Principes or Hypoſtaſes of their Trinitie; as Noes, Minds or Intellects ſuperior to the first Soul; and Henades and Agathotetes, Ʋnities and Goodneſſes, ſuperior to the first Intellect too; thereby making thoſe particular Beings, which muſt needs be Creatures, ſuperior to thoſe Hypoſtaſes that are Univerſal and Infinite. So great confuſions, yea contradictions attendes the Platonic Trinitie, which yet is too much admired.