The Court of the Gentiles Part 4:2, Treatise · Part 4 · Book 3 · Chapter 5

The Court of the Gentiles Part 4:2 · Treatise · Part 4 · Book 3 · Chapter 5

p. 150CHAP. V. Rational Demonſtration of Gods predeterminative Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of Sin.

Arguments for Divine predetermination of the Wil to the entitative act of ſin. (1) From the Futurition of althings in the Divine Decree: the objections againſt this argument ſolved. (2) From the certitude of Divine Preſcience; with the ſolution of objections. (3) From the Decree of Reprobation. Davenants Hypotheſis touching abſolute Reprobation and Decrees. (4) From Divine Concurſe, [1] Its Principe and Origine. [2] Its Nature; Totalitie, Ʋniverſalitie, p. 151Particularitie, Immediation, Prioritie, and Independence. [3] Its Efficace, as to al natural and ſupernatural Acts and Effects. Al the Arguments urged againſt Predetermination to the entitative act of ſin, ſtrike as much against Predetermination to what is good. (5) From the nature of ſin, its ſubſtrate mater and formal reaſon. (6) From Gods permiſſion of ſin; which is natural, negative, and poſitive. (7) From Divine providence about ſin, both conſervative, reſtrictive, gubernative. (8) From the abſolute, immediate, eſſential dependence of al creatures on God, as the firſt cauſe.

§. 1. HAving given a ſcriptural Demonſtration, as alſo the unanimousArguments for Predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of al ſin. teſtimonie of ſuch as undertook to defend efficacious Concurſe in al Ages of the Church, for the confirmation of our Hypotheſis, we now procede to demonſtrate the ſame by rational Arguments grounded on ſcriptural principes and evidence; which we ſhal reduce to the following Heads.

1. Arg. From the Futurition of althings in and by the Divine Decree; 1. Arg. from the futurition of althings.which we thus forme: That which dependes on the Divine Decree for its futurition, neceſſarily fals under Divine predetermination as to its exiſtence: But the ſubſtrate mater of al ſin dependes on the Divine Decree as to its futurition: therefore it neceſſarily fals under Divine predetermination as to its exiſtence. The major is granted by our Adverſaries, particularly by Strangius, who oft aſſertes, That Divine Predetermination is exactly adequate and commenſurate to Divine Predefinition; ſo that whatever is predefined by God in his Decree, muſt neceſſarily be predetermined by him in the execution and event. And what more rational than this aſſertion? Yea, what is predetermination of the event, but predefinition in the Decree? The difference between Gods eternal predefinition in the Decree, and predetermination as to actual concurſe and execution in time differ only as active and paſſive Creation: as active Creation gives futurition to things, and paſſive, actual exiſtence; ſo predefinition and predetermination; and therefore among the Greeks one and the ſame Verbe foreign ſignifies both to predefine and predetermine. So that our major ſeems ſo clear as to carrie with it its own evidence. Wherefore we paſſe on to demonſtrate the minor, which our Adverſaries principally ſtrike at, and therefore needs our ſtrongeſt forces: This we ſhal endeavor to make good in and by the following Propoſitions. (1) Prop. Nothing is or can be future in its own nature, p. 152without ſome cauſe of its futurition. How is it poſſible that any thing ſhould paſſe from a ſtate of mere poſſibilitie, contingence, and indifference, but by ſome cauſe? Do not poſſible, and future differ? and muſt there not be ſome cauſe of this difference? (2) Prop. Whatever is the cauſe of futurition to any thing muſt be eternal. This is moſt evident; becauſe whatever is future was ſo from Eternitie; for God foreknew it to be ſo: otherwiſe, how could his knowlege be certain? Hence, (3) Prop. Nothing can give futurition to things but God. For is there any thing but God eternal? (4) Prop. Nothing in God gives futurition to things but his wil. His Eſſence ſimply conſidered cannot give futurition to things; becauſe poſſible and future are the ſame as to the Divine Eſſence: neither doth the Preſcience of God give futurition to things; for things are not future becauſe God foreknows them, but he therefore foreknows them becauſe future. Hence it follows, that nothing but the Divine wil can give futurition to things, as Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 11. §. 9. whence alſo it neceſſarily follows, (5) That the futurition of the ſubſtrate mater of al ſin is from the Divine wil and decree. For what can make ſinful acts future and ſo the object of Divine foreknowlege, but the wil of God, which gives futurition to althings? And if Gods predefining decreeing wil give futurition to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, muſt not his predeterminative wil alſo give exiſtence to it?

But let us examine what aſſaults our Adverſaries make againſtObjections againſt this Argument ſolved. this Argument by Reſponſes and Objections. (1) They replie to our minor, That the futurition of the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act of ſin is not from the wil of God, but from the wil of man, that gives exiſtence to it. Thus Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 585. where he endeavors to prove, That it is not repugnant that ſomething ſhould be future, which God hath not abſolutely predefined, but left to the wil of man to effect. So cap. 9. pag. 628. he peremtorily aſſertes, That God hath not decreed al futures, namely, the Fal of Adam, or the ſin againſt the Holy Ghost, &c. So pag. 631. he ſaith, Nothing hinders, but that there may be ſome cauſe of the futurition of a thing beſides the Decree of God, namely the create wil. The like Le Blanc, Concord. Libert. Hum. p. 1. theſ. 55—57. where he endeavors to prove, That what is the cauſe why things exiſte in time, the ſame is the cauſe of their futurition from Eternitie: but mans wil only is the cauſe why ſin exiſtes in time, ergo, &c. A poor Reſponſe indeed, or rather begging of the Queſtion! For is it poſſible that p. 153the ſecond cauſe loged in time ſhould give futurition to a thing from Eternitie? Is it not an approved Maxime in Philoſophie, yea in Nature, that the cauſe is ever, at leaſt in order of nature, before the effect? and is the ſecond cauſe confined by time, before the eternal futurition of its effect? (2) But Le Blanc anſwers hereto, theſ. 56. pag. 454. That Futurition is nothing elſe but a reſpect of reaſon, and an extrinſec denomination of the thing, which is ſaid to be future, not ſomething really diſtinct from the thing future, &c. But the vanitie of this ſubterfuge is moſt evident; for hereby it follows, that the thing is not future before it is exiſtent: can a modal extrinſec denomination of a thing exiſte before the thing that gives it exiſtence? How many abſurdities would follow hereon?

But our Adverſaries have one grand Objection, which they lay much weight on, againſt our minor, and that is this: If the wil of God gives futurition to ſin, then ſin as future hath one and the ſame Idea with the wil of God: and ſo the futurition of ſin muſt be God. This objection is urged and adorned with many Trophies by Strangius, Le Blanc, and a Divine of name among us. So Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 9. pag. 631, 632. having pag. 626, &c. recited Twiſſes argument from the eternal futurition of ſin, he replies thus: Herein, ſaith he, lies the whole force of the argument, that there can be no other cauſe of a futurition made from Eternitie, but what is eternal. To which he anſwers with a ſcoffe thus: A pretty argumentation indeed! why may we not by the ſame reaſon prove, that the futurition of ſin is God? The ſame is urged by Le Blanc, de Concord. Libert. par. 1. theſ. 55, 56. pag. 454. where he endeavors to prove againſt Twiſſe, That if the futurition of ſin be from the wil of God, it is God; which makes God manifeſtly the Author of ſin. The ſame is urged by a Divine of ſome note among us. But in anſwer hereto, I muſt confeſſe, I cannot but marvel at the confidence of perſons ſo learned, and in other points judicious, on ſuch infirme and rotten grounds: For when we ſpeak of the futurition of ſin, which is a complexe aggregate thing, we muſt diſtinguiſh its material from its formal part. (1) If we ſpeak of the material entitative part of ſin, which is in itſelf a natural good, ſo we may without the leaſt violation of Gods ſacred Majeſtie affirme, that its futurition is the ſame, or not really diſtinct from Gods wil the cauſe thereof: and why not? is not the futurition of al natural Beings good? And whence procedes al good but from the immenſe Ocean of good? p. 154Yea, was not al good from Eternitie loged in the boſome of God, and ſonot really diſtinct from him? So that indeed this objection of Strangius and Le Blanc againſt the futurition of the material entitative act of ſin from the wil of God ſtrikes at the futurition of althings, even the moſt gratioſe acts from the ſame wil: for if the futurition of any one natural act may be reſolved into the wil of man as its firſt cauſe, why may not the futurition of al grace be as wel reſolved into the ſame human wil, ſpecially in Adams innocent ſtate, who had then perfect free-wil? But yet (2) if we ſpeak of the futurition of ſin in regard of its formal nature, conſiſting in its vitioſitie and obliquitie, ſo we utterly denie, that its futurition is the ſame with God: for the futurition of ſin as to its vitioſitie is not from the effective wil of God, but permiſſive; God decrees to effect the entitative act, but only to permit the vitioſitie appendent thereto, which follows on the act, as other privations do on the abſence of their habit. To make this evident by a parallel inſtance; God decrees the diurnal motion of the Sun, and that at night it ſhal retire into the other Hemiſphere, whence darkneſſe neceſſarily follows: may we thence argue, that the futurition of darkneſſe, or darkneſſe itſelf is the ſame with God? Would not any Freſh-man in Logic hiſſe ſuch a conſequence out of the Scholes? And yet who dares denie, but that the retirement of the Sun out of this Hemiſphere into the other is from God, as alſo its futurition? The like may be inſtanced in al other privations, which have no real being, and therefore no real efficient of their exiſtence or futurition: for nothing can admit a real efficient cauſe of its futurition, but what has a real efficient cauſe of its exiſtence: what is the firſt efficient of the exiſtence of things? Is it not the wil of God? and is it not alſo the ſame Divine wil that gives futurition to things? Yea doth not the very ſame act or decree of the Divine wil that gives real Beings their futurition, give them alſo, in their appointed periods of time, their exiſtence? So that in this regard the Rule of Strangius and Le Blanc is moſt true, That the ſame cauſe that gives things their exiſtence, gives them alſo their futurition: this I ſay holds true of the firſt cauſe, but not of ſecond cauſes, as they would needs perſuade us. So that, to conclude this argument, in as much as the wil of God gives futurition to al ſin, the effective wil of God to the entitative act or ſubſtrate mater of ſin, and the permiſſive wil of God to the formal reaſon, or vitioſitie p. 155of ſin, hence it neceſſarily follows, that the predeterminative Concurſe of God, (whereby I underſtand nothing elſe but the Efficacious Divine Wil as operative) gives exiſtence to the ſubſtrate mater of Sin.

§. 2. Our ſecond Argument ſhal be taken from the certitude 2 Arg. from the Certitude of Divine Preſcience.of Gods Preſcience; and we may forme it thus: God can certainly foreknow nothing, but what he certainly decrees, predefines, and predetermines to be: But God certainly foreknows al ſin. Ergo. The Minor is granted by our Adverſaries and denied by none, that I know, except Atheiſts and Socinians: Thus Job 34. 21. For his eyes are upon the wayes of man and he ſeeth al his goings. Our principal worke therefore wil be to make good our Major; which we dout not but to performe in and by the following Propoſitions: (1) Prop. Nothing can be certainly foreknown by God, but what has ſome certain Reaſons, Principes, and Cauſes of ſuch a foreknowledge. Now there are three cauſes that give certitude to al Science and Preſcience: [1] A certitude of the Object: for if the object be uncertain, the Science can never be certain: can the Structure or Edifice be firme, if the foundation be infirme? [2] A certain Medium, which is the principal fundamen of al Science. [3]▪ A certitude of the Subject: for be the Object and Medium never ſo certain, yet there can be no certain Science, unleſs the Subject apprehend the ſame. And doth not the Preſcience of God include al theſe degrees of Certitude? Muſt there not be a certitude of the Object, Medium, and Subject? (2) Prop. The Divine Preſcience as to future ſins admits not any of theſe degrees of certitude, but as originated from the Divine Wil and Decree. [1] How can Sin as the Object of Divine Preſcience be certainly future, but by the efficacious Wil of God making it ſo? [2] What certain Medium can there be of Divine Preſcience, but the divine Wil and Decree? [3] And thence, how can God have a ſubjective Certitude of ſin but in and by his own Wil? Hence, (3) Prop. Gods certain Preſcience of Sin infers alſo a certain predefinition and predetermination of the ſubſtrate mater of Sin. That God knows nothing future but by his decree making it future, has been the perſuaſion not only of Calviniſts, but alſo of the moſt ſober Scholemen in al Ages, Scotus, Ricardus, Hervaeus, Bradwardine, Johannes Major, and others not a few, as Le Blanc, de Concord. Libert. Par. 3. Theſ. 33. p. 443. confeſſeth. Yea, Strangius himſelf grants the futurition of Sin in Gods Preſcience, p. 156as l. 3. c. 9. p. 640. Yea, Le Blanc, De Concord. Libert. Hum. Par. 1. Theſ. 59. &c. p. 455. proves ſtrongly, That according to Strangius's opinion, there can no contingent [i. e. ſinful act] be foreknown by God as abſolutely future, but what God firſt decreed to be abſolutely future. His words are theſe: But ſome alſo of thoſe who hold ſome free acts of God to be abſolutely future, and as ſuch to be foreknown by God, without any Decree predetermining the free cauſes to thoſe acts, as Learned Strangius, yet denie, that free future contingents may be known by God according to any Hypotheſis, which doth not include an abſolute Decree concerning their futurition: as Strang. de Volunt. l. 3. c. 11. His reaſon is, becauſe nothing can be certainly known, but what is certainly true: but nothing is certainly true, but what is neceſſary either abſolutely or conditionally. Whence he collects, that future conditionates cannot be the Object of divine Science, which is infallible and moſt certain, unleſſe there be included the condition, whence that which is ſaid to be future may be certainly inferred. But if this reaſon prevails, God can foreknow nothing contingent as abſolutely future, but what he before decreed as abſolutely future; which yet Strangius admits not, who confeſſeth, that men act many things freely to which they are not predetermined by God. Thus Le Blanc of Strangius's ſelf-contradicting Hypotheſis. And indeed, to ſpeak the truth nakedly, there ſeems ſo much force in Strangius's reaſon, whereby he proves, That al Gods Preſcience of free future Contingents includes an abſolute Decree of their futurition, namely from the certainty of divine Preſcience, that I no way wonder that he urgeth the ſame, albeit to the ſubverſion of his own Phaenomena. And I am very bold, yea confident in aſſerting, and demonſtrating theſe following Propoſitions. (1) Prop. That God can have no certain Preſcience of things future, but from his own decree, the only certain determinate cauſe of their futurition. And therefore the Socinians denying a certain determinate Cauſe of things contingent, denie alſo Gods Preſcience to be certain, as Le Blanc, De Concord. P. 3. Theſ. 1. p. 438. and I cannot ſee how any can rationally avoid the Socinian objection, who do not reſolve the certitude of the divine Preſcience into the divine Decree. Hence, (2) Prop. There is an hypothetic or conſequential neceſſitie that ariſeth from Gods certain Preſcience. This is wel urged, though in the defenſe of an hellbred Hypotheſis, by the Socinians, and cited by Le Blanc (as a p. 157knot not eaſily untied) de Concord. Par. 3. Theſ. 22. pag. 441. There is, ſaith he, much of difficultie here, which in times paſt has exerciſed the ingenies of Doctors. For ſeeing it is impoſſible, that the Preſcience of God may be deceived, it cannot be but that thoſe things muſt happen, which God foreſees wil happen; and therefore that althings happen neceſſarily: and it is impoſſible, but that the very wil of man muſt produce thoſe acts, which God from eternity foreknew it would produce. This Objection I deſpair ever to ſee rationally anſwered by our Adverſaries without contradicting their own Hypotheſis. See more of this Chap. 6. §. 5. Hence (3) Prop. The ſame arguments that are urged by our Opponents againſt Gods predetermining the Wil to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, may be, as they are by the Socinians, urged with as great force againſt Gods certain Preſcience of Sin. For our Adverſaries, Strangius, Le Blanc, &c. granting the certain futurition of ſin in the eternal Preſcience of God, fal under al thoſe Imputations and black Conſequences which they charge on us, who aſſert the predefinition, futurition, and predetermination of the ſubſtrate mater of Sin in the divine Decree. This Propoſition is incomparably wel demonſtrated by judicious Davenant, in his Animadverſions on Gods Love to Mankind, p. 418, 419, 442, 462. where he proves, That Infallible Preſcience granted by the Arminians, infers as much neceſſitie on the Wil, as abſolute Predeſtination and Reprobation. Of which more in our next Argument; alſo c. 6. §. 5.

Let us now a little inquire into the Subterfuges which our Adverſaries take Sanctuarie in to ſecure themſelves from the force of this Argument taken from Divine Preſcience. And here at what a miſerable loſſe and confuſion are they among themſelves? How few of them agree on any one Principe or Medium for the ſolving this argument? Some flie for refuge to the Moliniſts Middle Science, telling us, That God foreſaw that men being placed under ſuch hypotheſes, and circumſtances, would ſin againſt him, &c. Thus Baronius, Metaphyſ. Sect. 12. Diſp. 2. n. 55, 56. p. 326. where he profeſſedly defendes Fonſeca's conditionate Science, making God to have a conditionate Science of the firſt ſin, if Eve ſeduced by the Serpent ſhould temt Adam, &c. Thus alſo one and another Divine of good note among us. But this ſubterfuge is greatly diſliked by the more fober of this new Method, particularly by Strangius; who, l. 3. c. 11. p. 651. proves nervo…. That there can be no ſuch thing as a Middle p. 158or conditionate Science in God, becauſe its Object is not certainly Cognoſcible, or Knowable: and this he proves; becauſe an object cannot be certainly knowen, unleſſe it be certainly true: which the object of this conditionate Middle Science is not. Thus alſo Le Blanc, De Concord. Libert. Par. 1. p. 452, &c. Others therefore perceiving the infirmitude of this evaſion, have recourſe to the Dominicans real preſence of things future in Eternitie; whereby they make God, by his Science of Viſion, to behold the ſins of men. Thus Strangius, l. 3. c. 10. p. 646. If it be demanded, ſaith he, to what Science Gods Knowledge of Sins muſt be referred, I eaſily grant that it is to be referred to his Science of Viſion, &c. But more fully, l. 3. c. 7. p. 594. Among al the modes which are wont to be explicated, there is none more probable than that which is taken from the preſence of althings in Eternitie; becauſe the Eternitie of God is Inſucceſſive and Indiviſible. The ſame he inculcates, p. 595, 596, 597. But this mode alſo of ſolving the difficultie, is greatly oppoſed, by ſome of his own party, the New Methodiſts, who take ſome pains to ſhew the invaliditie thereof. So Le Blanc, De Concord. Libert. Par. 3. Theſ. 37. p. 443. Firſt, ſaith he, as for that real preſence of futures in Eternitie, namely as they are ſuppoſed to coexiſte from eternitie to eternitie it ſelf, it appears to be a mere figment; for that one thing coexiſte to another, it is neceſſary that both exiſte, &c. Thus alſo a learned and pious Divine among our ſelves, who has eſpouſed Strangius's Hypotheſis, fals ſoul on the Thomiſts for aſſerting, Althings to be eternally preſent to the divine Intellect in eſſe reali, &c. Laſtly, others therefore to evade the fore-mentioned inconveniences, take up their refuge under the Infinitie of Gods Preſcience. Thus Le Blanc, De Concord. Par. 1. Theſ. 40. p. 444. As for the fourth opinion, which ſeeks the certitude of the divine Preſcience in the infinitie of the divine Intellect, and in the determinate truth of thoſe things which are contingently future, it eſtabliſheth nothing but what is certain and indubitable, &c. Yet he grants, Theſ. 41. That albeit this opinion contains in it nothing but truth, yet it doth not ſatisfie the Queſtion, nor remove the main difficultie, namely, How things paſſe from a ſtate of poſſibilitie to a ſtate of futurition, &c. Whence he concludes, Theſ. 43. Sithat there is ſo much darkneſſe on every ſide, there is nothing more ſafe than to profeſſe our Ignorance in this particular. And this indeed is the beſt refuge theſe New Methodiſts have, when they ſee themſelves involved in ſo many ſelf-contradictions, and abſurdities, p. 159to profeſſe their Ignorance as to the Mode of Divine Preſcience. Yea, ſome of them procede ſo far in this pretended modeſtie, as to profeſſe, That the mode of Divine Preſcience is not determined in Scripture. Thus Strangius, l. 3. c. 5. p. 576. That God is omniſcient is put out of dout, but touching the mode and manner of Preſcience nothing is expreſſely delivered in Scripture. The like others. But is it ſo indeed? Doth not the Scripture declare expreſſely the mode of Preſcience? Why then (1) are our Adverſaries ſo dogmatic and poſitive in their new modes and meaſures of Divine Preſcience, contrary to the received Sentiments of the Church in al Ages? How comes it to paſſe, that they contend with ſo much heat and paſſion, for that which they confeſſe is not expreſſely delivered in Scripture? Were not a modeſt foreign or ſuſpenſion of aſſent more agreeable to ſuch a Confeſſion? But (2) We eaſily grant them, that the mode of Divine Preſcience is unſearchable and paſt finding out, as indeed al Divine Perfections are, but yet muſt we thence neceſſarily conclude, that nothing of the mode of Divine Preſcience is expreſſely delivered in Scripture? [1] Doth not the Scripture evidently declare, That the mode of Gods Preſcience is far above yea oppoſite to that of Mans ſcience, as much as Heaven is above the Earth, yea infinitely more? [2] Doth not the Scripture alſo remove from the mode of Divine Preſcience al manner of Imperfections, much more Contradictions? And is not the mode of Gods Preſcience in his own Eſſence and Decrees, much more perfect than that which makes his Infallible immutable Preſcience dependent on the mutable fallible Wil of Man? But ſee more hereof, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 5. §. 2.

§. 3. We paſſe on to our third Argument, which ſhal be taken3 Arg. from the Decree of Reprobation▪ from the Divine Wil and Decrees; and more particularly from the Decree of Reprobation. And here we ſhal lay down this Principe, which is granted by Strangius, and others of the New Method, That Divine Predetermination is adequate and commenſurate to Divine Predefinition or Predeſtination. So Strangius, l. 3. c. 2. p. 547. We eaſily grant, ſaith he, that the predefinition of God from eternitie, and the predetermination of the create wil in time, mutually follow each other, ſo that if God doth abſolutely predefine any particular and ſingular act to be brought about by us, he muſt alſo determine our Wil to the ſame. This he inculcates, c. 5. p. 584. Now this ingenuous Conceſſion is as much as we deſire to build our p. 160Demonſtration on: for we no way dout but to demonſtrate, That God doth abſolutely predefine the material entitative act of Sin: Which we ſhal endeavour to make good in the following Propoſitions. (1) Prop. Reprobation admits no formal motive, proper condition or cauſe. This Propoſition is generally denyed by the New Methodiſts, who grant, That God decrees al good abſolutely, but as for Sin, ſay they, God decrees that only reſpectively and conditionally. So Strangius, l. 3. c. 2. p. 546-548. But we no way dout, but, before we have finiſht this Demonſtration, to make it evident, that Gods Decree of Reprobation, whereby he determines to leave men to ſin, is abſolute, as wel as the Decree of Election: Yea, it is to me a thing altogether impoſſible, to defend an abſolute Decree of Election, and yet to make the Decree of Reprobation conditional and reſpective: for if the abſolute good pleaſure of God be the only cauſe why ſome are elected, muſt it not alſo be the only cauſe why others are rejected? Doth not the Election of the one neceſſarily implie the Reprobation of the other? It's true, our Divines, that follow the Sublapſarian mode, as Davenant, &c. ſpeak of Sin as a commun condition belonging to the whole maſſe of corrupt nature, yet they allow not of any diſtinctive condition or formal cauſe or motive, which ſhould incline the divine wil to reprobate one rather than another: for nothing can move the divine Wil, but what is ſome way antecedent to it: Now the conſideration of al ſin is ſubſequent to ſome act of Gods Wil. (2) Prop. The act of Reprobation is not merely negative, but poſitive and efficacious. It's granted, that ſome of our Divines make mention of a negative act of Reprobation, which they terme Non-election, or Preterition, yet hereby they intend not a ſuſpenſe act of the Divine wil, but include alſo a poſitive efficacious act. Thus Janſenius, Auguſt. de Grat. Chriſti, l. 10. c. 2. pag. 420. proves out of Auguſtin, That Gods negative Reprobation is poſitive. So Davenant, Diſſert. de Elect. & Reprob. p. 113. But we muſt take heed, ſaith he, leſt with Scotus we think, that the Wil of God in regard of Reprobates, which he electes not but paſſeth by, is merely negative: for in this very act, which we expreſſe by a Negation, is contained an expreſſe and affirmate Wil of God. So in his Determinations, Quaeſt. 25. p. 117. he tels us, That it's moſt certain, there can be no Decree permitting ſin, to which there doth not adhere ſome efficacious Decree. And p. 118. he inſtructs us, That this Decree of permitting ſin is efficacious, not in a way of efficience, p. 161but by directing and ordaining to extract good out of evil. (3) Prop. In the mater of Reprobation God is conſidered as a ſoverain Abſolute Lord, not as a Righteous Judge. The Pelagians, Moliniſts, Arminians, and New Methodiſts conſider God in the act of Reprobation as a juſt Judge, not as a ſupreme abſolute Lord: whence they conclude, that it is unjuſt with God to reprobate any but on the previſion of their ſins; not conſidering, that Reprobation is not an act inflicting puniſhment, but of denying Benefits, wherein the Libertie and Dominion of God is only to be attended; according to that of the Apoſtle, Rom. 9. 21. Has not the Potter power over the clay, &c? What is ſoverain Dominion, but an abſolute right to diſpoſe of what is our own? And ſhal we not allow the ſame Dominion to God, which is allowed to the Potter over his Clay? Is the ſoverain Lord tied to his Creature by any Law, more than what is in his own nature and wil? Hence it follows, (4) That the Decree of Reprobation is moſt abſolute and Independent as to al diſtinctive conditions or cauſes in man. Thus Janſenius, Auguſt. de Grat. Chriſti, l. 10. c. 4. p. 423. proves out of Auguſtin, That the abſolute Wil of God is the alone cauſe of Reprobation. And Auguſtin complains, That it is a great injurie to God, when men ſearch for cauſes of things ſuperior to his ſoverain Wil: for his Wil is ſuch a ſupreme Rule of Juſtice, as that whatever he wils is for that very reaſon, becauſe he wils it, to be accounted juſt. So Bradwardine, de Cauſa Dei, l. 1. c. 47. proves ſtrongly, That albeit God puniſheth no man eternally without ſin committed in time; yet he doth not eternally reprobate any for ſin as a Cauſe antecedently moving his divine Wil. So Alvarez, de Auxil. Diſput. 109. 3^a Concluſ. The poſitive act, whereby God from eternitie would not admit ſome into his Kingdome, was not conditionate, but abſolute, antecedent, in a moment of Reaſon, to the il uſe of Free-wil. And it is proved, [1] Becauſe there can be no cauſe of Reprobation. [2] Becauſe ſupernatural Beatitude is not due to any upon the account of natural improvements: Therefore God could from al eternitie without any Injurie, before the Preſcience of the good or il uſe of free-wil, elect ſome to life eternal, and by a poſitive act wil not to admit others. And our Divines generally grant, That there can be no other cauſe aſſigned of Reprobation, than the abſolute foreign or good pleaſure of God.

But none is more categoric and poſitive in this, than judiciousDavenant's Hypotheſes about abſolute Reprobation. Davenant, (who yet in ſome points came nigh the new Methodiſts) p. 152in his incomparable Animadverſions on Gods love to mankind. Wherein he doth puiſſantly defend the following particulars greatly conducing to the eſtabliſhment of our Hypotheſis. [1] That Gods ſecret wil of good pleaſure is very different from his reveled, preceptive, complacential wil, as pag. 221, 349, 376. [2] That Gods reveled, complacential, approbative wil is the meaſure of our dutie, but not of Gods decrees or operations, pag. 222, 356, 391, 399. [3] That Gods beneplacite wil or good pleaſure is only properly his wil, pag. 392. [4] That Gods beneplacite wil or good pleaſure is moved by nothing but itſelf, pag. 375, 376. [5] That the abſolute Decrees of God contradict not general conditional promiſſes of life and threats of death, pag. 241, 332, 375, 387, 398. [6] That God may be ſaid, according to his wil of complacence and approbation, to intend the ſalvation of ſinners, yea Reprobates, by providing the means of grace conducing thereto, pag. 271, 376, 394. [7] That the externe means and offers of grace muſt be meaſured and interpreted according to the knowen nature of the means, not the unknowen wil of God, pag. 353. [8] That God, by his approbative complacential wil unfeignedly wils what he commands, pag. 329, 393, 394, 401. [9] That al under the means of grace are under ſome remote conditional poſſibilitie of ſalvation, pag. 256, 257. [10] That Gods evangelic, providential intention of ſaving ſinners is oft fruſtrated as to its events by mans ſin, although his decretive beneplacite intention is never fruſtrated, p. 377, 381, 387, 388, 395. [11] That abſolute Election and Reprobation may ſtand with a poſſibilitie to contrary events, though not with contrary events, pag. 240, 333, 341, 360, 402, 253. [12] That abſolute Decrees oppoſe not the Juſtice of God; with its difference from that of men, pag. 232, 321, 336, 339, 342. [13] That abſolute Decrees oppoſe not Gods Holineſſe, pag. 240-272. [14] That abſolute Decrees oppoſe not the MercieMercy of God, pag. 277-310. [15] That mere conditional Decrees are inconſiſtent with Gods ſoverain Being and Independence, pag. 226. [16] That abſolute Reprobation is not repugnant to Gods Truth, pag. 349-362. [17] That abſolute Reprobation takes not away the end and uſe of Gods gifts, pag. 374-404. [18] That abſolute Reprobation leaves no man under an abſolute neceſſitie or compulſion to ſin, pag. 253. [19] Let Reprobation be abſolute or conditional it leaves the ſame poſſibilitie and libertie to the Agents, pag. 333, 340, 341, 351, 360. [20] That the Arminians grant an abſolute, immutable, fixed Decree of Reprobation, which admits the ſame objections that they urge against the Calviniſts, p. 302, p. 163332, 333, 340, 351, 354, 400, 418, 419. [21] Infallible Preſcience granted by the Arminians infers as much neceſſitie on the wil, and compulſion to ſin as abſolute Reprobation, pag. 418, 419, 442, 462. [22] Laſtly, he ſhews us, What is the right uſe and abuſe of abſolute Decrees, pag. 454-526. Theſe Propoſitions clearly and fully explicated by our judicious Davenant give great evidence and demonſtration to our Hypotheſis, as alſo diſtinct ſolution to the objections of our Opponents, of which hereafter, Chap. 6.

§. 4. Our next Argument ſhal be taken from Divine Concurſe, 4. Arg. from Divine Concurſe.its Principe, Nature, and Efficace; the explication whereof wil give us a ful demonſtration of our Hypotheſis; which we ſhal endeavor to lay down in the following Particulars.

1. That God predetermines the wil to the ſubſtrate mater or1. Its Principe. entitative act of that which is ſinful, may be demonſtrated from the Principe of al Divine Concurſe. What is the active principe of al Divine Concurſe, but the Divine wil? Doth not ſacred Pagine expreſſely ſpeak ſo much? So Eph. 1. 11. Who worketh althings after the counſel of his own wil. And more particularly as to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin it's ſaid, Act. 4. 28. that thoſe who crucified our Lord, did acte but what Gods hand, or wil and counſel predetermined to be done, of which before. And Strangius himſelf grants us, lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 63. That concurſe, as to its prime act is in God, and the ſame with God. Now ſuch is the Omnipotence ofCùm voluntas Divina ſit efficaciſſima, non ſolùm ſequitur, quòd fiant ea quae Deus fieri vult, ſed quòd eo modo fiant, quo Deus ea fieri velit, Aquin. part. 1. the Divine wil, that althings muſt neceſſarily be done, which he wils to be done, and in that manner as he wils them, as Aquinas wel determines. How then is it poſſible, but that if God wil that the ſubſtrate mater of ſin exiſte, it muſt neceſſarily exiſte, and in that manner as he wils it? Can any perſon or thing reſiſte the Divine efficacious wil? And what is al active concurſe but the determination of the ſame efficacious wil? See more of Gods wil being the ſpring and principe of Divine concurſe, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. §. 3.

2. That God predetermines the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of2. Its Nature. ſin may be demonſtrated from the nature of Divine concurſe as to its Totalitie, Ʋniverſalitie as to effects, Particularitie as to manner of working, Immediation, Antecedence, and ſoverain abſolute Independence. (1) The Totalitie of Divine concurſe ſufficiently demonſtrates1. Totalitie. its predetermination as to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. That Gods concurſe to al ſecond cauſes, acts, and effects is total we have ſufficiently demonſtrated, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. pag. 417. p. 164Thus much is alſo granted by Strangius, lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 55.Adeò ut tota actio pendeat à Deo, & tota à Creatura. where he aſſertes, That the whole action dependes on God, as alſo on the creature; otherwiſe God ſhould not concur immediately: Though I am not ignorant that a Divine of name among us, as alſo of the ſame partie with Strangius, denies Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin to be total; yet becauſe he is ſingular therein, and different from his own partie, I ſhal take it for granted, that Gods concurſe is total, and thence endeavor to prove its predetermining the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. For if God totally concur to the ſubſtrate act of ſin, muſt he not alſo concur to the wil that puts forth that act? And if God concur to the wil in the production of the act, muſt he not alſo neceſſarily determine the wil to that act? That Gods total concurſe doth not only reach the act and effect, but alſo the wil itſelf is granted by Strangius, lib. 2. cap. 6. pag. 171. Neither, faith he, do we ſay, that the Concurſe of God doth reach only the effect, but not the efficient cauſe, ſithat the very foreign, Energie of the ſecond cauſe muſt be from God; and the action is not leſſe an effect than the work, &c.

(2) The Ʋniverſalitie of Divine concurſe as to al effects whatſoever2. Ʋniverſalitie. gives us a further demonſtration of its efficacious predetermination as to the entitative act of ſin. That Divine concurſe is univerſally extenſive to al acts of the wil, as wel as to al other objects, by giving forces and aſſiſtances to faculties, exciting and appling them to their acts, and ordering them ſo as that they may in the beſt manner reach their ends, we have copioſely demonſtrated, Court Gent. Part 4. Book 2. Chap. 7. §. 2. pag. 296, 297. And doth not this ſufficiently demonſtrate Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin to be predeterminative? Yea, to ſpeak properly, is there, or can there be any real efficience, influxe, or concurſe ſent forth by God as the prime univerſal cauſe of althings, which is not predeterminative? To talke of an univerſal general concurſe of God, which immediately influenceth the wil and al its natural acts, and yet doth not predetermine, i. e. excite and applie the wil to its act, what is it but pure non-ſenſe and virtual contradiction?

(3) The Particularitie of Gods concurſe as to its manner of3. Particularitie. working doth alſo invictly demonſtrate its predetermination as to the entitative act of ſin. Divine concurſe, albeit it be univerſal as to the extent of its object, yet it's moſt particular and proper as to its manner of working. Our Adverſaries generally, both p. 165Pelagians, Moliniſts, Arminians, and New Methodiſts talke much of a general indifferent concurſe, alike commun to al effects, and determinable by its ſubſtrate mater; as the general influence of the Sun is determinable by the mater it workes on. But, alas! how unbecoming and incongruous to the Divine perfections is ſuch a general indifferent concurſe? Doth not this make the firſt cauſe to be ſecond, becauſe dependent; and the ſecond cauſe firſt, becauſe independent? And doth it not hence alſo neceſſarily follow, that the firſt cauſe may, by the indiſpoſition of the mater or reſiſtence of ſecond Agents, be fruſtrated of its intended effect? What more expreſſely overthrows the ſoverain Dominion and univerſal Concurſe of God, than ſuch a general indifferent Concurſe? And yet is not this one of the moſt plauſible ſubterfuges our Adverſaries have to ſhelter themſelves under? They object, If God ſhould by a particular predeterminative concurſe determine the wil to act in ſins intrinſecally evil, as the hatred of God, or the like, then the ſpecification of the act and moral determination of it to its particular object would be from God; and ſo God inevitably ſhould be the Author of ſin. This is their principal and indeed their only objection worth a naming againſt our Hypotheſis; to which we intend a more ful anſwer in the next Chapter, §. 1. at preſent let this ſuffice, [1] We ſay not, that God is a particular cauſe, but univerſal, working in and by a particular concurſe ſuitable to the indigence of the mater it workes on. [2] We ſay not, that this particular Concurſe of God doth morally ſpecifie, or determine the ſinful act to its object, but only phyſically individuate or naturally modifie the ſubſtrate mater of the ſinful act. This is incomparably wel explicated by Dr. Samuel Ward, that great Profeſſor of Theologie, in his Determination of Gods Concurſe, pag. 117. where he ſtrongly demonſtrates, That the previous Concurſe of God, as the firſt cauſe, doth in its way modifie and determine al the actions of ſecond cauſes: and if ſo, then ſurely the ſubſtrate entitative act of ſin, as hereafter. [3] That general indifferent concurſe, which our Adverſaries ſo warmly contend for, ſithat they grant it to be cauſative and influential on the ſinful act, doth equally infer God to be the Author of ſin, as our predeter minative concurſe. For if it be cauſative and effective of the act, then ſurely of that individual act, as determined to ſuch an object: for to talke of its concurrence to the act in genere, in the general, and not in individuo, in its individual determination p. 166to its object, is ſuch an abſurditie in Philoſophie, that al awakened Philoſophers wil decrie it: for what Tyro cannot informe us, that al phyſical acts are ſuppoſitorum, of individual ſingular ſubſtances, and ſo without al peradventure individual and ſingular: and if ſo, then muſt not their general concurſe reach not only the action in general, but alſo individually conſidered, as relating to its object, not morally, but phyſically? And wil it not hence follow, that their general concurſe is cauſative of the entitative act, as determined to its object, and ſo makes God the Author of ſin, as much, at leaſt as wel as our predeterminative concurſe, as more fully Chap. 6. §. 1. Of the particularitie of Divine Concurſe ſee Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. §. 4.

(4) The Immediation of Divine Concurſe ſtrongly demonſtrates4. Immediation. the predetermination of the wil as to the entitative act of ſin thereby. Our Adverſaries generally, both Jeſuites, Arminians, and new Methodiſts, excepting ſome very few that adhere to Durandus, grant an immediate concurſe to the entitative act of ſin; which if wel followed wil neceſſarily infer predeterminative concurſe, ſpecially according to the conceſſions of the new Methodiſts; who ſay, That this immediate concurſe reacheth not only the effect and act, (which the Jeſuites and Arminians grant) but alſo the very wil itſelf, as the immediate efficient of the act. Touching this immediate Concurſe ſee Strangius, lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 54, &c. & lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 163. And among the Jeſuites none has more acutely demonſtrated this, than Suarez, Metaphyſ. Diſp. 22. Sect. 1. and our Country-man Campton Carleton, in his Philoſ. Ʋniverſ. Diſp. 28. Sect. 2, 3. pag. & Diſput. 29. Sect. 1, 2. pag. 323, 324. where he demonſtrates ſtrongly, againſt Lud. à Dola, That God immediately together with the creature produceth the very act of ſin. Now hence we thus argue: If God, together with the human wil, immediately produceth the very act of ſin, then certainly he muſt of neceſſitie predetermine the wil to that entitative act: For ſuppoſe the ſinful act be motus primò primus, as they phraſe it, or a mere ſimple volition of the wil, how is it poſſible, that God ſhould immediately produce this act of the wil, without applying the wil to the act? Do not the very Jeſuites, Suarez, Carleton, with others grant, That one and the ſame ſinful act is produced by God and the human wil? And doth not Strangius with others of the New Methodiſts alſo acknowlege further, That Gods Concurſe to this ſinful act of the wil is previous to that of the wil, not only ſimultaneous, as p. 167Strang. lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 56? Yea Strangius and thoſe of his perſuaſion grant yet more, That Gods immediate concurſe reacheth not only the act and effect, but alſo the wil itſelf, as Strang. pag. 171. And is it not moſt evident, from theſe ingenuous conceſſions of our Adverſaries, touching immediate concurſe, that God doth predetermine the wil to the entitative act of ſin? Can we imagine, that one and the ſame ſinful act ſhould be produced immediately by God and the human wil, and yet God not applie the wil to its act, which is al that is meant by predetermination? Yea, doth God not only concur with the wil to one and the ſame act, but alſo influence the wil in the production of that act, as Strangius and others grant, and yet not applie it to act? How is it poſſible, that God ſhould influence the wil in the production of any act, without actuating or drawing forth the wil to act? And if God actuate or draw forth the wil to act, doth he not applie it to the act, and ſo predetermine the ſame? Again, doth God by an immediate concurſe not only influence the wil and its act, but alſo antecedently and in a moment of reaſon and cauſalitie before the wil concurs to its own act, as Strangius alſo grants? and doth not this give us a more abundant demonſtration, that God predetermines the wil to that act? Can there be any previous concurſe immediately actuating and influencing the wil in its act, but what is predeterminative? Doth not the wil neceſſarily depend on the previous concurſe of the firſt cauſe? and if ſo, muſt it not be applied and predetermined to its act thereby? But more of this previous concurſe in our next Argument. Laſtly, if we allow (with the Jeſuites) unto God only an immediate concurſe to the act of the wil, al thoſe black conſequences which our Adverſaries caſt on the Aſſertors of predetermination, may with the ſame facilitie be reflected on them: for if they make God, by an immediate concurſe to concur to the act of ſin, do they not make him the cauſe and ſo the Author of ſin as wel as we? More of immediate Concurſe, ſee Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. § 4.

(5) The Prioritie and Antecedence of Divine Concurſe doth invictly5. Prioritie. demonſtrate its predetermining the wil as to the ſubſtrate mater of ſinful acts. We ſhal here reaſſume a Principe already eſtabliſhed, and granted by Jeſuites and New Methodiſts, namely, That the action of the firſt cauſe concurring with the ſecond, is not, as to paſſive attingence, diſtinct from the action of the ſecond cauſe. This is generally granted by the Moliniſts, as Le Blanc, Concil. p. 168Arbitr. par. 3. theſ. 28. pag. 433. and by Janſenius, Auguſt. tom. 1. lib. 5. cap. 20. pag. 119. It's true, the Concurſe of God the firſt cauſe is really different from that of the ſecond, as to active attingence or principe, becauſe Gods concurſe, actively conſidered, is the ſame with his wil; yet as to paſſive attingence, the action and effect produced by God differ not from the action and effect produced by the ſecond cauſe. This being premiſſed, we procede to demonſtrate Divine predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin from the prioritie and antecedence of Divine concurſe, and that in and by the following Propoſitions. (1) Prop. The first cauſe doth in order of nature or cauſalitie concur before the ſecond. This Propoſition is potently demonſtrated by the acute Dr. Sam. Ward, Determinat. de Concurſ. Dei, pag. 116, &c. And the arguments for it are invict: for [1] where there is ſubordination and dependence in cauſalitie, which is proper to every ſecond cauſe, there poſterioritie is eſſentially appendent. Again, [2] al ſecond cauſes in regard of God are but inſtruments, as Aquinas proves: yea the wil of man as dependent on God is but a vital inſtrument, albeit in regard of the effect it may ſometimes be termed a principal Agent: Now doth not every inſtrument ſubſerve the principal Efficient? And doth not that which is ſubſervient in order of cauſalitie move after that which is the principal Agent? But here we are to remember, that when we aſſert Gods Concurſe to be previous in regard of its principe and independence, we denie not, but that it is alſo ſimultaneous in regard of the action and effect produced by the ſecond cauſe, as Alvarez, lib. 3. de Auxil. Diſput. 19. num. 4. & Twiſſe, Vind. Grat. lib. 2. de Criminat. part. 3. pag. 56. But that which we denie is, That Gods Concurſe is ſolely concomitant and ſimultaneous; and that [3] becauſe this ſimultaneous concurſe makes God only a partial cauſe, and dependent on the ſecond cauſe in the production of its effect. Yea, ſome of the Jeſuites grant, That if we conſider the concurſe of God abſolutely, without reſpect to this or that ſecond cauſe, ſo it is in order of nature before the influxe of the ſecond cauſe. So Fonſeca, Metaphyſ. lib. 6. cap. 2. quaeſt. 5. ſect. 13. The like Strangius, lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 60, 61. Thus alſo Burgerſdicius, Metaphyſ. lib. 2. cap. 11. grants, Gods concurſe in ſupernaturals to be previous, albeit in naturals he would have it to be only ſimultaneous: which is moſt abſurd: for the active concurſe of God, being nothing elſe but the immanent act of his wil, muſt neceſſarily be p. 169the ſame in naturals as in ſupernaturals. More of the prioritie and Antecedence of the Divine Concurſe, ſee Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. §. 4. p. 416. Hence, (2) Prop. This previous Concurſe of God as the firſt Cauſe muſt neceſſarily move and applie every ſecond cauſe to its act and effect. For how is it poſſible, that the ſecond cauſe ſhould act, unleſſe the firſt move and applie it to its act? Can a ſecond cauſe move it ſelf to an act, unleſſe it be firſt moved thereto by the firſt cauſe? Whence, (3) Prop. This previous Concurſe of God in applying and moving the Wil of man to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin predetermines the ſame. For if one and the ſame ſinful action be produced by God and the human Wil, and God concurs in order of nature before the wil, yea premove and applie it to the act, muſt he not neceſſarily predetermine the ſame? Al the wit and ſubtilitie of our Adverſaries wil never extricate themſelves or ſatisfie any awakened mind in this point, How God doth by a previous concurſe move and actuate the Wil, and yet not predetermine it to the act. Indeed to ſpeak the truth, the Sentiments not only of the Arminians, but alſo of the new Methodiſts, Baronius, Strangius and others about Concurſe, fal in with thoſe of the Jeſuites for a ſimultaneous Concurſe only, albeit ſome of them in termes diſown it.

(6) Laſtly, the ſoverain and abſolute Independence of Gods Concurſe6. Abſolute Independence. gives us further demonſtration of his predetermining the wil as to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. That Gods Concurſe is not Conditionate but abſolute and independent, we have copioſely proved, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. §. 4. p. 412, &c. And indeed, what more abſurd, yea impoſſible, than ſuch a conditionate Concurſe, whereby the Moliniſts and Arminians ſuppoſe Gods concurrence to depend on mans? Is there not hereby an effectual dore opened to a progreſſe into infinite? For if God concur on condition that man concur, doth God concur to that condition, or not? If not, is there not then ſome act of the creature produced without Gods concurſe? If God concur to the working of that condition, then abſolutely, or conditionally: if abſolutely, then his former Concurſe is not conditional: if conditionally, then what an infinitude of Conditions will follow hence? We take it then for granted, that Gods Concurſe is not conditional, but abſolute and independent. And hence we thus argue: If God concur abſolutely and independently to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, then he doth predetermine the wil thereto: the conſequence is rational p. 170and clear: For where two Agents concur totally and immediately to one and the ſame action and effect, the one muſt neceſſarily depend on the other; and that which depends on another muſt be determined by that other: for every cauſe that is dependent on another, is ſo far as it depends thereon determinable thereby. It's true, natural corporeous effects have ſome dependence on the Sun, without being determined thereby, becauſe the Sun is a limited cauſe, and has not efficace ſufficient to determine the mater is workes on, but is rather determined thereby, and ſo in that reſpect dependent thereon: But as for God the firſt cauſe whoſe wil, the principe of his concurſe, is omnipotent and moſt efficacious, it's impoſſible, that he ſhould have any dependence on, or be any way determinable in his concurſe by the mater he workes on: he being the moſt univerſal cauſe, infinitely perfect, and void of al potentialitie or paſſive power muſt neceſſarily predetermine al ſecond cauſes to their acts, but be determined by none. But more of this in what immediately follows of the efficace of Gods Concurſe.

3. Having demonſtrated Divine predetermination to the ſubſtrate3. The efficace of Divine Concurſe proves predetermination. Nos autem eo nomine, [ſc. influxus communis] non determinationem ſeu praedeterminationem intelligimus, ſed vim, foreign, & efficaciam Dei, quâ cauſas ſecundas ſibi ſubordinat, &c. Strang. l. 1. c. 11. 1. Efficacious Concurſe as to natural acts. mater of ſin from the Principe and Nature of Divine concurſe, we now procede to demonſtrate the ſame from the Efficace thereof. Strangius, lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 61. albeit he denies Gods general Concurſe, whereby he concurs to the mater of ſin, to be predeterminative, yet he grants it is efficacious, calling it foreign, the force and efficace of God, whereby he ſubordinates ſecond cauſes to himſelf; ſo that whatever they are or act, they eſſentially depend on him in both reſpects. And this ingenuous conceſſion touching the efficace of Divine concurſe, is al that we require to build our preſent Demonſtration on, which we ſhal diſtribute into two branches, (1) Gods efficacious concurſe unto al natural acts and effects. (2) Gods efficacious concurſe to al ſupernatural acts and effects.

1. We ſhal demonſtrate Divine predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin from the efficacitie of Divine concurſe as to al natural acts and effects; which evidently appears in the following particulars. (1) Gods concurſe to al phyſic or natural cauſes, motions, and effects is moſt efficacious. This Propoſition the ſacred Scriptures do abundantly confirme, as Eſa. 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36. Eph. 1. 11. Act. 17. 28. of which before Chap. 3. §. 1. Thus much Strangius and thoſe of his perſuaſion grant us, as before, c. 2. §. 1. (2) The efficace of Divine concurſe dependes on the efficace and determination p. 171of the Divine wil. For what is efficacious concurſe, conſidered actively, but the efficacitie of the Divine wil predetermining to act ſo or ſo? To preſume that active concurſe is any thing elſe but an immanent efficacious act of the Divine wil is to croſſe the mind of ſacred Scriptures and the moſt awakened Divines, as we have copioſely demonſtrated, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. §. 3. (3) Gods wil being efficacious and determinate determines al ſecond cauſes to al their natural actions and effects. Is it not impoſſible, but that the wil of God being omnipotent and determined for the production of ſuch an action of mans wil, the ſaid action or effect muſt neceſſarily follow? Is not the wil of God ſufficiently potent to determine the wil of man in al its natural acts? Is not the efficacitie of the Divine wil ſo great, that not only thoſe things are done, which God wils ſhal be done, but in that manner as he wilsNon ſolùm ſunt ea quae Deus vult fieri, ſed etiam eo modo fiunt quo Deus vult fieri, Strang. l. 2. c. 11. p. 266. them? Doth not Strangius confeſſe ſo much lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 55. & lib. 2. cap. 11. pag. 266.? Whence if God in his own wil purpoſe and determine, that the human wil ſhould produce ſuch or ſuch an action, ſuppoſe that whereto ſin is neceſſarily annexed, is not the human wil neceſſarily in regard of the Divine wil, and yet freely in regard of its own manner of working predetermined thereto? This is moſt evident in the crucifixion of our Lord, expreſſed, Act. 2. 23. By the determinate counſel, foreign, i. e. Act. 2. 23.Acts 2:23by the decreed, fixed, determined wil of God. The like Act. 4. 28. of which places before, Chap. 3. §. 2. Hence (4) The efficacious concurſe of God modifies, and according to its mode determines al actions of ſecond cauſes, not only neceſſarily but freely. Doth the Divine wil determine itſelf to the production of every ſingular individual effect? and may it not, yea muſt it not then determine the human wil to al its natural acts? Has mans infirme ambulatorie wil power to determine al ſuch faculties, acts and effects as are ſubject to its Empire? and has not the Divine wil, which is infinitely more efficacious, power to determine al inferior powers, acts and effects ſubject to its univerſal Dominion? And doth it not hence follow, that the ſoverain Divine wil doth by its efficacious concurſe predetermine al the free acts of the human wil, which neceſſarily fal under its Empire and modification? See this wel demonſtrated by that judicious Profeſſor Sam. Ward, Determinat. de Concurſu Dei, pag. 118, &c. Whence (5) The efficacious predeterminative concurſe of God equally extendes itſelf to al natural good, even to the ſubſtrate mater of ſinful acts. Strangius and others of p. 172our Opponents grant, That Gods efficacious predetermining Concurſe extendes it ſelf not only to al ſupernatural good, but alſo to al natural good, that has not ſin intrinſecally annexed to it: whence we may, by a paritie of reaſon demonſtrate divine Predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of al actions, though never ſo intrinſecally evil: for the ſubſtrate mater of al actions though intrinſecally evil, is naturally good. Take the Hatred of God, which is reckoned to be an act moſt intrinſecally evil, and if we conſider it in its ſubſtrate mater or entitative act, ſo it is naturally good, and if it were exerted againſt ſin, its proper object, it would be alſo morally good: So that indeed the ſubſtrate mater of bad and good actions is the ſame, namely ſome natural good, and Gods Concurſe to the one and other is the ſame. Yea this indeed is acknowledged by Strangius, l. 2. c. 3. p. 154. Al natural acts are good by the bonitie of Being, i. e. entitatively and naturally—whence he concludes, and ſo as to Concurſe we ſay, that God concurs Et ſic quantum ad concurſum attinet dicimus, Deum concurrere eodem modo ad generationem ex legitimo matrimonio & adulterio, quia phyſicè eadem eſt ſpecie utrobique actio. Strang. l. 2. c. …. p. 254.in the ſame manner to generation from lawful Matrimonie and that from adulterie; becauſe the action on both ſides is phyſically of the ſame kind. A great conceſſion indeed, which would our Adverſaries fully come up unto, how ſoon and how eaſily might we put a period to this Controverſie? For if the ſame action may be, as to its ſubſtrate mater naturally good and ſinful, and both phyſically of the ſame kind, and ſo Gods Concurſe to both the ſame, why then may not God be allowed to predetermine the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of that which is ſinful, as wel as to the ſubſtrate mater of that which is good? Surely if the action be, as to its ſubſtrate mater, in one and t'other naturally good, and phyſically of one and the ſame kind, there can be no rational account given, why God ſhould not predetermine the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of that which is evil, as wel as to that which is good. In ſhort, as there is no moral act ſo perfect in this imperfect ſtate, but has ſome vitioſitie adherent to it, ſo there is no natural act ſo ſinful, but it has for its ſubſtrate mater ſome natural good: and as God by predetermining the wil to the moral good is no way the Author of the vitioſitie appendent to the act; ſo by predetermining it to the natural ſubſtrate mater of the ſinful act, he is as much exemted from being the Author of the ſin. The ſubſtrate mater of the one and the other being the2. Efficacious Concurſe as to ſupernatural Acts and Effects, ſame, of which more §. 5.

2. We procede to demonſtrate Divine Predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of Sin from the Efficacitie of Divine Concurſe p. 173as to ſupernatural Acts and Effects. Our Adverſaries the New Methodiſts, Baronius only excepted, grant that efficacious Concurſe as to ſupernatural good is predeterminative; from which we no way dout, but to draw an invict Demonſtration, that Divine Concurſe is alſo predeterminative as to the ſubſtrate mater of ſinful acts, even ſuch as are intrinſecally evil. This Province we ſhal endeavor to make good by ſeveral Arguments, (1) From the Principe of al Predetermination: what is the principe of al Predetermination, but the omnipotent efficacious wil of God? And how are al Acts and Effects predetermined by the Divine Wil, but by an immutable predeterminative Decree, termed his Determinate Counſel, Act. 2. 23? which is ſaid, Act. 4. 28. to predetermine the Crucifixion of Chriſt? Doth not therefore the ſame determinate Counſel or wil of God predetermine the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, as wel as any act morally good? Is not then predetermination as to its active Attingence or principe one and the ſame, both as to natural and ſupernatural good, albeit as to its paſſive Attingence and effect it be greatly different? For albeit there be a double Concurſe required to ſupernatural good, one to the ſubſtrate mater, which is a natural good, and the other to the moral good, which is ſupernatural, but only a ſingle concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin; yet in point of efficace the predetermination to the later is equal to the former, as to Divine efficience: For there is as much power and efficace required to predetermine or premove the wil to the ſubſtrate mater, or natural entitative act of ſin, as there is to any ſupernatural good: both are alike facile to the divine omnipotent wil: and ſurely no reaſon can be given, why predetermination is neceſſary for the production of any gracious act, and not as neceſſary for the production of the entitative act of ſin: for the Wil of Man is equally uncapable of acting at al, as of acting graciouſly without Predetermination, whatever ſome may imagine to the contrary.

(2) From the ſubſtrate mater of al natural and ſupernatural good. Are not al gracious acts and habits loged in human nature? What is ſupernatural good but a ray of the divine Nature irradiated into human Nature, and ſeated therein as its proper ſubject? Is not al grace a ſupernatural mode implanted in human nature? whence, if God by efficacious Grace predetermine the wil to receive any habitual infuſion, or act of Grace, muſt he not p. 174alſo neceſſarily predetermine the wil to the natural act which is the ſubſtrate mater of that ſupernatural mode? And if God predetermine the wil to the natural act of that which is good, muſt he not alſo predetermine it to the natural act of that which is evil? What difference can there be aſſigned between the natural act of Crucifying our Lord, which was intrinſecally evil, and that of crucifying the Thieves, which was a piece of Juſtice? Did not God then as much predetermine the former as the later? Yea, to raiſe this Argument higher, hath not the ſame ſubſtrate mater, which is ſupernaturally good and gracious as to its ſubſtance, ſome modal vitioſitie and obliquitie appendent thereto in this imperfect ſtate? If then God predetermine the Wil to the ſubſtrate mater of that which is ſupernaturally good, muſt he not alſo neceſſarily predetermine it to the ſubſtrate mater of that which is alſo evil? I am not ignorant what is replied hereto, which we no way dout but wil prove invalid, and no better than ſmoke or vapor, when we come to enlarge more fully on this Argument, §. 5.

(3) We demonſtrate the neceſſitie of Divine Predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of what is ſinful, from the Invaliditie yea vanitie of thoſe reaſons which are urged by our Adverſaries againſt it, which do with as much force ſtrike at Predetermination to what is ſupernaturally good. [1] One principal Objection that our Adverſaries urge againſt predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, ſpecially ſuch ſins as are intrinſecally evil, is That it deſtroyes the libertie of the Wil, &c. We ſhal not now attemt any anſwer to the Objection, but reſerve it for its proper place, Chap. 6. §. 5. only we are to ſhew, that the whole of this Objection, and the reaſons urged to enforce it, do with as much force ſtrike againſt al Predetermination, even that which is granted to ſupernatural good: For doth not Predetermination to gracious acts, lay as much compulſion on the wil, and thence as much deſtroy its libertie, as predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin? And is not the ſame objection with its reaſons as much urged, and that with as great color of Reaſon, by the Moliniſts and Arminians, againſt al Predetermination to gracious acts? I muſt confeſſe, I could never, neither do I think any elſe can maintain and defend our ground againſt the Jeſuites and Arminians, if thoſe reaſons and grounds which our Adverſaries urge againſt Predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, be admitted p. 175as valid. [2] The like may be ſaid of that other objection or reaſon, why our Adverſaries reject Predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, namely, That it makes al Gods Laws naturally and abſolutely impoſſible, &c. Is not this very objection, and the reaſon urged to enforce it, as much urged by Moliniſts and Arminians, againſt al Predetermination even to gracious Acts? And are not the reaſons as valid on the later as on the former ſide? What reaſon do the new Methodiſts give, that Predetermination to the entitative act of ſin makes Gods Laws impoſſible, but that it takes away the Wils Indifference, and deſtroys the natural power that the wil is inveſted with to act or not to act? And doth not Predetermination to good as much deſtroy the wils indifference, and its power to act or not to act? [3] Our Adverſaries urge, That this Predetermination takes away the uſe of Promiſes, Invitations, and al evangelic offers of Grace, and ſuppoſeth God not to deal ſincerely with Sinners, in making offers of Grace, and yet irreſiſtibly determining their Wils againſt the acceptance of theſe offers? Is not this very objection, with its reaſon urged, and that with as much force of reaſon by Jeſuites and Arminians againſt Predetermination to gracious Acts? For if no man can entertain thoſe offers of Grace by his own freewil, without a predeterminative Concurſe, are not al gracious Promiſes, Invitations, and offers of Grace to Sinners, who fal not under this Predetermination, vain and uſeleſſe? Our Adverſaries the new Methodiſts generally, (ſome few excepted) denie any ſufficient Grace or Free-wil in corrupt Nature for the reception of evangelic offers and Grace: and is not then the vitious wil of corrupt Nature as wel determined by its own vitioſitie againſt the offers of Grace, as by the predeterminative Concurſe of God? [4] Our Adverſaries object, That this Predetermination to the entitative act of ſin, ſuppoſeth God to compel and force men to ſin, and ſo makes him to be the real Author of Sin, yea more than the Sinner that is under a violent compulſion, &c. and is not this very argument urged by Jeſuites and Arminians againſt al Predetermination even to what is good, and that with as much color of reaſon? For ſay they, If God predetermine the wil to what is good, then he compels and forceth the wil to be good; ſo that the wil being under a compulſion cannot be ſaid to be the Author of its own act, but is as a Stock or Stone in the exercice of that act, which deſtroyeth al moral good, &c. Which objection p. 176is as valid as that of our Adverſaries, and can never be ſolidly anſwered if their objection be good; though according to our Principes neither the one or the other objection has any force in it, as we ſhal demonſtrate, c. 6. §. 5. To conclude this argument, I am very confident, our Opponents the new Methodiſts wil never be able to defend an efficacious determinative Concurſe to what is morally or ſupernaturally good, ſo long as they denie the ſame to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, which is naturally good: for al, or at leaſt the moſt of thoſe arguments they urge againſt the later, may, and are urged by the Moliniſts and Arminians againſt the former, and that with equal force. And this Baronius did by his natural acumen foreſee, and therefore he took a courſe more ſeemingly rational according to his Principes, though leſſe friendly to divine Concurſe, to denie al Predetermination as wel to ſupernatural as natural good; of which ſee his Metaph. Sect. 8. Diſput. 3. n. 66. &c. p. 136.

§. 5. Our fifth Argument ſhal be taken from the Nature of Sin, 5. Arg. from the Nature of Sin.its ſubſtrate mater and formal reaſon. 1. As to the general Idea and ſubſtrate mater of ſin, we have demonſtrated, Ch. 1. §. 2. (1) That al human acts conſidered in their natural entitie, abſtracted 1. Its mater.from their moral conſtitution, are neither good nor evil. (2) That al moral acts whether good or evil receive their formal Conſtitution and Determination from the Moral Law. (3) That no human Act conſidered phyſically, or according to its natural entitative ſubſtance, is intrinſecally evil, but only morally, in regard of its moral ſpecification or determination to ſuch or ſuch an object. Hence, (4) That ſin has for its ſubſtrate mater ſome natural good. Now theſe Propoſitions being laid as ſo many Principes, we hence argue, That God muſt neceſſarily concur to, yea predetermine the ſubſtrate mater of actions intrinſecally evil: For, if al ſinful acts, even ſuch as are intrinſecally evil morally, are, according to their ſubſtrate mater phyſically good, doth it not neceſſarily follow, that God the firſt cauſe muſt concur thereto, yea predetermine the ſame? Muſt not every ſecond Cauſe as ſuch be actuated and ſo determined by its firſt Cauſe and his efficacious Concurſe? Doth not the ſubordination of the ſecond Cauſe to the firſt, neceſſarily demonſtrate, not only its dependence on, but alſo Predetermination by the ſame in al its natural operations and effects? Is not every Being by participation neceſſarily limited, defined, and predetermined in al its natural entitative motions by the firſt Being, which p. 177is ſuch by Eſſence? May not this alſo be demonſtrated from the very conceſſions of our Adverſaries, who grant, that vitioſitie follows not any Act as a natural Act? So Strangius, l. 2. c. 11. p. 243. We confeſſe, ſaith he, that Vitioſitie doth not follow the Fatemur quidem, malitiam non ſequi actum peccati ut eſt actus, alioqui omnis actus eſſet peccatum, &c. Strang.act of ſin as an act; for then every act would be ſin; alſo that it doth not follow, as the act procedes from God, for then every act that procedes from God, would have ſin. Now if ſin follows not the act of ſin as an act, what reaſon can there be why God ſhould not efficaciouſly concur to, yea predetermine the entitative act of Sin? This is wel explicated by Lud. Crocius, (that Breme Profeſſor, who was a member of the Synod of Dort, and there began the New Method) Duodecas, Diſſert. de Volunt. Dei, Diſſert▪ 8. Theſ. 99. p. 426. As to the Act, ſaith he, of the Divine Wil about ſin, the effates of Scripture ſeem to contradict themſelves, whiles that ſome expreſſely affirm, That God nils and hates ſins, and thoſe that commit them, Pſal. 5. 5, 6, 7. Zach. 8. 17. but others ſeem to ſay, That God wils, creates, effectes them, Eſa. 45. 7. Lam. 3. 37, 38. Amos 3. 6. But theſe things do wel agree, if the diſtinction be rightly obſerved, (1) Between the Act, and the Vitioſitie of the Act. (2) Between the Act as it is from God, and as it is from the Creature. (3) Between the wil of God decreeing, and the wil of God commanding. Whence he concludes, Theſ. 100. p. 427. For God wils and produceth, by the Creature as the firſt Cauſe by the ſecond, the Act, as an Act, of it ſelf indifferent to moral Bonitie, and Vitioſitie; and wils and effectes the ſame, albeit depraved by the Creature, as inveſted with his moral rectitude, becauſe he produceth it by his own power, from his immaculate Sanctitie and Juſtice, which can never be made crooked or corrupted by any ſecond Cauſe. Whence he addes, Theſ. 101. And this act eſſentially good, even as defiled by the Creature, God juſtly and holily uſeth either as an Inſtrument of puniſhment, or of exploration or exercice, and as an ordinate convenient Medium, according to his Juſtice for the beſt ends. Theſ. 102. In this ſenſe God is ſaid, To create evil, to produce it out of his mouth, to ſend Joſeph into Egypt by the Vendition of his Brethren, to rob Job of his goods, to command Shimei to curſe David, to uſe Abſolon for the defiling his Fathers Concubines, to deliver Chriſt into the hands of Jews and Gentiles. Theſ. 103. For God decreed to produce thoſe acts, as acts, and to permit the depravation of them by p. 178the Sinners, and to uſe them albeit depraved, wiſely and juſtly to ends holily ordained by him.

2. Divine Predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin may2. From the formal reaſon of ſin. be alſo demonſtrated from the formal nature of Sin, which conſiſtes in the privation of that moral rectitude due to actions, as Ch. 1. §. 2. we have more fully explicated. Whence we thus argue: If every deflexion from the Law of God be ſin, then certainly God neceſſarily predetermines to the ſubſtrate mater of ſome ſins: and if of ſome, why not of al, even ſuch as are intrinſecally evil? That God predetermines to the ſubſtrate mater of ſome ſins is evident, and that from the conceſſions of our Adverſaries, who grant, That God doth predetermine the Wil to actions imperfectly good, which alſo, according to their own confeſſions are modally ſinful: Whence we thus argue; The ſubſtrate mater of the ſame action as good and as ſinful is the ſame: wherefore, if God predetermine the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of the action as good, muſt he not alſo predetermine it to the ſubſtrate mater of the ſame action as ſinful? When we ſay, That God predetermines to the ſubſtrate mater of the ſame action as ſinfil, As here, may not be taken reduplicatively, but only ſpecificatively, i. e. as it ſpecifies and diſtributes the ſame action into good, and ſinful; which are different modes of one and the ſame ſubſtrate mater or entitative act: ſo that our Opponents granting, that God doth predetermine the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of the action as imperfectly good, how can they poſſibly denie, that God predetermines it alſo to the ſame ſubſtrate mater which is modally ſinful? When I can ſee a rational ſolution given to this argument, (which I deſpair of) I ſhal think our Adverſaries have done much ſervice to their Cauſe. But they replie, If God concur by determinative influence to imperfectly good actions, it doth not thence follow, that he concurs to actions intrinſecally, and in the ſubſtance of them evil. But I conceive this evaſion wil ſoon vaniſh into ſmoke and vapor, if we conſider wel, (1) That the leaſt ſin may not be imputed unto God as the Author of it, any more than the greateſt: the difference between ſins modally and intrinſecally evil finds no place here: dare our Adverſaries ſay, that God is the Author of that modal ſin which adheres to actions imperfectly good, but not of that intrinſecal evil which is in the hatred of God, or the like? Whence, (2) The force of our Argument ariſeth from this paritie of reaſon, If God doth p. 179concur, yea predetermine the wil to an act only modally ſinful, without falling under the imputation of being the Author of ſin, why may he not alſo predetermine the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of that which is intrinſecally evil, without the like imputation? Albeit there be a diſparitie in the ſins, yet is not the paritie of reaſon for the one and the other the ſame? Ought we not to be as cautelous in exemting the Sacred Majeſtie of God from having any hand in the leaſt ſin, as in the greateſt? And if we allow our ſelves the libertie of making him the author of the leaſt ſin, wil not that open a wide gate for atheiſtic blaſphemous wits to impute to him the greateſt ſins? Whence, if we can prove, what our Adverſaries wil never be able to diſprove, yea what they approve of, namely, that God doth predetermine the wil to the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act, which is imperfectly good, but modally ſinful, it thence follows by neceſſary conſequence and inevitable paritie of reaſon, that he can and doth predetermine the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of that which is intrinſecally evil, without the leaſt imputation of being the Author of ſin annexed thereto. I would fain have our Opponents weigh impartially the force of this Argument.

§. 6. Our next Argument for Gods Predetermination to the6. Arg. from Gods Permiſſion of Sin. ſubſtrate mater of ſin ſhal be drawen from his Permiſſion of Sin. And to make way to this demonſtration we muſt diſtinguiſh of Permiſſion; which is either legal or natural: Natural Permiſſion is either divine or human; and both either negative or poſitive. (1) God gives no legal Permiſſion or Indulgence to ſin, but on the contrary ſeverely prohibites it, and that on pain of death. (2) Gods natural Permiſſion as Rector of the World is not of ſin ſimply as ſin, but as conducible to the principal ends of his divine Gubernation. It's true, Divine Permiſſion regardes not only the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, but alſo ſin formally conſidered, and ſo ſin under that reduplication, as ſin, yet not ſimply conſidered, but as it has a tendence or conducibilitie to the advance of Divine Glorie: and ſo much is confeſſed by Strangius, l. 2. c. 22. p. 399. If the Reduplication be joined to the terme ſin, it's true, that ſin as ſin is permitted by God, phyſically not morally. Yet I adde, not ſimply, but reſpectively, as conducible to Gods ſupreme ends of Government. And Lud. Crocius, Duodec. Diſſert. 8. Theſ. 74. pag. 415. aſſertes, That God, albeit he wils and decrees only the material of ſin, yet p. 178unbelieving and diſobedient, both Iews and Cananites, &c. 2. Whereas he tels us, that the Mythologiſts ſay, Mars was the firſt that invented militarie weapons and affairs, &c. This may as well refer to Joſhua, as to Nimrod. For albeit Nimrod began wars in Aſia the greater, or Babylon; yet we find no conſiderable wars amongſt the Cananites, or Phenicians, till Ioſhua's time; who by reaſon of his great militarie Exploits and victories, might well be reputed the God of War, Mars, or Hercules. 3. That which may adde to this parallelizing of Mars with Ioſhua is, that the Mythologiſts (whom Diodorus here brings in as the Authors of this deſcription) found abundant more matter and reaſon to reduce the ſtories they had received by Tradition touching Ioſhua, unto Mars, than thoſe of Nimrod. For the ſtories of Ioſhua were then, when Mythologie began to creep into the world, very freſh and pregnant, &c. 4. We have proved before, out of the conceſſions of Voſſius himſelf, that Mars was the ſame with Hercules, and therefore with Ioſhua.

3. Yet we need not reject, but may alſo allow, without any contradiction, a parallel betwixt Mars and Nimrod: as 1. Nimrod Mars's his parallel with Nimrod.was called by his ſubjects, Belus. So Servius on Virg. Aen. 1. ſaies, that Belus was the firſt that reigned in the Aſſyrian Monarchie. Mars alſo had the ſame title given to him; whence ſome derive bellum war, from Belus, Mars's name. 2. Nimrod is ſaid to be a mighty hunter, i. e. Warrier, Gen 10. 8. ſo Mars. See more of this parallel betwixt Nimrod and Mars, in Voſſius, de Idololatr. lib. 1. cap. 16.