The Court of the Gentiles Part 4:2, Treatise · Part 4 · Book 3 · Chapter 4

The Court of the Gentiles Part 4:2 · Treatise · Part 4 · Book 3 · Chapter 4

p. 108CHAP. IV. An Hiſtoric Idea of Predeterminants and Antipredeterminants.

The Aſſertors of Gods predeterminative Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of Sin; (1) Fathers, Auguſtin, Proſper, Fulgentius. (2) Such as ſucceeded in the Roman Church, Hugo de Sancto Victore, Aquinas, Scotus, Ariminenſis, Holcot, Altiſſiodorenſis: Bradwardine, his Converſion, Parts, both natural and acquired, zele for Efficacious Predeterminative Concurſe, particularly as to the ſubſtrate mater of Sin: How God wils Sin: How the entitative act is from Gods predeterminative Concurſe: How God ſpontaneouſly impels or neceſſitates men to the entitative act of Sin. The Dominicans, and particularly Alvarez's ſentiments conforme to our Hypotheſis. The concurrent perſwaſions of Janſenius and his Sectators: alſo of the Tridentine Catechiſme. (3) The Sentiments of Reformed Divines, Wiclef, Calvin, Zuinglius, Beza, Chamier, Lud. Crocius, the Synod of Dort, and Church of England, Davenant, Sam. Ward, &c. (4) Such as denie Gods Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of Sin, more ancient: Durandus, his proper Hypotheſis, and who may be accounted his Sectators; Lud. à dola his proper Sentiments and deſigne: Arminius, and his Adherents, the Remonſtrants and Anabaptiſtes. The New Methodiſtes, Camero, Amyraldus, Placeus, Le Blanc, Baronius, Strangius. How theſe New Methodiſtes fel into theſe Sentiments, and who may be eſtimed ſuch.

§. 1. HAving given a Scriptural Demonſtration of our Hypotheſis,The Aſſertors of Gods predeterminative Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of Sin. touching the efficacious, predeterminative Concurſe of God to the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act of that which is ſinful; we now procede to lay down the concurrent ſentiments of Antipelagians p. 109in al Ages of the Church; and withal to ſhew who have in al Ages defended the Antitheſis of our Adverſaries. Firſt, among the Patrons of our Hypotheſis none deſerves a more illuſtrious name and mention than Auguſtin, that great PropugnatorAuguſtin. or Champion of efficacious Concurſe. I am not ignorant that ſome of our Adverſaries, as Strangius by name, are ſo confident as to cite Auguſtin's teſtimonie in defenſe of their Antitheſis; but this is too palpable an abuſe to find place among the indifferent or impartial Sectators of Auguſtin; whoſe ſentiments touching this ſubject are ſufficiently evident in his Works. Thus, de Grat. & Lib. Arbitr. cap. 20. If the Scripture, ſaith he, be diligently inſpected, it wil appear, that not only the good wils of men, but alſo the bad, are ſo in Gods power, that he can incline them where and when he wil, to performe his benefices, or to inflict his puniſhments, by his moſt ſecret, yet moſt juſt judgement. Again, in the ſame book, he ſaith, That God workes in the hearts of men, to incline them which way he pleaſe, either to Good, out of his MercieMercy, or to evil according to their deſerts, by his Judgement, ſometimes open, ſometimes ſecret, but always juſt. So De Praedeſtinat. Sanct. c. 16. It is (ſaith he) in the power of wicked men to ſin; but that by ſinning malitioſely they do this or that, is not in their power, but of God dividing the darkneſs, and ordering it; that ſo hence what they do againſt the wil of God, might not be fulfilled but by the wil of God. Again, De Gen. ad literam lib. imperfecto, c. 5. Some things, ſaith he, God makes and orders, other things he only orders; righteous men he makes and orders, but ſinners, as ſinners, he makes not, but only orders, i. e. In good actions he is both the cauſe of the good, and of the action, but in ſinful acts he is not the cauſe of the ſin, but only of the act ordering it for his glorie. Again, De Civitate Dei, l. 13. c. 22. he ſaith, That Sin as it is juſtly permitted by God, fals under the Eternal Law, that is, the Divine Wil or Decree. Moreover, Auguſtin frequently aſſerts, that God puniſheth one ſin by giving men up to another: So Contra Julian. l. 5. c. 3. & de Civitate Dei, l. 15. c. 6. & libro de Natura & Gratia, from cap. 20. to the end. To theſe Teſtimonies we may adde ſeveral Hypotheſes of Auguſtin, which demonſtratively evince Gods Predeterminative Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. As, (1) He aſſerted, that Reprobation was the act of Gods abſolute Wil, and ſo in it ſelf poſitive and abſolute (2) He held, That Excecation and Obduration is the conſequent of Reprobation: of which ſee Janſenius, Auguſt. p. 110de G…t. Chriſt. l. 10. c. 3, 4. (3) He maintained, That al ſins in lapſed Nature are neceſſary, becauſe puniſhments, as Janſen. de Nat. Lap. c. 22. p. 264. Laſtly, that Auguſtin held Gods Efficacious predeterminative Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, is evident from the falſe Imputations charged on him by the Pelagians, who imputed to him the ſame odioſe and forged conſequences, which have been ever ſince imputed to the Aſſertors of Predeterminative Concurſe. As, [1] They falſely charged on him, that he aſſerted a fatal Neceſſitie, and ſaid, that God compelled mon to ſin. Whereas Auguſtin, l. 1. q. 2. ad Simpl. anſwers (in the ſame manner as we now adays) That God is ſaid to harden ſome Sinners, in that he has not merciemercy on them, not that he impels them to ſin, &c. [2] The Pelagians charged on Auguſtin, That he denied to ſinners the Libertie of their Wil, &c. It's true, when heSi ergo ſervi ſunt peccati, quid ſe jactant de libero arbitrio? Auguſt. libr. de Spirit. & lit. c. 30. diſcourſeth of Moral Libertie, conſiſting in Adherence unto God, he denieth, that ſinners have any ſuch Libertie; but yet he fully aſſerts a Natural Libertie, that which is eſſential to the wil, to belong to al ſinners, of which ſee Janſenius, Auguſt. Tom. 3. l. 7. c. 12. p. 330. To conclude, there is ſcarce any imputation falſely charged on thoſe that aſſert predeterminative Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin now a-days, but it was alſo imputed to Auguſtin by the Pelagians of old, and wiped off by him, as by us, which ſufficiently demonſtrates, that his Sentiments were as to this Hypotheſis the ſame with ours. He that wil ſee more of Auguſtins mind about this mater, may conſult Rutherford, de Providentia, cap. 30. Chamier, Panſtrat. Tom. 2. Lib. 3. c. 8.

Next to Auguſtin follow his Sectators and Diſciples, Proſper andProſper and Fulgentius. Fulgentius, whom our Adverſaries would fain make to be of their perſuaſion, but without ſhadow of Truth or Reaſon. As for the ſentiments of Proſper touching our Hypotheſis, they are to be ſeen, ad capitula Gallorum, where, following Auguſtin, he makes God to wil ſin as the puniſhment of ſin. So Fulgentius, l. 1. ad Monimum, c. 26. God, albeit he be not the Author of evil cogitations, yet he is the Ordinator of evil Wils: neither doth he ceaſe to work good out of the evil work of every evil man: neither in the very injuſt works of the Wil, doth he relinquiſh the juſt order of his own works; becauſe this he hath in that very order, that he doth juſtly deſert the evil Wil—and in the very injuſt wil of the ſinner, he fulfills his own Juſtice, &c. What could be ſaid more evidently to demonſtrate our Hypotheſis? Is God the Ordinator of evil Wils? doth he not then p. 111efficaciouſly, yea predeterminatively move and order them in their very evil acts? And doth he not ceaſe to worke good out of their evil workes? Muſt he not then applie their wils to the entitative act of thoſe evil workes? And what is this but to predetermine their wils to the ſubſtrate mater of thoſe evil workes? Again, if God, in the very injuſt workes of the Wil doth not relinquiſh the juſt order of his workes, then ſurely he muſt of neceſſitie applie and predetermine the wil of the Sinner to the entitative act of the worke, thereby to maintain his own juſt order.

§. 2. We now paſſe on to ſuch as ſucceded the Fathers, andSuch as ſucceeded the Fathers. albeit they lived in the boſome of the Roman Church, yet they ſtil defended the Doctrine of Auguſtin and our Hypotheſis, as to Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. I ſhall begin with Anſelme, Biſhop of Canterburie, who flouriſhedAnſelme. about the year 1095, an Italian by Nation, Monke by profeſſion, of a moſt acute Ingenie, devotional Sanctitie, conjoined with great Prudence and Humilitie, according to the character given him by Baronius. This Anſelme, de Concord. Praeſcientiae, Praedeſtinationis, Gratiae & Liberi Arbitrii, c. 1. thus ſpeaketh: God worketh althings, which are wrought by a juſt or unjuſt Wil, i. e. both good and evil workes; In good workes truely he cauſeth both that they are, and that they are good; but in evil workes he cauſeth that they are, but not that they are evil. Herein he gives us the difference between Gods Concurſe to good and evil acts, as alſo the demonſtration of our Hypotheſis; for if God cauſeth evil acts that they are, then certainly he efficaciouſly moves and applies the wil to the act, which is al that we mean by Predetermination.

Next follows Hugo de Sancto Victore, by Nation a Saxon, (andHugo de Sancto Victore. ſo allied to us,) by profeſſion a Monk, contemporary with Bernard, who flouriſhed about the year 1130. This Hugo, de Sacr. Fid. l. 1. c. 13. faith, **Malum eſſe vult Deus, & tamen malum non vult: vult eſſe malum, quia bonum eſt malum eſſe; non vult ipſum malum, quia bonum non eſt ipſum malum.That God wils there ſhould be evil, and yet he doth not wil evil: He wils there ſhould be evil, becauſe it's good there ſhould be evil; but he wils not evil, becauſe evil it ſelf is not good. An excellent deſcription of Gods predeterminative wil and concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, ſo as to vindicate his Sacred Majeſtie from any hand in the moral vitioſitie thereof: (1) God wils there ſhould be evil, i. e. he doth, by an omnipotent efficacious decree, wil the exiſtence of evil, in willing the ſubſtrate mater thereof: and yet (2) He doth not wil evil, i. e. he p. 112doth not with a wil of approbation or any way morally wil evil as to its moral vitioſitie or formal reaſon. (3) It's good there ſhould be evil, i. e. as it conduceth to the illuſtration of Gods glorie; and ſo God wils it. But (4) evil itſelf, [morally conſidered as evil] is not good, and therefore not willed by God as ſuch. The ſame Hugo, de Sacramentis, par. 5. cap. 29. affirmes, That God by preſiding Deum malas voluntates praeſidendo, occultâ & inviſibili operatione ad ſuum arbitrium temperare & inclinare.over evil wils, doth, by an occult and inviſible operation, temper and incline them to his own wil. What could more expreſſely be ſaid for the aſſerting Gods efficacious predeterminative concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin? Doth God indeed preſide over the evil wils of men, and ſo, by an occult and inviſible operation, temper and incline them to his own wil? how is it poſſible then, but that he applie and determine them to the entitative act of their ſinful workes? And whereas Hugo foreſaw many would be then, as now alſo, ſcandaliſed at this doctrine, touching Gods efficacious concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, he addes this as the reaſon of the offenſe: Not becauſe that which is ſpoken is not wel ſpoken, but becauſe that which is wel ſpoken is not wel underſtood. I wiſh our Adverſaries would wel conſider this prophetic reflexion of Hugo; of which more hereafter in Bradwardines ſentiments.

We paſſe on to Thomas Aquinas, whom ſome of our AdverſariesAquinas. would fain conjure into their Campe, and make a Patrone of their Antitheſis: but this is ſo great an impoſition on the intelligent world, that I cannot but admire at the confidence of thoſe who make uſe of it. Yet this has been the attempt not only of ſome leſſe converſant in Aquinas's Workes, but even of learned Strangius, who is oft more candid and ingenuous than others of his perſuaſion. Thus Strangius, lib. 2. cap. 14. from pag. 313. to 317. endeavors to demonſtrate, That Thomas doth not admit that phyſic predetermination of God to al and ſingular actions of the wil: The like a reverend Divine of eſtime among our ſelves would fain perſuade us, namely, That albeit the Dominicans are for ſuch an univerſal predetermination, yet Aquinas is not, &c. But let us a little examine the reaſon of this ſubterfuge: (1) Was not Thomas Aquinas himſelf a Dominican, of the Order of Dominic? And are not al the Dominicans ſworne Thomiſts? Albeit they are in regard of their Order Dominicans, yet are they not al in regard of their Doctrine Thomiſts? How comes it to paſſe then that they ſhould contend ſo hotly for phyſic predetermination of the wil by God in al its natural actions, even ſuch as are ſinful, and yet Thomas p. 113their Maſter againſt it? (2) Take the character of impartial Writers, and who ever denied this to be Aquinas's ſentiment? See learned and acute Dr. Samuel Ward, Profeſſor of Theologie at Cambridge, his Determinations, pag. 117, 118. where he proves Gods predeterminative Concurſe to al actions of the wil out of Thomas. But becauſe Dr. Ward ſeems to be our friend, we ſhal appele unto our Adverſaries for the deciſion of this Controverſie, namely to Le Blanc and Baronius. Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. Hum. par. 3. theſ. 10. pag. 430. aſſures us, That Thomas and his ſectators the Dominicans, teach, for the explication of Divine Concurſe—That God doth premove and applie the very ſecond cauſes to their worke: for this the dependence of the ſecond cauſes on God their first Mover doth require. For, according to their mind, God is therefore ſaid to be the first Mover, becauſe he doth antecedently move and applie al other cauſes to their operations, &c. What could be ſaid more evidently to explicate Aquinas's mind herein? Thus alſo Baronius, who, in his Metaphyſics, Sect. 8. Diſp. 3. §. 78. pag. 146. imputes this celebrious Opinion of Gods previous predeterminative concurſe to al actions unto Thomas Aquinas, as the principal Founder thereof. So §. 79. pag. 147. And §. 82. pag. 149. he urgeth, That from the opinion of Thomas it follows, that God is the Author of ſin. The like §. 85. pag. 151. But (3) to let paſſe the teſtimonies of others, if we may be allowed the privilege of believing our own ſenſes, and the reflexions of our own reaſon thereon, it is to me moſt evident, that Aquinas has copioſely and nervoſely defended our Hypotheſis, and impugned the Antitheſis of our Adverſaries. Thus, 1. 2. Quaeſt. 79. Art. 2. The act of ſin is both Ens and Act, and in both regards it is from God: for it's neceſſary that every Ens or Being be derived from the first Being, &c. And whereas Strangius and a reverend Divine among our ſelves pretend, that this includes immediate concurſe, but not predeterminative, it is moſt evident, that Aquinas owned no concurſe but what was predeterminative: For what is predetermination of the wil, but the application Praedeterminare voluntatem eſt applicare voluntatem ad agendum, & facere ut faciat, Strang. l. 2. c. 11. p. 244.of it to its act, as Strangius, pag. 244. grants? And is not this the proper notion whereby Aquinas deſcribeth the Concurſe of God to al acts of the wil? What more commun with him, than this grand Effate, That God applies al ſecond cauſes to their act? Thus in his ſums, par. 1. Quaeſt. 105. Art. 5. he layes down this concluſion, That God actes in every Agent finally, effectively, and formally, yet ſo as they alſo act. And then in the explication hereof p. 114he ſaith, (3) That it is to be conſidered, that God doth not only move things to work, as by applying the formes and virtues of things to their operations, (as alſo the Artificer applies the axe to cut, who yet ſometimes gives not the forme to the axe) but alſo gives formes to creatures acting, and preſerves them in being—and becauſe the forme is in the thing,—and God is properly the cauſe of the univerſal Being in althings, which among althings is more intime, it follows, that God workes intimely in althings; and for this reaſon in ſacred Scripture, the operations of nature are aſcribed unto God, as working in nature, according to that, Job 10. 11. With skin and with fleſh hast thou clothed me, &c. What could have been ſaid more evidently to demonſtrate our Hypotheſis? He ſaith, (1) That God actes in every Agent, not only finally and effectively, but alſo formally. (2) That God moves things to worke, by APPLYING (i. e. predetermining) the formes and virtues of things to their operations. Yea, (3) That God applies the ſecond cauſe to act, as the Artificer applies the inſtrument to worke. Whereby he makes al ſecond cauſes, the wil not excepted, but a kind of inſtrument of Gods principal efficience: For the wil, albeit it may be termed a principal cauſe of moſt of its acts, yet in regard of the Divine concurſe, which it receives, and in virtue whereof it actes, it may ſafely be termed a vital Inſtrument. (4) That God acting most intimely in althings, the very operations of nature are aſcribed unto him, which notes predetermination in the higheſt point. So alſo Aquinas, Quaeſt. Diſp. q. 3. de Potentia, art. 7. ſpeakes fully of this predeterminative application of al ſecond cauſes by God. And indeed how frequently is this Hypotheſis demonſtrated by him? So that I cannot but wonder, that any learned man ſhould urge Aquinas's teſtimonie againſt us.

We deſcend now to Scotus, (the Head of a Sect oppoſite to theScotus. Thomiſts, yet) who hath given evident and ſtrong confirmation and demonſtration to our Hypotheſis. I am not ignorant, that a learned and pious Divine makes uſe alſo of Scotus's name to patroniſe his Antitheſis: and I ſhal not denie, but that Scotus has in many points too much favored the Pelagian intereſt, which has inclined the Jeſuites to follow him rather than Thomas; yet this I no way dout but to make good, that as to our Hypotheſis, touching Gods predeterminative concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, Scotus is fully of our perſuaſion. This wil appear evident, (1) if we p. 115conſider his notion of Divine Preſcience of things future, which he makes to ariſe from the Divine Decree giving futurition to them, as Le Blanc, de Praeſcient. theſ. 33. pag. 443. confeſſeth. And certainly ſuch as hold Gods preſcience of ſins future to be from his own Decree efficaciouſly determining their futurition, cannot with any ſhadow of reaſon denie Gods predeterminative concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. (2) Scotus and his ſectators generallyScotiſtae nihil hujuſmodi phyſicum & intrinſecum creaturae inditum eſſe volunt, ſed eam dicunt per decretum Dei extrinſecum, abſolutum, & efficax ad agendum applicari, ac determinari, Carleton. Philoſ. Disp. 30. ſect. 1. pag. 327. hold, That God efficaciouſly concurs to al ſecond cauſes and their acts, not by any influence or impreſſion on the ſecond cauſe, (which the Thomiſts aſſert) but by his abſolute and efficacious Decree applying and determining the ſecond cauſe to act. Which we judge to be the very truth, as it hath been demonſtrated by us, Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. §. 3. So that the Thomiſts and Scotiſts differ not really as to the point of predetermination, but only as to its origine and principe; the Thomiſts making it to conſiſte in a phyſic intrinſec influxe impreſſed on the creature, and the Scotiſts placing the whole of it in the volition of God, without any force impreſſed on the ſecond cauſe, as our Country-man Compt. Carleton, in his Philoſophie, Diſp. 30. Sect. 1. pag. 327. has incomparably wel ſtated it. But (3) Scotus, in 4. Sentent. Diſtinct. 49. Quaeſt. 6. §. 14. pag. 522. (edit. 1620.) has theſe very words: Eſt contra naturam ejus, [ſcil. voluntatis] determinari à cauſa inferiori, quia tunc ipſa non eſſet ſuperior: non eſt autem contra naturam ejus determinari à cauſa ſuperiori, quia cum hoc ſtat, quòd ſit cauſa in ſuo ordine, It's against its nature, [namely the wils] to be determined by an inferior cauſe, becauſe then it ſhould not be ſuperior; but it is not against its nature to be determined by a ſuperior cauſe, becauſe it is conſiſtent herewith, that it be a cauſe in its own order. Wherein Scotus doth moſt acutely, though briefly, ſtate the Controverſie about Predetermination both negatively and poſitively. (1) Negatively, That the wil cannot be determined, or predetermined, by any inferior cauſe; becauſe then it were not ſuperior: for whatever cauſe predetermines another to act, is ſo far ſuperior to it: it being impoſſible, yea a contradiction, that the inferior ſhould predetermine the ſuperior. (2) Poſitively, That it is not against the nature of the wil to be predetermined by a ſuperior cauſe, i. e. by God the firſt cauſe, who gave it being, and therefore may without violence to its libertie determine or predetermine it in its operation: and Scotus's reaſon is invincible; becauſe to be predetermined by a ſuperior cauſe, is very wel conſistent with the wils being a cauſe in its own order: Yea, we p. 116may raiſe this reaſon to a greater height, therefore the wil is a cauſe in its own order, i. e. a particular, proper, principal, or leſſe principal cauſe, according to the nature of its cauſalitie and effect, becauſe it is predetermined to act by God the ſuperior firſt Cauſe: ſo that Gods predeterminative concurſe to the actions of the wil, even ſuch as have ſin appendent to them, is, according to Scotus's ſentiments, ſo far from infringing or diminiſhing the wils natural order and libertie in acting, as that it corroborates and confirmes the ſame. (4) Laſtly, Scotus in 2. Sent. Diſt. 37. q. 2. ſaith expreſſely, That [albeit God determine the wil to the material act which is ſinful, yet] the vitioſitie of ſin is not to be attributed to God, but to the create wil, becauſe the create wil is under an eſſential obligation to give rectitude to the action; but God is not bound by any ſuch obligation, &c. Which is the ſame with the ſentiments of Zuinglius and our reformed Divines, albeit oppoſed by the new Methodiſts, as wel as Arminians and Moliniſts.

Having laid down the concurrent teſtimonies of the two principalGregorius Ariminenſis. Heads of the Scholes, Thomas and Scotus, we now paſſe on to their ſectators, whereof we ſhal give the mention but of a few more illuſtrious. To begin with Gregorius Ariminenſis, who was by profeſſion a Dominican, and great defendent of Augustin's Doctrine; whom Biſhop Ʋſher valued as the ſoundest of the Schole-men, and Dr. Barlow, as the acuteſt: His invict demonſtration of our Hypotheſis we find, in Sent. 2. Diſtinct. 34. Art. 3. where he demonſtrates Gods▪ immediate efficience in producing the entitative act of ſin thus: (1) Every evil act when produced is conſerved by God. Ergo. The antecedent he proves thus: becauſe otherwiſe every evil act ſhould not in its exiſtence immediately depend on God, but be independent; and ſo by ſtronger reaſon, the wil itſelf, which is more perfect than its act, ſhould be independent. Again, if it be not repugnant to the Divine Bonitie to conſerve the evil act, neither is it repugnant to it to produce the ſame. (2) The wil is of itſelf indifferent to any act, therefore it muſt be determined to every act by God. (3) If God be not the immediate cauſe of the act, which is evil, he is not the Maker of al Beings. (4) Al good that is not God, is from God as the Efficient thereof; but the act morally evil is yet naturally good. Ergo. Hence he procedes to anſwer the Objections of his and our Adverſaries thus: (1) If God produceObject 1. p. 117the ſame evil act, which man produceth, then he ſins as man ſins. Whereto he anſwers, by denying the conſequence, and that on this reaſon; becauſe man doth not therefore preciſely ſin, becauſe he doth an evil act, as it is Ens or act; but therefore he ſins, becauſe he doth it evilly, i. e. againſt right reaſon; [or the Law of God] but now God produceth the ſame act according to right reaſon, and therefore wel. So the ſame man borne in fornication, is produced by God wel, but by the fornicator evilly. But (2) it is farther objected by his Adverſaries then, as by ours now, thus: Thou wilt ſay, that thoſe things that are, perObject. 2. ſe, in themſelves [or intrinſecally] evil, as the hatred of God, or the like, can never be wel done: therefore neither by God. I reſponde, ſaith he, (as we) that there is or can be no entitie which may not be wel done, albeit not by every Agent: e. g. man envieth; but God, although he produce the ſame act of envie with man, yet he doth not envie. For al ſuch acts, beyond the ſimple production or motion of ſuch or ſuch a thing, do connote ſomething on the part of the Author, who is ſo denominated, which agrees not to God: So to ſteal, beſides the ſimple tranſlation of the thing from place to place, connotes the thing ſtolne not to belong to him that tranſlated it: but God tranſlating the ſame thing, doth not tranſlate what is not his own; and therefore is not ſaid to be the thief, &c. But here we are to note, that whereas Gregorius Ariminenſis makes God to be a partial cauſe of ſin, it is not to be underſtood, as if God were the partial cauſe of the entitative act, for ſo he makes God to be a total cauſe; but he cals God a partial cauſe of ſin, as he produceth only the entitative act, not the vitioſitie, whereof man only is the moral cauſe. Thus alſo Holcot, our Country-man, ſuper Sentent. lib. 2. Diſt. 1. q. 1.Holcot. makes God to be a partial cauſe of ſin, yet not the Author of it: whereby he plainly means, as he explicates himſelf, that God is the phyſical cauſe of the ſubſtrate mater, or entitative act only, but man the moral cauſe of the vitioſitie alſo. This I mention, becauſe a reverend Divine of name among us from theſe expreſſions of Ariminenſis and Holcot, would perſuade us, that they make God the partial cauſe of the entitative act. We might adde to theſe the teſtimonies of Altiſſiodorenſis, in Sent. 2. where he provesAltiſſiodorenſis by ſtrong arguments, namely from the Paſſion of Chriſt, &c. That the evil action is from God operating and cooperating with the human wil; of which more in what follows touching Bradwardine.

p. 118I now come to Thomas Bradwardine, our pious, learned and profoundThomas Bradwardine his character and zele for efficacious Grace. Bradwardine, whom, might I be allowed my libertie, I ſhould rather reckon among our firſt Reformers, than among the Sons of Antichriſt; for indeed he was a zeloſe Patron of, and ſtout Champion for the fundamental points of the Reformed Religion, ſpecially efficacious free Grace, which he with ſo much courage, ſtrength of argument, and flaming zele defended againſt the Pelagians of thoſe days. This Thomas Bradwardine, borne at Hartfield in Suſſex, flouriſhed about the year 1350. He was a perſon of prodigioſe natural ingenie, which he greatly poliſht by al manner of acquired Sciences, ſpecially the Mathematics and ſcholaſtic Theologie. He was a great Affecter and Admirer of metaphyſic Contemplations, which in his firſt ſtudies he greedily drank in, even to the neglect of the holy Scriptures, becauſe they favored not of a metaphyſic ſtyle, as he himſelf informes us, in his Book de Cauſa Dei. When, ſaith he, in the ſtate of my unregeneracie, I came into the Scholes, and heard Lectures on Pauls Epiſtles of free Grace, &c. it did no way reliſh with me, quia non ſapit ſtylum metaphyſicum, becauſe it ſavored not of a metaphyſic ſtyle. It was with me, as it was with Auguſtin of old, nothing would pleaſe but ſcholaſtic diſcourſes for free wil, &c. But after his Converſion he was, as another Augustin, the greateſt Champion for free efficacious Grace. Balaeus, de Script. Brit. cent. 5. cap. 87. tels us, That John Baconthorp, that famoſe Divine and Engliſh-man, returning from Paris had a great conteſt with Bradwardine about the points of Gods Preſcience and Predeſtination; to whom at laſt Bradwardine aſſents in al thoſe points; as the ſame Baconthorp declares, in Sent. lib. 4. Diſt. 1. q. 4. Afterwards he was called to be Confeſſor to King Edward III. and thence made Archbiſhop of Canterbury, without any deſire of his own thereto. He was indeed a good Mathematician, a great Philoſopher, and excellent Divine, being communly ſtiled Doctor profundus, the profound Doctor.

Neither was he leſſe renowned for his Pietie and Zele in theHis zele for efficacious Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. Cauſe of God, againſt the Pelagians, which he defended with great fervor, as wel as acumen of ſpirit; which alſo is greatly illuſtrious in his defence of Gods efficacious Concurſe and Providence about the ſubſtrate mater of ſinful acts. This he frequently inculcates in his moſt excellent Book de Cauſa Dei, ſpecially lib. 1. c. 30, 31, 32, 33, 34. He demonſtrates (1) That al voluntary actions are governed by the Laws of Divine Providence, cap. 30, 31. p. 271, &c. (2) That althings which have any natural Entitie or Being, procede from Gods Providence actually and efficaciouſly diſpoſing them, and not merely permitting. Which he demonſtrates many ways: as [1] Becauſe there is no act ſimply evil and inordinate, by any inordination precedent to the divine wil. [2] Becauſe otherwiſe the whole Ʋniverſe would not be diſpoſed in the beſt manner. [3] Becauſe the Scriptures both of Old and New Teſtments, aſcribe to God in his Providence about Sin active Names. Thus cap. 32. p. 288. (3) That about whatever Gods Permiſſion is, his actual Volition is alſo employed about the ſame. And he gives this demonſtrative reaſon hereof: For albeit thoſe things that are evil as evil are not good, yet it is good that there ſhould be not only good things, but alſo evil. For unleſs it were good that evils be, the Omnipotent good would not ſuffer them to be, as Cap. 33.

Hence, (4) He comes l. 34. to the ſtate of the controverſie,How God wils Sin. How God wils ſin, and how he wils it not. [1] He proves, p. 294, 295. That God muſt neceſſarily wil the exiſtence of Sin, becauſe he permits it: alſo God doth voluntarily provide for, yea act al the voluntary acts of the wil both good and evil, with al their poſitive circumſtances, which neceſſarily import ſin. Again, This Propoſition, Sin is, is true; and therefore there muſt be ſome cauſe of its truth, which can be no other than the divine wil, from which al complexe beings as wel as incomplexe have their origination. Again, `Whatever is good muſt procede from the firſt good: but that Sin exiſte, is good, according to Auguſtin. So Hugo ſaith, That God wils that ſins exiſte, becauſe this is good. Moreover, he brings in Hugo ſpeaking thus; (which deſerves a great remarque) If it be ſaid, God wils ſin, this ſeems harſh and ſcandalous to the ear; and therefore ſome pious mind doth refute this, not becauſe that which is ſpoken, is il ſpoken, but becauſe that which is wel ſpoken is il underſtood. [2] Thence Bradwardine procedes to refute Lombard, who aſſerts, That God wils ſin as a puniſhment, not under this reaſon, as it is ſin; [i. e. materially or entitatively conſidered] which Hypotheſis of Lombard he refutes, by ſhewing, That the puniſhment of ſin is neceſſarily conjoined with the Sin: ſo that if God wils ſin as a puniſhment, he muſt neceſſarily wil the exiſtence of ſin. Alſo whoever knows two things to be neceſſarily and inſeparably conjoined, and wils that they ſhould be ſo conjoined, and knowingly and rationally wils one; the ſame perſon wils alſo the other; ſpecially if about both he employ an act of his wil: But now God knows and wils that thoſe two, Sin and Puniſhment be conjoined together, and rationally wils the one, namely the puniſhment of ſin, therefore alſo the ſin. Again, he that wils an Antecedent, wils alſo the Conſequent, at leaſt in an univerſal, albeit not in a particular: for he that wils a whole, wils al the parts neceſſary thereto. [3] Thence he procedes, p. 300. to ſhew, how God wils ſin: God, ſaith he, doth no way wil Sin ſimply, but only in ſome limited reſpect: For, to ſay that God wils ſomething ſimply, is, according to the commun manner of ſpeech, to ſay, that he loves it and approves of it as good. Yea, addes he, may it not be ſaid, that in the whole Univerſe there is no ſuch thing as Inordination, Deformitie, or Sin ſimply conſidered, but only Sin in ſome reſpect? Becauſe in regard of the prime and ſupreme Cauſe, al Beings both poſitive and privative are ſweetly diſpoſed with the higheſt wiſdome, beautie, and juſtice. Whence [4] He gives us the difference between Gods Concurſe to ſinful acts, and to ſuch as are good, p. 302. God, ſaith he, is not the Author of ſin, as of that which is done wel: For of this he is the Author ſo, as that he alone doth ſupernaturally create, and give to the wel-doer, Faith, Hope and Love, &c. But it is not ſo as to ſin. i. e. As to good, God produceth not only the natural act, but alſo the moral Bonitie, but as to Sin, he produceth only the natural entitative Act. [5] He thence p. 302. explicates, how the Apoſtle Paul and the Fathers denied, that God wils Sin: When, ſaith he, Auguſtin and the other holy men denie that God wils Sin, the cauſe of this negation ſeems this: Becauſe the Apoſtle and Auguſtin, and other holy men placed Predeſtination, Preſcience, and the like on Gods part, the Pelagians and other Heretics would excuſe Sinners from their ſins, and retort the cauſe and blame on God, who ſo predeſtinated or foreknew: therefore theſe holy men would ſay, that God by his Predeſtination, Preſcience or ſuch like, doth not compel them againſt their wil to ſin, but that they ſin freely and by their own wil; and that God by predeſtinating, foreknowing, or willing ſins, doth not ſin, nor do unjuſtly, neither is he the firſt imputable, or culpable cauſe of ſins; but the firſt, imputable, and culpable cauſe is the proper wil of the Sinner. This indeed is the proper ſtate of our controverſie at this day. Then p. 121he addes, pag. 303. But if it yet be ſaid, that it always hears il with many to ſay, That God doth any wiſe wil ſin, it is certainly true, and that peradventure according to Hugo before cited, not becauſe that which is ſaid is not wel ſaid, but Non quia quod dicitur non bene dicitur, ſed quia quod bene dicitur, non bene intelligī tur. Hugo.becauſe that which is wel ſaid, is not wel underſtood. I would to God therefore that they would take the Salt of Divine wiſdome, and ſavor and underſtand the truth which is ſavory to a ſane taſt; and that they would know, that there is no evil in the world, which is not for ſome great good: why therefore ſhould we ſubſtract from the World, and from God the Author of the World, this way of doing good, or of benefaction, which is ſo admirable and great? Yea it ſeems more miraculoſe and great, to worke good out of evils than out of goods, or to worke good only. And without peradventure it ſeemeth ſo diſguſtful to many, if it be ſaid, that God wils and produceth the act of Inceſt of the Father with the Daughter, of the Son with the Mother, of Parricide, Sedition, Blaſphemie, and other like ſins: and yet not only the Saints, but alſo the Philoſophers ſpeak thus: For who in ſuch an inceſt prepares the ſeed, and moves, creates, and infuſeth the ſoul into the foetus, but God? and however it may ſound, thus the Saints of God ſpeak, yea the Spirit of God, who ſpeaks in them. What could be ſaid more acutely, demonſtratively and divinely for the deciding our controverſie, would men but receive it?

(5) Again, Bradwardine, l. 2. c. 20. p. 542, &c. proves outHow the entitative act is from Gods Predeterminative Concurſe. of Altiſſiodorenſis, ſuper 2. ſent. That the evil action is from God operating and cooperating with the human wil. Altiſſiodorenſis's arguments are theſe, [1] From the Paſſion of Chriſt, which was good, and proceded from a good cauſe, namely the Wil of God. [2] From the act of Fornication, whereby an holy Prophet is begotten: which act is the cauſe of good, and therefore good; and yet it is alſo evil: and therefore an evil action as it is an action is good and from God. Thence he addes the Teſtimonie of Thomas, in Quaeſt. de malo, q. 19. where he demands, Whether the act of ſin be from God? and he anſwers thus: It muſt be ſaid, that among the Ancients there was a double opinion concerning this mater: ſome ſaid more anciently, that the action of Sin was not from God; attending to the very Deformity of Sin, which is not from God: but ſome ſaid, that the action of p. 122Sin is from God; attending to the very Eſſence of the Act, which muſt be granted to be from God, and that on a double reaſon; [1] Commun, becauſe God being Ens or Being by his own Eſſence, and his very Eſſence his Being, it muſt thence neceſſarily follow, that whatever doth participate of Being, muſt be derived from him who is Being by Eſſence. [2] Special: for it is neceſſary that al motions of ſecond Cauſes be produced by the firſt Mover, who is God, as p. 554.

(6) Bradwardine, l. 2. c. 22. p. 559. riſeth higher, and proves ſtrongly, That it implies a contradiction for any Nature to act or move without God, of himſelf, properly, actually, and ſpecially applying it to act, and moving of it. Which he demonſtrates many wayes: as [1] Becauſe no natural virtue or forme can operate without Gods cooperating therewith. [2] Becauſe al natural things or cauſes are but as Inſtruments in regard of God the firſt Cauſe. [3] Becauſe the create wil cannot ſubſiſt of it ſelf; therefore neither can it act of it ſelf, as c. 24. p. 563. [4] Becauſe God, by reaſon of his infinite Actualitie, permits nothing but what he wils.

(8) Bradwardine, l. 3. c. 29. p. 739. aſcends yet higher, andHow God ſpontaneouſly impels men to the entitative act of Sin. demonſtrates, That God, albeit he impel no man violently againſt his wil, yet he impels al mens wils ſpontaneouſly, and draws them to al their free acts, even ſuch as have ſin annexed to them. But further, addes he, it may be probably ſaid, that God doth in ſome ſenſe neceſſitate to the very act of ſin, as to the ſubſtance of the act; yet it doth not thence follow that he doth neceſſitate to ſin, or to the deformitie of ſin, as it is ſin, or the deformitie of ſin: for the omnipotent God may, as it appears, ſeparate the very ſubſtance of the act and whatever is poſitive in it from the Deformitie of ſin, and can produce and conſerve ſuch an effect really poſitive and good, without ſuch a defect and privative malice: Specially, ſithat Sin, Deformitie, Vitioſitie, or defect is not eſſentially the very act, nor of the eſſence of the act, nor neceſſarily a conſequent of the ſubſtance of the act. Therefore the good God acting rightly, pre-acting and in ſome ſenſe neceſſitating to ſuch an act, according to its ſubſtance and nature good, the vitioſitie or ſin doth not thence neceſſarily follow: whence therefore doth it follow, but from the free wil of the Creature freely deficient, and from the wil of the Sinner? What could be ſaid more acutely, more judiciouſly, more demonſtratively, p. 123and more piouſly, to put a period to this controverſie, had not men a ſtrong impulſe to oppoſe the Truth? I have been the more prolixe in rehearſing theſe illuſtrious and demonſtrative Sentiments of Bradwardine, becauſe I find nothing newly ſtarted by our Adverſaries, but what I find rationally, ſolidly, and convictively ſolved by him, above three hundred years ſince. As for his ſolutions to the particular Objections made by his Opponents then, and ours now, we ſhal produce them in what follows in anſwer to the Objections againſt our Hypotheſis, Ch. 6. §. 1, 2.

Having produced the concurrent Sentiments of the ancientThe Dominicans ſentiments. Fathers and Scholemen for the confirmation of our Hypotheſis, we might now deſcend to the later Scholemen, ſpecially the Thomiſts; but theſe lie under the ſame criminal accuſation and imputation with our Adverſaries, as the orthodoxe Calviniſt; and it deſerves a particular remarque, that look as the Pelagian Jeſuites oppoſe the Dominicans in this point under the Bears skin of being Calviniſts; ſo the Arminians and New Methodiſts oppoſe the Calviniſts in the ſame point, under the Bears skin of being Dominicans: and indeed no wonder, ſithat the Dominicans and Calviniſts in this point about Gods predeterminative Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin do greatly accord. And let our Adverſaries ſay what they liſt againſt the Dominicans, it's certain, that in this mater they have done great ſervice to the cauſe and intereſt of Truth: and particularly Alvarez, who isAlvarez. principally ſtruck at by the adverſe partie, deſerves great honor and diligent inſpection by thoſe who have any kindneſs for our Hypotheſis, or any part of the Doctrine of Efficacious Grace. I am not ignorant what an heavy load of Imputations, Strangius, and a Reverend Divine of Name among our ſelves, have laid upon him in their Oppoſitions to what he has writ in the defenſe of our Hypotheſis; but the Jeſuites themſelves, who are his moſt puiſſant Impugnators, give him a more candid and favorable treatment: For in the treaty between them and the Janſeniſts begun Feb. 18. 1663. the Jeſuites rejecting the Arbitrament of Gregorie Ariminenſis and Eſtius, whom they judged more ſevere, they pitcht upon Alvarez as the more moderate, to whom they required the Janſeniſts to conforme in thoſe points controverted, in order to an accommodement: and the reaſons they allege are of moment: For, ſay they, Alvarez having aſſiſted at the Congregations p. 124de Auxiliis, there is a grand apparence, that he and thoſe others who writ at the ſame time and ſince, took up this mode of ſpeech to ſalve Libertie, according to the movements and ſentiments which the Popes, Clement 8^th, and Paul 5^th had; albeit they made no Decree on this mater; of which ſee Refutat. de Pere Ferrier, Chap. 6. and Idea of Janſeniſme, p. 82. wherein remarque, (1) That the Jeſuites, Alvarez's ſworne enemies, give him a more favorable character, as one, who for his moderation was employed by the Popes to aſſiſt at the Congregations de Auxiliis, for the compoſing the differences in thoſe points in controverſie between the Dominicans and Jeſuites about Predetermination. Yea, (2) That the Popes themſelves, Clement 8^th, and Paul 5^th, had the ſame ſentiments with Alvarez. Is it not ſtrange then, that the Jeſuites, who are profeſſed enemies to Predetermination, and the Popes themſelves, who have been generally favorers of Pelagianiſme, ſhould have a greater kindneſſe for Alvarez's ſentiments about Predetermination, than Proteſtant Divines, whoſe Doctrine againſt the Pelagians and Jeſuites can never be defended but by thoſe principes on which Alvarez bottomes his Predetermination? For mine own part, I cannot but confeſſe, that in thoſe Notions about Efficacious Grace and Predetermination, I read Alvarez with al poſſible diligence and exactitude of ſpirit, and found therein ſo penetrant an acumen, ſo profound ſoliditie, and ſuch maſculine Demonſtrations, as that I never met with his equal, excepting Bradwardine and Ariminenſis. This Juſtice I conceive my ſelf under an eſſential obligation to do him, to wipe off thoſe undeſerved clamors and aſperſions which Strangius and another Divine of note among us, have loaded him with. His own Sentiments in the defenſe of our Hypotheſis are laid down in his excellent Diſputations de Auxil. l. 3. Diſput. 24. where he doth with a great deal of moderation and yet invincible force of argument demonſtrate, That God doth by a previous motion, truely and efficiently, or according to the mode of a phyſical cauſe, premove free-wil to the act of ſin, as it is an Act or Being. His Arguments for the demonſtration of this Theſis are weighty and invincible, namely from the Participation, Limitation, and Dependence of every Second cauſe, &c. Of which hereafter, c. 5. Laſtly, that the Scholemen generally, beſides ſuch as are Pelagian, aſſert divine Predetermination to the material entitie of Sin, ſee Twiſſe, Vind. Grat. l. 2. Digreſſ. 2.

p. 125I now paſſe on to Janſenius and his Sectators, who are broughtThe Doctrine of Janſenius concordant with our Hypotheſis. upon the Theatre by our Adverſaries as Patrons of their Antitheſis: but this is ſo great a miſtake in mater of fact, that I cannot but admire any learned man ſhould take refuge under it. Yet thus Strangius l. 2. c. 14. p. 318. brings in Janſenius oppoſing Auguſtin both to the Dominicans and Jeſuites as to the point of Predetermination. The like is urged by a Reverend Divine ofC. T. p. 3. p. 93. repute among us. But this miſtake is too obvious and great to take place among diligent and impartial Inquirers: For (1) It's evident, that Janſenius rejected the terme Predetermination as maintained by the Dominicans, not the thing it ſelf as aſſerted by Auguſtin: Thus in his Auguſt. Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 22. pag. 77, &c. he proves, That there is no manner of ſpeech among the Scholemen ſo efficacious and pregnant to expreſſe Predetermination by, but Auguſtin uſeth the ſame to illuſtrate Gods efficacious concurſe. And Tom. 3. l. 8. c. 1. p. 343. he acknowledgeth, That thoſe learned men the Dominicans have reached the Marrow of Divine Adjutorie, and thence the true opinion of Auguſtin. Again, cap. 3. p. 346. he ſaith expreſſely, that herein Medicinal Adjutorie agrees with phyſic Predetermination, that the office of phyſically predetermining the wil doth truely belong unto it, and it may be termed by that name taken not only in the abſtract, but alſo in the concrete. Whence in the ſame Chapter he uſeth the very terme of phyſic Predetermination to expreſſe efficacious Concurſe by, albeit not in the ſame manner as it is uſed by the Scholemen. So that it's evident, he was not averſe from the thing, albeit he but ſeldome uſed the terme to avoid the cavils of Scholaſtic Theologues, as alſo to confine himſelf to the termes uſed by Auguſtin. (2) That reverend Divine among us, who makes uſe of Janſenius's name againſt phyſic Predetermination, doth yet grant, that Janſenius held, the exiſtence of ſin to be neceſſary as a Puniſhment. Wherein he oppoſeth Janſenius, and alſo Auguſtin, who held, that ſin as a puniſhment, was willed and cauſed by God, as before. (3) Janſenius Auguſt. de Statu Nat. Lapſ. l. 4. c. 21. p. 264. aſſures us, That men in their lapſed ſtate, before Faith be introduced, are under the captivitie of luſt, and can do nothing but ſin; which captivitie is the ſame with that foreſaid neceſſitie and coaction, whereby ſins committed by unbelievers are ſaid to be neceſſary, and therefore they have no power to abſtain from ſin. And Tom. 3. de Grat. Chriſti, l. 10. he ſtoutly maintains theſe following aſſertions p. 126about Reprobation, which clearly evince Gods efficacious predeterminative concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. [1] He proves, cap. 2. pag. 420. That Gods negative Reprobation is▪ alſo poſitive. [2] He demonſtrates, cap. 4. pag. 423. That the cauſe of Reprobation, according to its comparative conſideration, is the abſolute wil of God. This is owned by reverend Mr. Baxter, Cathol. Theol. part. 3. Sect. 7. §. 22. pag. 93. in theſe words: [Janſenius's Doctrine is that] the Reprobation of men was by Gods poſitive abſolute wil, of men in original ſin, and the effect of it excecation and obduration. This being his proper opinion, it neceſſarily follows, that he aſſerted Gods predeterminative concurſe to the entitative act of ſin: for, as it is granted by Strangius, and others, efficacious predetermination always follows as a neceſſary conſequent of abſolute predefinition: if God abſolutely decrees to leave men to ſin, it neceſſarily follows, that he efficaciouſly determine men to the entitative act of ſin. [3] He goes higher than moſt of our Divines dare do in this point, in aſſerting, cap. 5. pag. 424. That damnation, excecation, obduration are the effects of Reprobation. But yet cap. 7. pag. 427. he anſwers the objection of ſuch, that argue hence, That God lies in wait to deſtroy ſuch as are reprobated; aſſuring us, that the ſinner only is the culpable criminal cauſe of his own damnation. And cap. 10. pag. 433. he demonſtrates, That Reprobates are not created unto damnation, i. e. damnation as ſuch is not the end of their creation: which ſufficiently vindicates the holy God from being the cauſe of their ſin or damnation.

As for the Janſeniſts, that they are of the ſame perſuaſion withThe Janſeniſts ſentiments. the Dominicans as touching our Hypotheſis, is evident from their conceſſions to the Jeſuites in their Treatie begun Febr. 18. 1663. mentioned in the Refutation of Pere Ferrier, Chap. 6. alſo Idea of Janſeniſme, pag. 82. The ſum was this: The Biſhop of Comenge, a friend of the Janſeniſts, propoſed this as an expedient to reconcile the two Parties, That the Janſeniſts declare, that they had no other ſentiment about this mater, but what was taught by the Thomiſts. And becauſe ſome of the Thomiſts flie higher than others, the Jeſuites demanded, That the Janſeniſts ſhould reduce themſelves to the forme of ſpeech uſed by Alvarez. So that it ſeems the Janſeniſts in the point of efficacious Concurſe are looked on by the Jeſuites (as indeed they are) as thoſe that went beyond the very Dominicans. The Janſeniſts replied, That the doctrine of Janſenius was not different from that of the Thomiſts, albeit it was p. 127not his deſigne to render himſelf conforme to them, but to Augustin. And the true reaſon why the Janſeniſts do not maintain greater correſpondence with the Dominicans, is, not their difference in doctrine, but becauſe many of the Dominicans have by a Spirit of Cabal, or of Faction joined with the Jeſuites.

Laſtly, that our Hypotheſis, touching Gods efficacious Concurſe to The Roman Catechiſme.al actions, even to ſuch as have ſin appendent to them, was generally owned, not only by ſingle Sects or Parties, but by the generalitie of the Roman Church, before the riſe of the Jeſuites, is evident from the Doctrine of the Roman Catechiſme, publiſhed by the command of the Council of Trent; where in the explication ofNon ſolùm Deus univerſa quae ſunt providentiâ ſuâ tuetur at que adminiſtrat, verùm etiam quae moventur & agunt aliquid, intimâ virtute ad motum at que actionem ita impellit, ut quamvis ſecundarum cauſarum efficientiam non impediat, praeveniat tamen, cùm ejus occultiſſima vis ad ſingula pertinear, Sapient. 8. 1. Act. 17.Acts 17 the Apoſtles Creed, about the end of the firſt Article, par. 1. cap. 2. §. 20. pag. 23. (edit. 1619.) we find this great teſtimonie to confirme our Hypotheſis: God doth not only preſerve and adminiſtrate althings that are by his providence, but alſo doth by an intime virtue, impel thoſe things that are moved and do act any thing, to motion and action; ſo that albeit he doth not impede the efficience of ſecond cauſes, yet he prevents them, in as much as his moſt ſecret force reacheth unto althings; and as the Wiſe-man teſtifies, Wiſd. 8. 1. He reacheth from one end to another mightily, and ſweetly doth order althings. Wherefore it is ſaid by the Apoſtle, Act. 17. 21. For in him we live, and move, and have our being▪ What could have been ſaid more clearly and fully for the aſſerting a predeterminative Concurſe to al actions and motions of the creature, even ſuch as have ſin annexed to them? And by whom is this Doctrine taught? By the Council of Trent, which is the ſtandard and meaſure of the Roman Faith, and no great friend to the Doctrine of Chriſt. Is it not ſtrange then, that Reformed Divines, yea ſuch as would be accounted Calviniſts, cannot allow the efficacious Concurſe of God ſo much as Trent-Papiſts allow?

§. 3. We have ſeen how far the Latin Fathers and thoſe who livedThe ſentiments of Reformed Divines. in Communion with the Roman Church have openly eſpouſed our Hypotheſis; let us now deſcend to Reformed Theologues, and examine what their ſentiments have been hereof. And here indeed we have an ample field to exſpatiate in, albeit our Adverſaries the new Methodiſts would confine us to a ſmal number of Adherents. We ſhal begin with John Wiclef, our firſt Engliſh ApoſtolicWiclef. Reformer, who following Bradwardine his Collegue in this, as in many other points about Grace, aſſerted, That as God neceſſitates the futuritions of inſtants, ſo alſo he neceſſitates al the events which in p. 128thoſe inſtants are futures, Art. Conſtant. damnat. 278. Again, he held, That God neceſſitates al active creatures to each of their acts; as Walden, tom. 1. cap. 21. pag. 35. & cap. 23. pag. 37. alſo Wideford, pag. 240, 248. Again he aſſerted, That to whatever Gods permiſſion reached, to that alſo his actual volition reached; as Walden, tom. 1. pag. 39. which clearly demonſtrates our Hypotheſis.

But we paſſe on to John Calvin, whom ſome new Methodiſts,Calvin. particularly Strangius, would force into their Campe. Thus Strang. pag. 384, 554. where he endeavors to take off Calvin from our Partie: but he that looks into Calvins Inſtitutions, l. 1. c. 18. wil find our aſſertion not only nakedly owned, but fully explicated and demonſtrated, and that by a multitude of ſcriptural inſtances. Particularly he proves, (1) That God wils the exiſtence Interdum bonâ voluntate hominem velle aliquid, quod Deus non vult. Rurſus fieri poſſe, ut idem velit homo voluntate malâ, quod Deus vult bonâ, Calv. ix Auguſt.of mens ſins; ſo that things repugnant to Gods wil of precept, are yet brought about by his efficacious wil of Decree and Providence. (2) That Gods permiſſion of ſin is not otioſe, but active and energetic. (3) That Gods providence moderates and orders the ſins of men. And he concludes the Chapter with this ſeaſonable caution: As for thoſe to whom this Doctrine of Gods judicial induration may ſeem rigid, let them but a little think, how tolerable their moroſitie may be, who reject a thing atteſted by ſuch clear teſtimonies of Scripture, becauſe it excedes their capacitie, and count it a crime to bring to light things, which if God did not know to be profitable for our knowlege, he would never have reveled them by his Prophets and Apoſtles. So in other parts of his Works, as Reſp. contra Pighium, de Libr. Arbitr. pag. 225. alſo Tractat. de occulta Dei providentia, he clearly aſſerts and demonſtrates our Hypotheſis. This is wel taken notice of by judicious Davenant, in his Animadverſions on Gods love, &c. p. 322. It is, ſaith he, Calvins opinion, de occult. Dei provident. reſp. ad 2. Lapſum Adae non fortuitum eſſe, ſed occulto Dei decreto ordinatum. God foreſaw Adams fal; he had power to have hindred it, but he would not, becauſe himſelf had decreed otherwiſe. This is the effect of Calvins doctrine. But as for the involving of men in ſin and damnation out of his only wil and pleaſure, theſe are conſequents falſely inferred upon Calvins Doctrine, by himſelf diſclaimed, &c.

How much Zuinglius favored this opinion of Gods efficaciousZuinglius. Concurſe to the entitative act of ſin, is ſufficiently evident from thoſe great reproches which the Papiſts lode him with for it; which he wiped off with this anſwer, That the ſame action, p. 129which is ſinful in regard of man, is not ſo in regard of God, becauſe he is not under the ſame Law with man. Thus Baronius, Metaphyſ. Sect. 8. Diſput. 3. §. 87. pag. 152. The third mode, ſaith he, is peculiar to Zuinglius, who teacheth, that God exciting the wil to an evil object doth not ſin, becauſe God hath no Law ſet to him, but man hath. To which Baronius anſwers, That albeit God hath no Law ſet to him by any Superior, yet he hath a Law ſet to him by his own nature, not to deal injuſtly or cruelly with men. This replie, although borrowed from Bellarmine, is now become commun with our Adverſaries, yet without the leaſt ſhadow of reaſon: for they do but beg the queſtion, in ſaying, That God hereby deals injuſtly or cruelly with his creature. As for Zuinglius's proper ſentiments about Gods exciting and applying the wils of men to the entitative acts of ſin, they are fully and clearly laid down in his Book de Providentia Dei, cap. 6. tom. 1. of his Workes, pag. 365. Seeing a Law is given to man, he always ſins, when he actes againſt the Law, albeit he neither be, nor live, nor operate, but in God, and from God, and by God: But what God workes by man is turned to man for ſin, but not in like manner to God: for man is under a law, but God is free—Therefore one and the ſame wickedneſſe, ſuppoſe adulterie or homicide, Umim igitur at que idem facinus, quantum Dei eſt Authoris, Motoris, ac Impulſoris, opus eſt, crimen non eſt; quantum autem hominis eſt, crimen ac ſcelus eſt. Ille enim▪ lege non tenetur, hic autem lege etiam damnatur, Zuing. prov. cap. 2. pag. 365.as from God the Author, Motor, and Impulſor, it is a work, not a crime; but as it is from man, ſo it is a crime and wickedneſſe: for God is not bound up by law, but man is condemned by law. Thus he procedes to illuſtrate by many exemples, of David, &c. Thence, pag. 367. he inſtanceth in the induration of Pharaoh, &c. wherein note, (1) That he cals God the Author, Motor, and Impulſor of the act; which muſt be underſtood, not morally, but phyſically, as he excites and applies the wil to its act. (2) That he frees God from being the Author or moral cauſe of the ſin, becauſe he actes not againſt any law: a diſtinction which was valid in his time, albeit ſcoffed at now-a-days even by Reformed Divines, yea Calviniſts. Neither was this diſtinction coined by Zuinglius, as Bellarmine and others would fain perſuade, but in uſe long before Zuinglius, by Scotus, Ariminenſis, and other ſcholaſtic Theologues, who followed Auguſtin herein. Thus Scotus, in Sent. 2. Diſt. 37. Quaeſt. 2. ſaith, The ſame action is ſinful in regard of the create wil, but not as to Gods concurſe, quia voluntas creata debet rectitudinem actioni tribuere, Deus autem non debet, becauſe the create wil is under an eſſential obligation or law, to give rectitude to the action, but God is not, as before.

p. 130How deeply Beza was engaged in the defence of our HypotheſisBeza. is ſufficiently evident by his Controverſies in this point: as Tractat. Theolog. vol. 1. pag. 313, &c. in anſwer to the calumnies of Heſhuſius about the Providence of God, he ſaith, (1) That no event ever happens otherwiſe than God decrees: which he demonſtrates from the Omnipotence of God. Thence he procedes, (2) to demonſtrate, That albeit God wil, and know, and decree althings in the world, yet that he is not the Author of ſin. So pag. 315. (3) He proves, That Gods permiſſion of ſin is not idle or merely negative. This he demonſtrates, pag. 317. from the vendition of Joſeph; the robbing of Job; the raviſhing of Davids wives by Abſolon; Davids numbering the people and Gods inciting his heart thereto; Shimei's curſing of David; the defection of the ten Tribes from Rehoboam, &c. (4) He procedes, pag. 319. to the fal of Adam, which he aſſertes to be from the decree and ordination of God, &c. The ſame Controverſie he manageth againſt Caſtellio, de aeterna Dei praedeſtinatione, p. 360. where he proves, That Adams fal was decreed and determined by God. The like, pag. 401. where he proves, That God doth not compel men to ſin, or infuſe ſin into them, but juſtly and rightly incite their wils to the entitative act which is good. This he confirmes by the induration of Pharaoh, and Gods making uſe of wicked inſtruments for the puniſhment of men. That Calvin and Beza did fully eſpouſe our Hypotheſis is evident not only by the oppoſition of Bellarmine and his ſectators, but alſo by that of Arminius, who objectes the very ſame things againſt them, as are objected againſt us, namely, That God ordained that man ſhould fal and become vitioſe: by which opinion, ſaith he, God is made the Author of Adams fal and ſin: of which ſee Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 2. pag. 554. And indeed al the Helvetian Churches to this very day continue very orthodox and zeloſe againſt al the Arminian Dogmes, in this as in other points; which ſufficiently appears by their new Articles lately added to their Confeſſion, and ſigned by their Miniſters and Profeſſors, for the condemning the new method of Amyraldus, and others in the French Churches.

That not only the German and Helvetian, but alſo the FrenchChamiers Difence of our Hypotheſis. Churches in their firſt Reformation fully maintained our Hypotheſis, is moſt evident by the moſt elaborate, acute, and demonſtrative determinations of great Chamier, the greateſt light that ever France Reformed had, Calvin only excepted, who in his Panſtrat. p. 131Cathol. tom. 2. lib. 3. gives us a copioſe, diſtinct, and convictive deciſion of this Controverſie as then agitated by the Calviniſts and Jeſuites; which anſwers exactly to our preſent Controverſie with the new Methodiſts. He titles this Book, Of the Author of ſin: and proves, cap. 1. That the Reformed Divines do not make God the Author of ſin, albeit the Jeſuites accuſe Calvin, Martyr, and Beza therewith. Thence, cap. 2. he layes down the opinion of the Reformed Divines, namely, That al actions both ſinful and good are to be referred to the actuoſe providence of God. Which he demonſtrates by Shimei's curſing David, Abſoloms inceſt, &c. Whence, cap. 3. he paſſeth on to the Papiſts opinion touching the Providence of God about ſin, which they make to be only by ſpeculative, idle permiſſion, as ſome new Methodiſts. Cap. 4. he procedes to prove, That God wils the exiſtence of ſin. Wherein he anſwers Bellarmines Objections againſt Calvin and Beza as to this point. Cap. 5. he paſſeth on to the ſecond Argument of the Calviniſts, namely, that men are in their ſinful acts the inſtruments of God. Thence, cap. 6. he deſcends to their third Argument, from Gods excecation and induration of mens hearts: wherein he diſtinctly opens the Scriptures about induration. Whence, cap. 7. he comes to their fourth Argument, from Gods energie in ſinful acts; which he demonſtrates both rationally and ſcripturally. And thence, cap. 8. he gives us Auguſtins opinion conſonant to Calvins herein. Whence in the following Chapters, 9, 10, 11, 12. he anſwers the Objections and Arguments of the Papiſts, whereby they endeavor to prove, That the Calviniſts make God the Author of ſin: which imputations are ſtil faſtened on us by the Arminians and new Methodiſts.

We may adde hereto the ſentiments of Ludovicus Crocius, ProfeſſorThe Teſtimonie of Lud. Crocius. at Breme, and a Member of the Synod of Dort, who in many points, ſpecially that of middle Science and univerſal Grace, follows the new method, yet in this of Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, ſeems orthodox and concurrent to Calvins Doctrine. So in his Duodecas Diſſertat. Exegetic. De voluntate Dei, Diſſert. Illam [ſcil. actionem] non verò hanc, [ſcil. malitiam] Deus vult ac decernit: hanc, non illam, permittit.8. theſ. 74. pag. 415. where he tels us, That the fundamen of clearing God from being the Author of ſin is the diſtinction of the material and formal part of ſin, namely of the action and the vitioſitie, which is in the action: for that, not this, he wils and decrees; and this, not that, he permits. And his reaſon is invincible: for otherwiſe there ſhould be an action independent p. 132as to God, and the efficacious providence of God ſhould be denied, which is Epicurean. And then, theſ. 99. pag. 426. he tels us, That as to the act of the Divine wil about ſin, the Scriptures ſeem to contradict themſelves, in that ſome Scriptures aſſure us, that God doth not wil ſin, but hate it, with thoſe that commit it, as Pſal. 5. 5, 6, 7. Zach. 8. 17. and yet other Scriptures ſay, that God wils, creates, and effects ſins, as Eſa. 45. 7. Lam. 3. 37, 38. Amos 3. 6. Then he ſolves theſe ſeeming contradictions, by diſtinguiſhing between the act and the vitioſitie of the act: alſo between the act as it procedes from God, and as from the Creature: laſtly between the decreeing wil of God, and the preceptive wil of God. Whence he concludes, theſ. 100. thus: `For God both wils and produceth the act, as an act, of it ſelf indifferent to moral bonitie and evil, &c. And he addes, theſ. 101. `That this act in itſelf eſſentially good, even as it is contaminated by the creature, God wils it as a puniſhment, and uſeth it as an ordained convenient means for the beſt ends. The like theſ. 112. p. 430. where he ſhews, how God wils ſin, not as ſin, but as a puniſhment, &c. of which more fully hereafter, Chap. 5. §. 5. Theſe ſentiments of Lud. Crocius I rather chuſe to cite, becauſe he, in other points, follows the new method, and is cried up by ſome of that partie.

As for the Judgement of the Synod of Dort touching our Hypotheſis,The Synod of Dort. it is ſufficiently evident by their Determinations, as alſo by the oppoſitions the Arminians made againſt them in this point, both whiles they ſate, and afterwards. I am not ignorant, that ſome of our Adverſaries are ſo confident as to cite the Synods teſtimonie in favor of their Antitheſis; but this is ſo falſe an imputation, as that I judge no intelligent impartial Reader can give credit to it. There needs no more to evince the Synods concurrence with us in this point, than their ſtout defence of abſolute Reprobation; of which ſee Davenants Animadverſions on Gods love, pag. 242.

We might adde almoſt an infinitude of Teſtimonies from ReformedThe Church of▪ England. Divines, Churches, and Synods for the confirmation of our Hypotheſis: but in what remains we ſhal confine our ſelves to the Doctrine and Teſtimonie of the Church of England, and thoſe renowned Profeſſors of Theologie who have maintained and vindicated our Hypotheſis. The Church of England as to Doctrine imbibed, even in her firſt Reformation, the ſentiments of p. 133Calvin and the Reformed Churches in France, Holland, Helvetia, and Germanie; albeit as to Diſcipline ſhe ſtuck unto Epiſcopal Juriſdiction. This is evident by that noble deſigne of Cranmer and our firſt Reformers, to reduce the Doctrine of al the Reformed Churches unto one Confeſſion. I ſhal here only cul out a few Teſtimonies of ſome great Profeſſors of Theologie both in Oxford and Cambridge, who were of an Epiſcopal Judgement as to Diſcipline, yet ſtout Champions for our Hypotheſis.

We ſhal begin with Davenant, a great Maſter of Reaſon, andDavenant. one that went as far as he could, and I think, as far as any ought, in compliance with thoſe of the New Method; yet he ſtil aſſerted, and with great ſtrength of reaſon defended abſolute Reprobation and Gods predeterminative concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. Thus in his Determinations, when Profeſſor of Theologie at Cambridge, Quaeſt. 22. In evil acts, ſaith he, God hath decreed to permit the event, to concur with the Agent as an univerſal Motor, and laſtly to order the event itſelf according to that of Hugo, de ſacr. fid. lib. 1. cap. 13. God wils that ſin be, and yet he wils not ſin, i. e. with a wil of approbation. So Quaeſt. 25. pag. 118. he grants, That Gods decree to permit ſin is efficacious, ſo as to extract good out of it. But he ſpeakes more fully for the defenſe of our Hypotheſis, in his Animadverſions on Gods love to mankind, pag. 72. But thoſe who derive the evil actions of men from their own free wil as the proper efficient cauſe, and the exiſting or coming of ſuch actions in eventum à Decreto Dei permittente & ordinante, are in no error at al. But if any ſhal go about to ſet mans wil at libertie, and to tie up ſhort the decreeing and determining wil of God, as if this had not the determining ſtroke amongſt al poſſible evil actions or events, which ſhal infallibly be, and which ſhal infallibly not be, he may avoid the ſuſpicion of Stoiciſme and Manicheiſme, but he wil hardly avoid the ſuſpicion of Atheiſme. For the greater number of mens actions being wicked and evil, if theſe come into act without Gods determinate counſel and decree, human affaires are more over-ruled by mans wil, than by Gods. What could be ſaid more acutely and diſtinctly for the demonſtration of our Hypotheſis? He here alſertes, (1) That the exiſtence of evil actions is from Gods decree permitting and ordering of them. (2) That Gods decreeing wil doth determine [or predetermine] al poſſible evil actions or events, which ſhal infallibly be. And do or need we aſſert more than this? And p. 134frequently in that Book Davenant aſſertes and demonſtrates, That the decree of Reprobation is abſolute, determining ſinful acts and events, yet ſo as that it leaves no man under a compulſion to ſin. So pag. 253. he ſaith, Gods decrees carrie with them a neceſſitie of infallibilitie as to the event, but not a neceſſitie of compulſion as to the manner of acting. And elſewhere he frequently inculcates, That let Reprobation be abſolute or conditional, it leaves the ſame poſſibilitie and the ſame libertie to the Agent. So pag. 333, 340, 341, 351, 360. Yea, he proves, That the Arminians muſt, and do grant immutable abſolute decrees, which admit the ſame objections and difficulties, as thoſe of the Antiarminians. So pag. 354, 400, 418, 419. Laſtly he proves, That infallible preſcience granted by the Arminians infers as much a neceſſitie on the wil, as abſolute Reprobation, aſſerted by the Calviniſts. So p 418, 419, 442, 462.

Davenant was ſucceeded by Samuel Ward, Doctor of Divinitie,Ward. and Margaret Profeſſor of Cambridge; a perſon of great natural acumen, and deep inſight into the main points in Controverſie between us and the Papiſts, as it appears by his acute and learned Determinations and Prelections publiſhed by Dr. Seth Ward. With what clear lights and heats he defended our Hypotheſis is fully manifeſt by his 24. Determination, pag. 115. where he ſtoutly demonſtrates this Theſis, That the concurſe of God doth not take away from things their proper mode of operation; according to that great ſaying (though in an apocryphous Book) Wiſd. 8. 1. Wiſdome [i. e. the wiſe Providence of God] reacheth from one end to the other mightily, and yet orders althings ſweetly. He firſt ſtates the Controverſie, ſhewing how the Remonſtrants fal in with the Jeſuites, Bellarmine, Molina, Leſſius, &c. in aſſerting only a ſimultaneous immediate concurſe of God with the ſecond cauſe upon its action and effect, yet ſo, that al the modification and determination of the act, ſpecially in free actions, be from the ſecond cauſe, as pag. 116. Contrary whereto he aſſertes, (1) That the concurſe of God with ſecond cauſes, even ſuch as are free, is an antecedaneous influxe upon the very ſecond cauſes themſelves, moving and applying them to their work. This he demonſtrates both by Scripture and Reaſon. The Scriptures he cites are Eſa. 26. 12. 1 Cor. 12. 5, 6. Eph. 1. 11. Rom. 11. 36. His Reaſons are cogent, namely from Gods prime cauſalitie, the inſtrumental concurſe of al ſecond cauſes, the dependence of the human wil, &c. (2) He aſſertes, pag. 117. That this previous concurſe of God the firſt cauſe doth, according to its mode, modifie and determine al the actions p. 135of the ſecond cauſes. This, which is fully coincident with our Hypotheſis, he invictly demonſtrates, [1] becauſe the Divine wil determines itſelf for the production of every the moſt ſpecial and ſingular effect; therefore it is not determinable by any inferior cauſe, as the influence of the Sun is. [2] Becauſe as mans free wil determines althings ſubject to it, ſo much more efficaciouſly doth the Divine wil determine al create things ſubject to it. [3] He demonſtrates the ſame from the ſupreme Perfection of Divine Providence, whereunto it belongs determinatively to wil and predefine al and ſingular things which are done in time, and to deſtine the ſame to thoſe ends intended by itſelf, as alſo to move and applie al ſecond cauſes to their determinate effects. [4] Becauſe otherwiſe the concurſe and determination of free-wil ſhould be exemted from the modification of Divine Providence; and ſo God ſhould not have a Providence over althings in particular, but only in commun: for, as Thomas, pag. 1. q. 22. teacheth, The Divine providence extendes only to thoſe things, unto which the Divine cauſalitie extendes: wherefore if God doth not determine the concurſe of free-wil, he wil not have a providence, but only a preſcience thereof in particular, as pag. 118. Thence (3) he aſſertes and demonſtrates, That this antecedaneous concurſe of God on ſecond cauſes modifying their actions, takes not away from them their proper mode of operating. This he addes to clear up the conciliation of efficacious predeterminative concurſe with human libertie, and he doth it with a marvellous dexteritie and ſagacitie, withal ſhewing, that the Moliniſts and Remonſtrants, with Cicero, make man ſacrilegious, whiles they endeavor to make him free. And Determinat. 26. pag. 132. touching abſolute Reprobation he ſaith, that it is the antecedent, but not the cauſe of mens ſin. Laſtly, what his ſentiments were touching efficacious predeterminative concurſe, is to be ſeen in his moſt acute Clerum, de Gratia diſcriminante.

From Cambridge we might paſſe on to Oxford, and without much difficultie demonſtrate, that al the principal Profeſſors of Theologie ever ſince the Reformation have chearfully eſpouſed and ſtrongly defended our Hypotheſis againſt the Jeſuites and Remonſtrants. Our learned and famoſe George Abbot, in his Quaeſtiones George Abbot.ſex, Praelect. &c. cap. 6. diſcuſſeth this very Queſtion, An Deus ſit Author peccati, Whether God be the Author of ſin? And pag. 207. he gives us this diſtinct deciſion of the whole: 4. In p. 136the very actions, which on mans part are vitioſe, the divine finger plainly ſhines forth; but ſo that God be the motor and impulſor [marque that terme which notes the higheſt Predetermination] of the action and worke; but not of the obliquitie or curvitie in acting: For God excites [i. e. predetermines] the ſpirits of wicked men to attemt ſome things, &c. And he cites for it that great Effate of Auguſtin, de Praedeſt. Sanctor. Quòd mali peccant ipſorum eſt; quòd verò peccando hoc vel illud agunt, ex virtute Dei tenebras, prout viſum eſt, dividentis, &c. What the Sentiments of pious and learned Dr. Holland, Regius Profeſſor of Divinitie, and Dr. Prideaux Dr. Holland, Prideaux, Barlow.his Succeſſor, were, is ſufficiently evident by their warm zele againſt the Arminians. As for Dr. Barlow late Margaret Profeſſor, he has ſufficiently declared his aſſent and conſent to our Hypotheſis, in his Exercitatio 2^•, de Malo, Concluſ. 7. Rat. 3. where he proves, That it is impoſſible there ſhould be any finite create Entitie which is not from God the Author of al Entitie. And to conclude this Head, it is very evident, that not only the Profeſſors of Theologie, but alſo the Biſhops and Convocation, together with King James, were greatly oppoſite to Arminianiſme, and ſo friends to our Hypotheſis: Yea in Biſhop Laud's time, when Arminianiſme began to flouriſh, there were but five Arminian Biſhops, Laud, Neale, Buckeridge, Corbet, Howſon, and Montague, who eſpouſed that Intereſt, as Dr. Heylin, in the Life of Biſhop Laud aſſures us. By al which it appears moſt evident, that not only Rutherford, Twiſſe, and Dominicans, but the main bodie of Antipelagian and Reformed Divines have given their ful aſſent and conſent to our Hypotheſis, for God's predeterminative Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of Sin.

§. 4. Having examined the Teſtimonies of ancient and laterSuch as denie Gods Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. Theologues that concur with us, let us now a little inquire into the origine of the Antitheſis, and who they are by whom it has been defended. The Antitheſis to our Theſis, namely, That God concurs not to the ſubſtrate mater of Sin, is generally aſcribed to Durandus, as the principal founder thereof, who denied Gods immediate concurſe to actions, under this pretext, that hereby we make God the Author of mens Sins. But to ſpeak the truth, this Antitheſis is much more ancient than Durandus. Capreolus in 4. d. 12. q. 1. ad 1. aſſerts, That this was the Opinion of the Manichees: and Aquinas in 2. d. 37. q. 2. a. 2. ſaith, That it it is next to the error of the Manichees, who held two Principes, one of Good, and the other of Evil. p. 137And the reaſon why this Antitheſis is fathered on the Manichees is this, becauſe whoever denies God to be the cauſe of the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act whereto ſin is annexed, muſt hold, That there is ſome real poſitive entitie in ſin whereof God is not the cauſe: whence by conſequence ſuch muſt aſſert, That there are two firſt Cauſes, one of Good, and the other of Evil; which was the error of Marcion and Manes, who held, there were two firſt Principes, the one foreign, the ſupreme good, who was the cauſe of al good; the other foreign, the ſupreme evil God, who was the cauſe of al evil. And certainly, they that maintain ſin to be according to its formal reaſon ſomething poſitive or real, or that God is not the cauſe of the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, wil neceſſarily fal into the ſentiments of Marcion and Manes. Again, Hieronymus, Epiſt. ad Cteſiphontem, makes this Antitheſis of Durandus Dicebat [Pelagius] Deum, collato ſemel libero arbitrio, ulteriùs nobis ad operandum: non eſſe neceſſarium. Hieronym. ad Cteſiph.to be the Doctrine of Pelagius, who, ſaith he, held, That God having once conferred free-wil, it is not neceſſary that he further operate with us: and he ſpeaks of natural operations, as of the motion of the hand, &c. which was Durandus's opinion. Though I cannot but confeſſe, Janſenius, Auguſt. Tom. 1. l. 5. c. 20. p. 119. tels us, the Pelagians granted, That God concurs to al the operations of the Wil. But the Conciliation of theſe two oppoſite Teſtimonies is not difficult, in that the Pelagians granted Gods concurſe to al operations in termes, but denied it in effect and conſequences, as our Adverſaries now-a-days. Compton Carleton, in his Philoſoph. Ʋniverſ. Diſput. 28. Sect. 1. §. 3. aſſures us, that the opinion of Durandus was aſſerted and defended before him, by Nicolaus Bonetus, lib. 7. Theol. c. 7. and it is not improbable but it was alſo by ſome others.

But yet it cannot be denied, but that the principal Author ofDurandus againſt Gods immediate Concurſe. this Antitheſis was Durandus; whence among the Scholaſtic Theologues it receives the Denomination of Durandiſme, which they cal a raſh, erroneous, dangerous error, little better than Arianiſme. Bellarm. l. 4. de Grat. & lib. Arb. ſaith, it is repugnant to the Scriptures, Teſtimonies of the Fathers, and manifeſt Reaſon. Suarez Metaph. Diſput. 22. Sect. 1. n. 7. ſaith, It is erroneous in Faith: & de Concurſu, l. 1. he aſſertes, That the opinion of Durandus is not only reprehended, but alſo rejected by al approved Theologues, as an error in Faith. Is it not ſtrange then, that Reformed Divines, yea ſome of great vogue for Pietie and Learning ſhould eſpouſe an error ſo groſſe, and ſo much decried by p. 138Papiſts themſelves? But to give a convictive demonſtration, that thoſe who denie Gods Efficacious Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin really fal under the Imputation of Durandiſme, we are firſt to examine what Durandus's opinion as to Gods Concurſe is, and then who they are who may be reputed his Sectators.

Durandus propoſeth his opinion, in ſentent. l. 2. Diſt. 1. Q. 5. in theſe words, Ʋtrum Deus agat immediate in omni actione Creaturae, Whether God acts immediately in every action of the Creature? which he denies; and the principal reaſons of his negation are theſe: (1) Becauſe then God ſhould be the author of Sin. (2) Becauſe ſuch an immediate Concurſe deſtroyes human libertie, in that it determines the wil, and ſo puts an end to its Indifference: of which ſee Strangius, p. 142. So that indeed the very ſame arguments, which were uſed by Durandus againſt immediate Concurſe, are uſed by our Adverſaries the New Methodiſts againſt predeterminative Concurſe as to the ſubſtrate mater of Sin. And albeit the moſt of them profeſſe a great diſpleaſure againſt the Hypotheſis of Durandus, yet, I muſt freely declare my mind, I cannot conceive how they can, without apparent contradiction, defend their own, but by eſpouſing that of Durandus, which a reverend Divine of great name among us profeſſedly doth; And that the moſt of our Adverſaries, even among the New Methodiſts, who in profeſſion diſown it, fal under the imputation of Durandiſme, we ſhal anon make evident, when we come to treat of their particular ſentiments: at preſent take theſe Criteria or diſtinctive notes of Durandiſme. (1) Al ſuch as aſſert a Divine Concurſe to the principe or ſubject only, and not immediate unto the Act, fal under the imputation of Durandiſme. This is wel obſerved by Strangius, l. 1. c. 10. p. 57. where he tels us, That thoſe who allow only a Concurſe to the ſecond Cauſe, moving it to act, without a continued concurſe to the action, fal into the error of Durandus. Herein Durandus is followed by Aureolus, a profeſſed abettor of Durandiſme. Thus alſo Amyraldus, and a Divine of name among our ſelves. (2) Al thoſe who hold only a general immediate concurſe to the act, ſuch as is determinable by the mater it workes on, as the Influence of the Sun is by its mater, are deſervedly branded with the black note of Durandiſme. Thus Baronius, together with the Remonſtrants and Moliniſts. (3) Al ſuch as denie every real Being or Entitie to be from God by an immediate efficience, juſtly fal under the marque of Durandiſme. Thus Camero, and our Adverſaries p. 139generally, who denie that God doth efficaciouſly concur to the ſubſtrate mater of Acts intrinſecally evil. (4) Al thoſe who affirme, That it implies no contradiction for God to make a creature which ſhal act without immediate concurſe, muſt neceſſarily ſymboliſe with Durandus. This is acknowledged by Baronius, Metaph. Sect. 8. Diſp. 3. S. 61. p. 131. where he brings in this as the Second argument for Durandus, That God can give to the creature a power to act without his concurſe, ſithat this involves no contradiction. To which he anſwers wel, in the Negative, that for God to make ſuch creatures as ſhould not depend on him in operation as wel as in eſſence, involves a flat contradiction, becauſe dependence in Eſſence and Operation is eſſential to the creature. This piece of Durandiſme Strangius and others ſeem chargeable with, as hereafter, in our account of Strangius.

But we deſcend to the particular Sects, who oppoſe our Theſis,The Jeſuites and Moliniſts. with endeavors to evince how far they fal in with the Hypotheſis of Durandus. And we ſhal begin with the Jeſuites, who now generally paſſe under the name of Moliniſts, from Ludov. Molina their chief Captain, who in his Concordia Lib. Arbitr. cum Gratiae donis, &c. Quaeſt. 14. Diſp. 26. aſſertes, (1) That Gods immediate concurſe terminates not on the human wil by applying it to act, but only on the act it ſelf and effect. Whence, (2) That this Concurſe is not antecedent or previous as to the act, but only ſimultaneous; i. e. That God immediately concurs together with the wil to the ſame act, and conſerves the ſame. Thence, (3) That this immediate concurſe of God is not predeterminative, at leaſt as to human acts, but only indifferent and determinable, like that of the Sun. Whence, (4) That as to the ſubſtrate mater of Sin, immediate Concurſe doth no way determine the wil, or applie it to its act, but only influence the act in a general indifferent manner, ſo as the wil ſtil retains its innate indifference, and libertie of acting or not acting. Such are the Sentiments of the Moliniſts or Jeſuites, wherein they are greatly oppoſed both by Dominicans and Janſeniſts: Thus Janſenius, Auguſt. Tom. 2. lib. 6. ſingul. c. 14. p. 58. where he proves, That this ſimultaneous Concurſe confers no forces or aide to ſecond Agents, but only accommodates it ſelf to the forces of the create power, &c. which ſufficiently demonſtrates the identitie of this opinion with Durandiſme, albeit the avouchers of it oppoſe Durandus with great vehemence.

p. 140But of late there ſtarted up Ludovicus à Dola, a CapucineLud. à Dola his following Durandus. Friar, yet learned and acute, who eſpouſed the Hypotheſis of Durandus, as the only Medium for the reconciling thoſe two oppoſite parties, the Dominicans and Jeſuites. His book he termes, A Quadripartite Diſputation, touching the mode how the Concurſe of God and the Creature ſtand in conjunction for the production of free Acts, of a natural order, ſpecially ſuch as are wicked: He bends his Diſputation both againſt the Predeterminants, as alſo againſt the Aſſertors of Middle Science. His firſt part is general, ſtating the controverſie between the Jeſuites, who aſſert a Middle Science, and the Dominicans, the Aſſertors of Predetermination; and withal explicating the origine of the Controverſie from the preſuppoſed Immediation and real Identitie of the Divine and creatural Concurſe. His Second Part is againſt the Jeſuites, to demonſtrate, That a next, immediate and identific concurſe of God to al acts both good and bad cannot be defended by the artifice of their Middle Science. In his third part he diſputes againſt the Dominicans, proving, That God doth not concur with us to acts of a natural order, ſpecially ſuch as are wicked, by a phyſic Predetermination, and moreover by an identific and ſimultaneous concurſe. In his fourth and laſt part he ſtabliſheth and demonſtrateth, (with al the force of Arguments ſuch a ruinous foundation wil admit) the Hypotheſis of Durandus, That the general Concurſe of God to acts of a natural order, ſpecially ſuch as are wicked, is not proxime, immediate and identific, but remote, mediate, and really diſtinct from the act of the creature. This Hypotheſis he defends as the only expedient for the conciliation of Divine Concurſe with human Libertie, the vindication of Gods Sacred Majeſtie from the imputation of being the Author of Sin, and the putting an end to thoſe endleſs controverſies about Divine Concurſe. And I cannot but conceive my ſelf under an eſſential obligation freely to deliver my mind in this point, that it is impoſſible for our Adverſaries, the New Methodiſts, or any others, to defend their Antitheſis againſt us from apparent contradictions and inconſiſtences with it ſelf, or to free themſelves from thoſe blaſphemous Imputations they charge upon us, unleſs they betake themſelves to this ſtratageme and ſubterfuge of Durandus and Lud. à Dola: and therefore I do no way wonder, that a Divine of great name and Head of that partie among us, doth openly declare his aſſent and conſent to this Hypotheſis of Durandus, it being the only refuge p. 141to preſerve him and his Adherents from ſelf-contradiction and condemnation.

Among the Reformed Churches, the firſt Impugnators ofArminius's Sentiments. our Hypotheſis were the Remonſtrants, communly ſtiled Arminians, from Arminius, their firſt Founder, Profeſſor of Theologie at Leyden, who began to diffuſe his Pelagian Infuſions about the year 1610. His Sentiments about Gods Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſinful acts he layeth down Diſputat. publica, Theſ. 7. §. 8, 9, 10. p. 193. but more fully, Theſ. 9. de juſtitia & efficacia Providentiae Dei in malo, p. 198. where he diſtinguiſheth Gods efficience about the act of ſin from that about its vitioſitie. This efficience of God about ſin he makes to be both about the beginning, progreſſe and conſummation of Sin. (1) As for Gods efficience about the beginning of ſin he diſtinguiſheth it into [1] Impedition, both ſufficient and efficacious, whereby God puts an impediment to ſin; and [2] Permiſſion, which is contrary to Impedition, the ſuſpenſion of al impediments, which might hinder the execution of Sin. The fundamen of this Permiſſion he makes to be mans Libertie, and Gods infinite Wiſdome and Power to bring good out of evil. (2) Gods Efficience about the progreſſe of Sin he placeth in Direction and Determination. [1] Direction of Sin he makes to be an act of Divine Providence, whereby God doth moſt wiſely and potently direct ſin to what end he pleaſeth, paſſing on from one extreme to the other mightily, and yet diſpoſing althings ſweetly, according to that great effate of apocryphous Wiſdome, c. 8. v. 1. [2] Determination he takes to be an act of Divine Providence, whereby God puts meaſures to his Permiſſion, and termes to ſin, that it run not into infinite, according to the pleaſure of the creature. (3) Gods Efficience about the conſummation and terme of Sin he placeth in Punition, and Remiſſion. As for Gods Concurſe to the Act of Sin as naturally good, he doth craftily, according to his wonted mode in ſuch caſes, wave that difficult point: Yet in his Articles, De Peccati Cauſa Ʋniverſe, p. 779. he Scepticly urgeth the Arguments of our Antagoniſts, to prove, That we make God the Author of Sin. But to ſum up Arminius's Sentiments in this point, Albeit he placeth Gods Permiſſion about Sin in a mere ſuſpenſion of Impediments, which is no way influential on the Act, yet in that he allows alſo a providential Direction and Determination of the Act to its end and due meaſures, we may thence evidently demonſtrate our Hypothesis, p. 142that God predetermines the Wil to the entitative act of Sin, of which hereafter, Chap. 5.

Arminius's Sectators uſually ſtiled Remonſtrants, (from theirThe Remonſtrants and their Sectators. Remonſtrances in the Synod of Dort) Grevincovius, Vorſtius, Epiſcopius, Corvinus, &c. who being animated by many of the Civil Magiſtrates of Holland, gave themſelves the confidence, but thoſe poor Churches the peſte, of divulging their Pelagian Poiſon; which, by the interpoſure of King James, (who was a profeſſed enemie to that faction) occaſioned the Synod of Dort, An. 1618. where Divines out of England, France, and Germanie reſorted, to put a period to thoſe Pelagian Dogmes. The Remonſtrants in oppoſition to that Synod, writ their Acta & Scripta Synodalia Dordracena, wherein they greatly impugne the Synods Determinations for Abſolute Reprobation, and Gods Providence in ſinful Acts, falſely charging on our Divines, (1) That they held, the Reprobate were deſtined to Incredulitie, Impietie, and Sins, as the Means and Cauſes of Damnation. (2) That they made God the Author of Sin, and the like, of which ſee Acta Synodalia, Scripta Remonſtrantium Dogmatica, p. 40, 41. I ſhal here only adde, what is wel remarqued by Le Blanc, Conciliat Arbit. Humani, Theſ. 32. p. 434. That theſe Arminians and Remonſtrants directly follow the Jeſuites and Moliniſts in aſſerting a general ſimultaneous indifferent Concurſe, ſuch as is determinable by the cooperation of the human wil.

Theſe Remonſtrants, from a ſpirit of Cabal, to fortifie themſelvesThe Anabaptiſts of Germanie that fel in with the Remonſtrants. againſt the Calviniſts, who overpowered them in the Synod, fel into a league offenſive and defenſive with many German Anabaptiſts, who thereupon drank in many Pelagian and Arminian Dogmes, particularly that of Free-wil; which Infuſions have been ſince diffuſed throughout ſome, yea whole Churches of that Perſwaſion in England. I am not ignorant, that a great number not only of Profeſſors but alſo Churches, who are for Rebaptizing, do yet keep themſelves unſpotted and untainted as to theſe Arminian Notions; and with theſe I have no controverſie, but particular love and kindneſs for many of them, albeit I differ from them in the point of Pedobaptiſem. But as for thoſe of that perſuaſion, who fight under Arminius's banner, they ſeemed moſt forward, after the breaking up of the Synod of Dort, to oppoſe the Calviniſts in their ſentiments about Gods Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of Sin. And (that which deſerves p. 143a particular remarque) the very arguments that are now urged againſt us by the New Methodiſts, were urged againſt the Synod of Dorts determinations in this point by them, and that in the ſame forme. Which is to be ſeen in a Dialogue of the Anabaptiſts, intituled, A Deſcription of what God hath predeſtinated concerning man, &c. wherein pag. 16. they have this very expreſſion, which they impute to the Calviniſts, (as our Adverſaries impute the ſame to us) namely, that they ſay, That God puniſheth man with Hel-torments for doing thoſe things, which he himſelf hath predeſtinated, ordained, decreed, determined, appointed, willed and compelled him to do; and that which a man cannot chuſe, but muſt needs do by the force and compulſion of his predeſtination. Are not the very ſame forged calumnies charged on us now-adays? See an excellent replie hereto, as to the reſt of their falſe imputations, by pious and learned Ainſworth in his Cenſure upon this Dialogue, pag. 2, 4, 5, &c.

But we deſcend now to our principal Antagoniſts, ſuch asThe New Methodiſts. would paſſe under the name of Calviniſts, and yet are profeſſed, yea vehement oppugnators of our Hypotheſis. Thus Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. Hum. Theſ. 34. pag. 434. But of thoſe Reformed Divines, which ſubſcribe to the Synod of Dort, ſome in this part agree with the Moliniſts and Remonſtrants, neither do they acknowlege any other general concurſe of God with ſecond cauſes, than what is ſimultaneous and indifferent, whereby God doth not influence the cauſe itſelf, but its act, &c. He inſtanceth in Baronius, Strangius, Amyraldus, &c. And what terme or title to give this new Sect of Adverſaries more proper than New Methodiſts I know not, this being the ſofteſt title, and that which they ſeem to recreate themſelves in: ſome terme them downright Arminians; and albeit I conceive their Principes directly iſſue from and tend to Ariminianiſme, yet I dare not lode them with this reprocheful ſtyle, becauſe they generally aſſert efficacious Grace. I think we might terme them without injuſtice Semiarminians, (as the Semipelagians of old, who refined Pelagianiſme) becauſe they aſſert conditionate Reprobation and al the conſequents thereof: But yet becauſe nothing more becomes an opponent than candor and ingenuitie, therefore to let paſſe al Titles that may carrie any thing of reproche, I give them only this of New Methodiſts, becauſe they affect and attemt to give us a new Method or Scheme of Predeſtination, efficacious Grace, Divine Concurſe, &c.

p. 144The firſt that opened the way to this New Method, was John John Camero.Camero, a perſon of excellent naturals, and thoſe wel improved by acquired literature, but too much addicted to innovation in the doctrine of the Goſpel, which he could not diſſemble, but too oft made profeſſion thereof; as in a Letter to Ludovicus Capellus, where he ſaith, That many things occurred to him, which neither his own mind nor the reaſon of the times would permit him to publiſh. He too much abounded in his own ſenſe and words, with too great contemt of ſuch as differed from him, though more deſerving than himſelf, as Chamier. There were few Theologic Queſtions profeſſedly handled by him, ſpecially ſuch as belong to the Doctrine of Grace and Free-wil, but he divulged ſomething of Novitie therein: among which novel opinions this was one, That he denied every real poſitive Being to be from God immediately as the prime Quod negem, omne ens eſt à Deo tanquam à cauſa efficiente immediata, Ep. ad Jac. Gallovaeum.efficient cauſe, as Epiſt. ad Thom. Rhaedam, (oper. edit. 1642.) p. 526. and Epiſt. ad Jac. Gallovaeum, pag. 528. Which ſentiment of Camero laid the foundation, which Baronius and Strangius his Country-men afterward built their Antitheſis on. Camero had for his intime Camrade Milleterius, who after his death turned Roman Catholic, and publiſht many Antichriſtian Errors, which he profeſſed to have received from Camero.

But Camero's principal Sectator was Moſes Amyraldus, who ſuccededMoſes Amyraldus. him in the profeſſion of Theologie at Saumur, and indeed much out-went him in his propenſions and cloſures with Durandiſme and the Arminian Dogmes; particularly with this about Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. And that I may not be thought falſely to accuſe ſo learned a man, one that paſſed under the name of a Calviniſt, I ſhal faithfully relate the Character given him in this particular by one of his own friends and adherents, Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. Hum. par. 3. theſ. 48. pag. 436. There are not wanting, ſaith he, among the Doctors of the Reformed Schole ſome who touching the general Concurſe of God neceſſary to al the acts of creatures, ſeem to have the ſame ſentiments with Durandus, and Ludovicus à Dola, Doctors of the Roman Schole. For that illuſtrious man Moſes Amyraldus ſeems not to acknowlege any other general Concurſe of God, by which he concurs with al ſecond cauſes, beſides that continued efficace, whereby he doth preſerve and ſuſtain the nature of every thing, and the forces given by nature. Whence he gathers, that ſuch a concurſe belongs not to libertie. So Amyrald. de Lib. Arbitr. ſect. 4. p. 145pag. 246. Make, ſaith he, nature and its abilities able to conſiſte without the aide of ſuch a concurſe, and they wil truly act freely. Therefore let there be granted a concurſe, which performes nothing elſe, but that theſe abilities, which would otherwiſe flag and vaniſh, conſiſte and be preſerved in their natural ſtate, Libertie wil thence receive no detriment. He had been ſpeaking of Gods concurſe to ſinful acts, and as Le Blanc wel obſerves, by theſe words ſufficiently indicates, that in this part he has the ſame ſentiments with Durandus. Wherein note, (1) that Amyraldus grants, that ſometimes it is ſufficient for God to preſerve the ſubject, and render its faculties habile or capable of acting, without immediate concurſe to the act: which is alſo the opinion of ſome among us. (2) That this opinion, according to Le Blanc, fals in with that of Durandus, &c. So Theſ. 50. pag. 437. Le Blanc addes, That Amyraldus held a double act of providence about evil acts, one externe, and the other interne: as for the externe act, he placeth it in two things, (1) in propoſing objects, (2) in permitting Satan to ſet home thoſe objects with efficace. The interne act of God conſiſtes, according to him, in that God doth of many objects inducing to evil, obſcure, or remove the one, or cauſe ſome other object to be offered, which is moſt taking. In al which there is no violence offered to human libertie, nor indeed any efficacious immediate concurſe aſſerted. Yea in his Speciminis ſpecial. p. 468. he ſaith in down-right termes, That the wil of God dependes on us, not we on the wil of God: which is rank Durandiſme and Moliniſme. More of his wild ſentiments in this as in other Arminian points, ſee Pet. Molinaei, de M. Amyraldi adverſùs Spanhemium libro, Judicium, praeſat.

Placeus, another Salmurian Profeſſor, albeit in other points hePlaceus. ſtiffely defendes the New Method, yea, in that of original ſin is greatly Pelagian, yet in this point touching Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, he ſeems pendulous and in ſuſpenſe. Thus, De libero Hom. Arbitr. p. 174. (edit. 1656.) What the dependence of the ſecond cauſes on the firſt in cauſing is, the Papiſts ſharply diſpute. It is truly confeſſed by al, that God doth concur with every cauſe, ſo as to operate conveniently with its faculties: but this concurſe ſome make immediate, proxime, and altogether the ſame with the very action of ſecond cauſes; but others denie it—But we, according to that reverence we bear to the infinite Majeſtie of God, dare not determine how great the dependence p. 146of the ſecond cauſe on the firſt is: it ſufficeth us, that, provided the leaſt ſpot of ſin be not imputed to God, too much cannot be aſcribed unto God, &c.

Le Blanc alſo, Profeſſor of Theologie at Sedan, though he ſeemsLe Blanc. to affect the like ſuſpenſive modeſtie, Concil. Arbitr. theſ. 55. yet theſ. 56. pag. 438. he inclines to the opinion of Strangius, and others, That God cannot phyſically premove and predetermine to acts intrinſecally evil, without being the Author of ſin. But yet theſ. 57. he recals himſelf, and ſaith, That provided God be not conſtituted the Author of ſin, the dependence of the ſecond cauſes on the firſt cannot be too much aſſerted. And theſ. 58. he addes this as moſt certain, That the aide and efficace of Divine providence, even about ſinful acts, may no way be reſtrained to a certain general indifferent concurſe, &c.

But from the French Profeſſors we paſſe on to thoſe of Scotland, Baronius.Baronius and Strangius, who have been ſtiffe and tenacious Adherents to this New Method, about Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. As for Baronius, he is accuſed of rank Arminianiſme; and that which has given juſt ground for ſuch an imputation is his denying al kind of predetermination as wel to good as to evil acts. Thus in his Metaphyſ. Sect. 8. Diſput. 3. §. 78. pag. 146, &c. he endeavors to prove, That God doth not by a previous motion excite ſecond cauſes to act. And his arguments to prove his Antitheſis are no other than what time out of mind have been urged by Pelagians, Jeſuites, and Arminians: namely that this previous motion and predetermination (1) deſtroyeth human libertie, pag. 147. (2) That it taketh away the power of the wil to oppoſite acts, pag. 148. (3) That it maketh God the Author of ſin, pag. 149. which he endeavors to prove many ways: [1] Becauſe the entitative act of ſin as being determined by God cannot be ſeparated from the obliquitie, pag. 150. [2] Becauſe the action then as of ſuch a ſpecies muſt be from God. [3] Becauſe this opinion makes God to be injuſt and cruel, as pag. 151. [4] That hereby God is made the Author of ſin more than the ſinner. Al which are but trite and thread-bare arguments, urged by Pelagians and Arminians, to which we ſhal anſwer more fully hereafter, chap. 6. §. 1, &c. Thence he procedes pag. 153. to anſwer our principal argument, That the ſecond cauſe doth not act, but as moved by the first, and therein agrees with Suarez and other Jeſuites in aſſerting a previous indifferent concurſe. It's true, §. 58. p. 129. p. 147he argues ſtrongly againſt Durandus, yet in fine pag. 153. fals in very far with him, but more fully with the Moliniſts and Remonſtrants; which is wel obſerved by Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. Hum. theſ. 35. pag. 434. This at leaſt, without al dout, is the opinion of Robert Baronius, in his Metaphyſic, where touching the Concurſe of God, and ſo of its concord with human libertie, he profeſſeth to have altogether the ſame ſentiments with Fonſeca and Suarez, namely that this concurſe is of itſelf indifferent, and determined by the ſecond cauſe to a certain ſpecies of action: neither is it needful, that God premove ſecond cauſes, but it is ſufficient, that together with them he influence their actions and effects. And indeed Baronius's own illuſtration, Metaph. Sect. 8. Diſput. 3. pag. 143. ſufficiently clears this to be his proper opinion; where he compares the Concurſe of God to that of the Sun, which is the ſame in the production of perfect animals and monſters, in itſelf indifferent, but modified and determined by the mater it workes upon: which is the very inſtance given both by Jeſuites and Arminians. Laſtly, pag. 159. he gives us four actions of God in the induration of ſinners, which are no more than what Moliniſts and Remonſtrants acknowlege. Whence it is to me apparent, that it would not be an act of injuſtice, ſhould we reckon him among the Arminians, whoſe ſentiments and cauſe he has eſpouſed; yet by reaſon of his nominal repute among the Calviniſts, I rather incline to the more favorable cenſure of ranging him among the new Methodiſts.

But yet our principal Antagoniſt is John Strangius, Profeſſor atStrangius. Glaſcow, who (as they ſay) having had his ſpirit chafed and exaſperated by the oppoſition of Rutherford, writ a great Volume in four Books, Of Gods Wil and Actions about ſin: wherein he bends his forces principally againſt the Dominicans, Twiſſe and Rutherford, (who in his influences of the life of Grace, both Preface and Book, oft animadvertes thereon) as if theſe al, by aſſerting predetermination to the mater of ſinful acts, made God the Author of ſin. I muſt confeſſe, he diſcovers a natural acumen and a nervoſe vene of Reaſon in his Book, yet mixed with ſo great incongruities and ſelf-inconſiſtences, yea contradictions, that I cannot but marvel how ſuch a Maſter of Reaſon could ſatisfie himſelf with ſuch poor ſubterfuges and evaſions: But this I impute not to any defect in naturals, but in his cauſe, which admits not any ſolid reaſon for its defenſe. And that which yet ſeems more ſtrange p. 148to me is this, that he who oppoſeth with much vehemence Durandus, Molina, Bellarmine, and the Remonſtrants in this point of Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, yet at long-run fals in with each of theſe parties in ſome one, if not al their ſentiments about this mater. (1) That he comes very near Durandiſme is evident, in that he holds the Concurſe of God not to be neceſſary to al acts of the creature, particularly to ſuch as are intrinſecally evil: For to ſuppoſe any real poſitive Being, that fals not under Gods efficacious concurſe, is to me no leſſe than Durandiſme. It's true, Strangius in words appears againſt Durandus, in owning an immediate Concurſe of God to al actions of the creatures, as lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 163. But when he comes to explicate this immediate Concurſe as to actions intrinſecally evil, he placeth it only (as ſome now adays among us) in Gods conſerving the nature and innate diſpoſition of natural Agents, and giving them a ſelf-determining power, whereby they are rendred apt and habile for any congenerous action, as they now phraſe it. Thus pag. 164. Ergo ſi una Dei determinatio ſufficiat, quâ Deus Agentium naturalium naturam ac indolem à ſe inſitam ac conſervatam determinavit, quid opus eſt multiplicibus imò innumeris determinationibus ad eundem effectum, &c. So lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 584. he layes down this as his Hypotheſis, That God doth not in althings determine the wil, but ſometimes permit it a free election, to chuſe this or that, to do this or that; and therefore in ſuch acts he has not decreed, that man ſhould preciſely chuſe this or that, &c. And he proves it by this argument, That it is not impoſſible for God, who hath made man a free Agent, and conſerves his nature and forces, to permit ſomething to mans free-wil, it a ut per Deum non ſtet quin homo poſſit eligere alterutrum, agere aliquid, aut non agere, &c. Wherein he proves, that it is not impoſſible for God to leave ſome things to mans indifference, without determining him to either extreme: and he proves this is not impoſſible, becauſe it implies not any contradiction; which is Durandus's very argument againſt immediate Concurſe. (2) That Strangius conſpires with and eſpouſeth the ſentiments of the Moliniſts and Arminians about indifferent ſimultaneous Concurſe is partly acknowleged by his friend Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. Hum. theſ. 36. pag. 434. having ſhewen the agreament of Baronius with the Moliniſts and Remonſtrants, he addes: Neither doth John Strangius ſeem to differ much from this opinion: for albeit he thinkes, lib. 1. cap. 11. That the action whereunto God and the creature concur, is in order of p. 149nature first from God, before from the creature;—and moreover, l. 2. p. 3. denies, That God concurs only by a general concurſe; as the Sun concurs in the ſame manner to the generation of a man and horſe; but determines, that the influxe of God is ſpecial to ſpecial effects, as they are ſpecifically diſtinguiſhed, not morally but phyſically; yet he doth by many arguments contend and prove, that the premotion and predetermination of God, which the Schole of Thomas defendes, to al and ſingular acts of the creature is not neceſſary. Note here, that albeit Strangius ſeems to differ from the Moliniſts, Remonſtrants, and Baronius in aſſerting Gods Concurſe to be previous, particular, and ſpecial; yet in that he denies Divine predetermination to al creatural acts, Le Blanc makes him not to differ much from the Moliniſts and Remonſtrants: which to me indeed is a great obſervation; for I am under a very ſtrong, and I am apt to perſuade my ſelf, rational preſumtion, that predetermination to good acts can never be rationally defended by theſe New Methodiſts, who denie predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of al evil acts; as Strangius doth, pag. 167, 584. of which more hereafter, chap. 5. §. 4, 5.

Here it were worthy of ſome labor to inquire How theſe New How theſe New Methodiſts fel into their new Model.Methodiſts fel into thoſe novel ſentiments about Divine Concurſe, and on what reaſons or grounds? As it was with the Semipelagians of old, ſo it has befel theſe New Methodiſts or Semiarminians: when the Pelagians were by Auguſtin driven from their foreign, or Diana of Free-wil and the potence of corrupt nature, the Semipelagians come with freſh forces and aſſault him in the point of Reprobation, and pretend, that he aſſerted, That God by a fatal neceſſitie compelled men to ſin, and then damned them for what he had compelled them to: Juſt ſo the Arminians having been ſuppreſſed by the Synod of Dort, theſe New Methodiſts owning abſolute particular Election and efficacious Grace with the Calviniſts, thought they might more ſecurely fal in with the Arminians in the points of univerſal Grace, conditional Reprobation, and that of denying Predetermination as to the entitative act of ſin. Thus they divide the battel between the Calviniſt and Arminian. But as Janſenius has wel obſerved out of Auguſtin, If there be the leaſt point granted to Pelagius, al wil be at laſt granted; ſo I am very apt to fear, that theſe New Methodiſts, by going ſo far in ſymboliſing with the Arminians, wil at laſt be wholly drawen over into their Campe. Thus much I am very confident of, they can never rationally defend p. 150abſolute Election and efficacious Grace againſt Jeſuites and Arminians, ſo long as they denie abſolute Reprobation and Predetermination to the entitative act of al ſins. As for the principal grounds, which induce theſe New Methodiſts to take up thoſe ſentiments, we ſhal endeavor to lay them down, when we come to treat of their proper Opinions and the conſequents that attend them, Chap. 7.

But whiles we are thus characteriſing the Authors of this newWho of the new Methodiſts may be eſtimed orthodox. Method, we muſt do ſuch Calviniſts, who incline to them in ſome points, that juſtice, as to free them from al imputation or ſuſpicion of Arminianiſme: It's wel known, that ſome of great worth and truly orthodox in point of Grace, have yet ſomewhat inclined towards the new Method in point of univerſal objective Grace, as pious and learned Ʋſher, Davenant, and others both in our and the French Churches, who hold, Chriſts death to be an univerſal remedie applicable to al, but yet are far from aſſerting an univerſal ſubjective Grace, or any velleitie in God of ſaving al men, which Amyraldus and others aſſert. As for thoſe who hold abſolute and particular Election and Reprobation, Original ſin in its ful extent, mens natural impotence and being dead in ſin, efficacious Grace in the converſion of ſinners, with Gods abſolute, efficacious, immediate, total and predeterminative concurſe to al natural as wel as ſupernatural actions, as Davenant, and ſome others, who incline to an objective univerſal Grace, do, I have no controverſie with them, but can owne them as friends of Grace, albeit in ſome modes of explicating it, they differ from us.