The Court of the Gentiles Part 4:2, Treatise · Part 4 · Book 3 · Chapter 3

The Court of the Gentiles Part 4:2 · Treatise · Part 4 · Book 3 · Chapter 3

p. 44CHAP. III. Scriptural Demonſtrations of our Hypotheſis.

Scriptural Demonſtration, (1) That God is the firſt Cauſe of al natural Actions and Things, Eſa. 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36. Eph. 1. 11. Pſal. 33. 15. Prov. 21. 1. Act. 17. 28. Jam. 4. 15. (2) That God doth predetermine natural actions to which ſin is annexed. [1] Joſeph's vendition, Gen. 45. 5, 7, 8. Gen. 50. 20. Acts 7. 9. [2] The Crucifixion of Chriſt, Mat. 26. 24. Luke 22. 22. John 19. 10, 11. Acts 2. 23. & 4. 28. Our Adverſaries Evaſions taken off. (3) That God makes uſe of wicked Inſtruments to puniſh his People, Eſa. 10. 5, 6. Jer. 16. 16. Pſal. 105. 25. Job 1. 21. (4) God's immediate hand in the Act of Sin, 2 Sam. 12. 11. & 16. 22. 2▪ Sam. 16. 10, 11. & 24. 1. 1 Kings 11. 31, 37. & 12. 15, 24. 2 Kings 9. 3. & 10. 30. 1 Kings 22▪ 23. Rev. 17. 17. (5) Gods efficacious permiſſion of Sin, 1 Sam. 2. 25. Job 12. 16, 17, 20. (6) Gods judicial hardening Sinners, Pſal. 81. 12. & 69. 22-27. Rom. 11. 10. Eſa. 6. 10. & 29. 10. & 19. 11- 14. & 44. 18, 19. & 60. 2. Rom. 1. 28. 2 Theſſ. 2. 11. The nature of Judicial Induration in ſix Propoſitions. (7) Gods ordering Sin for his glorie, Exod. 9. 14-16. Rom. 9. 17, 18. Prov. 16. 4. Rom. 9. 21, 22. 1 Pet. 2. 8.

HAving explicated the termes relating to and given the genuine ſtate of our Hypotheſis, namely, That God doth, by an efficacious power and influence, move and predetermine men to al their natural actions, even ſuch as have ſin appendent to them; we now procede to the Demonſtration hereof. And becauſe al demonſtration muſt be grounded on ſome firſt principes, which give evidence, firmitude and force thereto; and there are no proper principes of Faith and Theologie, but what are originally p. 45in the Scriptures, we are therefore to begin our DemonſtrationScriptural Demonſtrations. with Scriptural Arguments, which we ſhal reduce to theſe ſeven heads. (1) Such Scriptures wherein it is univerſally affirmed, that God is the firſt Cauſe of al natural actions and things, and more particularly of al even the moſt contingent acts of mans Wil. (2) Such Scriptures as directly demonſtrate, That God doth predefine, predetermine, and foreordain ſuch natural actions whereunto ſin is neceſſarily annexed. (3) Such Scriptures wherein God is ſaid to make uſe of wicked Inſtruments for the puniſhment of his People, in ſuch a way wherein they could not but contract guilt. (4) Such Scriptures as mention Gods own immediate hand in thoſe acts whereunto ſin is appendent. (5) Such Scriptures as mention Gods efficacious permiſſion of ſome to ſin. (6) Such Scriptures as demonſtrate Gods giving up ſome to judicial Occecation and Obduration. (7) Such as clearly evince Gods ordering and diſpoſing the Sins of men for his own Glorie.

§. 1. We ſhal begin our Scriptural Demonſtration with ſuch1. God the firſt Cauſe of al natural Actions and Things. Texts as univerſally affirme, That God is the firſt cauſe of al natural Actions and Things; and more particularly, of al even the moſt contingent acts of mans Wil. 1. The Scriptures that ſpeak God to be the firſt Cauſe of al natural Actions and Things, are many and great: we ſhal mention ſome; as, Eſa. 26. 12. Thou haſt wrought al our Eſa. 26. 12.Isa 26:12works in us, or for us. This Text is urged by Strangius, p. 54. to prove Gods immediate concurſe to al actions of the creature, though it doth in a more peculiar manner regard the deliverance of the Church; wherein God predetermines and over-rules many actions of wicked men, which have much ſin annexed to them. Again, this univerſal prime Cauſalitie of God efficaciouſly influencing al natural Acts and Effects is apparently expreſſed Rom. Rom. 11. 36.Rom 11:3611. 36. For of him, and through him, and to him are althings. Of him, as he frames althings; By him, as he operates in and cooperates with althings; and for him, as the final cauſe of althings. Thus Gods foreign, multiforme energie, as Cyril ſtiles it, reacheth al manner of Natural actions and effects: and if ſo, then ſurely ſuch natural entitative Actions as have ſin annexed to them. Is there any ſin ſo intrinſecally evil, which has not ſome entitative act or ſubject as the ſubſtrate mater thereof? And if althings are of God, and by him, and for him, muſt not alſo the entitative act of ſins intrinſecally evil be ſo? Strangius, p. 342. replies thus: Al that God workes muſt tend to his Glorie: But what p. 46Glorie redounds to God from thoſe Actions of hatred of God, blaſphemie? &c. A ſtrange replie indeed for a Divine to make. (1) Was there not much Hatred of God, and Blaſphemie in the crucifying of Chriſt? And yet was there any action more conducing to the glorie of God than this? Yea, (2) Doth not Strangius himſelf, and thoſe of his partie grant, that God directs, diſpoſeth, and over-rules al ſinful acts, even ſuch as are intrinſecally evil, ſo as that they conduce to his glorie? And how can God direct, diſpoſe, and over-rule them, unleſs he concur, yea predetermine the Wil to the entitative act? Again Strangius, p. 561. anſwers to this Text thus: None that is orthodoxe ever extended theſe words to ſins; as if ſins were of God, by God, and for him, &c. [1] Neither do we extend theſe words to ſins formally conſidered: [2] But muſt we thence neceſſarily conclude, that the entitative act, whereto ſin is only accidentally appendent, is not from God, nor by him, nor for him? Yea, [3] May we not ſay with Divines, that ſin formally conſidered, although it be not of God and by him as an Efficient, yet it is for him, i. e. conducing to his Glorie, as wiſely ordered and over-ruled contrary to the intent of the ſinner? Thus much Auguſtin once and again inculcates, as De Geneſ. ad liter. lib. Imperfecto, cap. 5. **Nam & vitiorum noſtrorum non eſt auctor Deus, ſed tamen ordinator eſt.For God is not the Author of our ſins, yet he is the Ordinator of them, &c. And thus much indeed Strangius, p. 860. confeſſeth.

Another Text that evidently and invincibly demonſtrates Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurſe to al natural as wel as ſupernatural Actions and Effects is, Epheſ. 1. 11. Who worketh althings Eph. 1. 11.Eph 1:11after the counſel of his own wil. We find three particulars in this Texte which greatly conduce to explicate and demonſtrate Gods efficacious Concurſe to al Actions, and particularly to the ſubſtrate mater of ſinful acts. (1) We may conſider the object, althings, i. e. whatever is clothed with the Notion and Idea of real poſitive entitie: althings muſt be here taken diſtributively into al ſingulars: there is no Being, that partakes of real entitie but is wrought by God. (2) Here is to be conſidered, the Act, foreign, who worketh energetically, or efficaciouſly: for foreign ſignifies to work with an invincible efficace; and thence it is oft joined with words denoting infinite power and activitie, as before, c. 1. §. 6. It notes here Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurſe, working in and with althings, according to their natural propenſions. Thence (3) follows the p. 47original principe of this predeterminative efficacious operation, foreign, according to the counſel of his own wil. Which notes, that Gods efficacious predeterminative wil is the ſupreme and firſt cauſe of althings: there is no executive power in God diſtinct from his Wil: his Concurſe in regard of its active attingence is no more than his ſimple volition: ſo that divine Predetermination is the ſame with divine Predefinition, as we have largely demonſtrated, Court Gent. P. 4. c. 7. §. 3. Whence alſo it follows, that Gods working althings according to the counſel of his wil, has one and the ſame Idea with his predetermining al actions and effects, even ſuch as have ſin appendent to them. Strangius, p. 560. replies to the Argument drawen from this Text thus: From this place nothing more can be collected, than that God has decreed thoſe things that he worketh: as it is certain, that God hath decreed nothing which he doth not execute—not that God worketh ſins, &c. [1] This Text ſpeaks more than what Strangius allows it to ſpeake, namely, that God has not only decreed thoſe things that he worketh, but alſo that he works by his Decree, or omnipotent Volition: for we owne no other executive power in God but his divine Wil, as Scotus, Bradwardine, and ſome of the greateſt Scholaſtic Theologues demonſtrate. [2] Who ſaith, that God worketh Sins? ſurely none but Marcion or Manes, or ſuch as hold Sin to be a poſitive real Being. [3] But yet we do with the Orthodoxe affirme and prove from this Scripture, that God worketh that entitative natural Act, whereunto ſin is appendent: for otherwiſe, how can he be ſaid to worke althings? Is this good ſenſe or Logic, to ſay, God workes althings, not only according to their generic or ſpecific diſtribution, but alſo according to their diſtribution into each ſingular, (for ſo the Syncategoreme Al is here taken) but yet he worketh not al ſingular entities, namely the ſubſtrate mater of Sin? Doth this amount to leſs than a down-right contradiction? He workes althings, but yet doth not worke althings? What Logic or wit of man can reconcile theſe Notions?

2. Unto our firſt Head we may alſo reduce ſuch Scriptures, as in a more particular manner mention Gods efficacious predeterminative concurſe to al human actions and effects, even ſuch as are moſt contingent and dependent on the ambulatory wil of man. Thus Pſal. 33. 15. He faſhioneth their hearts alike: he conſiderethPſal. 33. 15.Ps 33:15 p. 48al their works, foreign, who faſhioneth, formeth, frameth, as the Potter doth his clay: it notes not only, yea not ſo much the firſt Creation of the human Soul, as its actual figments, frames, imaginations and thoughts: this is evident from the ſcope and contexture of the words: for what is the Pſalmiſts intent and undertakement, but to demonſtrate Gods infinite preſcience, and its perfect comprehenſion of al the figments, frames, thoughts, intentions, and affections of the heart, as verſ. 13, 14? And how doth he prove this? Why, becauſe he faſhioneth their hearts alike, i. e. puts al the firſt thoughts, inclinations, intentions and movements of the heart into what forme, frame, or faſhion he pleaſeth. There is alſo a great Emphaſe and ſignificance in that terme foreign, which we render alike, but may be as properly rendred together, as it is by the Latine ſimul; neither is it to be referred to the Verbe frameth, but to the object Hearts: and ſo it notes an univerſalitie diſtributive into al ſingulars, without the leaſt exception of any. And then the ſenſe wil be; who faſhioneth, formeth, or frameth the hearts of al mankind in al their very firſt motions, conceptions, imaginations, reſolutions, end, intereſts, contrivements, ebullitions, affections, proſecutions, and fruitions, or other actions whatſoever. Whence he addes, He conſidereth al their works: what works doth he mean? Surely not only the works and labors of mens hands, but alſo the workings, movements, and figments of their hearts: and how can God conſider them, if he did not forme, frame and faſhion them? Yea, there yet lies a deeper notion in the coherence of theſe parts; namely, that Gods forming, framing and faſhioning the hearts of al men is the ground and cauſe of his conſidering their works: For how God can perfectly conſider and know the works of mens hearts, unleſſe he be the former, framer, and faſhioner of them al, as to their real entitative acts, al the wit of man can never deviſe or make clear unto us. So that Gods Science of Viſion, or Preſcience as to the figments of mans heart ariſeth from this, that God is the framer, former, and faſhioner of mens hearts and al their natural movements; which alſo implies his predefinition and predetermination of mans heart and al its firſt motions, inclinations, and affections. So then to forme and ſum up our Argument from this Text: Doth God indeed faſhion, forme and frame the hearts of al men in al their natural motions, imaginations, and affections? And may we without apparent contradiction to the light of this p. 49Text exclude the entitative acts of any ſins, though never ſo intrinſecally evil? What is this but to exclude the far greateſt part of human acts from being formed and framed by God? Or how can the omniſcient God conſider al the works of mens hearts, if he be not the former and faſhioner of them al, as to their natural entitie? I muſt confeſſe the validitie of this argument from Gods preſcience is to me ſo firme and great, as that ſhould it be baffled, I ſee no way left, but to turne Socinian, and ſo to denie the certaintie of Gods preſcience as to the contingent imaginations of mans heart, which implies much Atheiſme.

Another Text that proves Gods efficacious and predeterminative Concurſe as to al human acts is Prov. 21. 1. The Kings heart is Prov. 21. 1.Prov 21:1in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water; he turneth it whitherſoever he wil. (1) He mentions the Kings heart, as the meaſure of al other mens; becauſe Kings generally have a greater Soveraintie and Dominion over their own hearts, than other men: if any mens hearts may plead the privilege of exemtion from Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurſe, ſurely Kings may, ſpecially ſuch as Solomon was, who obtained from God ſuch an amplitude of Soul, and ſelf-Dominion: yet he grants, that the Kings heart was not exemted therefrom. (2) By the Heart we muſt underſtand, according to the Hebraic mode, the whole ſoul, and al its movements, imaginations, ratiocinations, contrivements, purpoſes, and undertakements. (3) In the hand of the Lord: i. e. under his efficacious predeterminative influxe or concurſe. The Hand being the inſtrument of our moſt potent operations, it's uſually put in Scripture for the energetic, potent and predeterminative Concurſe of God: So Hab. 3. 4. He [i. e. Chriſt whoſeHab. 3. 4.Hab 3:4 brightneſſe was as the light] had hornes, [i. e. beams, as foreign notes] coming out of his hands [i. e. moſt potent wil, the ſpring of al his efficacious operations: whence it follows] and there was the hiding of his power, i. e. his moſt potent efficacious predeterminative concurſe lay hid in the beams irradiated from his omnipotent hand or wil. So Act. 11. 21. And the hand of the Lord was with them, Act. 11. 21.Acts 11:21i. e. the efficacious predeterminative power of Divine Grace; the hand being the inſtrument whereby man exertes and puts forth his power. So Solomon ſaying, That the hearts of Kings are in the hand of God, it muſt be underſtood of Gods puiſſant predeterminative Concurſe, whereby he applies the heart to its acts, conduceth and guideth it therein, and determineth it as he pleaſeth. So it p. 50follows, (4) As the rivers of waters, he turneth it whitherſoever he wil. How eaſie is it by Aquaducts to turne waters this or that way as men pleaſe? And is it not infinitely more facile for the wiſe omnipontent God, to turne the hearts of men, and al their natural conceptions, products, and iſſues which way he liſtes? Al this may be evinced from Strangius's gloſſe on this Text, lib. 1. cap. 9. pag. 50. where having given us the mention of Gods preſerving and directing the wils of men even in evil actions, he addes a third and more ſpecial mode of Divine influence, whereby God doth bend, impel, and incline human wils which way he pleaſe, not by proper compulſion, but by ſweet inſpiration and motion: For albeit God doth never take away that libertie which is eſſential to the wil, yet he doth at times, and when he pleaſe, efficaciouſly move and impel the wils of men: and what Solomon predicates of the Kings heart, Prov. 21. 1. that very ſame may, on a greater account, be affirmed of the heart of every man. So Auguſtin, de Grat. & Liber. Arbitr. cap. 20. If the Scripture be diligently inſpected, it ſhews, that not only the good wils of men, but even the bad are ſo in the power of God, that where he wil and when he wil, he cauſeth them to be inclined, either to performe benefits, or to inflict puniſhments, by a moſt ſecret, yet juſt judgement. So again Auguſt. de Corrept. & Grat. cap. 6. God hath in his power the wils of men, more than they themſelves; without dout having moſt omnipotent power to incline mens hearts where he pleaſeth. What could be ſaid more categorically and poſitively to evince Gods efficacious and predeterminative Concurſe to al the natural products and iſſues of mans heart, even ſuch as have intrinſecal evil, as they cal it, appendent to them? Yea, Strangius, lib. 2. cap. 7. p. 182. grants, That God doth ſometimes efficaciouſly move and predetermine the wils of men not only to ſupernatural workes, but alſo to natural and civil, as oft as it ſeems good to him, to performe certain ends which he has preordained. So Prov. 16. 7. He maketh even his enemies to be at peace with him. And how ſo? Surely by over-ruling their hearts even in the ſinful movements. Thus he bent and determined the revengeful mind of Eſau to embrace his brother, Gen. 33. So he gained the hearts of the Egyptians towards the Iſraelities, Exod. 11. 2, 3. & 12. 35, 36. Thus God determined the wil of Cyrus to bring back the Captivitie of the Jews, 2 Chron. 36. 22. Ezra 1. 1. Thus God bent the mind of Darius and Artaxerxes to grant the Jews libertie for the rebuilding the Temple, Ezra 6. 1, &c. & 7. 2. Neh. 2. 4. So God p. 51dealt with Jeremy's enemies, Jer. 15. 11. Al theſe predeterminations even in civil and natural actions are allowed by Strangius: whence we argue, That it is impoſſible, but that God ſhould predetermine to the ſubſtrate mater of ſinful actions: for al theſe actions being exerted by wicked men, had nothing of moral or ſupernatural good in them, albeit God made uſe of them for the ſuccour of his people, yea they were ful of hatred againſt God.

To theſe Scriptures we may adde, Act. 17. 28. For in him we Act. 17. 28.Acts 17:28live, and move, and have our being. Not only Being in general, and Life, which implies more than ſimple being, but alſo al our movements or motions are from God as the prime Motor: which Paul demonſtrates out of one of their own Poets: for we are alſo his offſpring. As if he had ſaid: Do not your own Poets tel you, that we are the off-ſpring of God? Is he not then the firſt Cauſe and Motor of al our motions? Doth not Ariſtotle, Phyſ. 8. alſo ſtrongly demonſtrate, That al our natural motions muſt ariſe from one first immobile Motor? And to whom doth this Prerogative belong but to God? Muſt not then the ſubſtrate mater of al ſinful motions, even ſuch as are intrinſecally evil, be reduced unto God as the prime Motor?

I ſhal conclude this firſt Head of ſcriptural Arguments with Jam. 4. 15. For that ye ought to ſay, If the Lord wil, we ſhal live, Jam. 4. 15.Jas 4:15and do this or that. There were a number of Free-willers, who proudly conceited, that they had an abſolute and plenary dominion over their own wils and actions; whom James rebukes, and tels them, they ought to ſay, If the Lord wil, &c. So that he plainly reſolves al the acts of mans wil into the wil of God, as the original Cauſe and Principe. But let us ſee how poorly Strangius ſhifts off the force of this Argument, lib. 2. cap. 10. pag. 227. he ſaith, Who ever underſtood theſe words, if God wil, i. e. if God predetermine my wil to do this or that? Then he addes his own gloſſe: But truly nothing more can be underſtood by that condition, IF GOD WIL, than this, if God ſhal permit, or wil permit, as it is elſewhere explicated, Act. 16. 7. & 1 Cor. 16. 7. I muſt confeſſe I cannot but wonder, that a perſon of ſo great reaſon, and under ſo many advantages and aſſiſtances from Divine Revelation, ſhould ſatisfie himſelf with ſo ſlender an evaſion, which not only Reaſon and Scripture, but even Pagan Philoſophemes contradict. For (1) it is moſt evident, that James here, (as Luke, Act. 16. 7. and Paul, 1 Cor. 16. 7.) ſpeakes not of a mere permiſſive wil, but of an efficacious p. 52influential concurſe, ariſing from the wil of God, which is the alone principe and ſpring of Divine concurſe: for al actions both natural, civil, and ſupernatural muſt be reſolved into the wil of God, as their prime cauſe: ſo that If God wil here, is the ſame with foreign elſewhere, if God concur, if he aſſiſte, if he by his efficacious predeterminative wil, without which we can do nothing, concur. And that this is the genuine mind of this Text is moſt evident by the uſe of this phraſe among the Ancients both Jews and Pagans. Benſyra, that ancient Hebrew, Sent. moral. xi. thus ſpeakes: Let man never ſay he wil do any thing, before he hath prefaced this, If the Lord wil, i. e. aſſiſte or concur, not permit. So among Pagans, Hom. Iliad. B. verſ. 28. foreign, &c. The like Demoſth. foreign, If God wil. But none ſpeakes more fully to this point than Plato, Alcibiad. pag. 135. where Alcibiades demanding, How he ought to ſpeak touching Divine Si Dii volunt, volentibus Diis, Cic. in Offic.efficacious concurſe, Socrates replies, foreign, If God wil: and in his Laches: But I wil do this and come to thee to morrow, foreign, If God wil. Whence it's evident, that this formule of ſpeech was ordinary even among the Heathens, as wel as Jews and Chriſtians, noting not only a permiſſive or Directory, but Decretory and predeterminative wil. So the ſame Phraſe muſt be underſtood, Act. 18. 21. If God wil, and 1 Cor. 4. 19. If Act. 18. 21. 1 Cor. 4. 19.Acts 18:211 Cor 4:19the Lord wil. Is it poſſible that theſe Phraſes ſhould be underſtood of a mere permiſſive wil? Do not al mankind need an efficacious concurſe and predeterminative wil to conduct them in al their affaires? Again, (2) Gods permiſſive wil is either natural or moral: it cannot be meant of Gods natural permiſſive wil, becauſe that regardes only ſin, which there is no mention of in theſe Textes, neither is it neceſſarily included. Neither can it be meant of Gods moral permiſſive wil, becauſe that was already declared and manifeſt in the Laws of God: for al moral permiſſion belongs to Gods Legiſlative wil declared in his word. It remains therefore that this phraſe, If God wil, be underſtood of Gods efficacious wil, whereby al natural motions and ſo the entitative acts of ſin are predetermined.

§. 2. I now deſcend to the Second Head of Scriptural Demonſtrations,God doth predetermine natural actions to which ſin is annexed. namely, That God doth predefine, predetermine, and foreordain ſuch natural actions whereunto ſin is neceſſarily annexed. I ſhal mention only two Actions, The Selling of Joſeph, and the Crucifixion of our Lord, whereof the former was but a Type of the p. 53later. 1. I ſhal begin with the Selling of Joſeph, mentioned Gen. 1 Arg. from Joſephs Vendition, Gen. 45. 5, 7, 8.Gen 45:5Gen 45:7Gen 45:845. 5, 7, 8. Joſeph ſaith v. 5. Now therefore be not grieved, nor angry with your ſelves, that ye ſold me hither: for God did ſend me before you to preſervelife. Joſeph here has a double aſpect on his Brothers ſin; the one regards their hand in the ſin, which he, out of a noble generous principe of fraternal Love, paſſeth by; the other regards the ſpecial hand of Divine Providence in this their Sin, which he admires and adores, in that it by an efficacious predeterminative Concurſe brought ſo great a good out of ſo great an evil; which no finite power could do: men may make good uſe of what is in it ſelf good, but who can bring ſo great good out of ſo great evil, but a God omniſcient and omnipotent? (1) Let us remarque their Sin in ſelling Joſeph, and of what a black Idea it was. [1] It ſprang from Hatred, yea a deliberate rooted hatred, as Gen. 37. 4. They hated him, and could not ſpeak peaceably unto him. Their hatred was grounded on his fathers love to him. Yea, [2] There was much Envy and Indignation joined with their hatred, as v. 8. Shalt thou indeed reign over us? &c. whence v. 11. and his brethren envied him, &c. [3] There was in like manner bloudy Cruelty, yea intended Murther in this ſin, as v. 20, 21, 22, 24. [4] There was alſo notorious Lying evident in this ſin, v. 32, 33. [5] That this ſin was of a very crimſon bloudy guilt is evident by their own Convictions and Confeſſions, when God began to awaken their Conſciences, as it is conjectured about fourteen years after, Gen. 42. 22. Behold his bloud is required! [6] By al which it is moſt evident, that this vendition or ſelling of Joſeph was a ſin intrinſecally evil. For certainly if a ſin of ſuch bloudy Aggravations deſerve not the name of intrinſecally evil, I know not what ſin doth. Hence, (2) We are to demonſtrate, that God did predefine and predetermine Joſephs Brethren to the entitative act or ſubſtrate mater of this Sin. And this Province we no way dout but to make good out of the Texte, Gen. 45. 5, 7, 8. compared with other Texts. [1] Joſeph ſaith, v. 5. 7. God did ſend me before you to preſerve life. foreign, ſent me forth, by his efficacious predeterminative hand, which conducted me hither. The LXX. render it foreign, which ſignifies, to ſend forth with a mighty hand, as Captives into Libertie, Luke 4. 18. alſo, to ſend forth with commands, autoritie and power, Mat. 10. 16. & 11. 10. as elſewhere: again, to ſend forth executioners, Mat. 2. 16. laſtly, to direct the courſe of a Ship. In al theſe notions Gods efficacious predeterminative p. 54concurſe in ſending Joſeph into Egypt, is neceſſarily included. This alſo appears [2] by what is added v. 5. God did ſend me before you to preſerve life. Note here, that God certainly and abſolutely foreſaw the Famine and Joſephs being ſold into Egypt, which he intended to turne for good, even for the preſervation of Jacobs Familie and the Elect ſeed in him. Now how could God foreſee this abſolutely and infallibly, but in the predefinition or fore ordainment of his own Wil? And Strangius grants this, that where there is Predefinition, there alſo follows Predetermination: Muſt we not then conclude, that this Vendition of Joſeph was both predefined and predetermined by God? Yea, [3] Joſeph addes v. 8. So now it was not you that ſent me hither, but God, &c. You ſee here Joſeph makes a three-fold mention of Gods over-ruling hand in this their ſin, and that for their as wel as his good: And he tels them plainly, that it was not they that ſent him, but God. As if he had ſaid, You indeed ſent me to be a poor Vaſſal in Egypt; but did not God ſend me to be a Ruler over Egypt? You ſent me to deſtroy me, but why did God ſend me, but to preſerve both you and me? You ſent me out of Hatred and Malice; but did not God ſend me out of great Love and pitie both to me and you? And what could be ſpoken more emphatically to illuſtrate and demonſtrate Gods efficacious predeterminative concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin than this, It was not you that ſent me hither, but God? Why doth he uſe this manner of ſpeech? was it not they that ſold him? Yes; but becauſe they were but as mere paſſive Inſtruments or Midwifes to bring forth that great predeterminative Decree, and to ſubſerve Divine Providence in the uſhering into Egypt Joſeph their temporal Savior, and the Type of our Eternal Savior, therefore the entitative action is wholly taken off from them, (albeit the moral vitioſitie of it is imputable to none but them) and aſcribed unto God, as the principal Agent. This manner of ſpeech is Hebraic, and muſt be underſtood, (1) foreign, it was not you, i. e. not only you: you were but the Inſtruments of Divine Gubernation and Predetermination. (2) foreign, emphatically, it was not you, i. e. if we conſider the act of ſelling me in its natural entitative Idea, as the ſubſtrate mater of Divine Providence, ye had the leaſt hand in it, it was not you, but God that ſent me hither. We find the like Hebraiſme, 1 Sam. 8. 7. Not thee but me, i. e. principally and comparatively. So that it's moſt evident p. 55that Joſeph aſcribeth the whole Act conſidered entitatively and naturally unto Gods efficacious predeterminative and principal concurſe and conduct, whereof they were but the Inſtruments; albeit, if we conſider the act morally, as to its obliquitie, ſo itNon refert in Deum peccatum fratrum, ſed tranſitum ſuum in Aegyptum. Eraſm. was wholly theirs, not Gods: it is not his brethrens ſin morally conſidered, but the entitative act that he refers to God. [4] That this is the genuine mind of Joſephs words is evident from other Scriptures. So Gen. 50. 20. But as for you, ye thought evil againſt me, but God meant it for good, &c. Here we have their moral evil ſeparated from Gods natural and moral good in and by the Vendition of Joſeph. Their Act proceding from hatred, envy, and attended with Murder, was intrinſecally evil, and deſigned nothing but evil againſt Joſeph: but the ſame Act conſidered phyſically and entitatively as proceding from the efficacious predeterminative conduct of God, was naturally good; and as it tended to the deſigned exaltation of Joſeph, and rendered him a temporal and typical Savior of Iſrael, ſo it was morally good. The aggravation of their Sin, and efficace of Gods predeterminative Concurſe may be both greatly illuſtrated by an inſpection into the native import of the Hebraic foreign, uſed here to note their malitioſe plotted evil, and Gods plotted predeterminative concurſe in and about the ſame act. (1) He ſaith, Ye thought evil againſt me, foreign, ye plotted, contrived evil againſt me. foreign properly ſignifies to excogitate, deliberate, conſult, compute, calculate, contrive, reaſon. It is oft uſed to ſignifie plotted, inachinated evil, as Pſal. 10. 2. The ſame word is uſed to note Gods determinate counſel and wil about the entitative act of their Sin; but God meant it unto Good, foreign, i. e. from al Eternitie contrived and predetermined it for good. Their plotted contrived evil, was counter-plotted and contrived by God for good: Which notes that it was not a thing caſual or accidental, but fore-ordained and predetermined by God, according to the determinate counſel of his wil. The like may be deduced from Stephens words, Act. 7. 9. And the Patriarchs moved with envy, Act. 7▪ 9▪Acts 7:9ſold Joſeph into Egypt; but God was with him. Here we have their Moral evil aggravated from its original Spring, and Gods natural and moral good in the ſame Act. How was God with him? Not only in his paſſive Vendition, or paſſing into Egypt and continuance there, as ſome would perſwade us; but alſo in the very Active Vendition, or act of ſelling him to the Iſhmaelites, conſidered p. 56naturally and entitatively: for God was with Joſeph in cauſing the Iſhmaelites to paſs by at that very time, in determining his brethrens wils to take him out of the pit and ſell him to the Iſhmaelites, and inclining or determining theſe to accept the bargain. In ſum, God was with Joſeph by an efficacious predeterminative conduct, determining every circumſtance of this Vendition naturally conſidered.

I am not ignorant what Reſponſes or Anſwers are framed byThe Objections againſt Joſephs Vendition anſwered. the Jeſuites, Arminians, and New Methodiſts againſt our Argument deduced from this Vendition of Joſeph: Molina, (the Head of the Jeſuites as to their Pelagian Dogmes) de Concord. q. 19. Diſp. 2. tels us, that this Vendition of Joſeph is aſcribed to God, as merely permitting it. The like Ruiz, de Volunt. diſp. 18. Sect. 2. and Leſſius, de Efficac. Grat. Sect. 2. and others. Arminius, de Efficac. Provid. Diſput. 11, 12. over and above this mere Permiſſion of the Jeſuites, addes Gods oblation, direction, and determination of Arguments and Occaſions, yea ſome kind of concurſe in this Vendition of Joſeph, &c. But al theſe frivolous ſubterfuges to avoid the force of this Text are incomparably wel blowen off by Rutherford, de Divina Provident. c. 16. p. 192, &c. I ſhal therefore only give the ſolution of ſuch as have been coined ſince by the New Methodiſts, which indeed are much the ſame with thoſe of the Jeſuites and Arminians. A Divine of name among us, gives this replie to our Argument, That the Venditio activa, the active Vendition of Joſeph was not willed by God, but only paſſiva, the paſſive, or effect and conſequents; which are only mentioned in the Text. I muſt confeſs this anſwer gives me ſome amazement, but no difficultie to anſwer it. For, (1) What this Reverend Author means by his paſſive Vendition I cannot divine: I know that in the Ariſtotelean Scholes Action and Paſſion have been really diſtinguiſhed and so diſtributed into two diſtinct Predicaments; but I think this imaginary diſtinction is now generally hiſs'd out of the Scholes by al awakened Diſputants; yea, how many of thoſe, who are zeloſe Sectators of Ariſtotle in other points, have ſubſcribed the baniſhment of this diſtinction? So that to diſtinguiſh active Vendition from paſſive, what is it but to diſtinguiſh one and the ſame Act from it ſelf? But (2) grant there be ſuch a diſtinction in Nature, yet is it not moſt apparent, that it can have no place here? Doth not Joſeph aſcribe the very active Vendition or action of Selling him, unto God? Is it not p. 57ſaid v. 8. So now, it was not you that ſent me hither, but God? Can this, with any tolerable ſenſe be applied to the paſſive Vendition, or the effects and conſequents of the ſelling Joſeph? Muſt it not neceſſarily be underſtood of the very ſame active Vendition, which, conſidered in its natural entitative act, they were the Inſtruments of, but God the principal Agent and Conductor? (3) This Diſtinction of Active and Paſſive Vendition was not indeed forged by the Reverend Author before mentioned, but taken up from Bellarmine, who de Amiſſ. Grat. l. 12. c. 11. diſtinguiſheth the Action of ſelling Joſeph and crucifying Chriſt from the Paſſion, and grants, that God willed and decreed the Paſſion, but not the Action, which inferred the Paſſion; and becauſe the ſaid Author has ſo great an eſtime for Strangius, whom he generally follows in this point, I ſhal give him the anſwer which Strangius, l. 4. c. 11. p. 772. gives to this diſtinction of Bellarmine, thus: However it be, in the Text there are two things to be obſerved, [1] That Joſeph there cannot diſtinguiſh the Action from the Paſſion, as if the Paſſion were to be aſcribed to God, not the Action: for it's plainly ſaid and repeted in the Text, according to the Hebraic veritie, Gen. 45. 5, 7, 8. that God ſent him. [2] Thence c. 50. 20. he doth plainly diſtinguiſh between the good work of God and their evil in the ſame mater, from the diverſitie of the Intention: You deſigned evil againſt me, but God deſigned that for good— Then he addes: Here the various operation and provident adminiſtration of God is ſeen, that he might bring to paſs what he had preſignified before by the dreams of Joſeph, &c. And p. 773. he ſubjoins: There is no incommoditie if it be ſaid, that God elected and alſo procured the Vendition of Joſeph as a means to the end fore-ordained by him, and that may be underſtood not only of paſſive Vendition, but alſo of active, which truely can never be ſeparated. For if God willed that Joſeph be ſold, he willed, that ſome one ſhould ſel him, and that no other ſhould ſel him but his brethren. For neither was that Vendition a thing in it ſelf evil, if it be conſidered apart from the vitioſitie and defect of the ſecond Cauſes. Then he concludes: The Permiſſion of God here was not otioſe, but an efficacious operation in the tradition of Joſeph, ſubminiſtration of occaſions, out of the concurſe which he made both by the direction of al circumſtances, and moderation of the wil of his brethren, that their purpoſe of killing him being changed, they might p. 58do no other than what God intended. And the ſame efficace and force of Divine providence ſhines brightly in working, diſpoſing, and directing al other things that relate to this Hiſtorie. This Anſwer of Strangius to Bellarmine I have been the more prolixe in reciting, (1) becauſe the fore-mentioned Divine of ſo much repute among us makes great uſe of this diſtinction touching active and paſſive vendition or crucifixion, endeavoring thereby to ſolve al our Arguments from the vendition of Joſeph and crucifixion of Chriſt; whereas Strangius, one of his own partie, rejectes it as ſpurious and frivolous. (2) Becauſe the conceſſions of Strangius in this his Anſwer to Bellarmine do indeed give a mortal wound to his own cauſe: For if the active vendition of Joſeph was from Gods efficacious providence and wil decreeing the ſame, then actions intrinſecally evil are as to their entitative act or ſubſtrate mater naturally conſidered from God, albeit their moral vitioſitie is to be aſcribed to no one but the ſinner.

2. I now paſſe on to demonſtrate, That God doth predefine, or2. Arg. from the Crucifixion of Chriſt. foreordain and predetermine ſuch natural actions whereunto ſin is neceſſarily annexed, from the Crucifixion of Chriſt. And the Textes that confirme this part of our demonſtration are ſo great and illuſtrious, that I cannot but greatly wonder how any Chriſtian, that aſſentes to the veracitie and authoritie of Scripture, can evade the evidence thereof, or diſſent from our Hypotheſis. (1) I ſhal take the Scriptures as they lie in order, and begin with Mat. Mat. 26. 24.Matt 26:2426. 24. The Son of man goeth, as it is written of him; but wo unto that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed. [1] Note here that Chriſts death was infallibly predicted or foretold: ſo much, as it is written of him, neceſſarily infers. Now how could the death of Chriſt be infallibly predicted, if it were not predefined and preordained by God? Yea, if the death of Chriſt were not neceſſarily predefined and preordained by God, how could God infallibly foreknow the ſalvation of any one elect ſoul, which neceſſarily dependes on the death of Chriſt? So that it remains moſt certain, that the death of Chriſt was predefined and foreordained by God, and that in every the leaſt circumſtance thereof: the whole ſeries of intentions and actions in Judas's betraying his Lord, and the Jews malitioſe and bloudy crucifying of him was predefined and preordained by God. [2] Hence alſo it follows, that al the bloudy contrivements, barbarous and cruel executions, with al the particular circumſtances in the betraying and crucifying of p. 59Chriſt were predetermined by God. Thus much reaſon ſtrongly evinceth, and Strangius with others grant, that eternal predefinition or predeſtination, and predetermination in time are parallel and commenſurate each to other: whatever is eternally predefined or preordained by God is predetermined by him in time. Indeed if we wil take the true Idea of Divine Predetermination, what is it but the eternal act of the Divine wil, whereby God predefined or preordained al perſons, actions, and effects to exiſte in ſuch or ſuch a period of time? So that, to ſpeake truth, predefinition and predetermination differ not really and originally as to their active principe; albeit we may, out of compliance with the Scholes, put this difference between them, by underſtanding Predefinition, Preordination, or Predeſtination of the eternal active Decree of God, and Predetermination of the execution of the Decree, or its paſſive Attingence in regard of the effect. But take predetermination in what ſenſe you pleaſe, it muſt neceſſarily be applied to the Crucifixion of Chriſt and al the moſt minute circumſtances thereof. And ſo much indeed is implied in thoſe words, The Son of man goeth, foreign. Where? or to what? Surely to die, and how? without al peradventure, as efficaciouſly conducted, moved, yea predetermined by the Divine wil. There was not the leaſt ſtep he took to the Croſſe, the leaſt intention, action, or circumſtance in the whole complexe or ſyſteme of Chriſts Crucifixion, as wel active as paſſive, but was predetermined by God. But [3] note alſo hence, that this Crucifixion of Chriſt, although it were predefined and predetermined by God, yet this Divine predefinition and predetermination did not at al diminiſh the guilt of thoſe bloudy inſtruments, who had their hands embrued in that immaculate blood. This is particularly ſpecified in thoſe words: but wo unto that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed. Judas neither did nor could juſtly plead Divine preordination or predetermination, as an excuſe for his treacherie. No, his own conſcience told him, that he had voluntarily, yea malitioſely betrayed innocent bloud: neither could the Jews plead the ſame, in as much as their own malitioſe and bloudy wils were as deeply engaged in this Crucifixion, as if there had been no predetermination, which doth no way diminiſh the libertie of the wil. Hence, [4] it is moſt evident, that this Crucifixion of our Lord was a ſin intrinſecally evil. For was there not a world of enmitie and hatred of God in it? Did there not p. 60much blaſphemie attend their wicked deeds? Is not the ſhedding innocent bloud, yea the bloud of God, as it is ſtiled, Act. 20. 28. a ſin intrinſecally evil? And doth not this ſufficiently demonſtrate, that the ſubſtrate mater of an act intrinſecally evil is predefined and predetermined by God?

(2) Another Texte that evidently demonſtrates the Crucifixion of Chriſt to be predefined and predetermined by God, is Luke 22.Luk. 22. 22.Luke 22:22 22. And truly the Son of man goeth, as it was determined; but wo unto that man by whom he is betrayed. This Text is the ſame, and refers to the ſame paſſage with that before of Matthew, yet with this difference; Matthew ſaith, As it is written of him; but Luke, As it was determined; which puts it out of al dout, that Chriſts crucifixion was determined or predetermined by God. And for the more ful explication and demonſtration hereof, we are to remarque, that Luke being a Phyſician, was moſt intimely verſed in the Greek Tongue: for a Phyſician in thoſe days was of little repute, if not wel acquainted with the Grecanic Monuments relating to medicine. And thence we find, even by the confeſſion of ſome Atheiſtic ſpirits, that Lukes Greek both in this his Evangel, as alſo in the Acts of the Apoſtles, is moſt pure, elegant, and ſignificant. And among other this notion here uſed gives us a ſpecimen of his accurate skil in the Greek. For foreign here is a philoſophic notion, of much uſe among the Grecians to ſignifie that which is defined, determined, predetermined, predeſtinated, decreed, conſtituted, and ordained by an unalterable Decree, as we have more copioſely demonſtrated from the genuine import of foreign, cap. 1. §. 6. Of determinative Concurſe. And that foreign here may be properly rendred predetermined, is evident from the uſe of foreign, Act. 4. 28. To do whatſoever thine hand and thy counſel Act. 4. 28.Acts 4:28determined before to be done. Where it is in the Greek foreign, predetermined. And indeed Determination and Predetermination as to the Divine concurſe admit not ſo much as any mental diſtinction, according to the confeſſion of ſome Adverſaries. The Syriac, Luk. 22. 22. renders it, foreign, it is defined. foreign in the O. T. ſignifies to expand, to make clear, to explicate more fully and clearly by the diſtribution of al parts, &c. Whence it is rendred by the LXX. Ezech. 37. 12 foreign, to ſeparate: and Num. 15. 34▪ foreign, to decree: which ſenſe agrees with the mind of our Lord, Luk. 22. 22. So that it is moſt evident, that this notion foreign here conſidered in itſelf, and in al its ſynonymies, notes the p. 61Crucifixion of Chriſt in al its circumſtances both active and paſſive, to be determined, predetermined, and foreordained by God. Yea, we have for this a great conceſſion of Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 13. pag. 665. But that the workes of Chriſt, ſpecially his Paſſion and voluntary death were abſolutely predetermined by God is manifeſt from Scripture, Luk. 22. 22. Act. 2. 23. & 4. 28. Whence I argue, that if the death and crucifixion of Chriſt were abſolutely predetermined by God, then the ſubſtrate mater of a ſinful act, yea of an act intrinſecally evil was abſolutely predetermined by God. How poor and evanid the evaſions of Strangius and others are as to this Text we ſhal examine and lay open when we have explicated the following Texts, which demonſtrate the ſame.

(3) I paſſe on to the Conference between Pilate and our Lord, Joh. 19. 10. Then ſaith Pilate unto him, Knoweſt thou not, that I Joh. 19. 10, 11▪John 19:10John 19:11have power to crucifie thee, and have power to releaſe thee? Pilate having power of life and death committed to him by Tiberius Ceſar, he threatens our Lord therewith: and what replie doth our Lord make? verſ. 11. Jeſus anſwered: Thou couldeſt have no power at al againſt me, except it were given thee from above: therefore he that hath delivered me unto thee hath the greater ſin. We find ſeveral particulars here very remarquable for the demonſtration of our Hypotheſis. [1] Whereas Pilate boaſted of his power to crucifie, or releaſe our Lord, he tels him plainly, that he could have no power againſt him, except it were given him from above. The power that Pilate pretendes unto was legal Autoritie backed with an executive power committed to him: ſo much foreign notes: our Lord doth not denie his claim of legal Autoritie, as commiſſionated by Ceſar; but yet confines and reſtrains the execution thereof to Gods predeterminative Concurſe. As if our Lord had ſaid: I grant thy power and autoritie of life and death as Ceſars Commiſſioner and Miniſter; yet know, thou couldeſt not execute this thy power on me, unleſſe the providential concurrence of my Father did efficaciouſly move and predetermine thee thereto. [2] Obſerve here the double negative, foreign, which among the Grecians implies a more vehement negation. As if he had ſaid: Alas! thou haſt not the leaſt umbrage or ſhadow of power to execute againſt me, but what is diſpenſed forth unto thee by the efficacious predeterminative hand or providential concurſe of my Father; whoſe wiſe and omnipotent hand has put in every bitter ingredient into the Cup I am to drink of. [3] Neither doth p. 62al this excuſe Judas, the Jews, or Pilate as to their guilt in crucifying the Lord of Glorie: no, Gods predeterminative concurſe is ſo far from excuſing theſe Traitors, as that it aggravates their ſin. So it follows: Therefore he that hath delivered me unto thee hath the greater ſin. Therefore, foreign, for this very reaſon, becauſe my Father hath left that traiterous wretch Judas to be hurried, by his own avaricious luſt, into this horrid Treaſon of betraying me, and predetermined thine execution thereof, his guilt is the greater. [4] Laſtly, hence alſo we may argue, that this ſin of crucifying our Lord was intrinſecally evil. So much that laſt clauſe, hath the greater ſin, implies. As if he had ſaid: Oh! what a world of treaſon, murder, blaſphemie, hatred of God and al manner of ſin is involved in the wombe of this ſin?

(4) We find the predefinition and predetermination of Chriſts crucifixion more expreſſely explicated and demonſtrated, Act. 2.Act. 2. 23.Acts 2:23 23. Him, being delivered by the determinate counſel, and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and ſlain. What could more plainly be ſaid for the predefinition and predetermination of our Lords crucifixion, as to its ſubſtrate entitative act, and yet for the aggravation of their ſin in acting their parts in this bloudy Tragedie? Let us examine the particulars. [1] It's ſaid, he was delivered by the determinate counſel, foreign. The Greek foreign primarily notes counſel with a decree, or a decreed fixed counſel, from foreign the caſt of an arrow, or the like. Whence the formal act of the wil is termed foreign, which is but a derivation from foreign. But Luke, to expreſſe Peters mind more ſignificantly, addes, foreign, by that determinate, defined, firme, immutable, decretive, predeterminative counſel of God, as the word importes, according to our former explication of it, on Luk. 22. 22. whereto this Text ſeems to anſwer. foreign is by Gloſſaries made ſynonymous to foreign, to ordain; foreign, to preordain; foreign, to conſtitute; foreign, to eſtabliſh; foreign, to predetermine. Among the LXX. it anſwers to foreign, to termine, determine, predetermine, as Num. 34. 6. Joſh. 13. 27. and elſewhere. By which it is moſt evident, that it is here by Luke uſed to denote Gods efficacious, abſolute, predeterminative counſel and purpoſe touching the crucifixion of our Lord. [2] Then he addes: foreign, and foreknowlege of God. Note here, that Gods foreknowlege or Preſcience of Chriſts crucifixion, and ſo by conſequence of the ſin annexed thereto, follows the predetermination or determined counſel p. 63of his own wil: God therefore foreknew, becauſe in his determined counſel he foreordained or decreed the Paſſion of our Lord. And yet [3] this neceſſary predefinition and predetermination of Gods wil with his infallible preſcience touching the crucifixion of Chriſt, did no way leſſen their ſin: for addes Peter, Him ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and ſlain. Albeit he was predefined and predetermined by God to go (as himſelf declares, Luk. 22. 22.) to the Croſſe, yet they, by their wicked bloudy hands, took him as voluntarily, yea with as much bloudthirſty greedineſſe, as if there had been no predefinition and predetermination of the act by God. Lo! what a plain conciliation is here of efficacious predefinition and predeterminative concurſe of the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, with the voluntary and free election of the ſinner as to his part in this bloudy Tragedie. [4] Note that phraſe, foreign, by wicked hands, i. e. ſacrilegious, bloudy, God-murdering hands. Which certainly denotes their ſin to be of the firſt magnitude, and intrinſecally evil. And that this Text fully demonſtrates the predefinition of Chriſts Paſſion, Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 3. pag. 563. freely acknowlegeth. So lib. 4. cap. 2. pag. 768. he ſaith, That it is not to be douted, but that the whole humiliation and paſſion of Chriſt flowed from the decree and wil of God; and what God from Eternitie decreed, the ſame he executes and procures in time. But what his replie is to the force of our argument from this abſolute Decree of God we ſhal examine anon.

(5) I come now to that other parallel Text, which fully demonſtrates the predefinition and predetermination of Chriſts crucifixion by God, Act. 4. 28. For to do whatſoever thine hand and thy Act. 4. 28.Acts 4:28counſel determined before to be done. He ſpeaks of the gathering together both of Jews and Gentiles for the crucifying the Son of God, as verſ. 26, 27. he ſaith, They did nothing but what Gods hand and counſel predetermined to be done. [1] By the counſel of God we may here underſtand his Decretive counſel, or the counſel and purpoſe of his wil, whereby he predefined and predetermined the crucifixion of our Lord. Thus ſome terme Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurſe, quoad attingentiam activam, as to active attingence, which is nothing elſe but the very wil of God, according to his eternal counſel predetermining and foreordaining al future events, as Scotus and others aſſure us. Thus foreign muſt be underſtood, Act. 2. 23. as before. Whence [2] by the Hand of p. 64God, we are to underſtand his moſt efficacious and potent execution of his decretive counſel, predetermining the whole ſubſtrate mater, or al entitative acts and circumſtances in the crucifixion of our Lord, which they terme his predeterminative Concurſe, quoad attingentiam paſſivam, as to paſſive attingence. For mans hand being the inſtrument of operation, whereby he puts forth his power and force, it is thence applied to God, to denote his moſt potent execution of his Decrees in predetermining and applying al ſecond cauſes to their act, as before §. 1. of this Chapter. We find a very good gloſſe hereon in Strangius, lib. 4. cap. 2. pag. 769. In the other place, ſaith he, Act. 4. 28. there is mention made not only of the counſel of God, but alſo of the hand of God; that counſel may be referred to the Decree, and hand to the execution. To decree is preſuppoſed the wiſe counſel of God, and to execute the power of the Divine right hand. And here truly what God hath decreed in his counſel, he alſo by his hand hath executed: For in this whole work the hand of God hath appeared, howbeit many wicked hands did concur. So the Hand of God here is oppoſed to wicked hands, Act. 2. 23. The hand, I ſay, of God appeared in moderating, ordaining, governing, and directing al the machinations, endeavors, ſayings and deeds of his enemies, that they ſhould wil and perfect that very ſame thing which he willed, though with a far different counſel and purpoſe, whatever their malice were. Lo! what a ful teſtimonie is here? who would not think Strangius orthodox in this point, did he acquieſce here? But there lies a Snake in the graſſe: he elſewhere ſtarts off from what he here grants, as hereafter. Only this note, that he here, as elſewhere, ſtrongly impugnes and oppoſeth that paſſive crucifixion which Bellarmine and a reverend Divine of repute among us only aſcribe to God: for he expreſſely ſaith, That the very act of crucifixion was executed by the hand of God; yea al the machinations, endeavors, ſayings, and deeds of Chriſts enemies, moderated, ordained, governed, directed by the ſame Divine hand. What could be ſaid more for the predefinition and predetermination of the ſubſtrate mater of an act intrinſecally evil? But I paſſe on to the act of Divine predetermination expreſſed in the Text before us by foreign What the genuine import of foreign is, we have ſhewen, Chap. 1. §. 6. In the general it ſignifies to predefine, predeſtine, predetermine: it's applied in the N. T. both to perſons and things, and theſe both good and evil. It is here limited and confined p. 65to Gods predefining, predeſtining, and predetermining the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act of Chriſts crucifixion, which was a ſin of the firſt magnitude, containing in its pregnant wombe blaſphemie, hatred of God, murther, yea God-killing bloudguiltineſſe. The Syriac turnes it by foreign, to ſeal, conſtitute, and make firme any thing. And ſurely if the bleſſed God ever ſealed, conſtituted, made firme, or predetermined any thing in the world, it was the crucifixion of his Son, on which the ſalvation of al his Elect dependes. Auguſtin renders foreign here praedeſtinavit, he has predeſtined. So the old Latin renders it, 1 Cor. 2. 7. And Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 582. is herein (as in ſome other points) very ingenuous and free in confeſſing, That Auguſtin doth uſe the words to predeſtine, predefine, determine, conſtitute, ordain, and diſpoſe, indifferently, ſo as they may be extended to althings which God hath decreed. So that it's clear by his own confeſſion, that the crucifixion of Chriſt taken actively was predeſtined, predefined, conſtituted, foreordained, and predetermined by God. Whence by a paritie of reaſon we demonſtrate our Hypotheſis, that the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act of that, whereunto intrinſecal ſin is neceſſarily annexed, is predefined and predetermined by God. The inference and concluſion to me is ſo natural and evident, that I cannot ſee how the wit of man can evade it.

But let us examine what ſubterfuges and evaſions our OpponentsOur Adverſarie▪ evaſions examined. frame to evade the force and evidence this ſecond Head touching Chriſts Crucifixion gives to our Hypotheſis.

1. Bellarmine and from him a reverend Divine of name among1. Evaſion touching active and paſſive Crucifixion. our ſelves replie, That the paſſive crucifixion of Chriſt was from God, not the active: i. e. Chriſts Paſſion and the effects of it was from God, but not the actions of thoſe that crucified him. (1) How poor and ſhiftleſſe this ſhift is we have already demonſtrated on the vendition of Joſeph from Gen. 45. 5, 7, 8. (2) But more particularly as to this Head, I cannot but wonder how any, who have not quite baniſhed Reaſon and Religion from their minds, can ſatisfie themſelves with ſuch jejune notions and evaſions: Did not the bleſſed God predefine and predetermine the very act of Chriſts crucifixion? how elſe could he certainly foreknow that he would be crucified? Or what certain preſcience could he have of the ſalvation of any one elect ſoul, which wholly dependes on the death of Chriſt? Again, what fine-ſpun nonſenſe is this, God p. 66predetermined the Paſſion of Chriſts crucifixion, but not the Action? as if God predetermined that Chriſt ſhould be kiſſed and ſo betrayed by Judas, but not that Judas ſhould kiſſe and betray Chriſt: again, that Chriſt ſhould be mocked, blaſphemed, ſcourged, &c. by the Souldiers and Jews, but that theſe ſhould not mock, blaſpheme, ſcourge, &c. Chriſt. Laſtly, that the Spear ſhould be thruſt into the ſide of Chriſt, but yet not that any thruſt it in. What Logic, Reaſon, or ſenſe is this? Do not the very Ariſtoteleans grant us, That action and paſſion are not really, but only modally diſtinct? As the way from Athens to Thebes, and ſo back again from Thebes to Athens, is but one and the ſame way, diverſified only from its relation to different termes; ſo the ſame fluxe as it procedes from the Agent is called Action, and as it termines on the patient, Paſſion. Is it poſſible then that God ſhould predetermine or concur to the paſſion and not to the action of crucifixion? But enough of this, which is ſo ſtrongly refuted by Strangius, lib. 4. cap. 11. pag. 772.

2. Another reverend Divine of eſtime among us for parts and2. Evaſion. pietie evades thus: [Chriſts crucifixion] was a thing which Gods hand and counſel had determined before to be done, Act. 4. 28. i. e. foreſeeing wicked hands would be promt and ready for this tragic enterpriſe, his ſovereign power and wiſe counſel concurred with his foreknowledge, ſo only, and not with leſſe latitude, to define or determine the bounds and limits of that malignitie, than to let it procede to this execution. And to deliver him up (not by any formal reſignation or ſurrender, as we wel know, but permitting him) thereunto. Though the ſame phraſe of delivering him, hath elſewhere another notion of aſſigning or appointing him to be a propitiation for the ſins of men, by dying; which was done by mutual agreement between both the parties, &c. This replie of this learned pious Divine (ſo far as I can penetrate and underſtand it, which ſeems involved under much obſcuritie) may be reſolved into the following parts. (1) He makes Gods preſcience or foreſeeing the crucifixion of Chriſt by wicked hands, to procede or go before the concurrence and determination of Gods wiſe counſel or predefinition thereof. Wherein he fals in with the Jeſuites middle Science, making Gods preſcience precedent to his predefinition or decree, and ſo dependent only on the mutable wil of men as to the act of ſin; which he elſewhere ſeems to intimate: whereas the Scripture, p. 67which he refers to, Act. 2. 23. makes the foreknowledge of Chriſts crucifixion ſubſequent to the predifinition of his determinate Counſel or Decree. And certainly al the wit of man ſummed up in one cannot conceive or demonſtrate, how God ſhould have a certain preſcience of Chriſts crucifixion, which dependes wholly on the contingent uncertain wil of man, and not on the determinate counſel of his own wil. (2) He makes Gods determinate counſel or hand only to determine the bounds and limits of that malignitie, &c. As if the bounding and limiting of the malignitie, and not the ſubſtrate mater or act itſelf entitatively conſidered were from God. Whereas the Text ſaith categorically, That the hand and counſel of God predefined and predetermined whatever thoſe wicked hands of theirs executed. (3) He gives us a new Gloſſe or Paraphraſe on that phraſe delivering him, Act. 2. 23. as if it implied only an aſſigning or appointing him to be a propitiation, &c. But how little this gloſſe wil accord with the ſenſe of theſe Texts is evident. For that aſſigning and appointing him to be a propitiation was immanent and eternal in the Divine Decrees, but the delivering him here is meant of his being delivered into the hands of thoſe that crucified him, and that according to the determinate counſel of God.

3. We come now to the more plauſible ſubterfuges of Strangius, Strangius's Evaſions.whereby he endeavors to evade the evidence of thoſe Texts, which mention Gods predetermining the crucifixion of our Lord. He anſwers, lib. 3. cap. 4. pag. 573. thus: The occiſion and crucifixion of Chriſt, alſo the kind of death were from God: and as they were from God, they were good and greatly glorioſe, and properly the means to procure our ſalvation: and God is deſervedly judged the Cauſe and Author of them, Who by his determinate counſel and precognition delivered his Son to them, whom with wicked hands they killed on the croſſe, Act. 2. 23. Here truly in the ſame work the good action of God is diſtinguiſhed from their evil action: therefore their wickedneſſe and malice was not from God; neither was it willed or predefined by God, who cannot be ſaid to be the Cauſe and Author of any ſin. Therefore ſpeaking abſolutely, the occiſion of Chriſt was not ſin; (otherwiſe God ſhould be the Author of ſin:) as to kil a man is not ſin. And truly if God had commanded men to kil Chriſt, and they out of conſcience to that command had obeyed God, they had not ſinned. But to proſecute Chriſt out of hatred and il-wil is p. 68intrinſecally evil, neither can that be any way wel done, or commanded by God.

Obſerve here (1) he grants that the crucifixion of Chriſt,Anſwer. with al its natural circumſtances entitatively conſidered were from God, as the God of nature, and ſo naturally good: yea, that they were morally good and greatly glorioſe as means to procure our ſalvation; and therefore God is deſervedly judged the cauſe and author of them, as Act. 2. 23. And (2) we denie with him, that the wickedneſſe and malice of thoſe acts was from God. (3) He alſo grants, That the occiſion or killing of Chriſt conſidered abſolutely was not ſin. Whereunto we retort, That neither the hatred of Chriſt conſidered abſolutely without relation to its object is ſin. But, (4) he concludes: But to proſecute Chriſt out of hatred and il-wil is intrinſecally evil, &c. Whence we argue, That the crucifying of Chriſt was a ſin intrinſecally evil, and yet as to its ſubſtrate mater and entitative acts from God. For did not the Jews proſecute Chriſt out of hatred and malice, yea malice blowen up to the ſin againſt the Holy Ghoſt in ſome of them? And was not, in this good work of crucifixion, the good action of God, and the evil action of the Jews the ſame as to the ſubſtrate mater or natural entitative act? This pincheth Strangius cloſely, and therefore he ſeems to make the natural entitative act of God diſtinct from the natural entitative act of the wicked Jews: For he ſaith, Here truly in the ſame work the good action of God is diſtinguiſhed from their evil action; and therefore their wickedneſſe and malice was not from God. Here we grant, [1] his conſequence or concluſion, That their malice was not from God. [2] We thus far alſo grant his Antecedent, That the good action of God, conſidered both naturally and morally, was diſtinguiſhed from their evil action conſidered formally and morally: for the malice and vitioſitie which formaliſed the action as theirs, is no way imputable to Gods act conſidered either naturally or morally. [3] But yet we ſtil avouch, and no way dout but to demonſtrate in its place, that in the crucifixion of Chriſt the act of the wicked Jews conſidered materially, naturally, and entitatively was one and the ſame with Gods act: So much al theſe Texts clearly evince; ſo much alſo reaſon dictates: For if there were two acts, the one primarily, yea only from the wicked inſtruments, the other from God the prime Efficient, then how could they be ſaid to be the inſtruments of Gods Efficience? Muſt we not then alſo ſuppoſe p. 69two Crucifixions, one from God, and the other from the Jews? What a world of abſurdities would follow this Hypotheſis, That the action of God in the Crucifixion of Chriſt conſidered entitatively, materially, and naturally, was really diſtinct from the action of the Inſtruments conſidered entitatively, materially, and naturally? But to conclude, we find an excellent ſolution to al theſe evaſions and ſubterfuges in Auguſtin, Epiſt. 48. ad Vincentium, Quum Pater tradiderit Filium, & Chriſtus Corpus ſuum, & Judas Dominum, cur in hac traditione Deus eſt juſtus & homo reus, niſi quia in re una quam fecerunt, cauſa non eſt una ob quam fecerunt. Auguſt. Epiſt, 48. ad Vinc.thus: When the Father delivered his Son, and Chriſt his own Bodie, and Judas his Lord, why in this Tradition is God juſt and man guilty, but becauſe in one and the ſame thing which they did, the cauſe was not one and the ſame. A ſolution ſufficient to ſatisfie any ſober mind: Wherein note, (1) That the act of Tradition and ſo of crucifying Chriſt, was one and the ſame entitatively and phyſically conſidered both in regard of God and the ſinner. (2) That the difference ſprang from the Cauſes: God delivered his Son to Death, thereby to bring about the greateſt good that Sinners could wiſn for, their Salvation; but Judas and the malitioſe Jews delivered the Lord of Glorie to death, with wicked hands, out of an avaricious humor, malice, &c. Hence, (3) The Action was moſt juſt and glorioſe on Gods part, but moſt unjuſt and wicked on the Sinners part. This anſwer of Auguſtin is ſo great, that it might ſerve to anſwer al the objections againſt our Hypotheſis, were not men bent to cavil againſt the truth.

§. 3. I come now to a third Head of Scriptural Arguments, namely ſuch, wherein God is ſaid to make uſe of wicked Inſtruments for the puniſhing or afflicting his people in ſuch a way, wherein the Inſtruments could not but contract guilt. I ſhal divide this Head into two members; (1) Such Scriptures, wherein God is ſaid to make uſe of wicked Inſtruments for the puniſhing his ſinful people. (2) Such as mention Gods afflicting his righteous People by ſinful Inſtruments.

1. We ſhal begin with ſuch Scriptures wherein God is ſaid to 1. Gods puniſhing his ſinful People by wicked Inſtruments.make uſe of wicked Inſtruments for the puniſhment of his ſinful people. So Eſa. 10. 5, 6. O Aſſyrian, the rod of mine anger, I will ſend him againſt an hypocritical Nation. The Aſſyrian is ſent by God as his rod to puniſh his ſinful people; and every ſtroke of this rod wasEſa. 10. 5, 6, 7.Isa 10:5Isa 10:6Isa 10:7 from God; his hand guiding, ordering, and actuating the rod in al its motions. And yet, how much ſin was there committed on the Aſſyrians part in puniſhing Iſrael? How little did he intend p. 70to ſerve God herein? were not Pride and Ambition the main ſprings of his action? Thence it's added v. 7. Howbeit he meaneth not ſo, neither doth his heart think ſo, &c. whence v. 12. God threatens to puniſh him for his ſin. So that it's evident, this ſending of the Aſſyrian by God, mentioned v. 6. cannot be meant of any legal permiſſion or commiſſion given him by God, but of the ſecret efficacious predeterminative concurſe and Providence of God, ordering what ſhould come to paſs. So Jer. 16. 16. Behold, Jerem. 16. 16.Jer 16:16I wil ſend for many fiſhers, ſaith the Lord, and they ſhal fiſh them, and after wil I ſend for many hunters, and they ſhal hunt them from every mountain, &c. Note, (1) That theſe words contain not a promiſſe but threat, begun v. 9. This is evident from v. 17. (2) By Fiſhers and Hunters in the general we muſt underſtand enemies to the Jews. To fiſh and to hunt, is to take and deſtroy. War has a great reſſemblance with fiſhing and hunting, which is a kind of war againſt beſtes; as war is a kind of fiſhing and hunting of men: whence Nimrod the firſt Warrier after the Floud, is ſtiled Gen. 10. 9. a mighty hunter, i. e. of men. Ay, but more particularly, (3) Who are theſe fiſhers? Why, as it is ſuppoſed, the Egyptians, who are called Fiſhers, Eſa. 19. 8. (4) And who are the Hunters? The Babylonians, as it is generally ſaid: But, (5) Who is it that ſends for theſe Fiſhers and Hunters? It is God, I wil ſend, &c. (6) Why doth God ſend for them? To puniſh his ſinful People, and that by thoſe very Nations in whom they had ſo much confided, and to whom they had ſo much conformed, as is intimated v. 17. And what more juſt, than that Profeſſors ſhould be puniſhed by ſuch Inſtruments, as have been the ground of their confidence, and the exemplars of their ſins? (7) How doth God ſend for theſe Fiſhers and Hunters? Surely, not by any legal Act or formal Commiſſion given to them, but providentially, by exciting their minds, applying their wils, and drawing forth, yea determining the ſame to the ſubſtrate mater or material entitative act of afflicting the Jews, whereunto there was much malice, murder, and hatred of God and his People annexed. Yea, God did not only ſend Nebuchadnezar to afflict Iſrael, but alſo give him a reward for his ſervice; as Jerem. 27. 6. And now have I given al theſe lands into the hands of Nebuchadnezar the King of Babylon, my ſervant. God gives him the neighbor Nations as a reward for his ſervice againſt Iſrael. The like Jer. 43. 10. Multitudes of Texts might be p. 71added to ſhew, how God makes uſe of wicked Inſtruments in the puniſhment of his ſinful people, and in a providential way efficaciouſly concurs to and predetermines al their actions materially and naturally conſidered, and yet is no way the Cauſe or Author of their ſin.

2. To mention one or two Scriptures, which ſpeak of Gods2. Gods afflicting his righteous Servants by wicked Inſtruments. uſing wicked Inſtruments in afflicting his innocent People. So Job 1. God makes uſe of the Sabeans, and Caldeans, yea of Satan himſelf, to afflict Job; and yet he ſaith, v. 21. The Lord taketh away. He ſaw by faith Gods hand moving, yea predetermining the hearts and hands of his adverſaries to every act of theirs materially Job 1. 21.Job 1:21conſidered, albeit not to the vitioſitie. So Pſal. 105. 25.Pſal. 105. 25.Ps 105:25 He turned their heart to hate his people, to deal ſubtilely with his ſervants. Here it's ſaid expreſſely, that God turned, i. e. efficaciouſly moved and predetermined the hearts of the Egyptians to hate his People Iſrael. God's turning their hearts doth expreſſely and formally denote his efficacious predeterminative concurſe to the entitative material natural act of hatred, albeit not to the vitioſitie and malignitie thereof. So much alſo the next clauſe importes, and to deal ſubtilely with his ſervants, i. e. al their ſubtile ſtrategems, machinations, and politic contrivements for the extirpation of Iſrael, by putting to death their Males, oppreſſing them with hard labors, &c. al theſe were, as to their ſubſtrate mater and phyſic entitative acts from God, who turned their hearts thereto: And what could be more nakedly and evidently ſaid to demonſtrate Gods efficacious predeterminative concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin?

Let us now ſee what our Opponents replie to theſe Scriptures and our Arguments drawen thence. Strangius, l. 4. c. 4. p. 791. evades the force of this laſt Text thus: What is ſaid Pſal. 105. 25. that God turned their hearts to hate his people, it muſt be underſtood, that God did it not by perverting the hearts of the Egyptians, but by doing good to his people, whence the Egyptians took occaſion of hatred. (1) We ſay not that God perverted the hearts of the Egyptians; that's the commun odioſe conſequence which our Adverſaries impoſe on us. But, (2) We avouch, that God did more than give occaſion to the Egyptians of hating, by his doing good to his people. Is not this a ſtrange Comment, God turned their heart to hate his people, i. e. gave occaſion of hatred, by doing good unto his people? Doth not Gods turning the p. 70heart in Scripture Phraſeologie always import his effica… predeterminative concurſe in applying the wil to its act? … it's ſaid, Prov. 21. 1. God turneth the heart whitherſoever he w…, is it not meant of an efficacious concurſe? Do not alſo the following words, Pſal. 105. 25. to deal ſubtilely with his ſervants, clearly implie an efficacious act of God upon their hearts, predetermining them to their act? Certainly ſuch Comments are very poor evaſions to elude ſuch clear Texts. As for the other Texts, Strangius's general anſwer p. 774, 775. is, That God is the Cauſe of the act in thoſe ſins, but not of the pravitie of the Inſtruments, &c. And what do we ſay or deſire more? But yet there lies a ſting in this very conceſſion of his: for he addes, p. 774. That God hath decreed nothing by his Wil of good pleaſure, but what he approves as Good. i. e. God hath not abſolutely decreed to permit ſin, becauſe he doth not approve of it. Wherein note, [1] How he doth, with the Pelagians and Arminians, confound Gods Decretive Wil, with his Approbative complacential Wil. [2] We denie not but God approves of al his own Acts; but the Queſtion is touching objects, Whether God approves of al objects which by his Decretive Wil he decrees to permit? This we peremptorily denie, and no way dout but to make good our denial in its place.

§. 4. Another Head of Arguments, contains ſuch Scriptures as 4. Gods immediate hand in the Acts of ſin.mention Gods own immediate hand in thoſe Acts whereunto ſin is appendent. We begin with 2 Sam. 12. 11. where God tels David by Nathan, that for his folie committed with Ʋriah's wife, and2 Sam. 12. 11.2 Sam 12:11 murder, Behold, I wil raiſe up evil againſt thee out of thine own houſe, and I wil take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them unto thy neighbour, &c. This threat we find fulfilled, 2 Sam. 16. 22. And Abſalom 2 Sam. 16. 22.2 Sam 16:22went in unto his Fathers Concubines in the ſight of al Iſrael. What could be more plainly and diſtinctly expreſſed to demonſtrate Gods immediate concurſe to that entitative act of Abſalom's Sin? Here Strangius, l. 4. c. 4. p. 789. acknowledgeth, (1) That Abſalom's Inceſt in violating his fathers bed is by God owned as his own Fact. But, (2) then he anſwers, that this was acknowledged for the reaſon above-mentioned, namely, by reaſon of Gods efficacious Gubernation, Moderation, and Direction, which he afforded, according to the modes already explicated, about the ſinful Wils of Abſalom and Achitophel, and their actions in this wickedneſs; which fact is related 2 Sam. 16. 20, &c. For this is uſual, that the effect, p. 73which ariſeth from two cauſes, whereof the one is effective, and the other directive, be aſcribed to both, but in a different reſpect, &c. This is the commun anſwer, which he and his Sectators give to ſuch Scriptures, which ſpeake Gods immediate hand in the entitative acts of ſin; let us therefore a little examine the force of this anſwer.

(1) Take notice, that he allows Gods Gubernation, Moderation and Direction of the Act whereto ſin is annexed, but not the production of the act. This is evident by the Concluſion, wherein he makes the Sinner to be the effective cauſe, but God the directive only. But I replie, how can God efficaciouſly Govern, Moderate, and Direct the Act, unleſs he be alſo the effective Cauſe thereof? Take his own inſtance, the ſinful wils of Abſalom and Achitophel, how is it poſſible, that God ſhould efficaciouſly govern and direct thoſe immanent acts of their ſinful wils, but by influencing their wils, and efficaciouſly predetermining them to act? If God did, as he grants, efficaciouſly govern, moderate, and direct their ſinful wils in thoſe immanent acts of Luſt, certainly he muſt neceſſarily produce thoſe acts. (2) Neither wil this anſwer at al ſolve the Difficultie: for ſuppoſe we grant, that God doth only efficaciouſly govern, moderate, and direct the ſinful act, not produce the entitative mater thereof, yet this efficacious directive influence doth as much make God the Author of ſin, as our effective predeterminative concurſe. For Gods efficacious Moderation and Direction of the ſinful act, denotes his efficacious Preſervation of the act, which is as ſinful as the effection or production of the Act. But more of this hereafter, Chap. 5, 6.

Another Scripture which ſpeaks Gods immediate predeterminativeShimei's curſing David, how from God. 2 Sam. 16. 10, 11.2 Sam 16:102 Sam 16:11 concurſe in the entitative act of Sin, is 2 Sam. 16. 10. where David ſaith of Shimei, That the Lord ſaid unto him, Curſe David. And v. 11. Let him curſe; for the Lord hath bidden him. Now the force of this argument dependes on the explication of this word or command of God to Shimei, which muſt be here taken either morally, for a divine precept and injunction, or phyſicly for an efficacious Concurſe and influence. (1) That it cannot be here taken morally for a preceptive word, is moſt evident; becauſe had God commanded Shimei to curſe David, he had been the moral cauſe and ſo the Author of his ſin. (2) Therefore it remains, that it be here taken only phyſicly, for Gods efficacious Concurſe ſecretly and powerfully inclining and applying p. 74Shimei's wil to the entitative act of this curſing. And in this ſenſe the Word of God is frequently taken in Scripture, namely, for his efficacious predeterminative concurſe, in the Creation, Conſervation, and Gubernation of things.

Now what doth Strangius replie to this? Why, l. 4. c. 4. p. 786. he ſaith, That Shimei's Curſings being intrinſecally evil, we may not ſay, that God did move or impel him thereto in a proper manner of ſpeech, neither that Shimei was the Inſtrument of God in theſe actions, as they were determined to ſuch an object; but only as directed by God to his juſt judgements: and that moſt certain direction of God, with the adminiſtration of Circumſtances and Occaſions was as a Precept. In which Reſponſe note, (1) That he grants, that Shimei his curſing was an action intrinſecally evil: which is a great conceſſion, and wil clearly overthrow his own Hypotheſis, and prove ours, That God doth predetermine the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of actions intrinſecally evil. For if Shimei's Curſing was an action intrinſecally evil, then ſurely ſuch alſo was the Vendition of Joſeph and the Crucifixion of our Lord, which were both as to their entitative acts predetermined by God. But (2) he denies, that Shimei was the Inſtrument of God in theſe actions, as determined to ſuch an object. In the laſt clauſe of this Antitheſis lies the ſpirit and force of al his objections againſt predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin; which we intend more fully to examine Chap. 6. §. 1. at preſent, we ſay, [1] That Shimei was not the inſtrument of any moral but phyſic influence from God: the precept or bidding here ſpecified was not moral but phyſic and real: God did not morally command Shimei to curſe David, but phyſicly and naturally incline him to the entitative act of Curſing him; which was as a Precept: this Strangius grants in the cloſe as to Gods direction. [2] Hence if we conſider Shimei's curſing as phyſicly determined to ſuch an object, it was not morally evil but good, and ſo from God: It's true, as it was morally determined by Shimei the moral Agent to its object David, ſo it was intrinſecally evil, but as it was phyſicly or naturally determined by God, for the puniſhment of David, ſo it was both naturally and morally good and from God. (3) He placeth the whole of Gods Influence to this act, in directing his Actions to his juſt judgements, &c. To which I anſwer. [1] How could God direct theſe actions of Shimei; ſpecially, the immanent acts of his wil, (which were the worſt part of his malediction) but by an efficacious p. 75predeterminative influence on his wil and its acts? [2] He grants, that this Direction of God was moſt certain and efficacious: if ſo, then certainly predeterminative: and if the direction be predeterminative, is not Gods concurſe to the ſinful act conſidered materially and entitatively, predeterminative? [3] If Gods directive concurſe be predeterminative, as Strangius muſt by his conceſſions grant, wil not thoſe ugly conſequences which he lodes our Hypotheſis with, be al retorted on him? Did not Gods efficacious direction termine on Shimei's curſing as determined to ſuch an object, namely David? And was he not the Inſtrument of this efficacious direction?

Baronius, Metaph. S. 8. Diſp. 3. p. 158. anſwers this Text thus: To that malediction of Shimei it is anſwered, That God commanded Shimei to curſe David, not by bending his wil, but by opening to him the way to this evil, and by ſhutting it to al other evils, i. e. by permitting him to act this only, whenas he was ready for many other evils. A poor evaſion indeed, and ſuch as if admitted would make the whole Scripture but as a Noſe of Waxe. (1) Doth not David ſay categoricly, that God bid, [i. e. not morally but phyſicly] Shimei to curſe? And what can this implie, but the bending his wil to the ſubſtrate mater, or entitative Act? (2) Can it be imagined, that David could mean only a mere otioſe and ſpeculative permiſſion, and not an active concurrence to the act it ſelf entitatively conſidered? (3) Doth not Baronius confeſs, that God opened to him the way to this evil? And if ſo, muſt he not then open Shimei's heart to the mater of it? Did not the main act of malediction ariſe from his wil? And if that were not opened to the entitative act, would the way to this evil have been ever opened?

Again, Gods immediate predeterminative hand in thoſe acts, whereunto ſin is neceſſarily appendent, may be demonſtrated from 2 Sam. 24. 1. And again the anger of the Lord was kindled 2 Sam. 24. 1.2 Sam 24:1againſt Iſrael, and he moved David againſt them, to ſay, Go number Iſrael and Judah. Here it is expreſſely ſaid, that God moved David to number the people. foreign, and he moved or excited, i. e. efficaciouſly determined and applied his wil to the ſubſtrate mater of this command to number the people. Hence Strangius, pag. 790. anſwers, (1) That the He here muſt be meant of Satan, who is ſaid, 1 Chron. 21. 1. to ſtir up David to number the people. And he cites for this Comment Junius with others. But alas! what poor p. 76ſubterfuges wil men flie unto to avoid the force and evidence of Divine light? Doth not Grammatic conſtruction, as wel as the mind of the words utterly reject ſuch a gloſſe? The Particle He here is not a diſtinct Pronoun, as our Engliſh Verſion reads it, but included in the Verbe foreign which is by the Copulative ו joined to the former part, and the anger of the Lord was kindled: ſo that if the paſſive, was kindled, belongs to the Lords anger, then alſo muſt what follows, and he moved. Neither is this ſenſe aliene from other Scriptures: for 1 Sam. 26. 19. David ſaith, That God had 1 Sam. 26. 19.1 Sam 26:19ſtirred up Saul againſt him, i. e. efficaciouſly moved him to the entitative act of perſecuting David. Thence (2) Strangius fearing the ruinous downfal of this refuge flies to another, thus: But if we follow the commun interpretation, it appears, that the ſame fact is aſcribed to God and Satan; and therefore it muſt be on a different account: and here alſo the varietie in the end and mode makes the unſpotted Juſtice of God to ſhine forth, and the malice of Satan and pravitie of man to diſcover itſelf. For [1] the action of numbering the people was not in itſelf evil. [2] Divines diſtinguiſh between tentation of probation and ſeduction. [3] Here the ſane things concur, which were before explicated of the ſame ſenſe, whereby God is ſaid to incline to evil, namely the permiſſion and laxation of the reins to Satan, the oblation of occaſions and irritaments, impediments being removed, and the ſuſpenſion of Divine Grace: which things concurring with the pravitie of nature, ſin neceſſarily follows.

(1) We grant, that the ſame fact is aſcribed to God and Satan on different accounts: God put the thought entitatively conſidered into Davids heart, but Satan ſtirred up his heart to the act of numbering the people; God in judgement gave over David to this ſin, that it ſhould be at this time when God was angry with Iſrael: There is a ſpecial providence of God even in the ebullitions of luſts in the hearts of his own people. Thus alſo in the wicked; who put that thought of murder conſidered materially into the heart of Eſau, When my father is dead I wil ſlay my brother Jacob? Was it not from God? Whence came that motion into the heart of Judas to betray Chriſt, with al the circumſtances materially conſidered referring thereto? were they not from God? Thus here, God put the entitative thought of numbering the people into the heart of David, albeit Satan ſtirred it up; and God was the Orderer, albeit Satan the Abettor and in ſome ſenſe the Author of it: for God is only the prime phyſic cauſe of the natural p. 77entitie, but Satan the moral cauſe or Author of the vitioſitie: again, the concurſe of God to the natural entitative act is immediate, efficacious, and predeterminative, but Satans concurſe only mediate, objective, and ſuaſive, though with more or leſſe degrees of moral efficacitie, as Eph. 2. 2. Again, (2) we grant, that the different ends and modes of operating make Gods unſpotted Juſtice and mans pravitie to ſhine forth. (3) We are glad, that Strangius wil grant, the action of numbering the people not to be in itſelf evil. Whence, by a paritie of reaſon, we argue, That no action, though never ſo intrinſecally evil, is in itſelf, i. e. as conſidered in its phyſic entitative act, and according to its ſubſtrate mater, ſinful: for certainly if Davids numbering the people, which was a ſin attended with ſo much pride, vain-glorie, and confidence in an arme of fleſh, with other aggravations, which ſo greatly provoked God, were not in itſelf evil, no other ſin conſidered in its mere entitative and phyſic act is ſuch. Yea, I as yet ſee no reaſon why this ſin of David conſidered in its individual circumſtances and moral relation to its object and principes, may not be eſtimed a ſin intrinſecally evil, as wel as Shimei's curſing David. But (4) Strangius's ſummary concluſion, That Gods concurſe to Davids ſin was only an idle permiſſion, laxation of the reins to Satan, and oblation of occaſions, with ſuſpenſion of Divine Grace, is very contradictory both to the letter and mind of the Text, which ſaith poſitively, that God moved, or excited, and ſtirred up the mind of David, not morally, but phyſicly, to the entitative act of numbering the people. Certainly, when the Scripture ſpeakes ſo categoricly and poſitively of Gods moving the wil to its act, to reſtrain ſuch moving influences and cauſalitie, only to mere idle permiſſion, or objective oblation of occaſions, or negative ſuſpenſions of Divine Grace, what is this but to make the Scripture contradictory to itſelf, or affirmation and negation applicable to the ſame words? How eaſily might an Atheiſt hence take advantage to elude al Scripture!

But to paſſe on to other Texts, that clearly expreſſe Gods immediate predeterminative concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſinful acts. 1 Kings 11. 31. the Lord ſaith, I wil rend the kingdome 1 King. 11. 31, 37. & 12. 15, 24.1 Kgs 11:311 Kgs 11:371 Kgs 12:151 Kgs 12:24out of the hand of Solomon. So verſ. 37. to Jeroboam, I wil take thee and thou ſhalt reigne, &c. Whence 1 Kings 12. 15. it's ſaid, that the cauſe why Rehoboam hearkened not unto the people, was from the Lord, that he might performe his ſaying, &c. So verſ. 24. p. 78God ſaith expreſſely, The thing [i. e. the revolt of Iſrael] is from me. So of Jehu, God ſaith, 2 Kings 9. 3. I have anointed thee 2 Kings 9. 3. & 10. 30.2 Kgs 9:32 Kgs 10:30King: and chap. 10. 30. Jehu is ſaid to do unto the houſe of Ahab al that was in Gods heart. From theſe Texts it's moſt evident, that the holy God aſſumes to himſelf the production of ſuch entitative natural acts, which had ſin neceſſarily appendent to them.

Now let us examine what reſponſe Strangius gives hereto: l. 4. c. 4. p. 793. rejecting the anſwer of Bellarmine, (which to me is as good as his, yea not really different) he anſwers, It is not unlikely but that Jeroboam and Jehu, albeit in taking the Kingdome they ſinned not as to the thing itſelf and ſubſtance of the act, becauſe inſtructed by Gods-command, yet in manner of acting, as they were profane men, they variouſly ſinned by mingling their own ambition and depraved affections with the worke of God. Thence he concludes, That whatever their ſins were, yet the juſtice of God ſufficiently ſhines forth in the whole of this Adminiſtration, becauſe God uſed both the Kings and people in this worke only as inſtruments to execute his juſt judgements, &c.

To give a brief replie hereto, it is very evident, that al thatAnſwer. Strangius hath given us in anſwer to theſe Texts, doth but more confirme us in the true ſenſe we give of them. For (1) it is manifeſt, that Jeroboam and Jehu, with the Revolters their Adherents, ſinned not only in the mode or manner, but in the very ſubſtance of their acts: For is not High treaſon againſt a lawful King an act ſinful as to its ſubſtance? And were not Rehoboam and Ahab both lawful Kings? Was not Rehoboam Solomons Son, whom God made King? It's true, Jeroboam and Jehu had private prophetic Inſtructions and Unctions, but yet thoſe gave them no real title before the people, but only ſecret intimations what God would in his providence bring to paſſe. David had a promiſe of the Kingdom and alſo Divine Unction; and yet he confeſſeth, that God gave him no actual title to the Kingdom in the eyes of men; but he ſtil ownes Saul as his Soverain King, and the Lords Anointed: and ſo ought Jeroboam and Jehu their lawful Soverains, til God had given them a legal title before men. (2) But ſuppoſe Jeroboam and Jehu's ſin were only in the manner, not in the ſubſtance of the act, yet certain it is, that the peoples ſin, before God had declared his ſoverain wil to them, was high Treaſon, and ſo ſubſtantially evil. (3) Yea further, grant that they al ſinned but in the mode, not in the ſubſtance of their acts, yet whether the act p. 79be ſubſtantially or modally only ſinful, it comes al to one in this caſe of Divine concurſe and predetermination: For if God concur to the ſubſtrate mater of acts modally ſinful; why may he not as wel concur to the ſubſtrate mater of acts ſubſtantially ſinful? Do not our Adverſaries hereby, according to their Principes, make God the Author of modal ſins? Or, is not the entitative act of modal and ſubſtantial ſins the ſame as to kind, namely a real phyſic or natural good? and therefore if God concur to the one, why not alſo to the other? Aſſuredly, the moſt refined Wits wil never find out a ſufficient diſparitie between acts modally and ſubſtantially ſinful, ſo as to allow God an efficacious concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of the one, but not of the other. (4) Strangius grants in the cloſe, That God uſed both theſe Kings and their mutinous Adherents as inſtruments in this worke, to execute his just judgements, &c. Did he ſo indeed? Did he not then alſo make uſe of their politic contrivements, ambitioſe wils, and rebellious affections as inſtruments in this worke? And if ſo, did not God alſo move, excite, applie, yea predetermine their wils to the ſubſtrate mater of their traitorous rebellious deſignes and exploits? Do not al theſe conſequences hang together in an indiſſoluble chain of invict Reaſon? To cloſe up theſe arguments with that of Calvin, Inſtitut. lib. 1. cap. 18. §. 4. pag. 78. But now how it may be from God, and governed by his ſecret providence, which men wickedly undertake, we have an illuſtrious document in the Election of King Jeroboam; in which the madneſſe and temeritie of the people is ſeverely condemned, becauſe they perverted the order eſtabliſhed by God, and perfidioſely departed from the familie of David: and yet we know, that God would have him anointed; whence in the words of Hoſea, c. 8. 4. there appears a kind of repugnance; becauſe God there complains, That that Kingdome was erected contrary to his wil and knowlege; and yet c. 13. 11. he declares, That he gave Jeroboam to be King in his wrath. How can theſe things agree? Thence he concludes, We ſee therefore that God, who nilled the perfidie or treacherie, yet, for another end, juſtly willed the defection. And if God juſtly willed the defection, he alſo juſtly moved and predetermined them to the ſubſtrate mater thereof; for predetermination anſwers adequately to God predefinition or abſolute volition, as Strangius grants.

We adde to the fore-cited Texts, 1 King. 22. 23. Now therefore1 Kings 22. 23.1 Kgs 22:23 p. 80behold, the Lord hath put a lying ſpirit in the mouth of al theſe thy Prophets, and the Lord hath ſpoken evil concerning thee. (1) The Lord hath put, foreign, hath given forth, delivered, or put. LXX. foreign, hath given. It notes here an efficacious enthuſiaſtic infuſion, which of al kinds of predetermination is moſt prevalent and irreſiſtible. (2) Note alſo the ſin, it is a lying ſpirit, which certainly denotes an act intrinſecally evil: For is it not a ſin of the firſt magnitude to forge lying Prophecies, and impoſe them on men as the Oracles of God, thereby to delude their ſouls into Hel? Such was the caſe here: and yet, lo! it's ſaid, that this very ſin was, as to its ſubſtrate mater or entitative act, from God: can any thing be ſpoken more nakedly and clearly to evince and demonſtrate the truth of our Hypotheſis?

What doth Strangius replie to this? His anſwer we find, lib. 4. cap. 4. pag. 788. We muſt note, that this oration from the Prophet Micaiah is parabolic, in which various things are ſpoken foreign, to our capacitie; and in a Parable althings are not to be cut open to the quick, but that only muſt be regarded, which belongs to the ſcope of the Parable—But in that God ſaid, verſ. 22. Go forth and do ſo, it muſt be underſtood of Divine permiſſion: for we uſe the Imperative Mode not only in commanding, but alſo in permitting, or giving licence. And albeit there be mention made of a Divine precept, yet that is not otherwiſe to be taken, than for the efficacious direction of God, for the execution of his juſt judgement, that God delivered Ahab and his falſe Prophets left by God to be deceived by Satan: of which Tradition afterward.

In anſwer hereto, (1) what Strangius means by his parabolic Oration is not eaſie to divine. For we know, that al Parables conſiſte of two parts, the Propoſition and Reddition or moral: and what is there to be found of theſe in this Text or Contexture? But this ſeems moſt like to Strangius's deſign, to bring this Text to a parabolic image, thereby to elude its argumentative force: for Divines grant, That parabolic or ſymbolic Theologie is not argumentative, further than the ſcope and mind of the Symbol reacheth. That here is ſomething ſpoken foreign, or according to human capacitie I eaſily grant, but this doth not at al invalidate the argument, but rather confirme it. The wiſe God ſpeakes according to the manner of men, inquiring, examining, and expecting what the iſſue would be, thereby the more fully to demonſtrate his efficacious predeterminative concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater p. 81of this ſinful act. (2) As for the command of God, verſ. 22. Go forth and do ſo, it can in no ſober ſenſe be underſtood of a mere permiſſion. For al permiſſion is either moral or Phyſic and natural: it cannot be meant of a moral permiſſion, which Strangius ſeems to incline unto: for if God had given the lying ſpirit a licence, or legal permiſſion to deceive, how could he be vindicated from being the Author of the ſin? Is not lying a ſin intrinſecally evil? Should not the holy God then, according to this ſenſe, be the Author of a ſin intrinſecally evil? Neither can it be meant of a mere ſpeculative phyſic permiſſion, as to the ſubſtrate mater: for it's expreſſed in a terme of the moſt active import, the Lord hath put, foreign. This Divine precept therefore muſt denote an efficacious real influence, ſuch as predetermined thoſe lying ſpirits to the ſubſtrate mater of their ſin. Yea, (3) is there not ſo much included in the laſt clauſe of Strangius's replie, wherein he grants, This Divine precept to be taken for the efficacious direction of God, for the execution of his juſt judgement? Now what is Gods efficacious direction, but a part of his efficacious predeterminative concurſe? And how could God efficaciouſly direct theſe lying ſpirits in Ahabs falſe Prophets, but by a predeterminative influence applying their minds and wils to the ſubſtrate mater of their falſe prophetic inſpirations?

I ſhal conclude this Head with Rev. 17. 17. where ſpeaking ofRev. 17. 17.Rev 17:17 the ten Hornes, which gave their power to the Beſte, he ſaith, God hath put into their hearts to fulfil his wil, and to agree and give their kingdome unto the Beſte. That phraſe foreign, is very emphatic, and notes not the infuſion of any vitioſitie, but the efficacious predetermining their wils to the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act, and permiſſion of the vitioſitie. foreign here exactly anſwers to foreign, 1 Kings 22. 23. which the LXX. render foreign, and here ſignifies, to cauſe the mater effectually to be brought about, as the ſame word ſignifies, Mat. 12. 39. & 16. 4. & 24. 24. Mar. 13. 22. Act. 2. 19. & 14. 3. Rom. 15. 5. Rev. 3. 4. and elſewhere. Whence it follows: foreign, to fulfil his wil. foreign here ſignifies, powerfully to effect, or to performe with ſingular efficace, in which ſenſe it is uſed alſo Mat. 7. 22. & 13. 58. or to effect with labor and induſtrie, as it's uſed, Act. 9. 39. & 19. 24. Heb. 8. 5. foreign ſignifies properly a decree, ſentence, or confirmed purpoſe; ſo here. So that the mind of this Text ſeems this: The bleſſed God paſſed an abſolute irreverſible decree or p. 82purpoſe, that the Adherents of Antichriſt ſhould give up their Power and Kingdome to him; and thence he, by an efficacious concurſe, predetermined their wils to the ſubſtrate mater of thoſe acts, whereunto ſin was annexed, for the glorifying of his Juſtice, on Antichriſt, and his power and merciemercy towards his afflicted Churches.

Now let us examine the ſubterfuges men ſhelter themſelves under, to avoid the force of this Text. A reverend Divine of name among us replies thus: (1) He that readeth Dr. Hammonds Expoſition applying this to Alaricus ſacking Rome, with the effects, wil ſee that the very ſubject is ſo dubious and dark, as not fit to found ſuch a Doctrine on. (2) It was the effect of ſin that God willed, and not the ſin. (3) He is not ſaid to put the ſin into their hearts,—but only to do his pleaſure, and agree to give up, &c. which he could moſt eaſily do by putting many good and lawful thoughts into their hearts, which with their own ſins, would have that effect, which he willed: if a thief have a wil to rob, God may put it into his heart to go ſuch or ſuch a way, where a wicked man to be puniſhed wil be in his way. Thus that reverend Divine.

In anſwer hereto we ſay, That whatever mens Comments may be, yet certainly the ſubject is not ſo dark, but carries evidence enough with it, that it can be meant of no other than of the ten hornes, which give up their Kingdome to the Antichriſtian Beſte. (2) Whereas he ſaith, It was the effect of their ſin that God willed, and not the ſin, this ſeems contradictory to the very letter as wel as to the mind of the words: for it's ſaid, [1] God hath put it into their hearts, i. e. not only the effect, but the very material entitative act. Then [2] to fulfil his wil, i. e. his decree, ſo foreign here muſt note. Now God decreed the very act, and not only the effect; and therefore his predetermining concurſe muſt alſo reach the very act: according to that great theologic Axiome allowed by Strangius and others, That predetermination neceſſarily follows predefinition, or Gods abſolute Decree. Yea [3] it's ſaid, That God put into their hearts, not only to fulfil his wil, but alſo to agree and give their Kingdome to the Beſte. To agree, foreign, unanimouſly to make one Edict or Decree, and that at a Council-table. Which clearly denotes a deliberate, firme, unanimous conſent of giving up their power to the Beſte. And doth not this clearly ſpeak the act of their ſin, as wel as the effect? And is not this act p. 83as to its entitative mater, ſaid to be put into their hearts by God? So much alſo the next Verbe foreign importes, namely their deliberate free donation of their power, wherein the formalitie of their ſin lies: and yet this very act, as to its ſubſtrate mater, is ſaid to be from God. Whence (3) whereas he ſaith, God is not ſaid to put the ſin into their hearts,—but only to do his pleaſure and agree, &c. I eaſily grant, [1] That God did not put the ſin formally conſidered into their heart; for God temtes no one to ſin; but yet he put the material entitative act of the ſin into their heart. For wherein lay the malignitie of their ſin, but in this, that they unanimouſly and peremtorily agreed or decreed to give up their power to the Beſte? And is not this very act, entitatively conſidered, ſaid to be put into them by God? And was it not alſo Gods pleaſure or ſtated Decree, that they ſhould thus agree? &c. And [2] whereas he ſaith, God could make them do his pleaſure moſt eaſily, by putting many good and lawful thoughts into their hearts, &c. is not this a very ſlender evaſion? what the leaſt mention is there of any ſuch thing in the Text? Yea, is it not expreſſely ſaid, That God put into their hearts to agree, &c? And did not the poiſon of their ſin lie in this maligne bloudy agreement? Albeit the holy God be ſufficiently vindicated from the leaſt imputation of any hand in this conſpiracie, in that he decreed and produced only the entitative act, not the vitioſitie. [3] His inſtance or ſimilitude from the Thief that hath a wil to rob, &c. is extreme lame and nothing to the purpoſe; for it's evidently ſaid in the Text, that God not only concurred to the externe acts and effects, but that he put it into their hearts to agree, &c. So that the very wil and conſent, entitatively conſidered, was from God.

Let us now examine what Strangius replies to this, who lib. 4. cap. 10. pag. 855. acknowlegeth this Text Rev. 17. 17. to be meant of the ten hornes giving their power to the Beſte; but yet ſo as that if we underſtand the words (1) of Gods putting it into their minds to agree, &c. then the ſenſe muſt be no other than, 2 Theſ. 2. 11. Rom. 1. 28. and like places, which ſpeak of Gods delivering men up to a reprobate mind, and ſending the efficace of error, that they might ſerve Antichriſt. And here the diſtinction muſt always concur, when in the ſame action ſin and puniſhment concur, that not mens ſins, but Gods judgements and puniſhments muſt be aſcribed to God. In this ſenſe God is ſaid to excite, impel, and incline to ſin. Before we paſſe on to Strangius's p. 84ſecond anſwer, let us a little examine this. [1] He grants, that God judicially may and doth concur to ſin, yea excite, impel, and incline men to it. And doth not this fully overthrow his own Hypotheſis and confirme ours? For if God in judgement impel, excite, and incline men to one ſin, as a puniſhment of another, is he not then as much the Author of ſin in this way, as in ours? [2] How doth God judicially puniſh one ſin by another, but, to uſe his own words, by delivering ſuch up to a reprobate mind and the efficace of error? And if ſo, then muſt not the ſubſtrate acts of ſuch judicial dereliction be from God? Of this hereafter, §. 6.

But (2) I paſſe on to his ſecond anſwer, whereon he ſeems to lay the moſt weight, though indeed moſt feeble: But, ſaith he, becauſe thoſe words, Rev. 17. 17. are immediately ſubjoined to verſ. 16. and are connected therewith by the rational Particle foreign, which points out the reaſon of that which next follows, namely, that thoſe ten Kings having changed their opinion, ſhould deſtroy the Whore and Antichriſt, it ſeems to me more commodious, if in that verſ. 17. there be a reaſon given of this famoſe change, that they who were before the friends and vaſſals of Antichriſt, ſhould be afterwards enemies and adverſaries to him, namely, becauſe God hath put this into their heart. And the firſt words of verſ. 17. ſufficiently accord to this Expoſition—But what is ſubjoined, That they might give their Kingdome to the Beſte, until the word of God ſhould be conſummate, I ſhould think ought to be expounded negatively, &c. Thus Strangius.

A ſtrange comment indeed! let us a little inquire into it. (1) How infirm is his argument from the rational particle foreign, to make what follows, the fulfilling of Gods wil, to refer only to the deſtroying of Antichriſt? whereas the particle foreign ſeems rather to refer to the whole verſe, and more particularly to the laſt clauſe, until the Word of God ſhal be fulfilled; and ſo it notes, that God put it into their hearts to fulfil his Wil, [1] In agreeing to give their Kingdom to the Beſte, and [2] When the words of God were fulfilled, i. e. Antichriſts reign expired, then to hate the Whore, &c. And this makes the whole contexture of the words natural and evident. So that v. 17. is not only a reaſon of the change, mentioned v. 16. but alſo an account of the whole ſeries of their actions both whiles friends to, and enemies againſt Antichriſt. p. 85(2) As for what is ſubjoined v. 17. That they might give their Kingdome to the Beſte, I cannot but admire with what ſhadow of reaſon Strangius can underſtand this negatively, as if they ſhould not give their Kingdom to the Beſte: certainly if ſuch gloſſes ſhould be admitted, we might eaſily find in Scripture ſubterfuges for the worſt Hereſies and Immoralities? Why may not the moſt profane debauched wretch, when he is preſſed with thoſe Commands, Thou ſhalt not commit adulterie, Thou ſhalt not kill, &c. replie, that theſe Scriptures muſt not be taken negatively but affirmatively, Thou ſhalt commit adulterie, &c? But Strangius ſaw ful wel, that the affirmative ſenſe of thoſe words, That they might give their Kingdome to the Beſte, would quite ſubvert his forced ſenſe of the foregoing words, and therefore he ſaw no way left, but to ſecure himſelf by reducing this later affirmative clauſe to a negative, though contrary to the expreſſe letter and mind of the words. But (3) being after al his gloſſes ſenſible of the infirmitie and invaliditie of this reſponſe, he p. 856. flies again to his old refuge, telling us, That if any ſhal think this expoſition of the laſt member not ſufficient, but that beyond it there muſt be alſo ſignified, that God did put it into their hearts to give their Kingdome to the Beſte, I have no mind to contend about this mater, ſithat the ſenſe is ſufficiently ſane, which ever way the words be underſtood. In evil works God is not the cauſe of the moral evil, but of the ſubſtrate act and puniſhment, or Judgement which is annected to the ſin; but in good works, not only of the ſubſtrate act, but alſo of the moral Bonitie, &c. Who of us denies this? would our Adverſaries but ſtick here, how ſoon would our Controverſie be ended? But here lies the ſting, even in this plauſible conceſſion, Strangius with the reſt would fain perſwade us, that there are ſome acts of ſin ſo intrinſecally evil, as that you cannot ſeparate the phyſic natural act from its moral Vitioſitie.

§. 5. We deſcend now to ſuch Scriptures as mention GodsGods efficacious Permiſſion of Sin. efficacious Permiſſion of ſin. The former Heads regard only the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act of ſin, but this ſin in its formal nature. Our Adverſaries, the Pelagians, Jeſuites, Arminians and Semi-Arminians or New Methodiſts, al grant Gods permiſſion of Sin, but only ſuch as is otioſe, ſpeculative, negative and naked, without any efficacious active Influence for the production of its entitative act, or direction of it to its proper ends: But the ſacred p. 86Scriptures aſcribe to God a poſitive, efficacious, directive, and ordinative permiſſion of ſin, ariſing from his poſitive abſolute volition to permit it. So it's ſaid of Eli's Sons, 1 Sam. 2. 25. They 1 Sam. 2. 25.1 Sam 2:25hearkened not to the voice of their father, becauſe the Lord would ſlay them. The conjunction foreign here is Cauſal, and reſolves their ſin into the efficacious permiſſive Wil of God: The Soverain Lord had, by an abſolute peremtorie decree, predetermined to leave the Sons of Eli to this ſin of Diſobedience both againſt their Father and God, which ſhould prove the cauſe of their temporal and eternal ruine; and thence it's ſaid, they hearkened not, becauſe the Lord would ſlay them: the wil of God was not properly the cauſe of their ſin or ſlaughter, yet their ſin was a conſequent of Gods Wil efficaciouſly permitting it to be. I am not ignorant, that ſome of late have endeavored to give the cauſal particle foreign a more ſoft, as they phraſe it, Verſion; and among theſe ſome make it concluſive, and ſo render it ideo, idcirco, quapropter: others render it quamvis, as Turnovius; others otherwiſe: But certainly our Engliſh Verſion, which renders it cauſally, becauſe, ſeems much more agreeable to the mind of the Words and al the ancient Verſions: So the LXX. who render the words thus, foreign, becauſe the Lord in willing willed to deſtroy them. In willing willed, i. e. according to the Hebraic Idiome, peremtorily, efficaciouſly, immutablely and abſolutely willed. Thus alſo the ancient Syriac and Arabic Verſions, with ſome later, Munſter, Pagnine, Arias Montanus, Junius and Tremelius, Oſiander, Piſcator, Malvenda, with the Tigurine and Belgic Verſions; yea Caſtalio not excepted, render foreign cauſally, becauſe, according to our ſenſe and interpretament.

Let us examine now what Strangius returns in anſwer to this Text, lib. 4. cap. 6. pag. 809, &c. He anſwers, (1) That the ſons of Eli were, for their flagitioſe impieties, deſtined and devoted by God to ruine. (2) That the puniſhment of death here mentioned, ſeems properly and directly to be underſtood of temporal, not eternal. (3) That however it be, as it is manifeſt, that ſin precedes damnation and the inflicting of puniſhment, ſo it's neceſſary that the preſcience of every ſin be preſuppoſed in the eternal purpoſe of God, of damning and inflicting puniſhment, whether temporal or eternal. (4) That the particle Quia Becauſe, here uſed, doth not alwayes denote a proper cauſe, but a reaſon of conſequence, which may be taken from the effect, and other arguments beſides the cauſe, &c.

p. 87Strangius here raiſeth a great deal of duſt, to blind our eyes from beholding the Meridian light of this Text; but to anſwer briefly: (1) We ſay, that his firſt anſwer ſmells too rankly of Pelagianiſme, in that it makes the ſins of men the cauſe of the Divine Wil: The Sons of Eli were not for their flagitioſe Impieties deſtined by God to ruine, as if their flagitioſe Impieties were cauſative of and influential on Divine deſtination; but the Soverain God deſtined, by an abſolute decree, to leave them to thoſe flagitioſe ſins, and for them to deſtroy them. What are the dangerous conſequents of ſuch a conditional Reprobation, we intend more fully to ſhew hereafter, c. 5. §. 3. (2) That the Death here intended and inflicted was only temporal, is too crude a notion for a Divine inſtructed in the knowledge of divine wrath: Yea, Strangius confeſſeth, that they merited eternal wrath; and how then could they be exemted from it, who had rejected the Merits of their Meſſias? (3) What he addes, touching the preſcience of every ſin to be preſuppoſed in Gods eternal purpoſe of damning men, has a tincture alſo of rank Pelagianiſme: for if the preſcience or previſion of actual ſins, yea of final Impenitence, be that which moves the divine Wil to decree the Damnation of men, then it wil, by a paritie of reaſon, neceſſarily follow, that the preſcience or previſion of mens Faith and final Perſeverance is that which moves the divine Wil to elect men: for if Reprobation be conditional, Election muſt be ſo alſo, as our Divines on Scripture-reaſon ſtrongly demonſtrate. Davenant in his Animadverſ. againſt Hoard, invictly proves, p. 226. and elſewhere, That Decrees purely conditional are very much unbecoming the Divine Wil. But of this more in what follows, c. 5. §. 3. (4) As for the Particle Quia, Becauſe, [1] We grant, that it doth not alwayes denote a proper Cauſe, but a reaſon of Conſequence, and that taken ſometimes from the effect. But, [2] that it cannot denote a reaſon of Conſequence taken from the Effect in this Text, is moſt evident; becauſe Gods Wil to ſlay them was not the effect of their diſobedience, but their diſobedience was the conſequent of Gods wil to ſlay them. [3] Take notice, that we do not ſay, that Gods wil was the cauſe of their diſobedience or ruine, but only that the later was the conſequent of the former: God in his moſt ſoverain wiſe and efficacious purpoſe decreed to leave the ſons of Eli to ſuch flagitioſe ſins, as ſhould prove the cauſe of their ruine, both temporal and eternal: p. 88and hereupon their ſin and ruine followed, as Darkneſſe is the conſequent of the Suns retirement into the inferior Hemiſphere.

Again, Gods efficacious permiſſive wil about ſin may be demonſtrated from Job 12. 16. The deceiver and deceived are his. Job 12. 16, 17.Job 12:16Job 12:17foreign, His or unto him is the deceiver and the deceived, h. e. Juſto judicio permittit errare & ſeduci, Vatablus.i. e. he doth in juſt judgement permit men to deceive and to be deceived, as Vatablus on this Text. Which Mercer thus more fully explicates: I underſtand this not only of falſe Worſhip, but alſo of al errors that are committed every where; although more ſpecially in Polities and Cities to be governed, where God ſtirs up ſome who draw others into error, that they might follow their fallacious counſel, and enter on a pernicioſe courſe for their own dammage.—God therefore impels and draws ſome into error: not that the Lord is the Author of Error or Sin, but that their ſin and defection from God leads them thereto, God not only merely permitting, but alſo ordaining, &c. Whence it's added, v. 17. He leadeth counſellers away ſpoiled, and maketh the Judges fools; ſpoiled, foreign, i. e. of their wiſdom and counſel, as it follows. So it's taken, Pſal. 76. 6. The valiant are ſpoiled of their heart, i. e. deprived of their courage. And maketh the Judges fools, foreign, infatuat, or ad inſaniam adigit, as Mercer. He infatuates them. Again, v. 20. He removeth away the ſpeech of the truſty, and taketh away the underſtanding of the aged. foreign, the Judgement, Diſcretion, Counſel, Prudence, Senſe: Hebr. the ſavor or experimental taſt. So v. 24. He taketh away the heart of the chief of the People of the earth, and cauſeth them to wander in a Wilderneſſe where there is no way. The like Deut. 28. 28. and Eſa. 19. 11, 12, 13, 14.

Now let us ſee what anſwer Strangius, l. 4. c. 9. p. 836. gives hereto: It muſt be obſerved, ſaith he, that Job in this Chapter doth in an illuſtrious manner diſcourſe of Gods Providence ſo ordering things, that nothing comes to paſs caſually or fortuitouſly, nothing without his deſtinated counſel, that nothing is done but what he wils, either by permitting that it be done, or by doing of it, as Auguſt. Enchirid. c. 95. ſo that God doth effect and procure whatever things are good, and alſo wiſely foreknowing the future event, doth permit ſins, which he directs to good ends ordained by him.—Deſervedly therefore Job among other things obſerves, that it is from Divine Providence, p. 89that ſome erre, and draw others into error; and that both as to maters of Religion, and in other maters of this life; not that is he the Author of ſeduction and errors, but becauſe God, for the contemt and abuſe of his light, delivers them deſtitute thereof into a mind void of judgement, and preſenting objects and occaſions, opens a way, wherein they wander, &c.

Though this Paraphraſe be far ſhort of the mind of the Text, yet there is enough in it to confirme our Hypotheſis, and ſubvert his own Antitheſis. For (1) he grants, That nothing happens caſually, without Gods deſtinated counſel, according to that of Auguſtin, That nothing is done but what God wils, &c. Now certainly Gods deſtinated counſel or determined wil is moſt efficacious and irreſiſtible: ſo that if the permiſſion of ſin be from Gods deſtinated counſel, it muſt be alſo determined by his efficacious wil. (2) He grants, that God wiſely foreknows al future events, even the ſins of men: and how this can be without the efficacious predetermination of his own wil to permit the ſame, neither Strangius himſelf, nor any of his ſectators, could ever yet make out. (3) He grants alſo, That God directs thoſe aberrations and ſins to good ends appointed by him. And how can God direct the immanent aberrations of the mind, but by an efficacious predetermination of the ſubſtrate acts, and permiſſion of the vitioſitie? (4) He yet further grants, That God delivers them unto a mind void of judgement: and what do we ſay more? Doth not this evidently denote an active efficacious permiſſion of ſin? But then (5) his laſt clauſe, preſenting objects and occaſions, &c. overthrows al his former conceſſions: for the wiſe God doth not only preſent objects and occaſions, and thereby open a way to mens infatuation, but he alſo predetermines the mind to the entitative act, and efficaciouſly permits the vitioſitie, without the leaſt finger in the ſin.

There are other Scriptures which demonſtratively prove Gods efficacious permiſſion of ſin; as Eſa. 63. 17. O Lord, why haſt thou Eſa. 63. 17.Isa 63:17made us erre from thy ways, and hardened our hearts from thy fear? Strangius, pag. 839. grants, that the Verbe in both Members being in Hiphil oft notes a double action, as when we ſay, That one makes another to do a thing; though he pretends, that ſometimes it only notes a permiſſion of the action. But it is certain, that it cannot here denote a mere naked permiſſion, but ſuch as procedes from the efficacious wil of God. The like Jer. 20. 7. O Lord, thou haſt deceived me and I was deceived. Whereto anſwers, Ezech. 14. 9. p. 90And if the Prophet be deceived when he hath ſpoken a thing, I the Lord have deceived that Prophet. Which Texts ſpeak certainly more than a mere idle ſpeculative permiſſion, namely ſuch as reſultes from the active, efficacious, directive and ordinative wil of God, as Strangius, lib. 4. cap. 9. pag. 840—844. grants. What this permiſſion of God is, and how far it extendes, ſee what follows, Chap. 5. §. 6.

§. 6. Let us now paſſe on to ſuch Scriptures as mention Gods Gods judicial hardening Sinners.tradition or giving up ſome to judicial excecation and induration or hardneſſe of heart; which wil give a more evident demonſtration of Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act of ſin. Not to inſiſte on Gods hardening Pharaohs heart, Exod. 4. 21. which has been already ſolidly and demonſtratively explicated by a judicious Divine, in his Letter to a Friend, &c. pag. 28—30. I ſhal begin with Pſal. 81. 12. So I Pſal. 81. 12.Ps 81:12gave them up to their own hearts luſts, or to the hardneſſe of their own hearts, as Kimhi. Hebr. foreign, and I ſent them away in the depraved cogitation of their heart. LXX. render it, Deut. 29. 19. foreign, and Jer. 3. 17. foreign. Whence it follows: and they walked in their own counſels. foreign, in their own depraved imaginations. It's juſt with God to give up men to that ſpirit of hardneſſe which they affect: his way of hardening is myſterious and inviſible: he delivers ſinners up to the bent of their own luſts, and then lets them enjoy what they luſt after: when men adde acquired hardneſſe to natural, God juſtly inflicts on them judicial hardneſſe. And oh! how righteous is it with God judicially to harden ſuch as ſinfully, yea voluntarily harden themſelves! And then the heart which is an Adamant towards God and things ſpiritual, is as wax towards ſin and Satans tentations. And what is the effect of this judicial hardneſſe, but to ſeal up ſinners from the darkneſſe of mind to the darkneſſe of Hel? Thus God, albeit he be not the Author of ſin, yet is the Orderer of it, and the cauſe of the ſubſtrate act unto which ſin is annexed.

The like Pſal. 69. 22. Let their eyes be darkened that they ſee not, Pſal. 69. 22.Ps 69:22and make their loins continually to ſhake. Let their eyes [i. e. their minds] be darkened. foreign, be made ſo obſcure and dark, as that they may not ſee their way: let al true wiſdome be taken from them, and make their loins continually to ſhake: i. e. take from them al force, vigor and abilitie of acting as they ought; let them p. 91ſtagger and reel like to a drunken man. The ſhaking of the loins argues imbecillitie and want of force, which is chiefly ſeated in the loins. Thus he procedes, and then verſ. 17. brings Divine wrath to a black concluſion: Adde iniquitie to their iniquitie, &c. foreign, which implies, that God addes the puniſhment of judicial hardneſſe to the iniquitie of their voluntary acquired hardneſſe. We find this piece of judicial hardneſſe cited by Paul, Rom. 11. 10. Let their eyes be darkened that they may not Rom. 11. 10.Rom 11:10ſee, and bow down their back alway. The Heb. foreign is here rendred by Paul foreign, bow down; the ſenſe being the ſame; for the bowing down of the back argues the defect of ſtrength in the loins.

To theſe Texts we may adde, Eſa. 6. 10. Make the heart of this Eſa. 6. 10.Isa 6:10people fat: foreign make the heart fat, or groſſe, i. e. ſtupid and ſenſeleſſe: for the fat of animals has little ſenſe. It alludes to the heart in the animate bodie overgrowen and oppreſſed with fat. Theſe words are ſix times repeted in the N. T. Whence it follows: and ſhut their eyes. foreign, which is rendred by ſome, dim them, or make them dim; by others, daub them, as with plaiſter, or other like mater: by others, cloſe them: al which notes the efficacitie of error and blindneſſe, that follows on judicial hardneſſe.

The like curſe we find, Eſa. 29. 10. For the Lord hath poured Eſa. 29. 10.Isa 29:10out upon you the ſpirit of deep ſleep, and hath cloſed your eyes. LXX. foreign. The Heb. foreign is rendred by Aquila foreign, and by Theodotion foreign, which Act. 10. 11. notes a deep ſleep or ecſtaſie: and the radix foreign ſignifies to overwhelme with deep ſleep; and it's rendred foreign, Dan. 10. 9. So that by the ſpirit of deep ſleep, muſt be underſtood ſuch a ſtupor of ſpirit as leaves men without al ſenſe. The alluſion is to ſome ſoporiferous ſtupifying wine, or potion, or medicine, which, being given to a man, or ſprinkled on him, caſts him into a deep ſleep. Hence the Prophet uſhers in theſe words with a direful exclamation, verſ. 9. Stay your ſelves and wonder—they are drunken, but not with wine, &c. i. e. the Lord hath made them drunken with a ſoporiferous ſtupifying potion. As for foreign it is not derived from foreign, to pricke, Act. 2. 27. but from the ancient word foreign. The ſimple foreign being put for foreign, which alſo remains among the Latins, as nuo, nutus, nutare. Thence foreign and foreign, which ſignifies to nod, or ſhake the head, as they are wont to do who have drunk any ſtupifying potion. So that p. 92foreign here is ſuch a ſpirituoſe, ſtupifying potion as deprives men of their ſenſes, makes them ſhake the head, ſtagger and reel as drunken men. Thence it follows: and hath cloſed your eyes. When God judicially pours out a ſpirit of deep ſleep, how ſoon is the heart ſtupified and made ſenſeleſſe! This Text is citedRom. 11. 8.Rom 11:8 and explicated by Paul, Rom. 11. 8. According as it is written, God hath given them the spirit of ſlumber, eyes that they ſhould not ſee, &c. The firſt part, God hath given them the ſpirit of ſlumber, notes the ſtupor of their minds, unto which they were judicially delivered up by God.

Thus alſo Eſa. 19. 11—14. He begins verſ. 11. Surely the Princes Eſa. 19. 14.Isa 19:14of Zoan are fools, &c. Thence he procedes to give the reaſon of it verſ. 14. The Lord hath mingled a perverſe ſpirit in the midſt thereof, &c. The Lord hath mingled, foreign, poured out, or given them to drinke. Gods judicial excecation and induration is here, as elſewhere, compared to a cup of intoxicating liquor, which being very ſtrong and heady diſtempers men, and makes them to reel and ſtagger: ſo much the following phraſe importeth, foreign a ſpirit of perverſities. The Hebrew word, not elſewhere to be found in the O. T. is derived from a Verbe that ſignifies to pervert, turne away, or make crooked: it's here plural of a duplicate forme, and notes al manner of perverſities both extenſive and intenſive. They boaſted of their wiſdome, verſ. 11. but God made them drunk with a ſpirit of error and perverſities. The Chaldee and LXX. render it, with a ſpirit of error or ſeduction; the Latin, with a ſpirit of giddineſſe. The ſenſe is the ſame.

We may adde hereto, Eſa. 44. 18. They have not knowen nor Eſa. 44. 18, 19.Isa 44:18Isa 44:19underſtood; for he hath ſhut their eyes, that they cannot ſee, and their hearts, that they cannot underſtand. He hath ſhut, Heb. foreign he has daubed; Shindler renders it, cruſtavit, aut obduxit parietem. God did as it were plaiſter their eyes with a ſpirit of ſlumber: whence it follows, verſ. 19. and none conſidereth in his heart, &c. Thoſe profane Idolaters did ſhut their eyes, that they might not ſee, and the righteous God comes and as it were daubes or plaiſters them over, that they ſhal not ſee.

This judicial excecation is alſo lively expreſſed, Eſa. 60. 2.Eſa. 60. 2.Isa 60:2 For behold darkneſſe ſhal cover the earth, and groſſe darkneſſe the people. The Prophet having exhorted the elect among the Jews, verſ. 1. Ariſe and ſhine, for they light is come, &c. i. e. the Meſſias is come and ſhineth on thee with the glorioſe beams of Evangelic p. 93light; in this verſ. 2. he gives us the dreadful curſe of thoſe that ſhould wilfully ſhut their eyes againſt this light. For behold—thick darkneſſe. Heb. foreign, which ſeems compounded of a word that ſignifies to drop or deſtil, and another that ſignifies a miſt or fog: ſo that the compound notion here properly notes a miſt or fog ſo thick, that it even drops again; ſuch as the Egyptian miſt was, that filled the earth with darkneſſe, Exod. 10. 22, 23. When men wilfully ſhut their eyes againſt Evangelic light, God judicially leaves them to wander up and down in the thick miſt of their own darkneſſe, ſo that they ſtumble at noon day.

Thus God dealt with the Gentiles, even the wiſeſt of them, for the abuſe of natures light, as Rom. 1. 28. And even as they did Rom. 1. 28.Rom 1:28not like to retain God in their knowlege, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do thoſe things that are not convenient. They did not approve of or acknowlege God in their practic judgements or conſciences, and therefore God did not approve of or owne their practic notions, but delivered them up to a reprobate, ſpurious, droſſie, vain, adulterine, rejectaneous mind; ſo much foreign notes. A Divine of note among us ſaith to this Text, Here is nothing at al but a penal deſertion and permiſſion, &c. So that by this Tradition he underſtands only a negation of Grace, and mere permiſſion of men to ſin; but Strangius, lib. 4. cap. 7. pag. 813. is more ingenuous, and grants, that this Tradition importes ſomething poſitive: though what that poſitive is he doth not, neither indeed can by his Hypotheſis, explicate.

The like Tradition or delivering up to a reprobate mind we find foretold touching the Sons of Antichriſt, 2 Theſ. 2. 11. And 2 Theſ. 2. 11.2 Thess 2:11for this cauſe God ſhal ſend them ſtrong deluſion, that they ſhould believe a lie. When ſecure Profeſſors wil not receive the Truth in the love thereof, that they may be ſaved, it is juſt with God to ſend them ſtrong deluſions, that they ſhould believe a lie; that they might al be damned, &c. as verſ. 12. The fore-mentioned reverend Divine anſwers to this Text thus: Here is nothing ſignified, but (1) That God wil permit Magicians and falſe Teachers to vent deceits. (2) And permit wicked men to believe them: which is mentioned as a permitted conſequent, and not as an end intended by God. And the word ſending is mentioned, becauſe the permiſſion was penal for their ſin, &c. But this reſponſe is too ſlender and jejune for ſo great a Text: For (1) whereas that reverend Divine makes mention of Gods permitting Magicians, &c. this ſavors too much▪ p. 94of a Grotian and Caſſandrian ſpirit, which I preſume, he has no kindneſſe for, whereby al thoſe prophetic predictions about Antichriſt are fixed on Simon Magus, or ſome other falſe Teacher in the Primitive Churches: whereas it is moſt evident, that this ſending them ſtrong deluſion is aſcribed immediately to God, as a righteous Judge. (2) Neither is this only a mere permitted conſequent, as he phraſeth it; but the terme ſending importes active efficacious influence on Gods part that ſends, not on the ſin formally conſidered, but on the ſubſtrate mater, or act entitatively conſidered. But Strangius, lib. 4. cap. 10. pag. 853. is here alſo more candid, granting, Gods ſending the efficace of error, to be the ſame with Gods pouring out a ſpirit of ſlumber, Eſa. 19. 14. and Jerome thinkes, that Paul took his words from Eſa. And pag. 855. Strangius addes, That this ſending ſtrong deluſions may be aſcribed to God, as a puniſhment of their former ſin, in not receiving the truth in the love thereof: which ſufficiently proves our Hypotheſis, That the ſubſtrate mater of ſin is from God, as hereafter.

But let us a little more fully examine the general ſolutionsThe falſe comments of Adverſaries refuted. which our Adverſaries give to theſe Texts touching Gods active excecation and induration. 1. A Divine among our ſelves, whom I love and honor, thinkes, that thoſe Texts in the O. T. which ſpeak of Gods hardening men, &c. might, according to the Hebrew Idiome, have a ſofter ſenſe; ſo (as I ſuppoſe he muſt mean) as a mere permiſſion is intended thereby. But to anſwer hereto in the words of Strangius, lib. 4. cap. 9. pag. 839. The Hebraic forme is oft in Hiphil, which denotes a double action, to make a man to do a thing; yea ſometimes this induration is expreſſed by Verbes in Piel, of an active import, as Exod. 4. 21. & 9. 12. & 10. 20, 27. & 11. 10. & 14. 4, 8. Deut. 2. 30. Joſh. 11. 20. Whence Strangius concludes, That this phraſe of Scripture oft occurring denotes much more than a mere naked permiſſion. Though what this ſhould be he is at a great loſſe.

2. Baronius, Metaphyſ. Sect. 8. Diſp. 3. §. 99. pag. 159, 160. anſwers, That there are four actions of God in induration; (1) He puniſheth former ſins by permitting men to fal into greater. (2) He offers to them an occaſion of repentance, &c. (3) He gives them not grace to improve the occaſion; whence they are ſaid to be blinded and hardened. (4) He offers to them occaſions of greater ſins, by ſuch things as objectively move them to ſin. p. 95But al this, which Baronius allows God in judicial execation and Induration, comes far ſhort of what the forecited Scriptures mention. For beſides the mere permiſſion of Sin, privation of Grace, and offering occaſions and objects, the Scripture mentions a Tradition and delivering up to the very act of ſin, yea, Gods immediate efficacious hand in the very act of ſin, conſidered entitatively and materially.

3. But we come to Strangius, who, in his conceſſions goes beyond the former Divines, yet comes ſhort of the genuine mind and ſpirit of thoſe Texts, which ſpeak of Gods judicial Excecation and Induration. (1) He grants, (contrary to the ſentiment of a reverend Divine among us) that active excecation is aſcribed unto God. So l. 4. c. 8. p. 819. Active excecation, ſaith he, is aſcribed to God, Satan, and the Sinner himſelf. Satan and the Sinner in that action do greatly ſin, but God actes moſt juſtly. God can as juſtly puniſh Sinners with excecation of mind, as he puniſhed Elymas the ſorcerer with corporal excecation, Act. 13. 11. (2) Thence p. 822. he addes: Herein the whole difficultie lies, that in this action we rightly diſtinguiſh that which is ſin, and the cauſe of ſin, whereof God is not the cauſe, from the puniſhment, which God in juſt judgement inflicts. So p. 829. In al vitioſe action, the action ſubſtrate to the vice, or whatever there is of entitie and poſitive therein, muſt be reduced to God as the firſt cauſe, who doth concur therewith, as conſidered ſeparate from the vice or defect annexed thereto; and therefore whatever entitative or poſitive is found in any obduration, in like manner it muſt be referred to God, albeit he hath no commerce with the vice of the action. This ingenuous conceſſion of Strangius, did he not overthrow it by other poſitions, were ſufficient to period our controverſie: for what do, or need we deſire more than what he here grants? If whatever be entitative or poſitive in obduration be from God, then ſurely the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act of that whereto ſin is annexed, is from God. But here lies the point of our Controverſie with Strangius, he holds that there be ſome acts ſo intrinſecally evil, as that you cannot ſeparate the entitative act from the ſinful reference it has to its object. But, (3) Strangius addes, p. 831. That in the ſame Indutation the ſin and puniſhment are conjunct, &c. This indeed is a great conceſſion, that which overthrows Strangius's Antitheſis; for, if in the ſame Act the ſin and puniſhment be conjunct, then how can God concur to the act as a puniſhment, and not concur p. 96to the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act which has ſin annexed to it? This Knot the acuteſt of Strangius's Sectators wil never untie. Again, (4) He addes, p. 831. That the very Permiſſion of God is the act and effect of the wil of God.—For to wil to permit, and adviſedly to permit is alſo to act. What is done by God negatively in regard of his tranſient act, is done alſo poſitively, in regard of his interne immanent act. Herein alſo he lays before us a pregnant Truth, which is directly contradictory to his own Hypotheſis: for, [1] If Gods permiſſive Wil as to ſin be not only negative but alſo poſitive, then it muſt be efficacious. Again, [2] If Gods permiſſion of ſin be poſitive and efficacious, then alſo his Decree of Reprobation to permit ſin muſt be poſitive and abſolute, which directly impugneth Strangius's Opinion. (5) He addes, p. 832. That other actions alſo concur with Gods Permiſſion, becauſe he alſo rules, moderates and ordains what he permits, and concurs to the actions ſubſtrate to the ſin it ſelf. Is it ſo indeed? What then do we contend ſo vehemently for? what made Strangius write ſuch a voluminous diſcourſe, and oppoſe Rutherford, Twiſſe, and other Calviniſts with ſo much violence, when as here he grants whatever they contend for? But to ſpeak the truth, there yet lies a Snake under the herbe; albeit Strangius ſeems to grant ſo liberally Gods efficacious concurſe to the ſubſtrate act of ſin, yet indeed, when he comes elſe-where to ſtate this concurſe, he makes it be only a remote concurſe to the act conſidered in genere, in its generic nature, not to the individual particular act as ſo or ſo circumſtantiated. And herein he is followed byGods Concurſe to the individual act which is ſinful. a Divine of Name among us: wherein lies the ſpirit of al their ſolutions and oppoſitions. But how inept and evanid this ſubterfuge is, wil be very evident, if we conſider the nature of al phyſic or natural acts. Is not every natural or entitative act individual or ſingular? Are not al natural Acts the effluxes of ſingular Suppoſites or perſons? and if the ſubject be ſingular, muſt not the Action be alſo ſingular? To talk of a natural action in genere, or ſpecie, what a wild conceit is this, that which al true Logic and Philoſophie both new and old contradicts? It's true, human acts, as to their moral conſideration, may be diſtinguiſhed into generic, ſpecific, or individual: but if we conſider human acts in their natural entitative Being, ſo there neither is nor can be any ſuch thing as actio in genere, action in general; but al are ſingular and individual. So that if God concur to the act of ſin, it muſt p. 97be to the act in its individual ſingular nature, not morally but phyſically and entitatively conſidered; of which more hereafter, Chap. 6. §. 1.

But to give a diſtinct and Theologic Idea of Gods JudicialHow God judicially hardens men without being the cauſe of ſin. Excecation and Induration, with the Vindication of his Sacred Majeſtie from being the Author of Sin, the following Diſtinctions and Determinations may be of uſe to us. (1) We are to diſtinguiſh Gods concurſe in Judicial Induration or Hardneſſe, from that of the Sinner. (2) Gods Concurſe in Judicial Hardneſſe may be conſidered either in regard of his Decree, or in regard of his Providence and actual execution. (3) Induration may be diſtinguiſhed into Moral and Natural: or into ſinful and penal. Theſe things being premiſſed, the true nature of Gods judicial excecation and Induration wil appear in the following Propoſitions.

1. Prop. Gods Decree is not properly the cauſe of mans Hardneſſe of heart or Damnation, but only of the Negation or withdrawment of preventing Grace, which God is no way bound to give. The Decree of Reprobation is not the proper efficient or formal cauſe of the Sinners Induration or Condemnation, but his own wilful obſtinacie. This ſufficiently clears the Sanctitie and Juſtice of God.

2. Prop. Yet ſuppoſing the Decree of Reprobation, the ſinners Induration or Hardneſſe follows infallibly, and in ſome ſenſe neceſſarily; i. e. by a modal hypothetic neceſſitie, not brutiſh or coactive, ſuch as ſhould deſtroy Libertie. The holy God doth not infuſe hardneſſe, or by any compulſion hurrie men into it, but leaves them to the ſwinge of their own luſts, which violently hurrie them into ſuch courſes as neceſſarily harden. This alſo cleareth Gods Juſtice from the imputation of ſin.

3. Prop. Gods Providence in Judicial excecation and Induration is very efficacious and illuſtrious. (1) God leaves men to the Blandiſhments, Allurements, and Enſnarements of an heart-bewitching world, which inſenſibly harden. (2) He delivers up men to the power of Satan, the God of this world, whoſe ſubjects and vaſſals they willingly become, 2 Cor. 4. 3, 4. and ſo are taken alive captive at his wil, 2 Tim. 2. 26. (3) God ſo diſpoſeth and orders al his Providences, as that they do al accidentally, by reaſon of mens luſts, conſpire to harden them: Mercies become p. 100Curſes to them, Rom. 11. 9, 10, 11. Yea, (4) The very means of Grace, become the means of their hardening, their Food and Phyſic become Poyſon to them, 2 Cor. 2. 16. Eſa. 28. 12, 13, 14, 15. (5) Chriſt himſelf, the chief Corner-ſtone of ſalvation becomes to them a ſtone of ſtumbling and offence, Eſa. 8. 14. a ſtone of ſtumbling, foreign of ſmiting, ſuch as lying in the way the foot may ſmite againſt, and thence ſtumble and receive hurt. It anſwers to foreign, ſcandal in the New Teſtament: Thence it follows, and for a rock of offence. Heb. foreign, not a bare Stumbling-ſtone, or block, ſuch as a man may make a ſhift to avoid or get over, or if he ſtumble, yet recover himſelf again; but he is a rock of offence, which notes, [1] The Offence to be inevitable and unavoidable, as the removing of a rock: [2] The ruine to be certain, as that of a Ship falling on a rock. Whence he addes: for a gin and for a ſnare, ſuch as men ſhould neither by power, wit, or craft eſcape. Whence it follows, v. 15. And many among them ſhal ſtumble and fal, and be broken, and be ſnared, and be taken. The like Rom. 9. 33. (6) God puts a period to the day of Grace, and leaves men to the plague of their own heart, Eſa. 22. 14. Surely this iniquitie ſhal not be purged from you til you die. Hebr. foreign, If this iniquitie be purged. It is the conciſe forme of an Oath, frequently uſed in Scripture, as Chap. 5. 18. whereby God ſweareth, that their iniquitie ſhould not be purged. So Luke 19. 41, 42. Heb. 3. 7. (7) God doth poſitively, yea efficaciouſly concur to al that is poſitive, material, entitative, and natural in judicial hardneſſe, without the leaſt hand in the obliquitie or vitioſitie.

4. Prop. The ſuſpenſion of reſtraining Grace in Judicial excecation is not properly a privation of any Grace due to the Creature, but a negation or withdrawment of undeſerved and abuſed Grace. For the clearing whereof we are to conſider, the difference between Man and God in this particular: No meer man may or ought to permit or deliver up another to ſin or hardneſſe, if it be in his power to hinder: (1) Becauſe al men are under a Law and obligation of ſubjection to their Creator, whereby they are obliged to promove his Glorie, and prevent ſin and rebellion againſt him the moſt they can. (2) Becauſe al men are under a communion of Natures, and therefore bound to afford aſſiſtance each to other, ſo far as they may for their natural and moral p. 101good. But now the ſoverain Creator of man is under no ſuch obligation, and therefore may as he pleaſe diſpoſe of his own grace, or ſuſpend it, ſpecially when abuſed by ſinners.

5. Prop. God doth not deliver up men to judicial hardneſſe ſimply as hardneſſe, under that reduplication, but penally, as it conduceth to the vindication of his Juſtice. For the explication and demonſtration of this Propoſition we are to remember, that there is nothing in the world of itſelf, purely, and ſimply evil: for if there were any pure and chiefeſt evil in the world, then God, who is the chiefeſt good, could not wil it: but the greateſt evil has ſomething of good mixed with it; and this God wils. Thus in judicial hardneſſe there is a penal vindictive good, which God wils for the illuſtration of his Juſtice.

6. Prop. In judicial hardneſſe, that which is morally evil in regard of man and his tranſgreſſion, is naturally good in regard of God and his Providence. For albeit God doth concur with the ſinner, who is deficient as to his dutie, yet God is no way deficient. (1) Al moral evil of ſin is only ſuch to him whoſe it is, or to whom it doth belong, as the Author thereof, by virtue of ſome Law he offends againſt: But now this judicial hardneſſe or ſin doth not belong to God as the proper Owner or Author of it, but only to the ſinner; neither doth the holy God offend againſt any Law. (2) The ſpecific qualitie of an effect is not to be aſcribed to the univerſal firſt cauſe, but to the ſecond particular cauſe, from which it receives ſpecification. (3) The ſinner is only the moral cauſe of his own hardneſſe; becauſe he is the meritorious cauſe thereof, and alſo a voluntary, yea wilful Agent therein. Al his hardneſſe is voluntarily contracted, albeit judicially inflicted by God: he ſuffers his heart voluntarily to be defloured by ſinful objects: God threatens to ſuſpend his Divine influence, and the obſtinate ſinner cries, Content: Satan comes and blinds his eyes, and he hugges him for it. So that the whole deficience or moral cauſalitie is on the ſinners part, not on Gods. The ſinner wants Divine influence and is willing, yea glad to want it: therefore his depraved wil is the ſole formal, vital, ſubjective and moral efficient cauſe of his own hardneſſe and ſin.

§. 7. We come in the laſt place to ſuch Scriptures as mentionGods efficacious ordering mens ſins for his own glorie. Gods efficacious ordering, diſpoſing, and directing the ſins of men unto his own glorie, which evidently demonſtrates his immediate concurſe and predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater or entitative p. 102act thereof. Thus Exod. 9. 14, 15, 16. God threatens Pharaoh, Exod. 9. 14, 15, 16.Exod 9:14Exod 9:15Exod 9:16verſ. 14. to ſend al his plagues on his heart, i. e. in a way of judicial excecation and induration. And why? That thou mayſt know there is none like me in al the earth: i. e. that I may magnifie myVitiorum noſtrorum non eſt auctor Deus, ſed tamen ordinator, Auguſt. vindictive Juſtice and Power on thee. Whence he addes, v. 15. For now I wil ſtretch out mine hand, that I may ſmite thee, and thy people with peſtilence, and thou ſhalt be cut off from the earth. It runs in the Hebrew in the time paſt, foreign, I ſent out mine hand, i. e. by the peſtilence or murrain among the beſtes, as v. 3, 6. and ſo it follows: and I had ſmitten thee, with the ſame peſtilence; and thou hadſt been cut off, deſervedly; but for another cauſe (which is mentioned verſ. 16.) I have ſpared thee. This ſeemeth the genuine meaning, namely, that God ſpared Pharaoh in this plague, thereby to magnifie his vindictive Juſtice and Power the more in his final ruine. God let him alone to run on in ful career in his way of ſin, yea, concurred to the ſubſtrate mater of al his ſins, and cauſed al his plagues to meet on his heart, in order to his final obduration, thereby to render his vindictive Juſtice more illuſtrious in his ruine. And ſo verſ. 16. And in very deed for this cauſe have I raiſed thee up, for to ſhew in thee my power, and that my name may be declared thorowout al the earth. foreign, in very deed, or verily: it notes a great aſſeveration, ſuch as with God amounts almoſt to an oath. For this. The Apoſtle Paul, Rom. 9. 17. addes a Pronoun of intention, foreign, for this very ſame, i. e. cauſe or purpoſe, as the Greeks expound it, for this cauſe have I raiſed thee up. The LXX. render it, thou haſt been preſerved or kept alive; but Paul more emphaticly, Rom. 9. 17. foreign,Rom. 9. 17.Rom 9:17 I have made thee ſtand up, or, have conſtituted, or ſet thee up, as on a Theatre before al the world, to be a veſſel of wrath, and an exemple of Divine vengeance. The Syriac renders it thus: foreign, I have made thee to ſtand up; which emphaticly paints forth Gods abſolute wil in his Reprobation. So in the Hebraic Verbe, foreign, I have made thee ſtand up, as a monument of vindictive Juſtice. This making to ſtand up, notes the conſtitution and being of a thing, as elſewhere in Scripture: the righteous God gave being and conſtitution to Pharaoh for this very end, to magnifie the glorie of his vindictive Juſtice on him. So it follows: foreign, for to ſhew, or that I may ſhew in thee, or ſhew thee. But the LXX. adde the Particle In: ſo Paul, Rom. 9. 17. foreign, That I may give a ſpecimen, or demonſtration p. 103of my power in thee. Hebr. foreign, my power, or my force, my omnipotent ſeveritie. Thence it follows: foreign, for to declare, or tel my name. The righteous God ſuffered Pharaoh to run on with a vehement impetuoſitie in his ſinful rebellion, that ſo the world might ring of Gods vindictive Juſtice in his ruine. From al this the Apoſtle ſtrongly demonſtrates our concluſion, Rom. 9. 18. Therefore God hath merciemercy on whom he wil, and whom he Rom. 9. 18.Rom 9:18wil he hardeneth. Obſerve here, (1) the Apoſtle uſhers in this inference with the concluſive note, foreign, therefore. He layeth the premiſſes in Gods judicial procedings with Pharaoh for the manifeſtation of his vindictive punitive glorie in Pharaohs ruine: whence he infers this univerſal concluſion. Therefore God, &c. (2) He reſolves Gods hardening men into his abſolute wil or decree of Reprobation, which he in this regard, makes parallel to his abſolute decree of Election: for as God hath merciemercy on whom he wil, i. e. according to his abſolute purpoſe or decree; ſo in like manner, he hardeneth whom he wil, i. e. according to his abſolute decree of Reprobation. And it is moſt certain, according to the Scripture, no man can maintain abſolute Election, but he muſt alſo maintain abſolute Reprobation: and if Reprobation be abſolute, then alſo Gods concurſe to the entitative act of that which is ſinful muſt be efficacious and predeterminative, as hereafter, Chap. 5. §. 3.

There are other Texts that make expreſſe mention of Gods efficacious ordering and diſpoſing of wicked men and their ſins for his own glorie. So Prov. 16. 4. The Lord hath made althings Prov. 16. 4.Prov 16:4for himſelf; yea even the wicked for the day of evil. Note here (1) the end of Gods making althings, which is for himſelf, foreign, i. e. for the manifeſtation of his own glorie. (2) The manner of Gods making althings for himſelf, included in the Verbe foreign, hath made, which ſignifies [1] Gods active efficience, or his energetic, architectonic Decree, whereby althings are made. [2] Gods paſſive creation, or his efficience in time. [3] Gods conſervation of althings in their beings and wel-beings. [4] Gods efficacious actuating and governing althings to their ends. Thus Pſal. 46. 9. Eccleſ. 11. 5. Eſa. 5. 12. The LXX. generally render it by foreign, which Joh. 5. 17. our Lord uſeth to expreſſe Gods efficacious concurſe and predeterminative influence. And Strangius, pag. 804. grants, that whether we underſtand foreign here of Gods production in time, or of his eternal Decree to produce man, or p. 104of his ordination and conſtitution of man to puniſhment, the difference is not material. I would therefore take it in the largeſt notion as comprehenſive of al its ſignificates before ſpecified. (3) Whence follows the particular object, even the wicked, i. e. conſidered not only in their ſubſtance as men, but alſo in al their Modes, Adjuncts, Accidents, and Operations. There is not the moſt minute accident or action of a wicked man but God makes it, i. e. decrees, influenceth, and orders it for himſelf. Whence (4) the wicked are ſaid to be made by God, for the day of evil, foreign, i. e. for the day of vindictive wrath, or puniſhment inflicted for the illuſtration of Divine Juſtice: which includes alſo their being left to ſin; for the foreſt piece of Divine vengeance is mens being given up to their own hearts luſts.

Adde hereto Rom. 9. 21, 22. Hath not the potter power over the Rom. 9. 21, 22.Rom 9:21Rom 9:22clay, &c? Here Paul refutes the proud Pelagian blaſphemies by an argument taken from Gods abſolute Dominion and Soveraintie over his creature. As if he had ſaid: Has not the Potter an abſolute dominion over the clay, to forme it into what ſhape he pleaſe? and ſhal we not allow the great Creator of althings the ſame abſolute dominion? Did he not make althings? and therefore may he not aſſume the Prerogative of ordering althings to the ends for which they were made? As he gives to every creature what ſhape he pleaſe, ſo cannot he appoint them to what end he pleaſe, and direct them infallibly to that end? Is it not an end ſufficient for the being of any creature, to be the glorie of any Attribute? and therefore if God make a creature to be a veſſel of wrath fitted to deſtruction, is there any injurie done to the creature? The Pythagoreans have an effate, That foreign, the worſe is made for the ſervice of the better, which holds moſt true here of the veſſels of wrath or wicked men, who are made for the better, i. e. their Makers glorie, as Prov. 16. 4. Thus Paul concludes, verſ. 22. Veſſels of wrath fitted to deſtruction, foreign, ſignifies primarily aptly to fit, frame, or ſet together: thence, to ordain, decree, or conſtitute. Whence among the LXX. it anſwers to foreign, to found, as Pſal. 8. 2. Out of the mouths of babes he hath founded or ordained praiſe: alſo to foreign, to ordain, decree, eſtabliſh, as Pſal. 67. 10. & 73. 17. Thus it ſignifies here, namely Gods eternal ordination or abſolute Decree of Reprobation founded on his abſolute Soveraintie. Obſerve here the difference between the veſſels of merciemercy, and the veſſels of p. 105wrath: of the former he ſpeakes actively, verſ. 23. That he might make known the riches of his glorie on the veſſels of mercy, which he had prepared unto glorie; but of the later he ſpeakes only paſſively, verſ. 22. fitted to deſtruction. The reaſon of this difference ſeems this: The veſſels of merciemercy are wholly from God, both as veſſels, and as veſſels of merciemercy; they receive from God both their natural good of being, and their moral good of grace, wel-being, and happineſſe: but now the veſſels of wrath are ſuch partly from God, and partly from themſelves: That they are veſſels, and veſſels of wrath ordained to deſtruction, they are from God; but that they are veſſels deſerving wrath, this they are from themſelves: their ſins and puniſhment morally conſidered are from themſelves; but conſider them entitatively and penally, and ſo they are from God. I am not ignorant of the many falſe and Pelagian gloſſes which are affixed to this Text, without ſhadow of reaſon.

Another Text that evidently demonſtrates Gods efficacious predeterminative concurſe in ordering mens ſins for his own glorie is, 1 Pet. 2. 8. And a ſtone of ſtumbling, and a rock of offence, 1 Pet. 2. 8.1 Pet 2:8even to them that ſtumble at the word, being diſobedient, whereunto alſo they were appointed. This Text is taken partly from Eſa. 8. 14. Here Chriſt the chief Corner-ſtone of the Church, is ſaid to be a ſtone of ſtumbling and rock of offence to wilful unbelievers. The Greek foreign are ſynonymous, and of the ſame import here; though foreign be in its general notion more extenſive: It notes originally any thing that may offend the foot, or other part, from foreign, to halt, or from foreign, diſtorted: more particularly, it ſignifies (1) that tigillum, or croſſe piece of wood in your traps for Mice, Foxes, or the like: (2) a ſharp ſtake, whereby the foot is hurt: and ſo it is the ſame with foreign, interpreted by Heſychius foreign and ſo foreign is by him made to be the ſame with foreign, an impediment: it was called alſo by the Greeks foreign, denoting a military inſtrument, like a ſharp ſtake, whereby they annoyed their enemies: in which ſenſe the word foreign is uſed in that Apocryphous book, Judith 5. 1. foreign. (4) A ſtone that offends the foot: and ſo it anſwers with the LXX. to foreign, Lev. 19. 14. in which regard it is made ſynonymous to foreign, both by Peter; and Rom. 14. 13. by Paul: and this they both denote here, 1 Pet. 2. 8. the great offence which ſinners took at Chriſt, to their own ruine. Whence it's added: Whereunto alſo p. 106they were appointed, foreign. What doth this note? why take Grotius's Note on this Text, who was no friend to Calviniſts: Unto this, ſaith he, Unbelievers were deſtined by God, that they might moſt grievouſly fal—For foreign, which anſwers to foreign, oft ſignifies to ordain, deſtine, or decree, as Joh. 15. 16. So foreign, 1 Theſ. 5. 9. The Syriac in this place renders it foreign, they were deſigned; the Arabic foreign, they were conſtituted, namely by the Divine Decree. Thus Grotius, who here ſpeakes like a Calviniſt, though generally no friend to the ſentiments of Calvin. The like 2 Pet. 2. 11. As natural brute beſtes, made to be taken and deſtroyed. Is not abſolute Reprobation here, and that by the conceſſion of Grotius, no friend thereto, clearly and fully aſſerted? And if Reprobation be abſolute, muſt not alſo Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin be efficacious and predeterminative? The immutable connexion between abſolute Reprobation and predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of that which is ſinful we intend to demonſtrate hereafter, Chap. 5. §. 3.

But a reverend Divine of name among us anſwers to this Text thus: Reſp. 1. This [1 Pet. 2. 8. whereunto alſo they were appointed] hath reſpect to Luke 2. 34—And no more can be hence gathered, but that God hath decreed, that as a puniſhing Judge, (1) he wil leave the rejecters of Chriſt to go on in their own ſinful way; (2) and that their oppoſition to him ſhal be their ruine: So that [1] he doth not ſpeak this of any but the rejecters of Chriſt, that deſerved it. [2] He ſpeaketh not at al as willing their ſin, but only as one that penally denieth them further grace. [3] But the thing that he is ſaid to ordain them to, is not ſin, but ruine the conſequent of their ſin: The word [ſtumbling and falling] ſignifying their deſtruction. Thus that reverend Divine.

And now let us a little examine this his Reſponſe to our Argument from this Text, which wil ſerve for a replie to moſt of his ſubterfuges. (1) In anſwer to his firſt particular, we aſſert, that more may be gathered from this Text, than what he allows, namely, That God hath decreed, that, as a puniſhing Judge, he wil leave the rejecters of Chriſt to go on in their own ſinful way. For he himſelf grants, (which cannot be denied) That they were appointed to ſtumble on the rock of offence: And if ſo, then ſurely they were deſtined or appointed to the entitative act of ſin: for ſtumbling doth not only implie their deſtruction, as he inſinuates, but alſo p. 107their ſin. Whence, (2) there is ſomething more alſo implied, than that their oppoſition to him ſhal be their ruine. For it's expreſſely ſaid, That they were appointed, not only to their ruine, but alſo to their ſtumbling at the word, and being diſobedient, which notes the Decree of Reprobation to be abſolute and poſitive; yea predeterminative of the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. (3) Whereas he ſaith, That he ſpeakes not at al as willing their ſin, but only as one that penally denieth them further grace, this ſeems alſo againſt the expreſſe mind of the Text, which ſaith, They were appointed, foreign, i. e. according to Grotius, they were ordained, deſtined, or decreed to ſtumble at the word, &c. This certainly denotes more than Gods penal denial of further grace. (4) Whereas he ſaith, That the thing that he is ſaid to ordain them unto, is not ſin, but ruine, the conſequent of their ſin, the word [ſtumbling and falling] ſignifying their deſtruction, it ſeems contradictory to the letter and mind of the words: for both foreign and foreign ſignifie, according to our precedent explication of them, primarily their ſin, and then their ruine or deſtruction, as the conſequent of their ſin. This alſo is evident from that parallel Text, Jude 4. For there are Jude 4.Jude 1:4certain men crept in unawares, who were of old ordained to this condemnation, ungodly men turning the grace of God into laſciviouſneſſe, and denying the only Lord God. Theſe ungodly men are ſaid to be foreign, deſigned, and as it were before written in the book of Gods predetermination, to be given up to this condemnation, of turning the grace of God into laſciviouſneſſe, &c. So that it is evident, that God foreordained and decreed, not only their deſtruction, but to leave them to thoſe ſins, which ſhould cauſe the ſame.

But to ſum up the whole of this Head, we grant, (1) That abſolute Reprobation is not the cauſe either of mens ſins, or damnation. It's true, elective Grace is the cauſe of faith and ſalvation, but the Decree of Reprobation is not the cauſe of ſin or damnation. (2) That Reprobation withdraws not any power from the perſon reprobated. Yet we denie, [1] That it is injuſt for God, by an abſolute, efficacious Decree, to reprobate ſome, for the glorifying of his own Juſtice: For albeit the Decree of Reprobation be not an act of juſtice, yet it is not injuſt for God to reprobate any. [2] We denie alſo, that there is any motive, cauſe, or condition of Reprobation, as it regards the act of the Divine wil. Whence alſo [3] we denie, that the act of Reprobation is p. 108merely negative; but affirme, that it is poſitive and abſolute; of which ſee Davenant Diſſert. de Elect. & Reprobat. p. 113. Hence, [4] It neceſſarily follows, that when God predeſtines and preordains any unto Damnation, he predeſtines and preordains in like manner, by an efficacious act of his own ſoverain Wil, to leave men to their own ſinful courſes, and efficaciouſly to concur to the ſubſtrate mater of thoſe ſins. See more Chap. 5. §. 3.