Bulk and Selvage of the World, Chapter 2

Bulk and Selvage of the World · Chapter 2

p. 12CHAP. II.

THus then in the firſt place, one of the readieſt wayes for us to free the mind from miſtakes about the knowledg of the world, is, for us to gather remarks of things, as much in a nearneſs to the Divine idea of them, or that of ghoſtly beings, as our more underly way of thinking will give us leave to reach to; and to uncloath them of, or make allowance for, all thoſe anſwerings or analogies, that do ariſe to them upon the account of our animalities or beghoſted bodyhood. For I reckon it will be a good ſtep towards the knowledg of what the world ought to be to us, who are body and ghoſt both together, if we but know what 'tis to ſuch Being or Beings as are ghoſt altogether.

Now the two firſt and moſt bewildring things that the mind is likeſt to faſten on, as the main belongers to the world, are the room that the world takes up, and the time that the world laſts: But if we come to lay theſe to the Divine Being, we ſhall find, that as Time is to Gods eternity or everlaſtingneſs, ſo Bulk is to Gods immenſity or his all-fillingneſs. p. 13Our knowing then how the world behaves it ſelf to one of them, will help us ſtill to underſtand how 'tis to the other, as our knowing how 'tis unto both, will give us ſomewhat better to gueſs how 'tis to us who have neither.

Inaſmuch then as the known perfection of God is to be ſo everlaſting, as not to be ſucceſſive or jogging on and on, the idea or likeneſs that he frames of timeſome Beings that are ſo, muſt not be by ſhrinking up this his fulneſs, to the narrowneſs of thoſe Beings which muſt needs be creeping forwards while they are; for that would be to make himſelf like them; that is, not to be God: but he muſt take the ken of theſe beings, after wayes becomming his boundleſs or infinite being: if then it will not beſeem God to be at this time, and at that time, this after that, then neither will it become him to know things that are ſo, after that kind of way. Now becauſe all the things we can gripe in our minds are ſuch, and the likeneſſes that God has of them are not ſuch, the words by which we call them being anſwering to the things, we are as much at a loſs for words, as for thoughts, about things ſo vaſtly beyond us: all that we can do towards it is, to chooſe out ſuch vvords to ſet forth Gods ever-beingneſs by, as may be ſure to p. 14ſhut out formerneſs and afterneſs, which Gods everlaſtingneſs has not, though we cannot on the other hand make them take in what we believe it has. Thus the whole world almoſt of well enlightned, and right believing men, have hit upon the way of calling Gods everlaſtingneſs, a cleaveleſs or indiviſible now: not as if 'twere a moment of that time which we take up, (time being caſt out, as well in part as in whole) but only becauſe it cannot be brought to our bounded underſtandings, ſhrowded under any other word that can like that, cut off all formerneſs and latterneſs, which muſt by no means be taken in.

Which way of ſpeaking has as ſure footing too in holy Writ, as in well-guided reaſon. I am hath ſent me, this day have I begotten thee, before Abraham was, I am; being as much ſenſe ſpoken of God, as they would be nonſenſe of any one elſe. Had Abraham been at the beginning of the World he had not been ſooner, as to Gods everlaſtingneſs; or had he not been till the words ſpoken, he had not been later, becauſe there is neither ſooner nor later in the thing: that which would be [was] in Grammar to Abraham, is [am] to God, as that which would be [will be] to us, is ſtill [am] to him. Gods ſaying, I am before Abraham or the world, and I am after p. 15him or it, (anſwering to our were and will be) is as well the fullneſs, as truth of ſpeaking, for then we have ſpoken all that ought, when we have ſpoken all that can be; and then all that can, when there are no more words to ſpeak more with.

And that it may not ſeem ſo ſtrange to us that we are thus word-bound in ſuch kind of things, we may remember that we are enough put to it for words about things belonging to our own ſelves, when we would give forth thoſe raviſhments of love that we feel, but can not, (without giving Soul and all) give another to underſtand, our words, it ſeems, being moſt an end as little ſquared to unboundedneſs in the intention of degrees, or ſcrewing up high, as 'tis to that in the extenſion of parts, or letting out wide.

Beſides, if Gods everlaſtingneſs were to be ſet out by words, it muſt not ſurely be, by ſuch vvords as are fitted to the analogy that is betvveen us, and other timeſome and boundſome beings, as all thoſe vve yet have are, but is only to be ſet forth by vvords running even vvith the anſvverings betvveen them and the Divine Being, which we neither know, nor can tell whether ever we ſhall. Thus Logick and Philoſophy cannot be uttered by the neighing of Horſes, the barking and howling of Dogs, the hiſſing p. 16and gagling of Geeſe, the chirping or prating of other Birds, though they ſpeak enough that, amongſt themſelves, which we cannot give them to know by our more full words; they, it ſeems, being as unfit for Beings beneath us, as above us.

Indeed the Philoſophical Dr. Charleton, (from the Mighty Gaſſendus before him, as he from Epicurus) has taken up again, the opinion of Vorſtius, ſo learnedly overthrown by Mr. Barlow, that Gods everlaſtingneſs is boundleſs time, and that his unmeetſomeneſs is boundleſs width: Both which to me, (whatever they are to others) ſeem no leſs then frightful notions: For if we are exiſtant in a ſmall part of that duration, or the world in a ſmall part of that extenſion in which God exists, and Gods eternity not be an everlaſting now, and his immenſity an unbounded unextendedneſs; it will follow that ſome part of Gods everlaſtingneſs is yet to come, and not now; and ſome part of his all-fillingneſs beyond the world, not in it, vvhichwhich vvould make ſuch a medly of ſucceſſion and diviſion in the Attributes of God, vvhichwhich are God himſelf, as I can't novv underſtand, or believe, I, or any man ever ſhall; being as ſure, as I am of my ovvn thinkfullneſs, that vvhat is bounded or finite, cannot hold pace vvith that vvhichwhich is unbounded or infinite, vvitho… vvhole nor in part.

p. 17But becauſe it has been undertaken ſince by a Reverend Divine, who has followed it as well more cloſely, as more fully, and that too with a goodly income of Learning, and a right handſome addreſs of words, and well air'd periods; it may happily ſeem to the Reader, that either we want a kindneſs for the buſineſs we have hitherto owned, while we let ſuch a rub lye in our way uncared for, or elſe that we want reſpect enough for the Author, to think that ſo, which he has wrought hard to make ſo; eſpecially too, having done ſo much to awaken us, as, to reckon all that think otherwiſe than himſelf does, to be no leſs than fools and laughing-ſtocks; notwithſtanding yet the whole throng of thoſe that have been of moſt name for learning, or of moſt worth for holineſs, have been of the ſide that he is not of, from the beginning of the World to this day.

In the doing of this he warns his Reader of Tentamina Phyſ. Theol. de Deo. p. 373.two kinds of abiding, inward or in groſs, and outward or by it ſelf: The inward is the very eſſence or exiſtence of the thing, which if, as to what 'tis made up of, it be daily throwing off and taking in, (as we and all body-ſome Beings do) is then ſucceſſive; but if it be alwayes the ſame, as 'tis with ghoſt and the ſubstance of all bodies, then 'tis ſhut of ſucceſſion and diviſion, p. 18and is ſelf-ſame or permanent, like as God is.

Page 376, 377. The outward has ſo little reality in it, that the underſtanding cannot get a draught of it; it has nothing at all of poſitive reality (though it be not yet a ſheer dream or figment) which is gathered, becauſe it muſt alwaies needs be, both unmade by God, and unbeholden to, or independent on God; if God had never made any thing, it ſhould for all that have been; and if he ſhould unmake all things, it would ſtill be. Page 378. The whole of this is eternity or everlaſtingneſs, the half is aevum or endleſneſs, that ſhare of it that lackies it by the worlds ſide is time.

Pag. 398. Thus Gods inward everbeingneſs, or aeternitas concreta, is the very exiſtence of God, with an outward badge or denomination from time by-running; which is permanent and indiviſible: and 'tis about this aeternitas, Boethiusand others ſhould be underſtood, when ſpeaking of its being tota ſimul.

Gods outward or abſtract is in an endleſs onwardneſs, and is unto Gods everlaſtingneſs, asſpatium imaginarium is to his all…illingneſs, which is not an attribute of God, but an unbounded retching out together with it.

To bring off all this fairly, we have two things to do; Firſt, to ſhew that there is no ſuch thing at all as this ſame aeternitas externa. p. 19Secondly, that if there were, it would not yet do the job for which 'tis brought.

For the firſt, A real outward eternity or eternal time that has nothing at all of poſitive reality, is not; becauſe 'tis a contradiction in adjecto, that it ſhould be a right down ſelf-cut-throat, fordoing even its own being. Eternity, and nothing at all of poſitivity, can by no means ſtand together; for whatever is eternal, muſt needs be poſitive of eternity, as long as eternity is ſomewhat poſitive it ſelf: and whatever is big with or poſitive of eternity, cannot go farrow, or be privative of real entity; for a thing cannot be everlaſting, and not be at all: and that this is really ſo, is clear, in that 'tis not a figment or whimſie; So 'tis yielded to have a little reality in it, and a little real, is real; eſpecially ſeeing that little reality is enough to make it really lengthen'd out with Gods moſt real inward everlaſtingneſs, and ſo that although God were not, that would be, and though God had never been, that ſhould be.

Beſides he that gives it a little reality or thingſomeneſs, cannot for his heart be ſo ſparing as to hold his hand there, and give it no more: for why, 'tis ſuch a craving Horſleech, it will ſuck in more whether a man will or not: Whilſt it muſt for truth's ſake be granted, that that little ſnip of everlaſting time, p. 20which reaches from my Birth-day, or at leaſt, the Worlds raiſing day, till novv, has a little reality in it; For I have lived, and the World laſted really that little while; the reality of time being grafted in its timeiſhneſs, not in its boundleſneſs; ſo that every little ſhare of time muſt have a little of this little reality, and every little muſt make a mickle. Then ſay I, if the time that I have lived and the world laſted, has a little reality in it, then that of it, which is beyond, muſt have more; and that of it which reaches infinitely beyond it,) becauſe 'tis as reall as 'tis infinite, and as really more as 'tis real, (muſt have an infinite deal of reality beyond it; and that which has more, and infinitely more than a little, cannot ſurely be ſaid to have but a little, or leſs than a great deal, or any thing ſhort of infinite reality.

2. Its independency or looſneſs from God, lies as crotchet every whit, as its being; for if you ask about it the queſtion that is wont to be askt all the homeleſs Crew, Whence comes it? The anſwer muſt fare as if it were a God; for 'tis to be ſaid, God did not make it, nor did any thing elſe; and yet 'tis indeed, and was unbeginningly, and will be endleſly; and that is as much as can be ſaid of God himſelf, under that head. If it be ſaid that God has beſides an inward ever-beingneſs, that is neither cleaveſome, nor on and on; ſo p. 21has this too, by good luck; for the inward abiding is nothing but the exiſtence of a thing alwayes the ſame: now this outward everlaſtingneſs has alwaies been the ſame, without getting or loſing ought, but moments of exiſting, which the everlaſting God and all ſubſtances do. If it be ſaid that in God there is All-fillingneſs, as well as Everlaſtingneſs; ſo there is out of God too, a boundleſs roomthineſs, ſuch as would be though God were not, nor had been ever; and while he is, is retcht out together with him; and was, as he himſelf, without beginning, and without him too. So we have gotten ſomewhat to chew upon, that is as everlaſting, and as much every where, as God is, and as unbeholden to God for being, as God is to any thing elſe for his; and yet in the upſhot, 'tis ſuch a kind of ſomewhatkin, as truckles beneath the very tinyneſs of an half nothing, and is forſooth a fierdhalf nothing; for after the full nice brattling out of reality, into muchneſſes and littleneſſes, there falls to the ſhare of this, as little as may be, to keep it from dwindling into an altogether nothing, or a middlekin between ſomething and nothing, that is neither of them. Whereas I have thought, that as time had not been if God had not made timeſome beings, nor room if he had not made roomthy; ſo neither had eternity or immenſity p. 22been, if there had not been a God everlaſting and every where, the maker of all things.

3. As this new Everlaſtingneſs breaks with it ſelf, upon the ſcore of being or entity, ſo it as much undoes it ſelf upon that, of its boundleſneſs or infinity; for as before we were told it was a real eternal, not real poſitive, ſo over and above, we are done to wit, that 'tis an infinite not infinite: for 'tis ſuch an infinite as is cut in a trice into two halves, one paſt and the other to come. Now it being impoſſible that I ſhould give thus much to be the half of a thing, without I knew the whole were as much again, it follows that if I know how much the whole is, (and that I cannot but do, becauſe I am told what the half is,) then is this infinite, finite; for I who am finite can fathom it, and by my bounded knowledg of it, bound it; and yet again this finite is the meaſure to an hair of Gods infinity in abiding, who is boundleſly far and wide of me, and of my utmoſt knowledg. All which being dainties of too high a ſeaſoning, for my more homely underſtanding, I muſt leave them, with their Miche-good-do't-ye to the elder ſons of reliſh and ſhrewd fetches.

But ſecondly, if this ſame cleaving of Eternity in two (that is, into inward and outward) were yielded, we ſhould be ne're the p. 23nearer fadging for all that; for the concrete or inward everlaſtingneſs is ſaid to be the very exiſtence or eſſence (which as they do not differ to ſpeak of, ſo our Author mingles) of God himſelf, with the outward denomination taken from time gliding by. Now, though it ſeems harſh (to me at leaſt) that an outward denomination, ſhould come into the definition of an inward being, yet that the inward eſſence or exiſtence of God muſt nobe nakedly underſtood, is clear enough; for the naked eſſence of God is as much his all-knowingneſs, his all-fillingneſs, or his one-foldneſs, as his everlaſtingneſs; and that cannot be ſaid to be Gods everlaſtingneſs, which is as much ſomewhat elſe, as 'tis that. Gods everlaſtingneſs then is not Gods Being or Eſſence only, but Gods Eſſence everlaſting, or everlaſting God, or Gods Eſſence as 'tis to himſelf, or in himſelf endleſly abiding: as Gods knowledg is his Eſſence as to, or within himſelf all-knowing, his all-fillingneſs as to, or within himſelf filling all things. Now if all this be cleaveleſs or indiviſible, as is fairly yielded above; and of, and by it ſelf too, as, I think, may as fairly be hence gathered, to wit the externa aeternitas & immenſitas, or the everlaſting time and boundleſs roomthineſs, being utterly of themſelves without God, it would be a fooliſh blaſphemy or dirtying of p. 24God, not to yield that Gods inward everlaſtingneſs and boundleſneſs, may as well be without the outward, as they could be without the inward. Then, ſay I, after all this wheeling about, we are not a ſtep further than where we were; for Gods whole eternity rightly taken, and as 'tis to himſelf, is not ſucceſſive or growing on, but altogether, or one only everbeing now.

All that we have gotten by it is, a meaſure for it that is growing onward, as we have for his all-fillingneſs, another that may be ſundred. Now ſurely 'tis as hard to imagine, how that which is ſucceſſive and diviſible, as the outward are, ſhould be the meaſure of that which is permanent and indiviſible, as the inward is; as 'tis that that which is all at once, ſhould hold way with that which is on & on, or that that which is altogether ſhould hold out with that which has part and part; which is the huge non-ſence that is to be father'd upon the otherwiſe minded. And verily, for my ſhare, I cannot ſee why we may not have a yard or an ell of good-Angell, or a pound or an ounce of the foul fiend, as well as a ſucceſſive ſhare of Gods unſucceſſive everlaſtingneſs, or a diviſible piece of Gods indiviſible all-fillingneſs: but ſuch it ſeems may be had, if you knock at the right door; for meaſures that have fore and aft, and part p. 25and part, are the things, and the only things, by which 'tis meted out.

Beſides it carries a train of things after it, that are as hard to anſwer as eaſie to light upon. To name one for all; there being as many things to be known, as there are dotts or points in the outward immenſity; and as many new things to be known, as new minutes to be lived in, in the outward eternity; it will follow that Gods knowledg as well as his everlaſtingneſs is both diviſible and ſucceſſive: without we ſhould anſwer that God knows all that ſcope of points without retching out that his eſſence which is his knowledg; and all that chain of minutes, without any lengthening out of that his being which is his everlaſtingneſs; but then the new knack is quite ſplit, and we are no wiſer, nor ſpeak no more wonders, than the grey bearded men, that have gone before us.

But it being likely that that which beſpoke a kindneſs for this more hazardous by-road, was, becauſe the open way was lookt upon as more encumbred and leſs enlightned; that the charge may be ſhown, as leſs groundedly taken up, we ſhall give anſwer as far as we can, unto what has been laid before us under that head.

Among the hard ſayings then that we meet with, theſe come in chief; to wit, Page 384, p. 26The underſtanding cannot take it, how one nowſhould hold on with the whole runlong of all ages, any more than that one point ſhould be driven out to the utmoſt wideneſs of the whole World.

Page 386. Again, if everlaſtingneſs were cleaveleſs, nothing could be in any part of time, but it would be likewiſe whole everlaſtingneſs; the whole being in every leaſt of time.

Page 388. And further yet, it cannot be thought that two abidings or durations, to wit, time and everlaſtingneſs, ſhould be together and not be the ſame abiding; when inaſmuch as they are together they become one, as two rooms cannot be within one abutment, unleſs they be thereby clapt into one.

All which being of ſo near a kindred, we ſhall cramp them with this one inſtance, and that ſhall be one too, no farther from home than we our ſelves are from our ſelves: I mean that oneneſs that is between ſoul and body, as it makes up the being that is called man.

The ſoul is as cleaveleſs or indiviſible as a point of roomthineſs, or a now of time; and yet 'tis as much in every roomthy part of the body, all at once and altogether, as in the very leaſt: and if another mans underſtanding cannot take it, how a thing that has no parts, ſhould be every where at once, in a thing that has, the blame lies at the man, not p. 27in the thing, for we are as ſure that 'tis, as he can be that he don't underſtand it. Thus again the bone is as hard to pick, how a limb of the body ſhould not be as big as the whole, it being as big as the whole of that, which is full as much as the whole body, and in the mean time, the whole of the ſame too, is even with that which is but a limb of it. And another of the ſame is, that two abidings, that is to ſay, time and eternity, may be together and not be the ſame abiding, as well as the ſoul may be every where, where the body is ſtretched out, and yet it ſelf not be ſtretched out at all. But now either all this is true, or elſe the ſoul is as bulkie as the body, and as full of parts as it; or elſe as little as an atome, and ſo takes up only the leaſt room in it; both which are ſo eaſie to take off, that a few words will be enough to diſpatch them.

Page 297, & 300. First then, That the ſoul is not a Substance, body-like extended, for cloſeneſs indiviſible, for thinneſs penetrable, (which ſeems to be that draught of a ghoſt which our Author has ſome kindneſs for, and has both roundly helpt on and filled up) is thus to be made out.

'Tis given out that ghoſt, as well as the ſubſtance of body innerly, is ſuch a thing, as is alwaies the ſame, as much as God is; ſo that p. 28if you ſhift it, you quite and clean undo it. But now that ghoſtly being which enlivens the body of man, if it were ſtretched out with the body, would be as ſurely not the ſame, but ſhifted and changed, as the body it ſelf is: therefore we gather rightly it muſt not be co-extended with it at all. The reaſon of it in more words ſtands thus: the body is not only reeking out whole ſteams of little unſeen off-ſhoots, and taking to it as many more, but over and above 'tis taking in a daily minglement of bigger bodies, by what we eat and drink, which ſplicing in their little ſhives, within the croud of pieces that are clinging cloſe together, at once grow one with the body, and give further bigneſs to the body; and alſo, as it may happen, the body may be almoſt as much leſsned, by lopping off its branches, as 'twas bigned by the growing of its trunck. Now 'tis ask'd, does this extended ghoſt within the body biggen and leſſen with it, or does it not? The ſoul that I was quickned with at birth day, is the ſame that I am quickned with at this day, but the body that I have now is bigger than that which I had then: Is my ſoul bigned or is it not? If it be not, it reaches then only the leſſer ſhare of that body which I now have, the greater being ſoul-leſs; but if it be bigned, then 'tis not the ſame it was, any more than p. 29my body; nor to be ſure, is it ſo much the ſame, as God is, who is ſo the ſame as to be neither bigger nor leſs. Again, if I have an arm or a leg cut off, my body is leſsned; but I ask whether my ſoul be or not? If not, then have I forſooth ſome pieces of my ſoul jetting out of my body, ſome in it; and when I walk, that aſſignable, but indiviſible part of my ſoul, which was in my leg, comes ſhoveling after me, and that in my arm is ſwingling by me, in ſuch a ſhape of air, as takes up that room, that my leg and arm did, when limbs of my body; But if my ſoul does not thus featly ſtick out of my body, then it withdrew at the off-cut, and ſo my ſoul is not the ſame that 'twas before, but leſs. Beſides, when the ſoul draws back ſo, into what does it draw? Into it ſelf it cannot, for 'tis already ſo cloſe pack'd that it can be no cloſer; if it could be cloſer, it muſt be from ſome emptineſs within, but becauſe it muſt alwaies needs be brim full, there can be none, and if there were any ſuch, it might then be cut a pieces body-like; for, with thoſe that hold this, it ſeems the reaſon why an atome, as well as why a ghoſt, cannot be cloven, is nothing but becauſe it ſticks ſo cloſe together, that no emptineſs can come between; a thing being cleaveſome, not from its bulkineſs, but inward emptineſs mingled. Again, on the p. 30other hand, if the ſoul were as cloſe as it could be at firſt, (and ſo it muſt be, or elſe be out of kind,) then what it has put forth ſince of it ſelf, to keep even with the growth of the body, has left ſuch little emptineſſes within, (the body by waxing, having crack'd a many holes in it,) that 'tis now, at manhood, as like to be ſhorn in pieces as the body.

Secondly, If the Soul be not retched out with the body, but ſettles in ſome room whence it may beſt, by unknown reins, ſway the whole body; then 'tis ask'd, whether that room be cleaveleſs or not: If it be the Maw or Stomach, the whirl-pool of the ſpirits in the blood, the brain, the water of it, or the Glandula pinealis in it, (which ſome or other have ſet out for it,) they being all extended, the buſineſs would be the ſame as if 'twere in the whole body: If it be but in one atome or leaſting in the body, then a child would have more ſoul to its body than a man, and ſhould thence ſeem more a man, there being more atoms in the bigger than in the leſs body. Beſides the body being all over ſpending ſome and getting others, that atome in which the ſoul firſt lodg'd, may either ſhift rooms in the body, or quite ſlip out of it, as well as any others that do ſo; and ſo for ought I know, my ſoul was whilom in my head, and ſometime in my toe, and after at p. 31my fingers end, according as that atome in which it dwelt, chanced to be bounced about for elbow-room: and I may have been I know not how many men ſince I was born, according as that atome hapned to leave me, and another popped into its ſtead; I being I, no longer than I have that in me, in which my ſoul is.

From the whole then look'd back upon but wiſtly, it ſeems that Gods everlaſtingneſs may be all at once, or a beginningleſs endleſs now, and time that is ſucceſſive be together with it, without making that ſo; as well as our ſouls which are all together, may be every where, where the body is, without having parts, as that has: which latter, while we are fain to yield, it ſeems but unhandſome we ſhould make a boggle at the former.

Withall, it were not perhaps amiſs to remark, that a main thing which has put a cheat upon the underſtanding herein is this; When eternity is ſaid to be an everlaſting now, and immenſity as an every where cleaveleſneſs, ſome have been ſo hard with it, as to ſtrain from it what belongs to a now of time, and a leaſt of body: whereas both of them ſtanding off in their whole kind, 'tis impoſſible they ſhould hold together in ſome part; and ſeeing they ſo differ as things infinite and finite, 'tis impoſſible, the agreement that we make p. 32between them in words, ſhould be by making that which is everlaſting, the leaſt part of that, which is but a while laſting, and that which is beyond all bounds the leaſt ſhare of that little thing, which has bounds. That eternity therefore is called a now, and immenſity a thing indiviſible, hence 'tis, and hence only: to wit, every part of laſtingneſs beſides a now, is onwardly as well as bounded, and every part of bulk beſides the leaſt, is cleaveſome as well as bounded; now 'tis better to call them by words ſpeaking finite barely, which one thing they are not; than by words ſpeaking finite and ſucceſſive, or finite and diviſible, which two things we are ſure they are not; and though a point be the leaſt of boak, and a now the ſhorteſt of time, yet they may ſpeak everlaſtingneſs, and allfillingneſs, upon another ſcore, (as much as we can, that is, not as much as they ſhould,) for all their ſhorteſtneſs and leaſtneſs, as well as the longeſt or the biggeſt, if they could be brought in without other unfitneſſes; for neither of them would come any nearer to everlaſtingneſs, or everywhereneſs, than the ſhorteſt and the leaſt do; but would, to be ſure, be further off from them, by taking in more things which they have not, nor can have.

Therefore when our Author tells us (page 384.) of a now longer than Ages, and a being p. 33unretcht out, that ſhould be more than one that is, 'tis nothing to the buſineſs: for we only call Gods Everlaſtingneſs a now, to clear it of as many things as we can that would make it on and on, as things Time-laſting are; and Gods All-fillingneſs an altogether, to looſen it from any thing of ſunderſhip, which all extended Beings have: not but that one is boundleſly more than all the Nows of Time, and the other boundleſly more than all the Clefts of Body; but foraſmuch as we want words wherewith to name them what they are, we take thoſe that have leaſt to do with Time and Body, which they are not. In a word, Everlaſtingneſs is no more All at Once, as a Now of Time is, becauſe 'tis not thing enough to be a while, than it is it ſelf Timeſom; nor is All-fillingneſs any more unextended, as an Atome is, that is, becauſe 'tis not thing enough to be recht out, than it is it ſelf extended: but Everlaſtingneſs is quite another thing infinitely from what Time is, and the parts of Time are; and Every-whereneſs is quite another thing infinitely from what Bulk is, and the cleavings of Bulk are: But becauſe our mind gives us, that Time ſhould be liker to Eternity, and Bulk liker to Immenſity, than any other bounded things are, we chooſe the renableſt words belonging to the former, wherewith to ſet forth the latter.

p. 34Perhaps the underſtanding may draw ſomewhat nearer the thing as 'tis, by taking the next thing that ariſes from Soul, which is thinking, together with a next thing that ſtreams from Body, which is roomthyneſs; thoughtſomneſs ſetting full as cloſe to the very ſtamp or inmoſtneſs of a thinking Being, as boak or roomthyneſs does to the Being that is Bodyſom; ſo that if I would have bulk or roomthyneſs do any thing, it muſt be ſuch a thing for all the world as I would have Body do, & vice verſa, or heads and heels, ſo I may have it become big or little, ſhow of this or of that ſhape, ſtir or ſtand ſtill, becauſe theſe are things that I can have Body do: In like manner, if I would have Ghoſt do any thing, it muſt for all the world be ſuch another thing as I would have thought or thinking do, and on the other hand; for if every thing muſt do according as 'tis, thought being as much an inmate in the very heart of the thinking Being, as bulkineſs is in the very inſide of Body, it cannot be, but that that which is ſo much of Ghoſt in its Being, ſhould be very much ſo too in its doing; as outſtretchedneſs which is ſo much of Body, does as much like Body. If then I would have thought to be here or there, in a great thing or in a little, it muſt do theſe things the neareſt that can be to p. 35what a Ghoſt would do about them; now I find my thoughts are here and there, without moving hither and thither Body-like, and in a great thing or a ſmall one, without being great or ſmall themſelves; and thence I think I may freely gather, that Ghoſt would do ſo too, which is of all things in the world the next to it, and the root of it: Inſomuch, that as there may dwell as many thoughts upon Regiomontanuſes Fly, or Tredeskins chain'd Flea, as upon a Firſt-rate Kings man of War, or the greateſt Hall-place of the greateſt Keiſar, (while thoughts being off in their whole kind from the works of Handycrafts, they muſt needs be off too from what befalls them as ſuch); ſo there may be likewiſe as much Soul in the ſhaplings or tiny keeles of the great Malpighiuſes eggs within the ſix hours ſetting, as was in the foul ſtalking lundging body of that og of Baſhan, at the utmoſt bulk to which the Rabbins have beſwoln him: And, to end, as much of Gods Everlaſtingneſs in the ſhorteſt now, as in the longſomneſs of a thouſand years, and as much of his All-fillingneſs in the least of bodies, as in the greateſt throng of them: for why, much and little, ſhort and long are no more akin to Ghoſt or what holds to it, than thinking is to Body or its belongers; it being as likely to take the ſcantling of a ſtone by a p. 36chain made of thought after thought, which only haunt the ghoſt of a thinking Being, as to take the meaſure of Gods All-fillingneſs from bulk or extention, which ſticks as cloſe to Body.

But there comes up another Argument by the by, which may happily at firſt bluſh ſeem to have more tiew in it than all the ſtands we have met with hitherto, and that is in ſhort thus.

P. 383. Suppoſe God ten thouſand years ago to have made a world, and then to have unmade it, and after to have made this, or (which is all one) ſuppoſe this to be benothing'd, and ſome ten thouſands of years hence another to be made; Now if there were not time between them, there would be one upon the nick of another, when yet we have ſuppoſed a long while betwixt them; And if there would be time between them, then we are quite broke, inaſmuch as time may then be unmade, and of it ſelf, without timeſom Beings.

To which the anſwer is, firſt: If it were not eaſier to take up things upon truſt, than to frame Arguments, we had never been ſurprized with this which hangs ſo ill together: For to ſuppoſe God before any thing elſe was made to make ſomething, and then to unmake all that he had made, and leave nothing as he found nothing, and yet to leave ten p. 37thouſand years or ſome ten thouſands; is to ſuppoſe God to leave nothing, and yet to leave ſomething: for ten thouſand years, or ſome ten thouſands, are, in my mind, as much ſomething as the other were that were made nothing; and I believe it would hold any man as many thouſand years as there are years in the thouſands, to bring it but cleverly off, how ten thouſand years between ſhould not be time between, or how ten thouſand years ſhould not be ten thouſand years.

But taking it for granted that we ſhall be bated the ſuppoſition in this unweildy draught of words, and only be brought to this ſtreight or dead lift, whether if God ſhould make a world, and a while after annihilate or make it nothing, and again ſhould make another, and ſometime after benothing that likewiſe, and laſtly, ſhould over and above make a third World, would there be Time between theſe made or unmade Worlds? and would one be before or after the other, or would they not?

To this we anſwer round-dealing-wiſe, There would be no Time at all between them, nor would one be before the other or after the other, nor, in any other meaning than as they are in Gods Everlaſtingneſs, would they be together. The reaſon of this p. 38ſhort anſwer ſtands thus: There being nothing but everlaſting God beſides them, in whom there is nothing of timeſom onwardneſs, nor ground upon which to faſten fore and aft, there can be no ſuch thing as Time, or fore, or aft, at all. And we are withal to know, that the ground why we give afterneſs to ſome things in the World, is from the things that were former, ſo as until we come at a firſt; and formerneſs to other things, from the things that will be afterward, ſo as until we come to a laſt; inſomuch as ſome things, even in this World, may not be fore and aft, but only fore or aft: the firſt thing in the world that was made being after nothing, for why, nothing was before it; and the laſt thing in the world that ſhall be unmade, being before nothing, becauſe there ſhall be nothing after it: as what we gave anſwer about, and namely, the whole world now in being, is neither before nor after; becauſe there is nothing beſides but God, of whom it cannot be rightly ſaid, he was before or will be after, but that he alwayes is.

If this ſhould come unlookt for to the Readers underſtanding, it will may-hap ſeem more kindly further on, when we come to ſtrengthen it with an anſwer of the ſame ſort, about its twin-brother, outworldiſh emptineſs.

p. 39The little that is yet behind, is the anſwer that our Author would fain give to that moſt unanſwerable Argument againſt a ſucceſſive and diviſible everlaſtingneſs, and everywhereneſs; to wit, Whether the parts of it be finite or infinite?

Which with him is twofold, 1. Enough or abundantly, 2. More than enough, or ſuperabundantly: Enough, by acknowledging that it cannot be anſwered at all, (p. 402.) And then over and above, to that hard ſaying, Finite put to finite can't make infinite he ſays, A ſet number cannot indeed, yet nothing with-holds, but that from an infinite tale of finites there may at length ariſe an infinite, as who ſhould ſay, from an infinite twenty or twenty one, there ſhould ſtart up an infinite: what you will; for every number being even or odd as thoſe are, there is not a pin to chooſe whether you take one of them or ſome other; that muſt be as even or as odd to the full as one of them is, and that at the laſt be ſuch a number as you may put one more to unto all Eternity, or be a numberleſs number, or a number which is not a number, which is the very pith, and marrow, and heart, and ſtrength of a fineneſs. And, as to the back door that belongs to this, which is, that The number by which we are to tell the finites that go to the making up of an infinite, p. 40is beyond the numbers of Arithmetick, without all iffs & ands 'tis the very twin-trangham of a figure beyond all the figures in Geometry; both which are to be underſtood by no other thing in the world, but the own dear ſweet friend of them, yeleped reaſon beyond the reaſon of Logick.

But becauſe the main Caſtleward to ſhrowd theſe weaklings from blows and qualmes, is no other, but its fellow Fierdhalf nothing call'd ſpace or roomthineſs; which, that 'tis every way infinite, (though made up all of finites,) is ſaid to be as clear as the cleareſt thing in the world, (pag. 403): and it being as clear to us that 'tis not ſo, but bounded as well as Time, we are, when it comes in our way, to lay down reaſons; which, ſo much as they will make for that, ſo much will they make againſt this.

Now having thus far unbenighted ourſelvs, and clear'd our way in the foregoing from all that lumber that could hitherto be ſtumbled on, 'tis hoped we may have leave to ſettle Gods whole Everlaſtingneſs, as untimeſom, and altogether unbeclogg'd with onwardneſs; and as for any other of the name that ſhould be outward, that the ſame is altogether nothing but the airineſs of thinking: and withal, that Time and timeſom Beings, this time-laſting World, and every while-being p. 41thing in it, is neither early nor late, as the ken is taken of it by God Almighty; but that earlineſs and lateneſs ſticks to the things made, as made and not being unbeginningly, and ſo is only a tang, that all timeſom things have among themſelves, and cannot be reliſht by that everlaſting Being that made them, any more than we can reliſh his Everlaſtingneſs; but all the things that are early or late to us, are alwayes now to him.

Which is the firſt undertaking, in the ſorting of things, ſo as our underſtandings might beſt come at them, that is, by laying them as near as we can to the underſtanding of that Being, who is ſo all Mind as to be nothing Body: whence we have ſeen how the laſtingneſs of the World and made things, bears it ſelf to ſuch a Being; which was the uppermoſt thing, the mind was like to ſtart, in its thoughts about them.