Bulk and Selvage of the World, Chapter 1
CHAP. I.
WHoever in good earneſt betakes himſelf to the ſcanning of bodies, one and other, as they lie in the whole bulky throng of this World, either as to their kinds of being or wonts of working, will find nothing that the mind at freedom is readier to faſten upon, likelier to be loſt in, or, as to the knowledg of other things, be checkt or ſtifled by, than thoſe two puzling things, the maximum quantum and the minimum; how far a body may be biggened by putting to it, or leſſened by taking from it: the one loſing it ſelf in ſpatio imaginario, the other in puncto Mathematico. Now I have been thinking, there is ſo much of kindred between the two riddles, that if but one of them were rightly made out to mans underſtanding, the other would thence, as well gain ſomewhat of more light, as give back ſomewhat for further ſetling, and withal a fairer way would be made for the mind to buſie it ſelf about all thoſe beings that lie far and wide between them.
Wherein to attach other mens reaſonings of weakneſs, or to ſing Mattins and Evenſong to my own foreign, by a ſort of big and lofty ſtrains, is none of my buſineſs, only I would beg leave to ſay, that what I have met with from the pens and tongues of learned men hereabout, have left me altogether in the dark, whatever light others may thence have gathered, and that what I have hit upon as to this affair, and am now about to ſet down, has ſet my own mind ſo far at freedom, that I was not altogether given to miſtruſt, but it might ſomewayes alſo be helpful, to the ſetting right the thoughts of ſome others. Methought then that the anſwerings or analogies of beings, have been hitherto but ill pitcht or adjuſted, and that thoſe things that right reaſon and a wiſdom above us, had evened out into ranks and kindreds by themſelves, have been unhappily hudled and broken by the mind of man; and that other things wide enough off as to their Births and ſeats in the world, have been unkindly brought together by our leſs wary way of thinking, beſides a great many things which are either begotten by the underſtanding, working upon the draughts or idea's of things that ſenſe has to do with, or elſe do ariſe from the anſwerings or habitudes that the things of the World bear to the make of mankind, are haſtily forethought to have ſuch a kind of being in analogia mundi, as they ſeem to have in analogia noſtri. Whereupon things being either lodged in the mind, that have no dwellings in the world, or otherwiſe ſhaped, linkt, or laid, than they are in the world, it falls out that things that are not, are reckoned as if they were, or things that are, are reckoned otherwiſe than they are.
Thus a right underſtanding having bound up Moral beings, with their belongers, in one bundle, and Metaphyſical with theirs, in another, by the too forward working of the mind of man, the bond has been looſned and a medly made to the everlaſting ſhackling of that head or queſtion, Praeſtat non eſſe quam miſerum eſſe, for although it be as clear, as that which is cleareſt, that, ſo laid down, 'tis a known truth, yet Durandus's Argument will ſtand unanſwered till Doomſday, to wit, that which takes away the greater good, is the greater evil, but not being does ſo, for it takes away the good of well-being and the good of being both. This Mr. Barlow grants but with a Suppoſitâ ſemper ſubjecti duratione. But in my mind that anſwer is not of the ſame piece with the learnedneſs of the reſt; for 'tis not askt, whether to Peter not being Peter it be evil to be endleſly wretched? but whether to Peter, being Peter, it be not worſe to loſe his good of well-being and his good of being too, than to loſe but one of them? which is no worſe way of ſpeaking than what our bleſſed Lord ſpake of another of the twelve, *foreign. comparativè.Better had it been for that man, if he had not been born. Now he that grants bonum entis or eſſentiae to be the object of the will: that is, bonum Metaphyſicum to be bonum Morale, has ſhut himſelf out from anſwering, even for evermore: but give but to each good its right, and the thing is at an end; for bonum entis not being bonum Morale, any more than verum entis, which a lie may have, is verum Morale, knit unto malum Miſeriae a moral evil, and ſo laid before the will, 'tis eaſie enough to foretel where the choice will be: And that theſe two goods are wide enough aſunder, is clear, for why? Non bonum, that is, non ens Metaphyſicum, may be as truly bonum Morale, and ſo the darling of the will, as what is moſt of all ſo. Thus the not being of the world it ſelf, before all worlds, till it had a being, was as truly good, and ſo the object of the will of him that made it, as its ſelf ſame being when it began to be.
Thus again by the blending of Ens Phyſicum with Ens Morale, another queſtion about the thing that ſin is, has been as much rufled and darkned as any whatſoever; for though it has been made out, as heretofore, ſo moreover of late, by no mean hands, to be Ens poſitivum, yet moſt well-knowing men have been wary of ſpeaking it out, for fear they ſhould allot God Almighty a ſhare in it, he being the maker of every poſitive being; whereas, if I do not much miſ-think at leaſt, though God Almighty be the Maker of every being that is Phyſically ſo, it follows not that he is the ſame of each being that is Morally ſo: 'tis enough that God is the maker of the power to do evil, (which being good, may therefore ſpring from him) not of the things that are ſo done, ſo as from them he ſhould take name: thus 'tis moſt ſure, that a non ens Phyſicum may be a moral good; a Jews naked not doing buſineſs on his Reſt-day, had as truly Being in it, as the doing the other works of the day, for why? as truly good; and if God ſhould will me not to be, my not being, and willingneſs not to be Phyſically, would be as much Being, becauſe as much good Morally, as my very being alive and willingneſs to be ſo, worſhipping God whilſt ſo. A natural being leaves off to be ſo, when it no longer abides in the World; but a moral being skills not the world, but is ſuch only from its cloſing with, or ſwerving from the Law 'tis laid to; whilſt 'tis, it is indeed nothing in the World, nor is any thing elſe of it ſelf, rightly ſpeaking, unleſs it takes up room there. Had there been as much of the will of God, as there might be of the will of man, in thoſe two odd wiſhes, of two holy hearts, in the holieſt of Books, blotting out of the Book of God would have been a good, and accurſedneſs from Chriſt, a bleſſedneſs. For then a being grows up to its full ripe happineſs, when it fully reaches all that bliſs, which God aims at, for its utmoſt good; which whether it abides Phyſically or not, is neither here nor there, it being a weakneſs of underſtanding to ſay, that a made being is more happy in its natural life, which God wills not, than in its being nothing when God wills it ſo: for then either we could never have bin fully happy, unleſs we were as well from everlaſting, as to it; or at leaſt, thoſe that go to heaven at the end of the World, would not be ſo bliſsful as thoſe that went in the beginning, the former having an happy being, while the latter had neither happineſs nor being; whereas both ſtanding even in the love of God, they ſhould do ſo too, in their own bliſs. I think we do reſpect or look towards Gods glory, and our own happineſs more, by what we have in us of Ens morale, than by what we have of Ens Phyſicum.
Notwithſtanding all which there would follow nothing to make us think that ſin ſhould be any whit long of God; for why, all that he does towards it, is, to leave us to our ſelves to bring it forth if we will; and inſtead of driving on to it as a fellow helper or procatarctick cauſe, he draws from it, and towards the good, with unſpeakable endearments of woing, and drives from it, by forbidding the evil, with all that earneſtneſs of threatning, that may beget in man the utmoſtneſs of dread; nor is he any nearer the Phyſical cauſe of it, than to give that good power, which is not the cauſe at all, as it looks towards him, for by giving this power he is at the ſame time the evil thing is done, as much the cauſe of the gainſtanding good that is not done; now if he be no more the cauſe of it, than he is of that which is not at all, then he is not the cauſe at all.
Beſides this power is not only good, but alſo needful, for though the fulfilledneſs or perfection of the will in the next life, will not be in a ſtanding at jar, and wavering alike towards good and evil, but only in a ſelf-willingneſs to good, yet in this life, I think it mainly does, and muſt; for this is a life of doing, or believing, as it looks on to reward in that to come: that, a lie of rewarding, as it looks back to doing or believing here. Now if we do but allow God to deal with us, who are reaſonable beings, in wayes bearing an evenlineſs with our kind, as he does with lower beings in wayes agreeable to theirs; then muſt he needs beſtow upon us this freedom to ſin that we are ſpeaking of; for it ſeems not ſo much of right reaſon to reward that in man, which though he did willingly, yet he could not for his life do otherwiſe, leaſt then a ſtock or a ſtone ſhould put in too for reward, for its deeds of kind, which it does not unwillingly, but yet muſt needs do. In like manner Heaven being a life, not of earning wages, but of taking pay, 'tis enough there, for the freedom of the will to ſtand alone in ſpontaneitate ad bonum, or ſelf-willingneſs to good.
Hence likewiſe we are in a fair way to anſwer that thread-bare Queſtion, which did ſo much gravel the ungoſpel'd world; to wit, foreign; For inaſmuch as ſin is a moral thing, we are well enough on't if we can but track it up to a ſpring of its kind, without looking after any other riſte: Now unbounded wiſdom and goodneſs having laid out endleſs happineſs as reward for obedience, and the ſame wiſdom and rightwiſeneſs allotted endleſs wretchedneſs as puniſhment for ſin; without this obedience there could be no heaven, without ſin no Hell; and without a power not to do, in both, there could be neither. So then, that God may have leave to make man happy for holineſs, man muſt needs have power to make himſelf wretched for ſin. That evil ſhould alwayes flow from evil in a chain of breeders, is a great miſ-underſtanding; for as fire ariſes from that which is no fire, by a ſmart ſtroke upon a flint, ſo evil ſprings from that which is not evil, by a croſs blow given the Law.
If it be gainſaid, Then man may thank himſelf too for all the good he does, that being as much long of him as the other, while the thing done forbears to be denominated from God, at the freeneſs of the power in man: and ſo to make God not the ſpring or Author of good, would be much at one with the making of him the Author of evil.
I anſwer, it follows not; For in the firſt place, of all the good that man does, God is ſtill the Moral cauſe, egging on to it by all thoſe ſweetneſſes of entreaty, that the will can any way be wrought upon by; and though mans being free to it, makes it his deed (at ſecond hand at leaſt) both which, even holy writ and reaſon ſpeak aloud; yet inaſmuch as the ſtream of goodneſs, by the putting forth of freeneſs, is not damm'd up, but left to run on to the thing done: and again the ſame Almighty hand that barely upheld while ſin was done, does over and above further the thing that good is, by enlightning the mind, renewing the will, healing the ſpring in man, of that a…l which inbred ſin had brought upon it, and in a word making it every way more it ſelf; God muſt be more an owner there than man, and thence the thing done falls in with the divine will, becauſe it flow'd from divine goodneſs; all that which is good in man by way of off-ſpring, being ſo in God by way of well-ſpring.
Once more by the medly of Ens Mathematicum and Phyſicum, the Queſtion De compoſitione continui, or the making up of a bulky being, has been overwhelmed and loſt in the fineneſſes of words, and the airineſs of tattle, beyond all helps of freedom to a right underſtanding; whereas by dealing the dole evenly between both, we hope, further on, to make it likely at leaſt, that the doctrine of atoms is not wound up in thoſe darkneſſes that ſome mens underſtandings have may-hap over-weened.
And laſtly, whereas Ens Phyſicum or naturale, is either materiale, or immateriale, body and ghoſt or body and not body, by bewedding to body the things that belong to ghoſt, or bringing over to ghoſt, or that which is not body, the things cleaving unto body, the bulkineſs of the world, the buſineſs of motion, the emptineſs beyond the world, the all-fillingneſs of God, the hereneſſes and thereneſſes of ghoſts, have been too much interwoven and twiſted together, even to the bewildring of our cloſeſt and beſt weighed thoughts about them.
Beſides our very way of thinking upon bodies, or drawing their likeneſſes upon our ſouls, from the unluckineſs of thoſe pipes and ſuckers, through which we have fetcht them, have drunk in ſuch a tang of maniſhneſs, or a mingle mangle of half man, half world together, that 'tis uneaſie to ſay, what things a body has from us, and what it has from him that made it.
Now by giving to the above-named what is their own of right, and taking from them, what we have given them in wrong, as far as is belonging to what we have before us, is that which we have undertaken, to the utmoſt of our ſcantling, at leaſt, to be all along moſt heedfull of, and whence alſo we look for more light and eaſe to betide the underſtanding, than from the giving way to ſuch unkindly minglings as we have blamed before.