The Remains of John Corbet, Section 10 – Section 18
§ 10. Of Certainty upon Humane Teſtimony.
HUmane Teſtimony, as ſuch, is not a ground of Certainty ſtrictly ſo called, but at the moſt only of the above mentioned conjectural Certainty, that excludes anxiety and fluctuation of mind, but not all apprehenſion that the thing may be otherwiſe. Even the teſtimony of the beſt and wiſeſt of mortal men, can riſe no higher, becauſe there is no mortal man but may deceive, or be deceived.
Upon the ſame reaſon that any one man, or number of men, may deceive, every man, and all men may deceive. Wherefore as the bare teſtimony of one man, or a ſmall number of men by it ſelf conſidered, is not the ground of ſtrict Certainty; ſo neither the teſtimony of any multitudes, or all men by it ſelf conſidered, or meerly as a teſtimony by way of its proper authority.
Nevertheleſs with the teſtimony of men there may go along ſuch rational evidence, as may aſcertain the truth of it in the matter teſtified, and make it unqueſtionable. And then it is a ground of ſtrict Certainty; not formally and abſtractly, as a teſtimony; but as accompanied with the ſaid Rational evidence.
This Rational evidence accompanying humane teſtimony, and making it the ground of ſtrict Certainty, is, when there is an impoſſibility evident in Reaſon, that the Witneſſes or Reporters ſhould deceive, or be deceived. He that never ſaw Rome, or Conſtantinople, or Aſia, Africa, or America, hath ſtrict Certainty, that thoſe Cities, and thoſe parts of the world have been in being, from the Reports of thoſe that have ſeen them; for it is impoſſible in reaſon that all the Reporters ſhould deceive or be deceived.
Tho it be poſſible that all the Reporters, conſidered merely as ſo many particular perſons, may lye (for if any one may, all may in that conſideration) yet it is impoſſible that they being ſuch multitudes of ſeveral nations, of ſeveral ages, of ſeveral conditions, and ſo of ſeveral intereſts and inclinations, ſhould lye or deceive without detection; for there is no poſſible ſufficient cauſe of ſuch undetected lye; and we know there can be no effect without a ſufficient cauſe.
If it be ſaid, It is mo… …n we know what ſufficient cauſe there may be: it is anſwered, That any ſuch cauſe is, is beyond humane imagination to aſſign; and ſurely this is enough to ſatisfie that there is none. If there be any ſufficient cauſe of ſuch an undetected lye, it muſt be either a univerſal combination of all the Reporters to deceive, and that combination muſt be held conſtantly; but this is impoſſible: or elſe a concurrent inclination and impulſe in all the Reporters to lye, which is unimaginable, and can have no ſufficient cauſe.
Likewiſe if it be ſuppoſed poſſible that any one perſon through the deception of the ſenſes may be deceived in a matter of fact of palpable evidence; yet it is impoſſible (ſuppoſing our faculties to be true) that all the Reporters ſhould be deceived in matters ſo palpable, as that there is day and night; that there is a Countrey called France, Italy, Greece, &c. for they could not all be mad or ſenſleſs. Or if this were poſſible in reſpect of the humane created nature; yet it cannot be conceived without blaſphemy, that God ſhould govern the World by ſuch an univerſal and perpetual deception of the ſenſes.
Now whether this be ſaid to be naturally or morally impoſſible, it comes to one paſs, and gives equal certainty of the teſtimony from the impoſſibility of the contrary part. Beſides, our Arguing ſhews it impoſſible in the reaſon or nature of the thing.
§ 11. Of the nature of Infallibility.
THE nature, and grounds, and ſubject of Certainty being conſidered, I come to conſider of Infallibility, which one ſort of men lay claim unto without warrant, and ſome others without reaſon explode, as a thing tranſcending all created underſtandings, tho they grant a kind of Certainty: as the one by uſurped authority impoſe upon mens belief in the matter of Religion, which is mans higheſt concernment; ſo the other take away or leſſen that ſecurity of the mind, which is reaſonably required in ſo great a matter, and give too great advantage to the pretenders on the other extream.
The term infallible may be taken firſt in a paſſive ſignification, and then it is that which cannot be deceived: And ſo it may be applied either to the propounder, or to the believer of a truth. It may alſo be taken in an active ſignification, for that which duplicate page duplicate page duplicate page duplicate page cannot deceive; and ſo it may be applied to the propounder, as alſo to the truth it ſelf propoſed, and …o the evidence thereof, as in our Engliſh Tranſlation, Act. 1.3. by many infallible proofs, that is evidence that could not deceive.
Infallibility as aſcribed to the propounder or believer of a truth, is ſubjective infallibility; as aſcribed to the truth propounded, or the evidence thereof, it is objective infallibility, which ſignifies no more than that the thing cannot be falſe, and cannot objectively deceive. Now if there may be objective, there may be alſo ſubjective infallibility. If there be truth and an evidence of truth that cannot be falſe, then an underſtanding apprehending that truth as it is, cannot be deceived therein, nor can deceive in propounding the ſame to others: Beſides, objective infallibility is an inſignificant thing in reference to an underſtanding uncapable of infallibility. An object is denominated infallible with reſpect to the underſtanding to which it is or may be propounded, as not to be deceived in it.
§ 12. Of Infallibility which is hypothetical and limited, and that which is abſolute and unlimited.
INFALLIBILITY therefore denoting an impoſſibility of being deceived, and of deceiving, inquire we into the ſubject to whom it doth belong. Some ſay an impoſſibility of being deceived belongs only to an infinitely perfect underſtanding. We muſt diſtinguiſh between an impoſſibility of being deceived, that is abſolute and unlimited, and that which is hypothetical and limited. I grant that an abſolute impoſſibility of being deceived belongs not to a finite underſtanding. And no aſſerter of infallibility in the creature, intended the former, but the latter kind.
Hypothetical and limited impoſſibility of being deceived, may belong to a finite, and in particular, to a humane underſtanding, and it is that which ſuppoſeth a full revelation natural or ſupernatural to the ſubject in whom it is, and is limited to the truth ſo revealed; and this hypothetical infallibility doth not reſt barely upon the perfection of the humane nature, but upon this principle, That God is true in his revelations both natural and ſupernatural, and that he doth not govern the world by falſhoods. Now this is proper infallibility: For upon this principle I am not only ſure that I am not deceived; but alſo that I cannot be deceived as to the particular truths ſo evident to me; or to ſpeak it plainer, it cannot be that I am therein deceived, for it were a contradiction.
Moreover, that which is certain, is ſo upon neceſſary grounds, and therefore cannot be falſe. And he that knows it to be certain, knows it upon thoſe neceſſary grounds, and conſequently that it cannot be falſe; and this is to know it infallibly. If we know nothing infallibly, we know nothing either as neceſſary, or as impoſſible, whether abſolutely, or hypothetically.
§ 13. Of ſtated or permanent Infallibility, and that which is but pro tempore.
IT hath been ſhewed, that an underſtanding that is not abſolutely or by the perfection of its nature infallible, may be ſecured from poſſibility of miſtake; and an underſtanding that is not univerſally infallible, may be ſecured from poſſibility of miſtakes, and ſo be infallible in certain caſes, and to certain intents.
Now it is further to be noted, That there may be a ſtated or permanent Infallibility, and that which is but temporary. The former did belong to the eſtabliſhed Prophets of the Lord in their declarations to his people, and to the Apoſtles of Chriſt in matters pertaining to their Apoſtolical Commiſſion for eſtabliſhing the Religion and Churches of Chriſt. Alſo upon ſuppoſition of the Saints perſeverance, it belongs to all true Chriſtians as to the Eſſentials of Chriſtianity.
The temporary Infallibility belongs to ſuch perſons as receive the Viſions of God, or are divinely inſpired, not ſtatedly, but occaſionally, at ſome particular time or times; as among holy men, Zacharias, John Baptiſts Father, Gideon, the Parents of Sampſon; among the unholy, Balaam in his Propheſies before Balaac; and Saul, who ſometime was found prophecying.
§ 14. The Infallibility of a finite Ʋnderſtanding, further cleared.
IT is granted by the deniers of Infallibility, That that which is true, is not poſſible to be falſe. And thence I infer, If I know it to be true, I know it is not poſſible to be falſe, and ſo I infallibly know it. And my aſſent to a truth (as for inſtance to the Chriſtian Faith) cannot poſſibly be falſe.
Some that ſay, an impoſſibility of being deceived, belongs only to an infinitely perfect underſtanding, do grant that an underſtanding liable to be deceived, may not be deceived, and be ſure that he is not. And I infer thereupon, that he cannot be deceived in that particular aſſent: I mean not that he cannot ſimply, but in that ſtate and circumſtances, wherein he is put, he cannot be deceived therein; and that he knows he cannot, becauſe he knows it implies a contradiction that he ſhould be deceived in that wherein he is ſure that he is not deceived: For if I may be deceived in ſuch an apprehenſion or aſſent, not only ſimply, but all circumſtances being put, I cannot be ſure that I am not deceived therein.
Likewiſe thoſe that ſay an impoſſibility of being deceived belongs only to an infinitely perfect underſtanding, do grant, that a man cannot be deceived in that thing, with the belief whereof God inſpires him, and gives him ſuch evidence thereof as cannot be falſe. Now this is a conceſſion of hypothetical and limited inſallibility to humane underſtanding: For it is here acknowledged, that there may be ſuch evidence of divine inſpiration, as cannot be falſe: And indeed I take it for a repugnancy in nature, that God ſhould inſpire the belief of a falſhood. Nevertheleſs a man divinely inſpired is not ſimply infallible in his apprehenſion of divine inſpiration; for he may ſometime be deceived in thinking he is ſo inſpired, when he is not.
Thus it being evident, that an underſtanding, that is not ſimply infallible in a matter, may in the ſtate and circumſtances wherein he is put, be therein infallible; I think it better to explain and limit the term and notion of infallibility in the humane underſtanding, than wholly to reject it. But howſoever, they that reject or diſlike it, do grant and contend for a ſufficiently certrin evidence of truth; and I will not quarrel if that will ſerve for infallibility.
And they will alſo grant, that they who are not immediately inſpired of God, have ſufficiently certain evidence in reaſon to the diſcerning and chuſing of infallible guides that are immediately inſpired.
§ 15. Whether Infallibility admit of degrees, and in what reſpect.
EVery truth is equally impoſſible to be falſe; for all things that imply a contradiction, are equally, becauſe utterly impoſſible.
All are alike infallible in that, wherein they are infallible; and therein they cannot be more infallible, becauſe therein it is utterly impoſſible that they ſhould be deceived, and ſo it cannot be more impoſſible than it is already.
Nevertheleſs there are different degrees of evidence for being infallible in ſuch or ſuch a matter. Likewiſe there are different degrees of clear apprehenſion of being infallible; and ſo the ſure knowledg of being infallible admits of degrees That knowledg that is ſufficiently certain, may be advanced to be abundantly certain; and that which is abundant, may be advanced to yet more abundant.
Whereupon I conclude, that though infallibility in its formal reaſon admits of no degrees, yet there are different degrees of the evidence, and the clear apprehenſion thereof.
Moreover infallibility is in a more noble and perfect ſtate in one ſubject, than in another. And ſo the infallibility of a ſuperior intellect, as that of Angels, is in a more perfect and excellent, than the hypothetical, and the unlimited than the limited.
In the ſame ſubject infallibility may be in a more perfect ſtate at one time than another, according to the riſing or falling of the evidence thereof.
§ 16. Of the Infallibility of Senſe.
THAT which is agreeable to ſenſe rightly circumſtantiated, is impoſſible to be falſe; and that which is repugnant to ſence rightly circumſtantiated, is impoſſible to be true. For that the one ſhould be falſe, and that the other ſhould be true, implies a contradiction, ſuppoſing the ſenſitive faculty to be true. And if the ſenſitive faculties be not true, it infers that impious and abſurd opinion, that God cannot or will not govern the material world but by falſhood.
The Popiſh opinion of Tranſubſtantiation, is no deception of the ſenſe, but of the underſtanding; for they that have perſuaded themſelves to believe it, do not ſay they ſee, or taſt, or feel Chriſts body and blood, but acknowledg what they ſee, feel, and taſt, to be the accidents of the bread and wine, which they ſay remains after Tranſubſtantion. Wherefore the impoſing is not upon the ſenſes, but upon the underſtanding, which ought to judg by ſenſe of matters, that are the proper objects of ſenſe.
§ 17. Of Infallibility of Reaſon.
IF Senſe may be the ſubject of Infallibility, why may not the Underſtanding be ſo, which is a more excellent Faculty in the kind of perception or knowledg?
If the Underſtanding be the ſubject of Certainty, why not alſo of infallibility in that limited ſenſe, as hath been before explained? The proper object of Certainty is not that which may or may not be, but that which muſt be, or which is known to be ſuch.
An indubitable Certainty is acknowledged; and from an indubitable Certainty properly ſo called, I think a good inference is made unto an infallible Certainty. To be indubitable in a matter, is to be ſure that I am not therein deceived. And I cannot rationally be ſure that I am not deceived, unleſs I am ſure that it cannot be, that the thing be otherwiſe than I apprehend. And if I am ſure that it cannot be otherwiſe than I apprehend, I am as to that particular infallible.
Becauſe men in their moſt confident perſuaſions are commonly deceived by prejudice, from paſſion, intereſt, education, and the like; it follows not, that none can be ſecure from deception; that is, to know that it cannot be that they ſhould be deceived in ſuch or ſuch a matter. Certainly an impartial and unbiaſſed judgment may be found.
§ 18. Logical, Phyſical, Moral, and Theological Concluſiſions, as well as Mathematical, admit of demonſtrative Evidence.
UPON the foregoing enquiries, I judg it very diſadvantageous to the cauſe of Religion, to ſpeak, as ſome do, of a lower evidence for it than demonſtration, and ſuch as the matter is capable of; whereas I ſuppoſe there is not ſurer and clearer Evidence for any thing, than for true Religion.
Not only Mathematical, but Logical, Phyſical, Moral and Theological Concluſions, admit of demonſtrative evidence.
Whereas ſome ſay, the exiſtence of God is not Mathematically demonſtrable, becauſe only Mathematical matter admits ſuch kind of evidence; if it be meant of that ſpecial evidence that is in the Mathematicks, it is nothing to the purpoſe; but if it be meant of evidence in general, as demonſtrative as Mathematical evidence, it is falſe: for this Truth admits the cleareſt and ſtricteſt demonſtration.
This Propoſition, That God is, is demonſtrative in the ſtricteſt ſenſe by a demonſtration a poſteriori, viz of the neceſſary cauſe from the effect; it being evident, that the exiſtence of God is abſolutely neceſſary to the exiſtence of the World, for that we cannot attribute the being of the Phanomena or viſible things in the world, to any other cauſe than ſuch a Being as we conceive God to be, but we muſt offer violence to our own faculties.
This Propoſition, That every word of God ſhall be fulfilled according to the true and full intent of it, is demonſtrative in the ſtricteſt ſenſe a priori, from the veracity of God; it being as evident that God is true, as that he is.
As the Exiſtence, ſo the Attributes of God have demonſtrative Evidence, unleſs you had rather call them indemonſtrable principles, as having the greateſt ſelf-evidence.
From the Eſſence and Attributes of God, and mans dependance on him, and relation to him, Moral and Theological Truths of demonſtrative evidence are inferred, as touching Gods moral law, the good of conformity, and the evil of inconformity thereunto, and a juſt retribution to men, according to that difference.