The Remains of John Corbet, Section 2 – Section 9
§ 2. Of Moral Certainty.
LEarned men have diſtinguiſhed Certainty into Moral, Natural, and Supernatural. Moral Certainty is by ſome ſet forth to be an undoubted aſſent upon ſuch grounds as are fit fully to ſatiſfy a prudent man Natural Certainty is an aſſent upon ſuch grounds as ſhew, that in nature the thing cannot be otherwiſe than it is apprehended. Supernatural Certainty is an aſſent upon indubitable ſupernatural evidence.
As to the aforeſaid deſcription of Moral Certainty by an undoubted aſſent upon ſuch grounds as are fit fully to ſatisfie a prudent man I conceive it to be not clear enough. For if the grounds upon which the undoubted aſſent is built, be in their own nature and reaſon firm and ſure, then that aſſent is natural Certainty. Indeed I find Moral Certainty ſet forth by others, as that which excludes not only heſitation and anxiety, but all apprehenſion that the thing may be otherwiſe, which they call formidinem oppoſiti; and this is given as an inſtance of it, that Auguſtus Ceſar ſometime reigned at Rome. Now this I take to be all one with Natural Cer…ainty; for that the nature or reaſon of the thing ſhews it muſt needs have been, or the grounds of the aſſent thereunto air in their own nature and reaſon firm and ſure, as afterwards ſhall be further ſhewed: But if the grounds of an aſſent be not in their own nature and reaſon firm and ſure, excluding an apprehenſion that the thing may be otherwiſe, that aſſent is no proper certainty at all; as is already ſhewed.
I grant that a prudent man may and ought to proceed in humane affairs reſpecting this world, upon grounds not properly or ſtrictly certain; becauſe for the moſt part, as well in the greateſt as the ſmalleſt of them, there is contingency: And ſuch matters as have ſtrong probability in them, eſpecially ſuch as are known ſeldome or never to happen otherwiſe, may juſtly beget in men of underſtanding ſuch aſſent or perſwaſion, as they may call, if they pleaſe, a moral certainty, and that which may juſtly remove all diſturbing doubts concerning them; ſo that it would be folly to be interrupted in the courſe of action upon a conceit that they may fall out otherwiſe: Nevertheleſs it is no folly, but a right underſtanding, to conceive that thoſe very matters may fall out otherwiſe. No prudent man diſturbingly doubts whether any of the perſons this day alive in London, will be alive to morrow; yet it is not in the nature of the thing certain, that they will, and therefore no man can rightly judg it to be certain: For the contrary is poſſible to come to paſs, at leaſt in a ſupernatural way; and we have examples of ſuch events, as in the overthrow of Sodom and Gomorrah in one day by fire from Heaven, and in the ſlaughter of 185000 in the Army of Senacherib by an Angel in one night.
Wherefore that moral certainty (if it may be ſo called) which proceeds upon ſuch grounds as do not exclude formidinem contrarii, or an apprehenſion that the thing may be otherwiſe, I take to be no certainty properly ſo called: But if any will ſo call a knowledg or aſſent of that nature, I contend not about it. But the term may be taken in another ſenſe, viz. for a certain knowledg or aſſent in things of a moral nature, or from moral arguments, in which I judg that certainty ſtrictly ſo taken may be founded: And being ſo taken, it is of the ſame common reaſon with the following kinds of certainty: For it is founded in the nature and reaſon of things moral, as natural certainty in the nature and reaſon of things natural, and ſupernatural certainty in the nature and reaſon of things ſupernatural.
§ 3. Of Natural Certainty.
NAtural Certainty is that which is founded in the nature of things natural, and reſts upon evidence that is ſure in nature, and fails not. This is twofold; firſt, That which is founded in the ordinary courſe of particular nature. The ſecond, That which is founded in the univerſal and unchangeable reaſon of things.
1. There is Certainty founded in the ordinary courſe of Nature, or that which reſts upon the nature of things, keeping the natural courſe and ſtate wherein they are ſet by the God of Nature. So it is naturally certain that the Sun, that is ſet, will riſe again in our Horizon after ſuch a ſpace of time; it is naturally certain, that there will be a viciſſitude of Summer and Winter in our Climate; for that it ſhould be otherwiſe according to particular nature, or in a natural way, it is impoſſible. Theſe are in Scripture called the Ordinances of Heaven, by the ſureneſs whereof God ſets forth the ſtability of his Covenant of Grace.
But that Certainty is greater that is founded in the Univerſal and Unchangeable Reaſon of things, or in the Eternal Law, which is founded in the unchangeable nature and perfections of God; for this can never fail. There is not only an impoſſibility in the ordinary courſe of nature, but an abſolute and utter impoſſibility that an apprehenſion or aſſent founded herein, ſhould be falſe… …ho in the courſe of partirular nature it be impoſſible but that the Sun ſhould go down at the ſtated time; yet it is not utterly impoſſible that it ſhould not, but it may ſtand ſtill, or go back in the firmament, as in holy Scripture we read it hath done, and conſequently we cannot have an abſolute certainty thereof. But we are abſolutely certain of whatſoever truth reſts upon the unchangeable Reaſon of things; for the contrary thereof is a contradiction.
§ 4. Of Supernatural Certainty.
SUpernatural Certainty is an aſſent upon indubitable Supernanatural evidence, viz. Divine Revelation ſupernatural. A Divine Evidence is the higheſt kind of proof, and cauſeth Certainty, if any thing can cauſe it. For there is nothing more ſure in the nature of things, than Gods Veracity. And nothing more is requiſite to the certainty of that which brings a divine ſupernatural evidence or diſcovery, than to know that it is divine, or of God.
Wherefore ſupernatural Certainty preſuppoſeth two things: 1. The natural Certainty of this Principle, That God is immutably true. 2. A natural Certainty that the ſupernatural diſcovery or revelation that is to be the ground of our aſſent, is from God. Here by Natural certainty I mean that which ariſeth from the very nature of the thing, in which there is a full objective evidence. Nevertheleſs, the Certainty that is natural in the ſaid reſpect, may in another reſpect be ſupernatural, namely, in reſpect of the ſupernatural aſſiſtance of the mind unto that certainty or firmneſs of aſſent; it is natural in reſpect of the objective evidence of the thing, and ſupernatural in reſpect of the aſſiſtance of the faculty to apprehend it.
§ 5. The diſtinction of Certainty into evident and obſcure, conſidered.
CERTAINTY hath been diſtinguiſhed into evident and obſcure. Evident Certainty is ſaid to be of thoſe things that are ſome way clearly perceived, namely, either the firſt principles, or concluſions evidently drawn from them, or objects of ſence. O…cure Certainty is only of thoſe things which we hold by belief, or opinion, namely, things believed upon divine authority, or humane authority, or inferred from ſigns and conjectures.
But I conceive that to diſtinguiſh Certainty into evident and obſcure, is all one as to diſtinguiſh it into Certain and Uncertain. For evidence is the ground of Certainty; and ſo far as we have certain knowledg of any thing, ſo far we have evidence thereof; and no farther than we have evidence, can we have any Certainty. And it riſes or falls in the degrees of it, according as the degrees of evidence are more or leſs. I take Certainty and Obſcurity to be oppoſite in nature. All Certainty connotes knowledg; Obſcurity belongs not to knowledg as ſuch, but to ignorance; and obſcure knowledg is but knowledg mixed with ignorance.
Eſpecially I judg it much amiſs to place the certainty of divine faith under the head of obſcure certainty; for that I judg we have as good and ſure evidence for the truth of matters of divine faith as for any concluſion of Science, as ſhall be ſhewn.
Howbeit I grant, that things which are moſt firmly and rightly aſſented unto, may be in themſelves obſcure and unſeen; as the matters of the Chriſtian Faith, and the Myſteries of the Goſpel, that are known only by ſupernatural revelation: Yet in the certainty or firm aſſent of the mind about theſe things, there is not obſcurity but evidence, for it reſts upon ſuch grounds as are of clear and evident truth, as is abundantly proved by divers Authors, who have aſſerted the Divine Authority of the Holy Scriptures.
§ 6. Whether Certainty admits of degrees.
CErtainty ſtrictly ſo called, doth admit of degrees. A firm aſſent without wavering or doubting, may be more firm. My aſſent to this truth, That there is a God, is firm without wavering; and yet I may have a greater degree of aſſurance thereof. And doubtleſs the Angels that behold the face of God, have a greater Certainty or firmneſs of aſſent to the aforeſaid truth, than mortals upon earth.
The degree of firmneſs of knowledg or right aſſent, riſes according to the degree of evidence: I ſay not this of the firmneſs of all aſſent, but of right aſſent, which is knowledg, and in which is true certainty. There may be firmneſs of aſſent, which hath no foundation in the thing it ſelf, and the higheſt confidence in the greateſt miſtake, but no certainty, which always ſuppoſes the true perception of its object.
That that which is now evident or clearly perceived, may become more evident, is a truth which I ſuppoſe cannot be denied: And I think common experience confirms it to every obſerving man, that things ſufficiently or indubitably evident, are commonly made more and more evident. By ſufficient evidence, I mean that which gives us aſſurance that the thing cannot be otherwiſe than we apprehend: There are many divine truths that are now evident, which no true Chriſtian doubts ſhall be made more evident in the life to come. What we know here, we know but in part, and not perfectly.
The Apoſtle ſaith, that that which was made glorious, had no glory in this reſpect, by reaſon of the glory that excels; that is, that which poſitively is glorious, comparatively is inglorious: So we may ſay, that which poſitively is evident, comparatively is obſcure. All our preſent evidence of divine truths is but obſcurity in reſpect of the glorious clearneſs that ſhall be hereafter. In like manner the firm aſſent of divine faith may be called weak aſſent in compariſon of the aſſent of intuitive knowledg in the ſtate of glory. The lower degrees of true knowledg, are ignorance in reſpect of the higher; and the lower degrees of ſtrength and firmneſs ſufficient in its own place, is but weakneſs in reſpect of the higher, eſpecially thoſe tranſcendent degrees in heaven. And where there is not a privative, there may be a negative imperfection.
§ 7. Of the Certainty of Senſe.
CErtainty may be either of Senſe, or of Reaſon, or of Belief.
There is a Certainty of ſenſe or ſenſitive knowledg: And this cannot be denied without denial of all Certainty. 1. Becauſe almoſt all knowledg comes in firſt by the ſenſes: 2. All knowledg, which in a natural way, is had of matters of fact, that are contingent, comes either by our own ſenſe, or by the credit of others that have known the ſame by ſenſe. 3. The Certainty of reaſon and of belief, may as well be denyed, as the certainty of ſenſe: For if there be no certainty of ſenſe, our faculties are not true; and if the ſenſitive faculty be falſe, and not to be truſted, the rational faculty may as well be ſuppoſed falſe and not to be truſted; and if ſenſe and reaſon cannot be truſted, the credit of men in their reports made to others, cannot be truſted.
But that there be this Certainty, the ſenſe muſt be duly circumſtantiated, which is, when there is a ſound Organ, and a fit Medium, and a due Diſtance of the Object, &c.
Some ſupernatural deception of the ſenſes of ſome particular men, by divine permiſſion, being granted, makes nothing againſt the natural and ordinary Certainty thereof placed in due Circumſtances.
§ 8. Of the Certainty of Reaſon.
CERTAINTY of reaſon, or rational knowledg, is twofold, or of two degrees. The firſt, the certain knowledg of the firſt principles or common notions, which are known by themſelves, and appear as they are to all perſons, that are compotes mentis. The ſecond degree is the knowledg of concluſions ſo evidently drawn from the firſt principles, as all that underſtand what they are, muſt aſſent unto, unleſs they offer violence to their faculties.
§ 9. Of the Certainty of Belief upon Divine Teſtimony.
CERTAINTY of Belief reſts upon the credible teſtimony of others.
The Credibility of all teſtimony reſts upon the veracity of the perſon teſtifying, and the evidence of that veracity.
The higheſt degree of Credibility, and conſequently of Certainty from teſtimony, is that which reſts upon an immutable veracity, which belongs to God alone. A ſurer evidence of the truth of any matter cannot be, than a divine teſtimony thereunto: For there is not a ſurer and clearer truth, than this, That God is unchangeably true. And this is the ground of that Certainty, which men call the certainty of divine faith, the object whereof can never be falſe.
Tho Gods veracity be a principle by it ſelf evident; yet that this or that teſtimony is of God, may need proof.
A divine teſtimony may ſo carry its own evidence to the perſon to whom it is immediately made known, as to need no proof thereof; as in voices, and viſions, and inſpirations, tho the way of ſuch ſelf-evidence may be unaccountable by us; nevertheleſs in the caſe of ſuch immediate revelations, ſometimes holy men have without being blamed, asked a ſign for confirmation, and ſometimes God hath without their asking, given a ſign.
Every teſtimony, that is by another reported to us to be of God, ought to be rationally proved to be ſuch, or elſe it cannot rationally be credited, nor be a due object of divine faith, which is a rational aſſent. To ſound faith reaſon is always preſuppoſed.
There are certain rational proofs of a Divine Teſtimony, that are evident to humane reaſon, even ſuch as naturally evince the ſame: And to deny thoſe proofs, were to offer violence to the faculty of reaſoning.