Abstract of Logic, Book 1 · Chapter 6
CHAP. VI. Of Quality.
Ax. 1. QUality is that Accident by which a Subject is ſaid, and only ſaid to be of what Quality it is.
Ax. 2. The Species's of it are Four: Habit and Diſpoſition, Natural Power and Impotency, Patible Quality and Paſſion, Form and Figure.
Two Names are attributed to each ſingle Species, to fignifie Qualities diverſe rather in Degree or Time, or other Accidental Circumſtance, than Species or Eſſence: For Habit and Diſpoſition, Power and Impotency, differ in Degree: Patible Quality and Paſſion, in Time: Form and Figure, in Reaſon or Manner.
Ax. 3. Habit is an adventitious Quality of operating or doing any thing with eaſe.
Ax. 4. Diſpoſition is an imperfect Habit.
1. §. Habit, in Greek foreign, is ſometimes taken for whatever form which may be ſeparated from the Subject, as when oppos'd to Privation. So it is taken in the Tenth Chapter of the Book of Categories, and many other places. Sometimes for Cloathing, as Book IV. of the Metaphyſicks, Chap. 20. whence alſo the laſt Category is call'd the Category of Having. Amongſt Phyſicians it is taken for a Habit of Body, whether Good or Evil. Hence foreign, or, a firm Conſtitution of Body, ſuch as of old the Gladiators and Champions had: And foreign, that is, a bad Conſtitution; but in this place it is taken for the firſt Species of Quality which we have defin'd.
2. §. A Habit is ſaid to be an adventitious Quality, becauſe not flowing from the Eſſence of the Subject, or its Principles, but from elſewhere; and is either infus'd by God, as Faith, Hope, Charity, Prophecy, Gift of Tongues, &c. or acquir'd by frequent Acts. Acquir'd Habits are either in Body, as, a good Habit of Body acquir'd by Induſtry; or in the Mind; and theſe either in the Underſtanding, as Senſe, Intelligence, Wiſdom, Prudence, and Art; or in the Appetite, as Vertues and Vices Moral.
3. §. Diſpoſition, in Greek foreign, either ſignifies the Order of that which hath Parts, as in Book IV. of the Metaphyſicks, Chap. 19. or any Quality which prepares Matter for the Reception of Subſtantial Form; or any Quality of the firſt Species: In which Senſe the Philoſopher ſays, Chap. 8. of the Categories, where he diſputes of Quality, Every Habit is a Diſpoſition, but not every Diſpoſition a Habit. Or, Laſtly, A Habit beginning and imperfect, which is the ſignification of this Place.
4. §. A Habit differs from a Diſpoſition, becauſe inhering deeper in the Subject, it becomes more permanent and laſting than it: For a Diſpoſition, as it is ſoon occaſion'd, ſo it is ſoon mov'd and chang'd, as Ariſtotle ſpeaks in the recited Place.
Ax. 5. Natural Power is a Quality not obvious to the Senſe by which a Subject of its own Nature is apt to do or bear.
Ax. 6. Impotency is a diminiſh'd Power.
1. §. Natural Power, in Greek foreign, differs from the third Species of Quality, becauſe not obvious to the Senſes, as that is. The ſame differs from Habit, both becauſe it is from Nature, Habit elſewhere, and becauſe it only renders the Subject fit to do or ſuffer. Whereas Habit alſo renders a Subject propenſe, and that to do expeditiouſly and with facility.
2. §. Natural Power is alſo divided by Ariſtotle, Book IV. of his Metaphyſicks, Chap. 12. into Active and Paſſive. Both are defin'd in this manner: Some Power is ſaid to be a Principle of Motion or Mutation in another, as it is another; ſome from another as another: That is Active; This Paſſive. For Example; The Power of Generating, moving from Place to Place, Heating, Building, &c. is an Active Power; But Softneſs is a Paſſive Power to Cutting or Section.
3. §. To theſe may be added a certain mixt Power, which, becauſe a Principle of Mutation in it ſelf, is at the ſame time Active and Paſſive; as, the Intellect, and Will, &c. From this Power flow Actions immanent; as, to Underſtand, and Will, &c. From Active, Tranſient, or paſſing out.
4. §. Beſides which, Natural Power is either, Firſt or Second. The firſt is that which flows immediately from the Form of the Subject. The Second, a diſpoſition only of the Matter, and Apparatous of the Organs, with which the former exerciſes its Functions. For Example: The Faculty of Seeing, as it flows from a Senſitive Soul, is the Firſt Power; but as it conſiſts in the Structure and Temperation of the Eye, it is the Second. The firſt Power cannot be taken away from any Subject, or diminiſh'd. The ſecond be both taken away, and diminiſh'd: When therefore Impotency is ſaid to be diminiſh'd Power, the ſecond Power is to be underſtood.
5. §. To the Second Power are to be recall'd all Nature's Gifts, as well thoſe of the Mind; as Ingenuity, Aptneſs, Memory; as thoſe of the Body, as Strength, Hailneſs of Conſtitution, &c. Such Gifts as theſe, if they are very imperfect, as if any one be of a dull Wit, ſlippery Memory, &c. are ſaid to be Impotences; if wholly abſent, they are not Qualities but Privations meerly.
Ax. 7. Patible Quality is that which effects a Paſſion in the Senſe.
Ax. 8. Which if it ſoon vaniſhes, is ſaid to be a Paſſion.
1. §. Patible Quality, in Greek foreign, is not ſo called becauſe the Subject ſuffers any thing from it, in which it is, but becauſe it effects a Paſſion in the Senſes.
Hitherto belong the Five proper Objects of the outward Senſes, viz. Light, Colour, Sound, Smell, Taſte, and the Tactile Qualities, ſuch as the Four Firſt Qualities, viz. Heat, Cold, Moiſtneſs, Drineſs, and thoſe which ariſe from theſe, as Gravity, Levity, Rarity, Denſity, &c. every one of which Qualities affects a particular Senſe; Colour, the Sight; Sound, the Hearing; Heat, the Touch, &c. In which they are different from Figure and Form, which effect a Paſſion in more Senſes than one, &c.
2. §. If the Patible Quality ſoon periſh; as, Paleneſs from Fear, or Redneſs from Shame, it is called foreign, or Paſſion, becauſe it comes with a Paſſion. And ſo it comes to paſs that Regard, being had more to the Paſſion than to the Quality ariſing from the Paſſion, they are not ſo much ſaid to be Quales, that is, affected ſo and ſo with a Quality, as to have ſuffered ſomething, as Ariſtotle ſays, Cap. 13. of the Categories.
Ax. 9. Figure is a Quality ariſing from a Term of Magnitude.
Ax. 10. Form is a Figure with a Colour.
Form in Greek is term'd foreign & foreign, Figure foreign, Form is either Subſtantial or Accidental. Subſtantial Form belongs to the Category of Subſtance. Accidental Form in general is nothing elſe but an Accident; which, like a Form, inheres in its Subject. In this Place every Accidental Form is not underſtood, but only that which conſiſts about every thing, or which in the Superficies of a Body appears to our Eyes and Touch.
2. §. And altho' Figure and Form are often confounded, yet in this Place they are wont ſo to be diſtinguiſhed as that Figure is given to things Mathematical, in which nothing is conſidered but Magnitude; Form to things Phyſical, in which alſo Colour is conſidered. To Figure belong Triangle, Circle, Square, Sphaere, Cylinder, and other Appellations of Mathematical Figures and Affections of continued Quantity. To Form, Comlineſs, Deformity, &c.
Ax. 11. The Notes of Quality are Three: Firſt, Quality has a Contrary.
1. §. So Vertue to Vice, Heat to Cold are Contrary. Contrariety is only found in the Firſt and Third Species, not in the Second and Fourth, unleſs Fairneſs and Deformity ſeem Contraries; which yet belong to Form.
Ax. 12. Quality admits of more and leſs.
1. §. That is, is intended and remitted: For one thing is hotter or leſs hot than another; colder or leſs cold: This Note, or Affection of Quality ariſes either from Contrariety or Diſpoſition of the Matter. Habit and patible Qualities receive more and leſs from Contrariety. For they are remitted when intermixed with their Contrary, and intended when they are free from it, Light excepted; which altho' a a Patible Quality, yet is intended or remitted upon the Account of the unequal Diſpoſition of the Subject, becauſe is has not a Contrary. After the ſame Manner are the natural Powers intended and remitted. To which nothing is contrary with which they can be mixed.
Ax. 13. Things by Quality are ſaid to be like or unlike.
1. §. For Likeneſs and Unlikeneſs are Relations agreeable to things by Reaſon of their Qualities.