A Treatise of Knowledge and Love, Part 1 · Chapter 4
Chap. 4.
III. What are the Certainties that muſt be known and held faſt, and why?
IT is none of the Apoſtles meaning that men ſhould be meer Scepticks: Nor am I ſeconding Sanchez his nihil ſcitur, unleſs you take Science for adequate Science, or in a tranſcendent notion, as it ſignifieth that which is proper to another World, and therefore may be denyed of this. He can neither play the part of a Chriſtian or of a man, who doubts of all things, and is aſſuredly confident of nothing.
That our diſcourſe of this may be orderly and edifying, it is of great uſe that I firſt help you rightly to underſtand what Certainty is. The word is ambiguous, and ſometime is applied to the Object, and ſometime to the Act and Agent. The former is called Objective Certainty; the latter Subjective Certainty.
The Objective is either Certainty of the Thing, or Certainty of Evidence, by which the thing is diſcernible or perceptible to us. And this either Senſible Evidence, or Rational; and the latter is either ſelf-evidence of principles, or derived Evidence of Conſequences.
Subjective Certainty is alſo either conſidered in the Nature of it, or in the Degree: And as to the Nature it is either the Senſes Certainty, or the Intellects; and this either of Incomplex Objects, or Complex: The firſt is either of ſenſed Objects, or purely Spiritual: The ſecond of Principles, or of Concluſions. Of all theſe there are Certainty.
The Degrees are theſe: It being firſt ſuppoſed that no Humane apprehenſion here is abſolutely perfect; and therefore all our Certainties ſubjective are Imperfect: The word therefore ſignifieth not only a perfect apprehenſion; but it ſignifieth non falli, not to be deceived, and ſuch an apprehenſion of the evidence as giveth us a juſt reſolving and quieting confidence. And ſo 1. The due Objects of ſenſe, and 2. The immediate acts of the Soul it ſelf, are Certain in the firſt and higheſt degree. I know certainly what I ſee clearly, ſo far as I ſee it: And I know certainly that I think, and know, and will. The next degree of Certainty is of Rational Principles, and the next of Conſequents.
It's like in a Scheme you will eaſilier underſtand it.
CERTAINTY being an ambiguous word, is either,
I. Objective: which is,
I. Of Being of the Thing; which is nothing but Phyſical Verity.
II. Of Evidence; which makes things Perceptible; and it is Evidence,
1. Senſible; viz.
1. To the External Senſes.
2. To the Internal Senſes.
2. Intelligible,
1. Of the Being of Things, viz.
1. Quod ſint,
2. Quid ſint,
3. Qualia ſint,
1. Things ſenſed and imagined; as colours, light, heat, &c.
2. The Acts of Intellection and Will.
2. Of Complex Verity, which is,
1. Of ſelf-evident Principles.
2. Derivative Evidence of Concluſions.
II. Subjective Certainty; by which I am certain of the Object; Conſiderable,
I. In its Nature; viz. Certainty,
1. Of Senſe,
1. Of the Outward Senſes, when they are not deceived.
2. Of the Inward Senſe and Imagination.
2. Of the Intellect; which is,
1. Of Beings,
1. Senſed and imagined,
2. Of the Acts of the Soul.
1. Quod ſint.
2. Quid ſint.
3. Qualia ſint.
2. Of the Complex Verities,
1. Of ſelf-evident Principles.
2. Of Concluſions.
(N. Qu. Whether there be not a third ſort of Certainty both Objective and Subjective; viz. Goodneſs not-ſenſible, Certainly apprehended by the Intellectual Soul, not only ſub ratione Veri, ſed & Boni? and whether the Will by its Natural Guſt have not a Complacential Perception of it as well as the Intellect? Vid. Pemble Vindic. Grot.)
II. In the Degrees of Certainty; which are in the order following.
1. Senſe perceiving the Object and it ſelf, is the firſt perceiver; and hereof the ſureſt.
2. Imagination receiving from Senſe, hath more requiſites to its Certainty.
3. Intellection about things ſenſible, hath yet more requiſites to its Certainty; viz. 1. That the Object be true; 2. The Evidence ſenſible; 3. That the Senſe be ſound, and the Medium and other Conditions of Senſe be juſt; 4. That the Imagination be not corrupt, 5. That the Intellect it ſelf be ſound.
4. But Intellection about It ſelf and Volition hath the higheſt Certainty
5. We are ſurer of the Quod than the Quid and Quale; as that we Think, than What and How.
6. We are certainer of ſelf-evident Principles than of the Conſequences.
7. Conſequences have various degrees of Evidence and Certainty.
A few Propoſitions may further help your underſtandings.
I. All things in the world have their Certainty phyſical of Being; that is, it is a Certainty, or a Truth that this thing is.
II. The thing which is moſt commonly called Objective Certainty, is ſuch a degree of Perceptibility or Evidence as may aptly ſatisfie the doubting Intellect.
III. Evidence is called Infallible; 1. When he that receiveth it is never deceived; and ſo all Truth is Infallible Truth; for he is not deceived who believeth it: 2. Or when a man cannot err about it. And there is no ſuch Evidence in the world, unleſs you ſuppoſe all things elſe agreeable.
IV. The Perception is called Infallible, 1. Either quia non falſa, becauſe it is not deceived: And ſo every man is Infallible in every thing which he truly perceiveth: 2. Or becauſe it Cannot or Will not err. And ſo Abſolute Infallibility is proper to God: But ſecundum quid, in certain caſes upon certain Objects, with certain Conditions, all ſound mens Senſes and Intellects are Infallible.
V. Certainty of Evidence conſiſteth in ſuch a Poſition of the thing evident, as maketh it an Object perceptible to the faculty perceiving; to which many Conditions are required: As 1. That the Thing it ſelf have ſuch intrinſick qualifications, as make it fit to be an Object. 2. That it have the due extrinſick conditions concomitant.
1. To the Nature of an Object of perception it is neceſſary. 1. That it be a thing which in its Nature is within the reach of the perceiving faculty: And not (as Spirits are to ſenſe) ſo above us, or alien to us, as to be out of the Orb of our perception. 2. That they have a perceptible Quantity, Magnitude or Degree. 3. That, if it be an Incomplex term and object, and not an Univerſal of the higheſt notion, it be hoc aliquid, and have its proper Individuation. 4. That it have ſome ſpecial diſtinct conformity to the diſtinct perceiving faculty. In ſum, that it be Ens, Unum, Verum, Bonum, vel hiſce contraria reductivè & per accidens cognita.
2. To the extrinſick Conditions, it is neceſſary, 1. That the Object have a due ſite or poſition. 2. And a due diſtance; neither too near, nor too far off. 3. And that it have a due medium, fitted to it and to the faculty. 4. And that it have a due abode or ſtay, and be not like a Bullet out of a Gun, imperceptible through the celerity of its motion.
VI. That the perception of ſenſe be certain, it is neceſſary, 1. That the Organ be ſound, in ſuch a meaſure as that no prevalent Diſtemper undiſpoſe it. 2. That it be not oppreſſed by any diſturbing adjunct. 3. That the ſenſitive Soul do operate on and by theſe Organs: For elſe its alienation will leave the Organ uſeleſs: As ſome intenſe meditations make us not hear the Clock. 4. That it be the due Senſe and Organ which meeteth with the Object; as ſounds with the Ear, light with the Eye, &c. beſides the foreſaid neceſſaries.
VII. Common Notitiae or Principles are not ſo called, becauſe men are born with the Actual Knowledge of them; But becauſe they are truths, which mans mind is naturally ſo diſpoſed to receive as that upon the firſt exerciſes of Senſe and Reaſon, ſome of them are underſtood, without any other humane teacher.
VIII. Even ſelf-evident Principles are not equal, but ſome of them are more, and ſome leſs evident. And therefore ſome ſooner, and ſome later known. And ſome of them are more commonly known than others.
IX. The ſelf evidence of theſe Principles ariſeth from the very nature of the Intellect which inclineth to Truth, and the Nature of the Will which eſſentially inclineth to Good, and the Nature and Poſture of the Objects, which are Truth and Goodneſs in the moſt evident poſition, compared together, or Conjunct; ſome call it Inſtinct.
X. It is not neceſſary to the certainty of a Principle, that it be commonly known of all or moſt. For Intellects have great Variety of Capacities, Excitation, Helps, Improvements, and even Principles have various degrees of evidence, and appearances to men.
XI. Mans mind is ſo conſcious of its own darkneſs and imperfections, that it is diſtruſtful of its own Inferences unleſs they be very Near and Clear. When by a long Series of Ergo's any thing is far fetcht, the mind is afraid there may be ſome unperceived error.
XII. He therefore that holdeth a true Principle as ſuch, and at once a falſe inference which contradicteth it, is to be ſuppoſed to hold the principle firſt and faſteſt, and that if he ſaw the Contradiction he would let go the conſequent, and not the principle.
XIII. He that denieth the certainty of Senſe, Imagination, and Intellective perception of things ſenſed as ſuch, doth make it impoſſible to have any certainty of Science or Faith about thoſe ſame Objects but by miracle. And therefore the Papiſts denying and renouncing all theſe (Senſe, Imagination and Intellective perception,) when they ſay, that there is no Bread nor Wine in the Sacrament, do make their pretended contrary Faith impoſſible. For we are men before we are Chriſtians, and we have Senſe and Intellects, before we have faith. And as there is no Chriſtianity but on ſuppoſition of humanity, ſo there is no Faith, but on ſuppoſition of ſenſe and underſtanding. How know you that here is no Bread and Wine? Is it becauſe Scripture or Councils ſay ſo? How know you that? By Hearing or Reading? But how know you that ever you did hear or read or ſee a Book or Man? By ſenſe or no way! If ſenſe be fallible here, why not there? You'l ſay that ſenſe may be fallible in one caſe, and not in others. I anſwer, either you prove it infallible from Nature, even by Senſe and Intellective perception of and by ſenſe, or elſe by ſupernatural Revelation. If only by this Revelation, how know you that Revelation? How know you that ever you heard, read or ſaw any thing which you call Revelation. If by a former Revelation, I ask you the ſame queſtion in infinitum. But if you know the certainty of Senſe by Senſe and Intellective perception, then where there is the ſame evidence and perception, there is the ſame certainty. But here is as full Evidence and Perception as any other Object can have. 1. We ſee Bread and Wine. 2. We taſt it. 3. We ſmell the Wine. 4. We hear it poured out. 5. We feel it. 6. We find the effects of it; It refreſheth and nouriſheth as other Bread and Wine. 7. It doth ſo by any other creature as well as by a man. 8. It corrupteth. 9. It becometh true fleſh and blood in us, and a part of our bodies; Even in the worſt: Yea part of the body of a Mouſe or Dog. 10. It's poſſible for a Mouſe or Dog to live only upon conſecrated Bread and Wine. Is his body then nothing but Chriſt. 11. In all this perception the Objects are not rare, but commonly exhibited in all ages; They have all the Conditions that other ſenſible evident objects have, as to ſite, magnitude, diſtance, medium. 12. And it is not one or two, but all men in the World of the ſoundeſt ſenſes, who ſenſe and perceive them to be Bread and Wine. So that here is as full evidence as the words which you read or hear can have to aſcertain us.
Obj. But if God deny ſenſe in this caſe and not in others, we muſt believe ſenſe in others and not in this.
Anſ. But again I ask you, How you know that God biddeth or forbiddeth you any thing, if ſenſe be not firſt to be believed?
Obj. But is it not poſſible for ſenſe to be deceived? Cannot God do it?
Anſ. 1. It is poſſible for ſenſe to be annihilated, and made no ſenſe; and it is poſſible that the Faculty or Organ, or Medium, or Object, be depraved, or want its due conditions, and ſo to be deceived. But to retain all theſe due Conditions, and yet to be deceived is a Contradiction: For then it is not the ſame Thing: It is not that which we call now formally Senſe and Intellect, or Senſation and Intellection. And Contradictions are not things for Omnipotency to be tryed about. God can make a man to be no Intellectual Creature: But thereby he maketh him no man: For to be a man, and not Intellectual, is a contradiction. And ſo it is to be men, and yet to have no Senſe nor Intellect, that can truly perceive ſenſible Objects as before qualified: Therefore they unman all the World, on pretext of aſſerting the power of God.
2. But ſuppoſe that all Senſe be fallible, and Intellection of things ſenſible, yet it is the firſt and only entrance of all things ſenſible into the mind or knowledge of man: And therefore we muſt take it as God hath given it us, for we can have no ſurer: No ſenſible thing is in the Intellect which was not firſt in the Senſe: Whether my Eyes and Ears, and Taſte be fallible or not, I am ſure I have no other way to perceive their Objects; but by them I muſt take them and uſe them as they are. All the words and definitions in the World will not give any man without ſenſation, a true conception of a ſenſible Object.
3. Such abſurd ſuppoſitions therefore are not to be put, [What if God ſhould tell you by his Word, that all the ſenſes of all men are deceived, in one thing, or in all things? would you not believe him?] It is not to be ſuppoſed that God will give us all our Senſes and Intellective perception by them, to be our diſcerner of things ſenſible, and then bid us not believe them, for they are falſe; unleſs he told us that all our perceptions are falſe, and our whole Life is but deceit. And I further anſwer, if God tell me ſo, it muſt be by ſome word or writing of Man or Angel, or Himſelf: And how ſhould I know that word but by my ſenſe?
But the great anſwer which ſeemeth to ſatisfie Bellarmine and the reſt, is, that ſenſe is no judge of Subſtances, but of Accidents only; therefore it is not deceived.
But 1. It is falſe that ſenſe perceiveth not ſubſtances: It is not only colour, quantity, figure, which I ſee, nor only roughneſs and ſmoothneſs which I feel, nor only ſweetneſs which I taſte; but it is a coloured, extended, figured ſubſtance which I ſee; a rough or ſmooth ſubſtance which I feel, and a ſweet ſubſtance which I taſte: And if the Accident were the only primary object, the Subſtance is the ſecondary and certain. Elſe no one ever ſaw a Man, a Tree, a Bird, a Plant, the Earth, a Book, or any ſubſtance; but only the colour, quantity or figure of them! no man ever felt or touched a Body, but only the Accidents of it.
2. And I pray you tell me how Subſtances come to the underſtanding if they were never in the ſenſe: Prove a Subſtance without ſenſation as a medium if you can. Do you perceive any Subſtances Intellectually or not? If not, why pretend you that there are any? if yea, it muſt be either as Concluſions, or as Intellectual Principles, (which are both Logical complex Objects, and therefore not ſubſtances) or as the immediate immaterial objects of Intellection (which is only the Souls own acts) or what is by Analogy gathered from them; or elſe the objects of ſenſe it ſelf. It can be none of the former; therefore it muſt be the latter: And how can the underſtanding find that in ſenſe which was never there?
If it be ſaid that it is there but by Accidents; I anſwer, 1. That is falſe, though ſaid by many: I do as immediately touch ſubſtance as accidents, though not ſubſtance without the accidents. 2. Whether it be there by the mediation of the accidents, or immediately it ſelf, we are ſure that the underſtanding no otherwiſe receiveth it, than as the ſenſe tranſmitteth it; we muſt know material ſubſtance as it is ſenſed, or not at all.
We ſee then what a paſs this Roman Religion bringeth the World to. That they may be Chriſtians, they muſt believe (and ſwear by the Trent Oath) that they are not men; and that they may have Faith, they muſt renounce their Senſes, and that they may be ſure Gods Word is true, (and the Churches decrees,) they muſt be ſure that they are ſure of nothing; and how then are they ſure of that? And while they ſubvert all the order of Nature in the World, they pretend that God can do it, and therefore we are to believe that he doth it, meerly becauſe theſe Doctors can call themſelves the Church, and then can ſo expound the Scripture. When it is Gods ſetled order in Nature, that a Man as an Animal ſhall have Senſe to perceive things ſenſible by, and as a Man ſhall have underſtanding to receive from the Imagination and Senſe theſe objects, we muſt now ſuppoſe that God hath quite overturned the courſe of Nature, either by making ſenſe no ſenſe, or the object no object, or the medium no fit medium; and yet this is to be believed by Men that have nothing but the ſame ſenſes to tell their underſtandings that it is written or ſpoken, or that there is a Man in the World.
Suppoſe we grant it to be no contradiction, and therefore a thing that God can do, no man can queſtion but that he muſt do it as a Miracle, by altering and overturning Natures courſe. And ſhall we fain, 1. Miracles to become ordinary things, through all the Churches in the World, and every day in the week or every hour to be done? 2. And Miracles to be made a ſtanding Church Ordinance? 3. And every one in the Church, even all the wicked, and every Mouſe that eateth the Hoſt, to be partaker of a Miracle? 4. Yea that every ſuch Man and Mouſe, may all the week long live on a continued Miracle, while Accidents without ſubſtance do nouriſh them and turn to Fleſh and Blood? 5. And all this ordinary courſe of Miracles to be wrought at the will of every Prieſt, be he never ſo ignorant or wicked a Man? 6. And yet the ſame words ſpoken by the holieſt of the Proteſtant Paſtors will not do the Miracle. 7. But if a Papiſt Prieſt ſhould be unduely ordained, or forge his own orders, ſobeit the Church think him truly ordained, he can do the Miracle. All this muſt be believed.
And the Plague of all is, all men muſt be Burnt as Hereticks, or exterminated, that cannot believe all this, and diſbelieve their Senſes. And yet worſe, all temporal Lords muſt be diſpoſſeſt of their Dominions, who will ſuffer any ſuch to live therein, and not exterminate them.
An Epicure and a ſenſual Infidel who think man is but of the ſame ſpecies of Brutes, do but unman us, and leave us the Honour of being Animals or Brutes. But the Papiſts do not leave us this much, but muſt reduce us to a lower order, and teach us to deny our ſenſe it ſelf; and Torment and Kill them that will not do it.
And what is it that muſt perſwade us to all this? Why meerly a Hoc eſt corpus meum, as expounded by the Councils of Laterane and Trent. And is not Davids [I am a Worm and no Man, Pſal. 22.6.] as plain; yea and that in a Prophecy of Chriſt? Muſt we believe therefore that neither David nor Chriſt was a Man, but a Worm? Is not [I am the Vine, and ye are the Branches, Joh. 15.1, 2.] as plain? Muſt Senſe be renounced and ordinary Miracles believed for ſuch words as theſe?
And doth not Paul call it [Bread] after conſecration three times in the three next verſes?1 Cor. 11. And is not he as good an expoſitor of Chriſts Words as the Council of Trent?
And when did God work Miracles which were meer objects of belief againſt ſenſe? Miracles were done as ſenſible things, thereby to confirm Faith, and that which no ſenſe perceived was not taken for a Miracle.
To conclude, when the Apoſtle ſaith, that Fleſh and Blood cannot enter into the Kingdom of God, (plainly ſpeaking of them formally as now called, and not as they ſignify Sin,) and conſequently that Chriſts Body is now in Heaven a Spiritual Body, and not formally Fleſh and Blood, yet muſt the Bread and Wine be turned into his Fleſh and Blood on Earth, when he hath none in Heaven?
And by their Doctrine no Baker nor Vintner is ſecured but that a Prieſt may come into his Shop or Celler and turn all the Bread and Wine in it, into Chriſts Body and Blood: yea the whole City or Garriſon may thus be deprived of their Bread and Wine, if the Prieſt intend it: and yet it ſhall not be ſo in the Sacrament it ſelf, if the Prieſt intend it not. But I have ſtaid too long in this.
XIV. Next to the Act of Cogitation and Volition itſelf, and to the moſt certain Objects of Sence, there is nothing in all the World ſo Certain, that is, ſo Evident to the Intellect, as the Being of God: He being that to the Mind which the Sun is to the Eye, certainlieſt known, though little of him be known, and no Creature comprehend him.
XV. That God is True is part of our knowing him to be perfect, and to be God; and therefore is moſt certain.
XVI. That Man is made by God and for God; that we owe him all our Love, Obedience and Praiſe, that we have all from him, and ſhould pleaſe him in the uſe of all, with many ſuch like, are Notitiae Communes, Certain Verities, received by Nature, ſome as Principles, and ſome as ſuch evident concluſions as are not to be doubted of.
XVII. That the Scripture is the Word of God, is a certain Truth, not ſenſible, nor a Natural Principle; but an Evident concluſion drawn from that Seal or Teſtimony of the Spirit, Antecedent, Concomitant, Impreſſed and Conſequent; which I have oft opened in other Treatiſes.
XVIII. That the Scripture is True is a Certain Concluſion drawn from the two laſt mentioned premiſes, viz. That God is True (Verax) and that the Scripture is his Word.
XIX. Thoſe Doctrines or ſayings which are parts of Scripture evidently perceived ſo to be by Senſe and Intellective perception, are known to be True, by the ſame Certainty as the Scripture in general is known to be true.
XX. To conclude, then there are two ſorts of Certain Verities in Theology. 1. Natural Principles with their certain conſequents. 2. Scripture in General, with all thoſe aſſertions which are Certainly known to be its parts. And all the reſt are to be numbred with uncertainties, except Prophetical certainty of Inſpiration, which I paſs by.