A Treatise of Knowledge and Love, Part 1 · Chapter 3
Chap. 3.
What pretended knowledge is condemned, and what Philoſophy and Learning it is that Paul diſliked.
II. MOre diſtinctly, 1. It is condemnable for any man to think himſelf Abſolutely or Highly wiſe: becauſe our knowledg here is ſo poor and dark and low, that compared with our Ignorance it is little; we know not what or how many or how great the things are which we do not know; but in general we may know that they are incomparably more and greater than what we do know; we know now but as Children, and Darkly, and in a Glaſs or Riddle, 1 Cor. 13.11, 12. In the ſence that Chriſt faith, none is good but God, we may ſay that none is wiſe but God. For a man that muſt know (unleſs he be a very ſot) that he knoweth nothing perfectly in the World; that he knoweth but little of any Worm or Fly, or pile of Graſs which he ſeeth, or of himſelf, his Soul or Body, or any Creature, for this man to aſſume the Title of a Wiſe man, is arrogant, unleſs comparatively underſtood, when he is ignorant of ten thouſand fold more than he knoweth, and the predominant part denominateth. The old enquirers had ſo much modeſty, as to arrogate no higher name than Philoſophers.
2. It is very condemnable for any man to be proud of his underſtanding: while it is ſo low and poor and dark, and hath ſtill ſo much matter to abaſe us. He knoweth not what a Dungeon poor mortals are in, nor what a darkened thing a ſinful mind is, nor what a deplorable ſtate we are in, ſo far from the Heavenly light, no nor what it is to be a man in Fleſh, who findeth not much more cauſe of humiliation than of pride in his underſtanding, O how much ado have I to keep up from utter deſpondency under the conſciouſneſs of ſo great ignorance, which no ſtudy no means, no time doth overcome. How long Lord ſhall this Dungeon be our dwelling? And how long ſhall our fooliſh Souls be loth to come into the Celeſtial light?
3. It is ſinful folly to pretend to know things unrevealed and impoſſible to be known, Deut. 29.29. The ſecret things belong unto the Lord our God, but thoſe things which are revealed belong to us, and to our Children for ever, that we do them. Rom. 11.34. For who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his Counſellor? And how many ſuch compoſe the Theology of ſome, and the Philoſophy of more.
4. It is ſinful folly to pretend to know that which is impoſſible or unrevealed to him, though it be poſſible and revealed to others. For as the Eye, ſo the Underſtanding muſt have its neceſſary light, and due conſtitution and conditions of the object and of it ſelf, or elſe it cannot underſtand.
5. It is ſinful folly to pretend to certainty of knowledge, when either the thing is but probable, or at beſt, we have but doubtful opinions or conjectures of it, and no true certainty.
6. It is ſinful folly to pretend that we know or receive any thing by Divine Faith (or Revelation) when we have it but by Humane Faith, or probable conjecture from natural evidence. As ſoon as men are perſwaded by a Sect, a Seducer, or a ſelfiſh Prieſt, to believe what he ſaith, abundance preſently take ſuch a perſwaſion for a part of their Religion, as if it were a Believing God.
7. It is ſinful folly to take on us that we know what we know not at all, becauſe we do but know that it is knowable, and that wiſe men know it, and as ſoon as we underſtand that it ſhould be known, and that wiſe men conclude it to be true, therefore to pretend that we know it to be true.
8. And it is ſinful folly to pretend that we truly know or apprehend the Thing or Matter, or incomplex object, meerly becauſe we have got the bare words, and ſecond notions of it, which are ſeparable from the knowledge of the thing. All theſe are falſe and ſinful pretences of knowledge, which men have not.
But becauſe Paul ſo warneth us to take heed of vain Philoſophy,M. Antomine l. 1. §. 17. Doth thank God that he made no greater progreſs in Rhetorick, Poetry, and ſuch like Studies, which might have hindered him from better things, if he had perceived himſelf to have profited in them. And (in fine) quod cum Philoſophandi cupiditas inceſſiſſet, no… in ſophiſtam aliquem incidelin, nec … evolvendis, vel ſyllogiſmis reſolvendis, vel Mettorologicis diſ…iendi… tem… deſ…s contriverim. and Atheiſts, and Infidels deride him for ſpeaking againſt the wiſdom of the World, as if he ſpake againſt Learning, becauſe he had it not; and becauſe the Diſeaſe which he attempted to Cure remaineth among Schollars to this day, and inſtead of a Cure many contemn the Phyſician, and diſlike Chriſt himſelf and the Goſpel, as defective of the Learning which they overvalue, I will once again, and that more diſtinctly tell you ſome few of the faults of our common Learning, even now that it is cultivated and augmented in this Age, that you may ſee that Paul did not injuriouſly accuſe it, or Chriſt injuriouſly neglect it.
I. Natural Imperfection layeth the Foundation of our common calamity; in that it is ſo long before ſenſe and reaſon grow up to a natural maturity, (through the unripeneſs of Organs, and want of Exerciſe) that Children are neceſſitated to learn words before things, and to make theſe words the means of their firſt knowledge of many of the things ſignified; ſo that moſt furniſh themſelves with a ſtock of names and words; before ever they get any true knowledge of the matter.
II. And then they are exceeding apt to think that this treaſury of words and ſecond notions is true wiſdom, and to miſtake it for the knowledge of the thing: Even as in Religion we find almoſt all Children and ignorant people, will learn to ſay by rote the Creed and Lords Prayer, and Commandments, and Catechiſm, and then think that they are not Ignorants, when it is long after before we can get them to underſtand the ſenſe of the words which they can ſo readily ſpeak, yea though they are plain Engliſh words, which they uſe for the moſt part in ordinary diſcourſe.
III. When Children come to School alſo their Maſters teach them as their Parents did, or worſe; I mean that they beſtow almoſt all their pains to furniſh them with words and ſecond notions: And ſo do their Tutors too oft at the Univerſity: So that by that time they are grown to be Maſters of a conſiderable ſtock of words, Grammatical, Logical, Metaphyſical, &c. and can ſet theſe together in Propoſitions and Syllogiſms, and have learnt Memoriter the Theorems or Axioms, and ſome diſtinctions which are in common uſe and reputation, they are ready to paſs for Maſters of the Arts, and to ſet up for themſelves, and leave their Tutors, and to teach others the like ſort and meaſure of Learning, which they have thus acquired. Like one that ſets up his Trade as ſoon as he hath gotten a Shop full of Tools.
IV. And indeed the memories of young men are ſtrong and ſerviceable ſo many years ſooner than their judgments, that prudent Teachers think it meet to take that time to furniſh them with words and organical notions, while they are unmeet to judge of things: Even as pious Parents muſt teach them the words of the Catechiſm, that when they grow riper, their judgments may work upon that which their Memories did before receive. And in this they are in the right upon two ſuppoſitions. 1. That diſtinguiſhing things obvious and eaſily underſtood from things remote, abſtruſe and difficult, they would teach them thoſe of the firſt ſort with the words, though not the ſecond: And while they make haſte with them in the Languages they would not make too much haſte with the Notions and Theorems of the Arts and Sciences. 2. That they ſtill make them know that words as to matter are but as the diſh to the meat, and all this while they are but preparing for wiſdom and true Learning, and not getting or poſſeſſing it; and that unleſs they will equalize a Parrot, and a Philoſopher, they muſt know how little they have attained, and muſt after Learn things, or not pretend to know any thing indeed. As Children learn firſt to ſpeak and then learn what to ſpeak of.
V. And the great miſchief is, that multitudes of thoſe notions which are taught us are falſe, not fitted to the Things, but expreſſing the conceptions of roving, uncertain, erroneous, bewildred minds. Words are the inſtruments of Communication of thoughts. And when I hear a man ſpeak I hear (perhaps) what he thinketh of things, but not always what they are. Our Univerſal notions are the reſult of our own comparing Things with things. And we are ſo wofully defective in ſuch comparings that our Univerſal notions muſt needs be very defective, ſo that they abound with errour.
VI. And the penury and narrowneſs of words is a great impediment to the due expreſſing of thoſe poor confuſed conceptions which we have; For a man can think more aptly and comprehenſively than he can ſpeak. And hence it cometh to paſs that words and univerſal notions are become like Pictures or Hieroglyphicks, almoſt of arbitrary ſignification and uſe, as the ſpeaker pleaſeth. And (as a multitude of School-diſtinctions tell us) you can know little by the Grammatical uſe or Etymology of the words, what the meaning of them is in a theorem or diſtinction, till the ſpeaker tell it you by other words.
VII. And the conceptions of men being as various as their Countenances, the ſame words in the mouths of ſeveral men, have ſeveral ſignifications. So that when Tutors read the ſame books to their Schollars, and teach them the ſame notions, it is not the ſame conceptions always that they thus communicate.
VIII. And when all is done, Recipitur ad modum recipientis. It's two to one but the Learner receiveth their notions with a conception ſomewhat different from them all. And when he thinks that he hath learnt what was taught him, and is of his Teachers mind, he is miſtaken, and hath received another apprehenſion.
IX. And the narrowneſs of mans mind and thoughts is ſuch, that uſually there muſt go many partial conceptions, to one thing or Object really indiviſible: So that few things, or nothing rather in the world, is known by us with one conception, nor with a ſimplicity of apprehenſions anſwerable to the ſimplicity of the things: And hereby it cometh to paſs that Inadequate conceptions make up a great part of our Learning and knowledge. And (yet worſe) our words being narrower than our Thoughts, we are fain to multiply words more than conceptions, ſo that we muſt have ten conceptions perhaps of one thing, and twenty words perhaps for thoſe ten conceptions. And then we grow to imagine the things to be as various as our conceptions, yea and our words: And ſo Learning is become confuſed error, and the great and noble Actions of the Phantaſtical world, are a pitiful confuſed agitation of Phantaſms, and (whether fortuitous or artificial) a congreſs of Atoms, ſometimes digladiating, and ſometimes ſeeming by amicable embraces to compoſe ſome excellent piece of Art. And things ſeem to us to be multiplyed and ordered as our conceptions of them are. And the Scotiſts may yet write as many more Treatiſes de formalitatibus, before men will underſtand indeed what a conceptus formalis with them is, and whether diverſe formalities be diverſe realities, or only ejuſdem conceptus inadequati. But thus Learning is become like a poppet play, or the raiſing of the duſt.
X. The Entia Rationis being thus exceeding numerous, are already confounded with objective Realities, and have compounded our common Syſtems of Logick, Metaphyſicks, and too much of Phyſicks: So that Students muſt at firſt ſee through falſe Spectacles, and Learn by ſeducing notions, and receive abundance of falſe conceptions, as the way to Wiſdom, and Shadows and Rubbiſh, muſt furniſh their minds under the name of truth (though mixt with many real Verities.) For young men muſt have Teachers: They cannot begin at the foundation, and every one learn of himſelf, as if none had ever learnt before him: He is like to make but a ſlow proficient, that maketh no uſe of the Studies and Experience of any that ever learnt before him. And he that will learn of others, muſt receive their notions and words as the means of his information.
XI. And when they grow up to be capable of real wiſdom, O! what a labour is it, to cleanſe out this rubbiſh, and to unlearn all the errors that we have learnt, ſo that it is much of the happieſt Progreſs of extraordinary ſucceſsful Studies, to find out our old miſtakes, and ſet our conceptions in better order one by one: Perhaps in one year we find out and reform ſome two or three, and in another year one or two more, and ſo on. Even as when at my removal of my Library, my Servant ſets up all my books, and I muſt take them half down again to ſet them in their right places.
XII. And the difficulty of the matter is our great Impediment, when we come to ſtudy things. For, 1. Their Matter, 2. Their Compoſure, 3. Their Numbers, 4. Their Order and Relations, 5. And their Action and Operation, are much unknown to us.
XIII. 1. The ſubſtance of Spirits is ſo little known, as tempteth Sadduces to dream that there are none. The notion of a Spirit to ſome (through ignorance) is taken to be meerly negative, as if it ſignified no more, but [not corporeal.] The notion of Immateriality is lubricous, and he that knoweth not the true bounds of the ſignification of Materia, knoweth not what it is to be Immaterial. The pureſt Spirit is known only by many inadequate conceptions: One muſt anſwer the ſimilitude of Matter, in fundamental ſubſtantiality: Another muſt be anſwerable to that of Forms of ſimple Elements; and another anſwerable to Accidents. And though nothing be ſo notorious of Spirits as their Operations, and from the Acts we know the Virtues or Powers, yet that theſe Virtues are not Accidents, but the very Eſſential Form, and that they are (in all Spirits) One in Three, and many other things concerning their Eſſentiality, are quite overlookt by the greater part of Philoſophers; and thoſe few that open it, do either with Campanella, loſe it again in a wood of miſtaken ill gathered conſequences; or with Lullius, drown it in a multitude of irregular arbitrary notions; or with Commenius, give us a little undigeſted, with the mixture of crudities and miſtakes; or with our Learned Dr. Gliſſon de vitâ Naturae, confound Spirits and Bodies, and make thoſe Spirits which are the Vital conſtitutive principle of Compounds, to be but the inadequate conception of Bodies, as if they were all ſimply and formally Vital of themſelves, and for a Body to be inanimate were a contradiction, or impoſſible. And they that treat more nobly of Spirits (as Mr. Got and many Platoniſts) do it ſo immethodically and confuſedly, as greatly diſadvantageth the Learner.
And yet to treat of Bodies without treating of the Spirits that animate or actuate them, is a lame, deluding, unedifying thing: As it is to treat of a Kingdom, an Army, a School, without mentioning a King, a Captain, or a Schoolmaſter; or as to deſcribe a Gun, without any mention of Gunpowder or ſhooting: Or a Clock or Watch without the Poiſe or Spring, or Motion; or a Book or words without the ſenſe; and ſo of a Man without a Soul or Reaſon, or a Brute without any Life or Senſe. I mean when we ſpeak of Compound Beings, and not meerly of Corporeity in the notion, as abſtracted from all Vital moving principles.
XIV. 2. And what the true notion of Matter or Corporeity it ſelf is, it is but darkly and uncertainly known, how confidently ſoever ſome decantate their moles or quantity, diviſibility or diſcerptibility, and impenetrability: Whether Fire be material, and diviſible and impenetrable, and how far Fire and Spirits herein differ, and ſo Spirits and Bodies, and how far ſenſible muſt enter the definition of Corpus, is not eaſily known.
XV. 3. Nor do we well know the Nature of the ſimple Corporeal Elements; whether they agree only in materiality, quantity, and diviſibility, and impenetrability; and whether they differ only in magnitude, ſhape, ſight and contexture of parts; or by any eſſentiating Formal Virtues; or both; or (as Mr. Got thought) by a differencing proper ſpirit.
XVI. 4. How little of the Divine Artifice is known in the compoſition of mixt Bodies? (And we know of no exiſtent Simples in the world, that are not found only in Compoſitions.) All men confeſs that every Plant, every Worm, or Fly, every ſenſitive, yea every ſenſible Being, is ſo little known to us, as that the unknown part far exceedeth the known.
XVII. 5. And we are not agreed of late of the number of the very Elements themſelves; much leſs of Compounds; of which, while we know ſo few, that which we do know is the more defectively known; becauſe (as in knowing of Letters and Syllables) the knowledge of one thing is needful to the true and uſeful knowledge of another.
XVIII. But the Order and Relations of things to one another is ſo wonderfully unſearchable, and innumerably various, as quite ſurpaſſeth all humane underſtanding. Yea, though ORDER and Relation conſtitute all Morality, Policy, Literature, &c. ſo that it is as it were that World which humane Intellects converſe in, and the buſineſs of all humane Wills and Actions, yet few men know ſo much as what ORDER and RELATION is: Nay, nor whether it be Any thing or nothing: And though health and ſickneſs, harmony and diſcord, beauty and uglineſs, virtue and vice, conſiſt in it, and Heaven and Hell depend upon it, and Law and Judgment do make and determine it; yet is it not eaſie to know what it is by an Univerſal Notion; nor whether it be truly to be called Any thing at all. We doubt not but ORDER ſhould be a moſt obſervable Predicament, in the Series of humane Notions or nominanda: But yet I doubt not much but that Gaſſendus who would make tempus and ſpatium two of his Predicaments, doth aſcribe to them that Entity which they have not.
XIX. And though undoubtedly Action is a noble Predicament, and whatever the Carteſians ſay, requireth more cauſation than non agere doth; yea is it ſelf the cauſation of the mutations in the World; yet men ſcarce know what to call it. Some ſay it is res: others it is but accidens rei; and others modus rei; ſome ſay, It is in paſſo: Some ſay it is in agente: Some ſay it is neither, but is agentis: Some ſay immanent acts are Qualities, as Scotus, &c.
XX. And which is yet worſe, the very name, Accident, Mode and Quality, are but general unapt notions, not well underſtood by any that uſe them, nor ſuited meetly to the ſeverals contained under them. And when we call a thing, (or nothing) a Quality, Accident or Mode, we are little the wiſer, and know not well what we have ſaid. Sure I am that they are exceedingly heterogenea which Ariſtotle comprizeth in the very predicament of Quality. And Gaſſendus thought all Accidents may be as well called Qualities or Modes.
XXI. And which is yet worſe, all humane language is ſo wofully Ambiguous, that there is ſcarce a word in the World that hath not many ſenſes: and the learned world never came to agreement about the meaning of their common words, ſo that ambiguity drowneth all in uncertainty and confuſion.
XXII. And which is yet worſe, the certain apprehenſion of Senſe and Reaſon, is commonly by men called Learned, reduced to, and tryed by, theſe dreaming ambiguous names and univerſal notions: and men are drawn to deny their certain knowledge, becauſe they know not by what univerſal term to call it, e. g. I know as far as is uſeful to me, by ſeeing what Light is; but whether it be Subſtantia, Accidens, Modus, &c. or what to call it univerſally, few know! And no wonder, for their univerſal notions are their own works or Entia rationis, fabricated by the imperfect comparing of things with things, by ignorant underſtandings; but the ſenſibility of objects & the ſenſitive faculty & the Intellect, are the works of God. I know much better what Light is by ſeeing it, than I know what an Accident or a Quality is.
So I know by feeling what Heat is, I know what Motion or Action is, I know what pain and pleaſure is, I know what love and hatred is, I know partly what it is to think, to know, to will, chooſe and refuſe; but what is the right univerſal notion of theſe, what true definition to give of any one of them, the Learnedſt man doth not well know; Inſomuch, as I dare boldly ſay, that the vulgar ordinarily know all theſe better without definitions, than the moſt Learned man living can know them by definitions alone.
And here I will preſume to ſtep aſide, to ſay as in the Ears of our over-doing Separatiſts, who can take none into Chriſtian Communion, that cannot tell you how they were Converted, or at leaſt give them a fair account of their underſtanding all the Articles of the Faith, in words that are adapted to the matter: I tell you 1. That the knowledge of Words, and ſecond Notions and Definitions, is one thing, and the knowledge of Matters or Things is another. 2. And it is the knowledge of the Things, and not of the Words, that is primarily and abſolutely neceſſary to Salvation. 3. And that many an illiterate, ill bred perſon underſtand things long before they can utter their underſtandings in any intelligible words. 4. And therefore if any man do but theſe two things. 1. By Yea or Nay do ſignifie to me, that he underſtandeth the Truth, when I put the matter of (nothing but the Baptiſmal Covenant) into my Queſtions; 2. And do manifeſt ſerious willingneſs accordingly, by avoiding evil, and uſing Gods means; I dare not, I will not refuſe that perſon from the Communion of the Church; Though I would do as much as the rigideſt cenſurer to bring ſuch up to greater knowledge.
XXIII. And on the other ſide men are made to think that they know the things becauſe they know the Names and Definitions: And ſo that they are learned and Wiſe when they know little the more by all their learning. For to be able to talk over all the Critical Books and Lexicons and Grammars; all the Logical Notions and Definitions, is nothing but Organical Knowledge; Like the Shoemaker that hath a Shop full of Laſts, (and that moſt of them unmeet for any mans foot) but never made a Shoe by any of them. And falſe and confuſed and idle names and notions, fill the learned world with Falſe, Confuſed and Vain Conceptions, which Common-Countrey people ſcape, ſo that it coſteth many a man twenty years ſtudy, to be made more erroneous than he would have been, by following an honeſt trade of life.
XXIV. Nay our very Articles of Faith and Practice, which Salvation lyeth on, are commonly tryed by theſe arbitrary Organical notions; whole loads of School Volumes are witneſſes of this. Though the School-men, where our Grammarians deride them as Barbarians, have often done well in fitting words to things, and making the Key meet for the Lock: Yet old terms and notions and axioms too often go for current, and over-rule diſputes, when they are not underſtood, nor are proper or univocal. What work doth Ariſtotle make with Actus and Potentia, and the School-men after him? What abundance of darkneſs do theſe two words contain in all their writings? And for want of other words to ſupply our needs, what abundance of diſtinctions of Actus and Potentiae are the Scotiſts and other Schoolmen fain to uſe? What abundance of diſputes are kept up by the ambiguity of the word [Cauſe] while it is applyed to things ſo different, as Efficience, Conſtitution, and Finality? The like may be ſaid of many more. And then when it cometh to a diſpute of the Divine Nature, of the Soul, of the moſt weighty things, theſe confounding notions muſt over-rule the Caſe. We muſt not have an argument for the Souls Immortality, but what theſe notions check or vitiate; no nor ſcarce for an Attribute of God.
XXV. And it is ſo hard a thing to bring men to that ſelf-denial and labour, as at Age throughly and impartially to reviſe their juvenile conceptions, and for them that learnt words before things, to proceed to learn things now as appearing in their proper evidence, and to come back and cancel all their old notions, which were not found, and to build up a new frame, that not one of a multitude is ever Maſter of ſo much virtue as to attempt it, and go through with it. Was it not labour enough to ſtudy ſo many years to know what others ſay? but they muſt now undo much of it, and begin a new and harder labour? who will do it?
XXVI. And indeed none but men of extraordinary Acuteneſs and Love of truth, and Self-denial and Patience are fit to do it. For, 1. The Common dullards will fall into the ditch when they leave their Crutches. And will multiply Sects in Philoſophy and Religion, while they are unable to ſee the truth in itſelf. And indeed this hath made the Proteſtant Churches, ſo liable to the deriſion and reproach of their adverſaries. And how can it be avoided, while all men muſt pretend to know and judge, what indeed they are unable to underſtand?
2. Yea the half-witted men, that think themſelves acute and wiſe, fall into the ſame Calamity.
3. And the proud will not endure to be thought to err, when they plague the world with error.
4. And the Impatient will not endure ſo long and difficult ſtudies.
5. And when all is done, as Seneca ſaith, they muſt be content with a very few approvers, and muſt bear the ſcorn of the ignorant-learned crowd. Who have no way to maintain the reputation of their own Wiſdom, Orthodoxneſs and Goodneſs, but by calling him Proud, or Self-conceited, or Erroneous, that differeth from them by knowing more than they. And who but the truly ſelf-denying can be at ſo much coſt and labour for ſuch reproach, when they foreknow that he that increaſeth knowledge, increaſeth ſorrow?
XXVII. By theſe means mens minds that ſhould be taken up with God and his Service, are abuſed and vilified, and filled with the duſt and ſmoak of vain, and falſe, and confuſed notions. And mans life is ſpent (as David ſaith) in a vain ſhew. And men dream waking with as great induſtry, as if they were about a ſerious work. Alas how pitifully is much of the learned world employed.
XXVIII. By this means alſo mens precious time is loſt: And he that had time little enough to learn and do things neceſſary, for the common good, and his own ſalvation, doth waſte half of it on he knoweth not what. And Satan that findeth him more ingenious than to play it away at Cards and Dice, or than to Drink and Revel it away, doth caſt another bait before him, and get him learnedly to dream it away about unprofitable words and notions.
XXIX. And by this means the Practice of goodneſs is hindred in the world, yea and Holy Affections quenched. While theſe arbitrary Notions and Speculations, (being mans own) are his more pleaſant game; And Studies and Pulpits muſt be thus employed, and heart and life thus ſtoln from God. Yea it's well if Godlineſs grow not to be taken by ſuch dreamers, for a low, a dull and an unlearned thing; yea if they be not tempted by it to Infidelity, and to think (not only the zealous Miniſters and Chriſtians, but even) Chriſt and his Apoſtles to be unlearned men, below their eſtimation.
XXX. And by the ſame means the deviliſh ſin of Pride will be kept up, even among the Learned, yea and the Preachers of Humility: For what is that in the world (almoſt) that men are prouder of than that Learning which conſiſteth in ſuch notions and words as are afore deſcribed? And the proudeſt man, I think, is the worſt.
XXXI. And by this means the ſacred Chairs and Pulpits will be poſſeſſed by ſuch men, whoſe ſpirits are moſt contrary to a Crucified Chriſt, and to that Croſs and Doctrine which they muſt preach. And when Chriſt's greateſt Enemies are the Paſtors of his Churches, all things will be ordered and managed accordingly; and the faithful hated and abuſed accordingly. Though I muſt add, that it is not this Cauſe alone, but many more concurring to conſtitute a worldly wicked mind, which uſe to procure theſe effects.
XXXII. And by falſe and vain Learning Contentions are bred and propagated in the Churches. None are inſtruments ſo apt, and none have been ſo ſucceſsful, as all Church Hiſtory recordeth and the Voluminous contentions of many ſuch learned parties teſtify.
XXXIII. And this is an increaſing malady, for new Books are yearly written, containing the ſaid arbitrary notions of the ſeveral Authors. And whereas real and organical Learning ſhould be orderly and conjunctly propagated, and Things ſtudied for themſelves, and Words for Things, the ſyſtems of of Arts and Sciences grow more and more corrupted, our Logicks are too full of unapt notions, our Metaphyſicks are a meer confuſed mixture of Pneumatology and Logick; and What part hath totally eſcaped?
XXXIV. And the number of ſuch Books doth grow ſo great, that they become a great impediment and ſnare; and how many years precious time muſt be loſt, to know what men ſay, and who ſaith amiſs, or how they differ?
XXXV. And the great diverſity of Writers and Sects increaſeth the danger & trouble, eſpecially in Phyſicks; by that time a man hath well ſtudied the ſeveral ſects, the Epicureans and Somatiſts, the Carteſians, with the by-parties, (Regius, Berigardus, &c.) the Platoniſts, the Peripateticks, the Hermeticks, Lullius, Patricius, Teleſius, Campanella, White, Digby, Gliſſon, and other Noveliſts; and hath read the moſt learned improvers of the curranter ſort of Philoſophy, (Scheggius, Wendeline, Sennertus, Hoffman, Honorat▪ Faber, Got, &c.) how much of his life will be thus ſpent. And perhaps he will be as far to ſeek, in all points ſaving thoſe common evident certainties, which he might have learned more cheaply in a ſhorter time, than he was before he read them. And will wiſh that Antonine, Epictetus, or Plutarch had ſerved inſtead of the greater part of them. And will perceive that Phyſicks are much fuller of uncertainties, and emptier of ſatisfying uſefulneſs than Morality, and true Theology.
XXXVI. By ſuch falſe methods and notions men are often led to utter Scepticiſm, and when they have found out their own errors, they are apt to ſuſpect all the ſubſtance of Sciences to be error. And he ſpeeds well that cometh but with Sanchez to a nihil ſcitur: And he better that cometh but with Cornel. Agrippa, to write Vanity and Vexation upon all the Sciences: for many come to Infidelity it ſelf, and ſome to Atheiſm: And, as Dr. Tho. Jackſon noteth, by ſuch diſtruſt of men and humane things, are tempted into a diſtruſt or unbelief of Chriſt; or perhaps with Hobbs grow to cry down all Learning beſides their own, which is worſe than the worſt that they decry.
XXXVII. And by all this Princes and States are tempted to hate Learning it ſelf, and baniſh it as a pernicious thing: As the caſe of the Turkiſh, Muſcovian, and ſome other Empires teſtifie.
All this I have ſaid, not to diſhonour true Learning, which I would promote with all my power; but to ſhew the Corruption and Vanity of that Philoſophy and humane falſe Learning, which Paul and the Ancient Writers did decry; and why the Council of Carthage forbad the reading of the Gentiles Books, and reproached Apollinarius, and other Hereticks for their Gentile Learning.
Of the great uncertainty of our Phyſicks and Metaphyſicks, almoſt all the chief Authors themſelves make free confeſſions. See Suarez, Metaph. diſp. 35. pag. 219, 221, 237. Fromondus de Anim. pag. 63. Gaſſendus often; and who not?
Pious Bonaventure hath written a Tract de Reductione Artium ad Theologiam; and another de non frequentandis quaeſtionibus; Cornel. Agrippa de Vanitate Scientiarum, is well worth the reading beforehand to prevent mens loſs of time.