The Reasons of the Christian Religion Part 1, Part 1 · Chapter 4
CHAP. IV. Of Man, and other things, as produced by their firſt Cauſe.
§. 1. I Was not always what I am.
It is not yet ſixty years ſince I was no man:Read Galen's admirations of the Creator, l. de uſu part. praecipue l. 3. cap. 10. I had a late beginning, and though I now enquire not of what duration my ſoul is, my preſent compoſition is not from eternity: the ſame I ſee of others, that are born men, who were lately none: and ſo of all things that are here generated.
§. 2. I did not make my ſelf, Animorum nulla in terris origo eſt. Nil enim eſt in animis noſtris miſtum & concretum, aut quod ex terra natum, humidum, igneum, &c. His enim naturis nihil ineſt quod vim memoriae, mentis, cogitationis habeat, &c. Nec invenietur unquam unde ad hominem venire poſſint, niſi à Deo. Cicero.at leaſt as an independent uncauſed being.
I could not as I am, make my ſelf what I am: for ſo my ſelf as the cauſe ſhould be before my ſelf as the effect, which is a contradiction, unleſs the word [ſelf] be uſed equivocally. When I was not I acted not. If it be ſaid by any, that the Soul did fabricate a Body to it ſelf, and ſo one part of me made the other, I anſwer, 1. My ſoul did not make the matter of that Body: for if it did, it made it of ſomething or of nothing; if of ſomething, either it made that ſomething or not; if not, then it made not the firſt matter of the Body. If it made it of nothing, it muſt be Omnipotent; but it is conſcious of impotency. 2. My ſoul did not make it ſelf, for then it muſt be before it ſelf, which is impoſſible. And if I made neither form nor matter, I did not make my ſelf. If it be ſaid, that my Soul is an eternal uncauſed being, and ſo did fabricate this Body as a dwelling for it ſelf: I anſwer, 1. As to the ſuppoſed fabrication,Quis eſt tam vecors, qui cum ſuſpexerit in coelum, Deo, eſſe non ſentiat? & ea quae tantâ mente fiunt, ut vix quiſquam arte ullâ, ordinem rerum, atque viciſſitudinem perſequi poſſit, caſu fieri putet. Cicer. de Reſp. Aruſp. it is conſcious it ſelf of no ſuch thing. And if my Soul made my body, either it was as a cauſa ſubminiſtra vel inſtrumentalis, by the direction and power of a ſuperiour cauſe, or elſe of and by it ſelf as the prime cauſe. If the firſt, then it is a cauſed and dependent being it ſelf, and ſo leadeth us to a higher cauſe. If the ſecond be affirmed, and ſo my Soul an eternal, uncauſed, independent being; then, 1. That which is without beginning, cauſe and dependency, muſt needs be ſelf-ſufficient, and be the higheſt excellency; it muſt have an infiniteneſs, and need no help from any other: But my Soul is conſcious of imperfection in knowledge, its ignorance is its burden and diſhonour,Placet Stoicis corruptibilem eſſe Mundum, quippe genitum eorum ratione quae per ſenſus intelliguntur. Cujus & partes ſunt corruptibiles & totum, partes autem mundi corruptibiles ſunt, in ſe invicem mutantur. Eſt igitur corruptibilis Mundis. Ae quicquid mutari in deterius poteſt, corruptibile eſt. Mundus autem huic mutationi & corruptioni obnoxius eſt. Laert. in Zenone. it knoweth not ſo much as is here aſſerted of it ſelf, it knoweth no ſuch perfections or operations, it knoweth little comparatively of the Univerſe, or of any particular thing in it. If it were an eternal, uncauſed, independent Being, it need not all the helps of evidence and argument in this diſpute. Moreover it is conſcious of imperfection in Goodneſs, and defilement of Evil: it is defective in governing this fleſh, which could never be able to make me a ſinner or culpable, if it were animated with an uncauſed independent being. Moreover I am conſcious of impotency in every thing that I go about: a thouſand difficulties poſe and ſtall me! a thouſand things I would do and cannot, and as many I would have and cannot: whereas an uncauſed independent mind, ſhould neceſſarily have an uncauſed independent power, and wiſdom, and goodneſs, and ſo ſhould at leaſt partake of infiniteneſs in all.
Mundum autem fieti (dicunt Stoici) cum ex igne ſubſtantia per aërem verſa in humorem fuerit; deinde eraſſior ipſius pars effecta fuerit terra: porro ſubtilior in aërem ceſſerit, eadem que magis ac magis extenuata in ignem evaſerit. Id. ibid.And if my Soul did thus fabricate my Body, then what needed it pre-exiſtent Matter to make it of? And why did it not make it ſooner, ſeeing it hath ſuch an inclination to it? Can an independent Mind be ignorant what it was, and what it did it ſelf from all eternity, before it entred into this fleſh? And why doth it not amend the infirmities of this Body? or why did it not make it ſelf a Body more excellent, more comely, more ſound, more clean, and more durable? Could it chooſe no better? can it not heal and perfect this? can it not prevent the diſſolution of it? Seeing I find it ſo much in love with it, and ſo unwilling to be ſeparated from it, if it were an independent mind, and cauſed it at the firſt, it would not be unwillingly taken from it, and leave it to rottenneſs and duſt?
And if my Soul did thus independently make my Body, did all other Souls do ſo by their Bodies, or not? If they did not, then they had a ſuperiour Cauſe; if they did, then it ſeems that every Worm, and Fly, and Toad hath a Soul, that is an eternal, uncauſed, independent being. But why then have they no knowledge, no reaſon, no ſpeech? why did they not chooſe a more honourable dwelling? why do they all ſtoop to the ſervice of man, if they are equally excellent? And then it would follow that there are as many eternal independent beings, as there are Souls or living Wights in all the world. And ſo inſtead of one true perfect God, there would be innumerable demi-gods, which all had the perfection of independencies, and none of them had a perfection of being and ſufficiency: which would put us upon the further enquiries, whether they do all their buſineſs independently, or by a general council and conſent, and how they all do to agree, and not fall into perpetual wars; how the ſoul of an ideot, or a wicked man, or of a Toad or Serpent, came to be ſo ſelf-denying as to be contented with that part, when the Soul of Ariſtotle, and Seneca, and Paul were ſo much better provided for.
And if all this were ſo, who made the things inanimate, that have no ſouls of their own to make them? For my part I made them not. And my Soul is conſcious that it is a dependent being, that cannot illuminate it ſelf, nor know what it would know, nor be what it would be, nor do what it would do, nor can ſupport its body or it ſelf an hour. It looketh dependently to ſomething higher for help, and protection, and ſupply, and mercy, and is paſt all doubt that it is no God.
If it be ſaid that all Souls are but one, even parts of the univerſal Soul of the World,Chryſippus & Poſſidonius aiunt Mundum regi & adminiſtrari ſecundum mentem & providentiam, Mente per omnes illius partes pertingente; ſicut & in noſtra anima contingit, ſed per lias magis, per illas minus. Laert. in Zen. and that individuation is by Matter only, and that ſo though my Soul be not the whole firſt cauſe and being, it is a part of it: I anſwer, 1. I note by the way, that this hypotheſis acknowledgeth that which I am ſearching after, viz. that there is a God: and it aſſerteth higher things of man than I am proving, viz. That he hath not only an immortal Soul, but a Soul that is part of God himſelf. 2. And according to this, the Soul of every Heliogabalus, Sardanapalus, Ideot or Toad, ſhould be part of God. 3. And then all ſouls ſhould be alike, if all be God; the Soul of a murderer,Anaxogoras docuit Mentem, confufis primo rebus acceſſiſſe, omniaque compegiſſe ſimul & ordinaſſe. Laert. in …nax. ex Timone. Ovid's deſcription of the Creation of the world, is almoſ as if he had taken it out of Moſes, Metaph. l. 1. and of him that is murdered, of a Nero and a Saint, yea, of Caeſar and of his Dog. And how then cometh there ſo much enmity between them, and ſo great diſparity? why is one wiſe, and another fooliſh or bruitiſh, and one the Ruler of the other? The Soul of a Bird or Horſe ſeemeth to be lodged in as good a kind of matter as Mans; or at leaſt, the Soul of a Nero in as good a matter as the Soul of Paul; or at leaſt, the Soul of one that turneth to villany from virtue, hath the ſame matter which it had before. And certainly it is not matter that principally individuateth, but forms. Nor is the difference between good men and bad, and between Men, and Serpents or Beaſts, ſo much in Matter as in the Soul.
Moreover Nature teacheth all men to ſeek felicity, and fear infelicity and calamity: which they need not do, nor could not do, if they were all parts of God: God cannot be miſerable, but Man can, as to his Soul as well as his Body, and the miſery of his Body is little to that of the Soul even in this life. God cannot be evil, but the Soul may be vitiated and evil, as experience teacheth. God may not be puniſhed or afflicted, but a wicked man may be puniſhed and afflicted, even in his mind or Soul; and a Magiſtrate will not think, when he hangeth a thief, that he either puniſhed bare fleſh, or that he puniſhed God.
Moreover God can wrong no man, but one man may wrong another. God need not fear doing any thing amiſs, but the Soul of man muſt fear it. No part of God can be ſo unhappy as to chooſe to be a Toad, or a wicked or miſerable man. God hath no Body, but ſo have theſe Souls; elſe when men eat a plant, or bird, or any fleſh, they eat part of the Body of God.
Moreover I find, that it is Bodies only that are Quantitative or Extenſive, and ſo diviſible into parts: many parts of one Body may be animated by one Soul, but not by many parts of that one Soul, (except the Soul be material it ſelf.)
But why (may ſome object) may I not hold, that all the Orbs being one world, or one Body of one informing Soul, which is God; and ſo that really thoſe which you call individuals, are but parts of this one animated world. Anſw. This is confuted by what is ſaid. Whether the world be animated by one *The Pythagoreans and Plato. So Balbus in Cicer. de Nat. Deor. l. 2. and many more. But Cicero in other places ſpeaketh of God, not as the Soul of the world formally and conſtitutively, but only efficiently, calling him, The Parent of the Ʋniverſe, the Maker of all things, &c. So that it ſeems that he took not God, pro formâ mundi, but as we do, for More than the Soul of it, even the firſt Efficient. And lib. de Univerſ. he ſuppoſeth the Eternal God to have created that God who is the Soul of the world.univerſal Soul, we are not now enquiring. But that God is not this informing Soul is before diſproved. In point of efficiency we grant that he is as the Soul of Souls, effecting more than Souls do for their Bodies, but not in point of Conſtitution. He is much more than the Soul of the world, but is not formally its Soul. But, 2. Thoſe men that will think ſo, muſt acknowledge, that as they take the Horſe and the Rider to be both parts of God, and the Child and the Father, and the Subject and the Prince, and the Malefactor and the Judge, and the flagitious wretch and the beſt of men; ſo it is no other memberſhip than what conſiſteth with the difference of moral good and evil, of wiſe and fooliſh, of Governours and Subjects, of Rewards and Puniſhments, of Happineſs and Miſery, which are the things that I am ſeeking after. But ſo few lay this claim to Deity, that I need no further mind them.
§. 3. My Parents were not the firſt cauſe of my being what I am.
As each Individual cannot be the firſt Cauſe of it ſelf, ſo neither can their Parents; for they do not ſo much as know my frame and nature, nor the order and temperature of my parts; nor how or when they were ſet together; nor their uſe, or the reaſon of their location. And certainly he that made me, knew what he did, and why he did it in each particular. My Parents could not chooſe my ſex, nor ſhape, nor ſtrength, nor qualifications.
§. 4. The world which I ſee, and live in, did not make it ſelf.
As Men, and Beaſts, and Trees, and Stones did not make themſelves, ſo neither did they joyn as concauſes or aſſiſtants in the making of the whole; nor did any one of them make the reſt: nor did any of the more ſimple ſubſtances, called Elements, make themſelves; neither the paſſive Elements, or the active; the Earth, the Water, the Air or the Fire: For we know, paſt doubt, that nothing hath no power or action;God never wrought Miracle to convince Atheiſm, becauſe his ordinary works convince it. Lord Bacon Eſſay 16. p. 87. and before they were, they were not, and therefore could not make themſelves. Nor can they be the firſt cauſe of mixt bodies, becauſe there is that exceeding wiſdom moſt apparent in the generation, production, nature and operations of theſe Bodies, which theſe Elements have not.
§. 5. The viſible world is not an uncauſed independent Being.
For all the generated parts we ſee, do oriri & interire; they have a beginning, progreſs, decay and end. And the inanimate parts having leſs of natural excellency than the living, cannot infinitely exceed them, in the excellency of Deity as uncauſed and independent. And we ſee that they are all dependent in their operations. They ſhew in the order of their beings and action, that incomprehenſible wiſdom, which is not in themſelves: the Earth, the Sea, the Air and Winds, are all ordered exactly by a Wiſdom and a Will, which they themſelves are void of. Beſides, they are many and various; but their order and agreement ſheweth, that it is ſome One univerſal Wiſdom and Will which ruleth them all: and if they are dependent in operation, they are certainly dependent in being. And had they that excellency to be uncauſed and independent, they would have had therewith all other perfections, which we ſee they want; and they would not have been many but one in that perfection.
§. 6. The firſt univerſal Matter is not an uncauſed independent being.
If ſuch there be, its inactivity and paſſiveneſs ſheweth it to want the excellency of independency: and the ordination of it into its ſeveral beings, and the diſpoſals of it there, is done by a principle of infinite power, activity and wiſdom: on which having this dependence in its ordination and uſe,The Platoniſts ſimile is, As the ſubſtance and ſhadow may be at one time, though one be the cauſe of the other; ſo here. it muſt be dependent alſo in its being.
§. 7. If it were doubtful whether the world were eternal, and whether it were the Body of God as the informing Soul, yet it would be paſt doubt that it is not uncauſed or independent, but cauſed by God.
That the world is not eternal we want not natural evidence: for,(Vid.) Raymond. Lullium Arte magna de tabul. cap. 2, 3, 4, 5. ad ſin. 23. And Alex. Gill on the Creed, pag. 88, 89, &c. & pag. 96, &c. Lege etiam Diſputationem Zachariae Scholaſt. Epiſe. Mitilen. cum Ammonio contra mundi aeternitatem, in Bib. Pa. Graecolat. To. 1. pag. 330, &c. ſaith Lullius, then there would be two Eternals, the Cauſe and its Effects; and then all things would be cauſed by natural neceſſity, and not by free will, and conſequently always alike: and then there hath been Evil eternally, and both the cauſed Good and the Evil would in all other aggravations be anſwerable to Eternity, and the Evil would be as ſoon, as great, as durable as the good. The ſame world which is finite in good and evil, and other reſpects, would be infinite in Eternity; and the evil would have an infiniteneſs in point of Eternity, and this neceſſitated by the eternity of the world: And ſeeing no individuals are eternal, the ſuppoſed eternity of the world muſt be but of ſome common matter, or only intentional and not real. The corporeal part having quantity, is finite as to extenſion, and therefore cannot be infinite in duration. In Eternity then there is no time, no prius & poſterius; but in the world there is. Much more is ſaid by many; but this is not my preſent task, I ſhall ſay more of it afterward.
But if it were doubtful whether the world were not eternally the Body of God, yet would it be undoubted ſtill that he cauſed it. And that there were the difference of a cauſe and an effect, in order of nature, though not in duration. As if a Tree or a mans body were ſuppoſed eternal, yet the root and ſpirits of the Tree, and the principal parts and ſpirits in mans body would be the cauſal parts on which the reſt depend.
§. 8. It remaineth therefore moſt certain, that ſomething is a firſt Cauſe to all things elſe, and that he is the Creator of all things.
For if the world be not uncauſed and independent, it hath a Cauſe; and if it have a Cauſe it hath a Creator: For when there was nothing but himſelf, he muſt make all things of Himſelf, or of Nothing: not of Himſelf, for He is not Material, and they are not parts of God (who is indiviſible:) He that thinks otherwiſe, ſhould not kill a Flea or a Toad, nor blame any man that beateth, or robbeth, or wrongeth him, nor eat any creature; becauſe he doth kill, and blame, and eat a part of God, who is unblameable, and can injure none, and is to be more reverenced.
§. 9. If there were any doubt whether the Sun, or Fire, Quid enim poteſt eſſe tam apertum, tamque perſpicuum, cum coelum ſuſpeximus, coeleſtiaque contemplati ſumus, quàm eſſe aliquod numen, praeſtantiſſimae mentis, quo haec regantur. Cicer. l. 2. de Nat Deor.or paſſive matter had a firſt Cauſe, there can be no doubt at all concerning MAN, which is the thing which I am enquiring into at the preſent.
For every one ſeeth that Man hath his beginning, and confeſſeth that it is but as yeſterday ſince he was not; and therefore hath a Cauſe which muſt be uncauſed, or have a Cauſe it ſelf: if the latter, then that Cauſe again is uncauſed, or hath a Cauſe it ſelf. And ſo we muſt needs come at laſt to ſome uncauſed cauſe.
§. 10. If any ſecond Cauſe had made Man or the World, yet if it did it but as a cauſed Cauſe, it ſelf would lead us up to an uncauſed Cauſe, which is the firſt Cauſe of all, which we are ſeeking after.
Eſſe igitur Deos perſpicuum eſt: ut id qui neget, vix cum ſanae mentis exiſtinem. Cicer, de Nat. Deor. 2.For what any Cauſe doth by a power received from a higher Cauſe, and conſequently ordered by it, that is done principally by that firſt or higheſt Cauſe. And if God had made the world by an Angel or Intelligence, it would have been nevertheleſs his Creature, nor any thing the leſs to his honour than if he had made it by himſelf alone.
§. 11. The ſumm of all is, that There is certainly a firſt uncauſed independent Cauſe of Man, and all things elſe, beſides that Cauſe.