The Reasons of the Christian Religion Part 1, Part 1 · Chapter 5

The Reasons of the Christian Religion Part 1 · Part 1 · Chapter 5

p. 16CHAP. V. What this Cauſe is, in it ſelf. That it is God.

§. 1. THe firſt Cauſe is known to us imperfectly, and by the effects.Agnoſcimus Deum ex operibus ejus. Cic. 1 Tuſc.

Man is ſo conſcious of his ignorance herein, and of the perplexities and diverſities of opinions which follow thereupon, and of the neceſſity of beginning downward at the effects, and riſing upward in his enquiry, that I need not prove this Propoſition to any man.

Commoda quibus utimur, lucem qua fruimur, Spiritum quem ducimus, à Deo no…is dari & impertiri videmus. Cic. pro Roſc.§. 2. Though God (or the firſt Cauſe) is to be ſearched after in all his works, yet chiefly in the chiefeſt of them within our reach; which is Man himſelf.

If any ſhall ſay, that the Sun and other creatures are more excellent than Man, and therefore God (or the firſt Cauſe) is to be ſearched after rather in them, and his Attributes denominated from them: I anſwer, There is no doubt but ſecundum quid, Jovem dominatorem rerum & omnia nutu regentem, & praeſentem & praepotentem, qui dubitat, haud ſanè intelligo cur non idem, Sol ſit, an nullus ſit dubitare poſſit, Cicer. de Nat. Deor. l. 2. pag. (mihi) 48.the Sun is a nobler Creature than Man. But what it is ſimpliciter we cannot tell, unleſs we knew it better. The higheſt exellencies known to man in the Sun, is the Potentia Motiva, Illuminativa & Calefactiva; Motion, Light and Heat, with their effects, do tell us, what we know of it. That which we are conſcious of in Man is, Poſſe, Scire, Velle; Power, Intellection and Will, with their Perfections; which are an higher excellency than Motion, Light and Heat.

§. 3. He that giveth Being to all elſe that is, muſt needs be the firſt Being formally or eminently Himſelf.

p. 17Entity muſt needs be in the nobleſt ſenſe or ſort,Tria ſunt inviſibilia Dei: h. e. Potentia, Sapientia, Benignitas; à quibus omnia procedunt, in quibus omnia ſubſiſtunt, per quae omnia reguntur: Pater eſt Potentia, Filius ſapientia, Spiritus ſanctus Benignitas: Potentia creat, Sapientia Gubernat, Benignitas conſervat (& perficit.) Potentia per benignitatem ſapienter creat: Sapientia per potentiam benigne Gubernat: Benignitas per ſapientiam potenter conſervat: ſicut imago in ſpeculo cernitur, ſic in natura animae, &c. Huic ſimilitudini Dei approximat homo: Cui Potentia Dei dat bonum poſſe; ſapientia tribuit ſcire, benignitas praeſtat velle: haec triplex animae rationalis vis eſt; ſcil. Poſſe, Scire, Velle: quae ſupra dictis tribus fidei, ſpei & charitati cooperantur, &c. Poth… Prumenſis de ſtatu Domus Dei, lib. 1. in Boblioth. Pat. V. 9. in the Primum Ens, the original of Being, rather than in any derived Being whatſoever. For it cannot give better than it hath: ſo that Ens, or [I am] is his firſt Name.

§. 4. He that hath made Subſtances more noble than Accidents, is Himſelf a Subſtance either formally or eminently; and a Living Subſtance, yea Life it ſelf.

Once for all, by [Eminently] I mean ſomewhat more excellent, or tranſcendent, which yet Man hath no better Name for, or fitter Notion of. God is thus a Subſtance, Life tranſcendently, if not formally.

§. 5. He that hath made Intelligences, or Spirits, or Minds, more noble and excellent than Bodies, is himſelf a Mind, Intelligence or Spirit, either formally, or tranſcendently and eminently.

We find that corporeal, groſs and denſe Beings are moſt dull and paſſive, and have leaſt of excellency: The Body of it ſelf in compariſon of the Mind, is a dull and dirty clod. Though we have no adequate conception of a Spirit, we know not onelyonly Negatively, that it containeth a freedom from the baſeneſs and inconveniences of corporeity, but alſo we know by its eſſential acts, that poſitively it is a pure active Life, Intelligence and Will, and therefore a more excellent ſort of Being, than things meerly corporeal which have no ſuch action. So that we have found, as to his Being, that the firſt Cauſe is Ens, Subſtantia, Vita, Spiritus.

§. 6. There muſt needs be in the firſt Cauſe an Eſſe, Poſſe, & Operari.

If there were no Operation, there were no Cauſation: If there were no Power, there could be no Operation: and if there were no Being, there could be no Power. Not that theſe are things ſo various as to make a compoſition in the firſt Cauſe; but they are tranſcendently in it without diviſion and imperfection, by a formal or virtual diſtinction.

§. 7. Seeing the nobleſt Creatures known to us are Minds that have a Poſſe, Scire, Velle, active, executive Power, with an Ʋnderſtanding to guide it, and a Will to command it, God hath either formally, or eminently and tranſcendently ſuch a Power, Intellect and Will, which is his Eſſence.

For nothing is more certain, than that no Cauſe can give more than it had to give: If the firſt Cauſe had not Power, p. 18Underſtanding and Will,Deo nihil praeſtantius, ab coigitur neceſſe eſt m…um regi. Nihi igitur eſt na… …e…ens aut ſu… … D…s: Om…g …git ipſe natura… a… tenim ſi concedlimus intelligentes eſſe Deos. concedimus et am providentes, & rerum quidem maximarum. Cicer. de Nat. Deur. either formally or eminently in a higher and nobler kind, he could not have endowed all mankind with what he had not.

1. That the firſt Cauſe is moſt powerful is evident by his works: he that gave Man his meaſure of power, and much more to many other creatures, hath himſelf much more than any of them: He that made this marvellous frame of all the Orbs, and cauſeth and continueth their being, and their conſtant rapid motion, is incomprehenſibly potent. Whatſoever Power there is in all the Creatures viſible and inviſible ſet together, there muſt be more or as much in their firſt Cauſe alone, becauſe nothing can give more Power than it hath.Dicitis nihil eſſe quod Deus efficere non poſſit, & quidem ſine ullo labore: ut enim hominum membra ſine ulla contentione mente ipſa ut moveantur, ſic numine Deorum omnia fingi, moveri mutarique poſſe. Neque id dicitis ſuperſtitioſe atque aniliter, ſed Phyſicâ conſtantique ratione: inquit Cotta de Stoicis in Cicer. de Nat. Doer. 3. p 110.

2. His works alſo prove that the firſt Cauſe is an Ʋnderſtanding: for the admirable compoſure, order, nature, motions, variety and uſefulneſs of all his Creatures, do declare it. He that hath given Ʋnderſtanding to Man, hath formally or eminently more himſelf, than all men and all his creatures have. If Intellection were not an excellency above meer natural or bruitiſh motion, Man were not better than the inanimates or bruites; but if it be, the Giver of it cannot want it. Not that his Intellection is univocally the ſame thing with ours. But it is ſomething incomparably more noble, which expreſſeth it ſelf in humane Intellection as its Image, and is ſeen by us in this Glaſs, and can be expreſſed by us no better than by this name.

3. And as it is a nobler nature which acteth by Volition, or Free-will, than that which hath no Will at all, and ſo no voluntary choice and complacency; ſo the firſt Cauſe which hath given this noble faculty to Man, hath certainly himſelf, though not a Will univocally the ſame with ours, yet a Will of a tranſcendent excellency, which expreſſeth it ſelf in ours as its Image, and muſt be ſomething better and greater, but cannot be lower or leſs. And though ſuch Indetermination as proceedeth from imperfection, and conſequently ſuch Liberty belongeth not to the firſt Cauſe, which hath no defects, yet all that Liberty which belongeth to perfection muſt undoubtedly belong to Him. He that did what we ſee, hath done it willingly and freely.

§. 8. What ever the firſt Cauſe is, it muſt needs be in abſolute Perfection.

p. 19It muſt needs have in it more than the whole world beſides, becauſe it giveth all that to the whole Creation, which it hath received, and is. An imperfect cauſe could never have made ſuch a world as we behold, and partly know. And were the firſt Cauſe imperfect, there would be no perfection in being.

§. 9. The perfection of the firſt Cauſe in Being requireth that it be Eternal, without Beginning or End of duration.

Nothing in the world can be more evident to reaſon, than that ſomething muſt be Eternal, without beginning; nothing being more evident, than that Nothing hath no power, no action, no effects, and ſo can make nothing. And therefore if ever there had been a time, when Nothing was, Nothing could ever have been: imagine that there were Nothing now, and it is certain there never would be any thing.

Obj. Something may oriri de novo without any Cauſe, as well as God be eternally without any Cauſe.

Anſw. Its impoſſible: For he that is eternally, hath all perfection eternally in himſelf, and needeth no Cauſe, being ſtill in being, and being the Cauſe of Cauſes. But Nothing hath no perfection or being, and therefore needeth an Omnipotent Cauſe to give it a being.

Obj. If the world may be created of nothing materially, it may be what it is without any thing efficiently.

Anſw. Impoſſible: Pre-exiſtent matter is not neceſſary to the firſt created matter: for Matter may be cauſed of Nothing by an Omnipotent Efficient, as well as the wonderful frame of all things be made out of Matter. But without an Efficient, no Being can ariſe de novo.

So that it is moſt evident, ſeeing any thing now is, there hath been ſomething eternally. And if ſomething, it muſt needs be the firſt Cauſe, which is chief in excellency, and firſt in order of production, and therefore of exiſtence.

§. 10. The firſt Cauſe muſt needs be independent, in being, perfections, and operations; and ſo be abſolutely ſelf-ſufficient.

For it were not the firſt, if there were any before it:Deus eſt Mens, ſoluta, libera & ſegregata ab omni concretione mortali, omnia ſentiens, movens, &c. Cicer. 1. Tuſcul. and being cauſed by nothing elſe, it was eternally ſufficient in and for it ſelf: otherwiſe that which it were beholden to, would have the place of a Cauſe to it. And if it cauſed not all, or p. 20needed the help of any other,Velleius in Cicer de Nat. Deor. 1. Reciteth the Opinions of many of the Philoſophers, of God, p. 10. Sed Deo (ſi Deus eſt) longum nihil omnino eſt, cui punctum terra eſt, & ſub nutu omnia conſtituta. Arnob. l. 7. p. 63. it is not abſolutely the firſt Cauſe to all others, nor perfect in it ſelf. That which could be eternally without a cauſe, and it ſelf cauſe all things, is ſelfſufficient and independent.

§. 11. The firſt Cauſe muſt needs be free from all imperfection of Corporeity (or Materiality) Compoſition, Paſſibility, corruptibility, Mutability and Mortality, and all other imperfections of defendent beings.

There is ſuch a thing as a Living Principle, and a pure ſpiritual Nature in the created world: and the Maker of it muſt be life and Spirit in a higher purer ſenſe than it, and therefore muſt be free from all its imperfections: and having no cauſe, hath no defect; and having no beginning, can have no end. All this Reaſon doth certainly apprehend.

§. 12. This perfect firſt Cauſe muſt be Immenſe or Infinite in Being.

Not by corporeal extenſion; as if God, as a Body, were in a place, and being more extenſive than all place, were called Immenſe: But in the perfect Eſſence of an eternall Life, and Spirit, and Mind, he is every where without Locality, and all things live, and move, and be in him. The thought of ſpace is but a Metaphorical help to our conception of his Immenſity.

§. 13. Therefore he muſt needs be Omnipreſent.

Plato in lib. leg. Quid ſit omnino Deus, inquiri oportere non cenſet. Cicer. 1. de Nat. Deor.Not by extenſion quantitative, but in a ſort tranſcendent and more excellent, according to the tranſcendent way of his Exiſtence: For if we muſt have conceived of him as no better than a Body, and of Magnitude as an Excellency, we might well have concluded, that he hath made nothing greater than himſelf. Nemo dat quod non habet; and therefore he muſt be more extenſive than all the world, and conſequently abſent from no part of it. Much more when his Being, which ſurpaſſeth corporeity, directeth us to acknowledge a more noble kind of Omnipreſence than Extenſive.

§. 14. Therefore is he Incomprehenſible as to humane underſtanding, or any other created intellect.

Of our own incomprehenſion experience ſufficiently convinceth us here, and Reaſon evinceth the ſame of all created Intellects: for the leſs cannot comprehend the greater; and between finite and infinite there is no proportion. We p. 21know nothing purely-intelligible ſo eaſily and certainly as that God is: But there is nothing that we are ſo far from comprehending: As we ſee nothing more eaſily and certainly than the Sun, which yet we ſee not with a comprehenſive, but a partial and defective ſight.

§. 15. This Infinite Being can be but One.The wiſer ſort of the Heathens believed one only Parent of the Univerſe, but durſt not ſpeak out what they knew, of his unity or perfections. Cicero ſaith, Illum quaſi Parentem hujus Univerſitatis invenire difficile; & cum inveneris, indicare in vulgus, nefas. de Ʋ niverſit. pag. 2. And the ſame he ſaith, lib. 2. de nat. Deor.

For if there were many, they could not be Infinite, and ſo indeed there would be none: nor would there be any one firſt Cauſe of all things: For if one cauſed one part of the World, and another another part, no one were the firſt Cauſe of all: And if they joyned in cauſing all together, they would all conjunctly make but one firſt cauſe, and each one ſeveral be but part of the Cauſe. If there be no one that is ſufficient to make and govern all the World, there is no perfect Being, nor no God: but the effect ſheweth the ſufficiency and the unity of the World (the Orbs being one frame) the unity of the firſt cauſe. Perfection conſiſteth more in the unity of one all ſufficient Being,Stoici dicunt unum Deum eſſe: Ipſum que & mentem, & fatum, & Jovem dicunt: Principio illum cum eſſet apud ſe, ſubſtantiam omnem per aërem in aquam convertiſſe. Et quemadmodum in faetu ſemen continetur, ita & hanc ſerendi rationem in humore talem reſidiſſe, materia ad operandum aptiſſimè parata, ex quâ caetera poſt haec gignerentur. Tum genuiſſe primum elementa quatuor, ignem, aquam, aërem, terram. Videntur autem illis duo eſſe rerum omnia principia, ſaciens videl. & patiens: Quod patitur fine qualitate eſſe ſubſtantiam materiam: Quod autem faciat VERBUM DEUM eſſe quod in ipſa ſit. Hunc enim quippe ſempiternum per ipſum omnem ſingula creare. Laert. in Zenone, p. (mihi) 359, 360. than in a voluntary concurrence of many Beings. The moſt learned Heathens, who thought there were many to be named Gods, did mean but ſubordinate particular Gods, that were under the one univerſal God, whom the Stoicks and Academicks took to be the univerſal Soul, and the ſubordinate Gods the Souls of the particular Orbs and Planets.

§. 16. The Power of this God muſt needs be Omnipotency.

He that hath given ſo great Power to the creatures, as is exerciſed by them, eſpecially the Sun and fixed Stars in their ſeveral Vortices or Orbs; and he that could make ſuch a World of nothing, and uphold the being, and maintain the order, and cauſe, and continue the rapid motions of all the Vortices or Orbs, (which are to us innumerable, and each of incomprehenſible excellency and magnitude) is certainly to be accounted no leſs than Omnipotent. By his Omnipotency I mean that, by which in it ſelf conſidered in primo inſtanti he can do all things poſſible, that is, which belong not to Impotency, but to Power: And by which in ſecundo inſtanti he can do all things, which his Infinite Wiſdom judgeth congruous and meet to be done: And in tertio inſtanti, can do all that he will do, and are pleaſing to him.

p. 22§. 17. The underſtanding of the firſt Cauſe muſt needs be Omniſcient, and infinite Wiſdom.

1. He that hath given ſo much wiſdom to ſuch a Worm as Man, muſt have more than all the men in the World! Whatever knowledge is in the whole Creation, being given by Him, doth prove that formally or eminently he hath more. Were it all contracted into one Intelligence, it muſt be leſs than His that cauſed it. He hath not given more wiſdom than he had to give: nor ſo much as he had (or is) himſelf. For if he ſhould make any thing equal to Himſelf, there would be two Infinites, and there would be a perfect ſelf-ſufficient being, which yet had lately no ſufficiency or being, and there would be a being independent in facto eſſe, which was dependent in fieri: which are Contradictions.

2. The effects in the admirable frame and nature, and motions of the Creation, declare that the Creator is infinitely wiſe. The ſmalleſt inſect is ſo curiouſly made, and ſo admirably fitted and inſtructed to its proper end and uſes; The ſmalleſt Plants in wonderfull variety of ſhapes and colours, and ſmells and qualities, uſes and operations, and beautifull flowers, ſo marvellouſly conſtituted and animated, by an unſeen form, and propagated by unſearchable ſeminal vertue; The ſmalleſt Birds and Beaſts and creeping things ſo adorned in their kinds, and ſo admirably furniſhed for their proper ends, eſpecially the propagation of their ſpecies, in love, and ſagacity, and diligence to their young, by inſtinct equaling in thoſe particulars the reaſonable creature; The admirable compoſure of all the parts of the body of Man, and of the vileſt Beaſt and Vermine; The quality and operation of all the Organs, humours and ſpirits: The operations of the Minde of man; and the conſtitution of Societies, and over-ruling all the matters of the World; with innumerable inſtances in the creature; do all concurr to proclaim that man as mad as madneſs can poſſibly make him (in that particular) who thinketh that any lower cauſe than incomprehenſible wiſdom did principally produce all this; And that by any bruitiſh or natural motion, or confluence of Atomes, or any other matter, it could be thus ordered, continued and maintained, without the infinite wiſdome and power of a firſt p. 23Cauſe, ſuperiour to meer natural matter and motion. What then ſhould we ſay, if we had a ſight into the inwards of all the Earth, of the nature and cauſe of Minerals, and of the forms of all things; If we ſaw the reaſon of the motions of the Seas, and all other appearances of Nature which are now beyond our reach: Yea,Nee enim ignorare poteſt Deus qua mente quiſ que ſit. Cicer. de Div. At ignoratio rerum aliena eſt naturae Deorum; & ſuſtinendi muneris propter imbecillitatem difficultas, minime cadit in majeſtatem Deorum: ex quo efficitur id quod volumus, Deorum providentia mundum adminiſtrari. Cicero ibid. if we had a ſight of all the Orbs, both fixed Starrs and Planets, and of their matter, and form, and order, and relation to each other, and their communications and influences on each other, and the cauſe of all their wonderous motions: If we ſaw not only the nature of the Elements, eſpecially the active Element, Fire; but alſo the conſtitution, magnitude, and uſe, of all thoſe thouſand Suns, and leſſer Worlds, which conſtitute the univerſal World: And, if they be inhabited, if we knew the Inhabitants of each: Did we know all the Intelligences, bleſſed Angels, and holy Spirits, which poſſeſs the nobler parts of Nature; and the unhappy degenerate Spirits, that have departed from light and joy, into darkneſs and horrour, by departing from God; yea, if we could ſee all theſe comprehenſively, at one view; what thoughts ſhould we have of the wiſdom of the Creator? And what ſhould we think of the Atheiſt that denyeth it? We ſhould think Bedlam too honourable a place for that man, that could believe, or durſt ſay, that any accidental motion of ſubtile matter, or fortuitous concourſe of Atomes, or any thing below a Wiſdom and Power infinitely tranſcending all that with Man is called by that name, was the firſt Cauſe, Quod ſi ineſt in hominum genere, mens, fides, virtus, concordia, unde haec in terras niſi à ſuperis diffluere potuerunt? Cum que ſit in nobis conſilium, ratio, prudentia, neceſſe eſt Deos haec ipſa habere majora: Nec habere ſolum, ſed etiam his uti, in optimis & maximis rebus. Cicero de natur. Dorum. lib. 2. pag. 76.and is the chief continuer of ſuch an incomprehenſible frame.

§. 18. The firſt Cauſe muſt needs be infinitely Good.

By Goodneſs I mean all eſſential Excellency, which is known to us by its fruits and appearances in the Creature: which as it hath a Goodneſs natural and moral, ſo is it the Index of that tranſcendent Goodneſs, which is the firſt cauſe of both: This goodneſs is incomparably beyond that which conſiſteth in a uſefulneſs to the creatures good; or Goodneſs of Benignity as relative to Man. And it is known better by the meer name, as expreſsing that which Nature hath an intrinſick ſenſe and notion of, than by definitions. As ſenſible qualities, light, colour, ſound, odour, ſweet, bitter, &c. are known by the name, beſt, which lead to the ſenſitive memory, p. 24which informeth the Intellect what they are: As the mention of things ſenſible entereth the definition of ſenſe, and the mention of ſenſe doth enter the definition of things ſenſible; and yet the object is in order of nature before the act. And as Truth muſt enter the definition of Intellection, and Intellection the definition of Truth; and yet Truth is in order before Intellection, and contemporary with the Intellect: ſo is it between Goodneſs and the Will. But if we ſpeak of uncreated Good, and of a created Will, then Good is infinitely antecedent to that Will. But the Will which is created hath a nature ſuited to it; and ſo the notion of Excellency and Goodneſs is naturally in our eſtimative faculty, and the reliſh of it, or complacency in it, is naturally in the Will, ſo far as it is not corrupted and depraved. As if I knew a man that had the wiſdom and virtue of an Angel, my eſtimation calleth him Excellent and Good, and my Will doth complacentially cleave to him, though I ſhould never look to be the better for him my ſelf: or if I onelyonly heard of him, and never ſaw him, or were perſonally beholden to him.

Deus eſt ſummum Bonum, ſupra omnem ſubſtantiam, omnemque naturam; quod cuncta expetunt, cum ipſe ſit plenae perfectionis, nullius ſocietatis indigus▪ Plato in Tim. Amor Divinus fuit cauſa factionis mundi, & originis omnium rerum. Id. ib Bonus quidem Deus, & quidem Deus cauſa bonorum: Malorum autem omnium non cauſa. Idem de Leg. Deus ſi Vim ſpectes, valentiſſimus, ſi decorem formoſiſſimus, ſi vitam immortalis, denique ſi virtutem piaeſtantiſſimus eſt. Ariſtot de Mun. c. 6.That God is thus infinitely Excellent and Good, the Goodneſs of his Creatures proveth: for all the goodneſs that is in Men and Angels, Earth and Heaven, proceedeth from him. If there be any Natural Goodneſs in the whole Creation, there muſt be more in the Creator: If there be any Moral Goodneſs in Men and Angels, there muſt be more in eminency in him: For he can make nothing better than himſelf, nor give to creatures what he hath not.

§. 19. The Goodneſs of the firſt Being conſiſting in this infinite Perfection or Excellency, containeth his Happineſs, his Holineſs, and his Love or Benignity.

§. 20. The HAPPINESS of the firſt Being conſiſteth, 1. In his BEING HIMSELF. 2. In his KNOWING HIMSELF. 3. In his LOVING and ENJOYING HIMSELF.

The moſt perfect Being muſt needs be the moſt Happy, and that in Being what he is; his own Perfection being his Happineſs. And as Knowledge in the Creature is both his Perfection and Delight, ſo the tranſcendent Omniſcience of the Creator muſt needs be both part of his Perfection, (as diſtinguiſhed by our narrow minds) and ſuch felicity as may be called Eminently p. 25his Delight, Deus eſt Actus illis porro actus qui per ſe eſt; & optimus & aeternus. Atque Deum animal eſſe & aeternum & praeſtantiſſinium dicimus. Vita igitur & aevum continuum & perpetuum Deo ſuppetit: eſt enim hoc Deus. Ariſt. Metaphyſ.though what God's Delight is we know not formally. And as Love or Complacency is the perfective operation of the Will, and ſo of the Humane Nature in Man, and is his higheſt, final, and enjoying acts, of which all Goodneſs is the object; ſo there muſt be ſomething in the Perfection of the firſt Cauſe, though not formally the ſame with Love in Man, yet eminently ſo called, as knowable to us by no other name. And this complacency muſt needs be principally in Himſelf, becauſe He himſelf is the Infinite and onelyonly Primitive Good; and as there was primitively no Good but Himſelf to Love, ſo now there is no Good but derived from Him, and dependent on Him. And as his Creature (of which anon) is obliged to love Him moſt, ſo he muſt needs be moſt amiable to Himſelf. Self-love and ſelf-eſteem in the Creature may be inordinate, and therefore called Pride: but it is impoſſible that infinite Goodneſs it ſelf can be over-valued or over-loved by Himſelf or by any creature.

§. 21. The HOLINESS of the firſt Being conſiſteth, 1. In his ſeparation from all creatures; by that Tranſcendency, which maketh him their end. 2. In the ſpecial Perfection of his WILL, which willeth and hath complacency in that alone ad extra, which is agreeable to his perfect Nature, and infinite Wiſdom. 3. And ſo being the Fountain and Rule of Moral Goodneſs to the Rational Creature.

The Holineſs of Man conſiſteth, 1. In his ſeparation from common uſes unto God. 2. In the Rectitude of his Will, as habitually thus inclined and bent to Moral Good, and hating evil. 3. Whereby it is conform to the governing Will of God. And hence we may learn what Holineſs is in God, though not formally the ſame with that in Man.

§. 22. The Benignity and Love of the firſt Being is his Eſſence or Nature, as inclined to complacency in all created Good; and to benevolence or doing good to creatures, freely and agreeably to his infinite Wiſdom.

The Love of complacency to all created Good, is neceſſary in God, ſuppoſing the continued exiſtence of that created Good, which is the object. But it is not neceſſary that ſuch created Good do continually exiſt. The Love of Benevolence is alſo natural to God in this ſenſe, that it is his natural perfection as reſpecting the Creature to be uſed agreeably to his p. 26perfect wiſdom; but the exerciſe of it is not neceſſary, becauſe the being or felicity of the Creature is not neceſſary; but it is acted freely, according as the infinite wiſdom ſeeth it fit, as to thoſe Ends to which all Creatures are but the Means.

§. 23. The firſt Being muſt needs be the onelyonly ultimate end to himſelf, ſo far as he may be ſaid to intend an End.

Creatas autem Potentia…, creatrix uti que Potentia jare ſupereminet eo ipſo vel maxime quo creavit. Nam & animam animá praeſtantiorem ſaepe & experimur & dicimus. Claudian. Mammort. de Anime Statu. l. 1. cap. 15.God doth not intendere finem in defectiveneſs and imperfection as the Creature doth: He wanteth nothing, nor is he in via as to his felicity. But eminently he may be ſaid to intend an End, as he maketh one thing a means to produce or attain another, and doth nothing diſorderly nor in vain, but ordereth all things in infinite wiſdom. He is not wanting, but enjoying his end at all times, even in the midſt of his uſe of means. To his eſſential Goodneſs and Bleſſedneſs, there is no means, nothing is capable of the honour of contributing to it.When I conſider, that taking any one ſound, if you joyn thereto another, a Third above it, and then place another a third above that alſo; theſe three thus conjoyned and ſounding together, do conſtitute one entire Harmony, which governs and compriſeth all the ſounds, which by art or imagination can at once be joyned together in Muſical con…ordante: This I cannot but think a ſignificant Emblem of that ſupreme and incomprehenſible Three in One, governing, compriſing and diſpoſing the whole Machine of the World, with all its included parts in a perfect Harmony. Chriſtoph. Simpſon's The Diviſion Vioiſt. pag. 17. But his Will is the Beginning of all derived Beings, and his Will is the ultimate End of all. He is pleaſed to make and order all by his power and wiſdom, and he is pleaſed in all things as ſo made and ordered. The complacency of his Will then is the ultimate end of all his works, as the Glory of his own Power, Wiſdom and Goodneſs ſhineth in them. And though Complacency, or Pleaſedneſs, or Will, be not formally the ſame in God, as in us, yet ſomething eminently there is in him, which under this Notion we muſt conceive of, and expreſs.

§. 24. The Poſſe, Scire, Velle, the operative Power, Ʋnderſtanding and Will of God, according to their Perfection, called, his Omnipotency, Omniſciency and Goodneſs, by which he is Maximus, Sapientiſſimus, Optimus, is a wonderful, yet an intelligible and certain Trinity in Ʋnity, viz. In the Ʋnity of Eſſence there is this Trinity of Principles or Faculties, as they may be called from the manner of imperfect man, but deſerve a higher name in God.

§. 25. The Eſſence of God is not the Genus, and theſe three the Species; nor is it the Totum, and theſe three the Parts; nor is it a Subſtance, of which theſe three are Accidents: but they are like the Eſſential faculties in Man, which are one with the Soul in Eſſence, but are not one and the ſame Faculties, but truly diſtinct (whether it be Really, Formally, or Relatively and Denominatively p. 27onelyonly): Gods Power or Omnipotency is not formally the ſame (quoad conceptum objectivum) with his Underſtanding and Wiſdom, nor this the ſame with his Will and Goodneſs; they are as three eſſential Principles, and yet but one Eſſence, and ſo one God. Nor is it part of God that is Omnipotent, and part that is Omniſcient, and part that is Good; or quae poteſt intelligit & vult: lut the whole Godhead is Omnipotent, the whole Omniſcient, and the whole is Good, or Power, Wiſdom and Goodneſs it ſelf: Yet each of theſe Notions by it ſelf alone is not a total or full expreſſion of the whole perfection of the Deity.

Therefore we muſt neither confound the eſſential Principles in God, nor divide the Eſſence. The Omnipotency is as one faculty, the Underſtanding another, and the Will another; but the Godhead and Eſſence of them all is one, the Glory equal, the Majeſty co-eternal. Such as the Power is, ſuch is the Underſtanding, and ſuch is the Will. The Power uncreated, the Ʋnderſtanding uncreated, and the Will uncreated. The Power incomprehenſible, the Ʋnderſtanding incomprehenſible, and the Will incomprehenſible. The Power eternal, the Ʋnderſtanding eternal, and the Will eternal. And yet there are not three eternal Gods or Eſſences, but one Eternal; nor three Incomprehenſibles, nor three Uncreated, but One. The Power is God, the Ʋnderſtanding is God,The Reaſon why the Heathens made Gods of ſeveral Virtues, was, becauſe thoſe Virtues were moſt eminent in God, and by adoring them, men would learn to love and imitate them. Bene Mens, Pietas, Virtus, Fides conſecratur manu: quarum omnium R…mae dedicata publice templ. ſunt, ut illa qui habeant (habent autem omnes boni) Deos ipſos in animis ſuis collocatos putent. Cicer. de Leg. 2. p. 240. and the Will is God: and yet there are not three Gods, but one God. So then, there is One Power, not Three Powers; One Underſtanding, not Three Underſtandings; One Will, not Three Wills. And in this Trinity, none is in duration before or after other, none is greater or leſs than other; but the whole three Principles be co-eternal together, and co-equal. So that in all things as aforeſaid this Unity in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity is to be acknowledged as undeniable in the light of Nature, and to be adored and worſhipped by all.

And becauſe of the Unity of the Eſſence, theſe Three may be predicated in the Concrete of each other, but not in the Abſtract, becauſe of their formal diverſity. And ſo it may be ſaid, that the Power is an Underſtanding or wiſe Power, and the Underſtanding is an Omnipotent Underſtanding, and the Will a moſt Wiſe and Omnipotent Will, and the Power a Good and Willing Power: but not that the Power is the p. 28Underſtanding, and the Underſtanding the Will, or the Will is the Power or Underſtanding.

So as to their Order, the Power, as in it ſelf conſider'd, as an Active Vital Power, is firſt in our conception, and doth as it were act by the Underſtanding, and the Ʋnderſtanding by the Will, and in execution ſo go forth with the Will, that the effect is immediately to be aſcribed to it.

§. 26. Though all the Divine Faculties or Principles are adumbrate (or made manifeſt) in the Creation or Frame of the world, yet the Omnipotency is therein to us moſt eminently apparent.

It is infinite Wiſdom and infinite Goodneſs which ſhineth to us in this wonderful Frame. But we firſt and with greateſt admiration take notice of the Omnipotency. To conſider the innumerable number of the Orbs, the multitude of the Fixed Stars, which may be called ſo many Suns, and to think of their diſtances, magnitude, powers, orders, influences, communications, effects, &c. and how many millions of theſe, for ought we know, there may be, beſides thoſe which are within our ſight, even though helped by the moſt perfect Teleſcopes; it ſtriketh the Soul with unſpeakable admiration at the Power that created and maintaineth all this. When we think of the unconceivable rapid, orderly, perfect, conſtant motions of all theſe Orbs, or at leaſt of the Planets and circumjacent bodies in every Vortex: All theſe thoughts do make the Deity, or firſt Being, to be juſt to the mind as the Sun is to the eye, the moſt Intelligible of Beings, but ſo Incomprehenſible, that we cannot endure to gaze too much or near upon his glory.

§. 27. Whether the whole world be animated, or inanimate: Whether the whole have one conſtitutive Soul or not: Whether each Orb have its particular Soul or not, are things unrevealed, and beyond the Certain knowledge of the natural mind. But it is certain that the firſt Being is not the proper conſtitutive Form or Soul of the world▪ but yet that he is much more to it than ſuch a Form or Soul, even the total, perfect firſt Cauſe of all that it is, and hath, and doth.

He is not the conſtitutive Form or Soul of the Univerſe, (as it ſeems Cicero with the Academicks and Stoicks thought) becauſe then the Creator and the Creature ſhould be the ſame: p. 29or elſe the Creature ſhould be nothing but dead, paſſive matter: and then Man himſelf, who knoweth that he hath a Soul, would either be God, (which his experience and the conſcience of his frailty forbiddeth him to imagin) or elſe he ſhould be a Creature more noble than the Univerſe, of which he is ſo ſmall a part, (which his reaſon forbiddeth him alſo to believe.)

But yet that God is much more to the world than a conſtitutive Soul, is undeniable; becauſe he is the creating Cauſe, Fas autem nec eſt, nec unquam fuit, quicquam niſi pulcherrimum facere eum qui eſſot optimus. Cicer. de Ʋniverſ. p. 269.which is more than a conſtitutive Cauſe: and his continued cauſation in its preſervation, is as a continued creation: As in Man, the Soul is a dependent cauſe, which can give nothing to the Body but what it hath received, nor act but as it is acted or impowered by the firſt efficient. And therefore though we call not God the Soul of Man, becauſe we would not ſo diſhonour him, nor confound the Creator and the creature; yet we all know that he is to us much more than the Soul of Souls, for in him we live, and move, and have our being. So alſo it is as to God's cauſation of the Being, Motion and Order of all the world. God is incomparably more to it than its Form, as being the total firſt Cauſe of Form and Matter. To be the Creator is more than to be the Soul.

§. 28. The glory of all being, action and order in the creatures, is no leſs due to God when he worketh by means, than when he worketh by none at all.

For when no Means is a Means, nor hath being, aptitude,See Theophil. Antioch. ad Autol. l. 1. p▪ in B. p. 128. ſhewing that by Gods Voice ſpeaking to Adam is meant his Son. force or efficacy, but from himſelf, he onelyonly communicateth praiſe to his creatures, when he thus uſeth them, but giveth not away the leaſt degree of his own intereſt and honour: for the creature is nothing, hath nothing, and can do nothing but by him: It uſeth no ſtrength, or skill, or bounty, but what it firſt received from him; therefore to uſe ſuch means can be no diſhonour to him, unleſs it be a diſhonour to be a communicative Good. As it is no diſhonour to a Watch-maker to make that Engine, which ſheweth his skill, inſtead of performing all the motions without that little frame of means: But yet no ſimilitude will reach the caſe, becauſe all creatures themſelves are but the continued productions of the Creator's will; and the virtue which they put forth, is p. 30nothing but what God putteth into them. And he is as neer to the effect, when he worketh by means, as when without.

Sic Plato, cum de Deo loqui eſſet animatus, dicere Quid ſis, non eſt auſus: hoc ſolum de Deo ſciens, quod ſciri Qualis ſit, ab homine non poſſit; ſolem vero ei ſimillimum de viſibilibus ſolum reperit & per ejus ſimilitudinem viam ſermoni ſuo attollendo ſe ad comprehenſibilia patefecit. Nam Deus qui prima Cauſa eſt, unus omnium princeps & origo eſt. Hic ſuper abundanti foecunditate majeſtatis de ſe Mentem creavit. Haec mens quae … vo catur, qua patrem inſpicit, plenam ſimil tud…nem ſervat authoris. Macrob.§. 29. Thoſe that call theſe three faculties, or Principles in the Divine Eſſence, by the name of three Hypoſtaſes, or Perſons, do ſeem to me to ſpeak leſs unaptly than the Schools, who call [Deum ſeipſum intelligentem] the Father, and [Deum ut a ſe intellectum] the Son, and [Deum a ſe amatum] the Holy Ghoſt. For that in God which is to be conceived of us, by Analogy to our eſſential faculties, is with leſs impropriety called [an Hypoſtaſis or Perſon] than that which is to be conceived by us, in Analogy to our actus ſecundi, or receptions.

§. 30. And thoſe that ſay the firſt faculty, Omnipotency, as eminently appearing in the frame of Nature, may therefore be ſaid to be ſpecially therein perſonated, or denominated, the Creating Perſon, ſpeak nothing which derogateth from the honour of the Deity.

§. 31. Though we cannot trace the veſtigia, the adumbration, or appearances of this Trinity in Ʋnity, through the whole Body of Nature and Morality; becauſe of the great debility and narrowneſs of our Minds; Yet is it ſo apparent on the firſt and moſt notable parts of both, as may make it exceeding probable that it runneth in perfect method through them all; if our underſtandings were but able to follow and comprehend that wonderfull method in the numerous, minute and leſs diſcernable particulars.

Nulla gens eſt tam inmanſueta ne que tam ferrea, quae non criamſi ignoret qualem Deum habere deceat, tamen habendum ſciat. Cicero 1 de leg.I ſhall now give no other inſtance, than in two of the moſt noble Creatures. The Soul of Man, which is made after Gods Image; from whence we fetch our firſt knowledge of him, hath in the unity of a living Spirit, the three foreſaid faculties, of vital and executive Power, Ʋnderſtanding and Will, which are neither three ſpecies, nor three parts, nor three accidents of the Soul: But three faculties certainly ſo far diſtinct, as that the Acts from whence they are denominated really differ, and therefore the faculties differ at leaſt in their Virtual Relation to thoſe acts, and ſo in a well-grounded denomination.Omnibus innatum & quaſi inſculptum eſt, eſſe Deos. Idem de Nat. Deor. To underſtand is not to will: for I underſtand that which I have no will to, even againſt my will (for the Intellect may be forced: Therefore the ſame p. 31Soul hath in it the virtue or power both of underſtanding and willing, and ſo of executing:Nulla gens tam fera cujus mentem non imbuerit Deorum … pinio, Idem 1. Tuſc. Dicunt Stoici DEUM eſſe animal immortale, rationale, perfectum & beatum; à malo omni remotiſſimum, providentiâ ſuâ mundum & quae ſunt in mundo adminiſtrans omnia: Non tamen ineſſe illi humanae formae lineamenta: Caeterùm eſſe opificem immenſi hujus operis, ſicut & patrem omnium. Laert. in Zenone, pag. (mihi) 364. I had rather believe all the fables in the Legend, Talmud, Alcoran, than that this univerſal Frame is without a minde. Lord Verulam, Eſſay 16. which are denominated from the different acts which they relate to. There is ſome Reaſon in the powers, virtues, or faculties of the real difference in the acts.

So in the Sun, and all the ſuperior Luminaries, there is in the unity of their Eſſence, a Trinity of Faculties or Powers, 1. Motiva, 2 Illuminativa, 3. Calefactiva; cauſing motion, light and heat. The doctrine of Motion is much improved by our late Philoſophers: when the doctrine of Light and Heat are ſo alſo, and vindicated from the rank of common accidents and qualities, the nature of the Luminaries and of Fire will be alſo better cleared. The Sun is not to theſe Powers or Acts, either a Genus, a Totum, or a Subjectum. It is not one part of the Sun that moveth, and another which illuminateth, and another which heateth: But the whole Sun (if it be wholly Fire or aethereal matter) doth move, the whole illuminateth, and the whole doth heat: And Motion, Light and Heat, are not Qualities inherent in it; But Motion, Illumination, and Calefaction, are Acts flowing immediately from its Eſſence as containing the faculties or powers of ſuch acts.

He that could write a perfect method of Phyſicks and Morality, would ſhew us Trinity in Unity through all its parts from firſt to laſt. But as the Veins, Arteries, and Nerves,Multi de Diis prava ſentiunt: id enim vitioſo more effici ſolet: Omnes tamen eſſe vim & naturam divinam arbitrantur. Nec verò id collocutio hominum aut conſenſus efficit; non inſtitutis opinio eſt confirmata; non legibus: Omni autem in re conſenſio omnium gentium Lex naturae putanda eſt. Cicer. Tuſculan. Qu: l. 1. p. 220. Ceſarius and ſome other of the Ancients, make the Image of God on Man to be his Naturall perfections, and his ſimilitude, to be his moral perfections. the Veſſels of the Natural, Vital, and Animal, humours and ſpirits, are eaſily diſcernable in their trunks and greater branches, but not ſo, when they are minute and multiplied into thouſands, ſo is it in this Method.

But I muſt deſire the Reader to obſerve, that though I here explain this Trinity of Active Principles in the Divine Eſſence, which is ſo evident to Natural Reaſon it ſelf, as to be paſt all controverſie; Yet whether indeed the Trinity of Hypoſtaſes or Perſons, which is part of the Chriſtian Faith, be not ſomewhat diſtinct from this, is a queſtion which here I am not to meddle with, till I come to the ſecond part of the Treatiſe: Nor is it my purpoſe to deny it, but only to p. 32prepare for the better underſtanding of it. Of which more ſhall there afterward be ſaid.

§. 32. And thus all Creatures, and eſpecially our ſelves, declare that there is a firſt Being and Cauſe of them all, who is a Subſtance, Life, a Spirit, or Minde, an Active Power, Ʋnderſtanding and Will, perfect, eternall, independent and ſelf-ſufficient, not compounded, not paſſible, not mutable, corruptible or mortall, Immenſe, Omnipreſent, Incomprehenſible, only One, Omnipotent, Omniſcient, and moſt Good, moſt Happy in Being Himſelf, in Knowing himſelf, and enjoying him; moſt Holy, tranſcending all the Creatures, of a Perfect Will, the Fountain of all Morall Good, Love or Benigne: having a Trinity of eſſential Tranſcendent Principles, in unity of Eſſence, which have made their adumbration or appearance on the World, whereof though he be not the conſtitutive form or Soul, He is to it much more; the firſt Efficient, Dirigent, and ultimate final Cauſe of all: That is, THERE IS A GOD.