The Immortality of Mans Soul, Commentary – Title page 2

The Immortality of Mans Soul · Commentary – Title page 2

OF THE NATURE OF SPIRITS:

A Placid Collation with the Learned Dr Henry More; upon his Anſwer to à private Letter, publiſhed in the ſecond Edition of Mr. Glanviles Sadduceiſmus Triumphatus.

Reverend Sir,

§ 1. THat my haſty Letter ſhould occaſion you to benefit the World with more of your Information, in ſo conſiderable a point, as is the nature of a Spirit, was more than I thought of, or could hope for: Had I imagined that you would have ſo far honoured it, I ſhould have ſo written it, as might have drawn out more of your Inſtruction, and made your Animadverſions yet more edifying.

p. 2§ 2. I deſired you to have forborn the title of Pſychopyriſt, for theſe Reaſons: 1. Becauſe it tendeth plainly to miſinform the Reader, as if I held that Souls (or Spirits) are Fire; whereas in my Books and Letters, I ſtill ſay otherwiſe. And that they may be ſo called not formaliter, or univoce, but only eminenter and analogice. And when a name on the Title page, & through the whole, and a ſuppoſition in much of your arguing, implyeth that I hold what I renounce, it may wrong your Reader's underſtanding, though I am below the capacity of being wronged.

2. And the faſtning of Nicknames on one another in Controverſies of Religion, hath ſo much cauſed Schiſms, and other miſchiefs, that I confeſs I the leſs like it about Philoſophy. But I muſt ſubmit.

§ 3. My underſtanding is grown ſo ſuſpicious of ambiguity in almoſt all words, that I muſt confeſs that what you ſay alſo againſt thoſe whom p. 3you call Holenmerians and Nullibiſts ſatisfieth me not, unleſs many terms uſed in the controverſies, were farther explained than I find them here, or in your Metaphyſicks (your Books againſt Judge Hale I have not ſeen.) But I may take it for granted that you know that they who uſe the ſaying of [Tota in toto, & tota in qualibet parte] ordinarily tell us; 1. That they uſe the word Tota relatively, and improperly; ſeeing that which hath no parts is improperly called Tota. 2. That they mean it but negatively, viz. That the Soul is not in the parts of the body, per partes, part in one part, and part in another, but indiviſibly. And one would think this ſhould ſuit with your own hypotheſis.

And when I better know in what ſenſe Locus is uſed, I ſhall be fitter to enquire whether Spirits be in loco. When ſome take it for a circumſcribing body, and ſome for a ſubjective body (on which it operateth) and ſome for a meer room poſſeſt in vacuo, and ſome for God himſelf in whom are all things, the name of a Nullibiſt is as ambiguous to me.

§ 4. You tell your Reader that [All created Spirits are Souls in all probability, and actuate ſome Matter or other.]

Sir, Philoſophers freedom is uſually taken eaſilyer than Divines; I will therefore preſume that our mutual freedom ſhall not be in the leaſt diſtaſtful to either of us: And ſo I muſt tell you that I have long taken it for a matter of very great uſe to diſtinguiſh unknown things from known, and to bridle my underſtanding from preſuming to enquire into unrevealed things: And I take that holdneſs of Philoſophers to have had a great hand in corrupting Divinity. Secret things are for God, and things revealed for us and our Children, ſaith Moſes. And when I preſume moſt, I do but moſt loſe my ſelf, and miſuſe my underſtanding: nothing is good for that which it was not made p. 5for: Our underſtandings as our Eyes are made only for things revealed. In many of your Books I take this to be an exceſs; And I have oft wondred at your Friend, and (ſometime) mine, Mr. Glanvile, that after his Scepſis ſcientifica, he could talk▪ and write of doubtful things with that ſtrange degree of confidence, and cenſuring of Diſſenters as he did. I am accuſed of overdoing, and curioſity my ſelf: But I endeavour to confine my enquiries to things revealed.

This premiſed I ſay, undoubtedly it is utterly unrevealed, either as to any certainty or probability, that all Spirits are Souls, and actuate Matter. Alaſs how ſhould we come to know it. Neither Nature nor Scripture tells it us.

But 1. If this be ſo, the difference between you and the Pſychopyriſts muſt be opened as it is (much like that of Mammertus and Fauſtus,) whether the Soul (or a Spirit) have Matter by compoſition, or ſimply p. 6uncompounded: for a body you ſuppoſe it ſtill to have. Is it ſeparable from a Body or not? If it be, why ſhould you think that it is never ſeparated? If it can ſubſiſt without a Body, who can ſay that it doth not? If it cannot but be inſeparable, it is a ſtrange compoſition that God cannot diſſolve. And if it periſh upon the diſſolution, then it was but an Accident of the body, and not a compounding Subſtance. Dr. Gliſſons and Campanella's way is as probable as this; And I marvel that when you have dealt with ſo many ſorts of Deſſenters you meddle not with ſo ſubtile a piece as that old Doctor's de Vita Naturae: I have talkt with divers high pretenders to Philoſophy here of the new ſtrain, and askt them their judgment of Dr. Gliſſons Book, and I found that none of them underſtood it, but neglected it as too hard for them, and yet contemned it. He ſuppoſeth all Matter to be animated without compoſition, the Matter and Form being but conceptus inadequati, p. 7of an uncompounded being, however that Matter as ſuch be diviſible, into atomes, every atome ſtill being uncompounded living Matter. You ſuppoſe all Spirit to be in Matter. but by way of compoſition as diſtinct ſubſtances. I go the middle way, and ſuppoſe that ſubſtance (ſimple) is Active or Paſſive: that the three Paſſive Elements, Earth, Water and Air are animated only by compoſition, or operation of the active; But that the active ſubſtances have no compoſition, (but intellectual) but Subſtance and Form are conceptus ejuſdem inadequati. So that what Dr. Gliſſon ſaith of every clod and ſtone, I ſay only of Spirits, (of fire I ſhall ſpeak after.)

2. And do you think that the Soul carrieth a body out of the body inſeparable with it, or only that it receiveth a new body when it paſſeth out of the old. If the latter, is there any inſtant of time between the diſpoſſeſſion of the old, and the poſſeſſion of the new. If any, then the Soul is p. 8ſometime without a body: And how can you tell how long. If not what body is it that you can imagine ſo ready to receive it without any interpoſition? I have not been without temptations to over inquiſitive thoughts about theſe matters: And I never had ſo much ado to overcome any ſuch temptation, as that to the opinion of Averrhoes, that as extinguiſhed Candles go all into one illuminated air, ſo ſeparated Souls go all into one common Anima Mundi, and loſe their individuation, and that Materia receptiva individuat. And then indeed your notion would be probable; for the Anima mundi mundum ſemper animat, and ſo my ſeparated Soul ſhould be ſtill imbodyed in the world, and ſhould have its part in the worlds animation; But both Scripture and Apparitions aſſure us of the individuation of Spirits, and ſeparate Souls.

And I confeſs to you that I have oft told the Sadduces and Infidels, that urge ſeeming impoſſibilities againſt p. 9the Reſurrection, and the activity of ſeparate Souls for want of Organs, that they are not ſure that the Soul taketh not with it, at its departure hence, ſome ſeminal material Spirits (ethereal and airy;) and ſo that this ſpirituous or igneous body, which it carrieth hence, is a ſemen to the body, which it ſhall have at the Reſurrection, no man knoweth the contrary, and no man knoweth that it is ſo.

The Soul is many months here in organizing its own body in generation, and more in nouriſhing it to a uſeful ſtate: That particular organical bodies are made ready to receive them juſt at death, is hard to be believed: That the matter of the Vniverſe is ſtill ready is paſt doubt. But how organized, or how the Soul worketh without Organs, we ſhall better know hereafter. Your opinion much favoureth the Pythagoreans; If the Soul be never out of a body, is it not as like to come into one new forming in the womb, as into we know not what or where?

p. 10§ 5. I could wiſh you had printed my Letter wholly by it ſelf before you had annexed your anſwer, that the Reader might have underſtood it; which I can hardly do my ſelf as you have parcel'd it. But we muſt not have what we would have from wiſer men.

I take it for an odd method, when I never aſſerted Spirits to be fire, but denyed it, firſt to be in your Epiſtle feigned to have ſaid it, and yet in the end of it for you to ſay that [I mean not ordinary fire, but that my meaning is more ſubtile and refined] and never tell the Reader what it is before you diſpute it, and then through the whole anſwer to diſpute▪ on a wrong ſuppoſition, and in the end of the Book to confeſs again that I ſay not that Spirits are fire or material.

§ 6. Had I been to chooſe an edifying method, we would firſt have ſtated our queſtion, and agreed on the meaning of our terms; But I muſt follow your ſteps; though I had rather have done otherwiſe.

p. 11Ad SECT. I.

§ 1. THat my Notions are like thoſe of Judge Hale, is no wonder; we were no ſtrangers to each others thoughts about theſe matters; and though he and you have had ſome peaceable Velitations, I take it for no diſhonour to be of his mind.

1. De Nomine: There is no ſuch agreement among Philoſophers of the name Matter as you ſuppoſe. I refer you for brevity, but to a very ſmall Book of a very Learned Author (advanced by the Preface of one eminent for ſubtilty) the Metaphyſicks of Dr. Rich. Crakenthorp, who tells you at large, that Matter is taken either properly (as you and I do Subſtance) and ſo Spirits are material, or improperly and narrowly for that only which hath the three dimenſions; and ſo Spirits are not material. It's unprofitable to cite many more to to the ſame purpoſe: And I p. 12ſuppoſe you know, that not only Tertullian, but many other of the Fathers (many of whom you may find cited by Fauſtus Reg. whom Mammertus anſwereth) ſo uſed both Matter and Corpus alſo.

§ 2. The word [Form] is as ambiguous; You and I are not the only perſons that uſe it not in the ſame ſenſe. Matter in its firſt Conceptus called Primus, hath no Form; that is, is conceived of abſtracted from all Form. Matter in its next Conceptus is conceived of as diverſified by accidents, as quantity, figure, &c. And ſo the 3 paſſive Elements, Earth, Air & Water, are diverſified by many accidents, making up that Conſiſtence, which is called their ſeveral forms, known only by ſensſe, and capable of no perfect definition. Many ſuch paſſive Materials conjunct have their Relative Form, which is that Contexture in which conſiſteth their aptitude for their uſe: as a Houſe, a Ship, a Gun, a Watch. In Compoſitions where the Active natures are added, and operate unitedly on the paſſive, there the Active is the Form of the Compound, quite in another ſenſe than any of the former, viz. as it is principium motus.

You and I are enquiring of the different Forms of Matter and Spirit: You ſay that Impenetrability, and Diviſibility are the p. 13Form of Matter, and the contrary of Spirit: I ſay, that 1. Subſtance as Subſtance, (and Matter taken for Subſtance, which Dr. Crakenthorpe thinketh is the propereſt ſenſe) as ſuch hath no Form, that is, in conceptu primo. 2. That ſubſtance diſtinguiſhed by ſubtilty & craſſitude, viſibility and inviſibility, quantity, ſhape, motion, &c. doth herein differ Modally: And this Mode may well enough be called the Form, before it have another Form: And as the divers foreſaid Elements thus differ, ſo the ſubſtance of Spirits no doubt hath ſome Modal Excellency above all Bodies or Matter ſtrictly or narrowly ſo called: And if you will call this a Form, I contend not about the word, but it is but equivocally ſo called, Spirits having another nobler ſort of Form. 3. Nothing hath two Forms univocally ſo called: But Spirits have all that Virtus formalis, which I oft deſcribed▪ which is their very form: There is no Spirit without it: It's not a Compounding part, but the form of a ſimple ſubſtance. Vital Virtue, Vis, Potentia activa, ſignifieth not the ſame thing with Penetrability, and Indiſcerpibility; Therefore both cannot be the Form univocally ſo called: And how you could put both theſe your ſelf into one definition, p. 14as a kind of Compounded Form I wonder. Yea, your two words themſelves ſignify not the ſame thing: Penetrable and Indiſcerpible are not words of one ſignification. And ſurely you will grant that theſe two, Penetrable and Indiſcerpible can be no otherwiſe a Form to Spirits, than Impenetrable and Diſcerpible are a Form to Matter. And it's apparent that the firſt is but a modal conceptus, and the latter a relative notion of Matter, and neither one nor both are contrary to Virtus Vitalis in a Spirit (or Virtus activa:) Meer paſſive potentiality is rather the contrary difference here.

And I know not why you might not as well have named divers other Accidents or Modes, eſpecially Quantity, and the trina dimenſio, and called them all the Form of Matter, as well as your two.

Indeed when we have from ſenſe a true notion of Matter, we muſt know that it hath Quantity, and is ſomewhere, and therefore that one part of it, and another part cannot poſſeſs juſt the ſame place; and ſo we grant you the Impenetrability: And how far you prove Spirits to be ſuch ſubſtances as are extended, and have Amplitude (as you ſay pag. 105.) and ſpiſſitude, and be in loco, and in more or leſs p. 15ſpace variouſly, and yet that they have no dimenſions which the Divine Intellect or Power itſelf can meaſure; and whether all the Spirits in the univerſe can be in eodem puncto, and all that are finite, contracted into that one point, I leave this to Wits more ſubtil than mine to judge of.

For to tell you the truth, I know nothing at all without the mediation of ſenſe, except the immediate ſenſation it ſelf, & the acts of Intellection & Volition or Nolition, & what the Intellect inferreth of the like, by the perception of theſe. I have ſeen & felt how Water differeth from Earth, and from that ſenſation my Intellect hath that Idea of the difference which it hath: But without that ſeeing and feeling it, all the definitions in the world, and all the names of hard and ſoft, and dry and moiſt, would have given me no true notice of the formal difference. Now hence I infer, that I have no ſenſe at all of the difference of a Spirits Subſtantiality in ſuch modes and accidents from that of Matter; and therefore how can I know it? I know by knowing what knowing is, and by willing what willing is: And I know that theſe Acts prove a power (for nothing doth that which it cannot do,) and that Act and Power prove a Substance, (for p. 16nothing hath nothing, and can do nothing:) ab eſt tertii▪ adjecti ad eſt ſecundi valet argumentum: And I know, that unleſs Light might be called Spirit, Spirits are to me inviſible: And ſo I can knowingly ſay, 1. What they do, 2. What they can do, 3. What they are in the genus of Subſtantiality, 4. And what they are not as to many Attributes proper to Viſible Subſtances or Bodies; 5. And I have elſewhere fully proved in a ſpecial Diſpute (in Methodo Theol.) that the Power of Vital Action, Intellection and Volition, is not a meer Accident of them, but their very eſſential form. But as to that Modification of their Subſtance which is contrary to Impenetrability and Diviſibility, I may grope, but I cannot know it poſitively, for want of ſenſation.

§ 2. Is an Atom Matter? or is it not? If one Atom be no matter, then two is none, and then there is none. If an Atom be matter, is it Diſcerpible or not? If not, how is this the Form of Matter? If it be diviſible, it is not an Atom; that's a contradiction. And if every Atom be diviſible in infinitum, it is as great, or greater than the world, and then there are as many Infinites as Atoms. That three Atoms united cannot be divided juſt in p. 17the middle, etiam per Divinam Potentiam, is becauſe it implieth a contradiction, viz. that an Atom is diviſible; ſo that by you an Atom is a Spirit.

Do you take the word [Penetrable] actively, or paſſively, or both? If actively according to you Matter is penetrable; for it can penetrate a Spirit, that is, poſſeſs the ſame place. But I perceive you mean that Spirits can penetrate Bodies, & alſo that they can penetrate one another.

And I ſuppoſe that by Penetration you mean not that which ſeparateth parts, of the Matter, & cometh in between theſe parts, but you mean poſſeſſing the ſame place, as is ſaid: And if ſo, do you put no limitation? or what? I ask before, can all the Created Spirits in Heaven and Earth be in the ſame Atom of matter? If ſo, are they then abſent from all other place? or is every Spirit ubiquitary? You confute the Nullibiſts by the operation of the Soul on the Body: Ibi operatur, ergo ibi eſt: And do you think that all the Angels in Heaven, and all Created Souls may be in one Body by Penetration? If ſo, Are they one Soul there, or innumerable in one man? And if they may be all in one point, and ſo be all one, may they not be divided again? I confeſs my ignorance of the Conſiſtence of ſpiritual p. 18Subſtance is ſo great, that I am not able to ſay, that God who hath given Souls quantitatem diſcretam, and made them innumerable, is not able to make one of two, or many, and to turn that one into two, or many again: I am not ſure that it is a contradiction; eſpecially if it be true that Sennertus, and many more ſay of the multiplication of Forms by Generation.

But if you take Penetrability paſſively, then you mean that Spirits may be penetrated by Bodies, or by one another, or both. No doubt you mean both, and ſo, as I ſaid, Bodies alſo are penetrable, both actively and paſſively; that is, Bodies can penetrate Spirits, and be penetrated by Spirits. Whether any Bodies penetrate each other, viz. whether Light or its vehicle at leaſt be a Body, and whether it penetrate the body of Glaſs or Chryſtal, with more about theſe matters, I have heretofore ſpoken in my Reaſons of the Chriſtian Religion Append. Obj. 2. p. 525. and forward.

§ 3. To conclude this; as in natural mixt Bodies, there are three principles, Materia, Materiae Diſpoſitio (for that I think is a fitter expreſſion than Privatio) & Forma; ſo in ſimple Beings there are three (not parts, but) conceptus inadaequati anſwerable hereto; viz.

p. 19I. In the three paſſive Elements, Earth, Water and Air, there is in each, 1. The Matter, 2. The Diſpoſition of that matter by contexture, and various modes, of which Impenetrability and Diviſibility are parts; 3. The paſſive Form reſulting from all theſe, which conſiſteth in their various aptitude to their uſes; eſpecially their Receptivity of the Influx of the Active Natures. Here you put two Attributes together, which are both but parts of the Materiae Diſpoſitio, and call them two the Form.

II. In the Active Natures, there is, 1. The Subſtantiality, 2. The Subſtantiae Diſpoſitio, 3. The Form.

Of the firſt (not part, but) inadequate Conceptus, Subſtantiality, we agree, of the ſecond Conceptus we differ: That ſuch Subſtances have an incomprehenſible Purity, of which we can have no diſtinct Idea for want of Senſation, but a General Conception only; and that this Purity (whatever it be) is not the Form of Spirits, but the Subſtantiae Diſpoſitio, is that which I ſay: And you ſay that Penetrability and Indiviſibility are the Form, which (at moſt) are but the Diſpoſitio Subſtantiae; and yet you joyn the Vital Virtue as part of the formal Conception too, p. 20which is quite of another conception. And ſo we differ of the third Conceptus, viz. the Form alſo; which I affirm of all ſimple active natures to be the Virtus Activa: And if they are Vital, the Virtus Vitalis.

Of the name Vita, there is a Controverſie, which muſt be diſtinguiſhed from that de re. If it be true that Dr. Gliſſon ſaith, that every Atom of matter hath in it a Motive Principle without Compoſition, then the Motive Virtue is the Form of all Matter as well as of Spirit. If all be to be called Living or Spirit, which hath a Virtus Motiva for its Eſſential Form, then Ignis (or Aether) is Vital and Spirit; for it hath an Eſſential Motive Principle as its Form. Therefore the Queſtion whether Ignis or Aether) be Life or Spirit, is but a queſtion de nomine (ſuch as too many uſually in Diſputes manage, as if it were de re.) It is no Life or Spirit, if by thoſe names you mean only Senſitive and Intellectual Natures: But it is Life and Spirit, if by that name you mean only an Eſſential Formal Motive Principle.

I have oft profeſſed that I am ignorant whether Ignis and Vegetative Spirit be all one (to which I moſt incline) or whether p. 21Ignis be an Active Nature, made to be the Inſtrument by which the three Spiritual Natures, Vegetative, Senſitive and Mental work on the three Paſſive Natures: And though I was wont to think, that what I knew not my ſelf, all men of great Learning knew, ſpecially ſuch as you, in the points which you have with ſingular induſtry ſtudied; yet now experience hath baniſhed that modeſt Errour, and convinced me that other men muſt be content with an humble Ignoramus as well as I.

§ 4. And here I muſt note, that § 18. p. 127. where you purpoſely define a Spirit, you agree with me: Your definition is [A Spirit is an Immaterial Subſtance intrinſecally endued with Life, and the Faculty of Motion.] Forgive me for thinking that you are not ſtrict enough in your terms for a definition; but plainly you ſeem to mean the ſame as I do. You ſhould, I think, have mentioned a Spirit as a ſimple Subſtance differing from a mixt; and have ſaid, not only [intrinſecally] endued, for ſo is every Animal who is Body as well as Spirit, but alſo endued with it as its ſimple Formal Eſſence: And whether all Faculty of Motion (e. g. Gravitation) be Life, I am in doubt. But here p. 221. You agree with me in the firſt Conceptus [Subſtance;] And 2. As to that mode of Subſtance which I call the Diſpoſitio Subſtantiae ad Formam, you call it but [Immaterial] which is a negative, and ſpeaketh nothing poſitively; which is ſuch an honeſt Confeſſion as we poor Ignorants apertly make, that what the excellent Purity or modal Conſiſtence of Spiritual Subſtance is as compared to Material (or Corporeal) becauſe we never ſaw or felt it as we do Corporeal; we do not formally know, and therefore only tell men de genere, that it is moſt pure and excellent; but in ſpecial, that we have no true Idea of it, and therefore only tell men what it is not [not material] and not what it is. 3. But you name no Formal Difference but Life: When you add [the Faculty of Motion] it is a defective Explication of the Virtus Vitalis, which is ever Vnica-triplex, viz. Activa-Pe…ceptiva-Appetitiva, when it operateth to generation or augmentation. And do you think that Life and Immateriality are Synonyma's? Or that Life and Penetrable and Indiſcerpible, are Synonyma's? Or that the Form of a Spirit is a Compound of ſuch and ſo many Heterogeneals? Had you held to this definition, I think you had done beſt.

p. 23§ 5. Pag. 129. You ſeem to explain Immaterial ſo as to make Indiſcerpibility an immediate Attribute, and expound it, It is indiſcerpible into real Phyſical parts: (ſo is an Atom.) But as Phyſical ſignifieth corporeal, ſome will ſay, it may yet be per potentiam divinam divided into Spiritual parts. And you expound Penetrability actively, that it can penetrate the matter and things of its own kind, that is, paſs through Spiritual Subſtances: And ſuch any groſs Body can paſs through.

§ 6. When Anſw. p. 3. you ſay of a Spirit, that it is [ſo ſubtil as to be in ſuch ſort penetrable.] And in Sect. 31. to which you refer us, you make the difference of Spirit penetrating, and Body impenetrable to be ſubtilty and craſſitude.] Could any of us have ſaid more whom you contradict? Is Subtilty and Craſſitude the difference between Spiritual Subſtance and Material in their Conſiſtency? I have not ſaid ſo much as this.

§ 7. As to your oft-mentioned per ſe & non per aliud, as proper to Spirits, I am paſt doubt, that Spirits more depend on God for Being and Motion, than Matter doth on Spirits (Created.) But it's difference enough that God giveth them an Eſſential Formal Virtue ſelf-moving p. 24receptive of his moving Influx, when Paſſives move only as moved by ſelfmovers: (unleſs the aggregative Motion muſt be excepted, of which afterward.)

Ad SECT. II.

§ 1. THree Faults, of which one is a Miſchief, you find with my Conceptus formalis. 1. That it leaveth out what is contained in the Conceptus formalis of a Spirit in General, Penetrability and Indiſcerpibility.

Anſ. 1. It is but the diſpoſitio Subſtantiae at moſt, and not a proper Conceptus formalis. 2. You leave out other modifications as eſſential. 3. It leaveth none out that is known, while I ſay that it is Substantia puriſſima, which containeth your Modes and Attributes with more if they be true, if not, it avoideth the errours.

§ 2. 2. You ſay, [It puts in Perception, and we have no aſſurance that a plaſtick Spirit hath Perception, but as ſuch p. 25hath none: Elſe the Soul would perceive the Organization of its own Body.

Anſ. Dr. Gliſſon, de Vita Naturae and Campanella, have ſaid ſo much againſt you of this, that ſuppoſing the Reader to have peruſed them, I will not repeat it.

Did you think that there is no Perception but ſenſitive or Intellectual? Such indeed the vegetative Spirit hath not; but it hath a vegetative Perception. A Plant groweth in a Soil of various qualities: It attracteth to itſelf that part of Nutriment which is congruous to it, and digeſteth that ſo Attracted: And therefore it hath an anſwerable Perception, which ſort is congruous to it, and which not, when it neglecteth one ſort, and draweth another. It doth not ſee or feel it, nor underſtand it, but inſenſibly perceiveth it.

3. You ſay, you [do not eaſily aſſent to that conceit of a Trinity in this Conceptus formalis which I make to conſiſt in Virtute una-trina, vitali, perceptiva, appetitiva.]

Anſ. Nor did I eaſily aſſent to it; nor did Dr. Gliſſon after 80 Years of age, eaſily procure men to aſſent to it, nor Campanella take ſo marvellouſly with others as he did with our Commenius and ſome ſuch. And far be it from me to expect you ſhould eaſily aſſent to it, when I come p. 26not to you as a Teacher. But whereas you ſay, that theſe make three no more than Animal, Homo, and Brutum, or Cupiditas, Deſiderium, and Fuga, you ſilence me; for it beſeemeth me not to ſpeak to you in a Teaching Language, and there is no other to convince you. And if all that I have ſaid in Method. Theol. will not do it, I confeſs it will not eaſily be done, Animal, Homo, and Brutum, are three words containing only a Generical, and ſpecifick nature in two diſtinct ſpecies of Subjects: If you think that in the Sun Virtus-motiva, illuminativa, & calefactiva, or in mans Soul a vegetative, ſenſitive, and Intellective power, or in the latter, mentally-active, Intellective, and Volitive Virtue, are no other, I will not perſuade you to change your mind, much leſs give you any Anſwer to your ſimile of cupiditas, deſiderium, fuga, ſave that you might almoſt as well have named any three Words.

§ 3. But you ſay [The Omiſſion of Immaterial in your Conceptus formalis, or which is all one of Penetrability and Indiſcerpibility is not only a miſtake but a miſchief; it implying that the Virtus Appetitiva & perceptiva may be in a Subſtance though material, which betrays much of the p. 27ſuccours which Philoſophy affords to Religion, &c.

Anſ. Melancholy may cauſe fears by ſeeming Apparitions. I hope no body will be damned for uſing or not uſing the Word Material or Immaterial: It's eaſie to uſe either to prevent ſuch danger. And I am not willing again to examine the ſenſe of theſe words every time you uſe them. You know I ſaid not that Spirits are Material: And you ſay they are Subſtances of Extenſion, Amplitude, Spiſſitude, Locality, and Subtilty, as oppoſite to Craſſitude. And what if another think juſt ſo of them, (or not ſo groſly) and yet call them Matter, will the word undoe him? But you ſay I omitt Immaterial. Anſ. See my Append. to Reaſ. of Chriſt. Rel. whether I omit it: But is a bare Negative Eſſential to a juſt definition here? Why then not many Negatives more, (as inviſible, inſenſible, &c.) To ſay that Air is not Water, or Water is not Earth, was never taken for defining, nor any miſchief to omit it.

But that the poſitive term Puriſſima doth not include Immaterial, and is not as good, you have not as yet proved. Is Subſtantia puriſſima material? Do not you by that intimation do more to aſſert p. 28the Materiality of Spirits than ever I did? Have you read what I have anſwered to 20 Objections of the Somatiſts in the aforeſaid Append.

But you ſay, It implyeth that Virtus perceptiva, &c. may be in a ſubſtance material. Anſ. Negatur. If I leave out 20 Negatives in my Definition, it followeth not that the form may be with their poſitives. But can you excuſe your ſelf from what you call a Miſchief, when you intimate that Subſtantia puriſſima may be material? Becauſe I only called it puriſſima, you ſay I imply it may be material.

But I confeſs I am too dull to be ſure that God cannot endue matter itſelf with the formal Virtue of Perception: That you ſay the Carteſians hold the contrary, and that your Writings prove it, certifieth me not. O the marvellous difference of mens Conceptions! Such great Wits as Campanella, Dr. Gliſſon, &c. were confident that no Matter in the world was without the una-trina Virtus, viz. Perceptive, Appetitive, and Motive; I agree not with them: But you on the contrary ſay, that Materia qualitercunque modificata is uncapable of Perception. I doubt not, materia qua materia, or yet qua mere modificata hath no LIfe: But that it is p. 29uncapable of it; and that Almighty God cannot make perceptive living Matter, and that by informing it without mixture, I cannot prove, nor I think you: Where is the Contradiction that makes it impoſſible? Nor do I believe that it giveth a man any more cauſe to doubt (as you add) of the Exiſtence of God, or the Immortality of the Soul, than your Opinion that ſaith, God cannot do this.

To paſs by many other I will but recite the words of Micraelius Ethnophron, li. 1. c. 13. p. 23, 24. inſtancing in many that held the Soul to be Pure Matter. [Eam Sententiam inter veteres, probavit apud Macrobium, Heraclitus Phyſicus, cui anima eſt Eſſentiae Stellaris ſcintilla; Et Hipparchus apud Plinium, cui eſt coeli pars: Et Africanus apud Ciceronem qui detrahit animum ex illis ſempiternis ignibus quae Sidera vocamus; quae que globoſae & rotundae divinis animatae mentibus circules ſuos orbes que conficiunt celeritate mirabili: Et Seneca qui deſcendiſſe eam ex illo coeleſti Spiritu ait; Et Plato ipſe qui alicubi animam vocat foreign, radians & ſplendidum vehiculum: Et Epictetus qui Aſtra vocat nobis foreign, amica & cognata elementa: Ipſeque cum Peripateticis Ariſtoteles qui eam p. 30quinta eſſentia conſtare, & foreign in animabus ineſſe dicit: Inter noſtrates quoque Scaliger vocat animam Naturam coeleſtem & quintam eſſentiam, alia quidem à quatuor Elementis naturâ praeditam, ſed non ſine omni materia: Eadem Opinio arridet Roherto de Fluctibus, &c. And what many Fathers ſay I have elſewhere ſhewed.

And yet on condition you will not make the name Subſtance to ſignifie no real Being, but a meer Relation, or Quality, I think you and I ſhall ſcarce differ in ſenſe.

§ 4. But you magnifie our difference, ſaying [In this you and I fundamentally differ, in that you omit, but I include, Penetrability and Indiſcerpibility in the Conceptus formalis of a Spirit. Anſ. I think you mean better than you ſpeak, and err not fundamentally. 1. I do not think that your two hard words are fundamentals, nor that one or both are Synonyma to Immaterial. 2. I do not think but Puriſſima includeth all that is true in them, and ſo leaveth them not out. 3. I do not leave them out of the Diſpoſitio vel modus Subſtantiae, though I leave them out of the Conceptus formalis. 4. Your ſelf affirm the vital Virtue to be the Conceptus formalis. p. 31And hath a Spirit more forms than one! You know of no exiſtent Spirit in the World that hath not its proper ſpecifick form: And if your two words had been a Generical Form, that's no form to the ſpecies, but a Subſtantiae diſpoſitio. Doth he fundamentally err that ſaith Corpus humanum organicum is not forma hominis? Or that the puritas vel ſubtilitas materiae is not forma …gnis vel ſolis, but only the materiae diſpoſitio? If our little ſelf made words were ſo dangerous on either ſide, I ſhould fear more hurt by making the form of a Spirit 1. To be but the Conſiſtence or mode of the Subſtance, 2. And that to conſiſt in divers accidents conjunct, 3. And thoſe uncertain in part, or unintelligible, 4. And Spirits to have two Forms, or one made up of divers things, 5. And to place the form in a Negation of Matter. What a jumble is here, when the true definition of a Spirit is obvious?

§ 5. You ſay, [Penetrability maketh it pliant and ſubtil, and to a Subſtance of ſuch Oneneſs and Subtility is rationally attributed, whatever Activity, Sympathy, Synenergy, Appetite and Perception is found in the world.

Anſ. There is Oneneſs in Matter (in Atoms at leaſt) and doth Penetrability p. 32make Subtilty? And is Subtilty the difference? ſure, if you make any ſenſe of this, it muſt favour the conceit of Materiality more than my term Puriſſima.

But do you verily believe that Penetrability or Subtilty is a ſufficient, efficient, or Formal Cauſe of Vitality, Perception, Appetite? and ſo of Intellection and Volition? I hope you do not: It is the Eſſential Virtus Formalis (including Potentiam activam, Vim & Inclinationem) which muſt immediately cauſe the Acts; Subtilty and Penetrability elſe will not do it: No man will grant you that the Propoſition is good, ex vi Cauſalitatis, [Quodcun que penetrabile vel ſubtile eſt, ideo neceſſario vivit, percipit, appetit] unleſs it proceed à neceſſitate concomitantiae & exiſtentiae. Yet where you are moſt out of the way, you are at it again, that This Miſtake is a miſchief.

Ad SECT. III. & IV.

§ 1. YOur Third Section I am not concerned in: I tell you ſtill I deny not your Penetrability and Indiſcerpibility, though I lay not the ſtreſs on them as to p. 33Certainty or Importance, as you do, and am paſt doubt that they do but defectively ſpeak the Subſtantiality ſub conceptu modali & diſpoſitivo, and are unskilfully called the Forma Spiritus.

§ 2. Your 4th Section I had rather not have ſeen. 1. You diſlike that I ſay, that [a ſelf-moving Principle I dare not ſay is proper to a Spirit.] I hope Ignorance is never the worſe for being confeſt: All are not ſo wiſe as you. I deny it not; but I am not certain that Stones, Earth, and other heavy things, move not to the Earth by a ſelf-moving Principle. I am not ſure that if a Stone in the Air fall down, it is by a Spirits motion, and that God hath not made Gravitation, and other aggravative motion of Paſſives, to be an Eſſential ſelf-moving Principle. Few men I think have thought otherwiſe. And yet I am not ſure that all Stones and Clods are alive. If you are, bear with our Ignorance; for that is no Errour.

§ 3. When I ſay [I conſent not to Campanella de ſenſu rerum, or Dr. Gliſſon, that would make all things alive by an Eſſentiating Form in the very Elements.] Here you talk of foul play, to make one part fiſh, and the other fleſh; one part of Matter ſelf-moved, and other not.]

p. 34Anſ. But, worthy Sir, the foul play is yours, that ſeem to tell your Reader that I do ſo, which I never do: That is ſcant fair play. I ſaid not that Spirits are Matter, and I do but ſay I am ignorant whether Gravitation be from the Motion of a Spirit thruſting down the Stone, &c. or from an Eſſential Principle in the Matter. May not one be ignorant where he cannot chuſe? I cannot but much difference the motus aggregativus, ſuch as Gravitation cauſeth, which is only the tendency of the parts to the whole, that they may there reſt from motion, from the natural motion of known Life, which abhorreth ceſſation: I take Motus to be no Entity, but a mode of Subſtance; to be in motion or quieſcence, are ſeveral modes of it; and that mode which is moſt ſtated, moſt ſheweth nature. I ſee no contradiction in it, that a Stone ſhould fall without Life: I dare not ſay, that God cannot make a Rock or Clod to fall by an intrinſick Principle of Gravitation, without vital motion. And yet I am moſt inclined to your Opinion: But the ſtream of Diſſenters obligeth ſuch a one as I am to more modeſty than muſt be expected from one of your degree.

§ 4. Next you complain of [horrible Confuſion.] What's the matter? why, to p. 35include Life in the Conceptus Formalis of a Spirit (of which Self-motion is certainly an Effect) and yet ſay It is not proper to a Spirit. Anſ. It's worſe than confuſion to intimate that I ſaid what I did not. Your ſaying [It's certain] is no conviction of me, that there is no Self-motion but by Life. You think not that Fire liveth; and I am not ſure that a Stone is a ſelf-mover: I only ſay, I know not. I never yet ſaw your proof, that God is able to make no ſelf-mover but vital! And if he can, how know I that he doth not? The World ſuffers ſo much by mens taking on them to know more than they do, that I fear it in my ſelf, as one of the worſt Diſeaſes of Mankind.

§ 5. You conclude [We are to deny Self-motion in the matter it ſelf every where as not belonging thereto, but to Spirit]

Anſ. No doubt but Materia qua talis eſt mere paſſiva: But that God can put no motive inclination in it, or that he cannot give a Spiritual Vitality to any matter, are concluſions fitter for you than for me.

§ 6. To ſhew why I oft neglect the name [Material] (ſome taking it for the ſame with Subſtance, and ſome only for Corporeit) I ſaid, that the diſtinction of Natures into Active and Paſſive, ſerveth p. 36as well.] To this you ſay [Materiality is a Notion more ſtrict, diſtinct and ſteady.] Anſ. The contrary is commonly known, and before and elſewhere proved; when Materia is not only a very hard ambiguous word (and you have not yet enabled me by all your words, to know what you mean by it) but even ſuch great men as before named make the more general ſenſe (equal to Subſtance) to be the more proper: Had all uſed it, as you do, and you made us underſtand what you mean by it, I would hold to it accordingly.

You ſay, Paſſivity belongs to things Immaterial. Anſ. 1. Paſſivity as excluſive of Activity, or as predominant, doth not. 2. No Paſſivity belongeth to that which is not Matter in the foreſaid large ſenſe of Matter, of which more anon.

Ad SECT. V, VI.

§ 1. I Confeſt my Ignorance of the Cauſe of the deſcenſus gravium; whether it be from a Principle made by God eſſential to the matter that deſcendeth, p. 37or from an intrinſick compounding Active nature, or only from an extrinſick Mover. You here bid me not deſpair, for it is demonſtrable that the deſcenſus gravium is not from any principle ſpringing from their own Matter, but from an Immaterial principle diſtinct therefrom.

Anſ. 1. All doth not demonſtrate to me, which ſome call demonſtration; I perceive you note not at all what is my doubt, and how can you then ſolve it? I do not think that the Gravitation is from a principle ſpringing from the Matter. How can a Principle of Motion ſpring from Matter? But the doubt is of the ſeveral waies forenamed: 1. Whether it be from a principle in the Matter, as Dr. Gliſſon thought, as a Conceptus inadaequatus of its Eſſence, or at leaſt an inſeparable Quality or Accident. 2. Or whether it be by an Eſſential Compounding Principle, as Anima in homine: 3. Or by an extrinſick Agent only; Did you think that you had anſwered theſe?

You ſay, [which Principle to be the Mover of the Matter of the Vniverſe, I have over and over again demonſtrated in Ench. Metaph.]

Anſ. I would have had it plainer, but muſt take it as it is. It ſeems then that you think that it is only the Anima p. 38Mundi, without any ſubordinate moving Principle: But you ſhould have ſpoken out. I will not wrong you ſo much as to ſuppoſe that you think any Indiſcerpible Spirit proper to a Stone, or a Fox, or an Aſs, moveth all the World: Therefore I muſt judge that to the Motion of all the Stones, Clods, &c. in the world, there is none but an Univerſal Mover. I confeſs I think (as Dr. Gilbert de Magn.) and many others, that the whole Tellus hath one Active Principle (which I plainly think is Fire;) and if he call it Anima Telluris, I leave him to his liberty. But I think there are ſubordinate particular Moving Principles beſides the Univerſal?

Do you think that only the Anima Mundi animateth all Animals? I think you do not; elſe all Apparitions ſhould be but by one Soul. Beſides an Anima Vniverſalis, there muſt be a particular (or ſingular) Soul in every Man, Beaſt, Bird, &c. There muſt be more than the Univerſal Soul, to make you write, ſpeak, do better than others: And if ſo, how am I ſure that nothing under the Univerſal Spirit moveth deſcendentia gravia? In motu projectorum (another inſtance of my Ignorance) there is ſure ſome cauſality in Anima ſingulari projicientis. The Univerſal p. 39Cauſe is ever one, but excludeth not ſubordinate Moving Cauſes. My old Friend Mr. Sam. Got (on Moſis Philoſ.) ſuppoſeth each Element to have its ſpecial Spirit: I am not ſo well skilled in ſuch things, as to come to that certainty which others pretend to: I think to an equal common Motion an Univerſal Cauſe may ſuffice; but when Motions differ, I know not the different Cauſes ſo well as ſome think they do. How you anſwered Judge Hale of the Rundle in the Water, I know not: But you that think Fire in the Sun to be no Spirit but Matter, I am confident will never make me believe, that Fire and Sun are moved only by the Univerſal Mover, without any motive principle in themſelves. Your Metaphyſ. c. 13. I have peruſed, and am paſt doubt of a Spiritual Moving Power: But two things I ſee not proved; 1. That there are not particular Moving Principles ſubordinate to the more Univerſal. 2. That the God of Nature hath not put into the paſſive Elements, a ſtrong inclination of the parts to union with the whole, and to aggregative Motion when forcibly ſeparated; which Inclination Dr. Gliſſon calleth their Eſſential Life; but I think is ſomewhat that deſerveth not that name. I have not read p. 40your Vol. Philoſ. nor Adnot am. nor Anſwer to Judge Hale.

§ 2. Sect. 6. You ſay, This is to joyn the property of a Spirit to Matter. Anſw. That's it that I doubt of, whether all Self-motion (under the Univerſal Mover) be proper to a Spirit, or only Vital Self-motion.

§ 3. Your Aſſurance of the Earth's Motion, aſſureth not me: I have ſeen a M. S. of your Antagoniſt's Judge Hale, that inclineth me to deny it; and nothing more than the Igneous nature of the Sun, to which Motion is natural, and the torpid nature of Earth; God making every thing fit for its uſe. But of this, as my judgment is of little value, ſo I profeſs Ignorance.

§ 4. That there is Activity in fixed Thoughts, I grant; for Thinking is Acting. But that there is as much Activity in the not-acting of a Rock, e.g. I deny.

§ 5. Again, you are at the Miſchief of Leaving out your Penetrability, and Indiſcerpibility, and Immateriality; to which I have oft anſwered. And I now add, you make it an abſurdity to name that as a Form, which is not proper to the thing: But Immateriality, Penetrability, or Indiſcerpibility in your own Judgment (I think) are none of them proper to Spirit. p. 41For they are common to divers Accidents in your account, viz. Light, Heat, Cold, &c. are all theſe.

Ad SECT. VII, VIII.

§ 1. YOU come to the main thing which I importuned you to bleſs the world with your explication of, viz. The true difference of Subſtance and Matter. And you ſay, It's obvious to any obſerving Eye. They differ as Genus and Species. Anſ. I would I had an obſerving Eye. If by Matter you mean ſenſible Matter, ſuch as Man can ſee, feel, or meaſure, &c. the difference indeed is obvious: My doubt is here; ſeeing you confeſs that ſubſtare accidentibus is but a relative notion; (and it's commonly ſaid that God hath no Accidents, and yet is a Subſtance: How true I ſay not,) and all your notice of it, beſides Negatives is, that [Subſtance is a Being ſubſiſting by it ſelf] and call this [a compleat Definition;] 1. How you can call that a compleat Definition of that which indeed is not definable, for want of a Genus: For you ſay Metaph. c. 2. that Ens quatenus Ens non poſſe eſſe objectum Metaphyſicae cum tam generale p. 42ſit ut & Ordine & Naturae & Doctrinae res Phyſicas antecedat, &c. But this I ſtick not at: Things not definable may be partly known. But 2. whereas it's granted by you, that Subſtantia and Vita (or Virtus Activa) are two inadequate Conceptus of a Spirit, do you hold that the Conceptus of Subſtantiality hath any more in it of Real Entity, than the bare Conceptus of Virtus Activa (or Vitalis) alone? Or whether the meaning be, that as it is Res the Virtus Activa is its total Conceptus, and Subſtantia is but added to ſignifie that Res illa quae dicitur Vita vel Virtus Vitalis ſubſiſtit per ſe, & non in alio, id eſt, non eſt Accidens. If this be the meaning that the word Vis, or Virtus, ſpeak all that is Res, and Subſtance ſpeak only its ſtate, as being no Accident, but a Self-Being; this is intelligible, and it agreeth with ſome mens thoughts of God himſelf. But this ſeemeth neither to be true (at leaſt of Creatures) nor to be your ſenſe. Not true; for a Created Virtus (vel Vita) quae non eſt alicujus Subſtantiae Virtus, vel ut Forma vel ut Accidens, ſeemeth above our reach to conceive. Though I know many call God Purus Actus, & the Schools moſtly agree that Subſtantia is not univocally ſpoken of God and us, and deny it p. 43to be properly ſaid of God; and I can eaſily grant that God is utterly above all formal knowledge of ours; yet that Created Spirits ſhould be a meer Virtus (or Potentia Activa, or Actus) ſeemeth hard to believe.

And many words intimate that it is not your Judgment, but that Subſtantiality ſignifieth not only the Modus of the Exiſtence of the Actus Entitativus, or Virtus, but is the firſt half and fundamental Conceptus of a Spirit as Res, ſpeaking halfly its Entity. In this I think we agree.

And now if this be ſo, this very Conceptus of Fundamental Reality, is but that ſame which Schibler, and abundance others call Materia Metaphyſica, as different from Materia Phyſica; and which Dr. Crakenthorpe, & many others, take the general and moſt proper ſenſe of Materia to contain. & therefore I ſay but, that you ſhould not take an equivocal word for univocal, and lay ſo great a ſtreſs on an ambiguous name. And I confeſs ſtill all your names of Indiſcerpibility, Penetrability and Immateriality, give me no ſcientifical notion of the true difference between the loweſt Subſtantiality of a Spirit, and the higheſt of Fire or Aether, or Ariſtotelis quinta Eſſentia (which you call Matter.) But I am p. 44fully ſatisfied of an Incomprehenſible Purity of Subſtance; 2. And of the true Form of a Soul; and I find my ſelf to need no more.

§ 2. The Thomiſts take the Faculties of the Soul to be but Accidents (as Mr. Pemble de Orig. Formar. doth the Souls of Brutes to be but Qualities of Matter) which I have elſewhere confuted: And theſe muſt needs think that the Notion of … is almoſt all of the Soul.

§ 3. You add out of your Ethicks, nulliu… … in…mam nudam que eſſentiam cognoſci poſſe, ſed Attributa tantum eſſentialia, eſſentiales que habitudines. We are not any way able to diſcover the very bare Eſſence or Subſtance of any thing.] Anſ. Yet you ſay before, [What can be more plain?] and [It's obvious to every obſerving Eye.] I conteſs I underſtand you not: I know no eſſentia that is not intima: And if by nudam you mean accidentibus nudatam, we know no Subſtance ſo, becauſe there is none ſuch created: but we can abſtract the Eſſence from the Accidents. And if we know not the nudam eſſentiam of any accident we know nothing. Eſſential Attributes, and Habitudes are hard words: If by the Attributes you mean the names or ſecond ſignal notions, we know the Eſſence p. 45of Letters, Names, Sentences; but by them ut per ſigna we know the things themſelves, but ſcientia abſtractiva non intuitivâ. But this is true knowledge of the Eſſence ſignified. If by the Attributes you mean any Accidents ſignified by thoſe Names, thoſe are not eſſential Attributes. But if you mean the Eſſence ſignified you ſay and unſay. I am paſt doubt that we know the Eſſences of the immediate Objects of Senſe, and alſo of our own Intellectual Acts. But how? There is ſcientia adaequata and inadaequata: I am paſt doubt that nihil ſcitur ſcientiâ adaequatâ, (but only inadaequata: And ſo ſtricte, Res ipſa non ſcitur quia tot a ejus Eſſentia non ſcitur; but aliquid rerum ſcitur; and this is true of the Eſſence itſelf. All our knowledge is partial and imperfect, a half Science, but it reacheth Eſſences.

Ad SECT. VIII.

§ 1. WHereas I think that only Vſage muſt expound the difference between the ſenſe of Subſtance and Matter, you deny it not, but ſtill miſſuppoſe that uſe taketh Matter but in one p. 46ſenſe, and never applieth it to ſpiritual Subſtance. All this de nomine is to little purpoſe, but I will recite ſome words of your own: Ench. Metaph. c. 2. p. 8, 9, 10. Eſſentia quae nihil aliud eſt quam materia & forma ſimul ſumptae—Duo principia illa Entis interna & incomplexa quatenus ens eſt, eſſe Materiam & formam Logicam—Et uniuscujuſ que rei quatenus ens eſt Eſſentia conſiſtit ex Amplitudine & Differentia quae amplitudinem ab amplitudine diſcriminat. Nam quod res quaelibet aliquatenus Ampla ſit, ex eo patet, tum quod id voci materiae valde conſonum ſit quae tanquam principium Entis quatenus Ens eſt conſideratur; tum etiam quod nullam aliam ideam menti noſtrae ea afferre poteſt praeter hanc amplitudinem; Nec revera quicquam ab animis noſtris concipi omni amplitudine deſtitutum—p. 10. Ex quibus omnibus tandem profluit praeclarum hoc conſectarium quod omne Ens quatenus Ens eſt—Quantum, Quale—Ens dicitut reſpectu formae, legitimae que conditionis materiae.—Quod omne Ens ſit Quantum, ex illius Materiâ intelligitur—Then you blame them qui imaginantur quaedam Entia omni Materia carentia, etiam hac Logica, omni que ad materiam relatione.—p. 12. Omnis ſubſtantia ex eo quod Ens ſit, Materiam quandam vel Amplitudinem in ſe includat.

p. 47You ſee here how much more now you write againſt your ſelf than me: I never ſaid that Spirits are material, nor that every Subſtance hath ſome matter, as you do.

§ 2. But this is but Materia Logica. Anſ. And thoſe that I excuſe do but call it Materia metaphyſica: And what's the meaning of Materia Logica? If Logick or Grammar uſe ſecond Notions, Names, and Signs, if they be not rebus aptata they are falſe. What is it now but the aptitude of the Name that we ſpeak of?

Yea, you that make Spatium to be God, calling it Locus internus, really diſtinct from Bodies, yet ſay that you prove by Apodectical Arguments, that it is tribus dimenſionibus praeditum: And no doubt God is a Spirit, ſo that you your ſelf make a Spirit, even the Father of Spirits, to be Matter that hath Amplitude, Quantity, and the three dimenſions; And yet write a Book againſt one as aſſerting Spirits to be matter, who never aſſerted it, unleſs the word Matter ſignifie but Subſtance: For I aſcribe no more to it than your Amplitude, if ſo much. And yet I take the word Amplitude to ſignifie no form at all, no more than Quantity or Dimenſions, or Indiviſibility, or Penetrability, but to be p. 48the Conſiſtent Diſpoſitio Subſtantiae▪

And you once hit on that true notion of the Conditio materiae as a neceſſary Conceptus Entis praeter ipſam materiam & formam, Metaphyſ. c. 2. p. 10. [Verum Ens dicitur reſpectu formae, Legitimae que Conditionis materiae: Ne que enim Galea ex tenui Papyro fabricata & concinnata vera galea eſt, ſed potius ludicrum illius imitamentum. And ſo elſewhere. Yet now you make the … to be the Form.

… you make all Spirits to … ſome matter, You … to be but Anima Mund… … it either as a … Subſtance, as we ſay … the Body, or elſe as the forma … which is but Conceptus inadaequatu…. … Vitality is forma animae. If in the firſt …, you that ſay that operation of the Soul proveth locality, and aſcribe Amplitude and Quantity to God, and the three dimenſions, do ſeem to make him Intellectually though not actually Diviſible: That is, the Intellect may conceive of God as partly in the Sun, and partly on Earth, &c. or elſe you muſt ask pardon of your oppoſed Holenmerians as you name them, and ſay as they, that God is totus in toto & totus in qualibet parte.

p. 49If in the 2d ſenſe, then you make the matter only to be Subſtance, and God to be but the Form of that Subſtance (or as ſome dreams a Quality.) And then I confeſs your Notions of Indiſcerpible and Penetrable are very eaſily intelligible, as agreeing to the meer Form, (Vitality, Active-power, Wiſdom, and Love.)

But how either of theſe notions will ſtand, either with Gods Exiſtence ut ſpatium infinitum, beyond all Matter, (which you ſometime hint) or the Infiniteneſs of Matter, but with intermixt Vacuities, which (pag. 44. Metaph.) you ſeem to ſuppoſe to be communi naturae voce confirmatum) I know not: For then the vacuum is Deus extra materiam, and ſo all Spirit is not in matter. I think that all matter and Spirit is in God; and that he is much more than Anima Mundi & omnium animarum.

Ad SECT. IX.

§ 1. TO your Indiſcerpibility I further ſay, I diſtinguiſh, 1. Between Actual and Intellectual dividing; 2. Between what God can do, and what a Creature p. 50can do, and 3. Between the Father of Spirits and created Spirits: And ſo I ſay, 1. That if you had ſpoken of the meer Virtus Vitalis of a Spirit, I think it is a contradiction to ſay that it is Diſcerpible or impenetrable; But ſeeing you aſcribe Amplitude, Quantity, and Dimenſions, and Logical Materiality to the Subſtantiality of Spirits, I ſee not but that you make them Intellectually diviſible; that is, that one may think of one part as here and another there. 2. And if ſo, though man cannot ſeparate or divide them, if it be no contradiction God can. Various Elements vary in diviſibility: Earth is moſt diviſible: Water more hardly, the parts more inclining to the cloſeſt contact: Air yet more hardly: And if as you think the Subſtance of Fire be material, no doubt the Diſcerpibility is yet harder. And if God have made a Creture ſo ſtrongly inclin'd to the Unity of all the parts, that no other Creture can ſeparate them but God only, as if a Soul were ſuch; it's plain that ſuch a Being need not fear a Diſſolution by ſeparation of parts: For its own Nature hath no tendency to it, but to the contrary, and no fellow Creature hath power to do it, and God will not do it. God maketh all things apt for their uſe, and uſeth things as he p. 51hath made them, He made not Marble and Sand alike, nor uſeth them alike. And if he ſhould make a Spirit (e. g. an Anima hujus Vorticis, Solis, Stellae, &c.) Such as he only can divide, but hath no natural tendency to diviſion, but ſo much Indiſcerpibility as no Creature can overcome, this (beſides Scripture) intimateth Gods purpoſe about it.

3. But doubtleſs God and Creatures are both called Spirits equivocally or analogically and not univocally: And it is the vileſt Contradiction to ſay that God is capable of Diviſion: But whether it be ſo with created Spirits I know not: They have paſſivity and God hath none. It's no great Wiſdom to confeſs ones Ignorance; But not to confeſs it is very great folly.

I am ſcarce of your mind, that a man may be in the like puzzle in another World as he was in this, if he methodize not his Thoughts aright. But if it be ſo, you are beſt think again.

§ 2. For Penetrability you ſay, that one Spirit may have a greater Amplitude than another, and that the parts, as I may ſo call them, of the ſame Spirit, may in the Contraction of it ſelf penetrate one another, ſo that there may be a Reduplication of Eſſence through the whole Spirit. Anſ. You p. 52tempt me to doubt leſt you talk ſo much againſt materiality of Spirits to hide the name of your own Opinion, for that which others call materiality. If Spirits have parts which may be extended and contracted, you'l hardly ſo eaſily prove as ſay, that God cannot divide them. And when in your Writings ſhall I find ſatisfaction, into how much ſpace one Spirit may be extended, and into how little it may be contracted? And whether the whole Spirit of the World may be contracted into a Nut-ſhell, or a Box, and the Spirit of a Flea may be extended to the Convexe of all the World.

Ad SECT. X.

§ 1. I Said, [We grant that Spirits have a Quantitas diſcreta; they are numerous, individuate, and Formae ſe multiplicant: Generation is the work of Spirits, and not of Bodies. And how can I tell, that that God that can make many out of one, cannot make many into one, and unite and divide them as well as Matter.] You ſay, [This paſſage is worth our attentive conſideration. And 1. You hence infer Amplitude p. 53and Dimenſion of Spirits. Anſw. I meddle not for you, nor againſt you: What's this to me?

§ 2. You ask what are the Formae quae ſe multiplicant? Anſ. Senſitive and Rational as well as Vegetative Spirits: You ſay, That muſt be Creation, or Self-diviſion. Anſ. No; it is but Generation. And in Append. to the Reaſ. of Chriſtian Religion, I have partly ſhewed that Generation is from God as the Prime Cauſe, and yet the Parents Souls as a Second Cauſe, ſo that ſomewhat of a ſort of Creation and Traduction concur: which having further opened in Method. Theol. I here pretermit.

§ 3. But to my Queſtion, Why God cannot make two of one, or one of two, you put me off with this lean Anſwer, that we be not bound to puzzle our ſelves about it. Anſ. I think that Anſwer might ſerve to much of your Philoſophical Diſputes. But if you will puzzle us with a naked Aſſertion of Indiſcerpibility, we muſt ask your proof of it, why God cannot divide and unite extended ample quantitative Spirits? and if he can, how you know that he doth not? or that Indiviſibility is the Form of a Spirit; when as if Water be divided into drops, every drop is Water ſtill.

p. 54Ad SECT. XI.

§ 1. IN your further thoughts of this Sect. 11. you do firſt miſ-ſuppoſe that my Queſtion intimateth ſuch a Diviſibility of Souls, as of terrene Bodies into Atoms, or a contrary Union. Terrene Atoms have the moſt imperfect Union. All the Sands on the ſhoar are not only diviſible, but partly divided: I cannot ſay, that all the parts of the Air are ſo; much leſs of the Fire. There is a far cloſer Union of all the Subſtance of that Lucid Calefactive Element, than of Earth, Water, or Air.

§ 2. And here I muſt inſert, that after long thoughts, I doubt not but all things Created are truly one, and truly many: No one particle of the Univerſe is independent on the reſt: Parts they are; as every part of a Clock or Watch: Every Leaf, and Grape, and Apple on the Tree hath a certain individuate or numerical Being, and yet every one is a part of the Tree: And every Herb and Tree is a part of the Garden or Orchard, and that a part of England, &c. and all a part of the Earth in which they grow; and no doubt the p. 55Earth is as dependant on other parts of the Univerſe; and all on God. We dream of no total ſeparation of any Creature from the reſt, much leſs Spirits.

But all the Illuminated Air, is more one flamma tenuis (though compound of Air and Fire, and called by us Light) than the Sands are one Earth: And I doubt not but that Fire, which is the Motive, Illuminative, and Calefactive Subſtance, in all the Air, and elſewhere, is yet much leſs diviſible than the Air, and Souls than it: So that ſhould God make many into one, they would be many Individuals no more, but one again Diviſible by God himſelf.

§ 3. And you miſ-ſuppoſe me to ſuppoſe that the whole Subſtance of all Humane Souls, are but the ſame which once in Adam was but one, and from him divided. Writing is a tedious work, becauſe it ſo hardly cauſeth men to underſtand us. I ſuppoſe that a continued Creative Emanation from the Father of Spirits, giveth out all that Spiritual Subſtantiality which becometh new Souls; but that God hath ordained that the Generating Souls ſhall firſt receive this Divine Emanation, and be organical ☞ in communicating it to the Semen▪ and ſo to new organical Bodies; not that the Parents Souls only diſpoſe p. 56the ſeminal recipient Matter, but are themſelves partly receptive, and then active in the communication: It will be a defective ſimilitude if I ſay, as a Burning-glaſs by a receptive contraction of the Sun Beams, is inſtrumental in kindling combuſtible matter: Rather as one Candle kindleth a thouſand, and yet the ſubſtance of the Lucid and Calid Being, is communicated from the Ignite Air by the means of that one Candle. (For that it is only Motus a Motu, I believe not.)

That you have drawn me thus effutire quae circa generationem, opinor, muſt help you to be patient with my tediouſneſs. And the rather, becauſe to avoid offending you, I will now paſs by any further Anſwer to your Queries, Whether Adam's Soul was a Legion? which elſe was Adam's Soul? How come they to be Male and Female? was that number of Souls expanded or contracted? what a change by Venery? what becomes of the many Souls in the Chaſt? and the reſt. I would not by a particular Anſwer diſgrace your Queſtions, or the jocular urgent amplifications. No doubt Lights are too low Illuſtrations; but the higheſt within the reach of ſenſe. There was not a Legion of Candles in that which lighted a Legion: p. 57nor need I tell you which of the lighted Candles was that which lighted it; nor why lighting more conſumed not the firſt; nor why it kindled a Wax-Candle, and a Tallow-Candle, &c. I knew not till now that you thought Souls differed in Sex, becauſe the Perſons do. But I will not ſtrive againſt your Conceit. The Soul of a Male and Female I better underſtand, than a Male and Female Soul.

§ 4. But you tell me, I muſt conſider the Nature of Light throughly, and I ſhall find it nothing, but a certain motion of a Medium, whoſe particles are ſo or ſo qualified, ſome ſuch way as Carteſianiſm drives at: But here's not Subſtances but Motion communicated, &c.

Anſ. I had as willingly have heard Carteſius tell me any Dream elſe that ever came into his Brain: For this I greatly deſpiſe: And wonder not that any man is ignorant of the nature of Spirits, who is ſo groſly ignorant of the igneous analogical Nature as he was. I have ſaid ſo much in divers Books againſt it, that I will not here in tranſitu any further touch ſo noble a Subject, than to tell you that if you have ſtudied the old Stoicks, Platoniſts, &c. and Patricius, Teleſius, Campanella, Lud. le Grand, &c. as much as Carteſius, p. 58I pitty you for believing him. I doubt not the Subſtance of Fire hath a Virtus motiva, as well as illuminativa & catefactiva: And conſequently that Light and Heat are neither of them without Motion: But that they are a tripple operation of the Vna-trina forma ignea, I am paſt doubt, (after as hard ſtudy as you can adviſe me to.) But your terms [certain motion] and an (unnamed) Medium, and particles ſo and ſo qualified, and ſome way, &c. are not notifying terms to me.

That Lumen is ipſe motus methinks a man of half Carteſius's Age ſhould never dream: That it's an effect of Motion many ſay, and think it ſo, as much as Intellection is an effect of mental-Vitality, and Volition of Intellection. But (to lay no ſtreſs on Sir Ken. Digby's Arguments) I make no doubt Ignis lucens is as truly a Subſtance as a Spirit is. If Light be an Act or Quality it hath ſome immediate Agent or Subject: It doth not exiſt ſeparated from them. It is in the Air but as the Recipient, as it is in the Oil of the Candle. The Air ſhineth not of itſelf (as the Night informeth us.) It is therefore a Subſtance that moveth and illuminateth the Air: And if Cartes will call that Subſtance Gl… buli aetherei, or mat eria ſubtilis, I need not p. 59a game at ſuch toyiſh words: As Motus cauſeth Senſation, and Intellection, which yet by meer motion would never have been cauſed, without the conjunct Acts of the Senſitive and Intellective Faculties as ſuch; ſo is it of Light. Really when I read how far you have eſcaped the deluſions of Carteſianiſm, I am ſorry that you yet ſtick in ſo groſs a part of it as this is; when he that knoweth no more than motion in the Nature of Fire, which is the active Principle by which mental and ſenſitive Nature operateth on Man, and Bruits, and Vegetables, and all the paſſive Elements, (if it be not ipſa forma telluris) and all the viſible actions in this lower World are performed, what can that mans Philoſophy be worth? I therefore return your Counſel, ſtudy more throughly the Nature of Aethereal Fire.

I find cauſe to imagine (by your Writings) that you are (as Mr. Glanvile) for the pre-exiſtence of Souls before Generation. And when do you think they were all made? And what Bodies did all the Souls that have ever ſince been in the World animate, when there was no human Body but Adam's and Eve's? Can you conjecture what Animal's they were before they were men's? If you on the one extream p. 60(thinking that God made as many Souls, yea Animals the firſt week, as ever are in Being to the end of the World) and the Averrhoiſts on the other extream (who think all Souls are but one individuated by receptive Matter, as one Sun lighteth many Candles by a Burning-Glaſs, and all return as Candles put out, into one again) were to diſpute it out by meer Philoſophy (without the Experience of apparitions,) I know not which would get the better.

Ad SECT. XII, XIII.

THe 12. Section being all meer fiction needs no further Anſwer.

§ 1. It ſeems you call that the [excited Spirit of Nature,] lighting every Candle which other men call Fire: And ſo you will number Fire with Spirits.

§ 2. Your 13. Section is ſtrange. 1. You ſay Penetrability and indiviſibility are not accidents at all, no more than Rationale of a man. Anſ. Anima rationalis is forma hominis in the ſtrict proper ſenſe of Forma as an Active Principle. Indiviſible is a Negative, and it and Penetrable are the conſiſtency or mode of the Subſtance p. 61(or, as you call it, Matter:) As Amplitude, Quantity, Spiſſitude, Dimenſions, Locality are by you ſaid to be, which are called Forms in another ſenſe, as the paſſive Elements differ from each other. But the Principium Activum being the true and only Form of a Spirit, theſe modalities and Conſiſtencies are but conditio materiae, as you call it, or Subſtantiae as I call it, as to the Form. Yet that Diſpoſitio materiae is Eſſential I have aſſerted.

§ 3. And yet though all along I deny not your two words to be the conditio omnis Subſtantiae ſpiritualis (joined with more) I ſtill tell you that difficulties make me not lay ſo much on them as you do. To add one more, As I told you Quality is penetrable; as well as Spirit, e. g. heat, ſo yet though we commonly ſay, it is indiviſible, I wiſh you would ſolve this Objection: You prove the locality of Spirits by their operation on this or that Body, (And doubtleſs you may well prove that the Recipient body is in loco, and conſequently the Agent relatively.) But how ſhall we avoid the diviſion of Qualities or Spirits ex diviſione materiae ſubjectivae. E. g. If a red hot Iron be penetrated by the heat, yet if this Iron be cut in two, while hot, and each part ſet (per potentiam ſuperiorem) p. 62at 20 Miles diſtance. is not the heat divided with the Iron? So if a mans Head be ſtruck off, and (by ſuch a quick mover as you think moveth the Earth) the Head in a moment were carried far off, while both parts of the Body are yet alive, is not the Soul in each part? And if the Parts were 20 or 100 Miles a ſunder, is it ſtill one undivided Soul?

I can ſay ſomwhat to ſatisfie my ſelf of this; but hardly without croſſing ſomwhat that you ſay.

§ 4. Again when my chief diſſent from you is more againſt your Confidence than your Verity, yet you again tell us, that we know not bare Eſſences, but Eſſential Attributes. I tell you I take not theſe to be notifying Expreſſions: We know ſome Eſſences either intuitively (as Ockam ſaith) or without ſigns, immediately, e. g. what it is to ſee, taſte, hear, ſmell, &c. and what to underſtand and will. And we know other Eſſences Scientia abſtractiva per ſigna. And what good would the knowledge of Attributes elſe do us. Attributes in notione prima are the thing itſelf: And to know an Eſſential Attribute, and to know ipſam Eſſentiam Scientia inadaequata is all one. But an Eſſential Attribute as notio ſecunda, is but ſignum per quod res ſignificata p. 63cognoſcenda eſt: And this is knowing the Eſſence too, but ſcientia abſtractivâ: And all is ſcientia valde imperfectâ.

§ 5. You ſay, that Neither the faculty nor Operation of Reaſoning is the Eſſence, and conſequently not rationale.

Anſ. Things of ſo great Moment ſhould not not be obtruded on the World with a bare ipſe dico. The Act of Intellection or Reaſoning is but the Eſſence in hoc modo: but the Faculty is the Eſſential Form of the Soul. When you have confuted the Scotiſts, and my peculiar Diſput. in Meth. Theol. where I think I fully diſprove what you ſay, I may hear you further.

Ad SECT. XIV, XV, XVI.

§ 1 HEre you would firſt know, How I know that the Vitalitas formalis belongs not to Matter, unleſs I have an Antecedent notion of Spirit diſtinct from Matter. Anſ. 1. I conſent not to Dr. Gliſſon, who thought all. Matter had a Vital Form. But I undertake not to prove that God cannot endow any Matter with a Vital Form. And forma denominat; where I find the Form of a Spirit I'le call it Spirit.

p. 642. Dr. Henry Moore in his Metaph. would ask me, how I know that a Helmet may not be made of Paper; and he and I would agree that Paper is not materia diſpoſita, and yet we would not call it Galeae formam.

§ 2. Your denial of Subſtantiality to be ex traduce, I anſwered before; telling you that I think it is both ex emanatione creativa, & ex traduce, but not by either alone; nor all Souls that ever will be, created in Indiſce…pible Individuality at once, and tranſmuted from Body to Body.

§ 3. When I ſay, the Negative Immaterial notifieth not the form, you ſay that Immaterial implieth Poſitiveneſs. Anſ. Therefore give us the poſitive notion, or you give us no definition, nor any notifying word.

§ 4. When you ſay, [You believe it is not eaſie to give an Example that materia is put in lieu of ſubſtantia in that adequate ſenſe.] What abundance of Authors could I name you, yea, have I oft named, beſides Dr. Crakenthorp?

§ 5. When you ſay, [All created Subſtance is both Active and Paſſive in ſome ſenſe or other.] It's but to ſay, all words are ambiguous. So all created Subſtance is matter in ſome ſenſe or other. But one would have thought by your oft repeated p. 65denial of the ſelf-moving Power of Matter, that you had thought only Spirits have a ſelf-moving power. And if ſo, will you yet ſay, that [this is a diſtinction which diſtinguiſheth nothing?] I think thus, Natura activa as meet a name as Spiritus. And that yet it hath ſome Paſſivity, Damaſcene, yea, and Auguſtine, de Spir. & Anim. c. 8. ſay that is becauſe the Soul [reſpectu incorporei Dei corporea eſt.] though in reſpect to our Bodies it is Incorporeal: Other Fathers ſay much more, but I juſtify not their words.

§ 6. Ad 15. Sect. I pretend not to have ſuch an Idaea of Spiritual Subſtance, as to denominate its conſiſtence more fitly than by Purity, a word which you alſo uſe, yet not denying your ſeveral Attributes.

§ 7. As to your Doctrine of Atomes, I think no wiſe man dare ſay that God made matter firſt in divided Atomes, and after ſet them together. But that God is able to divide all matter into Atomes or indiviſible parts I doubt not. The Virtus Formalis of Spirits (and ſo ſome qualities) conſiſt not of Atomes: But how far God can divide the ample Subſtance of them, I only tell you, that I know not; and to pretend to know it would be none of my Wiſdom. Your Attributes of amplitude, quantity, p. 66dimenſions, imply that God made ſome Spirits bigger in amplitude than others, as well as Virtutis ſortioris. You think I ſuppoſe that which you call the Spirit of the World, or Nature, bigger in amplitude than the Spirit of a Wren.

§ 8. Ad Sect. 16. You that ſay, Spirits have Extenſion and Spiſſitude, ſay that ſpiſſitude ſignifieth more ſubſtance in leſs compaſs. And theſe Phraſes ſound liker to Corporeity than any that I have uſed: More ſubſtance and leſs ſubſtance, ſpiſſitude by Contraction ſignifie much change, and ſignifie that which the Intellect may diſtinguiſh into partes extra partes, though undivided which would increaſe a mans doubt, whether God be not able to make a bigger Spirit leſs, and a leſs bigger, and to ſeparate the parts that are ſo diſtinguiſhable in amplitude, and to make one into two, or two into one.

§ 9. Whether Aether or Fire be material, methinks you ſhould be as uncertain at leaſt as I. For you ſay Light is but motus, of ſomwhat exciting the Spirit of the World. If it be the Spirit of the world that is the neareſt cauſe of Illumination by way of Natural activity, than that which you call the Spirit of the World, I call Fire; and ſo we differ but de nomine. But p. 67I have oft profeſt my Ignorance whether Fire, and the Vegetative Nature be all one, (which I encline to think) or whether Fire be a middle active Nature between the Spiritual and the meer paſſive, by which Spirits work on Bodies. I think I ſhall quickly know all this better than you do.

Ad SECT. XVII, XVIII, XIX.

§ 1. OF your Doctrine of Atomes I ſpake before: I have no mind to examine the weight of your Reaſons publickly.

§ 2. I thought you that ſo extol the Atomiſts Doctrine, would have deigned to read at leaſt ſome of the Leaders of the various Sects: And my undervaluing them is no excuſe to you: for as you knew not my judgment, ſo I ſuppoſe you do not much eſteem it. That which I blame them for, is, that Lud. le Grand over-magnifieth Fire, Teleſius and Campanella over-magnifie Heat, Patricius over-magnifieth Light, as Carteſius doth Motion: But if the one Principle of Motion, Light, and Heat, had been better handled as one, (as it is) it had been ſounder.

p. 68§ 3. I need not your hydroſtatical experiment of the riſing Rundle to convince me of the Motion of the matter of the World by a ſpiritual power: I doubt as little of Spirits as of Bodies: But I underſtand not what greater wonder there is in the riſing of your Rundle, than in the riſing of a piece of Timber from the bottom of the Sea; or that the heavieſt body ſhould ſink loweſt if it have way. Whether Water conſiſt of oblong flexible Bodies, I am not much regardful to know: Each of thoſe oblong ones are diviſible into Atomes.

§ 4. But as to what hence you infer of Fire, I make no doubt but the Flames and the red hot Iron are compouud things; and that the oily or ſulphureous matter moved and heated, is the Subſtance which we ſee. But I believe not that bare motion as motion, were it never ſo ſwift, wo'd cauſe this: But that theſe effects are cauſed in the capable matter by the ſpecial action of a permeant Subſtance in itſelf inviſible as Subſtance, whoſe form is the Active Virtue of moving, illuminating, and heating, and ſo is ſenſible only in this triple Effect. And if you call this a Spirit I leave you to your Liberty.

p. 69Ad SECT. XX. XXI.

§ 1. THE ſeven Propoſitions which you find in my words I own, ſave that the fourth ſhould be thus formed [That the Subſtantiae diſpoſitio in fire diſtinct from the form, beareth ſome ſuch Analogy to a Spirit (if it be not one, viz. Vegetative) that may ſomewhat ſerve us to conceive of it thereby, and they that from this Analogy, call it Ignis non formaliter ſed eminenter, are excuſable; though it can be no ſtrict proper name that cometh not a forma.

§. 2. Ad ſect. 21. But you ask [Whether by Active power I mean a power alwaies exerting itſelf into act, ſo that this fire is alwaies moving, enlightning, and hot formaliter, elſe why ſhould it be called Ignis?]

Anſ. Anſwer your ſelf, when you ſpeak of a power of Senſation, and Intellection and Volition in a Soul, do you mean a power alwaies exerting itſelf into ſenſation, Intellection and Volition, elſe why is it called a Soul.] Anſ. 2. I mean a power which hath alwaies an inclination to Act; & hath its own ſecret immanent act, & alwaies acts ad extra, when it hath fit recipient p. 70objects. As to your oft mentioned Confutation of Judge Hale, having not read it, I am no Judge of your performance.

You Queſtion what is this new igneous ſubſtance never heard of before] while in all Ages it hath been ſo famous a controverſy; when not only the Stoicks but moſt old Philoſophers gave to it ſo much more than meet; when Lud. Le Grand, would make us believe that it was almoſt the only God of all the Heathen World, under various names, and while ſo many new Sects have written ſo many volumes of it, who would have believed that even Dr. Henry More had never heard of it before?

To your queſtion, Is it material or immaterial?] I ſtill anſwer, material is a word of larger or narrower ſenſe, ambiguous: I know that it hath the aforeſaid Actions: And by them I know that it hath the Power ſo to act: and by both I know it is a ſubſtance capable of ſuch power & Acts: And I know that the ſubſtance is inviſible in ſe, but ſeen in its Effects. And my brain is too dark to be confident of more: Let him that knoweth more boaſt of it.

§ 3. You ſay [A material Fire diſtinct from the flame of a Candle, or Fire-ſtick, or red hot Iron, there is no more ground for, p. 71than material Water diſtinct from Wells, Rivers, Seas, &c.]

Anſ. Do you not take Carteſius materia ſubtilis, if not globuli aetherei, to be inviſible, & not alwaies appearing in Candles or Fire-ſticks? If a Soul may be a ſenſitive and intellective Subſtance, and yet not be alwaies feeling or underſtanding, why may there not be Fire where it ſhineth not. It ſeemeth you take not the illuminated Air to be Ignite, becauſe it is not a Candle or Fire-ſtick: I doubt not but Fire is a Subſtance permeant and exiſtent in all mixt Bodies on Earth; & in ipſa tellure; in Minerals; in your Blood it is the prime part of that called the Spirits, which are nothing but the Igneous Principle in a pure aerial Vehicle, and is the Organ of the Senſitive Faculties of the Soul: And if the Soul carry away any Vehicle with it, it's like to be ſome of this. I doubt you take the ſame thing to be the Spirit of the world, while you ſeem to vilifie it.

§ 4. It's ſtrange when I tell you that I conceive of a Spirit but as Ignis eminenter, and not formaliter, that you ſhould ſtill ask whether I take it not for Ignis formaliter? I have often ſaid, that I think Subſtances differ ſo gradually, that the lower …ath ſtill ſome Analogy to the higher: p. 72And I ſtill ſay that Natura Mentalis, & ſenſitiva are not Ignis formaliter; But whether the Natura Vegetativa be any other than ipſe ignis I know not; but think it is no other. Do you that better know its conſiſtence call it Spirit or not as you pleaſe.

Ad Sect. 22. 23, 24, 25, 26, 27.

§ 1. YOU puzzle me more and more: Before you ſaid, Fire is nothing but motion of ſulphureous particles, and only in Candles, Fire-ſticks, hot Irons, &c. And yet now [The vehicles of Angels are Igneous or aethereal.] Is an Angel only in a Candle or hot Iron, &c. Is motion, yea motion of ſulphureous particles their vehicle? If they are Animals, and have bodies, as you think, they are ſuch as deſerve a nobler Character.

§ 2. I tell you ſtill, the Greek Fathers I think, as well as I, call'd mental and ſenſitive Spirits, Ignis, but Analogically, which you call Symbolically: If that ſatisfy you what have you all this while diſputed againſt? And if Fire be the vehicle of Angels it is a ſubſtance. And when you ſe… the Motion, Light, and feel the heat, d… p. 73you think, what ever is the Recipient moved Matter, that the inviſible Mover is not preſent and contiguous? It is that immediate mover which I call Fire, and am fully ſatisfied doth it not by Motion only, but the exerting of its triple Virtue.

§ 3. You confeſs, Sect. 24. the common uſe of the name of Fire applied to Souls by the old Philoſophers: and ſtill you ſay it was but Symbolically: and did they find no Reaſon to make Fire a Symbol rather than Earth or Water. When I ſtill tell you that it is only analogically that Souls may be called Fire, did you fairly to pretend the contrary?

§ 4. Yea Sect. 25. You are at it again, ſaying that [I ſeem to conceive the Fathers to ſpeak not ſymbolically, but properly.] Anſ. where and when did I ſay any ſuch thing? will you tell the world that a Man holds that which he never ſaid, and hath oft written againſt, and write a Book againſt him on ſuch a ſuppoſition, and at laſt have nothing to ſay but Putarem? I uſe not the words Symbolical and Proper; they are not preciſe enough for this ſubject: I ſaid more when I ſaid that Souls and Angels are called fire, only eminenter & analogice, but not formaliter: and forma dat nomen.

p. 74But you are offended that I ſay thoſe Greek Fathers ſpake tolerably and informingly, and you ſay, It was miſchievouſly, inducing men to believe the Soul mortal. For Light may be blown out, and hot Iron cooled. Anſ. Alas! What dry Philoſophy is this of Fire? Is any thing annihilated when the Candle goeth out? Was there not an inviſible active principle moving your ſuppoſed ſulphureous particles, which was as immediate an Agent as your Soul is of Senſation or Intellection: which remaineth the ſame? But indeed it is Air and not Sulphur which is the firſt and neareſt Recipient of the illuminating Act, and is Conjux Ignis, I ſuppoſe you'l ſay, The Spirit of the World doth this. Anſ. Call it by what name you will, It is a pure active Subſtance, whoſe form is the Virtus motiva, illuminativa & calefactiva; I think the ſame which when it operateth on due ſeminal matter is Vegetative. But the World hath Spiritual Natures more noble than this; viz. ſenſitive and intellective.

§ 5. Ad Sect. 26. You ſay againſt the Fathers, [When we enquire into the diſtinct Nature of things we muſt bid adieu to Metaphors.] Anſ. When I am ignorant of my own Ignorance, I will hear you, I am far from dreaming that I have one formal p. 75Conception of God, but only Analogical: Only that of Ens is diſputed between the Thomiſts and Scotiſts, whether it be Univocal de Deo & Creaturis. And here Analogical is but Metaphorical: And yet it is not nothing to ſee as in a Glaſs & enigmatically. And when I can perceive that your two hard words do not only ſignifie more than negatively and modally, or qualitatively, but alſo give us an Idea of a Spirit which hath nothing Metaphorical, but all formal, I ſhall magnifie them more than I do.

§ 6. You ſay we muſt ſearch out the adequate defi…ition.] Anſ. That [adequate] is a word too big for me: I dare ſay that you have not an adequate knowledg of any thing in the World; not of one Fly or Flea or Pile of Graſs: And can you make adequate Definitions of Angels and all Spirits? Even who before twice told us that we know not the intimate eſſence of things, but the Attributes? Indeed I perceive your Attributes are ſuch as will not notifie Eſſences. I ask my own experience whether Indiſcerpible is a word that giveth any Idea of the Eſſence, ſave negative (that it cannot be torn into pieces) and modal? and I find no other that it maketh on my Mind.

p. 76The common note of Matter is, that it hath partes extra partes: and I think you thus make Spirits material. You make them parts of the compound Animal: and you deny them to be toti in toto; and you give them locality, & amplitude, & quantity. And if ſo, though they be indiſcerpible, they have continued parts intelligible; and that part of the Soul is not in one hand which is in the other: and as partes Animalis they are actually ſeparable from the matter. The Spiritus Mundi you ſuppoſe to be a great continued amplitude or extended Subſtance. And Atomes are in ſome Elements a cloſely continued Subſtance. You ſeem to make all Subſtance to be Atomes, ſpiritual atomes and material atomes. And I am not ſure that God cannot make material atomes ſo continued a matter as that no Creature can diſcerp them: is it any contradiction? and I doubt not but Souls and Angels are ſo indiviſible, as that their Nature tendeth to continued, undivided Unity, and no Creature can divide them. But that God cannot do it I cannot ſay.

Even of the Souls Mortality not only Arnobius, but many other Chriſtian Writers maintain, that it is mortal naturâ, but immortal ex dono; which is unfitly p. 77ſpoken but well meant: that is, God hath made their Natures ſuch as have no tendency in themſelves to a Diſſolution or Deſtruction, but not ſuch as he cannot diſſolve or deſtroy; Yea I doubt not but without a continued Divine Suſtentation, all the World would in a moment be annihilated; Preſervation being a continued ſort of Creation. Your owning nothing in Fire but what's viſible, I have ſpoke to.

Ad SECT. XXVIII.

§ 1. THat Spirits are each Ens unum per ſe, ſo as to have no divided parts, or ſuch as tend to diſſolution I doubt not: that they are each one by the continued uniting Influx of that God who continueth their Being, and ſo far per aliud, is paſt doubt. You here make Metaphyſical Monades abſurd and ridiculous. But is not that a Monad and Atome which is one and indiviſible? though it be not minimum: and if your Penetrability imply not that all the ſingular Spirits can contract themſelves▪ into a punctum; yea, that all the Spirit of the World may be ſo contracted, I find it not yet ſufficiently explained: For you never p. 78tell us into how little parts only it may be contracted: And if you put any limits I will ſuppoſe that one Spirit hath contracted itſelf into the leaſt compaſs poſſible; and then I ask, cannot another and another Spirit be in the ſame compaſs by their Penetration; If not, Spirits may have a contracted Spiſſitude which is not penetrable, and Spirits cannot penetrate contracted Spirits, but only dilated ones. If yea, then quaero whether all created Spirits may not be ſo contracted.

And I ſhould hope that your Definition of Spirit excludeth not God; and yet that you do not think that his Eſſence may be contracted and dilated. O that we knew how little we know!

And as to your rejection of Metaphors I ſay, the very name Spiritus which you uſe is a Metaphor: rhe firſt ſenſe being our Breath à ſpirando, or the Air or Wind: Martinius nameth no fewer than Fifteen ſenſes of it, and Wiſdom itſelf ſaid, 1 Cor. 15. There is a natural Body, and there is a ſpiritual Body.

§ 2. You add, [If you will ſay, that if he ſhould create ſuch a Spirit with metaphyſical Amplitude, which though ſo large himſelf cannot divide, and ſever into parts, he would thereby puzzle his own Omnipotency, p. 79at this rate he ſhall be allowed to create nothing, no not ſo much as matter, nor himſelf indeed to be.

Anſ. I had rather tremble at this than boldly anſwer it. Whatever is a contradiction cannot be; and it is not for want of power that God cannot do it: It is no work of power: Had you proved it a Contradiction for God, to make two Spirits of one, or one of two, you had done that part in an eaſier way, which I ſhould not gainſay. But this Speech of yours is as if you ſaid, [He denieth God to be the Creator, or to be God, who ſaith that God is able to divide an Ample ſpiritual Subſtance; that is, who ſaith, that this is no contradiction, and that God is Almighty: when our Creed ſaith, that God is the Father Almighty maker of Heaven and Earth. Cannot he alter or annihilate his own works: Before he made the World, he could have made the ample Subſtance of the Spirit of the World into many Spirits: And is he leſs able ſo to change it? If Spirits be unified as the Bodies which they animate, cannot God make many Bodies into one? Cannot he make many Stars into one? And then would that one have many unifying Spirits, or but one? It's a thing ſo high as required ſome ſhew of proof, to intimate p. 80that God cannot be God, if he be Almighty, and cannot conquer his own Omnipotency.

§ 3. Your words like an intended Reaſon are [For that cannot be God, from whom all other things are not produced & created.] Anſ. 1. Relatively (as a God to us) it's true; though quoad exiſtentiam Eſſentiae he was God before the Creation. 2. But did you take this for any ſhew of a proof? The ſenſe implied is this, [All things are not produced and created by God, if a ſpiritual ample Subſtance be diviſible by his Omnipotency that made it: Yea, then he is not God. Negatur Conſequentia.

Ad SECT. XXIX, XXX, XXXI.

§ 1. YOU ſay your definition is more informing than defining a Spirit by Fire, viz. [a Spirit is an immaterial ſubſtance indued with Life, and the faculty of Motion] and virtually containing in it Penetrability, and Indiſcerpibility] Anſ. 1. Your definition is common, good and true, allowing for its little imperfections, and the common imperfection of mans knowledge of Spirits. The ſame things need not be ſo very oft repeated in anſwer to p. 81you: but briefly I ſay; if by Immaterial you mean not [without ſubſtance] it ſignifieth truth: but a negation ſpeaketh not a formal eſſence. 2. Spirit is itſelf but a Metaphor. 3. Intrinſecal, indued with Life, tells us not that it is the form: Qualities and proper accidents are intrinſecal. 4. The [faculty of motion] is either a tautology included in life, or elſe if explicatory of life, it is defective; or if it diſtribute Spirits into two ſorts, vital and motive, it ſhould not be in the common definition. 5. No Man can underſtand that the negative [Immaterial] by the terms, includeth Penetrability and Indiſcerpibility. 6 You do not ſay here that they are the form, but elſewhere you do: and the form ſhould be expreſt, and not only virtually contained as you ſpeak. 7. They are not the form, but the Diſpoſitio vel conditio ad formam. 8. If ſuch modalities or conſiſtence were the form, more ſuch ſhould be added which are left out. 9. Penetrability and Indiſcerpibility are two notions, and you ſhould not give us a compound form. 10. Yea you compound them with a quite different notion, [Life and the faculty of motion:] which is truly the form, and is one thing, and not compounded of notions ſo different, as Conſiſtence and Virtue p. 82or Power.] 11. You ſay Life intrinſecally iſſues from this immaterial ſubſtance: But the form is concreated with it, and iſſues not from it.

You mean well: It is informing truth which you intend, and offer to the world. And we are all greatly beholden to you for ſo induſtrious calling fooliſh ſenſualiſts to the ſtudy and notion of inviſible beings, without which what a Carkaſs or nothing were the world. But all our conceptions here muſt have their allowances, and we muſt confeſs their weakneſs.

And you might have informed us of all that you know, without fathering opinions on others, which they never owned, and then nicknaming them from your own fiction: As if we ſaid that Souls are fire, and alſo took fire as you do for Candles, and hot Irons, &c. only.

§ 2. Now I that pretend not to a perfect definition repeat that which is the neareſt to it that I underſtand.

And firſt I am for agreeing on the ſenſe of words before we uſe them in definitions.

1. I take not the word [Spirit] to be of univocal ſignification here, but ſo analogical as to be equivocal. God and Creatures are not univocally called [Spirits.] p. 832. I know not (and I think no other) that all Created Spirits in the univerſe are ſo far of one ſubſtantial conſiſtence as that the word [Spirit] univocally fits them all, as a Genus among the 15 ſenſes of the word before ſaid mentioned by Martinius; when we confine it to one, men are apt to boggle at the ambiguity: yet when we have defined it, the name is to be uſed.

3. Materia is as ambiguous as Spiritus; and is oft uſed for Res or Subſtantia, which is fundamental to modes and qualities and active forms: and oft for ſubſtance of ſuch a conſiſtence as is ſenſible (to the higheſt ſenſes) and as a mind in the fleſh can have an Idea of in its conſiſtence; and if you will, ſuch as you call Impenetrable and Diſcerpible.

4. The word [ſubſtance] itſelf, if uſed only to ſignifie, either Quoddity and not Quiddity; (as Ens for Quod eſt, and not Quid eſt, and ſubſiſtit for aliquid ſubſiſtit; not telling what) or relatively only for Quod ſubſtat accidentibus; or negatively for Quod non eſt accidens; ſed aliquid ſubſiſtens in ſe, and include not the notion of Res fundamentalis, is not fit here to be uſed as a Genus; but in this ſenſe it is.

5. Forma being oft taken for ſubſtantiae figura, and oft for the contexture of p. 84corporeal parts making it receptive of Motion, and oft for the union of the moving and the moved parts, and oft for the moving principle in a compound, and oft for the Motive or Active Virtue in a ſimple ſubſtance, but ever ſtrictly for the ſpecifick conſtitutive cauſe, per quam res eſt id quod eſt; I take it to be but improperly and equivocally applied to the meer Receptive conſiſtence preſuppoſed to the form.

Theſe things ſuppoſed. I preſume not to give a definition of God, but ſuch a deſcription as we can reach.

Suppoſing the word [Nature] to ſignify in general [Quoddity and Quiddity] I firſt diſtinguiſh [Nature] into Active and Paſſive: By Active I mean that Nature which hath a formal Power, Virtue, and Inclination to Activity. By Paſſive I mean that Nature which having no ſuch Active form, is formed to receive the Influx of the Active.

I refuſe not to call the firſt Spirit: but becauſe they ſo greatly differ, I chooſe rather the common name of Active Nature; being not metaphorical.

2. I ſuppoſe there is no ſuch thing as Spirit (or Active Nature) which is not ſome ſpecies of Spirit: Therefore I give no definition of [Spirit] or Active NaNature p. 85in general, for where there is no form and no ſpecies there is no proper definition. And all Spirit being actually Mental, Senſitive or Vegetative, and every thing having but one univocal form, I name no form but of each ſpecies, but as in compounds, ſo in ſimples we mentally diſtinguiſh the materia (vel ſubſtantia) Diſpoſitio & forma.

Therefore defining only the ſpecies, I define, Naturam Mentalem to be [ſubſtantia Puriſſima Virtuoſiſſima, Virtute ſcilicet Formali Vitaliter-Activa, Intellectiva, Volitiva (una-trina:) I define Naturam Animalem ſeu ſenſitivam, to be [ſubſtantia Purior Virtuoſior, ſcilicet, virtute Vitali-Activa ſenſitiva, Perceptiva-ſenſitiva, Appetitiva-ſenſitiva.

I have told you oft enough why I ſay Puriſſima, including as much of your [Immaterial, Penetrable, Indiſcerpible] and more, as is really the ſubſtantiae diſpoſitio; and if you will call it as ſome do forma diſpoſitiva, I quarrel not: But I uſe [Puriſſima] 1. to avoid many words, and 2. To avoid pretending to more diſtinct conceptions of ſpiritual conſiſtencies than I find any idea of in my mind.

I uſe but the Comparative degree of p. 86[Purior and Virtuoſior] to ſenſitives, not being ſure that there is not a gradual difference in both conſiſtency and virtue in theſe ſpecies of Spirits.

I define the Vegetative Nature, ſuppoſing it to be ipſe Ignis, to be [ſubſtantia Pura, Virtu…ſa, ſcilicet Virtute formali Activa, Illuminativa, Calefactiva; by which prime operations it cauſeth Vegetation, & thereby in plants, Diſcretionem, Attractionem, Digeſtionem, &c. by an Analagous perception, appetite and motion. But theſe actions belong to compounds; And I ſtill profeſs my ſelf in this alſo uncertain, whether Natura Vegetativa and Ignea be all one: or whether Ignis be Natura organica by which the three ſuperior operate on the Paſſive. But I incline moſt to think that they are all one; when I ſee what a Glorious Fire the Sun is, and what operation it hath on Earth, and how unlikely it is that ſo glorious a ſubſtance, ſhould not have as noble a formal Nature as a plant. And I take all the ſuperior Virtues to be the inferior, eminenter, and the inferior to have analogy to the ſuperiour.

Your frequent repetitions draw me to this repetition. If we agree in the definitions, I will not contend about any name.

And I confeſs if you could prove that p. 87Indiviſibility is proper to any ſpecies, then it would be a contradiction for it to be that ſpecies, and yet to be diviſible, and ſo it would be no act of Omnipotency to do it. But as in Materials, ſo as far as I can conceive in Spirituals, to make two into one is no change of the Nature of the things, nor to make one into two. This belongs to Individuation, and not to ſpecification.

Who can doubt but God being all in all things, he is as intimate to us as our Souls to our bodies, and more: And tho the Schools commonly ſay, that God hath no Accidents, pardon my diſſent who doubt not he hath the accidents of Relations, and dare not ſay that all the world is not Dei Accidens, while in him we live, and move, and have our being: for I will not, and I do not think that it is Pars Dei, as if he were but Anima mundi, and yet I will not ſay that the world hath no entity or ſubſtance; nor yet that the entity of God and the world, is more than the entity (or ſubſtance) of God alone; for to be Minor or Pars is below God. But Accidents though no parts are ſubſtantiae accidentia. And though I think the Fryar (Benedictus de Benedictis) in Regula Perfectionis ſpeaketh fanatically when he taketh p. 88it to be perfection to ſuppoſe we ſee and know no being but God; yet we muſt know nothing quite ſeparate from God, and that hath not ſome dependent union with him. And yet while all things are in God, and ſo inſeparable from him that nothing but annihilation can totally ſeparate them, yet they are multitudes in themſelves, and wicked Men and Devils are ſeparated from the influx of his Grace and Glory. And the human nature of Chriſt hath ſome nearer union with God than other Creatures have. And ſo I doubt not but every Creature is ſo united to the univerſe, that nothing but annihilation can totally ſeparate it from the reſt; and yet this is conſiſtent with individuation. I remember when I told him whom you ſo oft mention of Auguſtines words de Anima, in which he ſeemeth to favour the ſaying that [All Souls are one, and yet many] rather than that [All Souls are one and not many] or [many and not one] he ſeemed much taken with it: all which I mention to infer that there is a ſeparability (from God and the univerſe) which is no way poſſible but by annihilation; and in compounds ſome ſeparation of parts will change the ſpecies; and if it were proveable which Aquinas holds, that no p. 89two Angels are not of diſtinct Species, then every alteration of the individual might alter the Species; but yet it wo'd be a Spirit.

And I have long thought that ſo much ſelfiſhneſs as is our ſin or imperfection, is a potent cauſe of making all men more regardful of Individuation and fearful of loſing it by Union of Spirits than they ought; and that holy Souls will be nearlier one with Chriſt and one another than we can here deſire or conceive; and yet Individuation ſecundum quid at leaſt, ſhall be continued. But yet I ſay, while there is numerus animarum, and it is uncertain whether alſo each Orb hath not one, and you plead for Amplitude, and Minority, (Quantity) and the Bodies animated may as vaſtly differ as a Flea, or a Wren, or a Pigmy, and the Sun, it is quite above my reach to know that a change of Individuals, by making one many, or many one, is a contradiction, and ſo impoſſible.

And as to Penetrability I repeat, that ſeeing by Penetration I ſuppoſe you mean not piercing inter partes, but poſſeſſing the ſame place with other things, and contraction of itſelf, into leſs amplitude, as I know not how a thing that hath no parts (and that extra partes) can contract itſelf into leſs ſpace, (which is to contract parts p. 90that are no parts) ſo I cannot ſee but ſuch Contraction and Colocality muſt needs be limited, ſo as that all the World cannot be deſerted and mortified by all Spirits Contraction to one narrow ſpace; nor yet that at once every Spirit is every where; and when the Contraction and Colocality is come to the narroweſt poſſible, in that ſtate Spirits muſt needs be further impenetrable, that is, no more can be in that ſpace.

So that while I am paſt doubt, that God hath made Spirits of no kind of parts but what do naturally abhor ſeparation, and ſo are inſeparable, unleſs God will ſeparate them, and ſo there is no fear of altering the Individuation much leſs the ſpecies of Souls; I there ſtop and will put no more into my definitions of Souls or Spirits than I know, at leaſt as ſtrongly probable, much leſs by laying the formal Eſſence on a Compoſition of hard & doubtful words, tempt all to believe tkat the very Being of Spirits is as doubtful as thoſe words are.

Ad SECT. XXIII.

§ 1. YOu ſaid, [That a Spirit is Ens, ideoque verum, and that True implieth p. 91a right matter and form duly conjoined.] To which I ſaid, [Do you not here make Spirits material?] You anſwered, [I do not make Spirits material in any ſenſe derogatory to their Nature and Perfections.]

Reply. Nor do thoſe that I excuſed: ſo then after all theſe Sections, you make Spirits conſiſt of Matter and form, in a ſenſe agreeable to their nature and perfection: And ſo de nomine, you come nearer thoſe that you accuſe than I do.

§ 2. But you ſay, [That Matter and Form I there ſpeak of, is a Matter and Form that belongs to Ens quatenus Ens— in a moſt general notion preſcinded from all kinds of Being whatever, and therefore belongs to Beings Immaterial.]

Anſ. If you may ſay Quidvis de quovis, lay not too great ſtreſs on words. Ens quatenus Ens hath no Form, nor proper Matter. Ens is that terminus incomplexus, to whoſe Conception all other are reſolved. Therefore every other conception incomplex or complex, muſt add ſomwhat to it. It can be no Genu…, or Species: If it have any kind of Matter and Form it is more than Ens quatenus Ens: And ſure that which is [preſcinded from all particular kinds of Being, is preſcinded from Material and Immaterial, unleſs the word [particular] p. 92be a Cothurnus. To ſay that Ens hath Matter and Form, is to ſay more than Ens, a moſt general notion, as you call it.

But if Ens as the moſt general notion, have Matter and Form, then ſo hath Spirits, and every ſubordinate; for the general is in them all.

§ 3. But you ſay, [It's only materia & forma logica.] To which I anſwered before. That's but to ſay, It is notio ſecunda, which if it be not fitted ad primam, or ut ſignum ad rem ſignificandam, it is falſe. And we ſuppoſe you to mean to ſpeak truly and aptly. If you ſhould mean neither materia ex qua, nor in qua, but circa quam, ſo Form may be Matter.

§ 4. You ſay, [Nor is the Form adjoined in a Phyſical Senſe to the Matter, unleſs where the Form and Matter are Subſtances really diſtinct.

Anſ. 1. I believe not this to be true: If it be, then only Compounds have Form and Matter; but I think Simples have Matter and Form, that are not two Subſtances but one. As I have oft ſaid, Dr. Gliſſon after others moſt ſubtilly laboureth to prove it of every ſimple Subſtance, that its Matter and Form are not compounding parts, but Conceptus inadaequati: If the Intellect compound and divide its p. 93own Conceptions that maketh not a real Compoſition of two Subſtances in the objects, but as the Scotiſts call it, of two Formalities, or Conceptus objectivi: which if you will call a Logical Compoſition or Intellectual, if you explain it, the matter is ſmall. But beſides that Earth, Water and Air have their Matter and differencing Forms, which are not two Subſtances, ſo hath Fire in a more noble ſenſe if it be material: And by your Application of the word [Phyſical] you ſeem to extend it to Spirits: And if ſo, I am paſt doubt that the Subſtance and Form of Spirits are not two diſtinct conjoined Subſtances.

Too many Logicians have hitherto taken the Potentia naturalis, or Faculties of the Soul to be accidents in the Predicament of Quality: Let them call them Qualities if they pleaſe, but the Scotiſts have fully prov'd them to be no Accidents, but the formal Eſſence of the Soul, (and I have anſwered all Zabarell's Arguments ubi ſup.) And this Virtus formalis, (vel facultas, vel potentia activa) is not a Subſtance joined to a Subſtance, but the form of a ſimple Subſtance. But I perceive by your next words that you approve all this, and ſpeak only of mental Compoſition as to Spirits. And I ſay that the Mind p. 94ſhould conceive, and the Tongue ſpeak of things as they are, and not at once deny Materiality to Spirits, and call them Logically material; or at leaſt bear with others that ſay but the ſame. If Logical Matter ſpeak not Subſtantiality at leaſt, it is deluſive.

Your Interminata amplitudo ſounds ſo like Infinita, that I am not willing to ſay that no Spirit hath any Terminos Subſtantiae.

Ad SECT. XXXIII, XXXIV.

The Concluſion.

§ 1. YOu ſay that I wrote not ſo curtly, but that I have ſufficiently conveyed my mind to you.] anſ. I would have done ſo, had I dream'd of your Printing it. But that I did not, appeareth by your grand Miſtake, as if I … aſſerted that materiality of Spirits which is proper to Bodies.

§. 2. As in all, our difference lieth in a much ſmaller matter than you thought. ſo in your great deſign of convincing the blinded Sadduces of this Age, and in the truly pious Concluſion in your 34. Sect. I not only agree with you, but in my own name, and many others, humbly tender you unfeigned Thanks.

§ 3. And becauſe I would not ſeem more diſtant from you than I am, I ſhall firſt tell you, that on theſe Subjects your thoughts and mine have been ſo long working to the ſame ends & much in the ſame way, that, 1655. your Book p. 95againſt Atheiſm and my popular diſcourſes of the unreaſonableneſs of Infidelity coming out together, we both uſed many of the ſame Hiſtories of Apparitions, Witches, &c. for Confirmation; and in that Book of yours, you have theſe following words, which if they are not (as I think they are not) miſchievous, it's like mine of the ſame importance are not ſo, nor are more ſo proved by you than your own.

Antid. Li. 1. p. 17. [The parts of a Spirit can be no more ſeparated though they be dilated, than you can cut off the Rays of the Sun by a pair of Sciſſars made of pellucide Chryſtal.]

Appen. p. 304. [Suppoſe a point of Light, from which rayes out a luminous Orb according to the known Principles of Optiques: This Orb of Light doth very much reſemble the Nature of a Spirit, which is diffuſed and extended, and yet indiviſible: For wee'l ſuppoſe in this Spirit the Center of Life to be indiviſible, and yet to diffuſe itſelf by a kind of circumſcribed Omnipotency, as the point of Light is diſcernible in every point of the luminous Sphere. And yet ſuppoſing that central lucid point indiviſible, there is nothing diviſible in all that Sphere of Light. For it is ridiculous to think of any Engine or Art whatſoever to ſeparate the luminous Raies from the ſhining Center, and keep them apart by themſelves, as any man will acknowledge that does but conſider the thing we ſpeak of. Now there is no difficulty to imagine ſuch an Orb as this, as Subſtance as well as a Quality. And indeed this Sphere of Light itſelf, it not inhering in any Subject in the place it occupieth, looks far more like a Subſtance than any Accident. And what we fanry unadviſedly to befal Light and Colours, that any point of them will thus ray orbicularly, is more rationally to be admitted in ſpiritual Subſtances, whoſe central Eſſence ſpreads out into a ſecondary Subſtance, as the p. 96luminous Rays are conceived to ſhoot out from a lucid point. From whence we are enabled to return an Anſwer to the greateſt difficulty in the foregoing Objection, viz. That the conceived parts in a Spirit have an inſeparable dependance on the central Eſſence, from which they flow, and in which they are radically contained; and therefore though there be an extenſion of this whole ſubſtantial power, yet one part is not ſeparable or diſcerpible from another, but the entire Subſtance, as well ſecondary as primary, or central, is indiviſible. But let us again caſt our Eyes on this lucid point and radiant Orb we have made uſe of: It is manifeſt that thoſe Raies that are hindered from ſhooting out ſo far as they would, need not loſe their Virtue or Being, but only be reflected back toward their ſhining Center; and the Obſtacle being removed they may ſhoot out to their full length again: ſo that there is no Generation of a new Ray.—

And p. 357. [When I ſpeak of Indiviſibility that imagination create not new troubles to her ſelf, I mean not ſuch an Indiviſibility as is fancied in a Mathematical point, but as we conceive in a Sphere of Light made from one lucid point or radiant Center. For that Sphere or Orb of Light, though it be in ſome ſenſe extended, yet it is truly indiviſible, ſuppoſing the Center ſuch. For there is no means imaginable to diſcerpe or ſeparate any one Ray of this Orb, and keep it apart by itſelf disjoined from the Center.

Now a little to invert the Property of this luminous Orb, when we would apply it to a Soul or Spirit: As there can be no alteration in the radiant Center, but therewith it is neceſſarily in every part of the Orb, ſo there is alſo that Vnity and Indiviſibility of the exterior parts, if I may ſo call them, of a Spirit or Soul, with their inmoſt Center, that if any of them be affected, the Center of Life p. 97is thereby alſo neceſſarily affected, and theſe exteriour parts of the Soul being affected by the parts of the Object with ſuch Circumſtances as they are in, the inward Center receives all ſo circumſtantiated, that it hath neceſſarily the entire and unconfuſed Images of things without, though they be contrived into ſo ſmall a compaſs, and are in the very Center of this ſpiritual ſubſtance. This Symbolical Repreſentation I uſed before, and I cannot excogitate any thing that will better ſet off the nature of a Spirit, &c.]

Here is the ſame and more than I have ſaid, unleſs you think Light here to be no Fire; but take Light for a Subſtance, and Fire but for Motion: which if you ſay, I am willing to believe you will recal.

And that a Spirit is in its Contraction impenetrable, let your words teſtifie, p. 312.

foreign I define thus: A Power in a Spirit of offering ſo near to a corporeal Emanation from the Center of Life, that it will ſo perfectly fill the Receptivity of Matter into which it has penetrated, that it is very difficult or impoſſible for any other Spirit to poſſeſs the ſame, and of hereby becoming ſo firmly and cloſely united to a Body, as both to actuate and be acted upon, to affect and be affected thereby.

So here is a Spirit when it hath filled a Body, that can no more be penetrated by another Spirit or Body; and ſo in this contracted ſtate is impenetrable. So that this is but bringing diffuſed parts cloſer together, and then no other can be in the ſame place. And is this the neceſſary Form of a Spirit?

But may not this extenſion and Indiviſibili…y alſo be omitted as too hard, without all the miſchief mentioned by you, and a truer notifying Form found out?

p. 98Let us hear your ſelf, p. 359. [To prevent all ſuch Cavils we ſhall omit the Spinoſities of the Extenſion or Indiviſibility of a Soul or Spirit, and conclude briefly thus: That the manifold Contradictions and Repugnancies we find in the nature of matter, to be able to either think or ſpontaneouſly to move itſelf, do well aſſure us that theſe operations belong not to it, but to ſome other ſubſtance: Wherefore we finding thoſe operations in us, it is manifeſt that we have in us an immaterial Being really diſtinct from the Body, which we ordinarily call a Soul: The ſpeculation of whoſe bare Eſſence, though it may well puzzle us, yet thoſe properties that we find incompetible to a Body, do ſufficiently inform us of the different Nature thereof: for it is plain ſhe is a Subſtance indued with the power of Cogitation, that is, of perceiving and thinking of Objects, as alſo of penetrating and ſpontaneouſly moving of a Body; which properties are as immediate to her as impenetrability and ſeparability of parts to the matter, and we are not to demand the cauſe of the one any more than of the other.]

So here we have the true Form as ſufficient notice.

And if voluntary Motion be proper to a Spirit, I think meer Fire (Solar or Aethereal) is no Spirit; But if all ſelf-moving Power be proper to a Spirit, Fire is a Spirit. And from the Form will I denominate, while you oft tell us, that the Eſſence of Subſtance is unknown. (By Eſſence meaning ſomwhat elſe than that which I can fully prove to be the Form.

To conclude, there are theſe different Opinions before us.

I. That the whole Entity or Conceptus realis of a Spirit is Virtus vitalis, and is mera ſorma, p. 99or rather ſimplex actus Entitativus; and that ſubſtantia is added not as a partial real Conceptus, but as reſpective, to notifie that this Virtus vitalis is no Accident, but a thing that may ſubſiſt of itſelf. Some hold this true only of God, and ſome of all Spirits: If this be true, your notions of Penetrability and Indiviſibility are moſt eaſily defended.

II. That Spirits have two inadequate, real Conceptus, and that Subſtantia is the fundamental as truly as materia is in meer Bodies, and an incomprehenſible purity of Subſtance (or that it is Immaterial, not having partes extra partes with the trine dimenſion) is Subſtantiae diſpoſitio; (yet that this hath degrees as the Forms have, all Spirits not being of equal Purity;) And that Virtus vitalis is the partial Conceptus, viz. Formalis. And this I encline to, as to created Spirits.

III. That the Conceptus formalis of Spirit is this Virtus vitalis, vel motiva, perceptiva, appetitiva, but that all Matter is eſſentially informed by that Vitality, and ſo Matter and Vitality are the inadequate Conceptus of every Subſtance, and that not by Compoſition, but as of one ſimple thing. And this is Dr. Gliſſon's and ſome others.

IV. That a Spirit is both a real Subſtance, (as the fundamental Conceptus) and informed both by Immateriality, Penetrability, and Indiſcerpibility, and alſo by a vital and moving Power: But that it exiſteth only in Bodies or Matter, and ſo always makes up a Compound of two Subſtances, (ſaving that God is infinite, beyond all Matter.) And that all ſuch p. 110Spirits were at firſt made together indiviſible Individuals, both that of the leaſt Creature and of the greateſt, but changed from Body to Body, and ſo are parts of Animals. This I ſuppoſe is your Opinion.

Our chief difference is, that I profeſs to be ignorant of the Conſiſtency and Incorporation which you talk of, and muſt be ſo: Though I am aſſured of the Subſtantiality and Form, which ſatisfieth me; for Chriſt knoweth all the reſt for me.

FINIS.

OF THE IMMORTALITY OF Mans Soul, And the Nature of it, and other Spirits.

Two Diſcourſes:

One in a Letter to an unknown Doubter; The other in a Reply to Dr▪ Henry Moore's Animadverſions on a private Letter to him; which he publiſhed in his Second Edition of Mr Joſeph Glanvil's Sadduciſmus Triumphatus, or Hiſtory of Apparitions

By RICHARD BAXTER.

LONDON: Printed for B. Simons, at the Three Golden Cocks at the Weſt End of St. Pauls. 1682.