The Immortality of Mans Soul, Title page 1 – Epigraph
OF THE NATURE OF SPIRITS; ESPECIALLY MANS SOUL.
In a placid Collation with the Learned Dr. Henry More, In a Reply to his Anſwer to a private Letter, Printed in his ſecond Edition of Mr. Glanviles Sadduceiſmus Triumphatus.
By Richard Baxter.
LONDON, Printed for B. Simmons, at the Three Golden Cocks at the Weſt End of St. Pauls. 1682.
A Letter to the Reverend Dr. Henry More at Chriſts-Colledge in Cambridge.
Reverend Sir,
I Had anſwered your deſire ſooner, but having lent out the Sadduc. Triumph. I ſtaid till now to have …ad it returned (being loth to buy another, it coſting me 6s.) But I was fain to get another at laſt, and …n the review I find that I have ex…reſly given you my thoughts already …f your notion of a Spirit in my Methodus, having noted it in your Book of Atheiſm, and your Ench. Metaphyſ. In ſhort. 1. I think you and I are agreed that we cannot conceive of a Spirit unico conceptu, but muſt have two inadequate conceptions of it: of which one is that which Dr. Gliſſon De Vita naturae, calls conceptus fundamentalis, and is that which we call Subſtantia: for we can ſcarce think of a Virtus formalis, which is not ſubſtantiae alicujus virtus, but qua virtus ſimpliciter exiſteth of itſelf; (unleſs we muſt ſo think with ſome of God.) And though this maketh not an actual compoſition, as Matter and Form in mixtis, yet intellectually we muſt take it as a diſtinct inadequate conceptus.
The other inadequate conceptus i… Formal; and I think you and I ar… agreed that this is Virtus Una-trina… as deſcribed by me, viz. Virtus V…talis, vitaliter activa, perceptiva… appetitiva, as Dr. Gliſſon ſpeaks (of which I make three ſpecies a… deſcribed.) And I am my ſelf fa… better acquainted with the nature … a Spirit by the eſſential Virtus formalis, known to us by its acts; (for nothing doth that which it cannot do) than from the notion of ſubſtantiality. And yet I dare not ſay that a ſelf-moving principle is proper to a Spirit. Nor do I conſent to Campanella de ſenſu rerum, and Dr Gliſſon that would make all things alive by an eſſentiating form in the very Elements.
I diſtinguiſh Natures into Active and Paſſive; and Paſſivity is a word that ſerveth me as well as materiality: But whence the Deſcenſus gravium is, I deſpair of knowing; and if it be of an innate principle, I call it not therefore a Spirit, becauſe it is but paſſivorum motus aggregativus ad unionem in quiete, when Spirits motion is vital and ſo eſſential to them, that they tend not to union in quieſcence, but in everlaſting activity; quieſcence in inactivity, being as much againſt their nature as motion againſt a Stones. So that I think we are agreed of the formal notice of a Spirit in general, and of an intellective, ſenſitive, and vegetative in ſpecie.
But truly I am at a loſs about the conceptus fundamentalis, wherein the true difference lieth between Subſtantia and Materia. Do we by—Subſtantia mean a conceptus realis, or only Relative. To ſay it doth ſubſtare accidentibus, ſpeaks but a Relation directly, and leaves the queſtion unanſwered, Quid eſt quod ſubſtat accidentibus. To ſay it is not an Accident, tells us not what it is, but what it is not. To ſay it doth ſubſiſt per ſe, either ſaith no more than that it is Ens reale, or elſe tells us not what it is that doth ſubſiſt. Quoad notationem nominis diſtinct from uſe▪ doth not materia and ſubſtantia ſignify the ſame fundamental conceptus? And is not the form the notifying difference? You difference Subſtance and Matter antecedently to the formal difference by Penetrability & Impenetrability, Indiviſibility & Diviſibility. But 1. I deſpair knowing in this life, how far Spiritual Subſtances are penetrable and indiviſible. I grant you ſuch an extenſion as ſhall free them from being nothing ſubſtantial, and from being Infinite as God is. 2. We grant Spirits a quantitas diſcreta; they are numerous, individuate; and formae ſe multiplicant. Generation is the work of Spirits, and not of Bodies. And how can I tell that God that can make many out of one, cannot make many into one, and unite and divide them as well as Matter? But if he ſhould, that would be no deſtruction of their Species, as the mixtorum diſſolutio is; but as every drop of divided Water is Water, & one Candle lighting many, and many joyned in one, are all the ſame fire; ſo much more would it be with Spirits, were they united or divided; and their locality and penetrability are paſt our conceit. 3. But were we ſure of what we ſay therein; theſe two (Penetrability and Indiviſibility) ſpeak but Accidents, though proper; and therefore are no ſatisfying notice of the notion of Subſtance Spiritual as diſtinct from Matter. I am hitherto therefore conſtrained to contain many thoughts in the following compaſs.
1. I know Spirits beſt by the Virtus vitalis formalis una trina.
2. I hold that of Created Spirits ſubſtantia as notiſying a Baſis realis, muſt be the Conceptus Fundamentalis.
3. The word Immaterial ſignifying nothing (but a negation) and Materia being by many Antients uſed in the ſame ſenſe as we do Subſtantia, I uſually lay by the words.
4. I hold to the diſtinction of Natures, or Subſtances Paſſive and Active.
5. I diſtinguiſh Spiritual Subſtances as ſuch by the Purity of the Subſtance, beſides the Formal Difference.
6. Yet I doubt not but all Created Spirits are ſomewhat Paſſive, quia influxum cauſae primae recipiunt: And you grant them a Spiſſitude and Extenſion, which ſignifie as much as many mean that call them Material. But Cuſtom having made Materia, but ſpecially Corpus, to ſignifie onelyonly ſuch groſſer Subſtance as the three Paſſive Elements have, I yield ſo to ſay, that Spirits are not Corporeal or Material.
7. Though I run not into the exceſs of Ludov. Le Grand de Igne (nor of Teleſius or Patricius) I would Ignis were better ſtudied: But this Room will not ſerve me to ſay what I think of it. But in brief, He that knoweth that Ignis is a Substance, whoſe Form is the Potentia Activa movendi, illuminandi, caleſaciendi, theſe as received in a groſs Paſſive Body, being but their Accidents oft, but the Igneous Subſtance in act operating on them, and conceiveth of Spirits, but as Ignis eminenter, that is, of a purer ſubſtance than Ignis is, which we beſt conceive of (next the Formal Virtue) by its ſimilitude, I think knows as much as I can reach of the Subſtance of Created Spirits. And the Greek Fathers that called Spirits Fire, and diſtinguiſhed Ignem per formas into Intellective, Senſitive, and Vegetative or Viſible Fire, (as it is in Aere Ignito,) allowing an Incomprehenſible …urity of Subſtance in the higher above the lower (as in Paſſives Air hath above Water, &c.) I think did ſpeak tolerably, and as informingly as are the notions of Penetrability and Indiviſibility; though perhaps th…ſe alſo may be uſeful.
Sir, I crave your pardon of theſe curt expreſſions of the thoughts which you deſired concerning the deſcription of a Spirit. If God make us truly holy, we ſhall quickly know more to our ſatisfaction. I reſt
Nov. 17. 1681. Your obliged Servant, Rich. Baxter.
You make [a Spirit to be Ens, ideoque, Unum, Verum, and that True denotes the anſwerableneſs of the thing to its proper Idea, and implies right matter and form duly conjoined.] Q. Do you not here make Spirits material? But no doubt whether to be called Material or Subſtantial, the form is not an Adjoyned thing, but the form of a ſimple eſſence is but an inadequate conceptus, making no compoſition.