Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable — Richard Baxter

Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable · Richard Baxter

THE Sixth Days Conference OF Natural Corruption and Impotency, and Free-will. BETWEEN B. (the Reconciler) and (C. a Calvinist.)

We come now ſomewhat nearer the heart of the Controverſie: Try here your contending ſkill, Whether you can make this breach ſeem wider than you did the former, about Predeſtination and Redemption.

The first Crimination.

Some of them deny Original Sin, and ſo make man need no Saviour to pardon it, no Sanctifier to cure it, no Means or Duty on our part De modo & ratione, many School-men and other Papiſts open it better than thoſe that lay all upon Gods meer Will. Viguerius Inſtit. c. 18. v. 11. maketh our memberſhip of Adam, and natural derivation to be the reaſon of Imputation, as the act of the Hand is to the Man. So Joan. a Bonon▪ Panorm. de peccat. Orig. Non enim cenſetur quis ſacere quippiam in alio niſi quod alius faciat, facit & ipſe. So Contarenus, ſo Eſtius truly in Rom. c. 5. 12. Dicuntur omnes peccaſſe in Adamo …tanquam in principio & radice, generis humani, quoniam in lumbis …ju… erant quando pecca…it:] that is, ſeminally: All which, and many more ſuch, Rivet citeth, as concordant to us. Chamier To. 3. Pauſtr. l. 1. c. 2. ſect. 9. proveth that Bellarmine Peltanus, Delphinus, Cunerus, Alvarez, Va…quez, &c. are of the ſame judgment with the Proteſtants. See Drelincourts Synopt. Controv. Art. 64. Sed quid tibi in mentem venit, ut Infantes ſola imputatione reos eſſe profitearis? Cum non modo in Adamo dum peccaret omnes ſui…, a quo naturam noſtram accepimus, …t ratione naturae pluſquam imputatione Dei, peccaſſe merito dicamur in Adamo, ſed & conditionem miſere corruptam & vitiatam ab iis hauſimus: Twiſ. Contr. Corvin. p. 269▪ c. 2. & ib. p. 343. Certe peccatum Originis, ex primo Adae peccato (ſed & ex noſtro quippe qui in eo peccavimus omnes) fluit. Et p. 344. At ſic Adami peccatum imputari poſteris—noſtri ad unum omnes negandum contendunt, (i. e. mera imputatione). In Adamo peccavimus omnes eandem que contagionem contraximus—Ita que Adami peccatum nobis imputatur ſed non-tantum imputatur, ſed & noſtrum fuit, hoc eſt naturae noſtrae, &c.—Ita ſaepiſſime Twiſſus recte. And Rivet in his Decret. Syn. National. de Imputat. Primi peccat. Adami, by expreſs citations proveth the concord of Proteſtants and Papiſts about the very Imputation of Adam's ſin, and among the Concordant numbereth Arminius, pag. 87. As alſo Baldwin, Brochmand, Dietericus, Hunnius, Index, Meiſner, Spangenbergius, and other Lutherans: And Gell. Suecanus, the Anceſtor of Arminius: And of the Papiſts, as Aegyd. Rom. Dion. Carthuſ. Gab. Biel, Ca…et. Clarius, Tolet. Sa…bout, Joan. a Bonon. P…orm. Contaren. Bellarm. Pererius. Soto, Muſeus, Vigner. Eſtius, Becanus a Lapide, Catharinus, &c. Beſides the concurrence of the Auguſtane and other Confeſſions: And though with the Socinians he cite the Apol. and Corvinus for the contrary, it is no more: And it is but this part of Original Sin, and not the Corruption that he citeth them as denying. And it is like that other mens ill expoſition o… it, is that which they mean, or at leaſt which tempted them to it.for the cure, no true Baptiſm for Infants, no true Repentance for ſuch Sin; and ſo are true Pelagians.

1. Thoſe [ſome] I undertook not to prove of the ſame mind with you and me: But let us charge no more with it than we can prove guilty. That's nothing to all the reſt: The Jeſuites and Lutherans differ not from you herein as far as I can find, nor the generality of the Arminians. Thoſe that are chiefly charged with it, are Arminius, Arnoldus, Corvinus, Epiſcopius, and Biſhop Jeremy Taylor: Arminius expreſly owneth it: Theſ. privat. 31. n. 9, 10, 11. pag. 299. Quoniam vero ratio-foederis a Deo cum hominibus primis mihi haec fuit, ut ſi ipſi in favore Dei & Gratia, per praecepti iſtius & aliorum obſervationem permanerent, ad poſteros dona in illos collata tranſmitterentur, eadem gratia divina quae illis obligat: ſi vero illi eorum ſe indignos facerent per inobedientiam, posteri quo que ipſorum iis carerent, & contrariis malis obnoxii eſſent: Hinc accidit ut omnes homines qui naturaliter ex ipſis propagandi fuerint, morti temporali & aeternae obnoxios evaſerint, & do…o iſto ſpirit…s ſancti ſi…e juſtitiae originali vacui: quae paena priva…io imaginis Dei & peccatum originale appellari ſolet. An vero praeter carentiam juſtitiae Originalis aliqua contraria qualitas conſtituenda ſit, tanquam pec…ati Originalis pars altera, diſquiri permittimus: Quamquam arbitramur vero ſimilius illam ſolam carentiam ipſum peccatum Originale eſſe, utpote quae ſola ſufficiet ad quaevis peccata actu…ia committen…um & producendum.

Mark that he ſaith, but peccatum Originale appellari ſolet.

1. But he diſowneth it not. 2. He owneth the name in the next Theſis. 3. While he confeſſeth the thing, the lis est tantum de nomine, if he had denied the name.

Alſo in Diſp. privat. Theſ. 67. de Baptiſ. p. 334, 335. he is for Infants Baptiſm to waſh them in the blood of Chriſt, and give them the Holy Ghoſt. And he maketh this to be a waſhing from ſin. What elſe ſhould it be?

But he taketh it to be but Privatio Juſtitiae Originalis.

1. He taketh it to be doubtful. 2. Remember that he calleth it not Negatio, but Privatio. 3. Almoſt all the School-men, and moſt or very many Calviniſts ſay the ſame (though I do not).

But in his Articuli perpendendi in fine, lib. p. 780. col. 2. he ſaith, that Peccatum Originis non eſt illud actuale peccatum quo Adam legem de arbore ſcientiae boni & mali tranſgreſſus eſt, & propter quod nos omnes peccatores conſtituti ſumus & rei facti condemnationis & mortis.

1. Mark that he expreſly maketh us by Adam's ſin to be Peccatores & rei constituti. 2. So in the next Theſis. An peccatum Originis ſit tantum carentia juſtitiae Originalis, & ſanctimoniae primaevae, cum inclinatione ad peccandum, quae & antea in homine fuit, licet non ita vehemens, aeque & inordinata ut nunc eſt, propter amiſſum favorem Dei, maledictionem ejuſdem, & amiſſionem ejus boni, quo in ordinem redigebatur; An vero contrarius quidam habitus juſtitiae & ſanctimoniae infuſus (vel ingreſſus, acquiſitus) post peccatum perpetratum, Dub. Here he confeſſeth alſo a poſitive Original Sin in the inordinateneſs of the ſenſual inclination. 3. When he denieth Adam's Act to be our Original. 1. He denieth not (for no Chriſtian denieth it) to be the Original Sin, that is, the firſt ſin and the cauſe of ours. 2. And he ſeemeth but to mean that Adam's Sin individually was not ours: which is moſt certain: For the ſame Accident cannot be in two diſtinct Subjects: If our perſons be not every one Adam's perſon, it is impoſſible that the ſame individual ſin or guilt ſhould be his and ours, any more than the ſame individual Soul. If God did arbitrarily (meerly becauſe he would do it) impute Adam's fact to all Mankind, and to every one perſonally, this would make it as many ſins as there be perſons; One mans Original Sin would not be anothers, and none of theirs the ſame quoad formam numericam with Adam's. Adams is Adams, and yours is yours, and mine is mine. We cannot therefore be heretick men for ſuch doubtful forms of ſpeech, in which we differ among our ſelves.

The plain truth is, the matter is not ſo well opened commonly among us, as to allow us to condemn others till we have better done our own parts. My thoughts are theſe: 1. That we were ſeminally and virtually really in Adam; having the very eſſence of our Souls derived from him; not being in him only as the Houſe is in the head of the Architect, but as an eſſential form is in the generater; though we call both, eſſe in cauſa. 2. That we were not perſonally in Adam (though ſeminally) that is, we were not natural perſons in him, when he ſinned. 3. God ſuppoſeth no man to have been what he was not, or done what he did not: For he erreth not. 4. God is not the Author of Sin: Therefore he doth not by arbitrary imputing of Adam's act, and reputing us to have done what we did not, make all men Sinners, which Adam could not do. 5. But God doth truly repute us to have been ſeminally in Adam, and to have no Eſſence but what is really derived from his Eſſence: And as when a man is guilty, no part of him is innocent, ne que ſemen ne que ſanguis, though they have not a diſtinct guilt, but participative qua partes rei; ſo we were Sinners in that act, and guilty of that act, ſo far as we were partes Adami, and in him. 6. This was not to be at that time guilty as distinct perſons; for we were not ſuch. 7. But we that were then only ſeminally inexiſtent, after became real distinct perſons, and then that guilt even of Adam's fact, adhering ſtill to us, became reatus perſonae, becauſe the Subjects of it are perſonae. Even as if Eve had been made after the Fall, of Adam's Rib, that Rib at firſt was guilty, not by another, but the ſame numerical guilt that Adam was, as part of a Sinner: For it was a capable Subject of no more: But when that ſame Rib was made a perſon, it would be a guilty perſon; For it loſt not the guilt by that change. But then it is not only or chiefly our Bodies which are from Adam (which are from the elements in our daily food) but our Souls. And therefore the adherence of the guilt to a rational ſpirit eſſentially flowing from anothers eſſence, is more eaſily underſtood and defended than that of the corporal Rib could be. 8. I do (contrary to excellent Joſ. Placeus) ſuppoſe that in primo inſtanti, this our participation in Adam's guilt is in order before our qualitative pravity: And that God doth therefore deny us his Spirit firſt, to make us originally holy, not only becauſe Adam, but becauſe we in Adam (as aforeſaid) did forfeit and expel it. 9. I think that mens aſſertion of a Decree or Covenant of God, that if Adam fell, any more ſhould be imputed to his Off-ſpring than they were thus really guilty of themſelves, is the bold addition of mens invention, of greater audacity than the addition of Ceremonies to the Worſhip of God, which yet ſome are more ſenſible of. 10. I think that if Adam had not ſinned that ſame firſt ſin, but had ſinned another ſin the next hour, or day, or monethmonth, or year, or any time before Generation, it would have been equally ours, as this firſt was, becauſe we were equally in him, and no Scripture-Covenant makes a difference. 11. I think that whereas Adam's ſin had twenty particular ſins as parts of the whole, we were guilty of all, as well as of the firſt act or part; elſe we ſhould not be guilty of his eating the forbidden …ruit; for doubtleſs that was not the firſt: His incogitancy, and non-Nolition and ſinful Volitions were before it. Yea I doubt not but we are guilty of all the ſin that Adam committed, from his firſt ſin till the making of the New-Covenant, at leaſt. 12. I doubt not but if Adam had never ſinned, yet (ſuppoſing the ſame Covenant to ſtand) if his Sons after him had ſinned, we ſhould have been guilty of it as we are of his ſin: yea had it been but our neareſt Parents. 13. I doubt not but that we are ſtill ſo guilty of our nearer Parents Sins, further than as the introduction of the new pardoning Covenant, and the oft pardons by it, and the incapacity of nature, to bear any more puniſhment, may make a difference. This is not a place voluminouſly to prove all this. But if any Arminians be tempted to ſpeak doubtingly of this Original Guilt, while they confeſs Original ſinful pravity, 1. Blame your own additions to Gods Covenant, and your obſcure writings of the thing; 2. And ſay not that they deny Original Sin, but expreſs the matter as it is. It ſeemeth that Arminius by Peccatores & rei conſtituti ſumus meaneth as we do.

I must confeſs your explication is rational and concilatory: But how can you excuſe Corvinus?

See but how he defendeth Arminius againſt Tilenus, as holding our Original Sin to be truly Sin, and a puniſhment for Sin, and you will think that he denieth it not himſelf: See alſo what Twiſſe ſuppoſeth him to grant, Cont. Corvin. p. 253, 254. Indeed he doth two much obſcure and extenuate the formalem rationem peccati in compariſon of the ratio poenae in it. But I much ſuſpect that there is much Logomachie in the controverſie, and that it is moſtly de nomine peccati non de re. For I perceive ſome of them conceive of peccatum as a word that hath only an active ſignification from peccare: And becauſe an Infant doth not peccare actualiter, therefore they ſay that Original Sin is not ſtrictly called Peccatum, meaning that the Name properly agreeth only to an evil Act. And can a Controverſie de nomine make a hereſie? Aſk them theſe Queſtions? 1. Whether an Infant be not animal rationale liberum, as having the ſame natural faculties with the Adult? 2. Whether he be not then capable of virtuous and vicious Diſpoſitions? 3. And whether theſe are not bonum & malum morale? If he be not capable of malum morale, than neither of bonum morale? And if ſo, then not of Holineſs, nor any moral aptitude for Heaven, any more than a Beaſt. This they all deny▪ and therefore muſt needs ſay that their vicious inclinations are malum morale, adapting them not only phyſically for phyſical evil, but morally for puniſhment. And truly if they will call Sin ſuch a moral evil, I will not break communion with them about the ſenſe of Peccare.

But Ameſius tells Grevinchovius, that it may be proved by good witneſſes that he denied Original Sin: which Dr. Twiſſe many times over and over reciteth contra Corvinum.

As the inſtance of three or four ſingle perſons is nothing to my buſineſs, ſo I am no judge of any ſuch Reports, unleſs I had heard the witneſſes my ſelf. I have had ſo many notorious lyes confidently reported of me by men not contemptible, that it hath taught me to be backward in receiving any Accuſations, and judging before I hear the accuſed. Eſpecially a man that writeth much is more to be judged of by his Writings, than by Back-biters Reports.

But Epiſcopius is no way to be excuſed, Nor Biſhop Jer. Taylor, who copiouſly plead againſt Original Sin.

Therefore they are not the perſons that I have now to do with; but have elſe-where as copiouſly proved Original Sin, and confuted ſuch Arguments as they uſe; But the chief of my Arguments they touch not.

The ſecond Crimination.

They ſay that man before regeneration can do that which is ſpiritually good; and hath power to uſe his naturals well, ſo that by degrees he may thereby come up to a ſtate of ſaving Grace, or be fitted to be a Believer: And that ſome can believe and repent that do not. Whereas the Scripture maketh men dead in ſin, and out of Chriſt we can do nothing.

This unhappy [CAN] I tell you is our Cannon that battereth our Peace and Love; and pardon me if I tell you as I did them, that I doubt whether you underſtand well what it ſignifieth. Tell me,

Quest. 1. Have not wicked men natural life? Or are they dead?

No man doubteth of that.

Queſt. 2. Have they not natural powers or faculties for natural Acts?

Nor is that denied by any man.

Quest. 3. Is it not the ſame natural faculty of Intellection by which we underſtand and believe things common and ſpiritual? And the ſame natural faculty of willing, by which we love or will them both?

Nor is that queſtioned by any.

Queſt. 4. Is there not ſuch a thing as common Grace, diſtinct from, and ſhort of true Regeneration or Sanctification?

Yes, we are all agreed of that.

Quest. 5. Is there any Nation or People in the World, that are not obliged by God to uſe ſome means towards their own Converſion, and to forbear their Sin?

No doubt of it, but they are obliged to perfect Obedience, and they are ſpecially obliged to repent, and uſe ſome means thereto.

Queſt. 6. Is there not ſuch a thing in the World, as a true power to do ſomething that never is done, and forbear what is not forborn?

I know not what to ſay to that: An hypothetical power, and ſecundum quid ſo called there is: But of proper power I doubt. Dr. Twiſſe againſt Hord, li. 1. p. 71. ſaith, [Suppoſe all men had power to do any good: If God will not give them velle quod poſſunt,—is it poſſible that they ſhould velle bonum, if God will not work it in them.]

It is a logical impoſſibility of conſequence (nothing to the purpoſe) which alſo fore-knowledge would infer: But as to real power, denominating the Object poſſible, it is a palpable contradiction, to ſay I have true power to do an impoſſible thing: when to ſay I have power to do it, and to ſay, it is poſſible to me, are all one. Elſe-where Dr. Twiſſe can ſay, that Gods velle eventum is not neceſſary ad poſſibilitatem, ſed ad eventum. Do you doubt whether Adam was able to have forborn the ſin, and ſo ſinned for want of power to do otherwiſe?

An obediential and paſſive power he had, and faculties that were able hypothetically if God had predetermined them by premotion and effectual Grace: But of the reſt I doubt.

We will not be diverted with empty words: A dead man hath an obediential paſſive power (as the School mean it). An hypothetical or conditional power is no power when the condition is not exiſtent. If you ſay Adam could not but ſin, you make his ſtanding a natural impoſſibility, and God the cauſe of all his ſin, whom he could no more overcome therein than make a World: And will men then believe that God hateth that ſin which he unreſiſtibly cauſeth, and ſent Chriſt to die for it? and will damn men for not doing natural impoſſibilities?

Well! ſuppoſe (as commonly we do) that Adam was able to have ſtood? and conſequently that there is a true power in the World that's never acted.

Quest. 7. Is no man by Nature with common helps and Grace able to do more good than he doth, and forbear more ſin?

No doubt, he can if he will; But the doubt is of his Will.

Quest. 8. Is no man by Nature and common Grace able to will the doing of more good, and forbearing more evil, than he ſo willeth.

His Will hath natural power; but it is contrarily diſpoſed.

Queſt. 9. Can no man by Nature and common Grace, notwithſtanding the undiſpoſedneſs of his Will, yet ſo far reſtrain or prevail againſt his undiſpoſedneſs, as actually to will and do more good and leſs evil than he willeth and doth.

If▪ Adam could have forborn all ſin, I must think common Grace P…aecipitur nobis bene agere; non quod poſſimus ex nobis illud facere, ſed quia ſi faciamus totum quod in nobis eſt, ſemper Deus paratus ſit facere quod in ſe eſt. Aegid. Colum. Quodl. 2. qu. 30. p. 121, 122. Noſtrum eſt enim ſecundum Damaſcenum ſequi Deum vocantem ad virtutem; vel diabolum vocantem ad malitiam: unde Damaſ. l. 2. c. 30. Ipſe eſt omnis boni principium & cauſa, & ſine ejus co-operatione & auxilio impoſſibile eſt bonum velle vel facere: In nobis autem est, vel permanere in virtute & ſequi Deum vocantem, vel rec…dere a virtute quod eſt fieri in malitia & ſe qui diabolum. Idem ibid.to be no Grace, if by it a man could forbear no ſin, nor do any good.

Queſt. 10. Cannot every man deſire to be happy? and to eſcape Hell?

Yes: For all do it in ſome ſort or other.

Quest. 11. Cannot ſome men without Holineſs, forbear Murder, Treaſon, Theft, Adultery, and paſs by a Tavern-door when they go in?

Yes; for we ſee many forbear ſuch ſins: and therefore more might do it.

Queſt. 12. Cannot ſuch a one go to a Sermon, and read good Books, when he goeth to a Tavern or a Play-houſe?

Hobbes will ſay no, who thinks that every Volotion is neceſſitated as the motion of a Watch is by the Spring: but ſo will not I. He cannot be willing to attend Gods Ordinances as the godly do; but he can will to uſe them ſometimes in his manner.

Queſt. 13. Cannot he by common Grace understand the meaning of the words heard or read, and remember them?

Yes; and be a famous Expoſiter and Preacher too.

Queſt. 14. Cannot a man by common Grace know that he is a Sinner, and miſerable by ſin? and that he needeth Mercy and a Saviour?

Yes; or elſe he could not deſpair with Judas?

Queſt. 15. Cannot he think of his own ſinful and miſerable condition? yea and think how to get out of it and be ſaved?

Yes: diſpairing men cannot forget it: And a wicked Preacher, for common ends, can force his thoughts, most of the year, to meditate on Gods Word, and holy things.

Queſt. 16. Can he not wiſh and deſire that he had mercy and a Saviour, and ſo much Grace as to keep him from Hell, and ſo make him happy when he muſt go hence? And can he not by ſome earneſt prayers ſpeak out theſe deſires?

Yes: All men have not ſaving Grace, that go but ſo far.

Queſt. 17. Cannot a man by common Grace do all that which our Divines commonly ſay, an Hypocrite may do, or a half or almoſt-Chriſtian? ſuch as Mr. Perkins, Bolton, Rogers, Hooker, Mead, Bifield, and abundance more deſcribe.

Yes; they that have ſo much common Grace can go ſo far.

Quest. 18. Are not the beſt of theſe men, by common Grace, more prepared for Converſion than ſome others?

Yes: elſe what good did that Grace do them? and why ſhould we write (as Mr. Hooker) of the Souls preparation for Chriſt? and Chriſt told one, Thou art not far from the Kingdom of God.

Queſt. 19. Doth God command all theſe men to uſe the means of their full Converſion and Salvation utterly in vain?

No: it is not in vain, if he bleſs them to whom he will.

Queſt. 20. Laſtly, Then tell me, if you acknowledge all theſe [CANS] or Powers, what is the power which you deny?

A power to things ſpiritually good.

Ambiguous words muſt not deſtroy Love and Churches. What mean you by [Spiritual?]

That which is done by Gods Spirit, to ſpiritual ends, and in a ſpiritual manner.

Here are three things: The Efficient, the End, the Manner. 1. Is not the Spirit of God the Author of common Grace?

Yes, that is not denied by any.

2. If by a ſpiritual end you mean, the foreſaid ſaving of the Soul from Hell, you confeſs common Grace may give it. If you mean loving and intending God above all, do not the Arminians ſay as well as you, that none but the Regenerate can do it?

I confeſs they do.Quum actus ille fidei non ſit in poteſtate hominis naturalis, carnalis, animalis, peccatoris, eum que nemo praeſtare poſſit niſi per gratiam Dei, omnis autem Gratia Dei ſecundum voluntatem Dei adminiſtretur, & voluntatem quam apud ſe ab aeterno habuit, &c. Armin. Diſp. Privat. Theſ. 41. Sect. 1. p. 30…. Aegid. Colum. Quodlib. 2. qu. 29. pag. 121. Cum bona habeant duplex eſſe, ſcil. Naturale & ſupernaturale: Dicendum eſt quod ſine gratia habituali poſſimus bona agere quoad eſſe naturale; non quod ſupernaturale: Secundum ſanctorum ſententiam etſi ſine Gratia poſſimus facere bona non tamen bene: ne… mereri per illa, &c.

3. What mean you by a ſpiritual manner? If you mean it, of doing all from that love to God, and intention of that end, the anſwer is the ſame.

Man can do nothing of himſelf, without God.

Did ever man in his wits think otherwiſe? Was it ever a controverſie, whether we have any power that is not both given and ſtill maintained by God? All the queſtion is, but how God giveth it? and not whether we have it without him. One thinketh that he giveth more by the way of Nature than others do: And another thinks that he giveth more by the way of common Grace than others do: Miſtake not your ſelf: you aſcribe no more to God, than any even Pelagian doth; but only he aſcribeth more to God by the way of natural conveyance than you do. I only except the Dominican Predeterminants, that aſcribe all mans circumſtantiated Volitions to God. Lay therefore the controverſie where it is.

But we can do nothing without Chriſt and Grace.

I am more for that than you are. I doubt you think that we can do the works of Nature without Chriſt; For I find that many of you will not have ſo much as Magiſtracy to depend upon him derivatively. But all things are now delivered into his hands, and Nature is reprived and continued by ſome degree of Grace, that is, of Mercy contrary to Merit. But tell me, do men do that without Chriſt, which they do by his common Grace?

The words ſignifie, [Joh. 15. Out of me ye can do nothing.]

And do you differ about that? Do not you before confeſs how far men out of Christ as to regeneration may go? Come to the point, and tell me where you differ?

We differ here; that they think that God hath promiſed ſaving Grace to men prepared by common Grace, and we ſay, No.

Very good: Is all come but to this? Tell me what is this to the queſtion of mans power or impotency? This is only about Gods Word. Queſt. 1. Do you not believe that God hath made it the duty of all the Unregenerate, to deſire, and beg, and ſeek his ſpecial regenerating Grace? and uſe means to get it? and avoid impediments?

Yes: it is their duty; otherwiſe the omiſſion of it were not their Sin.

Quest. 2. Hath God commanded them to do all this in vain?

I told you, that it is not in vain, if he convert but ſome few of them.

My queſtion was not, whether the command be in vain, but whether the duty commanded be in vain. And how doth one mans good uſe of common Grace, prepare another man for converſion, and not himſelf. It is for himſelf that God commandeth and earneſtly exhorteth men to be reconciled unto God. And is this in vain to themſelves if they do it? If they repent when commanded it is not in vain? If they uſe common Grace in ſeeking God, how prove you that it ſhall be in vain? If you ſay to your Servants, [Come and aſk me for your Food and Raiment when you want them], they would think that Command did not ſet them upon a vain aſking. If an able Phyſician that could cure a Diſeaſe at his pleaſure ſhould ſay, [Take this Medicine for the cure of your Diſeaſe] or [this preparative] it would be ſuppoſed not in vain. In this Command God is both Rector and Benefactor: As Rector, the right government of mankind is his end; which is not done by ſetting them on vain duty: As Benefactor, the good of his Creature is his end (as we may call it, under his Glory therein). And vain duty is an evil, and not a benefit to any. If the King ſent to you to come and aſk him for He that readeth the Doctrine of the greater part of the Papiſts, of ſupernaturality, …and infuſion of Charity or Grace, will have little reaſon to ſay that they bring them too much into the power of man: …eſpecially the Dominicans. Doth not Alvarez ſet Grace far enough out of mans power, when he ſaith, li. 7. diſp. 69. p. 306. c. 1. Impoſſibile eſt quod Gratia habitualis ſit connaturalis alicui ſubſtantiae creatae vel creabili: Ergo etiam eſt impoſſibile quod Charitas, vel ejus actus, ſit ei connaturalis, aut ex ſolis viribus naturae procedens. Prob. antecedens, Quia contra rationem Gratiae eſt quod ſit debita naturae; ex …o enim gratia dicitur, quia gratis datur & non ex debito—. And is not a mans Being and Nature given him gratis & non ex debit…? Indeed had he defined Grace to be quod datur contra meritum, the contradiction in the terms would have allowed this game at words to be true: But words it is, and to no purpoſe, or elſe I cannot excuſe it from blaſphemy, to ſay that God is not able to make an Angel or any Creature in whom the habits of Grace or Love ſhall be connatural? Proteſtants hold on the contrary, that ſome degree of habitual Love was connatural to Adam and the Angels, though not as eſſential to their Natures, and ſo unloſable: And that Love is now called ſupernatural, becauſe medicinal ſupernatural Grace muſt reſtore it to corrupted Nature. Rada the Scotiſt, Cont. 1. ſpeaks better of ſupernaturality: For my part, that which I fear in theſe high ſtrains of ſupernaturality, in theſe Papiſts Doctrine, and Sir Henry Van… 's is, …eſt it ſhould produce Infidelity and Saduce…ſm; And he that to day holdeth that the Love to God is ſo exceeding far ſupernatural to perfect Nature it ſelf, may to morrow hold that mans Species is changed by Grace; And the next day that it is more credible that mans Nature was never made to love God, or to be glorified, than to believe that God will either make him of another Species, or give him another Nature, beſides the perfecting of the Nature created: Yea that God cannot make a Creature that ſhall naturally love his Maker.preferment, you would take it to ſignifie half a promiſe. Now Gods Promiſes are not ſtrictly Obligations, any further than the notification of his Will, and giving the ſubject a right, is an Obligation; where Gods Perfection is inſtead of an Obligation. And is ſuch a Command [Aſk, Seek, Accept,] no notification of his Will that our labour ſhall not be loſt? I do not call it a Promiſe: But is it not a ſignification that God the Rector and Benefactor of the World, will not let the performer loſe his labour.

He loſeth not his labour if he get by it but temporal mercies, and an abatement of his pains in Hell.

Do you thus paraphraſe Gods Command, [Seek for Grace, and thou ſhalt have Health or Riches: or ſeek for Converſion and Salvation, and thou ſhalt have an eaſier Damnation.] This is ſtill a duty that's vain as to the commanded End.

I confeſs it were not in vain if they could do it as he commandeth: for God commandeth them to do it in faith, and ſpiritual ſincerity, which they cannot do.

Do you thus paraphraſe the Command, [Seek Faith in Faith, and ſeek Sincerity in Sincerity] that is [You that have not Faith and Sincerity, if you have them already, ſeek that you may have them.] Did not you confeſs that they that have not ſpecial Grace are bound to ſeek it in the uſe of certain means?

They are bound to do it, but they are not able.

Did not you confeſs that they were able by common Grace to do the works of common Grace? and that in abundance of inſtances? What is common Grace for, if they can do nothing by it?

It is equal to nothing, for it is not acceptable to God.

Did not you confeſs that it is a preparation to ſpecial Grace, and may bring them nearer to the Kingdom of God?

But without Faith it is impoſſible to pleaſe God.

But there are ſeveral ſorts of Faith, and ſeveral degrees of pleaſing God. We grant that without ſpecial Faith it is impoſſible ſo to pleaſe God, as to have Juſtification, Adoption, or any Title to Heaven, as the members of Chriſt have. But by a common Faith men come to be leſs diſpleaſing to God than groſſer Infidels and Rebels; and are more prepared for converting Grace. You know that this is the common Doctrine both of our practical and polemical Divines, as you may ſee in their Books, and the Synod of Dort.

But our Divines againſt the Arminians oft ſay, That a man that hath but nature and common Grace, cannot uſe them well.

I am reſolved not to be cheated by ambiguous words. To uſe them well ſignifieth, 1. To uſe them in love to God as the Ultimate End, and ſo none but the godly uſe any thing: And do not all the Arminians grant you that? 2. Or it is to uſe them ſo much better than worſer men, as that they draw nearer God, and are more prepared for ſpecial Grace? And do not all our Divines grant that they may ſo far uſe them well? where then is the difference?

The prayer of the Wicked is abomination to the Lord.

By [wicked] is meant, either one that is yet unregenerate as ſuch, or one that is actually ſet upon wickedneſs, progreſſively, and is not about returning to God. And by [abomination] is meant, either that which God accepteth not ſo far as to pardon and ſave him that doth it, though he judge him more prepared for Grace than others; or elſe that which he totally abhorreth as being no preparation to his Grace. A man that is unregenerate may ſo far ſeek mercy in a returning degree yet ſhort of ſaving Grace, as that it ſhall not be in vain. Even an Ahab had experience of this; And ſo had Nineve and many others: And why elſe do you ſtill confeſs a ſtate of preparatory Grace? Is Gods preparatory Grace abominable to him? Doth Chriſt give abominable Grace? or is preparation to Converſion an abominable thing? 2. But the Text ſpeaketh of a wicked man as wicked: He that goeth on in a wicked life, and thinketh by Sacrifice and Prayers to pacifie God, and make him amends, his Sacrifice and Prayers are abominable. But wicked men may have ſomewhat in them that is better than wickedneſs: They may have ſuch a belief that God is, and that he is a Rewarder of them that diligently ſeek him; yea ſuch a Faith in Jeſus Chriſt, as ſhall move them to that ſort of repentance and reformation as that they ſhall be almost true Chriſtians, and not far from the Kingdom of God. And the wicked man that doth this, doth it not as wicked, but by common Grace. And though it be ſo far abominable as not to prove him juſtified, it is not ſo far abominable as to be all in vain.

But when you have ſaid all, yet they have no Promiſe.

1. You know, I ſuppoſe, how hard it is to underſtand certainly many Texts of Scripture, whether they be Promiſes to ſuch or not! Matth. 7. 8. Every one that asketh receiveth, and he that ſeeketh findeth, &c. Lam. 3. 25. The Lord is good to the Soul that ſeeketh him. Amos 5. 4. Seek me, and ye ſhall live. Luke 11. 13. God will give the holy Spirit to them that ask him, &c. I only ſay that there is difficulty in theſe and ſuch other Texts. 2. But you confeſs that God hath formerly made Promiſes of Church-Priviledges, and of temporal things to unſanctified men: Therefore if he did make a Promiſe of further helps of Grace, to them that well uſe former helps, it were no more incongruous. And 3. Truly I underſtand not what it is that moveth ſome men to be ſo much againſt ſuch a conception, that God ſhould make any Promiſe of further Mercy, to the obedient uſe of former Mercy, when it is ſo agreeable to his Rectorſhip and Bounty, and to the common intereſt of Mankind. 4. But yet I aſſert no ſuch Promiſe: All that I plead for is, that you will ſtate the difference aright as it is, and not miſreport it, as if it were greater.

How is it that you would have it ſtated?

1. You are all agreed, that by Nature man can do natural actions; and by common Grace, he can do the actions of common Grace; and by ſpecial Grace, he can do the acts of ſpecial Grace. Are you not all agreed of this much?

Yes, this cannot be denied.

2. And you are agreed that the acts of common Grace are ſuch as conſiſt in a commanded ſeeking of, or preparing for ſpecial Grace.

Yes, that alſo is agreed on.

3. And you are agreed, that the beſt ſtate of common Grace is in the nature of the thing, certainly and always, a ſtate of preparation or greater moral aptitude for ſpecial Grace, whether it certainly follow or not.

Yes, that is not denied neither.

The difference then is but this. One Party ſaith, That [God hath ſignified certainly his Will, to give ſpecial Grace to them that ſo ſeek it by common Grace, as to come up to the higheſt degree of preparation: And that this ſignification of his Will is a Promiſe]. The other Party ſaith, [That God by commanding ſuch to ſeek his ſpecial Grace, and beſeeching and exhorting them thereto, and giving them abundant means and helps, doth ſignifie his Will, that they ſhall not labour in vain if they do it: and giveth them ſo much encouragement and hope, as that none hath cauſe of remiſsneſs by diſpair, but all are unexcuſable that ſhall neglect ſuch means and hopes. But that this is not a proper Promiſe, becauſe it giveth them not a right.]

You have truly ſtated the difference: And I confeſs that if I were comforting an afflicted Conſcience ready to diſpair, I ſhould tell ſuch, that a Command to ſeek Mercy, implyeth a certainty that he that ſo ſeeketh it ſhall find it; And if we could but ſay to men, as the people to the blind man, Behold he calleth thee, It would be near to a promiſe that he will heal them.

But forget not that all this is but your anticipation of the Controverſies about Grace, or Gods Promiſes, and is no part of the Controverſie about mans power or corruption.

But there is a further difference yet. For they ſay, That mans Will hath power to reſiſt the Grace of God, and fruſtrate it, which elſe would be effectual, if man did not overcome it.

You have brought the Controverſie now to a ſtrange kind of power, and further confirm me that this empty [CAN] is the ſum of the Controverſie, which is nothing but a ſound. This which you call power is nothing but natural power as morally corrupt and impotent. If it be non-agendo, that you mean they can reſiſt, as by not-believing, not loving God, &c. What power is neceſſary to it? Is it an act of power, not to love God? Next ſay, that a dead man hath power not to live, and a dumb man hath power to be ſilent; and a blind man is able not to ſee. If it be agendo that you mean that they reſiſt, the act as an act in genere is an act of that natural power which God himſelf giveth, upholdeth, and by univerſal concurſe acteth: and ſo far it is no reſiſtance. But as that act hath the prohibited Object, rather than another, ſo it is ſin: And your meaning is that they ſay, Man can ſin. And indeed is this the Controverſie? Have you been blaming the Arminians, advancing mans natural Power and Will, and now do you become the advancers of it? Who advanceth or praiſeth man more? He that ſaith, He can ſin? Or he that ſaith, He cannot ſin? Even now you pleaded, that men cannot believe, and will you now plead, that they cannot chooſe but believe? Is it a power to ſin, that you accuſe them for aſſerting?

They cannot believe without ſpecial Grace: But they cannot chooſe but believe if they have it.

It's true: Becauſe it is not that which we call ſpecial Grace, if it cauſe them not to believe: And ſo it were a contradiction to ſay, That they have Faith, and they have not Faith. But this [cannot chooſe] is not an impotency [for to believe is an act of power]: But it is meerly the name of a logical impoſſibility that theſe two ſhould conſiſt, [He believeth and he believeth not.] He that by Grace believeth, hath that natural power which of it ſelf is able not to believe (if you will call it ability): But it is power determined to believe; and ſo Faith is become neceſſary, when a man hath it neceſſitate exiſtentiae. But the aſſerting power to ſin, and to be an Unbeliever, I will never charge on the Arminians, when I would blame them for advancing man.

But it is a power to overcome Gods Grace, which they aſſert.

Read but Dr. Twiſſe his judgment of Reſistance, and you will call it no more an overcoming; any otherwiſe than a weight overcometh my ſtrength, which I can lift up, and will not. But I tell you, I will not be cheated with ambiguous words. 1. Either you mean an active or paſſive overcoming. 2. And either you mean an overcoming of Gods utmoſt exerted Power by a greater Power; or you mean an overcoming of Gods Will, and his Power exerted with an abſolute Will of efficiency; or you mean the non-efficiency or non-prevalency of ſuch an Act of God, as cometh without any Decree or abſolute Will of prevailing, but with a Will of leaving the ſucceſs to mans free Will: (as in Adam's caſe.)

1. Speaking improperly, you may ſay that all men that are not ſoftened, convinced, converted by the means which God thereto appointeth, overcome God, in that they overcome the means.

2. Thus in not-repenting, not-believing, not-loving, &c. the leſs power any man hath, the more he paſſively overcometh: (as a hard ſtone overcometh the Hammer that breaketh it not.)

3. No Arminian holdeth that man is ſtronger than God, and overcometh his Power by a greater Power: Out of Bedlam none have ſuch thoughts that are awake.

4. None of them think that any Act of Gods Power is overcome, or is unſucceſsful, which is exerciſed with his abſolute Will or Decree of prevailing, or of the effect.

5. But they think that in ſome caſes, yea ordinarily Gods Will is freely to exert no more of his power towards the cauſing of a commanded act, than what ſhall give man a power to obey, with ſome aſſiſting motives, and leave the ſucceſs or effect to his free Will. That God doth ſo ſometimes, is proved by the caſe of Adam. Now whether you will call this overcoming or not, and whether you will ſay, Adam overcame Gods Grace, or Gods Grace overcame not Adam's Will, is but a Logomachy. The thing in queſtion, is nothing but ſinning againſt that degree of Grace, which enabled man to have done better. But all this belongeth to the controverſie of Grace, and not of mans power: unleſs you think ſin a powerful honourable act.

At least in this they over-value mans power, in that they hold, That mans Will hath power to determine the influx of God, and ſo man ſhall rule his Maker: when Gods influx or premotion ſhall but leave it to the Will of man, what ſhall be the ſucceſs.

This toucheth phyſical predetermination; and needeth no other anſwer than is oft given. 1. You wrong them: They hold not all (properly) that mans Will determineth Gods Will, either as to the eſſence of the Divine Will, or as to the Act, connoting the meer Object: But only that it can determine of a common effect, which Gods and mans Free-Will would produce if both concur. 2. They do not think that m… Will hath any the …leaſt operation cauſally on Gods Will in it ſelf; but only that variations are made by variety of recipient diſpoſitions, where the influx of the Agent is univerſal and equal: And ſo that mans receptive indiſpoſition may be a cauſe that Gods Influx work not the ſame effect on him which it would do on a diſpoſed ſubject. 3. And they ſay not this of Gods abſolute Will and Power, but of his power operating reſtrai… edly by his own free Will; when he will exert no more, than what ſhall be ſucceſsful only on a free concurring and diſpoſed Subject, and not on a reſiſting undiſpoſed one.

It pleaſeth God that the Sun ſhall operate but with a common Operation, variable in the effects, by the various diſpoſition of Recipients. The Flowers ſpring and are ſweet, and Weeds ſtink, Trees grow, and Stones grow not; humanity is acted by it in men, and not in Fruits. God could have made the Influx of this Sun to have been cauſa ſpecialis, and to have turned a Weed into a Roſe, or a Stone into a Tree, if he had pleaſed: but he doth not. Now will you ſay that we are erroneous, and over magnifie the recipient, if we ſay that its diſpoſition is the cauſe of much of this diverſity? and that the ſtone is ſtronger than the Sun and overcometh it? No: the Sun did all that was properly intended: Its beams came down on the Stone, as well as on the Animals and Plants. It warmed it, though it did not quicken it. So God doth his work on the Will of Sinners: His Influx is terminated on their Will, and had he ſent it with a reſolution to convert him, it ſhould have done it. But ſeeing he ſent it limitedly, only to enable a man to Will, and to concur ſo far as ſhall prevail, if he do what his own Will is able to do by ſelfexcitation, its no overcoming God, if the man ſin. Once more, I ſay, that men that fear God ſhould be very cautelous what they ſay in all Controverſiès which are reſolved into the nature of Divine Volitions, and their way of efficiency; Seeing, 1. Will in God is not the ſame thing as in man; an Appetite. 2. Its own determination, and the way of its determining us are confeſſed by the ſubtileſt to be utterly unſearchable: Saith Vaſquez (in Thom. q. 19. diſp. 80. p. 503.) Quo autem pacto Deus ſeipſum determinet ad hoc potius quam ad illud, ineffabile ſane eſt; niſi-quod nostro modo intelligendi intelligimus eſſentiam Dei, quae eſt ejus voluntas, habere circa futura peculiarem rationem voluntatis cum reſpectu illo rationis: Et ideo dixi, in hac controverſia intelligi poſſe certa ratiocinatione Quid not ſit: Quid tamen ſit, & quo pacto voluntas determinetur, explicari non poſſe: So that what Gods Act of willing or working is, beſides his eſſence and the effect, they all confeſs that they are ignorant. And yet ſhall the more ignorant contend?

The third Crimination.

They hold free-will to good: that unregenate men have free-will Auſtin li. 1. de G…n. Contr. Manich. c. 3. profeſſeth, That all men may believe if they will; and juſtifieth it in his Retractations: But if the Will of man be corrupt and averſe from believing, we juſtly ſay, ſuch a man cannot believe, yet this is an impotency, moral only, which is to be diſtinguiſhed from impotency natural. For notwi…hſtanding this, it may be truly ſaid, that all men may believe if they will: And herein conſiſts the natural Liberty of the Will: The moral Liberty conſiſteth rather in a ſanctified inclination unto that which is good, whereby it is freed from the power of Sin and Satan, &c. But I never find that Arminians do diſtingu…ſh theſe. Twiſſe againſt Hoord, li …. p. …without Gods ſpecial Grace; and regenerate men have free-will to do good and forbear evil, even when Grace effecteth not the event.

This is an Engliſh Objection. What men that write in Greek or Latin deny Free-will? Did not all the ancient Fathers and Churches hold it till Augustine's time, of whom we have any notice? And are you coming to turn Chriſt's Body into a Hereſie, or the members of an Harlot by your charge? Did not Augustine, Proſper and Fulgentius hold it? VVho denied it for above a thouſand or thirteen hundred years after Chriſt? And do you deny all free-will your ſelf?

No; but it is free-will to ſpiritual good.

What need I tire you with the ſame things again. 1. Read but what I ſaid to A. of Free-will. 2. And ſee the Table of it in the Second Book. 3. And peruſe what I have juſt now ſaid of the power of the Will, and you will ſee that here is no more neceſſary. Make not new words to ſeem a new Controverſie. Put but Liberty for Power, and and the anſwer to the laſt Crimination ſerveth to this.

The tenth Article of the Church of England ſaith, [The condition of man, after the Fall of Adam, is ſuch, that he cannot turn and prepare himſelf by his own natural ſtrength and good works, to Faith and calling upon God: wherefore we have no power to do good works pleaſant and acceptable to God, without the Grace of God by Chriſt preventing us, that we may have a good Will, and working with us when we have that good Will.

I had rather you dealt plainly, and kept cloſe to the word of God, and evidence of Truth, than ſeek ſhelter from the words of thoſe in power. But what Jeſuite or Arminian will not ſubſcribe to this? Who doubteth of it? How oft do they all maintain the neceſſity of this preventing and co-operating Grace? But by the words [no Power] you muſt not underſtand no natural power or faculty, but no moral power: For 1. Elſe man is no man. 2. It is a moral Subject which they ſpeak of, and muſt accordingly be underſtood.

But what Free-will is it that you deny? Tell me what you mean by Free-will?

If you know what Will is, and what Free is, you need no expoſition: the words are plain enough of themſel…s.

Thus do men ſtrive about words that profit not, to ſubvert the hearers, and increaſe to more ungodlineſs. Anſwer me theſe Queſtions.

Queſt. 1. Hath not the Will more than a Liberty Political, or by Gods Law to forbear ſin, and to do all good? Doth God forbid it?

No; he commandeth it, which is more than leave or licence.

Queſt. 2. Do you think that the Will is forced? Is it not a contradiction to Will unwillingly eodem reſpectu?

Yes: we all hold freedom from compulſion.

Quest. 3. Is not mans Will a ſelf-determining faculty or principle naturally; ſo as to be Domina ſuorum actuum under God?

Yes, under God; the underſtanding directing it.

Quest. 4. Hath not the Will power and liberty to chooſe evil, or to ſin, without Gods predetermining premotion?

I dare not deny it, though many do▪

Queſt. 5. Hath not the Will a certain command over the inferior faculties reſpectively, and can move or not move them?

Yes: ſuppoſing it moved accordingly it ſelf.

Queſt. 6. Can Angels or Devils neceſſitate the Will by any efficient predetermining premotion?

No: I think not; for its commonly thought ſo.

Queſt. 7. Can any man by force or flattery neceſſitate another man to will any thing evil or good efficiently?

No: They may ſtrongly tempt, but not neceſſitate.

Queſt. 8. Can meer Objects as ſuch neceſſitate the VVill to a comparative The Opinion of Aegidiu… Roman, how the Will is actuated & determined I will ſet down, though not wholly approving it, Quodlib. 3. qu. 15. p. 177, 178: A fine, & ab …o quod apprehenditur ſub omni ratione boni, voluntas Activatur & Neceſſitatur. Ab his autem quae ſunt ad finem & ab his quae non apprebenduntur ſub ratione omni boni, poteſt Actuari, ſed non neceſſitari: A …ullo autem poteſtviolentari.—Ad finem nec activando nec determinando ſemovet: Ad ea autem quae ſunt ad finem, facta in actu per finem potest ſe determinare, ſed non activare: Quantum ergo ad actuationem nihil ſeiplum ſecundum ſeipſum movere poteſt: aliter idem ſecundum idem eſſet actus & potentia.—Nunquam voluntas per ſ… & directe actuat ſeipſum: ſed bonum apprehenſum eſt quod cauſat Volitionem in voluntate: & quod actuat eam.—Sed ſuper hujuſmodi Volitione voluntas habet dominium quia in poteſtate voluntatis eſt ſiſtere vel non ſiſtere in tali Volitione.—Lib…ra eſt quia cum intellectus …ffert ei, e. g fornicationem ſub utra que ratione, ſub mala & ſub bona oportet quod utra que conſideratio ſit Volita: Quamdiu enim ſtat in utra que tamdiu vult de utra que conſiderare determinat autem ſe hoc modo: Quia eſt domina ſui actus poteſt totaliter deſiſtere a conſideratione unius, & totaliter inſiſtere in conſideratione alterius: Vel poteſt non totaliter deſiſtere ab uno, nec totaliter intendere ali…d: ſed magis eſſe intenta ad unum quam ad aliud. Si autem totaliter deſiſtat velle conſiderare de inordinatione, vel notabiliter ſit attenta ad conſiderandum de delectatio…e, modicum autem attendat ad inordinationem, tunc fornicatio ſic apprehenſa activabit cam & cauſabit in …a volitionem] So that he thinketh that the free omiſſion of the Wills command of neceſſary thoughts is the beginning of Sin: But what he ſaith of the Wills being actuated per finem & non per ſeipſam needeth better explication. Objects actuate but morally, that is, are occaſions, and quoſi materia diſpoſita ad actu… terminationem; but it is the faculty or form that actuateth by proper vital agency▪ Et poſtea Qu. 16. pag. 183. Etſi entitas effectus reducatur in entitatem cauſae, non tamen defectus reducitur in defectum …ſdem cauſae. Non deficit cauſa, ſed effectus ille deficit a cauſa. Etſi non ſit voluntas in actu niſi prius ſit in actu intellectu…, non ſequitur quod non poſſit voluntas deficere niſi prius deficiat intellectus: Abſ que enim eo quod intellectus male proponat voluntati, poteſt ſe voluntas determinare male—viz. ſi ſit intenta circa delectationem, non circa inordinatione….act, that is, to chooſe this rather than that, (de mediis)?

To good they cannot: but I doubt of it as to evil, whether Objects do not neceſſitate ſome men, ſo that they cannot forbear.

Who made theſe Objects, and cauſeth their nature and exiſtence?

God made all things: Meat, Drink, Pulchritude, Money, &c.

Doth God then neceſſitate men efficiently to Sin by Objects.

I ſay not ſo: For Objects are not efficient.

True; as Objects they are not: Therefore they effect not: Therefore they do not neceſſitate properly, which is an efficiency: Indeed they are but cauſae quaſi materiales actus in ſpecie ſeu individuo, and conſtitute it, and no act is without its Object: But they effect it not.

Doth not the Sun effect our ſight by its light?

Yes: but not as a meer Object, for ſo it only terminateth and conſtituteth it as the matter: But it cauſeth it efficiently as an Agent.

Well! I will ſuppoſe that ſo far as a wicked man is neceſſitated to ſin, it is his pravity that doth it circa objectum (ut ſine quo non) and not the Object it ſelf efficiently and in proper ſpeech.

Queſt. 9. Is the Will efficiently neceſſitated by the ſenſes or phantaſie?

No otherwiſe than as by the Objects which they do preſent?

Quest. 10. Is it ſo neceſſitated by the Paſſions?

I know not whether I may ſay the Paſſions do it, or its own pravity, when the paſſions do diſturb and tempt it.

Queſt. 11. Is it ſo neceſſitated by the Intellect?

So Camero and ſeveral others thought, and conſequently by the Objects: But I have many reaſons againſt that Opinion quoad media, in comparate elections. But the Intellect may neceſſitate it circa finem; 2. And quoad media, in ſpecificatione, etſi non quoad exercitium actus.

1. Quoad finem, it is not the Intellect that neceſſitateth, but the natural inclination of the Will; Intellection is but a previous act ſine quo non. 2. Where there is no exercitium actus, there is no ſpecification. Therefore you can only ſay, Non ſpecificatur ſine ductu intellectus; but the Will can prevent that ductum intellectus, if not ſuſpend its act alſo after it.

Queſt. 12. Can any one but God, by force, impreſs ill habits on the Will.

No: we were miſerable if any could make us wicked.

Queſt. 13. Will God ever make any ſuch evil habits in the Will.

As a habit he may cauſe it, but not as evil.

Queſt. 14. Do you think that a Sinner is neceſſitated to every ſin that he committeth, or to every Duty which he omitteth, ſo that he could not do otherwiſe?

I think he is under a neceſſity of ſinning: but I cannot ſay it of every ſin which he committeth.

You before granted many things to be in the power of the Will: And can you deny that power to be free, that the ſame things are in its liberty: I will tire you no more; but deſire you, 1. To peruſe all your former conceſſions about mans power. And 2. To peruſe all the twenty Conceſſions of A. Confer. 5. Criminat. 1. where he denieth Free-will in all thoſe ſenſes, and then tell me, where is the difference?

They think that our freedom is inconſiſtent with neceſſity; but ſo do not we, who think that Decree and Predetermination do neceſſitate.

I have forced you before to confeſs your concord here. A Logical neceſſitas conſequentiae in ordine probationis, Arminius and almoſt all men confeſs doth reſult from meer preſcience. And Dr. Twiſſe profeſſeth, that neither the Protestants or the School-men hold any other neceſſity to reſult from Decree or Predetermination.

But the pravity of the wicked neceſſitateth their Wills to evil.

1. Not to all evil: For 1. Men commit not all: 2. And you before confeſſed, that men can do more good and leſs evil than they do. 2. The truth is, as I diſtinguiſhed power before into Phyſical and Moral, ſo muſt we do Liberty and Neceſsity. The Will hath its phyſical Liberty, and is free from phyſical neceſsitation, in all the ſin that men commit, and in all the good they do (I think) though not from all Divine predetermining neceſſitation to good: Men do not good and evil as Bruits do their acts. But the Will hath a kind of moral neceſſity of doing evil, by radicated habits, and hath no further moral Liberty, than it is freed from the power of thoſe evil inclinations. But theſe habits neceſſitate not phyſically, but morally, and that only to ſome ſin, but not to all. A man can act contrary to a good or evil habit, as common experience proveth. But becauſe mens Volitions and Actions are ordinarily or much agreeable to their fixed inclining habits, therefore we uſe to ſay that morally ſuch can do no better; meaning that they will not.

But ſure you would not have me believe that there is no difference betwein us and the Arminians in the point of Free-Will?

If there be any, either you know it, and can name it your ſelf, or you know it not, and then may be aſhamed to contend about it. Queſt. 1. Tell me plainly, Is not all the Liberty which you deny a moral Liberty a malo, from ſinful diſpoſitions of the Soul?

There is much diſpute about Liberty from Divine predetermination; But I will not meddle any further with that. I never contended againſt any Free-will, but freedom from ſinful habits, as ſuppoſed to be in men more than it is.

Queſt. 2. Do you not hold then that all men have Free-will ſo far as they have effectual Grace, and Sanctification.

Yes, in that degree: For voluntas per gratiam liberata eſt libera.

Queſt. 3. Do the Arminians hold that the VVills of the graceleſs and unſanctified are freed from ſinful habits? and ſo are morally free to holy acts.

No, I confeſs they do not: Corvinus and others oft ſay, that it is Grace that giveth us the vires credendi which we had not before; But ſome of them deny any habits to be in the Will: But theſe ſay the Understanding muſt be enlightned before we are able to chooſe aright.

Quest. 4. Doth not common Grace give men a moral Liberty to common good, from all neceſſitating inclinations to the contrary?

Igranted it before as to Power, and therefore muſt as to Liberty.

Where then is the difference between you?

I take it to be here, that the Arminians and Jeſuites ſay that the Wills of the Unregenerate are not only free to common preparatory good acts, but to the ſpecial acts of Faith and true Repentance and Converſion unto God, which we deny.

Either you mean this of all unregenerate men, or but of ſome: 1. Of all they ſay it not: For the Synod of Dort chargeth them but with ſaying that men can uſe their naturals, ſo as by degrees to come up to Faith. They commonly hold, that ordinarily the Will muſt be prepared by commoner Grace, before it (morally) can believe, though ſuch are freely Unbelievers, having a natural liberty or power to the contrary, though undiſpoſed, and have a moral power and liberty to ſome preparatory acts. 2. But if you mean it of thoſe that are come up to the higheſt preparatory acts, and alſo have Gods Grace ad poſſe credere, where there is the poſſe morale, there is moral Liberty ſo far. But whether this be really any mans caſe, or how many, to have Grace to enable them to believe who yet never do believe, is a Controverſie which I find not Proteſtants apt to meddle with; And it is too hard for us to decide.

That is the very heart of the Controverſie, whether ever God give immediate Power and Liberty to believe to any one, who never believeth and uſeth it.

Where do you find this Controverſie much meddled with, unleſs by the School-men, who aſſert ſufficient uneffectual Grace to believe? But this belongeth to the next Article (of Grace) though here you anticipate it. But if this muſt be it, I ſhall briefly diſpatch it. 1. Adam's inſtance hath already made you confeſs, that ſuch a thing there hath been, as Grace ad poſſe & non ad agere, called ſufficient but uneffectual Grace? And your confeſſion of all the foreſaid powers that men have by common Grace (to do more good and forbear more evil than they do) yieldeth that yet ſuch a ſort of ſufficient Grace ad aliquid there is.

2. The courſe of Gods Adminiſtrations, maketh it ſeem moſt probable, that ſome and many have ſuch a meer ſufficient Grace to believe and repent: For if Adam had ſuch a Grace enabling him to have fulfilled the whole Law of Innocency, it ſeemeth proportionable that the Rector of the World give ſome ſuch a Grace to fullfil the mediate Law of believing and repenting, who uſe it not.

3. It's common with Dr. Twiſſe to cite Auguſtine with approbation as ſaying, Poſſe credore eſt omnium, credere vero fidelium, and to make this the great difference of effectual Grace from that which is more common, that it giveth not only the Poſſe velle & credere, but the Act.

4. But yet becauſe we can know no more of Gods ſecret workings than he diſcovereth, I take it to be dark and dubious: But that this is certain, that whoever wanteth the power or liberty of Will (moral) to repent and believe, they are penally denied it, for not uſing that power and liberty which they had, to inferior preparatory Acts. And you can carry this Controverſie of Free-will no further.

And is it not then a horrid ſhame, to hear honeſt people ſo ſeduced into Love-killing factious ſidings by their Teachers, as that Boys and Women ſpeak of wiſer and better perſons with diſaffection and reproach, ſaying, O he is a Free-willer, or he holdeth Free-will, when they know not what they talk of: but are made believe that it is ſome monſtrous impious Opinion, making a man almoſt an Heretick? VVhen even you that lead them are unable to ſhew me any proved (at leaſt conſiderable) difference at all.

Are there ſo many Books written de libero arbitrio between Jeſuites and Arminians, and us, and yet is there no difference?

1. I do not ſay that no man that ever wrote of it, hath wrangled himſelf into any words of ill ſignification, or taking up any more than is defenſible. 2. But if the main Controverſie be not Logomachy, why do not you tell me what the real difference is? It is not fair-dealing to make me ridicuous for calling to you to name the difference, and yet your ſelf refuſe to name it, and make it good. VVill you aſſert what you know not, and accuſe men without proof?

The fourth Crimination.

They hold that the Unregenerate are not dead in ſin, and void of all ſpiritual good.*Of this read Milancth…n's Anſwer to all their Objections, in L…. com. de liber. ar…. c. 7. and Strigelius on him.

Do you think that they differ from you herein? This was ſpoken to before. 1. They hold that the Unregenerate have natural life, and ſo do you. 2. They hold that their faculties are bonum naturale, and ſo do you. 3. They hold that common Grace is bonum morale, at leaſt Analogically ſo called, and ſo do you. Indeed as bonum is ex cauſis integris none on Earth is morally good, no nor doth any thing that is bonum morale, becauſe it is imperfect; and ſo our defective holineſs is not bonum morale in that ſenſe: But as good is ſo called from the predominant Will, the godly have bonum morale: And as it is denominated from that which is not predominant, yet real in the VVill, the Unregenerate in their common Grace have bonum morale. For common Grace is not meerly quid phyſicum, nor meerly ſin. 4. De nomine, whether we ſhall call this ſpiritual good or not, when we have a Grammar written from Heaven, or by Apoſtles, we ſhall have more mind to diſpute with you. But I told you once already, that 1. As to the efficient, it is ſpiritual, that is, common Grace is wrought by Gods Spirit. 2. As to the end ſlightly and uneffectually wiſhed it is ſpiritual; But as to the trueſt end (the pleaſing and glorifying of God) predominantly and effectually willed and intended, it is not ſpiritual. 3. Nor as to the manner, if the exerciſe of ſuch an intention be called the manner. Tell not men that we differ, becauſe you can bring forth ambiguous words, and there dream of a difference; but plainly tell me, Are not you and they thus far agreed? and is not this all that's in your charge?

The fifth Crimination.

They hold that man is not meerly paſſive in his first Converſion to God, which is contrary to us and to the Truth.

VVhen will the Lord give his Miniſters as much ſkill to heal, as to wound? to find out real concord as to make differences in their Dreams and Fictions? Do you think indeed that you differ in this point?*The Jeſui…es with the other School-men commonly diſtinguiſh with Auguſtine the Grace which ſine nobis in nobis operatur, from that which after cum nobis operatur; The firſt they call Operantem, the ſecond Co-operantem: The firſt preventing, the ſecond con-comitant; the firſt infuſed, the ſecond governing; the firſt exciting, the ſecond Adjuvant: Of which ſee Vaſquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. diſp. 88. c. 9, &c. Alvar. l. 12. diſp. 116. p. 473. In omni libero arbitrio creato, qua ratione creatum eſt, reperitur aliqua indifferentia ſeu potentia paſſiva ſecundum aliquam rationem. Nam 1. Lib. arb. creatum non eſt purus actus, nec lib. per eſſentiam 'ut Deus—. 2. Ex ſua natura eſt percabile.—3. Non eſt impliciter primum ſe movens, ſed movet ſe libere, motum tamen a Deo prius ration…. Here a Jeſuite, Vaſqu. 1. Tho. diſp. 12. n. 4 Prima gratia non datur bene laborantibus, ne que expectantibus, ne que qu… rentibus ut definitur, Concil. Aranſic. 2. Can. … 4. 5. & 6. ſed ſedentibus in tenebris & umbra mortis.

Or elſe I muſt think that we may be aſhamed to ſhew our faces to the people, if we make them believe that we differ when we do not, and thereby ſtir up their diſtast of others.

The queſtion may have three ſeveral ſenſes of paſſiveneſs, as man is conſidered, 1. In his Nature. 2. In his Action. And therein, 1. In the reception of the Divine Influx. 2. In the acting thereupon. And ſo the queſtions are, 1. VVhether mans Soul be an active nature, or paſſive matter only? 2. VVhether mans Soul be meerly paſſive in the reception of the Divine Influx ad agendum? 3. VVhether mans Soul be meerly paſſive in its own firſt act of Faith or Repentance? Tell me, Are not theſe three diſtinct queſtions? And are they not all that you can deviſe? (unleſs you will make another, whether we are merly paſſive in the preparatory part?) And are you not now aſhamed to confeſs that you need any anſwer to any one of theſe three queſtions.

I. All the world is agreed ſave the Hobbiſts, and Somatiſts, and Sadduces, that mans Soul is not meer paſsive nature, but is an active nature, inclined to Action, as paſſive Elements are to non-action: And that when God moveth it, he moveth not Earth, Water or Air, but a Spirit, whoſe nature is ſelf-moving (as fire) under the firſt mover.

II. All the world is agreed, that the Soul and all Spirits are not, ſo purely and meerly active as God is, but are partly and firſt paſſive; and that they do and needs muſt be receptive of the Divine Influx before they can act: For all Creatures depend on the firſt Cauſe, and both Being, Nature and Action would ceaſe, if Gods emanation to it ceaſed. And all the world agreeth, that no man before Converſion or after doth any act of Faith, Love, &c. no nor eating, and drinking, and going, &c. but he is in the firſt inſtant paſsive as influenced by God, before he is active. Who ever doubted whether phyſice recipere be pati? Did you ever know ſuch a man?

III. All the world is agreed, that man is not meerly paſſive when he acteth. An Act is an Act ſure! And to believe, repent and love is an Act, and an act of mans Soul. And Scotus who thinketh that immanent Act: are qualities (as we think of habits) yet thinketh that the Soul is truly active antecedently to that quality. Where now is there any room for a Controverſie?

You would make me believe that we are very ignorant Wranglers, that make a noiſe in our dream, and will not ſuffer others to rest! Do not the Arminians ſay, that man concurreth with God to the firſt act of his own Faith? yea that he maketh Gods Grace effectual.

You ſhall not again tempt me to anticipate the queſtion of effectual Grace, though enough is ſaid before to it as far as this Objection is concerned in it. Gods Influx on the Soul is one thing: mans natural faculty receiving that Influx paſſively is another: And mans Act is another. To thruſt in here a general word [man concurreth] and ſo to run away from clear and neceſſary diſtinction, is not the part of a man of knowledge. Did ever man yet deny that man herein concurreth as aforeſaid? 1. Man concurreth not to make his Soul, nor to continue it in being or power. 2. Man concurreth not as any efficient of Gods Influx on his Soul ad agendum. 3. But man receptively or paſſively concurreth as a Receiver of that Influx. 4. And man actively thereupon concurreth to believe and repent. Is not all this true?

But you would tempt the Arminians to ſay, that it is you and not they that are herein to be accuſed? For what mean you elſe, by confining the Controverſie to the firſt act of Faith, or to our firſt Converſion? Would you make men believe, that a converted man is not as truly paſſive in believing, loving God, &c. as the unconverted is? Muſt not the holieſt perſon be paſſive in receiving the Divine Influx on his Soul, before, he do any holy Act? You ſeem to deny this? and then you are the perſon that err, by aſcribing too much to man. If not, ſhew the difference.

There is a habit of Faith goeth before the firſt Act: And it is in reſpect to that habit that the Arminians ſay we are active procurers of it; which we deny. But the godly operate from a habit.

You ſpeak a private Opinion of your own brain, againſt the ſenſe of the Concordant Churches. Where doth Scripture ſay, that a habit of Faith goeth before the firſt Act? Mr. Pemble *Vind. Grat…ſaith ſo indeed: yet he ſometime calleth that but a Seed, which at other times he calleth a habit. Dr. Ames in his Medulla contradicteth it. Biſhop Downame *In the end of his Treatiſe Of Perſeverance. Le Blank. de diſſ. Grat. 2. Theſ. 22. ſpeaking of our being paſſive as to operating Grace, ſaith truly, [Non videntur hac in parte Reformati a ſanioribus inter Scholaſticos diſſentire, licet aliis verbis mentem ſuam exprimant] The School-men and Proteſtants little differ in the method of operations of Grace, and all are drawn by Controverſies too near curioſity, beyond their reach.hath written a large Confutation of Mr. Pemble. The generality of Protestant Divines contradict it, and thus (with Rollock de Vocat.) diſtinguiſh Vocation from Sanctification, that they ſuppoſe Vocation to cauſe the firſt act of Faith and Repentance, and Sanctification to give us the fixed habit, the act intervening. Mr. Tho. Hooker is large upon it, in his Souls Vocation. Will you ſtart one mans Opinion, which Calviniſts and Arminians are againſt, and feign this to be a difference between Calvinists and Arminians? And perhaps Mr. Pemble himſelf, by his firſt ſemen or habit, meaneth no more, than the Divine Influx ad actum received. I have before told you how unſearchable the nature of that Influx is, and how hard it is to know the true nature of an Habit.

But Mr. Pemble ſaith, It is the Spirit that is given before we believe.

Away with Ambiguity. By the Spirit is meant either the meer received Influx of the Spirit ad agendum; and ſo it is granted: Bad men receive the Spirits Influx to ſuch acts as he moveth them to. Or elſe you mean, the foreſaid fixed Habits and Diſpoſitions, to a ready and facile ordinary Operation. Or elſe you mean, the Spirit given relatively by Covenant, undertaking to be the Sanctifier and Preſerver of the Soul. In both theſe latter ſenſes, the Spirit is not given before the firſt act of Faith, to Infidels. They have not the fixed habits of Holineſs, Love, Hope, Obedience, &c. Otherwiſe they were holy Infidels. No Scripture ſpeaketh it: nay contrarily it promiſeth the Spirit as to Believers, and affirmeth it given after Faith, Eph. 1. 13. Joh. 14. 17. & 15. 26. Gal. 3. 14. & 4. 6. Joh. 7. 39. And that the Holy Ghoſt is not given in Covenant to Infidels I need not prove, to them that will not baptize Infidels.

The ſixth Crimination.

They hold that none are damned only for Adam's ſin imputed.*Yes, Vaſqu. and other Jeſuites hold, that Infants that have no remedy, are excluded from Glory only for Original Sin.

And I think ſo do all Chriſtians, or ſhould do. 1. Of all the Adult there is no queſtion. Is there any that hath no ſin of his own? Or doth God forgive all their own ſin to the damned? And as to Infants, 1. Wiſe men ſhould not vex Gods Church with matters no more revealed. 2. All the Scripture maketh them members, as it were, of their nearer Parents as well as of Adam, and as I have proved to you, threatneth them for nearer Parents ſins (even in the Second Commandment, and Exod. 34.) as well as for Adam's. And all the world being, Gen. 3. 15. brought under a Covenant or Law of Grace, which conditionally pardoneth all ſin, the not-believing of the Parent, is the cauſe of the non-liberation or not-pardoning of himſelf and his Infant. How can you ſay then that they ſuffer only for Adam's ſin? 3. And ſure their natural pollution is their own ſin: And the Church of England, Art. 9. thus deſcribeth Original Sin: [Original Sin ſtandeth not in the following of Adam (as the Pelagians do vainly talk) but it is the fault and corruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is ingendred of the Off-ſpring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from Original Righteouſneſs, and is of his own nature inclined to evil: So that the Fleſh luſteth always contrary to the Spirit: and therefore in every perſon born into this world, it deſerveth Gods Wrath and Damnation. And this infection of Nature doth remain, yea, in them that are regenerated, whereby the luſt of the Fleſh, called in Greek foreign, which ſome do expound, the Wiſdom, ſome Senſuality, ſome the Affection, ſome the Deſire of the Fleſh, is not ſubject to the Law of God.] (Though I think that Text, Rom. 8. ſpeak not of the Regenerate.)

I include this Corruption when I ſpeak of Adam's ſin imputed; And though the Article mention not this Imputation, I ſuppoſe it was but through forgetfulneſs, and not that they denied it, as no part of Original Sin.

*Vid. Chamier Pauſtr at To. 3. l. 1. c. 2. 7, 8. Contr Pigh. & Salmeron. & Pet. Mart. in Rom. 5. & Placaeum in Theſ. Salmurienſ. Vol. 1. & in Tractat. pecub. defenſ. de Imputatpeccati Adae: who are leſs for the imput. of Adam's ſin than others, e contra vid. And Rivet's enumeration of Writers for that imputation, Defenſ. Concil. &c.I have nothing to do with that, and am no judge of other mens thoughts that are dead. All that I deſire you to obſerve is, that all underſtanding Proteſtants agree, that the ſole Law of Innocency [Obey perfectly and live] is not the Law that God governeth the World, or any in it, by, ſince the Covenant of Grace was made, but all are under a Law of Mercy: And therefore Parents and Children, in and out of the Church, are judged by that Law which they were under, and not by the Law of Innocency alone, without any remedying Law of Mercy.

Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Conference 6

p. 109THE Sixth Days Conference OF Natural Corruption and Impotency, and Free-will. BETWEEN B. (the Reconciler) and (C. a Calvinist.)