Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable — Richard Baxter

Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable · Richard Baxter

THE Fifth Days Conference WITH AN ARMINIAN Of mans natural ſinfulneſs and impotency to good, and of FREE-WILL.

You have hitherto perſwaded us, that all the Controverſies of the Decrees and Redemption, between the Synodiſts and Remonſtrants, being reſolved into thoſe of the Execution, we ſhould there expect the ſolution of all: To this therefore we are next to come. And first about mans Sinfulneſs, Impotency and Free-will; And there all theſe things following offend me.

The first Crimination.

That ſome of them deny all true Free-will, and others deny all Free-will to good, and others to all ſpiritual good, by which man is made uncapable of being a moral Agent, and ſo uncapable of moral Good or Evil, any more than a Tree or Beaſt; ſeeing Free-will is the ſeat of moral Virtues and Vices, which neceſſitated Natures are uncapable of.

I hope you are willing to underſtand your ſelf, and to be underſtood. Tell me then, what mean you by Free-will?

I know that the true nature of Liberty is much controverted; but I mean that Qua poſitis omnibus ad agendum requiſitis, poſſumus agere vel non agere.*Alvarez hath theſe concluſions hereof, de Aux. l. 12. d 115. p. 469.—[1. Ad liberum arbitrium neceſſario requiritur quod poſitis omnibus antecedenter ſecundum ordinom rationis vel temporis, ad actum praerequiſitis, poſſit operari vel non operari; Ita viz. ut cum iiſdem praerequiſitis, ſtet ſimul in libero arbitrio facultas & potentia qua poſſit operari ſi velit, vel non operari ſi velit. (But the queſtion is, de poſſe velle.) 2. Non eſt de ratione aut definitione liberi arbitrii quod poſitis omnibus ſecundum ordinem cauſalitatis, antecedenter praerequiſitis ad operandum talem actum, poſſit eundem actum non operari, in ſenſ… compoſito; ſi compoſitio fiat, inter hujuſmodi requiſita, & carentiam talis actus, ſeu actum contrarium. 3. Legitima liberi arbitrii definitio, ita ſe habet lib. arb. eſt facultas voluntatis, & rationis ad utrum libet agendum, vel non agendum, & ad agendum unum vel alterum.] But I ſuppoſe his predetermination inconſiſtent with his potentia ad contrarium in the firſt propoſition: Becauſe it is antecedent to the wills ſelf-determination and the Will is not able to determine it ſelf againſt the predetermining cauſality of God, nor as he holdeth without it neither, and ſo hath no true power, but on ſuppoſition of the premotion of God predetermining.

1. Do you mean by agendum, imperate Acts only, or alſo Volitions?

Both: All moral Acts of Body and Soul.

That which is requiſite to extrinſick moral Acts, is, that they be commanded by a determined will: You mean then that it is Liberty for the Tongue or Hand to be able to Act when the Will forbiddeth it, and not to Act, when the Will commandeth it.

I mean it only of imperate Acts as voluntary; for it is the Will and not the executive power that is the ſeat of Liberty.

2. By Agere what Action of the Will do you mean? you know that mans Soul is an active nature, and can no more ceaſe all action than ceaſe to be. You may as well ſay that fire with fuel can forbear to burn, as a Soul to be active.

I mean only moral Acts, of Virtue and Vice.

All that a man doth by Reaſon is Actus humanus, a moral Act, either good or bad; And a man at the uſe of Reaſon liveth among thouſands of intelligible Objects▪ neceſſarily preſented to his Intellect by ſenſe; and among thouſands of Objects, good for us, or bad for us, deſireable or hateful; And is it poſſible for ſuch a ſenſitive, intelligent Creature, to live continually with intelligible, amiable or odible Objects, and to ſuſpend all rational apprehenſions, Volitions and Nolitions of them?

I mean it not of all moral Action in general, but of this or that ſingular Act …ic & nun….

I will not entangle you with an enquiry; whether he that c…n do every particular good act, cannot do all univerſally; and whether he that can forbear every ſingular evil (or good) act cannot forbear all, when all is nothing but all ſingulars. But, 3. What mean you by [requiſitis?] All things of meer neceſſity to the Act ſine quibus non? Or alſo all things that can poſſibly be put to aſcertain the Act?

Of the firſt I am moſt fully reſolved: Of the ſecond there is much doubtfulneſs. If I include it, I know you will ask me, whether it be impoſſible for God ſo to determine the Will, as to make the contrary act impoſſible, without taking away its Liberty? And whether Chriſt could commit every ſin? or elſe was not free? And whether Heaven take away all Liberty, if it make ſin impoſſible? But briefly I anſwer you, that the Libertas Viatoris differeth from that in Heaven; and that Ours ſtill ſuppoſeth a poſſibility of the Contrary, but Theirs doth not.

But if it be their Liberty to be paſt a poſſe peccare, why ſhould it not be ours to come as near it as may be? eſpecially when we have the fore-taſts and firſt-fuits of Heaven on Earth, and Grace is the ſeed of Glory.

It is our Liberty to be as far from ſin as may be: But this is another kind of Liberty, and not to be confounded with that which is a meer power of doing or not doing.

4. But that a man can act poſitis omnibus ad agendum requiſitis is no wonder; ſo can a Stone, or Bruit: but how ſay you poteſt non agere, when non-agere is not an effect or exerciſe of Power? There needs no Power ad non agendum.

Yes; when Nature, or Vice, and Temptation draw us to a forbidden Act, it is a work of Power to reſiſt them and forbear it.

But ſure Nature, Vice or Temptation do not ſo draw us to love God perfectly, to hate all Sin perfectly, to be heavenly-minded, to conſent to ſuffer Death for Chriſt, &c. as that we ſhould need any power to reſiſt ſuch drawings, or forbear ſuch acts. How then do you make this a part of your power?

But when the Spirit of God draweth us to love him, it is an act of natural abuſed power to reſiſt him. And alſo in this and the former caſe I ſay, that by [poſſumus] here, we do not mean a moral or phyſical power always, but in this instance only a logical power: And our meaning only is, that we are not neceſſitated to Act or not Act; to love God, or to hate him, or not to love him. As Privations are reduced to Entities, in Deſcriptions, ſo are Impotencies to Powers.

The word [Poſſe] then in your definition is equivocal, and ſignifieth both Power and No-Power. What a definition is that? But, 5. What maketh you call it by the name of Liberty, to be impotent? or, if you will, to be able not to love God? not to live to God? not to know God? not to truſt God? not to repent of Sin? not to be heavenlyminded? what Liberty is this? yea, or to be able to hate God, and Sin, and damn your ſelves?

*Arnold. Corv. deſcribeth it to be that without which we are not men.It is not Liberty ſpecifically as it is for ſin or againſt God; and ſo not Libertas moralis; but it is only Libertas naturalis, or the indetermination of the Will with a ſelf-determining power, which is the natural ſeat of morality, and may be uſed to good or evil.Formalis Libertas arbitrii creati, non conſiſtit formaliter in indifferentia objectiva, ne que in indifferentia paſſiva; ſed in indifferentia Activa ipſiu… facultatis liberae, quae indifferenter ſe habet ad oppoſita: quamvis adjunctam habeat vel praeſupponat aliquam indifferentiam paſſivam ipſius potentia & indifferentiam objecti. Alvar. de Aux. l. 12. d. 116. p. 473. c. 2.

Now you ſay ſomewhat, and come into the Light; Therefore having thus prepared the way, I add, that there is Libertas à malo, and Libertas ad bonum; both properly: But it is improper to ſay, Libertas à bono (naturali vel morali) vel Libertas ad malum qua tale. 2. As there may be a three-fold Reſtraint or Compulſion, Phyſical, Ethical, or Civil; So there is a three-fold Liberty, 1. Natural, which is a Liberty from natural neceſſitation from God, or our own faculties, or things extrinſick, unto any evil. 2. Ethical; which is a Liberty from vicious inclination, or neceſſitation by it at leaſt. 3. Civil; which is a Liberty from the reſtraining or conſtraining Laws, of any that would or might draw us to evil, or keep us from good; and ſo of penalties by thoſe Laws. To which is reducible Liberty from the ill commands and puniſhments of Parents and Maſters, and from the violence of enemies or wicked men. And Liberty is either from ſin, or from miſery. But the diſtinctions about Liberty are ſo many, that I have given them you in a Table in the Second Book, and refer you thither, that we may agree on the ſtate of the queſtion, What Liberty it is that you mean? But firſt I ſhall aſk you a few more queſtions.

Queſt. 1. Do you think that Liberty conſiſteth in the greatest indifferency of the Will, when it is meerly in aequilibrio?

No: For then every virtuous or vicious habit ſhould take away Liberty.

I pray you think on it then, Whether if ſtrong habits which do tantum non neceſſitare, do not at all abate or take away any part of Liberty, it be like, that if ſuch a habit were ſo ſtrong as per eundem inclinandi modum to neceſſitate, it would not yet conſiſt with Liberty of Will?

Queſt. 2. Do you think that a man is not neceſſitated to will his own felicity by a ſimple Volition? Is he free to deſire miſery as ſuch?

No: This is not an act of Election, and therefore not of Liberty.

Do you think that this certain conſtant neceſſary act of the Will, is not a more perfect or excellent act, than that which you call free, which ſometime is done and ſometime not done, and is before uncertain? *Poſſe male agere non eſt aliquid quod ad Libertatis perfectionem pertineat: ſed potius quaedam eſt imperfectio libertatem comitans in perſona creata, & quae Libertati accidentaria eſt: Nam Deus, &c. Blank de lib. in genere, n. 33.Or, is it not a more excellent ſtate of the Will to be conſtantly and certainly well determined, than to be undetermined, and defectible? I would know as we go on, whether the Liberty which we plead for, be good and deſirable, or evil?

I cannot deny but it is incomparably more deſireable to be certainly and neceſſarily determined to good, than not: But it is better to be free and left to our own choice uncertainly, than to be determined to evil, or to be ſo determined to inferior good, as ſhall keep down the Soul from the ſuperior. I do not take this indetermination and free power, for our beſt ſtate, but for a middle condition, fit for a Viator that is tried here in order to his end. Beasts are neceſſarily determined to things inferior: The glorified Angels and Saints (its thought and hoped) are neceſſarily determined to things ſuperior; and ſo was Chriſt: But our undetermined ſtate of Liberty is better than one, and worſe than the other, and fit for our trying life on Earth.

You ſay well. Therefore remember, that our Liberty is no further good, than as it is a Liberty to good and from evil, *Poſſe peccare non pertinet ad rationem formalem liberi arbitrii: ſed potius eſt quaedam imper…ectio arbitrii creati, competens illi, …o quod factum eſt ex nibilo: Alvar. ib. d. 115. p. 470. Et hanc rationem aſſignat S▪ Auguſtinus, l. 2. de vitiis & concup. c. 28. & l. 12. de civit. Dei, c. 1. Unde Thom. 1. p. q. 62. art. 8. ad 3. ait quod Liberum arb. diverſa eligere poſſit, ſervato ordine ſinis, ut hoc pertinet ad perfectionem libertatis ejus; ſed quod eligat aliquid divertendo ab ordine finis, quod eſt peccare, hoc pertinet ad defectum libertatis. Idem dicit de ver. q. 24. art. 3. ad 2. Voluntas noſtra vere libera eſt, comparatione volitionis aut nolitionis, quam elicit, quolibet momento,—non ſolum quia prius natura quam ſe determina…et ad alteram partem, poterat ſeipſam non determinare ad eandem partem, ſed ad oppoſitam: nec ſolum quia poteſt continuare, vel ac…iſtere ab operatione, quam producit in inſtanti praeſentis temporis: ſed etiam quia in inſtanti temporis quo elicit ſuam operationem, veram retinet poteſtatem & facultatem qua poſſit eam non elicere, ſi velit, aut etiam elicere, contrariam operationem: Alvar. diſp. 116. p. 476. Here is a power Volendi ſi velit. But 1. Is it per candem volitionem, vel aliam? 2. Hath he qui non vult, Potentiam volendi pro hoc inſtanti?not from all determination: but that the nearer we draw to neceſſary love to God and goodneſs, the better we are.

Q. 3. I further aſk you, Do we not neceſſarily will alſo bonum ſenſibile, ſenſible good as ſuch, with a ſimple Volition? and ſo are not at Liberty in that point?

What mean you by a ſimple Volition?

That by which we will a thing by ſimple complacence, conſidered as ſimply good, before the underſtanding compare it with any other good, and call the Will to an Election.

No doubt but we have an Appetite to ſenſible good; but whether it be only the ſenſitive Appetite, or always the rational Appetite alſo? I am in ſome doubt.

When ſenſe perceiveth ſweetneſs by tast or ſmell, light and pulchritude by fight and fantaſie, ſenſual joy by internal ſenſe, doubtleſs in an Intelligent Creature, the Intellect preſently perceiveth ſuo modo, that theſe are ſuch indeed as ſenſe perceiveth, and alſo that they are bona ſenſibilia, and that bona ſenſibilia are verè bona in their proper order. And therefore as ſenſible good is apprehended by the Intellect, and made volible, ſo the Will muſt needs have a complacency or ſimple volition of it, though it may refuſe it comparatively.

I grant it you: Becauſe I take not any ſimple complacency to be a free act whatſoever: but only comparative Elections.

It's true, quoad ſpecificationem actus, vel libertatem contrarietatis: But how prove you it true quoad exercitium actus, vel libertatem contradictionis? May not the Will ſuſpend a ſimple complacency, or diſplicency, by not acting therein?

Not while the Intellect apprehendeth the appetible good.

But becauſe the Will is principium exercitii, may it not firſt ſuſpend the act of the Underſtanding, either by diverting it, or by its own omiſſion in not exciting it to cogitation? But, to be ſhort, I grant you, that about ſenſible Objects, ſenſe may neceſſitate the firſt ſimple apprehenſion of the Intellect, and thereby the firſt ſimple complacency of the Will may be neceſſitated? But, 1. The comparing act of the Intellect. 2. And the very firſt apprehenſion of things altogether inſenſible or ſpiritual, are ſo far under the power of the Will, that the Will may ſuſpend them. And ſo the VVill hath a liberty of exerciſe or contradiction as they call it, as to its ſimple complacency about things inſenſible or ſpiritual, ſo far as it can ſuſpend the Intellects apprehenſion of their goodneſs (at leaſt.) The arguments of Camero and others to the contrary I know are conſiderable; but I muſt not now digreſs to anſwer them.

Queſt. 4. But further, If the Intellect perceive that there is but one means to a mans felicity, and that abſolutely neceſſary, is it not neceſſitated to will that means, by its neceſſary willing felicity it ſelf?

It is commonly ſo concluded: But I am doubtful of it.

And well you may, without limitation. For, 1. Felicity it ſelf is conſiderable either in the complex notion, or in the incomplex matter; I do not think that the firſt is it that is neceſſarily deſired, but the latter; even good it ſelf, as exiſtent or deſired to exiſt: 2. And this good that is felicity is not neceſſarily known by the Intellect: One taketh it to be ſpiritual good, and another to be ſenſible good: One taketh it to be God, another to be the Creature: One ſeeketh it hereafter, and another here. Therefore the ſame man may be in doubt of this, both as he doubteth of the Truth, and as he doubteth of the ſuitableneſs of inviſible things: And therefore though he knew that, e. g. Chriſt and holineſs be the medium unicum to that end and felicity, which he thinketh or believeth predominantly to be the only felicity; yet as he hath ſome doubting of it, ſo he may have ſome deſire of a ſenſible inferior felicity, though not predominant; and theſe may alſo make him the more uncertainly to chooſe the means to the former. 3. And if a mans underſtanding were fully ſatisfied, that the only true felicity is in God and Heaven, yet he cannot but both feel (ſenſibly) and know (intellectually) that there is alſo a preſent ſenſible good: And therefore he muſt complacencially will it: And his perception and will may grow inordinate, and be entangled by it, by undue adheſion and delight: And ſo he may be diverted from things ſpiritual; yea and oppoſe the means of his true felicity, as oppoſite to his lower beloved good.

By this, you ſuppoſe that the ſame man may have two Ultimate ends.

1. If by an Ultimate end you mean that only which a man habitually eſteemeth, loveth and ſeeketh above all reſolvedly as his felicity, ſo no man hath but one. 2. But if you mean that which is his Ultimate end, either in a lower ſenſe, or as to a particular act, I doubt not but he may have two: That is, he may ſometimes by intellectual doubting waver towards one ſide to day, and towards another to morrow, though not equally; And he may alſo have an inordinate complacency in things ſenſible, and ſo uſe means to pleaſe his ſenſe, while he knoweth that other things are better. 3. And the School-men oft ſay▪ that bonum ſenſibile or the pleaſing of ſenſe, is oft made to be finis in this ſenſe, in that it is not medium, nor referred to any thing elſe: As a holy perſon when he ſinneth by ſenſuality, doth not love and uſe that Meat, and Drink, and Eaſe, and Honour, and Luſt, only as a medium to God and Glory. But it is not finis, ſay they, properly, ſo as that other things are referred to it. But the truth is that even holy perſons, may chooſe and uſe ſinful means for their fleſhly pleaſure as an inordinate end; and Meat, Drink, &c. are ſuch means: And ſo their Pleaſure is properly an Ultimate end; But not the predominant chief end, and ſo not to be denominated finis hominis, quoad vitae Curſum, but only as to his odd inordinate act: And ſo Paul ſaith, It is not I, but indwelling ſin.

So that we may ſay that medium unicum ad unicam foelicitatem vel bonum amatum, & ubi est omnimoda ratio boni, & nihil repugnat, is neceſſarily willed; (For this is no Election:) But otherwiſe not.

Queſt. 5. But I alſo aſk you, Whether you think not that ſome habits (to evil at leaſt, if not to good) are ſo ſtrong and like to nature, as that Fatetur Arminius, hominem ſub ſtatu peccati nibil quod vere bonum ſit poſſe intelligere, vell…, facere, & binc quidem cum neceſſarie peccare, niſi Den… iſtam neceſſitatem gratioſe tollat: ſed quia ſtatuit Deum foedere ſuo gratiae, quod cum hominibus i…it, oſtendiſſe nolle ſe homine… praeciſe ſecundum primum pactum tractare, ideo que ne que propter peccatum, originis condemnare, ſtatuit etiam Deum paratum eſſe quaod ſe, tollere iſtam peccandi neceſſitatem & …oc ipſi declaraſſe, Arnold. Corv. cont. Tilenum, cap. 11. pag. 394.the Will till it be changed by an exterior power, is always, or almoſt always determined according to them.

Ordinarily it is, as all experience telleth us: but not neceſſarily.

You ſee then that it is but a very little Liberty (from neceſſity) which is left in caſe of ſuch fixed Habits. And indeed, though you may truly ſay that they neceſſitate not by compulſion at all, nor yet by inclination ſo conſtantly to every evil act, but that ſome evil acts may be avoided where ſuch evil habits are; yet you never knew the tenor of a mans Will and Life go contrary to a ſtrong and rooted habit: ſo that ſo far they neceſſarily incline.

It ſufficeth that no inclination neceſſitateth to every act of Sin, nor from every Duty: For by one good act, they may be prepared for more.

1. It is true that you ſay, as to your concluſion. But, 2. You miſtake the Antecedent. There is an inclinatio naturalis antecedent to adventitious habits, which is inſeparable and neceſſitating, yea eſſential to the Soul (which I am not now to handle.)

But Quest. 6. I further aſk, Do you think that any man is free from Gods Government, and ſubjection to his Laws and Judgments?

No: His Service is perfect freedom.

Quest. 7. Is it freedom to be from under the over-coming power of heart-melting Love, and infinite attractive Goodneſs?

It is only an unhappy Imperfection, not to be over come by Love.

Quest. 8. Is any Creature free from Gods Propriety or Dominion, and from his diſpoſing Will, by which he doth as he liſt with his own?

No: But God as a Governour hath told us what he will do with us.

Queſt. 9. Is the Will free from the directing power of the Underſtanding?

No: Yhat were no freedom, but bruitiſhneſs: But it is not determined neceſſarily by the Underſtanding.

I will not now diſpute that. Quoad ſpecificationem actus in many caſes, at leaſt, it cannot go against it: But ſuppoſing the Underſtanding well informed, Is not that the moſt perfect and happy Will, that never goeth againſt it?

Yes: For to go againſt it, is to ſin.

Queſt. 10. Are we at Liberty from under the over-ſight of Angels?

No: That were an unhappy Liberty: But they neceſſitate not our Wills.

Queſt. 11. Are we at liberty from the rule and doctrinal Education, Admonition, Reproofs and Corrections, of Parents, Maſters and Tutors?

No: All this is our Good, which we are not free from.

Quest. 12. Are we at liberty from the Laws, and Judgment and Puniſhments of Kings, and their ſubordinate Magiſtrates?

No: This is Gods Order; and they are His Miniſters for our good.

Quest. 13. Is any Child of Adam free from Original Sin, and pravity, inclining them to evil, and making them averſe to holy good?

What ever Epiſcopius and Biſhop Jer. Taylor ſay, I muſt ſay No: For I will not ſide with Pelagius againſt the Univerſal Church.

Queſt. 14. Is any unſanctified man free from the Dominion of this Original pravity, together with contracted habits of ſin?

No: For that is the very ſtate of an unſanctified perſon.

Queſt. 15. Is any regenerate perſon perfectly free, from theſe ſinful Diſpoſitions and Inclinations laſt mentioned?

Not till he attain to Perfection, which is not in this life.

Quest. 16. Is any man free from all actual ſin?

There is no man that hath not committed actual ſin heretofore; And no man that will not commit it again if he live long in the world; And no man that is free from the Reatus culpae; nor yet from the Reatus poenae till remitted. But, 1. There are many that live not in any mortal reigning ſin. 2. And there are ſome hours in which a man doth not actually ſin at all: As in a deep and dreamleſs ſleep, &c.

Quest. 17. Is any man (or all at leaſt) wholly free from the crafty and violent Temptations of Satan?

No: but they neceſſitate us not to ſin.

Q. 18. Are we wholly free from the temptations of falſe Teachers, Flatterers, Tyrants, Perſecutors, Enemies, and other wicked men?

No: But they cannot neceſſitate us to ſin.

Q. 19. Are we wholly free from a multitude of objective ſnares, of Proſperity and Adverſity even in every Creature and way?

No: but neither do they neceſſitate us to ſin.

Q. 20. Are we any further freed from the ſtrong temptations of our own ſenſes, appetites, and fleſhly Concupiſconce than Orace delivereth us?

No: But neither do theſe neceſsitate each particular ſin.

Very good! Let us come to the Application. *Quod ſpectat naturam libertatis non minor eſt in utra que ſchola ſententiarum varietas—Quidam docent libertatem arbi…rii oppoſitam non eſſe neceſſitati, ſed coactioni tantum: Verum quae hic eſt controverſia aut mere verbalis eſt, aut non magni momenti. Hi enim concedunt ad libertatem non ſufficere immunitatem a coactione, nec libertatem in ea proprie conſiſtere: ſed in …o quod agens liberum ſeipſum movet & agit, ratione agenti intellectuali propia.—Et agnoſcunt agentia libera in pleriſ que ſuis actibus non ſolum immunia eſſe a coactione, ſed ne que eſſe ad unum neceſſitate quadam determinata. Adeo que ex eorum ſenſu nonnulli eorum actuum neceſſarii ſunt; ſed Pleri que tamen contingentes—Quum autem Libertas extenditur ad actus neceſſarios et immutabiles, fatentur illam latiori ſignificatione ſumi: Libertatem vero ſtrictius acceptam verſari tantum circa contingentia—Qui contra pretendunt libertatem opponi, non coactioni ſolum, ſed etiam neceſſitati, concedunt voluntatem ſuorum quorundam actnum ratione babere ſ… neceſſario, quamvis plerorum que reſpectu contingenter—Et in illis actibus ad quos voluntas immutabiliter & neceſſario determinata eſt eſſe quandam libentiam & complacentiam unde pat…t contentionem eſſe verbalem & non realem. Nempe utri que conſentiunt quomodo res ſe habeat. Quaeſtio ſolum remanet, A… actus neceſſarii, Liberi dicendi fuit? Blank de Lib. abſol. Theſ. 8. 9, 10, 11, 12. And Th. 14. he citeth Eſtius his words, confeſſing the ſame of Bonaventure, that taking Voluntarium for Liberum, it is but a difference de nomine Libertatis. And Strangius de Vol. Dei l. 3. c. 14. p. 687. Ne que nobis videtur hac de re litigandum, quia alioqui tantum eſſet foreign Non …i… negamus, ſic vocem liberi arbitrii recte uſurpari, quamquam in alio ſenſu illas actiones diximus eſſe liberas. See Blank ibid. n. 17, &c. proving alſo that the quarrel among Proteſtants herein, is but about the Names of neceſſity and liberty, and that they are agreed of the matter. And Theſ. 22, &c. That their difference about neceſſity, and indifferency in the matter of Liberty is but about the name, and eaſily reconcilable. And the ſame Th. 25. he ſaith of the [Poſitis omnibus ad agendum requiſitis, poſſe agere vel non agere.] And de Lib. arb. in genere Theſ. …5. he ſaith the ſame, (with Strangius) that it is a meer Logomachy between them that ſay, All voluntary acts are free, and thoſe that deny it: while they take Liberty in ſeveral ſenſes▪ one pro libentia ſecundum ration…m, the other pro indeterminatione & indifferentia, &c. That Liberty is conſiſtent with neceſſity, in many Caſes many of the chief School-men-hold. For which let the learned Reader peruſe the Citations of them in Janſenius; and ſee ſpecially Alex. Al. 2. p. q. 72. numb. 3… a. 3. & Aquin. qu. 10 de Potent. a. 2. ad 1. & ejus ſequacem Viguerium Inſtitut. c. 3. ſect. 3. verſ. 1. (Cum plu ib… aliis Thomiſtis) & Bonavent. in 2. d. 7. 4. 3. & d. 25. q. 2. And the Scotiſts and ſome Nominals I have elſe-where cited. Eſpecially Reader; if you would ſee more on the Subject, Ripalda nameth you enow, Expoſ. Magiſt. l. 2. d. 5. qu. 12. that go ſeveral ways. But note (with Janſenius de Grat. Salv▪ l. 6. c. 37.) that the neceſſity of voluntary acts, as Scotas ſaith, is not previous to the Will, that the Will ſhould be thought to fall under neceſſity as impelling it to, and fixing it in the act: For if it were ſo, Voluntas ageretur & non ageret: nec ſtaret in tali actu libertas: ſed eſt neceſſitas concomit…, it a quod ipſa intelligatur cadere ſ…b voluntate: ſic quod voluntas propter firmitatem libertatis ſua, ſibi ipſi neceſſitatem impo…it, in eliciendo actum, & in perſeverand….If we are agreed in all theſe twenty particulars; and that in ſome of them we are under neceſsity, and in ſome next to it, and in others are under no ſmall dangi…, and that none of all theſe denied is the Liberty of Will which you contend for, we are very unhappy, if we do not all agree of the neceſſity of Gods Grace, and if yet there remain any other ſort of Liberty about which we muſt needs contend.

I pray you now tell me, What Liberty it is that you accuſe your Brethren for denying? Is it a Liberty to good, or unto ſin?

Both, 1. They make mans Will neceſsitated to ſin; and good to be impoſsible to it. And, 2. They make Gods Grace to work ſo irreſiſtibly as to take away the liberty of ſinning.

1. What neceſsity is it that you mean? Is it more than in all that aforeſaid your ſelf hath granted. 2. And who thinketh that man obeyeth Grace, and forbeareth reſiſtance, or committeth ſin, for want of either Power or Liberty? O that we could be ſo happy as to take away our own and other mens Liberty to ſin, and to reſiſt God, and to undo themſelves!

Tell me first what Liberty of Will you maintain, and then I ſhall beſt tell you in what in we differ: even as I have told you what Liberty we deny.

The method is convenient, I. We grant that we have a Will which is naturally a ſelf-determining Principle, and Lord of its own acts, able to determine it ſelf with due Objects and helps, without extrinſick predetermining phyſical motion either of God or Creatures.

II. We grant that this Will hath the command of other faculties, reſpectively; that is, of ſome politically (as they uſe to ſay) and indirectly, or imperfectly, and of others deſpotically or directly and more perfectly.

III. We hold that this Will is directly and properly ſubject to none but God.

IV. For inſtance, neither Angels or Devils can determine it antecedently to its own ſelf-determination, to its hurt, though Angels may help it, and Devils may tempt it.

V. No men by the greateſt Power or Violence, nor by the ſubtileſt Oratory or Deceit, can neceſſitate or predetermine it, though they may do much to induce it to ſelf-determination.

VI. No Objects (though they neceſſitate the ſenſe and appetite, and the firſt apprehenſion of the Intellect,) can neceſſitate the Will to Election, or comparative ſelf-determination; nor do Objects carry us by neceſſity as they do the Bruits.

VII. Neither our external or internal ſenſes, or imagination, can predetermine or neceſſitate the ſaid elective or comparative Will.

VIII. Though our paſſions and motions of the Spirits may much moleſt and hinder the Will, they cannot neceſſarily predetermine it in the ſaid election and comparative acts.

IX. Though the Intellect may direct it to that which it will determine it ſelf to, (in ſome caſes neceſſarily ex principiis naturae, and in others not neceſſarily;) and being it ſelf deceived, may miſlead it to miſchooſings and refuſings, yet is it not the commander of the Will, but the guide, (as the eye to the Body, which cauſeth us not to go, but to go the right way): And being it ſelf under the Wills command quoad exercitium, doth not efficiently predetermine it, nor can neceſſitate it to ſin or miſery, unleſs it be firſt the culpable, unneceſſitated cauſe it ſelf.

X. And as none of theſe can neceſſitate the Will originally to evil Acts, ſo much leſs can they neceſſitate it to any evil habits, or inclinations, nor take away thoſe that are good.

XI. I hold that this Free-will is joyned with neceſſity (not constrained, but convenient, by its nature or inclination.) 1. In the ſpecification of ſimple Volition of our own felicity. 2. In the ſpecification of ſimple Volition or Love to ſenſible good as ſuch. 3. In the ſpecification of the Volition of that which is fully perceived to be the only means of our only felicity, and to be only good. But that it is ſeparated from natural neceſſity, and ſuch neceſſitation as is before denied. 1. In its ſubjection and love to God as its Creator or firſt efficient of good. 2. In its love to and ſimple Volition of God, as our Ultimate end. 3. In the election of any end, where divers things are Competitors to be our end (beſides our felicity), whether God or the Creature. 4. In the election of means, where divers are offered. 5. In the exerciſe of the act of intending our end. 6. In the uſe of the means, and commanding the imperate faculties therein.

XII. I hold that this Liberty of the Will is of three ſorts (though but two are commonly held.) 1. Contradictionis, vel exercitii; viz. Velle aut non velle, nolle aut non nolle. 2. Contrarietatis ſeu ſpecificationis, quoad Actum; viz. Velle aut nolle hoc. 3. Competitionis, vel comparationis, i. e. Contrarietatis ſeu ſpecificationis, quoad Objecta, viz. Velle aut hoc aut illud, nolle aut hoc aut illud, vel hoc potius quam illud.

XIII. Out of all theſe freedoms of the Will it ſelf, reſulteth the Liberty of the PERSON, uſually called, largely, Liberum Arbitrium, or Free-choice: which is, 1. That no man can be compelled to moral good or evil againſt his Will. 2. No man can deſerve Rewards or Puniſhments of God, againſt his Will. 3. No man can be happy againſt his Will, nor unhappy unleſs it be the Cauſe.

XIV. All this that I have hitherto named is but mans natural liberty as a man, which all men have, and is part of that common natural Image of God, which differenceth us from Bruits, and is mentioned Gen. 9. 6.

XV. Beſides this there is a political or civil Liberty, according to which no Man or Angel hath power to command us to ſin againſt God, or to caſt away our Innocency or Happineſs, or undo our Souls.

XVI. And God as our Governour doth not only give all men leave and liberty to be holy, but offereth them Life, and giveth every man his choice whether he will repent and live, or refuſe Grace and periſh; And much more then Liberty he giveth them, by Commands, Threatnings, Promiſes, Mercies, Means, Helps, Intreaties, Afflictions, &c. urging them to repent and live.

XVII. And this political Liberty containeth a freedom from all puniſhment from God, to thoſe that cauſe it not by wilful ſin: And more than ſo, a certainty of the Reward of Glory.

XVIII. Beſides theſe fore-mentioned Liberties natural and political, there is alſo an ethical or moral Liberty from ſinful Habits and Acts: And of that we hold, that every man is delivered from theſe ſinful Habits and Acts, ſo far as he hath and uſeth Gods Grace: And ſo that the ſanctified are delivered from the reign or ſervitude of ſin.

XIX. And we hold that yet the habits of Grace do not neceſſitate this or that particular act of Obedience or Love, but it is too poſſible to ſin by Omiſſion or Commiſſion notwithſtanding theſe habits.

XX. And we hold that the ordinary habits of Vice in the wicked do not abſolutely neceſſitate them to this or that ſinful Commiſſion in particular, at leaſt not to very many ſins, but that it is poſſible for them to do ſome Duties, and forbear many ſins, notwithſtanding Original and ſuperadded pravity.

XXI. I add to the XI. Sect. before as an inſtance, that mans Will is not by any natural neceſſity, determined to will its own felicity by the comparate electing Act of the Will; but hath Power and Liberty to refuſe or nill it. This many will think ſtrange, but I am ſure that it is true. For man was made and redeemed, and is ſanctified for a higher End than his own felicity; yea more than one, even the Glory and Pleaſing of God, and the common Good. And reaſon telleth me undoubtedly that I ought to love that beſt which is beſt in it ſelf, and that if my annihilation would conduce to the ſaving or happineſs of the World, or of one Kingdom, or of thouſands of Perſons, I ought to conſent to it for ſuch ends; yea were it but to keep the Earth from periſhing, and the Sun from being uſeleſs to this World. And though God in mercy hath ſo united my felicity with his Glory and the common Good, that there never will be uſe for ſuch an option or choice, yet it followeth not thence that I may not ſay, that hypothetically (if I were put to it) ſuch a thing is poſsible and would be due. And as Paul ſaid, I could wiſh my ſelf accurſt from Christ for my Brethrens ſake, the Jews (not I do wiſh it, but would this ſave them, I could wiſh it, becauſe the ſalvation of thouſands, and their Service to God, is better than Ours;) even ſo may we. Annihilation is inconſiſtent with Felicity: But Annihilation might and ſhould be choſen before the Annihilation of the World, or the perdition of millions, if God had called us to it. Yea Chriſt that ſaith, [It were good for that man that he had never been born,] implyeth, that a damned man would chooſe it as a minus malum; yea many a one that I have known my ſelf, deſired it. Therefore it is a thing that the Will may do.

XXII. And as another Inſtance, I need not prove, that the bonum ſenſibile which is neceſſarily loved or willed by ſome complacency or ſimple Volition, is not neceſſarily choſen, but may freely be rejected. Otherwiſe no ſin ſcarce could be avoided.

All theſe ſorts or Acts of Free-will we hold, and are agreed on. And are we yet unfit for concord and coalition for want of acknowledging the freedom of the Will?

I must confeſs that you have acknowledged much.

And I confeſs that ſo have you on the other ſide. I pray you now tell me, where lieth our diſagreement?

You overwhelm me with Diſtinctions and numerous particulars, ſo that I ſuſpect you do but by this dust intend to blind our eyes. A man may make any thing good by ſuch minute diſtinguiſhing, and atomizing matters to make them imperceptible. Did you deal plainly, I could anſwer you.

Is this an anſwer fit for a learned or ingenuous man? Is confuſion plainneſs with you? ſuch plainneſs too many plani have deceived the Church with, and ſet well-meaning Chriſtians together by the ears; ſo that the Chriſtian World hath long pleaſed the Devil, and found him ſport, as fighting-Dogs and Cocks do to men, and all by the cheats of ignorant confuſion; Kingdoms and Factions fight about words which they never underſtood. Like the conſulting Phyſicians who could not agree, whether their Patie…ts Iſchury ſhould be cured by Succinum, or by Electrum, or by Carabe, or by Ambarum, and the poor man died becauſe they could not conſent.

If I diſtinguiſh vainly or falſly ſine differentia, cannot you ſhew where the vanity or falſhood is? How can you tell it is falſe or vain, if you know not where the falſhood or vanity is? Will you ſay, It is ſomewhere, but I know not where? Let that anſwer from others then to all your reaſonings ſeem ſufficient, [Your reaſon is falſe, and your argument naught, but we know not were the falſhood lyeth.] A ready confutation, fit for our Church-troublers. I have purpoſely in the Firſt Book, given you all the diſtinctions about Liberty which I uſe, in an orderly Table, that you may eaſily underſtand them by ſeeing them together: ſo that if there be falſhood or vanity in them, they are open to your eaſie ſearch and view.

Tell me what freedom is denied you, or elſe for ſhame contend no more.

They hold that Original Sin doth neceſſitate all the unregenerate to do evil, and to forbear good, ſo that they cannot poſsibly forbear Sins of Commiſsion or Omiſsion. II. They hold that Grace doth irreſistibly ne…ſſitate the Elect to believe and love God, and forbear Sin, ſo that they cannot do otherwiſe.

I. Stay a little. 1. You muſt diſtinguiſh of ſeveral ſorts of Good and Evil: 2. And of ſeveral ſorts of Neceſſity.

1. I hope you will not think it falſe, vain or curious, to diſtinguiſh between, 1. An ungodly courſe of Life, and ſome one particular act of Sin: 2. The omiſſion of the predominant Love of God, and a courſe of holy living, and ſpecial ſaving acts, and the omiſſion of this or that commanded act.

2. And I hope I may adviſe you to diſtinguiſh between, 1. A conſtrained Neceſſity againſt our Will, and a voluntary Neceſſity, of diſeaſed vicious inclination. 2. And between a neceſſity in ſenſu compoſito and in ſenſu diviſo. 3. And between an uncurable and a curable neceſſity. And then I anſwer.

I. We hold that an ungodly man by his Original and ſuperadded pravity, is ſo ſtrongly and fixedly inclined to a ſenſual ungodly life, that in ſenſu compoſito, while he is ſuch, he will certainly live ſuch a life in the main courſe of it. And do not you think ſo too? I pray you tell me?

It is an idle queſtion: For that is but neceſſitas exiſtentiae. He that is ungodly is neceſſarily ungodly while he is ſo.

II. VVe hold moreover that the ſame man will certainly, all that time, omit the prevalent love of God and all acts proper to the godly.

That's but the ſame: elſe he were a godly man.

III. VVe hold alſo that yet this man may forbear many acts of ſin, and do many things commanded: and ſo is not under a vicious neceſſity of committing all Sin, or omitting all Duty.

IV. VVe hold alſo that his vicious neceſſity of diſpoſition is curable, and not remedileſs and deſperate.

V. VVe hold alſo that it is not curable without Gods ſaving ſanctifying Grace, proportioned to his diſeaſe or pravity.

VI. VVe hold alſo that God hath appointed every man certain Duties and Means to be uſed in order to his cure.

VII. VVe hold that he giveth much outward help, and ſome inward commoner Grace antecedent uſually to ſanctifying Grace, by which much of theſe Duties and Means may be uſed.

VIII. And we hold that God appointeth no means in vain, nor commandeth any unprofitable Duty, or which man hath not ſufficient encouragement to uſe, with hope of ſucceſs, and is not unexcuſeable if he neglect.

Do you differ from us in any of this? Or is there any thing more that we muſt have to be capable of your love and concord?

Though I granted you a neceſſitas exiſtentiae, that a wicked mans life while ſuch be wicked in the main, (for that is but to ſay that a wicked man is a wicked man), yet I grant you not a neceſſitas effecti, as if his pravity made his wicked life unavoidable or neceſſary as a neceſsitating cauſe.

His wicked life is conſiderable, 1. As to his inward actings, or to his outward: 2. As to the immediate or next Acts, and as to the remote. 3. And the neceſſity is voluntary or involuntary. And ſo I ſay,

1. He is under no natural or involuntary neceſsity; but under a *Etſi Amor ille non excedat vires phyſica… voluntatis humanae per ſe ſpectatae; eas tamen ſuperat, ſi ſpectentur difficultates quae occurant. Unde fit, ut ſine ſpeciali auxilio non poſſit ad actum reduci naturalis inclinatio D…um ſuper omnia diligendi. Non poteſt homo credere myſteria …fidei …t oportet ad ſalutem, ſine gratiae auxilio, etiam quum ſufficienter ſunt propoſita, & probatum a Deo eſſe revelatum. Non poteſt homo ſervare quoad ſubſtantiam ullum praeceptum affirmativum ſupernaturale de interno actu, ſine auxilio gratiae etiam de ſingulis, Pet. a S. Joſeph. Theſ. general. de aux. p. 81. 82, 83.vicious inclination or habit, which will produce ſome effects certainly, and others uncertainly.

2. The certain effects of the habitual privation of the love of God, and enmity to him and to holineſs, is, that his Soul will not in ſtatu praeſenti immediately, (nor till it be cured or over-ſwayed by a ſuperior cauſe, …) love God above all, nor love holineſs, nor live a holy life: Becauſe the Soul will not go contrary to its habitual inclination, without ſomewhat to over-power that habit. An effect will not be contrary to the fixed inclination of its cauſe.

3. And another certain effect of a Soul predominantly habituated to ſenſ…ality, is, that it will live a ſenſual life, conſtantly as to the bent of inward Volitions, and ordinarily as occaſion ſerveth in outward actions.

4. But being not ſo neceſſitated to every Sin, nor againſt every Duty and means of Cure, this Soul is not under a neceſſity of ſo continuing uncured.

Now if it be the preſent voluntary aſcertaining Diſpoſition which you deny, then, 1. You muſt hold that an Enemy of God can immediately love him above all, and live a holy life: 2. And that there is ſome cauſe in a man moſt habitually ſenſual, by which he can forbear both the inward deſires and outward acts of ſenſuality; which are contradictions to him that knoweth what a prevalent fixed habit is. 3. And that all wicked Enemies of God have in them a cauſe that can immediately cure all their own enmity and pravity without Gods Spirit of Grace; or elſe have his Spirit and Grace immediately at an inſtant at command. And if all a mans Original Sin, and contracted habits, be ſo eaſily laid by at any minute, the cure ſeemeth much eaſier than the depravation, which perhaps hath been a long time growing to that ſtrength: which is contrary to all the Worlds experience: As it is eaſier to kindle a fire in the City than to quench it, and to catch the Plague or any Diſeaſe than to cure it, or to wound the Body than to heal it, or to pull down a Houſe than to build it, to drown a Ship than to make it, &c. So all Miniſters, Tutors, Parents, Chriſtians; yea, perſons find how wofully hard it proveth to cure one Sin; To cure the Ignorant, the Unbelieving, the Hard-hearted, the Proud, the Luſtful, the Covetous, the Paſſionate; much more the malignant Enemies of God and holineſs. What need of the ſanctification of the Holy Ghoſt, or the medicinal Grace of Chriſt, if the very depraved Will can do all in a moment of it ſelf, and depoſe its enmity.

You ſpeak to me as if I were a Pelagian: I am not for any of this. But will rather yield to what you ſay.

II. And as for your ſecond Charge, *Vid. quae ha…t Ruiz de praedefin. tr. 2. d. 8. per tot. de neceſſitate vaga conſiſtent… cum libertate ſecundum quid. Et a. 9. p. 137. That all good actions are fore decreed of God, proved and multitudes cited that defend it.that they aſſert unreſiſtible neceſſitating Grace, I pray you leave it to the Fourth Article, which is its proper place to avoid repetition. But here let me remember you by the way. 1. That not to love God, not to believe, not to repent, not to live holily, are no Acts, and therefore no Effects of power, but a privation.

2. That therefore Gods cauſing a man to love him, to Believe, to Repent, to be Holy, is not to deprive him of any power, but to give him act and power.

3. Therefore it is not a depriving him of any true Liberty: For true Liberty is the Liberty of ſome faculty or power.

4. But if you will call a voluntary Impotency and Viciouſneſs by the name of a free-power, then God taketh away ſuch Power by giving us Power, and ſuch Liberty by making us free. But proceed to the next Crimination.

The ſecond Crimination.

*The Arminians ſay that God giveth a ſupernatural power, even to the Will it ſelf, and that by immediate operation, Synod. art. 3. & 4. p. 15, &c. And they add, [Mente illuminata & voluntati conceſſa ſupernaturali potentia partim per illuminationem, partim per virium immediatam inſuſionem; Deum quo que Affectus noſtros & partem illam ſenſitivam corrigere, & bonis deſideriis quorum objecta monſtrat intellectuo, actus vero imperat voluntas, afficere: Quibus affectibus magis magiſ que correctis, caſtigatis & in ordinem redactis, promptior & facilior, ac minus impedita poſtmodum redditur voluntas ad exer…endos pietatis actus, non uſ que adeo ut ante reluctantibus affectibus, & lege illa in membris belligerante.] Qui aſſerunt eum quem Deus movet ad actum bunc neceſſario aut illum neceſſario agere, Alij vero pertendunt nulla proprie dicta neceſſitate illum ad agendum impelli. Verbis quidem diſcrepant, idem autem reipſa ſe…tiunt, Blank de Libertat. Abſol. Theſ. 22. See his proof following.They deny the Unregenerate to have any power to believe, repent or to do any good: And ſo they feign God to command men things impoſsible, and to condemn men for that as Sin which they could not poſsibly avoid, and for not doing that which they could no more do than make a World; and ſo to put men under a neceſsity of ſinning and being damned.

This is in ſenſe the ſame with that about Liberty fore-going, though under the other notion (of Power.) But the truth is, it is the very core and true ſum of all our Controverſies, and if I prove this to be nothing but words, I ſhall prove them all ſo, about the four firſt Articles.

I will here take it for granted that you ſpeak not of any meer Paſsive or Obediential Power (as it's called) but of a proper active Power, and that truly ſo called, and not only hypothetically on ſuppoſition of things to make it up, which are not exiſtent, nor to be ſuppoſed.

I know of nothing in the Soul of man for our enquiry, but 1. The natural-faculties, or virtues, inclined naturally to their neceſſary Objects. 2. The right diſpoſition, or adventitious inclination or habits of theſe faculties. 3. And the Acts. Tell me firſt, Do you know of any more?

Not that I can remember.

It is therefore the Faculties or Diſpoſitions that we differ about, or nothing: (For it is not the Acts). Tell me then, Quest. 1. Do you …now of any that deny all mens Souls to have the three faculties of Active, Power or Life, Intellection and Volition (which the Thomiſts ſay are Accidents immediately and inſeparably emaning from the Eſſence; and the Scotists better ſay, are the very formal Eſſence of the Soul it ſelf,) without one of which a man is no man?

No, none doubt of this in ſenſe, though ſome number them as three, and ſome but as two.

Do we differ about the ſecond? Do you believe that a Drunkard hath the habit of Sobriety, or a Fornicator of Chaſtity, or at leaſt, that an ungodly man hath a holy habit or diſpoſition to love God, and truſt him above all, and to believe in Chriſt, and repent of Sin, and live in Holineſs.

No; no man ſaith that he hath ſuch a habit: But he hath a power to do them, though not a habit.

Is it any thing that you call a power beſides the natural faculties, and their habits or diſpoſitions?

No: but the natural faculty is ſtill a power to believe, love God, live holily, &c. without a habit.

Do you not believe that an ungodly man is diſpoſed, yea habituated to the contrary, viz. To a fleſhly and worldly mind and life, and againſt a life of Faith and holy Love?

Yes: at leaſt ſome are: And I will not deny Original Sin, and therefore grant ſuch a diſpoſitive pravity in all, though not ſo much as in ſome is ſuperadded: But yet theſe ill diſpoſitions and habits are not ſo ſtrong, but that the Sinner can for all that believe and repent, &c.

No doubt but if he believe not, it is not for want of natural faculties. He hath an Intellect, a Will and a vital and executive power; And theſe all have that force or ſtrength of natural activity which is neceſſary to Faith, Love, and every holy Duty: For theſe are the unalterable Eſſence (or Properties) of man as man; And if Sin deprived us of them, it ſhould change our Species; And if Grace gave them, it ſhould reſtore our Species, and we ſhould be men by Grace only, and not by Nature. But you confeſs that theſe powers want their right diſpoſition to act.

But yet I ſay that this undiſpoſed ill-diſpoſed Soul, is able to act contrary to its accidental diſpoſition.

I tell you once for all, that the ſhaming and ending of all the Controverſies between the Synodists and moderate Arminians (or Jeſuites) lieth in the true opening of the ambiguity of this one ſyllable [Can]. And unhappy is the Church when its Paſtors have neither skill nor love enough, to forbear torturing and diſtracting it, by one poor ambiguous ſyllable, not underſtood by the Contenders. But to compel you to conviction,

Quest. 1. Do you mean by [Can] or [Able] or [Power] any thing beſides the natural faculty and the diſpoſition?

No: I mean the natural faculty as related to this Act or Object now in queſtion, e. g. believing and loving God.

Queſt. 2. Is not natural ſtrength or power a thing belonging to man as man, which Sin deſtroyeth not, and Grace reſtoreth not. And have not all the Churches diſowned Illyricus *Be…a angrily calleth him Turpis iſte Illyricus, and Peucer, and Strigelius, and other Diſciples of Melanchthon have defended the moral cauſation of Grace againſt him and ſuch Lutherans, who went too much the other way.though a very learned, laborious, godly Divine, for making Original Sin the ſubſtance of the Soul it ſelf?

All this is granted you.

Queſt. 3. Therefore if Adam had natural power to love God, and if the ſanctified have it yet, doth it not follow that all men have it? Becauſe it belongeth to man as man, and is not changed by Sin and Grace, except in its Diſpoſitions and Acts?

Thus you make all the wicked able to love God.

Yes; As to that ſort of Ability which is but the natural faculty they are all able; but there is ſomewhat elſe they want.

But the Name [Power] you confeſs your ſelf is Relative to ſomething that is to be done, or to an Act with its Object; And when the natural faculty is not changed, but is the ſame in all men, yet the Relation of [Power] in it may be changed; as by a change of the Object, *Caſp. Peucer Hiſtor. Carcerum againſt the Lutherans phyſical motion, aſſerteth pag. 720. That Concurrentibus in converſione his tribus cauſis, verbo, ſpiritu S. & volantate hominis, agentibus ſuo loeo & ordine viribus in homint, quamqam ex ſe & natura ſua prorſus invalidis ad ſpiritualia, rationalibus tamen & inter ſe differentibus, eo que ordine quo conditae ſun… a ſp. ſancto per media verbi & ſacramentorum in ordinato & Legitimo ſingulorum uſu, ut in audit… verbi cum attentione & meditatione vir…ute ſua efficaci ſingulis excitis liberrime, ſine coactionis, impulſu & rapt…, & nova luce accenſa in mente nova vero virtute voluntati communicata, &c. Qui aſſentiuntur & obſequ…ntur ſpiritui ſancto virtute ejuſdem id faciunt, non tamen ſine actione, motu & annixu, Id. p. 722. Still note that the Grace called ſufficient is that which giveth the Power without the Act: Therefore as many things concur to denominate us able, ſo do they to ſufficiency of Grace: Malderus in 12. qu. 111. …. 3. d. 3. ſaith, [Recte quidam eruditus annotavit, ne que praedicationem, aut excitationem externam, ne que internam illuminationem intellectus ſimpliciter eſſe gratiam ſufficientem, quamvis in ſ…o genere quae que ſufficiens dici poteſt, &c. ſed voluntas per boni affectus aſpirationem ſupernaturali motione excitanda eſt. Our Bradward. ſhortneth all the Controverſie, li. 13. cor. p. 208, 109. telling us that Gods Will is the cauſe of every future, (and ſo of the future form of ſin) and that if there were no God, there would be no Impoſſibile: Whereas I think there would be nothing but impoſſibles. For it would be impoſſible that any thing ſhould ever be. But there would be no propoſitions de impoſſibili: Nay, he talks of a non-poſſe eſſe impoſſibile, and calls this mirum corrollarium. Adrian Quodl. 3. fol. 16. [Quis duplicitur poteſt credereſe a peccatis abſtinere non poſſe: 1. Quod non poſſet ſine ſpeciali Dei gratia & adjutorio & ſic non errat. 2. Abſolute credendo ſe non abſtinere poſſe a peccata, aut non poſſe ad vitandum peccata a Deo ſufficiens auxilium impetra…, etiamſi fecerit quod in ſe eſt. Et hic error eſt ſpecies infidelitatis oppoſita fidei, ad quam obligatur credendo Deum juſte, pie & miſcricorditer mundum gubernare: Illi-enim manifeſtiſſime repugnat, apud nunquem que ſanae mentis Deum homini imputare ad culpam ad quod vitandum nec dedit, nec dare paratus eſt ſufficientem facultatem; homini inquam facienti totum quod in ſe eſt.medium, helps, concauſes, &c.

You ſay true: But remember ſtill that this is from no change in the natural faculty, as you confeſs: For it was never in any man a power, e. g. to act without dependance on God, nor to act without an Object in Specie, nor to act on an incongruous uncapable Object, nor without a due medium, and neceſſary concauſes. Now if you mean that the change is not on mans faculties, but on the Objects, Medium, Cauſes, &c. that men do not love God while unholy, you are notoriouſly miſtaken. For it is Sin that hindereth. And God is the ſame God, and Chriſt the ſame Chriſt, and the Word the ſame, and oft the preaching the ſame to a Believer and an Unbeliever. So that though outward helps and hinderances do much, the inward cauſe is moſt conſiderable. And if all were right within, it were no ſin in us to be diſabled by outward changes; It is no ſin not to hear without a Preacher, or not to ſee that which is inviſible, or not to underſtand that which is not Intelligible, or not to love that which is not Amiable, or that which is by diſtance or unfit mediums made no Object of our Acts; no more than not to touch the Moon, or not to ſee into the bowels of the Earth. Therefore though it's true that the Will is related as a power to capable Objects, and not as a power to things that by incapacity are no Objects; yet the change that is made on it ſelf by Sin and Grace, doth not make it no power and a power in this natural eſſential ſenſe. It is one thing that is called natural power or faculty, and another thing that is called, Aright diſpoſition or habit: Therefore as to the firſt, the Soul of every man hath a true natural power to repent, believe and love God, and they omit it not for want of natural power, but of ſomething elſe.

Call it then a moral power if you will.

We muſt ſo call it: But you muſt know what that is. It is not a power of the ſame ſort with the natural power. The very word [Power] is equivocal or analogous to them. Elſe Grace ſhould increaſe the Eſſence of the Soul, or make a man to be more a man, than he was before. And Dr. Twiſſe derideth the Arminians for ſaying that potentia fundatur in potentia, viz. Moralis in naturali, which were very juſt if it were powers of the ſame kind that were ſpoken of; but now being otherwiſe it is unjuſt: for no doubt but potentia moralis is in potentia naturali, as health is in the Body.

Queſt. 4. But I further aſk you, Do you think that any men do now in an unregenerate ſtate love God above all, and live a holy heavenly life, yea or effectually and ſavingly believe, by the meer power of their natural faculties, till they are changed?

No; that's a contradiction; to be unholy and holy. I am none of thoſe Pelagians that make Grace unneceſſary to mans cure.

Are you not convinced then that where the natural power is exiſtent, ſomething is wanting without which the acts of Holineſs will not be performed? Tell me then what that is?

That which is wanting to a man that hath ſufficient Grace, is nothing but his own Concurrence or Will; For without any ſpecial Grace differing from ſufficient he can believe. But that which is wanting to them that have it not, is ſufficient Grace it ſelf for believing, which they want for abuſing the antecedent Grace ſufficient for preparation.

We ſpeak not now of Grace as efficient, ex parte Dei agentis; But of Grace as it is in us, or an effect of the former: what is it in man that is wanting to believing? Is it a natural Power, or a right Diſpoſition, or what?

Till a man have ſufficient Grace to believe, it is proper ſtrength or power it ſelf that he wanteth, and ſufficient Grace is ſuch a power: But when he hath it, he wanteth nothing but the Act, which he can excite and doth not.

I confeſs I find Arminius, Arnoldus, Corvinus, and others granting, that all men are unable to believe till Grace enable them, and more than ſo, ſaith Arnoldus, There is more ſtrength or power neceſſary now to believe in Chriſt, than was neceſſary to Adam to keep all the Law, partly becauſe of the myſteriouſneſs of Faith, and partly becauſe we muſt firſt be reſtored to a new ability, which requireth more power than to keep what we had. (A ſly equivocation, turning the queſtion from the potentia operata to the potentia operans: If it did require more power in the efficient ſo to renew us, it followeth not, that he thereby putteth more power into us than Adam had: But Gods Power hath no degrees.) But that which I aſk you, is, whether this new power given by ſufficient Grace, be of the ſame Species with our natural powers, or of ſome other.

What if I ſay, It is of the ſame ſort.

Then (as I have hinted) you muſt make the Soul to have either two orders of natural powers of the ſame Species, one founded or ſubjected in the other (which is it that Dr. Twiſſe derideth;) or elſe indeed to have two Souls, (For I have elſe-where at large proved with the Scotiſts that the faculties are eſſential to the Soul;) or elſe you muſt make the ſpecifick powers of the Soul to have degrees, and Souls to be augmented, and ſo that they have more Soul that have Grace than they that have none, and ſo Grace is a kind of generation or augmentation of Souls.

What if I ſay that it is of another Species?

Then we muſt conſider what it is. Is it of a ſuperior Species or ſubordinate, or co-ordinate? If you ſay with ſome Fryers and Fanaticks, that it is the Spirit of God in Eſſence, or God himſelf, it would be Omnipotency. If it be not any created Spirit or Subſtance, (which would alter our Species, or make each one two) it muſt be an Accident (as all confeſs it is, and therefore not ejuſdem ſpeciei with the faculties that are eſſential:) And if ſo, tell us what this power is?

The Soul of man is it ſelf ſo little known to it ſelf, that we cannot eaſily tell what its natural powers be (as the difference between Thomas and the Scotiſts ſheweth:) much leſs can we tell how to conceive aright of the quiddity of the Accidents of a Soul, who know ſo little of the Accidents of Bodies, or of Bodies themſelves. Let me hear what your own conceptions are of the matter, if they tend to elucidate or reconcile.

He that will take up with the bare words, [Can] or [Cannot] and confeſs that he knoweth not what they ſignifie, ſhould not with the blind confidence of too many Contenders, trouble the peoples ears in Pulpits, and ſet them on fire againſt one another, and by raving diſtract the Churches of Chriſt, with ſuch [Can's] and [Cannot's] [Able] and [Unable.] And yet this one poor word is the Granade or Fire-Ball. If I pretend to underſtand it no more than you, yet I will be aſhamed to vex and enſnare mens Souls with what I underſtand not; but will uſe the eaſieſt intelligible words. But to anſwer your deſires diſtinctly.

1. The Soul is, as you ſay, ſo little known to it ſelf, that no man living, I think, hath a true formal conception of, that firſt accident or effect which it receiveth from Gods Spirit, nor yet of the true nature of a habit or diſpoſition following it. He that readeth but what our Metaphyſicks and School-men have ſaid of Habits, will find this to be true; and that their quiddity is paſt his underſtanding. To ſay that they are qualities by which we are prompt to act, is but to name a general notion no better underſtood than the quaeſitum, (Quality); and to name the effect (promptitude) and not the form or thing it ſelf.

II. The nature of fire ſeemeth to be a kind of likeneſs to Spirits. And in this ſenſible thing we cannot tell what it is that is added by excitation and incenſion. And they that talk of generation of fire, know not what generation ſignifieth: whether the production of a new ſimple ſubſtance that before was nothing? or the introduction of a new form into a pre-exiſtent ſubſtance, by mixture, or how? or only a new motion? or if they ſay, It is a generation of new Qualities, they know not what the word [Quality] ſignifieth. But this much is apparent, that whether it be done by Colliſion or however, to kindle a ſpark or latent fire into a flame or incendium, is to excite a pre-exiſtent active nature; And this excitation is by motion. And as we have ſome (very defective) conception what motion received is, in Bodies, and how by contact when it cometh from force, motus motum cauſat, & vis per motum vint quandam imprimit; ſo by ſome Analogy, we may conceive how Spirits move Spirits: and ſuch as is the (unexpreſſible) action of one Spirit on another, ſuch is the thing thereby imprinted and received; A kind of ſpiritual motus. And as in bodily motion the firſt thing received is the very thing moved by contact, qua talis, as it ſelf in motion, or act; ſo Spirits ſno modo ſeem, qua agentes & attingentes tranſcendently, to be the firſt received by the moved Spirits; And the ſecond thing the vis impreſſa, and thence followeth the ipſe motus. But if it to this day (moſt certainly) ſurpaſs the wits of the greateſt Philoſophers, formally to conceive what it is that adhereth to the res mota to contiue its motion, and what that is that is called Vis impreſſa, and in what ſubject it moveth the projectum, &c. (For the Carteſian fancy that motus inceptus nunquam ceſſabit niſi impeditus, either tells us nothing of the continued cauſe, or ſuppoſeth moveri to be no effect, and to need no more cauſe than negatio motus, which is unworthy a confutation), what wonder then if it ſurpaſs the conception of all mortal men to know what that ſpiritual Vis impreſſa on a Soul is? But what-ever it is, this much is the beſt notion that we can have of that which the Divine Action firſt communicateth, that it is influxus Dei Receptus; vel excitatio facultatum exe…ata, as diſtinct from excitatio Dei excitans; It is paſſive excitation, or a ſpiritual Vis impreſſa, whence Action followeth.

III. But it hath alſo a ſimilitude to the Agent in more than ſimple motion, Even as the Sun or Fire doth kindle fire on combuſtible matter (which had alſo a latent fire before, or elſe it's not combuſtible); which is not (as the Carteſians feign, by motion alone, but by the operation of a three-fold virtue in the Sun, viz. the motive, lucid and calefactive, producing the ſame in the Receiver: ſo the Spirit of God doth in this excitation at once communicate to the three faculties of the Soul, an impreſſed force for Vital-activity, Intellection and Volition; ſo that the three natural faculties by this received impreſs and excitation are ſuſcitated to holy Activity, Knowledge and Love; the habit of which is holy Life, and Light, and Love abiding.

For it is certain that it is not one only, but all the faculties of the Soul that are vitiated by Sin, and therefore all that muſt be repaired by ſanctifying Grace. The Vital-active-power (as it is a faculty of the rational Soul) is as it were ſleepy, dead and impotent, and muſt be quickened with ſpiritual life and ſtrength. The Intellect is dark, and muſt be illuminated. The Will is carnal and unholy, and muſt be turned from the Fleſh to God by mortification and by holy love. And all this the Holy Ghoſt doth by Action, but not meer Action in genere, but by a ſuitable communicative Action, quickening, illuminating and converting, or touching the Soul with love.

IV. The firſt effect of this received Influx *It is a great diſpute among the School-men, whether Grace & Theological Virtues (Faith, Hope and Love,) do really differ? ſaith Malderus in 1. 2. Tho. q. 110. a. 3. p. 472. [Non diſtingui, opinio eſt magiſtri—quem ſequ…nt…r Scotus Alexand. Alber. Richard. Gabr. Durand. Vega, Bellarm. a: ii. Inter quos tamen ea eſt diverſitas, quod Durandus teneat diſtingui ſolo nomine Gratiam & Charitatem: Alii dicant, diſtingui ſola ratione, non realiter aut formaliter, aut ſecundum ſpeciem: Alii dicant formaliter diſtingui, ut ſint ſpecies qualitatis diverſae; ita tamen ut non ſint duae res—Realiter autem ut duae res diſtingui eſt opinio Tho…ae, Bonavent. Valent. Suarez, &c. Et ipſe Malderus opinatur Gratiam eſſe Donum ſpir. ſancti Charitati praevium: Et non potentiis ſed in ipſa anim… eſſentia immediate implantatum: & quod virtus poſtea diſponet potentias ſecundum inclinationem naturae: & ita antequam Charitatis virtute elevetur voluntas ſtabiliter ad hunc amorem conſentaneum eſt ipſam animae ſubſtantiam prius natura elevari ad ejuſmodi inclinationem per habitum aliquem non voluntati, ſed ſibi proxime inbaerentem.] Here is a venturous Conjecture, and ſuch as may tell you that theſe men make not Grace to be natural; when beſides all the habits of Faith, Hope, Love, and other Virtues or Graces in the Mind and Will, they hold a general habit or holy inclination in the Eſſence of the Soul, and not in the faculties, which differeth from Love and other ſuch Virtues, as (they think) the faculties of the Soul differ from the Eſſence (as he after explains it): and is it that is called, The Holy Ghoſt and the Divine Nature in us: which is the ſame that Mr. Pemble held: An influx received from God before our Acts I acknowledge: And that this received impreſs ſome way diſpoſeth the Soul to the following Act; and that Infants themſelves may have ſuch a holy diſpoſition, and that this is ſome reparation or ſanctification of nature: and if there be more I oppoſe not what I underſtand not: But the word Habit moſt properly belongeth to particular habits of this or that Act: (as Faith, Love, &c.) And whether you will call this Grace a general Habit or a Nature, I contend not: But I think that the founding it in the Eſſence and not in the Faculties, falſly ſuppoſeth the Faculties not to be the Eſſence; And I think that it differeth from the particular Habits or Graces, but as the natural power or ingenious diſpoſition of an Infant doth differ from his ſaid ingenuity when it is improved into habits; which I think are not another thing, but the ſame diſpoſition advanced and perfected. But of this let each man think as he can. Bradwardine cuts ſhort all the Controverſie, and ſaith, [That as without Gods ſpecial Grace, Free-will cannot over-come any Temptation at all, ſo that ſpecial Grace is (beſides all that is created) Gods own Will that he ſhall over-come it. So that by this no man can do any more than he doth, or than God willeth or decreeth that he do. And ſo by his Opinion, effectual Grace is Gods Eſſence as decreeing, willing the effect; Lib. 2. c. 4, 5, 6, 7. Yea he ſaith, that no man that is not tempted can avoid any ſin, without this ſpecial Grace, which is Gods Will that he ſhall avoid it.] But this opinion is rare: Gods Will is his Eſſence and in it ſelf ſimple and unchangeable. Indeed no good will be done but what he willeth: But the queſtion is, whether he doth not both will and give much true proper power to do that which is never done? and ſo whether he that willeth not Good, or hateth it, do it always for want of power to do better. Gods Will as immanent, and conſidered in it ſelf only a Will, doth not create or cauſe ad extra: But his Will as productive or really cauſing, which we call his active or executive power (and he denieth it not to be productive, though he deny it to be any thing but Volition, de nomine). And if this be all, then the queſtions of the nature and efficacy of Grace are ended; and Grace ex parte Dei is nothing but his Will, what ſhall be, and a production of it by willing it; and in the effect it is nothing but the being of what he ſo willeth (Act or Habit). So l. 2. c. 13. he ſaith, [That the A…xil…um ſine quo nullus perſeverat, & per quod quilibet perſeverat, eſt ſpiritus ſanctus, Divina Bonitas & Voluntas,] (where he ſeemeth to hold that Dei Bonitas & voluntas is the Holy Ghoſt, the third Perſon.) And l. 2. c. 9. p. 498. he laboureth to prove that no Angel or Man (in Innocency) can by the greateſt Grace before his Fall perſevere a moment without Gods ſpecial help, that is, Gods Will that he ſhall ſo do. So that the neceſſitating cauſe why one Angel ſtood and another ſinned, and why Adam ſinned, is, becauſe God willed it. And though he hold that Adam could not ſtand becauſe God willed it not, yet he holdeth alſo that God poſitively willed it; not ſeeing that he had made that needleſs. Read but Ruiz de Vol. Dei copiouſly, proving that God willeth the Salvation of them that are never ſaved, and you will ſee that no Proteſtants more differ herein than the Papiſts do among themſelves. And there is no reconciliation with them that hold that nothing is poſſible but what is future, or no man can do any thing but what he doth.or vis impreſſa that we know of, is, The Act excited it ſelf. It is Action that God doth ſuſcitate the Soul to, and Action next followeth.

V. As there is a difference between a Spark, or Candle, and a great incendium or flaming-fire; ſo is there a marvellous difference between the Souls Actions (upon the ſame Object and of the ſame kind) in the degrees: As we perceive by daily experience. In a dream, the ſame thoughts ſtir us not up to execution, as when we are awake will do it. And a man that heareth a cold Preacher, and coldly thinketh over all the ſame Truths, and mentioneth them, and ſubſcribeth and profeſſeth them (as of the evil of particular ſins, the need of Chriſt and Mercy, &c.) yet feeleth no power in them; nor will all his knowledge overcome a ſmall Temptation, or ſet him upon Duty; but he knoweth, and thinketh, and talketh, as if he did it not. And at another time, when his Soul is ſuſcitated or awakened to ſeriouſneſs, the ſame thoughts wholly take him up, and make him wonder at his former ſtupidity, and command his life with great facility.

VI. Experience telleth us that uſually this effectual ſuſcitation of the Soul to more powerful lively apprehenſions and Volitions is done by a ſuitable external means: As by a more clear and lively awakening Miniſtry, by ſome notable Providence, eſpecially by ſurprizing ſufferings and diſtreſs. A Thief when he is taken, or judged, a Fornicator when he is found in the ſhame of his Sin, a Prodigal in Jail or want, a Drunkard or Glutton when he is brought by it to the Gout or other pain and ſickneſs, &c. have quite other apprehenſions uſually of the folly of ſinning, than ever you could bring them to before, by any other the certaineſt convictions.

VII. As we are certain by experience that the Acts called Intellection and Volition now, are ſuch operations of the Soul as ever ſtir and uſe the Spirits, and we perceive both together as if it were a compound operation, and know not by experience what any Knowledge or Volition is which uſeth not the Spirits; ſo we find by true experience, that the ſuſcitation of the ſaid Spirits (or igneous particles) in us, much conduceth to the ſuſcitation of the faculties of the Soul: By which fervent ſpeaking, and awakening Providences do much: And alſo that they that have clear and quick Spirits, are eaſilieſt awakened.

VIII. We find alſo by experience, that the internal ſenſitive faculty hath a great ſhare in theſe effectual operations: For the certaineſt apprehenſions of the Intellect, work but defectively on the Will, unleſs they are accompanied with, or ſtir up ſome Senſe, Affection or Paſſion; either Fear, Hope, Love, Deſire, Delight, Anger, or ſome other proper paſſion. And Volitions themſelves are but ſluggiſh uneffectual Acts, as to the imperium or command of the executive Powers or Thoughts, unleſs they ſtir up ſome Paſſion to their aid; And therefore lifeleſs wiſhes are common with ſluggiſh and unreformed men.

IX. The Spirit of God can, and we have reaſon to think, ſometime doth ſtir up the faculties of the Soul to holy Cogitations, Apprehenſions and Volitions, without any other means, known to us, than what the perſon before uſed uneffectually: And when means are effectual to ſanctifying Acts, it is principally by the operation of the Holy Ghoſt, and leſs principally the aptitude of the means.

X. The firſt received influx ad actum is not it which we call a Habit: For a Habit is a fixed promptitude to act.

XI. An habit in the Intellect is skill, or intellectual promptitude to Act rightly and eaſily. An habit in the Will, is inclination, and love it ſelf radicated, or averſation and radicated hatred. And a habit in the vital executive Power, is a promptitude and vivacity to the right executing of the Wills commands (and firſt exciting it to act).

XII. A habit infuſed is of the ſame Species with acquired habits, though it be otherwiſe cauſed, and of a more excellent uſe. And in both we have reaſon to think that the Act goeth before the Habit; Though the Holy Ghoſt can fix a Habit by one Act, when acquired Habits are cauſed but by cuſtom or many Acts.

XIII. In the ſtrict ſenſe, as Acts ſo Habits are ſpecified by their Objects, and are not found but in ſuch Species: But in a larger ſenſe and leſs proper we may ſay that there are more univerſal Habits, not denominated at all from any ſort of Objects, that is, the right Dipoſition of the Soul to its due operations: But this is but an inadequate univerſal conception of the ſame Habit, and not another thing I think.

XIV. A habit of the Intellect about Principles is a Diſpoſition to the knowledge of concluſions or conſequents: And a habit of the Will ad finem, is a Diſpoſition to the choice and uſe of the known means; but not ſtrictly a habit to them.

XV. Motion tendeth to further motion. One Act of the Soul diſpoſeth it to or furthereth another: And as water that hath got a Chanel and is ſet in motion, floweth ſtill the ſame way, and fire by burning, the more forcibly proceedeth to burn; ſo the Soul by acting, the more readily holdeth on that courſe of action.

XVI. The Soul hath at once more Acts than one, and upon more Objects. As at once it understandeth and willeth, ſo at once it operateth on and towards the end, and on and in the means. But one of them (ſpecially ad finem) is uſually deep, and not obſerved ſenſibly by the Agent; And the other is uppermoſt, and uſing the ſenſe and fantaſie more, and the Spirits, is eaſily perceived. And ſo a man in his travel, hath a deep unobſerved but moſt conſtant and ruling Knowledge and Volition of his end or home; though yet he ſeem to himſelf ſeldom to think of it, but only of things obvious in his way.

XVII. By all this its eaſie to perceive how hard it is to have the formal knowledge of the quiddity of a Habit: when we have preſuppoſed all this before-ſaid, 1. That the Soul is eſſentially of an active nature, and as naturally contrary or averſe to ceſſation or non-action as a ſtone is to action: 2. And that it hath inſeparably in its nature, an inclination to Truth and Goodneſs as ſuch, and to its own felicity: 3. And that it hath multitudes of exciting Objects, and extraordinarily awakening Preachers, and Providences, ſpecially dangers and ſufferings, naturally apt to excite the Soul into act: 4. And that it hath the uſe of the ſenſe, and ſenſitive paſſions, which things ſenſible are apt to excite, by which it may be it ſelf excited: 5. And that it hath a certain degree of neceſſity of knowing by ſimple perception things received by the ſenſe and fantaſie; men may know much of Good and Evil, Duty, Sin, Danger, whether they will or not: 6. And that the Will hath a natural inclination to follow the Intellects apprehenſions about Good or Evil, in its Volitions and Nolitions (though not always neceſſarily:) 7. And that the Soul excited to one Act is the more apt to another of the ſame ſort: 8. And that a curſus actionum with the fore-ſaid inclinations, is like a courſe of corporal motions, which ſtrongly tendeth to continuation; (ſo that they that are accuſtomed to do evil, hardly do well:) 9. And that the potentiae ſecundae, the ſenſitive powers, and the Spirits by cuſtom attain the ſame propenſity to that way of action in themſelves, and ſo become to the active Intellect and Will, what the Chanel (worn by courſe) is to the Torrent or River, which with the natural gravity cauſeth the continuance of its courſe that ſame way: Or as a Horſe, trained by cuſtom who hath got his own peculiar habit is to the Rider: 10. And that the Soul hath its profound, or not noted Action which is conſtant, and maketh ſo little uſe of the ſpirits, ſenſe, imagination or paſſion, as that it is unobſerved, while it is predominant, (ſuch as is the aforeſaid intention of the end in the uſe of means: And doubtleſs the Soul is never unactive an inſtant, no not in ſleep; but hath this kind of deep inſenſible action. It is knowing it ſelf, loving it ſelf, intending its own Felicity, deeply, ſecretly, inſenſibly, without uſing the memory and imagination, to the Act; and this deep inſenſible Act is ſuch, as that a man may doubt whether it be not the very thing which we call a habit:) I ſay now, all theſe ten things being preſuppoſed (which yet are none of them commonly taken to be the habit of Grace,) How hard is it to us to know, what a habit is indeed beyond all theſe, and what it is that it addeth to theſe? We are ſure that it is a Diſpoſition, Propenſity and Aptitude to holy Action in Specie; But what that Diſpoſition and Propenſity is, beſides all this fore-named, it is not eaſie to underſtand. And yet undoubtedly it is the Operation of the Holy Ghoſt.

XVIII. How hard then muſt it be to know how much Power, or what kind of Power (and in what ſenſe ſo called) it is that this ſuperadded habit containeth, beſide all the ten fore-mentioned excitations and propenſities? And whether it be properly called Power, and how it differeth from the potentiae naturales?

XIX. But yet our great Diſputes being more about the firſt act of Faith, which antecedeth the habit, than about any of the acts that follow the habit, the caſe will be yet harder, what that Power is which the Holy Ghoſt giveth before the habit of Faith, as to the performance of that particular act. That it ſuſcitateth the natural …aculty to act is certain: Therefore in order of nature it muſt be diſpoſed or inclined to that act, before it act. That the Soul receiveth the Divine influx is certain: But no mortal man knoweth what that is. We commonly conclude that ex parte Dei it is nothing but God himſelf. By God himſelf is meant his Act; By his Act is meant his Eſſence as in Act: But how his Eſſence is always immutably in equal Act, and yet produceth a world in time, which it produced not from eternity, and how the equal Act or Agency of the Eſſence is natural, neceſſary and eternal, and the Effect free; How the Volition is neceſſary in ſe, and yet free in every termination and effect ad extra; How a natural-equal-eternal Agency, can produce ſuch wonderful diverſity of Effects; And how Souls are ſaid to receive Gods Influx, if it be nothing but his Agent Eſſence; All theſe are paſt the reach of Mortals.

XX. And it addeth to theſe difficulties that we are uncertain what uſe it is that God maketh of Angels in operating on the Soul. They are miniſtring Spirits for the good of them that are Heirs of Salvation, about the matters of their Salvation. It is abſurd to think that Devils (whoſe very powerful Operations on our imagination we ſurely feel,) have more power to put evil thoughts into us, and ſtir up evil paſſions in us, than Angels good ones. And ſeeing a Spirit is more active than a Body, they that take the Sun to be a Body, and perceive that its Beams and Virtue, of Light, and Heat, and Motion, is extended to this Earth and incomparably further in a minuite, ſhould not take an Angel to be like a ſtone or ſtaff, that moveth no where but where it corporally toucheth, and is no where, but where it moveth.

XXI. And all Motion and Action hath ſo many impediments in the world, and all Active Natures (as fire) have ſo ſtrong a natural inclination to act when they are not hindred by a greater Power, that we little know how much of the action of the Soul is promoted by removing impediments, internal and external: As they that dam up the water all ways ſave one, do force it to riſe, (if it be a ſtream) till it flow that one way. Embittering all other things to a Soul, doth much to turn its thoughts towards God; and diſpair of any delight or felicity on Earth, maketh Heaven regarded.

XXII. Seeing all naturally-neceſſary Concauſes, Objects, Media are ſuppoſed to the Ratio formalis of Power, (which is Relative ad poſſibile) he that giveth or taketh away any one of thoſe neceſſaries, doth give or take away Power, though he never change the Soul or faculty at all. And this is called A moral collation or cauſation of Power (not a moral Power). As when a man bringeth a Light into a dark Room, he enableth us to ſee; or if he bring in a Book, he enableth me to read that which elſe I could not have read: If he open the Windows, or if he cure me of blindneſs, by cutting a Suffuſion, &c. So he that preacheth the Goſpel to them that had not heard it, and God when he gave Chriſt and the Goſpel to be an Object of Faith, did make the natural faculty to be more in ſenſu naturali, potentiam ad hoc, to which before it was no power, but hypothetically only.

XXIII. The Will is not a Power of chooſing or willing an unknown good: Therefore it may be truly ſaid to be naturally unable to will that which the Intellect perceiveth not to be good. And he that giveth knowledge to ſuch a Mind, doth truly give more power to the Will, as the loſs of knowledge▪ is its loſs of power. Though the Will it ſelf ſhould receive no habitual alteration by it.

XXIV. We muſt not conceive of the ſuſcitation of an active nature, as we do of the motion of dead matter, which is meerly paſſive: But as of that which is paſſive indeed from God and ſuperior Cauſes, but active in it ſelf, and on inferiors; (And I think like the Sun beams, paſſive from no lower nature, ſave by ſtop or reſistance of its own activity.)

XXV. As the Scotiſts diſtinguiſh Paſſive (Receptive) Power, into natural (which is naturally diſpoſed to the form received), and violent (which is averſe or oppoſite to the form) or neutral (which is indifferent), and affirm the Soul to have the firſt ſort of paſſive power (natural) to the love of God and ſupernatural felicity; ſo the diſtinction is ſound, and their aſſertion is true as to the nature of the Soul in it ſelf conſidered, (for it was made to love God). But accidentally by reaſon of adventitious pravity, it is but potentia paſſiva violenta: for the the carnal mind is enmity to God, and neither is nor can be ſubject to his Law. So that it is both natural and violent in ſeveral reſpects.

XXVI. As for the great queſtion, what is a moral Power? I anſwer, 1. Power may be called Moral ab objecto, becauſe it is ad mores, and ſo our natural power is moral, and actus humanus and actus moralis are oft put for Synonima's.

2. Power may be called moral from the way of effecting it. And ſo our natural Powers alſo are moral; not in the Eſſence of the Soul, but in the Relative form of the power in ſpecie vel individuo ad hoc objectum: For he that cauſeth or revealeth the Object, doth by moral cauſation give us a natural power ad hoc.

3. Power is called moral, formally; In that of it ſelf it is a moral Virtue or Vice, Good or Evil: which yet could not be true if it were but meer power: For morality conſiſteth formally and primarily in the Will or Voluntary: And to be able to do Good or Evil, as ſuch, is not formally any moral Good or Evil, (but natural): But Diſpoſition is.

4. Power is called Moral, Analogically and Reputatively, as cauſa finalis is ſaid to cauſe, when it is called a moral cauſe, and the operation metaphorical, or as he is called a moral cauſe who perſwadeth to the End or Object. And ſo we take the word [Moral Power] in our queſtion. And ſo the received Impreſs or Influx of Divine Agency, as alſo the habits of Grace in the Soul, are an Analogical Power; becauſe they are neceſſary to the natural powers performance of the Act: And ſo the ſuſcitation (as received) of a dormant active power, may be called Analogically a Power: And the right diſpoſition of a power may be called a power: And the deep fore▪deſcribed Action of the Soul, may be called a power to other ſenſible Acts.

XXVII. Next to this moral power, is potentia logica which is but the name of Power given extrinſically from ſome other thing, without which the effect will never be, though it be poſſible, and the Cauſes have power ſufficient. And the name of Impoſſibility de effectu is oftner and more tollerably here uſed, than of impotency as in the cauſe. So we ſay that whatſoever God willeth or decreeth is poſſible, and what he nilleth abſolutely is impoſſible: And thence ſome ſay, That God can do it becauſe be will, and he cannot do what he will not: And ſo we ſay, that in ſenſ… compoſito an undiſpoſed or averſe Will cannot love or will aright; when perhaps no more than a Logical impotency is meant, viz. That theſe two Propoſitions cannot poſſibly be both true [Judas is undiſpoſed to Love and Juſtice] and [Judas at the ſame time doth exerciſe Love and Juſtice] ſpeaking of a predominant diſpoſition. And this is but a denomination of the ſame ſenſe, as neceſſitas conſequentiae vel logica is, as diſtinct from neceſſitas conſequentis vel effecti. And ſo we ſay, that he that is fore-decreed, yea or fore-known to be good cannot be bad: The meaning is not that he wanteth true power to be bad: But that in ordine dicendi theſe two cannot poſſibly be true, [Peter is decreed by God, or fore-known to be a Saint,] and [Peter will not be a Saint]. And this logical impoſſibility is meant oft in Scripture, as Joh. 12. 39. Therefore they could not believe, becauſe that Iſaiah ſaith, &c. not that this hindered them: but logically de conſequentia, both theſe could not be true [that Eſaia's Prophecy ſhould be true, and yet that the Perſon propheſied of ſhould be Obedient]. And ſo the words [the Scripture muſt be fulfilled] and [that the Scriptures might be fulfilled] are oft uſed, as to the inference.

XXVIII. Thus by extrinſick denomination and connotation, impotency is oft imputed to the Agent from the incapacity of the Recipient: As it is ſaid, Mark 6. 5. That Chriſt could do no mighty work there, becauſe of their unbelief: When as this was not from a diſability in Chriſt to have done it, if he would: But here it is firſt ſuppoſed that God hath ordinately fore-decreed to do no ſuch Works, but where the perſons were ſo qualified as to be capable of them; And then that the perſons there were unqualified: And ſo the Effect was logically impoſſible, in ſenſu compoſito. Thus we ſay, That [God cannot ſave Unbelievers, he cannot hear the prayers of the Wicked, he cannot forſake the Faithful]: that is, [His Ordination and Decree ſuppoſed, logically ſuch a thing cannot conſiſt with it in verity.]

XXIX. When ſomething elſe, and not impotency, doth aſcertain an event, by omiſſion, or ſomething beſides Power aſcertaineth the contrary efficiently, yet the effect is oft denominated poſſible or impoſſible, and aſcribed to Power or Impotency, by a conjunction of this moral and logical denomination. So we ſay, That [Gods pure eyes cannot behold Iniquity, that God cannot love the Workers of Iniquity as ſuch.] Not for want of Power, but by reaſon of his perfect Will and Nature. So God cannot lye, Tit. 1. 2. And it is impoſſible for God to lye. God cannot deny himſelf, 2 Tim. 2. 13. God cannot be tempted with evil, Jam. 1. 13. So Joh. 10. 35. The Scripture cannot be broken. Iſa. 1. 13. Your Aſſemblies I cannot away with. No wonder alſo if this be ſaid of men: As, 1. Joh. 3. 9. He cannot ſin, becauſe he is born of God. Not for want of power, but partly he will not, and partly logically theſe cannot conſiſt. So of the wicked, Joh. 7. 7. The World cannot hate you—.

XXX. Oft times the word [Cannot] is taken politically, I cannot, that is, I must not, or I cannot lawfully: Quod turpe, impoſſibile. Gen. 19. 22. I cannot do any thing, till thou be come out. Act. 10. 47. Can any man forbid water, &c. that is, lawfully. 2 Cor. 13. 8. [We can do nothing against the Truth,] that is, by Authority from God.

XXXI. Oft times in Scripture the word [Cannot] is meant only of that which a man cannot do without ſuffering, or loſs, or difficutly. So Act. 4. 16. We cannot deny it,] that is, without the ſhame of falſhood. Luk. 14. 20. I cannot come,] that is, without ſuch inconvenience as I am unwilling to bear. Jer. 29. 17. They cannot be eaten,] that is, without loathing. 1 Sam. 25. 17. He is ſuch a Son of Belial, that a man cannot ſpeak to him,] that is, without inconvenience by it. 2 Sam. 23. 6. They cannot be taken with hands,] that is, without hurt. Gen. 34. 14. We cannot do this thing,] that is, without God.

XXXII. Oft times this inconvenience procuring unwillingneſs, this unwillingneſs is named like impotency, and it is ſaid, Men cannot, becauſe they will not. And ſo it is in divers of the laſt cited inſtances. Joh. 3. 9. They cannot ſin,] that is, They will not. Luk. 14. 20. I have married a wife, and therefore I cannot come,] that is, I will not, becauſe I cannot without this inconvenience. Neh. 6. 3. I cannot come down,] that is, I will not. Gen. 44. 26. We cannot go down. Joſh. 24. 19. Ye cannot ſerve the Lord; for he is a holy God: that is, you are not diſpoſed to do it holily, and then he will deſtroy you. Joh. 6. 60. This is a hard ſaying, who can hear it?] that is, willingly. Iſa. 49. 15. Can a woman forget her ſucking-Child?] that is, will ſhe forget it? Jer. 2. 32. Can a Maid forget her Ornaments? Mar. 2. 19. Can the Children of the Bridegroom fast? &c. Mar. 9. 39. Can ye drink of the Cup that I drink of, and be baptized? &c. 39. They ſaid unto him, we can,] that is, Have you Wills diſpoſed for ſuch ſufferings, and will you go through them?

And this unwillingneſs when it is habitual and prevalent, is it that is commonly called mans moral impotency, as to believe, love, obey, &c.

XXXIII. This impotency which is the moral pravity of the Will hath divers degrees: And the ſame degree of received help from God, will not cure it in one that will in another. The godly have ſome of it, and the ungodly more, and ſome of them more than others. But we uſe to call it abſolutely a moral impotency, when the indiſpoſition of the Soul is ſuch, as that none ſuch ever do believe and conſent without more help of Grace than yet they have received. And we uſe to ſay that he is morally able, or hath power, whoſe indiſpoſition is not ſo great nor Grace ſo ſmall, but that ſome in that caſe by that ſame help do believe and conſent, though it be rarely. But that power is morally called impotency, which no man ever reduceth to act.

XXXIV. This moral Power is yet ſhort both of Act and Habit; For a Habit is not only a power to Act, but to Act promptly, and eaſily, and aright.

XXXV. By all this you may partly ſee how to anſwer the common queſtions about mens power or impotency to believe, and to love God.

Queſt. 1. Is every man able to believe, and love God?

Anſw. Every man hath that natural faculty, which hath ſufficient of that ſort of power called natural, to do it, ſuppoſing neceſſary concurrents.

Queſt. 2. Is any man naturally able, without Divine ſupport and concurſe, and without neceſſary Objects, Concauſes and Media?

Anſw. No: no more than to make himſelf an Angel. He never had ſuch power in Innocency.

Queſt. 3. *That Potentia peccandi is of God, ſee Aureolus in 2. d. 44. art. 2. pag. 327. 328. Utrum praecept… ſupernaturalia poſſit bomo ſervare fine ſpecia…i auxilio gratiae? Reſp. Quod non: quia ipſa neque…nt ſervari niſi eliciendo actus inſuſarum virtutum, &c. Carera ſum. Theol. 2. 2. c. 1. And what would you have higher than his▪ q. 4. a. 1. An l…men ſupernaturale infuſum fidei fit tota virtus agendi actum fidei? Reſp. Aſſ-Quia actus fidei eſt quoad omnem rationem …odum, ſubſtantiam, denominationem, quidditatem, ſupernaturalis: ejus vita in actu ſecundo ſupernaturalis, Deum & authorem ſupernaturalem attingens, nec continetur intra vires & ordinem naturae, & intellectus creatus ſuapt… natura eſt ad illam improportionatus, p. 38. 39. So other Thomiſts. But here wanteth ſome explication of ſupernaturality. Yea they aſſert (ut idem ibid. p. 39, &c.) That the Intellect hath not ſo much as a potentia obedientialis activa, but only paſſiva to the act of Faith; but conceive that the ſupernatural infuſed Grace of Faith is as neceſſary to enable the faculty to that act, as the faculty to the Eſſence of the Soul therein. Though yet they grant that the Intellect is cauſa fidei principalis, as the eſſence is which yet can do nothing but by the faculty: And thus they make potentiam fundari in potentia, which Dr. Twiſſe denieth. But a hard queſtion troubleth ſome of the School-men, ſeeing ſaith is wholly ſupernatural, and Gods work, and it was ſo in the Jews that believed that Chriſt was to come; if that Faith continued in any ſome time after (as in Nathanael, &c.) Whether God ſtill cauſed it when it became falſe as he did before? which muſt needs put them upon ſome exception: They ſay, How it is fides humana, but per opporentiam divinam, & D…us omnium dominus efficere poteſt ut quis …li… …ecidat fin… pacc…o (Idem, ibid.) But a further anſwer may and muſt be given; which will be uſeful to the Caſe before us, when conſide ed. Of which in due place.Is a man able to ſin, if God Decree he ſhall not; or able to forbear ſin, or obey, if God fore-know that he will not?

Anſw. Yes: for God is not ſuppoſed to decree or fore-ſee that he ſhall not be able; nay, if God fore-ſee that he will not do what he can, it inferreth that he can. But the event is a logical impoſſibility; that is, it is not true that it will be.

Queſt. 4. Is the Intellect truly informed, able to ſet right an habitually undiſpoſed Will?

Anſw. It is able to do that towards it which on a better diſpoſed Will would be effectual: But not to produce the effect.

Queſt. 5. Is a power not excited to Act, able to do that act?

Anſw. The queſtion is, Whether a power not excited be a power? Yes, It is a Power, but ſuch as will not act till excited.

Queſt. 6. Is that Grace which exciteth our Powers, another ſecond Power?

Anſw. It is the excitation of a Power; or a received impulſe: Call it Power or what you will, ſo you trouble not the Church with a needleſs wrangling about a Name, when there are others as fit.

Queſt. 7. Is a Habit a Power?

Anſw. It is ſomewhat not well known by man; But we know that it is leſs than the natural Power, in point of ſubſtantiality, as being but an Accident: But it is more than both natural and moral power, in order of perfection to the act: For to be able and prompt is more than to be meerly able.

Queſt. 8. Is a hindered Power truly a Power?

Anſw. If the hinderance be ſuch as the faculty is not able to overcome, it is not formally a power ad hoc: But otherwiſe it is.

Queſt. 9. Can God make a man able without any change on himſelf, to do that which he was unable for?

Anſw. Yes: If his diſability lay in the want of extrinſick Concauſes, Objects, or Media.

Queſt. 10. May a meer change of the Understanding enable the Will to do what it could not do?

Anſw. Not what it had not a natural Power to do: But what it wanted but a moral power or diſpoſition to do; it may in two caſes, 1. If God do powerfully illuminate the Underſtanding, and by the Underſtanding powerfully operate on the Will: Or in ordinary caſes, if the underſtandings acts be clear and ſtrong. 2. If the Will it ſelf be not obſtinately before ill diſpoſed.

Queſt. 11. Is an unwilling Will able to excite or change it ſelf?

Anſw. Even in the point of believing, it hath natural power and liberty to act otherwiſe than it doth, even to turn it ſelf from the act of Unbelief to the act of Faith: But being undiſpoſed and ill diſpoſed, it will not do that which it hath a natural ſelf-determining power to do; till God aſſiſt it or turn it by his Grace.

Queſt. 12. Can any man believe that Will?

Anſw. 1. A man that knoweth not the Goſpel, or what to believe, upon a general rumor of it, may wiſh that he had it, knew it, and believed it: And yet cannot believe it indeed, till he know what to believe. 2. A man that perceiveth not the evidence of verity or credibility in the Goſpel, and therefore believeth it not to be true▪ may for the end and matter wiſh he could ſee evidence of truth and believe it; And yet is not able, till he ſee it. And a Believer that believeth it weakly, may wiſh to believe it more ſtrongly than he can. 3. One that conſenteth not to leave his luſts for Chriſt, may know ſo much of the wiſdom and happineſs of thoſe that can conſent, as to wiſh he had ſuch a Will himſelf, and that he were one of them: And yet may be morally unable, that is, unwilling ſo to do. For it's one thing to will Christ and Holineſs for it ſelf and God, and it's another thing to will to have ſuch a Will. A mans own Will may be the Object of his Will, for fear of puniſhment, and ſo he may wiſh that he had a better heart, leſt he be damned; when yet he loveth not Holineſs for it ſelf. In a word, 1. He that willeth God, Holineſs, Chriſt, as they are, as better than all the World. 2. And that with a ſerious effectual Will, ſhall have what he willeth: And he that willeth ſuch a Will, as part of Gods holy Image, and for it ſelf, above the pleaſures of his Fleſh, ſhall have it, yea already hath it. But a man may will ſuch a Will, yea and Chriſt, and God himſelf, in a falſe notion, as minus malum, as not ſo bad as Hell, but leſs amiable than ſinful pleaſures, and yet be graceleſs, and undiſpoſed to believe.

The reſt I pretermit.

XXXVI. The Intellect as ſuch underſtandeth neceſſarily per modu… naturae: And therefore as ſuch, its diſpoſition or indiſpoſition is not morally good or evil; And as it hath no freedom, ſo theſe habits or diſpoſitions are but the accidental perfections or imperfections of a natural power, and participate of the natural neceſſity of that power: But the ſame Intellect, ſo far as it is under the power of the Will, and imperate, is the ſubject of moral acts and habits; and ſo as ſecondarily moral, they are ſecondarily free.

XXXVII. To conclude, as Auguſtine ſaith, We uſe in common ſpeech to diſtinguiſh Power and Will: and from one we ſay, Men are able, and can do this or that: and from the other we ſay, They will or will not. And both habitual or diſpoſitive and actual willingneſs or unwillingneſs is not called uſually Strength or Power, but Will: The Will it ſelf hath its proper power to will, for it is a natural faculty: But its habits and acts are better known by the name of willingneſs and unwillingneſs, than of power. If therefore men would do as Scripture doth, uſually expreſs moral habits and acts by theſe their beſt known names, and when we uſe the terms of Power, Can and Cannot, would do it ſo rarely and explainedly as to be underſtood, that it is nothing but moral will…ngneſs and unwillingneſs that we mean, it would do much to end all this Controverſie. For he that is puzzled with the queſtion (unexplained) [Whether an Unbeliever can believe, and have power to repent:] would quickly be ſatisfied if the queſtion were [Whether he be willing habitually, or actually to believe and repent.] And he that is ſtalled with the queſtion, [Can a Sinner leave his Sin, and love Goodneſs?] would eaſily anſwer, [Whether he be willing to do it?] Yea and [Whether he be diſpoſed or inclined to it?] Yea and [Whether he have a natural faculty of willing, which quoad potentiam naturalem can do otherwiſe?]

You have been ſo tedious and numerous in your Distinctions and Obſervations, that no plain man is able to follow you. Do you think that poor Chriſtians muſt be puzled with all this, and loſt in a multitude of diſtinctions, before they can know the truth, Whether a man can believe and repent, or not?

I expected to hear your own mouth condemn you. Queſt. 1. Is there any of theſe diſtinctions which are unneceſſary to the deciſion of the preſent Controverſie? If there be, name it and lay that by. 2. Is a general and an ambiguous term better underſtood by the bare ambiguous name, than by opening the particulars contained in it, and the ambiguities? Than Catechiſms, and Commentaries, even on our baptiſmal Covenant, the Creed, Lords Prayer and Decalogue, are hurtful. Do you underſtand your ſelf what you mean by your [Power] and [Can] and [Cannot Repent] without conſidering of the ambiguity? 3. Will it ſatisfie you, if we uſe your words [Can] or [Cannot] what ſenſe ſoever we take them in? Is that all that you contend for? Muſt the Church be fired about a word, which neither Side much ſtick at, could they have their ſenſe of it? 4. But the truth is, You open your own ſhame: that muſt trouble the ears of honeſt plain Chriſtians, with words which cannot be underſtood without all this ado; and will chooſe ſuch terms as have ſo many meanings, to confound, or bewilder men, and that without explication; and even in ſtrict diſputes, and not only in Oratory; when as there are plainer enough at hand, which ſpeak the matter as we are agreed.

You tell us a great deal of habits of the Will, which are more than Power (in order to Action). But I find that ſome men of our Party hold, that there is no ſuch thing in the Soul as an habit or diſpoſition which is not meerly a Power or an Act: They know no more.

The truth is, too many on the other ſide, who know not how much they deſtroy their own work by over-doing, and uſe to fear but one extream, do harp ſo much upon this ſtring, that no wicked man is able to repent, or hath power to believe, or c…n forſake his ſ… ▪ that they have ignorantly given you the advantage which you lay hold on, 1. To call Grace ſtill by the name of a meer power, and 2. Then to diſgrace their Opinion, who ſay that God damneth men for doing that which, they are utterly unable to do.

What is the advantage which you think we take by this?

*Mark what Pet. a. S. Joſeph ſaith, Theſ. Univerſ. pag. 236. de Charit. Dare facilitatem agendi ſpectat ad virtutes acquiſitas, no… autem ad infuſas, quae ſolam agendi potentiam …ribuunt. So that proper habits by this are nothing but acquired, which yet at other times he denieth. Herveus in Quodlib. 1. q. 13. unde…taketh to ſhew the difference inter potentiam & habitum, though habitus be potentia in a large ſenſe as it is taken pro omni principio activo & paſſivo: And he taketh the ſubſtantia actus (as it's called) to be more reducible ad potentiam, and the modu… to the habit. But he leaveth the difference ſtill in the dark. And Quodlib. 3. qu. 7. he is larger of it, and ſaith that a habit is [Diſpoſitio potentiae pe quam diſponitur ad actum] and that it ſuppoſeth a Power not ſufficient to determine it ſelf to prompt and facile action.The greateſt that you have againſt your Adverſaries. 1. By the firſt you make Grace to be no determiner of the Will at all, habitual or actual: For Grace, you ſay, giveth men but a power to believe and repent▪ And ſo whether a man will uſe that power or not, and will actually repent and believe or not, is never the more aſcertained for Grace, if it give men but a power. For you leave it ſtill to Free-will to uſe that power or not uſe it. (I ſpeak but of ſome of you.) 2. And hereby you contrive Grace into this conception, that it is but ſome common thing like nature, and as a man that hath power to ſit, or ſtand, or go, may uſe that power as he will himſelf; ſo all men where the Goſpel cometh have a power to obey it, which they may uſe as they will: But to the Will it ſelf Grace giveth but this power: And if that were true that a habit of the Will were but a power to will, fair fall Pelagius.

It's well you charge us not all with that Opinion; But I confeſs I am not yet ſatisfied that it is falſe, and that the Will hath any thing but power and act: But power facilitateth the act.

You may ſay it facilitateth, becauſe …it maketh it poſſible, which is eaſier than that which is impoſſible? Is that facility? But mark.

1. If that Opinion be true, then 1. Gods inward workings are not ſuitable to his outward means: For his means are Perſwaſions, and Exhortations, and Mercies, and Corrections, which are not only to make men able, but willing: And if they make them willing, they do in primo inſtanti diſpoſe them to be willing, and then procure actual willingneſs, and then fix the Will in an habitual propenſity.

2. If that Doctrine be true, then a habit hath no moral good or evil in it, it is no Virtue or Vice: And then there is no Virtue or Vice, that is, no ſuch thing as moral Habits, but only Acts. For no man ſhould call meer power or impotency, which is neither habitual, diſpoſitive or actual willingneſs or unwillingneſs, by the name of Virtue or Vice. It is not goodneſs meerly to be able to do good, nor evil to be able to do evil; unleſs as eating, walking may be good or bad materially by participation, ſo far as voluntary.

3. If that Doctrine be true, the Will as a Will ſhould be an unſanctified or unrenewed faculty, further than it is found in action. For its diſpoſition is its holineſs and rectitude.

4. And a man ſhould have no Grace in his ſleep, or when he is minding natural things alone; unleſs you will ſay, as I hinted before, that ſleeping and waking he hath ſtill a Latent inſenſible Volition in act, which is it that we call a habit: But if you acknowledge ſuch a habit, (even a fixed latent deep conſtant act inclining to other holy acts) the ſtrife then is but about a name.

5. It is certain, that the Soul hath in it beſides power and obſerved acts, a natural inſeparable inclination. The form of the Soul is not only potentia, but potentia ſeu vis vel virtus inclinata; Man is not only able to love good as good, and felicity as ſuch, and ſenſible Pleaſure as ſuch, but he is inclined to it. And if there be ſuch a thing as natural inclination or propenſity, beſides power and act, then 1. It is poſſible and probable there may be a gracious inclination. 2. Yea and if the whole Soul be ſanctified, muſt not its inclination be ſanctified?

6. Why elſe are we ſaid to be New Creatures, and have ſoft and tender hearts, and to be made partakers of the Divine Nature? Nature in active things, is a principle inclined to action, and not only able for it. And ſurely a Divine Nature can ſignifie no leſs than an inclination to holineſs and the love of God.

7. Whence can you imagine that a wicked man ſhould riſe every morning ſo ready to go on in wickedneſs again (that ſleep doth not end his ſin,) yea that he is ſo obſtinate in ſuch acts, if beſides the act he hath nothing but a power to do evil? If you ſay that it is alſo a diſability to do better or forbear; 1. You will extenuate his ſin, by ſaying that he can do no better. 2. Experience telleth you that his ſin is ſenſuality: And Appetite (inordinate which ruleth him) is more than Power, Impotency or Act; It is alſo an inclination to that Act.

8. No doubt but each faculty hath Grace ſuited to its nature and uſe: And therefore as the potentia vitalis activa & executiva, hath its power and vivacity, ſo the Intellect hath Illumination, and the Will holy Love, in diſpoſition and in act.

9. Laſtly, The Scripture calleth that which is given us by the name of the Spirit of God, (and I would the Church would hold to that name, and ſay, Men have or have not the Spirit of holineſs:) But the word Spirit cannot be judged to ſignifie nothing but power and act. Yea it is expreſly named in reference to our three ſanctified faculties, the Spirit of Power, and of Love, and of a ſound Mind, 2 Tim. 1. 7. And the Spirit of Love or Adoption (Gal. 4. 6. Rom. 18. 16, 26.) is not only a power to love: A Child hath more than a power to love a Father; It is a filial loving nature which is called our regenerate ſtate. And if it were only the Act alſo, why is it called a Spirit and Nature.

To confeſs the truth you have ſaid much to prove that we have ill managed this Controverſie about Power and Impotency, to repent and believe: And for my part I mean hereafter to uſe most the common and Scripture phraſe, and ſay as to the efficient, that men have or have not the Spirit, and as to the effect, that Power, Diſpoſition, or Inclination, Act or Habit, are things to us obſervable in the Soul, and that cannot and will not, muſt not be confounded. And if it be moral or logical Power that I ſpeak of, I will mention it properly as it is in the effect or event, called Poſſible or Impoſſible, rather than as it connoteth the faculty called Potent or Impotent thereto, lest I deceive men: And I will let them perceive an impoſſibility of conſequence, from an impotency of ſufficiency: For I know that when it's true, that logically in ordine dicendi it cannot be, (that is, be true,) that [God fore-ſeeth or decreeth that Peter will not ſin,] and yet that [he will ſin]; yet it is not true that [Peter had not power to ſin]. But I proceed.

The third Crimination.

They make man ſo corrupted, and that by Adam's ſin without his own conſent, as that there is no good in him; But he is dead in ſin: And ſo all men ſhould be utterly and equally wicked.

*Melanct: Loc. Com. de lib. arb. c. 7. Etſi peccatum Originis vitiat naturam, non prorſus aufert eam, nec delet nec mutat eam in aliam ſpeciem. Et ſp. ſanctus non abolet, ſed adolet naturam, non deſtruit, ſed ſanat. Et Ambroſ. de Voc. Gent. l. 1. c. 3. Nec quia ſpiritu Dei agitur, ideo putet ſe libero arb. carere: quiae nec tunc perdidit, quando diabolo voluntate ſe dedit, a quo judicium voluntatis depravatum eſt, non ablatum: Non enim homo voluntate, ſed voluntatis ſanitate privatus eſt: cum a diabolo ſpoliaretur: cum igitur homo ad pietatem redit non alia in co creatur ſubſtantia, ſed eadem quae fuerat labefactata repar… tur.The anſwer to the former might ſerve to this: But ſtill I ſee that Names muſt be our quarrel. Is the queſtion of the Thing, or of the Name, whether it be to be called Good? 1. As to the thing, they deny not that there are firſt notices and common principles of morality in all mens underſtandings. 2. Nor that the Intellect is inclined to truth as truth. 3. Nor that the Will is inclined to good as good. 4. Nor that natural Conſcience doth ſomewhat for God and Duty, and againſt Sin in bad men. 5. Nor that a Heathen may have as much good as experience proveth ſome of them to have had, as Antonine, Alexander Severus, Cato, Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, Plutarch, Socrates, Plato, &c. 6. Nor that common Grace when the Goſpel cometh may prepare them for ſpecial Grace, and make them almoſt ſanctified Believers. In a word, almoſt all agree, that 1. Nature, as now upheld by Mercy, may have all the good aforeſaid. 2. That common Grace with the Goſpel may go further. 3. And that it prepareth for ſpecial ſaving Grace. If you deny this, you accuſe them contrary to the fulleſt evidence that you could expect, whilſt our Britiſh Divines at Dort tell you ſo largely how far univerſal or common Grace goeth in this preparing work; and when there are ſuch a multitude of Treatiſes, written by the ſtricteſt Engliſh Antiarminians on two Subjects, 1. Of preparation to Converſion. 2. How far an Hypocrite (or unregenerate Perſon) may go in Chriſtianity, (the Title of one of Perkins's Books.)

2. But if it be de nomine, whether this may be called good, it is a queſtion unfit to trouble the Church with. All are agreed that is materially ſomething commanded by God, partly conformable to the Law of Nature or Scripture, and that it tendeth towards the well-fare of him that hath it, and of others; and is better than its contrary. But if we m…ſt ſet up a metaphyſical Theater to diſpute de ratione Boni, by that time (on as good reaſon) we have proſecuted our diſputes de ratione entis, uni…s & veri alſo, we may fall out with all that agree not, in Suarez his Metaphyſicks, or at leaſt in Aquinas or Buridanes's Ethicks. I pray you begin your ſelf, and tell me what is bonum, goodneſs, in your queſtion?

You ſhall not tempt me into ſo difficult a metaphyſical or moral diſpute, which I know the learned are ſo little agreed in: For you would but make uſe of it to inſult over me.

And yet is this one of your Accuſations of your Brethren, that they agree not with you in the ſenſe of ſuch a word, as you dare not definitively tell your own ſenſe of?

Moral good in man is his conformity to the holy regulating Will of God, by reſignation of our ſelves to him as our Owner, ſubjection to him as our Ruler, and love to him as our End, or perfect Good, with all the exerciſe of theſe. Now, 1. In the ſtricteſt ſenſe, men ſay, Bon…mest ex cauſis integris, and ſo where there is any ſin, there is not good in that ſenſe; that is, unmixed perfect good: And in that (with a more tranſcendent) ſenſe Chriſt ſaith, That none is good ſave God only: I hope you will not quarrel with him for it. And yet the Papiſts commonly reproach the Proteſtants, as teaching that all that we do is ſin, and no good, becauſe we ſay that all is mixt with ſin, and imperfectly good. I profeſs for my ſelf, that I never loved, truſted, feared, obeyed God in all my life without imperfection: And I take that imperfection of my love to God, &c. to be the great and grievous ſin of my Soul; ſo that I groan out all my days; the laſt dying-words of Arch-biſhop Uſher, Lord, forgive my Sins of Omiſſion; And if the School-men almoſt agree, that moral evil is privatio boni, me-thinks a Papist ſhould hardly dream that his greateſt Faith and Love have no degree of ſuch privation.

2. But as the word [Good] ſignifieth that which is ſincerely ſo though imperfectly, being more predominant in heart and life, than the contrary evil, and proveth the perſons acceptation with God, and right to Salvation, and is the imperfect Image of Gods holineſs repaired, ſo all and only the ſanctified are good.

3. But in the third ſenſe, as goodneſs ſignifieth, ſuch Inclinations and Actions as are good but in a low degree, and bad predominantly; ſo none deny but bad men have ſome good Inclinations and Actions. And de nomine here Divines agree not, either Protestants or Papiſts: ſome (and moſt commonly) call all ſuch Actions good in their degree; Others ſay, That quia finis deeſt, none of it is to be called properly good. It may end all, to ſay that it is good analogically, as accidens is ens: or ſecundum quid, though not ſimpliciter.

The fourth Crimination.

*So do the Jeſuites, as you may ſee in Vaſqu. in 1. Tho. q. 23. & paſſive.They damn multitudes of Infants for Original Sin, which they could not avoid; yea and the Adult too as neceſſitated by it to ſin, for the prevention or cure of which they have no remedy; eſpecially all the Heathen World, in compariſon of which, from Adam's days till now the reſt are very few: ſo that they make the World to be made or born purpoſely for unavoidable damnation in Hell fire.

Here are ſeveral things which muſt be diſtinctly ſpoken to, I. Of Infants. II. Of the ſtate of the Heathen World. III. Of the neceſſity of ſinning. IV. Of the neceſſity of puniſhment for ſin. Of theſe in order.

1. For the caſe of Infants, there are three queſtions to be handled, 1. Whether they have Original Sin? 2. Whether they are worthy of puniſhment for it? 3. Whether they are puniſhed for it, and how many, and how?

1. For the firſt, I have proved in a peculiar Diſputation, that Infants have Original Sin, that is, moral Pravity in diſpoſition, with their participation in the guilt of Adam's ſin, as being ſeminally and virtually in him. And I find you not yet denying it.

2. For the ſecond, no Chriſtian doubteth, I think, but that all ſin deſerveth puniſhment; But the deſert of Actual Sin and of Original Sin are as different as the nature of the ſin. Habitual or Diſpoſitive Pravity is a Diſpoſitive preparation or worthineſs of puniſhment: And actual Sin, is an actual preparation for it, but all deſerve it; that is, are Subjects morally fit for it, to demonſtrate holy Juſtice.

3. For the third, Scripture and experience put it paſt controverſie, that Infants ſuffer: For, 1. They are deprived of the Spirit of Holineſs, as quickly appeareth by their early practice. Which privation is the greateſt puniſhment here. 2. They are hereupon left to the power of their own Corruption; which deſertion is a grievous puniſhment. 3. They have pain and ſorrow. 4. And they die.

And if they have all this ſuffering here, it is unlikely that they are wholly free hereafter, if not pardoned: Becauſe, 1. They have immortal Souls that are capable. 2. And future as well as temporal death or miſery is the wages of ſin.

And that their ſuffering is for ſin, is undoubted, from Rom. 5, &c. And the Pelagians ſcarce deny but that Adam's ſin cauſed it. And if it be proved that they have moral pravity, or ſin of their own, then it is for their own ſin. And if ſo, it is their own puniſhment.

All the doubt then is, Whether all Infants are forgiven. And for that, 1. We ſee that the temporal puniſhment is not forgiven them. 2. We ſee as ſoon as they come to action, that to many at leaſt, the foreſaid penal deſertion and privation of the Spirit of Sanctification is not forgiven them: And 3. Without holineſs none can ſee God. 4. They that affirm it muſt prove it: which they neither do, nor can do. There is no word of Scripture which telleth it us. How then ſhould that be part of our Faith, which is no part of Gods Word?

If you ſay that Chriſt, being the ſecond Adam, ſaveth the World from all the ſin and miſery brought on them by the firſt Adam; I anſwer, 1. Conditionally he doth: He hath purchaſed Salvation to be given men on the terms of the Covenant of Grace, and all that perform the Conditions ſhall have Salvation. But 2. His bare Sacrifice it ſelf without ſuch application ſaveth none, any further than to bring them under the terms of the ſaid Covenant. It is apparent by experience, that Chriſt doth not undo all the hurt that Adam did; immediately to all, or any one in the world, no not till death, no nor till the Reſurrection. Sin and miſery is ſtill upon us. Infants ſhew as ſoon as they come to the uſe of reaſon, that they were not brought to the Innocency that Adam had before the Fall. You your ſelves diſtinguiſh the Impetration from the Application of Salvation as to the adult, and the reaſon is the ſame as to Infants, though the condition be not the ſame. Shew us a promiſe of the Salvation of all Infants, and we will believe it.

5. Indeed they are ſaved conditionally as the adult are; and the condition is expreſſed in Scripture, [That they be the Children of the Faithful, dedicated to God.] The Parents and their Seed are in the ſame Covenant. And this is all that God revealeth of them.*Saith Twiſſe Cont. Corvin. pag. 136. c. 2: De Infantibus infantia ſua morientibus falſum eſt quod nobis obtrudit: Ne que enim dicimus ullos Infantes credentium & foederatorum Dei in infantia decedentes ad exitium deſtinatos: Sanctos enim eos pronunciat Apoſtolus. Et una cum parentibus fidelibus in foedere Dei comprehenduntur. But I doubt he befriendeth the Anabaptiſts more than he was aware of, when he addeth, [Obſignant (Sacramenta) credentibus remiſſionem peccatorum & vitam aeternam: At Infantibus quoties adminiſtratur Baptiſmus, non tam credentibus quam credituris obſignat promiſſiones iſtas: Non credituris autem nihil obſignant. If ſo, then to them that die in Infancy, or yet are Infants no pardon is delivered and ſealed by Baptiſm: which is not ſound. Of our guilt of nearer Parents Sin. Let them that reject me in this, hear Auguſtine, in Enchirid. c. 46. Pa…entum quo que peccatis parvul… obligari, non ſolum primorum hominum, ſed etiam ſuorum de quibus ipſi nati ſunt, non improbabiliter dicitur: Illa quippe divina ſententia, R…ddam peccata patrum in▪ filios, tenet hos uti que antequam per regenerationem ad teſtamentum novum incipiant poenitere.—Reperiuntur plura peccata & alia parentum quae etſi non ita poſſunt mutare naturam, reatu tamen obligant filios, niſi gra…uita gratia & miſerecordia divina ſubveniat.

But whether God do alſo, without a Promiſe, ſave any of the Children of the Heathen World, or of wicked Parents? and how many? and with what Salvation? and alſo what degree of puniſhment they have in the life to come, we take for unrevealed things, which we are ſo far from making Articles of our Faith, that we take it to be preſumptuous arrogancy to diſpute it, and meddle with the Secrets of the Almighty. The Papiſts themſelves are not agreed whether Infants have only the poenam damni as ſhut out of Heaven, or alſo poenam ſenſus? Janſenius and many more (yea moſt) have written for the firſt; and Petavius and others for the latter. But ſecret things belong to God.

We cannot prove that all Infants are ſaved, nor do we preſume to tell you what Salvation it, is that they ſhall have; But we hope the beſt: And I am glad to find that you take the Salvation of true Believers dying Infants to be ſure (by the ſame Covenant which pardoneth their Parents), and that you do not peremptorily condemn all the reſt.

You know that the Synod of Dort have ſaid the ſame that I do of true Believers Children, Art. 1. Sect. 17. and the reſt they meddle not with.

But I pray you tell me your thoughts, Whether Infants themſelves do periſh for Adam's ſin alone? And what remedy is provided for them?

The whole tenor of the Scripture putteth me paſt doubt, that Divines have ſtrangely erred, by over-looking the common Intereſt and Communion of all Parents and Children, and appropriating our Original Guilt to Adam's ſin alone: But this requireth a larger Diſputation by it ſelf. At preſent conſider, 1. That no Text of Scripture doth ſo appropriate it, or make Adam only the Corrupter of our Natures: But only maketh him the Original of our Guilt and Pravity, as he was the Original of our Nature: And ſo he only is the Original of our Death and Puniſhment.

2. That the whole ſcope of Scripture containeth Promiſes and Penalties to Children with the Parents, for and by the Parents ſins, more plainly than any was antecedently expreſſed of Adam's Poſterity as his: Yea the very Moral Law in the Second Commandment, and in the Proclamation of Gods Name and Nature to Moſes, Exod. 34. 6, 7. which nothing but prejudice and partiality can deny to be a valid proof, of a ſecondary Birth ſin derived to us. And he that will read the Sacred Hiſtory from the Curſe on the Seed of Cain, and Cham, of the Caſe of Iſhmael, Eſau, Moab, Amnon, Sauls Grand-Children hanged, and ſo on to Matth. 23. 38. [On this Generation ſhall come all the righteous blood, &c.] And [His blood be on us, and on our Children,] with all the Promiſes to the Seed of the Righteous only, and Threatning to the Houſes and Seed of the Wicked, with the reaſon of Infant-Baptiſm it ſelf, 1 Cor. 7. [Elſe were your Children unclean, but now are they holy]; will ſoon be convinced that we are born under more guilt and puniſhment than what we derive from Adam.

3. And even Adam's ſin could not be, or is not made ours immediately, but as we derive it from our nearer▪ Parents: For our nature is no otherwiſe from him. Why am I guilty of what Adam did, but becauſe I have a nature that was ſeminally in him? And was it not proximately in my nearer Parents? And can they convey their part of Adam's guilt and pravity to me, and no other?

4. And few ſober men can deny, but that the Children of ſome Glutto…s, Drunkards, Fornicators, &c. derive extraordinary diſeaſed, and vitiouſly-inclined temperaments from their neareſt Parents.

5. And no peculiar reaſon can truly be given for our guilt or pravity from Adam, which reacheth not to prove the derivation of the like from our nearer Parents, ſave only, 1. That Adam only was the Original. 2. And in Adam we ſinned under a Covenant that gave no pardon: But now under a Covenant of Grace.

If this hold, it will make eaſie the Doctrine of Original Sin, which I confeſs to you that I have been inclined to doubt of, by your Divines faſtening all upon Gods Arbitrary Imputation, rather than from the Childrens ſeminal in-being.

Doubtleſs they have much tempted Arminius, Epiſcopius, Arnoldus Corvinus, Biſhop Jer. Taylor, and others, to ſay ſo much againſt Original Sin as they have done, by feigning an (unproved) arbitrary Covenant of God made with Adam and his Poſterity which was no Law of Nature, nor is made to any other ſince, (according to the change of the Covenant), and by which God imputeth Adam's ſin to us, not becauſe we were in his Loins (for then it would extend to others), but becauſe it was his Will to do ſo; As if it had been God and not Adam that defiled our Natures, and made us all Sinners, by an unneceſſary, if not ungrounded imputation. By which alſo they have kept men from knowing their ſecondary birth-ſin. *Dr. Twiſſe frequently ſpeaketh rightlier of the reaſon of the imputation of Adam's ſin.The Church of England prayeth not for the Dead, but for the Living, when it ſaith, Remember not our Iniquity, nor the Iniquity of our fore-Fathers: And Nehemiah and Daniel were of the ſame mind.

But they ſay that then our Sins would increaſe as Ages go on, and the laſt Age would be the moſt ſinful.

Men will ſay almoſt any thing in their partiality, while they look but on one ſide. 1. The Covenant is now changed which men ſin under: Not ſo as not to extend to Children: But it is now a pardoning Covenant; And when the ſins of the Fathers are pardoned to themſelves, they are pardoned to their Infants dedicated to God in the ſame Covenant, even by the ſame. 2. But where they are unpardoned, there is a certain ſort and degree of guilt increaſed on the Poſterity; and ſo no wonder if many Kingdoms of Heathens and Infidels feel it. 3. But as it is not ſo much to have a nature eſſentially derived from Parents, and to be ſeminally in them, as it is to be a ſinning perſon, ſo the guilt proportionably differeth. 4. And there is a pardon of ſome temporal puniſhments which God giveth ſome bad men in this life. 5. And as to the puniſhment in Hell, there is a certain degree, that God will not exceed in hi… execution, and that humane nature, as it is, is capable of no more. And a man may have many Obligations to one and the ſame puniſhment, as he may to the ſame duty; and ſo a man is but hanged or put to death that hath deſerved death ſeven times over among men: For the ends of puniſhment ſet the bounds in all executions.

Well, but what ſay you to the ſecond; The periſhing ſtate of Heathens.

II. I have ſaid ſo much in the Firſt Book, that I muſt refer you thither; Now only ſaying, 1. That it is firſt to be conſidered what Law they are under; 2. And next how they keep it; 3. And then how they are judged by it.

1. Undoubtedly all the World is now under the Law of Grace, as to the eſſentials, as it was made with all men in Adam and Noah, though not as to the mutable part, which bound men to expect a future Meſſiah. That Law was made with all Mankind, Gen. 3. 15. and is never repe…ed to Mankind. The World was under it (as to Obligation) before Chriſt's Incarnation; And Chriſt took no benefit from them which they had. Clemens Alexandrinus, and other Fathers, erred not in this to much as ſome have charged them to do: No man is now under the Covenant of Innocency alone.

2. But how all men keep or break their proper Conditions of this Law of Grace, as they are under it, he that knoweth every man in the World, and all their hearts and deeds can tell, but not I.

3. And no doubt but they are judged as they kept or kept not the Conditions of that Law of Grace which they were under. What difference there is, 1. Between the Conditions to the Chriſtian-Church now, and the Jewiſh of old. 2. And between the Conditions to the Jewiſh of old, and the reſt of the World, I have ſhewed partly, Lib. 1.

But becauſe many ſelf-wiſe perſons are bitterly cenſorious againſt me, or any man that ſpeaketh of any poſſibility of the Salvation of any, ſave Jews formerly and Chriſtians now: I beſeech the ſober but to think of this one thing, that Abraham thought there had been fifty righteous perſons in Sodom, even when God had told him how much worſe it was than other places. How many then proportionably did he think there was in Canaan and all other Countries of the World. By which Abraham's judgment about the Salvation of others is manifeſt, though he was miſtaken in thinking Sodom better than it was. And I deſire to be a Son of Abraham, and am not wiſer than he.

This ſeemeth plain truth, however the World take it: And it is a wonder to me that any good man ſhould take it ill to have ſo much of Gods certain Grace acknowledged. But what ſay you to the third point, The neceſſity hence of ſinning.

I have anſwered it to you before: I now add, 1. It is not a phyſical neceſſity from the principles of Nature, but a moral neceſſity from the pravity of Nature. 2. It is not cauſed by God, but by ſinful man. 3. It is not a neceſſity of committing all ſin, or every particular ſin, nor of omitting every duty. 4. It is not an uncurable neceſſity. 5. God of his free Grace hath provided the remedy himſelf, and tendered it in ſome degrees to all. 6. And he appointeth to all men certain duties and means to be uſed to this end, which they can uſe. 7. Therefore it is no neceſſity What cold comfort the Papiſts give to Infants, and what inſufficient Grace they have that die unbaptized, they …only declare. See … in 12. q. 111. … 7. p. 496.of being damned.

This anſwereth the fourth Queſtion as to the Adult. But what remedy is there for Infants, eſpecially among Heathens and Unbelievers?

The ſame that is for their Parents: They have no ſin but by their Parents, and God hath told us of no remedy, but that they be the Children of Believers dedicated to God. It is meet that their remedy come as their ſin did. They have no Wills of their own, but be at the will of others. They are in Infancy, as if they were members of their Parents: And as the Hand and Heart doth fare as the Head conducteth them, ſo may Infants here.

But it's ſad that all Infants ſhall be unſaved, if the Parents conſent not.

It is ſad that men deſtroy themſelves: And it is ſad that they corrupt their Infants. But what way elſe would you wiſh God to ſave them?

Certainly to ſave all dying in infancy.

1. And why not as well all at Age? 2. Then men would be tempted to think it the greateſt act of mercy in the World, to go with an Army and kill all the Children of Infidels and Heathens, certainly to ſave them.

So you may ſay by the Children of Believers then, if they be ſaved.

No: for they have holy Education, under Gods Promiſe, Ordinances and Bleſſing, and ſo are in great hope of being publickly ſerviceable to the Church, and alſo of attaining a greater degree of Glory. But it's an hundred to one but the Children of Heathens and Infidels, are bred up to be alſo ſuch themſelves.

The fifth Crimination.

They ſuppoſe that no man can do any more good than he doth, nor Quod Repro…us non poſſit gratiam adipiſci, non eſt intelligendum ſecundum impoſſibilitatem abſoluta… ſed conditionatam, qui… reprobatio non ſubtrabit aliquid de potentia reprobati: Idem dicendum eſt de praedeſtinato quem ſalvari neceſſe eſt. Carbo Thom. Compend. 1. q. 23. …. 3. Bradwardine and ſome Dominicans are liable to this Objection, but ſo are few Proteſtants, and the Synod of D…rt rejecteth it.forbear any more evil, than he forbeareth; Becauſe he is not only predeſtinated to do juſt what he doth, and no more or leſs, but alſo predetermined phyſically in the practice, ſo that he cannot poſſibly do more or leſs than God predetermineth him to; And 1. Gods Decrees having fixed all future events, all that man can do will not alter them: Beverovicius may tire the World of Divines with his queſtion de termino vitae before he will ever get ſatisfaction, how Phyſick can prolong a predeſtinated term of life. And 2. By this means God who ſet man upon a courſe of impoſſibilities or vain means, with great and urgent exhortations, is made a diſſembler, and his revealed Will and his ſecret ſuppoſed contradictory, and the latter falſe: And how then can ſuch a God be believed?

Theſe are but the bold effuſions of a miſunderſtanding contentious temerarious paſſion. Here are ſet together ſeveral things, which muſt diſtinctly be conſidered: I. Whether man can do no more good, and forbear no more evil than he doth? II. Whether means to lengthen life or ſave Souls be vain? III. Whether Gods ſecret and revealed Will be contrary, and the revealed falſe.

I. As to the firſt, this unhappy ſyllable [CAN] by its ambiguity is the cauſe of all our ſilly quarrels. 1. If by [CAN] you mean [a phyſical power or faculty] man can not only do more good than he doth, but he can repent and believe who doth not. 2. If you mean a moral power, that is, ſuch a degree of diſpoſition to good as may be excited, or ſuch an indiſpoſition as may be overcome as to the act, without any more ſupernatural Grace than he hath; ſo all men can do more good and leſs evil than they do. And therefore the Synod of Dort rejecteth your accuſation as a calumny. And men ſhould know their own minds beſt. 3. If by [Cannot] you mean only a logical impoſſibility that theſe two Propoſitions be both true [Judas will believe and be ſaved] or [Herod will not be eaten with Worms.] And [God decreeth that Judas ſhall not be ſaved] and [that Herod ſhall be eaten by Worms] I confeſs your charge; and ſay that Arminius ſaith the ſame upon the ſuppoſition of Gods fore-knowledge. And how are you concerned to prove God to be either fallible in his fore-knowledge, falſe in his Predictions, or mutable in his Purpoſes. By this rule all Propheſies take away mens power, and make it impoſſible to do the contrary. But you miſtake: For they aſſert mans power: He that fore-knoweth and fore-telleth that Judas will abuſe his power, and decreeth to damn him only for abuſing his power, doth imply that he hath ſuch power—. But—Ergo.]

II. Beverovicius (and other mens) queſtion, de utilitate mediorum Aegid. Col. Quodl. 1. q. 2. Precibus ſanctorum potest juvari praedeſtinatio: Non tamen ſic, ut hae Divinum propoſitum immutent: ſed quod taedem velut media illud ipſum propoſitum adimpleant mediantibus enim talibus orationibus, fit de nobis quod Deus diſpoſuit.—Si Divina praedeſtinatio dicat Divinum propoſitum in ſe acceptum, non juvatur precibus; quia nullum aeternum juvatur per aliquod temporale: ſed ſi dicant divinum propoſitum, non abſolute, ſed ut impletur mediantibus cauſis in effectu, ſic praedeſtinatio juvatur precibus & operibus ſanctorum.need no very learned Pens to determine it. He did well to make that learned and pious Lady Maria Van Schurman one of his Caſuiſts. What can be plainer, than that means are made moſt neceſſary, and alſo the liberty of our Wills in the uſe of means, when God doth make this one Decree; e. g. [Peter ſhall hear, believe, repent freely but certainly, and be ſaved.] [Noah ſhall make an Ark freely, but certainly, and be ſaved from the deluge.] [Noah ſhall plant a Vineyard, and water and dreſs it in due ſeaſon, freely but certainly, and it ſhall bear him fruit.] And [fore-ſeeing that Judas will freely betray his Lord, I will condemn him.] [Such a Sluggard will not plow and ſow, and therefore ſhall have no crop.] [Such a man will not uſe any meet remedy againſt his Diſeaſe, and ſhall die by it.] It's ſtrange that nothing can pleaſe you unleſs God be ignorant, or mutable, and over-rule not all the World.

III. I have made it plain, that there is no ſhew of contradiction between Gods ſecret and revealed Will. What contradiction is it to ſay, [Judas, I command thee do not murder thy ſelf,] and [I know that Judas will betray his Lord, and will diſpair, and do that which tendeth to his own murder, and for his ſin he ſhall be ſo ſelf-murdered]. Or [Judas will betray Chriſt, and ſhall be damned for it,] and [I forbid Judas to betray Chriſt.] Plainly, 1. About puniſhment, Gods revealed Will in his Law, ſpeaketh only de jure (vel debito) in forbidding it. 2. Gods revealed Will by Propheſie ſometime fore-telleth that this Law will not be kept; and Gods Decree is, that the puniſhment eventually be inflicted: ſo that one ſpeaketh only de debito, and the other de eventu. And about ſin it is but Gods fore-knowledge de eventu, and his Law de debito, that ſeem to you contradictory, without any reaſon.

But this belongeth to the firſt Articles, where you had enough of it before: And mans true power to do more good, and forbear more evil than he doth, is ſo far from being denied, that it is aſſerted in all, and your charge denied generally by the Calvinists, unleſs perhaps by ſome raſh contentious Diſputer of a ſhallow brain, who cannot diſtinguiſh between phyſical, moral, and meer logical impoſſibilities. You may read the Synod of Dorts expreſs renunciation of it, that man can do no more good than he doth, nor forbear more evil: And do you know their judgment better than they know their own? And will you go on to charge them with that which they abhor?

Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Conference 5

p. 73THE Fifth Days Conference WITH AN ARMINIAN Of mans natural ſinfulneſs and impotency to good, and of FREE-WILL.