Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable — Richard Baxter

Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable · Richard Baxter

THE Second Days Conference OF PREDESTINATION. Between C. (a Calvinist) and B. (the Conciliator.)

I hear of your undertaking to manifeſt the ſmallneſs of our Differences in the long controverted Articles of Predeſtination, Redemption, Grace and Free-will. *Le Blank de diſt. Grat. Theſ. 80, 81. Tanta varie…as ſententiarum & opinionum circa naturam & eſſentiam gratiae efficacis & rationem ac modum, quo in animis hominum operatur quae a tot jam ſeculis ſcholas Chriſtianas exercet, arguit rem eſſe perplexam, obſ…uram & quae undi que multis difficultatibus ſcatet: Nec ſpes eſt fore contentionum …inem, niſi curioſitati modus aliquis ſtatuatur, & omittantur qu…ſtiones arduae & nonneceſſariae. Ac profecto longe conſultius foret, & paci ac pietati Chriſtianae conduc…b…lius in totum ab ejuſmodi quaeſtionibus abſtinere, quam ſine fine rixari de rebus quae difficultate ſua ing… nium humanum obruunt, & in quibus vix quiſquam ſibi poteſt ſatisfacere. Praeſertim quaeſtion…s illae apud plebem Chriſtianum in homiliis & concionibus non tantum nullo cum fructu, ſed maximo ſaepe cum damno proponuntur, dum ſimplicium animis injic…untur varii ſ…rupuli, quos diſputa…ionum ars & eloquentia ſatis poſtea diſcuter… non poteſt. And he mentioneth the things which he would have us take up with, which we are agreed in, viz. Quicquid boni …obis …neſt, & a nobis fit, Divi…ae gra…iae deberi: Deun… eſſe qui omne bonum in nobis operatur ſine Chriſto & ſpiritus illius a…xi…io in …s quae aeternam ſalutem promovent n…bil nos qui…quam poſſe, &c. D…um …amen ſi… per grat…am ſuam in nobis operari, …t libertati noſtrae ni…l decedat …mp o q…i male agunt null…m occaſionem habere a… Deo quae…endi, &c.But theſe Reconcilers do but hal… between two Opinions; and while they will be of neither ſide, they are like… and loved by neither.

Bleſſed are the Peace-makers, for they ſhall be called the Children o… God. We will ſeek to pleaſe all men for their good to edification; an… yet ſeek to pleaſe no man before God, nor in ſin, nor place any of ou… happineſs in their favour, nor think much to bear their diſpleaſure o… contempt: For if we (ſo) ſeek to pleaſe men, we are no longer the Servants of Chriſt. If Gods favour were not enough for us, he were not our God.

I am afraid your ſtudy of Syncretiſm or Concord will tempt you to war… and turn half an Arminian, and forſake the Truth.

I thank you for your care of me, and I wonder not at your fears… as long as you miſtake one another as you do. As all perſecution o… Gods Servants is raiſed by miſ-reports, and miſapprehending them to be very bad and dangerous perſons, and as all ſinful Schiſms and ſeparations in Churches ariſe from mens thinking one another to be very bad and unfit for communion; Even ſo theſe factions, and Church-dividing Contentions, come from a falſe conceit that each ſide is ſo dangerouſly erroneous, as that all good men muſt ſtir up their zeal, and with all their diſputing-ſkill and contending-fervency muſt arm, to defend the Truth againſt them, and to ſave the Church and the Souls of men from the infection of their Errour. Since I ſaw the nature of theſe preſent Controverſies, it filleth me with ſhame and pity to think, what fierce and fiery work… there hath long been, what hatred, ſlanders, ſcorns, perſecutions; what volumnious Contentions, what Snares laid for young Students; what factious Oppoſitions to each other among Paſtors and People, throughout much of the learnedſt part of the Chriſtian World; and all in a dream, for the moſt part about meer names and words, or things, that none of them at all underſtood, nor ever will do in this World. O ſubtile Tempter! O fooliſh men! even wiſe and learned men! O lamentable Churches! O miſerable World!

I pray you tell me what good you look for by this attempt? Do you no… know how many ſuch have come to nothing?

I'le tell you what good I expect. I expect that here and there an impartial ſober Divine ſhould ſearch into and find pacificatory truth: And that divers Students, not yet engaged in any Faction, ſhould diſcern it: And that moſt of the idle, ignorant and factious, who find it moſt for their intereſt, eaſe and honour, to be ſervent for the Opinion which that party holdeth, with whom they do embody, will reproach my ſelf and theſe attempts, and call me a Calviniſt or an Arminian, or one that holdeth dangerous Opinions, and ſelf-conceitedly over-valuing my own apprehenſions, do trouble the Church, and ſtrengthen the Adverſaries by pretended Reconciliation. But I look that thoſe that receive the Truth, ſhould themſelves be ſaved from the guilt of all that uncharitableneſs, faction and injury to others, which is cauſed by mens miſtakes: And alſo that they ſhould be a ſeed of Peace-makers, to propagate Truth to Poſterity, till the Age come when God will heal the Churches, and baniſh contentious Error from among them. And in the mean time, I look for peace of Conſcience in the Service of God, and in his approbation. And it will be reward enough to live out of the fire of Contention my ſelf, and to eſcape the Feaver of that zealous Wiſdom which is earthly, ſenſual, and deviliſh, and with envy and ſtrife doth bring in confuſion, and every evil work: And to feel the ſweetneſs of ſome of the Wiſdom from above, which is firſt pure, then peaceable, &c. J…. 3. 14, 15, 16, 17.

And I am the more reſolved not to omit my Duty through diſpair, for the experience which I have already had. I remember the time when in the Country where I lived, Sacraments and Diſcipline were neglected, through the diſtances of the Epiſcopal, Presbyterians and I…dependants, about the way of Adminiſtration, and we looked ſtrangely at each other. I thought it our Duty to joyn in love and practice ſo far as we agreed, and paſs by the reſt till we could better ſee our way. But many years I thought I ſhould be but ſcorned if I attempted it, and ſo for bore it in diſpair. But at laſt attempting it, almoſt all conſented with whom I did endeavour this way of Concord, and I found no conderable oppoſition, and many other Countries began to follow our example.

After this I ſaw that whilſt Miniſters only preached publickly, and ſpake but now and then occaſionally with the people perſonally, they were ignorant of their own Flocks, and edified them but little, and occaſioned Diſputes about examining them before a Sacrament, and many other inconveniences; And I earneſtly wiſht that they would ſet up the courſe of Catechizing and familiar Conference with all, from Family to Family in order through each Pariſh. And I thought that if a few Miniſters ſhould attempt this without the conſent and concurrence of the reſt, they would but be contemned by the people: But if all the Miniſters of Reputation would conſent, it might happily go on: But to motion ſuch a thing I thought as vain, as to attempt that which ſeemed next to an impoſſibility. But when I did attempt it at laſt, I found little or no oppoſition; but the Miniſters readily conſented, and other Countries began the like; In ſo much that ſome Miniſters of Helvetia ſent to me their deſires, of ſetting on foot the ſame courſe there. Theſe inſtances confute diſpair, the great Enemy of all good, and make me reſolve to do my part in any good Work, and leave the iſſue to God. I confeſs, and its too well known, that ſome attempts ſince theſe for concord between Church contenders in England, were without ſucceſs: But they have afforded my Conſcience that peace, which doth abundantly compenſate all my ſufferings. When I pray, Thy will be done on Earth as it is in Heaven, I mean, Let us with the most holy alacrity perform thy preceptive Will and do our Duty; and then with confidence expect, and with complacence rest in thy diſpoſing Will, what ever be the event.

I have read your Undertaking, and what you have ſaid to A. before, and I think you favour them too much, and make their Errors to ſeem ſmaller than they are.

Do you follow the ſame method that he did. Begin with the ſame Point, and ſuppoſe me an Arminian for this time, and tell me the worſt that you have againſt their Opinions, (not medling with the Pelagians, who deny Original Sin; nor with the raſh or odd ſayings of particular men,) and let us try how wide you can prove the difference here to be, and whether all be not reſolved into the Controverſies of Grace and Free-will.

The firſt Crimination.

I. They deſtroy the comfort of the Faithful, by *Epiſcop. ubi poſtea, p. 414. Nullo modo ſequitur quod ad gloriam prius fuerant electi, quam crederent.denying that God did certainly and immutably elect individual perſons to Salvation.

You miſtake them: They hold that he did certainly and immutably elect particular perſons to Salvation. They hold that he foreknoweth what motions means and circumſtances will eventually take with mens Wills, without ſuch neceſſitation as is inconſiſtent with their liberty; and that to certain perſons he immutably decreeth to vouchſafe them all thoſe means and motions; and that he then fore-ſeeth that De certo numero electorum & ſalvandorum & de hoc opinionem Catharini & Thomiſtarum, &c. vide in Vaſqu. in 1. Tho. q. 23. d. 101. c. 1, 2, 3.theſe will prevail, and that they will believe, yea decreeth that they ſhall thus prevail, and ſo decreeth that all thoſe perſons ſhall be juſtified: And in like manner that he fore-ſeeth what means and motions will prevail to their perſeverance; and that he decreeth to give them thoſe means and motions; and that by them they ſhall eventually preſevere, and ſhall infallibly be ſaved. The moderate Jeſuites, and Arminians, and Lutherans do maintain, and will grant all this. And all this is from eternity. And is not here then an eternal aſcertaining immutable Election of individuals.

The ſecond Crimination.

II. *Qui habet gratiam efficacem ad converſionem aut fidem praeordinatus eſt ad converſionem et fidem. Malderus, 1. 2. q. 111. a. 3. p. 519.They feign an election of †Vid. Epiſcop. Inſtit. Theol. li. 4. ſect. 5. cap. 6. p. 413.Things, inſtead of an election of Perſons; and ſay that Election is Gods Decree to make Faith the condition of Salvation: And ſo they bring in an indefinite Election of Univerſals or Species of perſons; that God decreeth to ſave Believers, & damn Unbelievers.

Doth any Chriſtian deny any of this? *Reſtat ergo ut voluntates eligantur ſed voluntas ipſa niſe aliquid occurat quod delectet, at que invitet animum, moveri nullo m…do poteſt: Hoc autem ut occurrat non eſt in bominis poteſtate, Auguſt. lib. 1. ad Simplician. q. 2.1. That God hath de facto, made Faith the condition of life, is viſible in the Goſpel: And what God did in time, from eternity he decreed to do. Therefore he decreed to make Faith the condition of life.

2. That God hath in his Covenant made a Deed of Gift of Chriſt and Life to all true Believers, and of Heaven to all that ſo perſevere, and that he hath promiſed to perform this Covenant, is viſible in the Scripture. Therefore God decreed to do this from eternity, even to juſtifie Believers, and glorifie perſevering Believers. Make not the world believe that any of us queſtion this.

But if you mean that they deny all other Decrees of Election, and extend it not to individual perſons, you miſtake them. Read but Molina, Suarez, Vaſquez, Penottus, and other Jeſuites, and you will ſee it: And ſo you may in Arminius himſelf. They hold an Election of Individuals, as I laſt deſcribed it, in the way of their ſcientia media, beſides the Election of Believers in general. See alſo our Playfaire on the Point.

The third Crimination.

III. They deny any Decree or Will of God to give men the firſt ſpecial Grace, effectually to make them believe and repent, but only that he decreeth to give them ſufficient Grace, which their own Wills muſt make effectual.*They commonly acknowledge a preventing operating Grace, …quam Deus in nobis ſine nobis operatur. But the Ratio efficaciae is controverted among them.

Did not I tell you that all the Controverſie of Predeſtination is reſolved into that of effectual Grace? Such Grace as he giveth men, ſuch he decreed to give them. This all conſeſs. But what it is that denominateth Grace effectual, we are to conſider in its proper place. Only let me here tell you, that all will grant you (of whom I now ſpeak) that God decreeth to give men that ſpecial Grace which ſhall cauſe them to repent and believe. But on what terms, and in what manner it ſo cauſeth it, is afterward to be handled.*See Ruiz de praedef. d. 6. ſect. 4, 5. proving Faith, Perſeverance, &c. to come from Gods Decree.

The fourth Crimination.

Their Doctrine de *Of this ſee more in the firſt Book.ſcientia media on which they ground their Opinions of Gods Decrees, is many ways injurious to God; and is a fiction not to be made good.

1. I doubt all ſides are over temerarious in their diſtribution of Gods Decrees and Volitions. But, 1. All are agreed that ex parte Dei Volentis, there is no real difference in his Volitions; nor ex parte Dei ſcientis, in his knowledge: For ſo his Knowledge and Will are his Eſſence. 2. All agree, that ex parte objecti cogniti & decreti there is a real difference. 3. All muſt agree, that in Gods Intellection and Volitions as denominated ab extra, viz. ab objectis, there is a relative or denominative difference. 4. Ex parte objecti, there is no man can queſtion, but that this Propoſition [If John have ſuch and ſuch means and helps, he will believe,] doth differ from this Propoſition, [It is convenient and good that John ſhall believe] and from this, [John will believe]. 5. If you are againſt mincing Gods Knowledge into ſuch ſcraps as theſe various objective Propoſitions do infer, you muſt be againſt the old diſtinction, into ſcientiam ſimplicis Intelligentiae, & ſcientiam purae viſionis. For no doubt but God knoweth all things, how various ſoever, un… intuitu, with one ſimple knowledge, ex parte ſui, though it be by our weakneſs denominated many, even innumerable, ex relatione objectiva, vol terminatione rei in quam tranſit. Doth not God with one Act know Convenients, Deſirables and Futures? And cannot I here copiouſly thetoricate againſt you for your first and ſecond ſort of Divine Knowledge, as well as you do againſt them de ſcientia media. 6. It is agreed that God knoweth all things to be what indeed they are▪ and not otherwiſe. 7. It is agreed that God knoweth not as man doth, by Names, Propoſitions, or Syllogiſms; And yet that God knoweth all Names, Notions, Propoſitions and Syllogiſms, with their modes; as they are the meaſures, organs or actings of Humane Underſtandings. 8. †I refer the Reader to Blank, de Concord. lib. cum …ecretis 1. Theſ. 25. &c. where by citing their own words at large, he proveth that the moſt famous and reſolute Antiarminians were for this ſcientia media conditionata, viz. Fr. Gomarrus (Arminius's chief Antagoniſt) in Mat. 11.—21. Antonius Walaeus loc. com. de ſctent. Dei, pag. 160. Paulus Ferrius Scholaſt. Orth. vindic. p. 203, 209, 210. Beſides Rob. Baronius Metaph. ſect. 12. diſp. 2. num. 55, 56. (who in his laſt days was neareſt to the Arminians, as appeareth in thoſe Metaphyſicks.) And Jo. Strangius, l. 3. c. 13. p 675. nameth alſo Lud. Crocius Dyodecad. diſ. 7.It is therefore undeniable to all Chriſtians, that the thing which they call *Could Alvarez and his fellows well prove, that the permiſſion of the firſt ſin is an effect of Reprobation, as the word is uſed (in a fit and ordinary ſenſe) they would do more to overthrow the Doctrine de ſcientia media circa malum, than is yet done. But they fail in their attempts of proving this: Of which after.ſcientia media, is as certainly in God, as is the ſcientia ſimplicis Intelligen…iae & Purae viſionis; that is, [that God knoweth the truth of all true conditional Propoſitions, and knoweth what would be done, by ſuch and ſuch cauſes, or upon ſuch and ſuch alterations, if they were put]. Doth any Chriſtian doubt of this? 9. Whether this ſhould be called ſcientia media is a queſtion de nomine, and that of no great importance, and not at all de re? 10. Whether it be of any neceſſity or uſe in this Controverſie, is a queſtion only about the order of argumentation, as long as the thing it ſelf is confeſſed to be true. 11. Some that caſhier it as an uſeleſs Engine in this matter, do go as far from you as the Jeſuites and Arminians who uſe it; As you may ſee at large in Ludov. à Dola, and Durandus himſelf. 12. I am one that fear Preſumption both in their and your diſtributions of the Knowledge and Decrees of God, and dread the taking of his Name in vain; And one that think that we need not the notion of ſcientia media for our ſatisfactory explication of theſe matters. But as the truth of the thing is confeſſed, ſo if it be applied only to the Doctrine of Reprobation (as it is commonly called) and not (at leaſt always) to the Doctrine of Election, I ſee no untruth that it inferreth, nor no real difference that it will prove between us.

The fifth Crimination.

They deny abſolute Reprobation at leaſt, and ſay that God reprobateth no men, but upon fore-ſight of ſin; And ſo that he hath no Decree that men ſhall ſin, nor that he will permit them to ſin, nor that they ſhall do the act in particular which is ſin: As if God had not decreed the hardening of Pharaohs heart, the ſin of Sihon, of Rehoboam, of the Jews in killing Chriſt, &c.

1. I told you before, Reprobation is a word that ſignifieth ſeveral acts: You dare not but grant them, that God decreeth or willeth to damn no man but for ſin, and as a Sinner: And this is the ſame thing that they mean.

2. If by Reprobation you mean Gods Decree to give them no Faith or Repentance. 1. You muſt prove that God hath ſuch a Decree or Will, for a meer negation, where not-decreeing or not-willing to give them Grace, will do as much. 2. All Chriſtians muſt needs confeſs that God made a Covenant of Grace with fallen Mankind in Adam and Noah; And that no man is now under the meer Obligations of the Law and Covenant of Innocency, which ſaith [Be perfect and live, ſin and die for ever]: And that there is ſome common mercy extended to all the World, which obligeth them to repent in order to Salvation. He ſubverteth Scripture, and all experience, that denieth this. Therefore all muſt grant, that God denieth no ſpecial Grace to any, but the abuſers of this common Grace. And he decreeth to do but what he doth. *Thus our Brittiſh Divi…es at D…rt, in their ſuffrage on Ar. 3. at large.Therefore the perſons whom he decreeth to deny ſpecial Grace to, are none but the abuſers of common Grace, or the rejecters of that ſpecial Grace, when offered.

3. If by Reprobation, you mean Gods Will or Decree to permit them to ſin and periſh willfully; 1. You can prove no ſuch Decree or Will: Becauſe permiſſion being a negation or nothing, needs it not, but will be as certainly without it, upon a bare not decreeing to hinder them from ſin. 2. And you miſtake in ſaying that Arminius denieth it: For he *Arminius himſelf expreſly profeſſeth, that in caſe God permits a man velle p…ccatum, nec…ſſe eſt ut nullo argumentorum gene…e perſuadeatur ad volendum: Exam. Perk. pag. 153. Dr. Twiſſe againſt Hoord, li. 1. pag. 70.ſaith with you, That God decreeth his own permiſſion. 3. You muſt take the pains to diſtinguiſh between negative and privative Unbelief, and between negative and privative not-hindring Sin, or not-giving Faith. Negative Unbelief is meer not-believing: And ſo none of us did believe from eternity, or before we were born: He that is not, believeth not; nor yet in the firſt inſtant that the Promiſe and Law of Faith was given us. Our unbelief is not ſin, or privative, but on ſuppoſition that we are men, and have reaſon, and have a Law and Object of Faith. And Gods permitting us in this negative Non-belief is not to be called a privative, but only a negative permiſſion. For God did from eternity ſo permit me to be no man, and no Believer, and yet this was not Reprobation. So God did negatively not hinder Adams firſt ſin, but not privatively; becauſe not penally for any evil done, nor yet by denying him any thing that was naturally or morally his due: Therefore this was not an Act of Reprobation. But when the New Covenant of Grace, and the common Grace of the Covenant are once given men, and they are obliged to believe, then ſometimes God penally denieth them Grace, and that is all which the Ar…inians put againſt abſolute denial, becauſe this denial is only for mens fore-going ſin. But he alſo ſtill negatively only, and not privatively or penally denieth ſome Grace to ſome, yea to all; And that is only ſuch Grace as is neither morally their due, nor naturally due or neceſſary to them. And the denial of ſuch is no Act of Reprobation.

4. If by Reprobation you mean meerly Gods Preterition; that is, his …t-willing or not-decreeing to give men Grace. 1. Not to Will or Decree, is nothing; And how can you call nothing abſolute or conditional? Theſe are the modes of Acts, and not of not-acting, or of nothing. All grant that Gods non-agency, non-volition, not-decreeing hath no cauſe, much leſs a cauſe in man, leaſt of all in man when he is no man.

5. The word Condition, either reſpecteth, 1. The thing or event willed; 2. Or the Will as relatively denominated with reſpect to that event; 3. Or that Will radically conſider'd in it ſelf. I opened this before, but think of it again; for the reaſon of the diſtinction is very plain. And, 1. God damneth no man but for ſin, (nor privatively denieth any neceſſary Grace, but for ſin.) Therefore the event no doubt is before-hand conditional; that is, dependeth on a condition: God decreeth to damn them if they live and die impenitently, and not elſe. 2. The Act of Gods Will as denominated from the ſaid Effect or Object particularly, may be called, A conditional Act or Will. But if any think otherwiſe it is but de nomine. 3. The radical eſſential Will or Act of God as in himſelf can have no cauſe or condition. *[Though ſin be acknowledged to be the cauſe of the Will of God in Reprobation quoad res volitas, that is, in reſpect of the puniſhment willed thereby, this hindreth not the abſoluteneſs of reprobation quoad actum reprobantis: And unleſs we underſtand the Fathers thus, we muſt charge them with an Opinion, which Aquinas is bold to profeſs that never any man was ſo mad as to affirm, &c.] Twiſſe againſt Hoord, li. 1. pag. 49. But, 1. The actus reprobantis as really diſtinct from the effect, is nothing but Gods Eſſence. And who ſaith that ſin cauſeth Gods Eſſence? 2. And the effect of Reprobation, as it is ſaid to be a Decree not to give Faith or Grace is nothing: and therefore that nothing cannot aptly ſo much as extrinſically denominate Gods Will or Eſſence as an Act. Is not here then a fair agreement? Ruiz. de praedef. d. 9. p. 150. Quantum ad negationem electionis & quantum ad permiſſionem peccati finalis, praed…finitus ſuit reproborum numerus.Dr. Twiſſe denieth none of this.

6. That God willeth or decreeth not ſin formally, all the Chriſtian world almoſt confeſs. And what lovelineſs is there in that only odious thing, that ſhould tempt good people to father it on God, or attribute the being of it to his Will, or to be zealous Reproachers of thoſe that ſay otherwiſe?

7. And if God will and decree the Act not only as an Act in general, but with all its modes and circumſtances, he undeniably willeth or decreeth the form of ſin, or the immediate neceſſary cauſe of it; which in the caſe of efficiency will more evidently appear.

God willeth not the Form, that is, ſin as ſin, and yet he willeth the Act with all its circumſtances.

I have told you before that a wicked man may will ſin in matter and form, and yet not will it as ſin. To will it as ſin, is to take the form of ſin as ſuch to be good, and ſo to be the ratio volendi; which few if any Sinners ever do. But to will both matter and form in one, not as the formal reaſon of Volition, but making total ſin, the matter choſen as a means to ſome other deſired end, this is poſſible for a very wicked man to do: But I think the ordinary caſe of Sinners, is not at all to will the form of ſin, but caſt that by, and to will the matter of it, for the carnal pleaſure or inferior good which it ſeemeth to tend to. Now this excuſeth not their will from wickedneſs, that they will not malum ſub ratione mali, or ſin becauſe it is ſin, but for another end. And ſhall we charge God of willing ſin as the wicked do?

God willeth it to a good end, and they to an evil end.

As evil muſt not be done, that good may come by it, ſo neither muſt it be willed to that end. Man may need ſuch a *Sure Arminius granteth enough, and that which …the…uſ and many School-men deny, and for my par… I cannot grant, when he ſaith, [At per accidens bonum eſt ut malum ſiat, propter Det ſaptentiam, bonitatem & potentiam, ſecundum quam Deus expeccato materiam gloriae ſuaeilluſtrandae ſumit. Eſt ergo peccatum iſto reſpect… non medium per ſe illuſtrandae Gloriae Divinae; ſed occaſio tantum, non data in hunc finem ne que natura ſua ad illum accommodata, ſed a Deo arrepta, & horſum mira arte & landabili abuſu uſurpata.] Armin. exam. Perkinſ. pag. 508. An occaſion it is indeed: but I will not grant that ex peccato God ſetcheth matter for his Glory; nor that by accident it is good ut fiat. Caeterum peccata etiam ſecundum rationem malitiae moralis, objecta ſunt ſeu materia circa quam divina praedeſtinatio verſatur: …o modo quo verſatur poenitentia, Vaſqu. in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 5. d…ſp 93. c. 2.means to his ends, but ſo cannot God. Yea, men have oft good ends for evil Acts: Many lye to glorifie God, and ſin for his Cauſe and Church, and for their own and other mens Salvation. Much of the Blood, and Cruelties, and Superſtitions in the World, have had good ends; which yet excuſed not the things from ſinfulneſs.

God is under no Law, and therefore cannot ſin: But man is.

1. That proveth God no Sinner; but not that he cauſeth or willeth not the ſin of man. 2. Gods natural eſſential Perfection is his Law, and more than a Law to him: And from that Perfection all Laws in the world, that are juſt and good, have their Original; that is, Gods own Laws are the expreſſions of his holy perfect Will and Nature; and Mans Laws are authorized by, and ſubſervient to, and derived from the Laws of God, in Nature and Scripture: So that when the Apoſtle would deſcribe a man beſt and likeſt unto God, he ſaith, That the Law is not made for the Righteous. 3. If Gods Holineſs and Wiſdom make man a Law, forbidding ſin on pain of Hell, the ſame Wiſdom and Holineſs, with his Justice and Mercy, will not will the ſin ſo forbidden, nor cauſe it; nor conſiſt with ſo doing.

It is not the form or eſſence of ſins that God willeth, but the exiſtence, and futurity or event; not ſin, but that ſin be.

I many a year ſtudied thinking to prove that true: But I doubt it is but a game at words, and groundleſs diſtinguiſhing, for a falſe concluſion. For, 1. Sin is a Relation formally; even a diſconformity of an Act or diſpoſition, and ſo of the perſon to Gods Law. It can no otherwiſe be cauſed, but by making the Law, and cauſing the Act in the circumſtances diſconform. God maketh the Law, and God maketh man and his faculties, and God cauſeth the Object, and God permitteth the tempter: If God alſo cauſe the Act in the prohibited circumſtances, he doth all that can be done in the cauſation of ſin: And ſo of his Volitions or Decrees. As for the eſſence of ſin in notion, without the exiſtence, more may be ſaid that God indeed is ſome cauſe of that, without culpability, yea by his Holineſs and Power. For as the Relations of Curvitude and Diſſimilitude reſult from the Relate's fundamentum, as compared to the Correlate, or terminus; ſo he that cauſeth any of them, hath ſome hand in cauſing the Relation as a Relation: And ſo God by forbidding Adultery, Lying, &c. by his Law, doth by Inſtitution make thoſe acts to be ſin; that is, He layeth down the rule from which they are ſo denominated when committed. That Adultery is committed is long of man: that it is a ſin when committed is long of God and man; God by his Law, and man by his Act. So that when you ſay God cauſeth not the eſſence, but the exiſtence or futurity, you are ſo far out, as that leſs of cauſality is to be aſcribed to him, as to the existence, than the eſſence.

2. But what is the exiſtence but the eſſence exiſting, or extra cauſas? And what is it to cauſe ſin, but to cauſe it to exiſt? And what is it to cauſe it to exiſt, but to cauſe it, or give it a being? And what is it to will that ſin ſhall exiſt, but that the eſſence of it ſhall exist? And what is it to will the event or futurity, but to will that ſin ſhall be? And what more can man will or do about it, to ſhew himſelf to be bad, (as Eſtius and others fully manifeſt.)

I cannot but think that God may will that Act which is ſin, ſo he do not will it *Twiſſ. Vind. li. 2. Digreſſ. 4. p. 201. Falſum eſt peccatum fieri ab homin… ut eſt peccatum. Licet ſit peccatum ut fit ab homine, non tamen fit ab homine ut eſt peccatum, hoc eſt ſub ratione peccati. Quanto minus in divinam voluntatem cadit,—cum hoc … in humanam voluntatem competat.as ſin, (and ſo may cauſe it) Quod peccatum, but not Qua peccatum.

Here are three things before us: 1. The common ſubſtratum or …atter of the ſin, which is the Faculty, and the Object, and the Act only in genere act us, or as not cloathed with the forbidden circumſtances. 2. The Act thus circumſtantiated. 3. The Relative form of ſinfulneſs. 1. No doubt but God doth cauſe all the firſt, the Faculty, Object, and the Act as an Act; e. g. In David's Adultery and Murder, and Peter's denying Chriſt, God gave them the Faculty by which they did it: He …pheld their natural power; and as the Fountain of Nature concurred with it in and to the Act as an Act; But, 2. The Act as thus circumſtantiated he neither cauſed nor willed, but permitted only; that is, that David ſhould hic & nunc luſt after her that was another mans wife, that he ſhould vitiate her, that he ſhould chooſe out Uriah to the Sword, that Peter ſhould ſpeak thoſe particular words, &c. In the firſt ſenſe, God willeth the Act which is ſin, and the Faculty which is ſinful; but not in the ſecond as ſinfully circumſtantiated.

And as for your Qua peccatum, I tell you again, few Sinners, if any, will it qua peccatum.

What ſay you to this undeniable Argument: If God will not that Act which is ſin, he willeth almoſt nothing that men do; For we ſin in all ſomeway or other. And ſo God hath little to do in the world.

The laſt anſwer fully ſerveth to this. If we ſin in every Act, yet all that is in every Act, is not ſin, or prohibited. All that is good in the Act is of God, and willed by him. But it is the prohibited circumſtances of the Act, which God doth not cauſe or Will, which morally ſpecifie it as ſin. As when I pray, I ſin in praying coldly, unbelievingly, with wandring thoughts: God cauſeth not theſe, though he cauſe the Prayer. Or to come from compound Acts to ſimple: Thoſe wandring thoughts are not my ſin as they are thoughts, but as they are upon an undue Object. A lye is not a ſin as it is a word, but as this word which is falſe; And ſo in all others.

But ſome Acts are ſimply forbidden in themſelves, and not only in their circumſtances: Therefore if God there cauſe the Act, he cauſeth the Sin.

No Act as an Act is forbidden, but as circumſtantiated, by Object, Time, Mode, Place, &c. Mr. Capell *Lib. of Tempt.chooſeth lying only as an inſtance of prohibitum per ſe. But I anſwered before, that all the Act in lying is Volition, Intellection and Speech; And theſe as ſuch are not forbidden: But only theſe particular words which are falſe. The common inſtance is Odiſſe Deum; But here hatred in it ſelf is not the ſin, but …s unduly terminated on God as the Object. And this God willeth not.

By this you deifie man: For you make him the cauſe of ſomething which God is no firſt cauſe of. And ſo man is made a firſt cauſe, that is a God. For the particularizing of the Object, and the circumſtantiating of the Act, is aliquid, ſomething, and muſt have ſome first cauſe.

The truth is, this one Objection is all that is conſiderable in the whole cauſe of the Dominican Predeterminants: Which I have anſwered in due place; and here briefly tell you, 1. That when two Objects are before me, a commanded and a forbidden one, there is *I have noted after, that Dr. Twiſſe ſaith, [Non neceſſe eſſe ut Deus ſit effector omnis Boni in genere conducibilis; Vix enim datur aliquod peccatum quod non eſt alicui conducibile—ne que neceſſe eſſe ut Deus ſit Auctor omnis Boni jucundi, magis quam ut ſit author peccati:] And theſe have as much entity as Bonum vel malum morale, Armi. dic. Grat. li. 1. p. 1. ſect. 7. pag. 133. It is true that the Will is free ad actum utile & jucundum, in many inſtances: And God maketh the Object, e. g. Honey, or Eves fruit; and God maketh the Appetite: ſo that by making Nature God antecedently maketh the jucundity; that is, that if thou wilt eat Honey it ſhall be ſweet or pleaſant unto thee: But whether thou wilt eat it, he hath left free: ſo that if God alſo cauſed that determinate act, he cauſed all. And ſo it is confeſſed that God maketh the Law, the Object, and the man: and thereby maketh, that if thou wilt cauſe ſuch an Act, ſo diſordered, it ſhall be thy ſin and miſery: ſo that if God would as much cauſe the Act alſo he did cauſe all in ſin. And they that aſcribe the Act in ſuo modo to him, aſcribe all to him. But as to Bonum utile, he ill nameth it Bonum conducibile: For it may be Conducibile ad malum & interitum. But it is not utile, unleſs it be conducibile ad bonum, yea ad fin…m ultimum. For all is not profitable that accompliſheth a mans ends or will. And God is the Author of all true profit to us.no more true natural entity in my chooſing the forbidden one, than in my chooſing the commanded one. To hate God, and love ſin, hath no more natural entity, than to love God and hate ſin: To ſpeak an Oath or Lye, than to ſpeak Truth and Holily: To will a forbidden Act, than to Nill it, and to will a good one. So that it is no deifying man to make him a firſt cauſe, of that which hath no natural entity; that is, of an Act, not as an Act, but comparatively as rather this way than that way exerciſed. And Dr. Twiſſe hence ſaith, That moral ſpecification of Acts, is no true ſpecification of them; And it's true that it is not a Phyſical ſpecification.

2. If you ſay that we have a Liberty ad exercitium as well as of ſpecification, or of Contradiction as well as of Contrariety; Even to will or not will, do or not do: And in this caſe to do or will when forbidden, is more than not to do or will; I anſwer, 1. The Soul is naturally an active vital power, and it is as natural to it to be in act, as to a ſtone to lie ſtill; And the Carteſians will tell you, that Action needeth no more cauſe than Reſt: But I rather ſay, that God never forbiddeth Action in general to the Soul; but only this or that Action upon this or that Object, at an undue time. So that no man ever ſinned by meer Action as ſuch, whether Vital, Intellectual or Volitive. The Action which God commandeth he willeth: The Action which he forbiddeth is but this or that upon an undue Object. Adam had this liberty of contradiction, to will or not to will this particular Act, of eating the forbidden fruit; but not to will or not will ſimply. Now for Adam to will to eat that fruit, inſtead both of nilling it, and of willing to pleaſe God by nilling or refuſing it, had no more natural entity in it, than if he had not willed it, but willed ſomewhat elſe at the ſame time.

3. An Action it ſelf is not properly Res, but modus Rei; and if any ſhould ſay that God is not able to make a Creature, that ſuppoſing God the cauſe of its Power continued, ſhall be the firſt cauſe of its own Act or exerciſe of that Power, he ſaith that which no mortal man can prove. The Glory of Gods Works, is their likeneſs to Himſelf; And as Intellection and Free-will are parts of this likeneſs, we know not juſt how far God can go in ſuch Communications. I ſee no contradiction in it, to ſay that a faculty maintained by God in its natural force, with neceſſary (though not determining) concurſe, can determine it ſelf without any more cauſation. And if it be not a Contradiction, God can do it.

4. But this is all prevented by conſidering, that mans Soul is never out of Act. Its active force is never idle; though it act not always the ſame way, nor with the ſame extenſion or intenſion: ſo that to reduce it into act, is not to reduce it from a meer potentia in actum, but from a power acting one way, or ſlowly, to act another way, or more intenſly.

5. Yea, this is all anſwered by conſidering, that as I ſaid, while God continueth the Soul in its nature, it continueth a naturally active force or power; inclined eſſentially to activity: So that though, I ſay▪ that Action needeth more cauſe than non-action, that is, here done, in God ſtill cauſeth the active diſpoſition. But ſuppoſing that upheld, I ſay, that there is oft more need of other cauſality or ſtrength to keep it from Action, than to cauſe it to act. Whatever the world talketh againſt Durandus, they are never well able to anſwer à Dola (though in ſenſe they that factiouſly oppoſe him mean the ſame as he.) And if a Rock hanged in the Air by ſomething that might be cut off or removed (as a threed), ſuppoſing God to continue the nature of it, and all things elſe, there is more ſtrength and cauſality needful to hold it from falling, than to make it fall, when the threed is cut. It was a work of Gods Power to keep the fire from burning the three Confeſſors, Dan. 3. and the Lions from devouring Daniel, Dan. 6. and the Sea from flowing on the Iſraelites, and the Sun from moving in Joſhuah's fight.

6. And yet conſider that it is not ſo much as an Action, which is but modus rei, that is in queſtion, but only the comparative circumſtantiating of that action; ſo that it is but modus modi rei.

7. And laſtly, The denial of the matter of our power and liberty in this I have elſe-where proved, overthroweth the certainties and fundamentals of all our Religion. Now whether any man ſhould deny all our Religion, and certain neceſſary Truths, for ſuch a metaphyſical uncertain notion as this, that God is not able to make a Creature, that can cauſe a modus modi, in determining its active nature to this Object rather than to that, without Divine predetermination, let ſobriety be judge.

But thus you make man the ſpecifier of his good acts, without Gods determination, as well as of the evil.

Janſenius is in the right in this: we have more need of Divine help to the willing and doing of good than of evil. We cannot do evil without his natural ſupport and concurſe: But we cannot do good, eſpecially ſpiritual ſaving good, unleſs we have moreover his medicinal ſpecial Grace. To the ſpecifying of good actions, there muſt ever concur Gods natural help, Gods gracious help, and mans free-will or ſelf-determination. It is not two or three determinations of the Will, which are made by theſe ſeveral Cauſes; but one determination. So that under God, man is the ſpecifying determiner of his Will to good; or elſe he were not a Believer, nor rewardable or puniſhable. And that he cannot determine his Will to good as well as to evil, proceedeth not from the Original nature of the Will, (for with that ſuch a determination was conſiſtent) but from its Pravity or Corruption. But how Grace and Free-will concur is after to be handled.

Dr. Twiſſe Vindic. Grat. lib. 2. p. 190. (Vol. minoris) hath a full digreſſion (4) to prove that [God willeth that ſin ſhall come to paſs, he permitting it, and ſaith, Noſtri Theologi affirman…: Arminiani …ontificii negant.]*This Digreſſion of Dr. Twiſſe is anſwered in the firſt Book. His Friend Alvarez de Aux. li. 11. diſp. 110. p. 442, &c. diſcuſſeth the Qu. An detur ex parte noſtra cauſa reprobationis: and concludeth that [Reprobatio qua Deus ſtatuit non dare aliquibus vitam aeternam, et permittere peccatum eorum, non eſt conditionata ſed abſoluta, nec praeſupponit in Deo praeſcientiam demeritorum ipſius reprobi. 2. In Angelis qui ceciderunt nu… la datur cauſa reprobationis ex parte ipſorum quantum ad integrum effectum, &c. 3. Et ita de reprobatione parvulorum comparativa: & ita de adultis. 4. Non ſolum comparative, ſed etiam abſolute loquendo, nulla datur cauſa reprobationis quantum ad omnes effectus.] Where note, that he granteth that there is in man a cauſe of Reprobation as to ſome effects, viz. puniſhment; For by a cauſe he meaneth any prerequiſite condition: For no doubt there is no efficient cauſe of any thing in God. And all his ſtreſs is laid on this, that the permiſſion of the firſt ſin, is the firſt effect of Reprobation, and this permiſſion hath no cauſe in man: Ergo Reprobation quoad omnes effectus hath no cauſe in man. But the truth is, 1. A man may put ſuch a ſence on the word Reprobation, as to include what he pleaſe. But it's uſually taken for Gods Decree to damn men, and to deprive them of ſomewhat neceſſary to their ſalvation; and ſo is, 1. A poſitive Act as a Volition, 2. And privative, objectively, and 3. Some unfitly extend it to that which is objectively negative and not privative; 4. And ſome moſt ineptly extend it to that which is negatio actus, no Act, that is, to nothing. And ſo a man that will play with words, may ſay, that 1. Gods non-agere, non…igere, is an Act. 2. That his non-impedire is an effect, which is nothing, and therefore no effect: And Alvarez utterly faileth i… this proof, either that non-eligere is an Act, or permittere vel non impedire an e…ect; or that it is fitly called Reprobation, which hath … privation but a negation for its Object; e. g. that Judas ſhall not be an Angel nor i…eccabil…; but have natural free-will, is no act of his Reprobation: And ſo of the permiſſion of the firſt ſin. Arminius himſelf exam. Per…inſ. pag. 568. ſaith, [Vole…et Deus Iſraelem punire, & Achabum menſuram ſcelerum ſuorum implere—Propria, …mmediata & ad…quata cauſa cur permiſerit, ut Acha… i… cadem perpetraret, eſt illa quam dixi; menſ…ra ſ…elerum implen… erat. … D… …tra peccatum hominis, per aliam …em Nabothum ad ſe evocare.] Which Dr. Twiſſe uſeth through all his Writings againſt him ad hominem, in ſtead of argument. …-thinks this conceſſion ſhould ſeem enough which is too much. And I conjecture, that Arminius wrote it by over-ſight and wo…ld have ſaid, that God permitted Ahab to kill Naboth, becauſe he would … him to … ▪ up the meaſure of his ſin: making permiſſion the res Vo…ta. But all thei… aſſigning Cauſes of Gods … are … …ld; God being above all cauſe….

I wonder not that Dr. Twiſſe holdeth that God willeth it, when he holdeth that he efficiently premoveth and predetermineth the Will to every forbidden act, clothed with all its circumſtances. That which God cauſeth, he muſt needs will. But when he ſaith, Nostri Theologi affirmant, he muſt mean but ſome few, ſuch as Maccovius, Spanhemius, Rutherford, (and perhaps Piſcator or Beza,) of his own mind. But the generality of Proteſtants either are againſt him, or meddle not with it. He that will read Davenant, and ſuch others, ſhall find the difference. I remember but few Engliſh Divines at all that own it, beſides the forenamed and Mr. Norton. But having written both an anſwer to this Digreſſion of Dr. Twiſſe, and to his and Alvarez, and other mens Doctrine of phyſical predetermining premotion; I may pretermit that here.

But by this they make God an idle Spectator of ſin in the World, and ſo deny a great part of his Providence or Works.

1. This belongeth not directly to the Point of Reprobation, but of Gods Works. 2. Take heed of ſuch unreverent words of God: Who will not hold him guiltleſs that taketh his Name in vain. Dare you reproach God as Idle, if he do not all that your ſhallow thoughts will cut out for him?

The blaſphemy is theirs that give the cauſe by their unſound Doctrine, and not mine that do but denominate their conſequents.

Let us try that. Do you believe that God doth as much as he can do? that he made the World as ſoon as he was able, and could have done it no ſooner? or that he is able to make no one Man or Beaſt, or Plant or Atome more than he hath made? nor to do any one action more than he doth?

No: I hold no ſuch thing: For God is Omnipotent and Free.

I pray you then ſtudy it, and tell me, if God be not to be blaſphemed as Idle, for ſuch a total Non-agency or Free-ſuſpenſion of his own Acts as to all ſuch poſſibles; why ſhould you call him Idle, if by the ſame Wiſdom and Free-will he only ſuſpend ſome degree of his co-operation with man in the caſe of ſinning? And if God freely decree that man ſhall be made a free Agent, able (by Gods common generical concurſe as the cauſe of nature) to determine or ſuſpend his own Volitions, without any predetermining efficiency of God. If God will delight himſelf in making ſuch a Creature, will you dare to ſay that he is Idle, becauſe he moveth him not in another manner? you will not ſo reproach a Watchmaker, for not moving the Watch all day with his finger.

I confeſs I cannot anſwer that: But how then is God the Governor of the World, if ſo much ſin be done without his Will and Operation.

The Work of a Governor, as ſuch is only, 1. By Legiſlation, to make the Subjects Duty. 2. And by Judgment to try and decide the caſe of each Subject, whether he do that Duty. 3. And to ſee to the execution of that Judgment. But not to be the determining cauſe of all the Subjects Volitions and Actions.

It is ſo with man, becauſe he can do no more: but not with God.

Indeed God governeth all meer Naturals and Bruits, by phyſical motion, as Engins are moved (as a Clock or Watch) by natural neceſſitation: And ſo he doth the meer naturals of man; (As his Concoction, Pulſe, circulation of Blood, generation in the Womb, &c.) But God having made man an Intellectual free Agent, ruleth him as ſuch, agreeably to his nature; even by moral Agency, by Laws and Judgment: And this is that Regency of which we ſpeak. If you believe not that God is thus the moral Ruler of Mankind, or King of the World; you deny him to be God, and overthrow all Religion and Morality.

But what ſay you to all the Texts that tell us, that God willed and cauſed that which wicked men did; as in the caſe of Pharaoh, Sihon, Rehoboam, Abſolom, the death of Christ, and many others.

One of the greateſt over-ſights of them that thus Object, is, that they diſtinguiſh not between the ſin, and the effect of the ſin; or the forbidden Will and Act of the Sinner as of him, and the reception of this Act in paſſo, in the recipient. God can many ways concur to the cauſing of the reception and the effect, without cauſing the Volition or Act as Agents by a ſpecifying determination. Eſpecially when Cuſtom comprizeth both in one name; dull wits are eaſily here deceived▪ As the words, Murder, Theft, Adultery, Drunkenneſs, &c. do ſignifie both the Volition and Act of the Agent, and the Reception or Effect. Now God can many ways make the ſinful Volition and Act of every ſuch Sinner, to produce that effect which the word Murder, Theft, Adultery, Drunkenneſs, &c. connoteth or includeth, without cauſing the Volition or Act forbidden determiningly.

I pray you ſhew me how?

1. He can by Providence order or ſet the Object in their way. 2. He can fit the Receptive diſpoſition of the Patient to the effect: Moſt of the wonderful Varieties in the World are à diverſa recipientium diſpoſitione. That Act will produce an Effect on a diſpoſed matter, which will not on another. 3. He can rule the Sinners Inſtruments of Action. 4. He can remove other Objects out of the way. 5. He can remove Impediments. 6. He can put in ſome good thought or deſire into the Sinners mind, which ſhall determine the Effect. 7. He can ſuſpend ſome concurſe of his own, which will tend to this effect rather than another.

Give me ſome Inſtances to make it plain.

You need no other than the inſtance of the Murder of Chriſt: 1. When his time was come, he that before oft retired into the Wilderneſs, and lived in Galilee, came up to Jeruſalem in their way. 2. He was willing himſelf to die for man, and ſo did not avoid it. And he went into the place where Judas could find him. And he ſpake the words which he knew that they would call Blaſphemy, &c. 3. God directed the Souldiers Spear to the Region of Chriſts heart, which their intent or aim alone elſe had not done. And he provided a Croſs, and a Simon to bear it, &c. 4. God did not open to them effectually thoſe Reaſons which ſhould have moved them more to deſire the death of Barrabbas. 5. Abundance of Impediments God could have ſet in their way (as the peoples tumult, Pilate's reſiſtance, &c.) which yet he did not. 6. God put into their minds (by moral means at leaſt) the true apprehenſion of the probability that the Romans hearing of a King of the Jews, would turn their jealouſie and fury againſt them, and take away their place and Nation. 7, He ſuſpended that preſerving operation by which he could have kept Chriſt alive on the Croſs, and healed his Wounds, and cauſed him to come down from the Croſs, when they promiſed him then to believe in him; and he reſtrained the Souldiers from breaking his bones, &c. And in all this, there is no Decree, Volition or Cauſation of their ſinful Wills or Deeds.

So in the caſe of Abſalom's Inceſt (or any ſinful Generation,) 1. God order'd it ſo, that his Fathers Concubins were juſt in his way. 2. They had an inviting pulchritude; and an impotency of reſiſting. 3. The ſtate of his affairs was ſuch, as that the action had an appearance of tendency to his ends, by making him ſeem unreconcileable to his Father. 4. And for Achitophel and Abſalom to know the truth of this, was no ſin. 5. Other diverting Objects and occaſions are kept out of the way, &c. Yet in all this God neither willeth nor cauſeth that Will and Act of Abſalom in ſpecie; but the effect.

But by all this you do deſcribe God as plotting and doing the ſame thing that they do. And (but for different words) this cometh all to one.

1. If you think this enough, why doth it not ſatifie you? while it is granted by them that you oppugn. 2. It is not the ſame thing. Is it the ſame thing for Chriſt to be killed, and for the Jews to will and perform his Murder? Is mans Will and Act, and Christs Death the ſame thing? 3. God did fore-know their ſinful Will and Action, and permit it only, but did not cauſe it, but was a concauſe of the Effect.

So God may to a Drunkard, 1. Cauſe ſtrong Drink or Wine to be in his way. 2. And remove ſome ſmaller Drink, that would have ſatisfied him. 3. And remove Diſſwaders and many impediments. 4. And give him money, and facility of obtaining it. 5. And cauſe him truly to know that the Drink is pleaſant to the taſt, exhilerating, ſpiritful. 6. And cauſe it when he hath drunk it, to make him drunken. And none of this is quid prohibitum, or ſin in man: But his ſinful Will and Act, which are forbidden, are preſuppoſed or fore-ſeen.

I cannot ſee but that it cometh all to one, for God to permit that which he fore-ſeeth, and could eaſily hinder if he would.

1. Your conceits that it cometh all to one, muſt not over-rule our certain knowledge of Gods Holineſs, and his true and holy Word, and all the certainty of Religion in the World. 2. We are ſure that God is Holy, a hater of all ſin, and a righteous Judge, &c. And are you as ſure that it cometh all to one? And muſt all men elſe ſay that they are ſure of it too, or elſe be back-bitten, and called Arminians, Jeſuites, &c. 3. Do you conſider what Gods permiſſion is? It is far from a full permiſſion. He doth all that belongeth to a Rector to hinder it. He ſtrictly forbiddeth it by Laws: He openeth the malignity of it. He threatneth miſery here, and everlaſting damnation hereafter to them that will not forbear it or forſake it. He promiſeth all bleſſings in this life, and endleſs Glory in Heaven hereafter, to them that will. He ſendeth his Miniſters, firſt with Miracles, after with ſealed Doctrine and Gifts, to proclaim all this to the World, and to perſwade them: He gave his own Son to condemn ſin in the Fleſh, on the Croſs, and by his holy Life, and Doctrine, and Suffering, to declare the malignity, and hatefulneſs, and hurtfulneſs of it to the World: He ſets up all his Ordinances, Magiſtracy, Miniſtry, Sacraments, Worſhip and Diſcipline to this end: He warneth the World by many Judgments; and eſpecially by the Meſſengers of each mans death; and the conſtant Afflictions which are the fruits of Sin: He obligeth them to Obedience, by multitudes of Mercies: He ſets Heaven and Hell before them daily; and is this permitting it? He doth indeed in this ſenſe permit it, in that he doth not all that he can againſt it, or doth no more than as aforeſaid. 4. If this permitting be all one as loving or cauſing it, then when God made man a free Agent, and reſolved to rule him by moral means, and leave Adam to his own Will, it was a loving and a cauſing ſin. And is every King or Parent a lover of Vice, who doth not all that he could do to reſtrain it?

We do not hold that God loveth ſin, though he will the event, and cauſe the act circumſtantiated.

I know you ſay that neither God nor man loveth ſin as ſin: But whether Dr. Twiſſe & Rutherford ſay not in equipollent terms, that God is the greateſt Lover of Sin in all the world, judge by their confuted words in the former Book. 1. They deny not (nor can do) that Love and Voliti… in God are all one. Gods Love is not a Paſſion, but his Will. 2. They ſay, that God willeth that ſin exiſt. 3. And that as ſummè & unicè conducible to his Glory. 4. And that this great conducibility is a great good. 5. That God is pleaſed finally in what he willeth antecedently. 6. And that as God is infinitely above man in his Being, ſo is he in the greatneſs, and power, and efficacy of his Volitions. 7. And that man loveth not, nor willeth not evil as evil, or ſin as ſin; but for inferior good infinitely below Gods Glory, for which he willeth its exiſtence. And is not this to ſay that he is the greateſt Lover of it that is?

Yet it ſticks with me, that God ſhould be the Omnipotent Governor of the World, and all Sin which is the common work of the World, ſhould be without or againſt his Will: Providence is wronged by this.

You miſtake the matter: 1. That he decreed to leave any men ordinarily to their Free-will, under moral Government, was not from impotency, as if he could have made man no better, or more neceſſary an Agent: But of his Wiſdom and Freedom, by which he made the Bruits without Reaſon, and Stones without Senſe.

2. All ſin is done againſt the Law or commanding Will of God, which determineth only of Duty, and not directly of Event. But it is not done againſt his abſolute Will de eventu: For God is not overcome nor fruſtrate of his Decrees.

3. I pray you once for all remember what I have told you in the firſt …ook, that Gods Providence doth about mans ſin, and then you will …ot ſay that he is Idle, or neglecteth his Government, unleſs he cauſe Sin.

I. It is God that made man an Intellectual free Agent in his own Image, and the Lord of his own Acts, as a Creature morally governable by Laws: And ſo all his free power is of God, who ſtill upholdeth it.

II. As God is the Fons Naturae he is the Principium motus, and he concurreth as the firſt cauſe to all Action as Action in genere, and ſo to all that hath a phyſical entity and reality in ſin: And I do not believe that Aureol…, Dura…d, or Lud. à Dola thought otherwiſe, though they differ in expreſſing the mode of concurſe.

III. God giveth men all the mercies which they turn to ſin, and is the cauſe of all thoſe Objects which they inordinately love and abuſe.

IV. God himſelf concurreth with Sinners, in cauſing the ſame effects which they cauſe alſo by prohibited Volitions and Actions (as in generation, &c.) even when cuſtom giveth one name to the ſin and the effect: And that by all the ways fore-named, and many more.

V. God as the Worlds Governor and Benefactor, maketh mens ſins the occaſions of much good, and ordereth and over-ruleth all Wills and Events, ſo as not to miſs of any of his ends: But will attain all his ends, while the Sinner ſeeketh his own.

VI. All this that God doth he decreeth to do. And all that Sinners do he fore-knew. And neither his Wiſdom, Goodneſs, or Power, is ever over-come by ſin, or defective in any thing about it. And is not all this enough for you, but yet God muſt be the chief willer of ſin.

I confeſs that God can govern the ſinful World by this much.

Take in but one thought more, which I afterward ſuggeſt. Ockam laboriouſly endeavoureth to prove, that the outward Act hath no peculiar ſinfulneſs in it ſelf diſtinct from that of the Will. I have told you my Opinion of his tenet: But this is granted him, that no outward Act hath any ſinfulneſs, but ſecondary and participative, as animated by the Will: and that ſin is primarily in the Will alone. Now in abundance of the Scripture Texts alledged by Dr. Twiſſe and Rutherford, it is not the Will of the Sinner that God is made the Author of, but ſeemingly of the Act, (indeed of the Effect.) Now God cannot be the cauſe of any mans ſin, unleſs he cauſe the ſinful Volition.

But I have anticipated our Diſpute of Providence in all this, becauſe it is here uſually handled as the matter decreed. And therefore when we come thither, you muſt excuſe me from repeating it, or pardon what you put me to do.

The ſixth Crimination.

My next offence againſt them is, that they make Gods Will and Decrees conditional, and ſo make God dependent upon man.

This is opened in the Second Book. *Vaſquez in 1. Tho. diſp. 91. c. 1. [Cum quaeritur an divinae praedeſtinationis detur cauſa? qu. non eſt de actu divinae voluntatis, quatenus eſt ipſa eſſentia divina, & res increata: ſic notant ſcholaſtici omnes—clarum enim eſt divinae praedeſtinationis hoc modo non eſſe cauſam ſed eſt de effectibus. Et perinde eſt quaerere cauſam praedeſtinationis ex parte noſtra, at que cauſam aliquam totiu… effectus praedeſtinationis in nobis quae effectibus illis non ſit annumeranda. Nam ſi quidpiam ponitur effectus praedeſtinationis nequit illud ulla ratione eſſe cauſa totius effectus.—In Deo, 1. Ipſa eſſentia Dei. 2. Reſpectus rationis ad res cognitas et volitas: Hic naſcitur ex objectis: Ejus igitur poſſunt eſſe cauſae.Indeed they differ not from the Synodiſts (or Dr. Twiſſe himſelf, I think,) in this. That is, 1. They hold that God hath made conditional Donations, Promiſes and Threatnings in his Word. 2. And that God may truly be ſaid to Will and Decree his own Word, and all that is in it, with its conditional mode. 3. And as Aquinas and Twiſſe, and all ſay, Deus vult, hoc eſſe propter hoc; ſed non hoc vult eſſe, propter hoc. Gods Will doth not depend on the Condition; but Gods Will is, that the Effect or Event ſhall depend on the Condition. When the Condition is performed, it is not a medium of Gods Volition, but of the Effect. 4. But yet this all muſt confeſs, that as to the bare extrinſick denomination from the Object, as Gods Will is variouſly denominated from things paſt, preſent and future, ſo it may be from abſolute and conditional Grants and Promiſes: which you will not deny but God hath made. 5. And in caſe of ſin and damnation, ſin fore-ſeen is an objective condition, diſpoſition or qualification ſine qua non, of ſuch as Gods velle damnare is immediately terminated on (as they confeſs at the Synod at Dort, and Molinaeus there openeth in his judgment at large.)

But this decreeing upon fore-ſight of ſomewhat in man, maketh God to follow the Creature, and depend upon it.

It maketh him no way dependant at all: For the Creature neither cauſeth any Act of God, nor hindreth him from any thing which he would do. It is his own Will that this ſhall be the Order. But as to Gods Acts or Volitions following mans, 1. They no way follow mans but as Objects; which Objects in their natures and qualifications, relatively terminate, or by connotation denominate Gods Volitions. 2. And do you or any man deny that? Doth not Gods Knowledge Praeteritorum & Exiſtentium ſuppoſe the preterition or exiſtence of Objects. Doth not Gods complacential Volition of the holineſs and glory of his Creatures, preſuppoſe that holineſs and glory? Doth not Gods hatred of paſt or exiſtent ſin preſuppoſe it?

But what can God fore ſee in man, till he firſt decree to cauſe it, or at least decree that it ſhall exiſt?

Sin: He decreeth neither, and yet fore-ſeeth it, (of which, lib. 1.)

The ſeventh Crimination.

*Aliqui ſcholaſtici minus caute de gratia Dei loquuntur. Patres negarent …mne meritum cauſam & occaſionem ex nobis praedeſtinationis noſtrae, ut oftender ent gratiam in tempore omnin… gratis ſint aliquo horum nobis donari, Vaſq. in 1. Tho. qu. 23 diſp. 91. c. 10.But ſome of them ſay, that the Goſpel it ſelf, yea and the firſt ſpecial Grace, is given to men upon merit of congruity, though not of condignity, and ſo is decreed on that fore-ſeen.

1. We mind not what ſome odd perſons ſay, but what the moderate and ſober ſay, whom we are reconciling. 2. But I pray you wherein do you differ from theſe? Is it in words, or ſenſe alſo.

In both: I hold no ſuch merit, fore-ſight, or decree.

Do you hold that there is ſuch a thing as common Grace, diſtinct from ſpecial?

Yes: ſo do all Proteſtants.

Is it not every mans Duty to make a good uſe of the common Grace or Mercies which he hath, as in order to his Repentance and Salvation?

Yes: He that had but one Talent ſhould have improved it.

Is not a man that doth this as far as common Grace will go, more diſpoſed and prepared to receive ſpecial Grace, than one that hath long abuſed it, and derideth God and godlineſs?

Yes, no doubt ſome ſuch are not far from the Kingdom of God.

Have not *Doct. of Faith.Mr. Jo. Rogers, Mr. Tho Hooker, Mr. Rob. Bolton, †Inſtruct. for Comfort. Conſc. Read Vaſq. i… 1. Tho. qu. 23. a. 4. diſp. 9. throughout, proving that Predeſtination to the firſt Grace is not upon foreſeen Merit, no nor upon any fore-ſeen Cauſe ſine qua non, no nor Condition ſine qua non, &c. and againſt Caſſianus, and the Maſſilienſes, and the Greek Fathers, that the initium primae gratiae & praedeſtinationis is not from our free will: Yea, c. 10. oppoſing Scotus, Grabri…l, Cajet. Richard. Durand. Pantuſ. &c. as coming too near the Maſſilienſes: Yea, and all that hold that facienti quod in ſe eſt ex viribus naturae, Deus non denegat gratiam.and abundance of other Proteſtants written much of Preparation to Converſion? And is it not our common Doctrine?

Yes: but what's that to Merit of Congruity?

What do you think they mean by it more than you by Preparation?

They mean ſuch Merit as it is decent for God to reward.

The greater part, I think, by far of the School-men ſay, That the firſt ſpecial Grace is not given upon any Merit at all. And the learned and ſober that thus talk of Merit of Congruity and Decency, mean no more but this, 1. That God who commandeth men ſuch uſe of his common Grace, as a means to ſpecial, doth command no Duty, and appoint no means in vain. 2. That ſuch prepared perſons are fitter for ſpecial Grace than the unprepared, and malignant Enemies of it. 3. That it is Gods uſual way to prepare men by common Grace, before he give them ſpecial Grace. 4. And many ſay that we cannot prove that God uſeth to deny ſpecial Grace, where he giveth the higheſt degree of preparing common Grace. And which of theſe are you againſt?

But doth not God give ſpecial Grace alſo without ſuch preparation?

1. Our foreſaid practical Proteſtants ſeem to think not (to men at age.) For they oft ſay, that it cannot be conceived that a man can value Grace, and come to Chriſt truly, that hath no preparatory ſenſe of ſin and miſery. 2. But I find not that the Papiſts uſually deny it, but that God may give ſpecial Grace to the unprepared on a ſudden. 3. But Papiſt's and Protestants are agreed that this is not his ordinary way. And where do we differ in all this?

But we ſay not that there is any Merit in all this.

Phy on that word Merit! I thought it was but the name that we differed about. 1. And many of themſelves diſlike the name, and ſay, It is unapt: And I think ſo do the Lutherans and Arminians more commonly. 2. And others ſay, that by Morit they mean nothing but a moral aptitude for Reward. And they ſay, that they can find no one fitter name for that than this, which all Chriſtians without known oppoſition uſed for many hundred years after the Apoſtles. And that the Scripture word foreign, worthy, is the ſame in ſence. 3. And they uſually ſay, that ſpecial Grace is called a Reward to the prepared, (if not unaptly, as many or moſt ſay, yet) but in a lower Analogical ſenſe, and not as Heaven is the reward of Holineſs: Becauſe, of the latter, there is a flat Promiſe, and premiant Law or Covenant made by God; but of the former they can ſay no more than as aforeſaid, that God appointeth no Duty and means in vain.

The eighth Crimination.

They make many Elections or Decrees where God maketh but one. *Theſe are but contentions de nomine; as Vaſquez truly ſaith about Durandus Opinion, who 1. d. 41. q 2. n. 11. concurring with other School-men, that the queſtion de cauſa praedeſtinationis, is meant only ex parte effectus, & de toto effectu, an ſcilicet totius effectus detur aliqua cauſa oppoſeth Ockam & Gabr. therein, on the ſuppoſition that glorification is no effect of Predeſtination, but the means to it. And that becauſe Predeſtination is as prudence in a man, which is only circa media, which ſaith Vaſque…, diſ. 91. c. 4. non tam rei, quam vocis quaeſtio eſt. So alſo Bonaventure and Jave differ from others, and ſay, that Praedeſtinationis (quoad effectum) datur meritum congruum ex auxili… gratiae. But its a meer ſtrife about a word, while they take Predeſtination as reaching only to Juſtification, Perſeverance and Glorification; and others take it as extending alſo to preparatory Grace, as Vaſqu. alſo noteth, diſp. 91. cap. 5.As an Election to Glory, and another to Juſtification, and another to Faith and Converſion, and another to have the Goſpel, and another to be redeemed by a ſufficient ſatisfaction of Chriſt, and another to be made men. And ſo vary the Objects.

Some of theſe are Decrees of common Grace, and not called Election by any that I know of, except, as ſome ſay, God choſe Man and not Devils to have a Saviour. But all that I ſpeak of are agreed with you, that Gods decreeing Will is his Eſſence, and that it is but one God or Will in the notion of Eſſence or Principle, or Act as it is meerly Agentis: But they ſay, that if we diſtinguiſh not Gods Decrees by connotation of the various Effects or Objects, our Controverſies are at an end. And I aſk of you, Do not you diſtinguiſh them when you diſpute of their Order, Priority and Poſteriority?

Yes: There is no Order without diſtinction.

Will you not diſtinguiſh Election from Reprobation?

Yes: Though both be Gods Decree.

Will you not diſtinguiſh the Election of Peter, both from the Reprobation of Judas, and from the Election of Paul?

Yes, as connoting various Objects and Effects.

Is there not then the ſame reaſon for diſtinguiſhing Gods Vo…tio… about one and the ſame perſon, as to various effects? As Gods Will that Paul be born, that he be redeemed, that he be endured in his ſin, that he be converted, that he ſuffer, perſevere, be glorified?

Yes: But though theſe be various Decrees, yet not Elections.

Theſe names and words are our unhappy Difference. 1. Remember then that you agree to call them divers Volitions or Decrees; and, I think, no ſober man will fall out with you for the name Election▪ 2. But what reaſon is there in the nature of the thing, why you may not as lawfully and decently ſay, that to chooſe David to be a Saint, a King and a Prophet; to chooſe Paul to be a Chriſtian, a Preacher, and a Marty…, …e various Elections, as well as various Decrees? 3. But my own Opinion is, that the denomination ſhould follow the Object: And therefore where the Objects elected, or the Termini of the Relation are various▪ we may call them various Elections: But when they are diverſified but as parts, we ſhould call them various acts and parts of one Election. And no doubt but our election to have the Goſpel, to Converſion, to Juſtification, to Perſeverance, to Glory, to the Miniſtry, to Martyrdom, &c. may in ſeveral reſpects be named many, and parts of one Election.

I confe… I am convinced that it is a ſhame to make a quarrel of this: becauſe it is about … word, and really there is no difference. But why make they various Objects in one man of theſe Decrees?

What is it but diverſity of Objects that doth diverſifie them? In the execution the caſe is plain. Paul uncreated and creandus was nothing, or no man. 2. Paul before he heard the Goſpel, was a Phariſee that had not heard it. 3. Paul before Converſion and convertendus, was a perſecuting Infidel. 4. Paul jam justificandus was a Believer. 5. Paul jam vocandus ad facrum Ministerium was a Chriſtian. 6. Paul perſevering, and ready to overcome finally, was a faithful holy Chriſtian and Apoſtle. 7. Paul jan… juſtificandus per judicem finaliter & glorificandus, was a perſevering over-coming Chriſtian, Saint and Apoſtle.

The ninth Crimination.

*Bannes in 1. q. 23. a. 2. pag. 264. Jaciendum nobis eſt fundamentum neceſſarium, viz. quod in divinis omnia ſunt ſimul & nihil prius aut poſterius in aliquo genere cauſae, nihil que realiter ab alio diſtinctum, ubi non obviat relationis oppoſitio. At quia non ſimplici conceptu ſed multis & imperfecte nos cognoſcimus, neceſſe eſt diſtinguere, you may ſee a multitude of Authors and Reaſons to prove that Gods Will to all Objects is but one moſt ſimple Volition, in Ruiz▪ de Volunt. Dei diſp. 5. ſect. 6. p. 34.But that's my next offence: that they order Gods Decrees according to the order of Execution, and not according to the order of Intention: when as Quod prius eſt intentione, poſterius eſt executione.

Dr. Twiſſe hath that word, I think, many ſcore, if not hundred times: But it is no fit matter for contention. Do you believe that in God himſelf there is Priority and Poſteriority of Decrees?

Not in time: but in order of Nature or Intention.

How can there be difference of Order, where there is no diverſity?

Though in God there be no diverſity, yet you confeſs there is the Relative connotation and denomination from the Objects?

True: Therefore the Order alſo muſt not be denominated from any feigned diverſity in God, but from the Order of the divers Objects, as one is firſt or laſt, in time, or nature, or uſe. That which is firſt, God decreed ſhould be firſt: That which is propter aliud, God decreed ſhould be propter aliud: And that which is the end of another thing, God decreed ſhould be its end.

But even in God himſelf, we muſt, as men, conceive, that his velle …em, and velle media are not all one, but muſt diſtinguiſh them.

As men, we muſt not judge falſly of God, when we know that it is falſe. If velle finem & media be certainly one without any diverſity in God, ſaying what is in the connoted Objects, and the relation or denomination; how can we without ſin deſtinguiſh where there is no difference? But I pray you tell me, what mean you by Gods intendere …em?

I mean that as every wiſe man doth first will an end, and then do all for it, ſo doth God.

We call nothing to man an end, but ſomething which he wanteth, … at leaſt is without: But God wanteth nothing, nor is ever without his …d, or the accompliſhment of his Will. But of this I crave leave to refer you to the firſt Book, where I have fully ſhewed that God willeth an … improperly, and not as man doth. But tell me, what take you to be ſtrictly Gods end?

His Glory.

What mean you by his Glory?

Our Knowledge, Admiration and Praiſe of his Perfection.

*Conſtat totius effectus praedeſtinationis non eſſe cauſam per modum finis aliquid ex parte praedeſtinati, cum Gloria quae poſſet eſſe ſinis inter effectus annumeretur, Vaſqu. in 1. Thom. diſp. 91. c. 4.Theſe are Acts of men, and can mans Acts be Gods chief …od?

I know ſome ſay, It is the objective Luſter, or Demonſtration of Gods Perfections: Take that if it pleaſe you better.

That Luſter or Demonſtration objective is a Creature: And can a Creature be Gods Ultimate End?

No: God who is the Beginning is the End alone.

God is no efficient Beginning of himſelf or any thing in himſelf: For in God there is no Cauſe or Effects; how then can he be his own End or final Cauſe?*If any man will ſay, that to be generated, and to proceed in the ſecond and third perſons, are effects, I account it preſumption to enter into a diſpu … of it: But it's certain, that nothing in God is effected by a a Creature, nor his Eſſence by himſelf.

He is neither Beginning nor End, efficient nor final Cauſe of himſelf; but of his Works or Creatures only.

Therefore not of his Volitions, or Decrees which are himſelf, not of any of his Actions meerly as Agentis; becauſe they are himſelf: but as they are in the effects. But how can God be the Creatures end? The Creature is no means, either that God be God, or that he be perfect, or that he be glorious in himſelf, or that he be juſt or merciful: It is the higheſt blaſphemy to ſay it.

You know all our Divines ſay, That Gods end in decreeing, is the Glory of his Mercy in the Salvation of the Elect, and of his Juſtice in the damnation of the Reprobate.†Bannes's order is thus, 1. q. 23. a. 2. pag. 266. [Actus q…os nos poſſumus imaginari eſſe in mente divina tam communes quam proprio… circa praedeſti…atos hi ſunt: Cognovit Deus omnes homines poſſibiles; ex quibus quoſdam dilexit quantum ad eſſe naturae, & hos voluit creare: ex quibus adhuc quoſdam dilexit ad finem ſupernaturalem, quae divina electio dicitur; quatenus ex aliis quos creare volebat iſ…os ſeperavit ſibi; & deni que hos electos praedeſtinavit; hoc eſt, providet & ordinavit ut per quaedam media ſupernaturaliter efficaciter pervenirent in finem ſupernaturalem]. That nothing but God himſelf can be the objectum formale of Gods Volition, ſee Ruiz de Vol. Dei diſp. 15. ſect. 6. p. 165. Ruiz de V…l. Dei diſp. 22, 23, 24. pretendeth to more accurateneſs than others in ordering Gods Decrees, and other Acts. Denying with others all real diſtinction, but aſſerting a diſtinction ſecundum rationem ratiocinatam, and would perſwade us that he knoweth what that is (what the fundamentum in re is) he refuteth many others Opinions de ratio ordinis (Molina's Vaſquez, Zumel, Dried…s, &c.) eſpecially Aureolus, and concludeth (ſect. 5.) that inter divinas operationes ordo prioris & poſterioris ex eo eſt, quod …nus actus ſit requiſitus ad alium, vel ſit, alterius ratio vel conditio: He confeſſet… all theſe to be fictious, and that there is no real diverſity, (and diſp. 11. ſect. 1. on the qu An in Deo ſit proprie libera Volitio effi…ax) dicit (Nullius animus tranquilla pa…e qui…ſcit ſolutionibu… hac uſ que inventis, nec aliis ſe ſatisfaciſſe put at, qu… nec ſibi ſatisfecerit.) Yet againſt Ockam he would have theſe fictions thought to be of very gr… uſe: when as all his prophane tremendous preſumptions are but enquiring after a cauſe of the firſt cauſe, under the name of Ratio vel conditio, while he denieth that indeed there is any cauſe. Their queſtion is, why Gods Will is terminated on this Object rather than on that? And is not this to ask a cauſe of it (of the firſt cauſe); ſay but that Deus volitione …nica vui… diverſa diver ſi m…de ordinata, and you have ſaid enough? Had they meant only the Ratio receptiva increatis, & ratio conſtitu…iv… alli…m divi…arum ut in effectis vel p…ſſo & … extrin…e…u… denominat…rum, it had been ſenſe. But in God himſelf there is diverſitas rationum volendi.

Here are a multitude of Errors or Ineptitudes together. 1. That the name of the means (Salvation and Damnation) is put into the end. 2. That one little parcel of the means only is put, as if it were the whole. If we muſt ſpeak ſo low, as to aſcribe an End to God, we muſt ſay, that Ultimately he hath but one: And that one muſt needs be more than the glory of his Mercy and Juſtice towards man. Is all the reſt of the world Angels and Men, Heaven and Earth, and Chriſt himſelf, no means in which he will be glorified? 3. That quid creatum is made Gods Ultimate End: For this Glory of his Mercy and Juſtice is no other, but a created demonſtration or apprehenſion of it. 4. And why are Mercy and Juſtice only named, as though the glory of his Power, Wiſdom and Goodneſs it ſelf were here no part?

If you like none of this, tell me your own ſenſe of it.

1. I ſuppoſe that Intendere finem is ſpoken of God only in a tranſcendent ſenſe, and not at all as it is of man. And, 2. I ſuppoſe that Gods Being hath no Beginning or End, nor any thing in him. 3. I ſuppoſe that Gods Free-will, by communication of Eſſence, and of Perfections, is the Original free Cauſe of all things. He neceſſarily is what he is: but he freely made what he made. 4. Therefore I ſuppoſe that the ſame Will which is the Beginning of all, is the End of all: So that Gods Will as efficient is the Beginning, and Gods Will as fulfilled and pleaſed is the end of all his Works. 5. This may be called finis Dei improperly after the manner of men, but tollerably and with the leaſt impropriety, and ſuch as we muſt uſe. 6. This is more properly the commanded and appointed end of the Intellectual Creature, and analogically the end that all things tend to. 7. God is never without his end: For his Will is ever fulfilled and pleaſed; For pro hic & nunc he willeth nothing but what is. 8. But there are degrees of Perfection in Gods Works, and the narrow Creature hath lower ends beſides the Ultimate, inſeparable from it. And ſo man muſt intend his own felicity, and above that the perfection of the Univerſe, and above that the complacency of Gods Will. 9. And becauſe all the parts are to contribute to the perfection of the whole, and ſo all the parts of the means do make up one perfect Univerſe, in the ſtate of Glory, and there and then the whole world ſhall bear the livelieſt impreſs of the Divine Perfections, this Impreſs or objective Splendor and Image of God, together with the active Viſion, Love and Praiſe of the glorified (which is part of the ſaid Image or Impreſs) is called Gods Glory: which ſhineth in part in every part, and perfectly in the whole perfected world. 10. So that in a word, the perfection of the Univerſe being the medium compleated, is called Gods End in the lower material notion: And the fulfilling and pleaſing of his Will in the perfected world, is called his End in the formal and higher notion. And we can ſay no more of Gods Velle finem.

I confeſs your explication of Gods End and Intention ſeemeth to be most agreeable to the Principles of Theology.

And do you think that it is wiſe and Chriſtian-like dealing to fill the Church with Contentions, and make others odious to the people, about the Order of Gods Decrees ſecundum intentionem, while men know not whether God do Intendere finem or not? or what his End is? or what his Intention is? or while they miſtake all?

Will you make as many fines operantis and Intentions in God, as there are fines operis, and as the means or Creatures are made for one another as an End? or will you aſſign to God one End alone?

You know that in that our Divines do differ. Some that write of the Order of the Decrees, make Gods Glory the end of Salvation and Damnation, and theſe the end of Grace and permitted Sin, and theſe the end of Creation, &c. But Dr. Twiſſe writeth againſt them (even Perkins and Beza, &c.) maintaining that God hath but two Decrees; one de fine, and the other de mediis; and that his End is but one.

If you are no better agreed, bear with others that differ from you. But either you diverſifie Gods Decrees by their connoted Objects, or as divers intrinſick real Acts in God. If you ſay the latter, your own Party, and all the School-Divines, will ſay you blaſpheme, by making God diviſible or compounded, and will call you Vorstians. If the former, how innumerable muſt you make Gods Decrees? And why may not the Order as well as the ſpecies and number of them be ſo denominated from connotation? And then you will ſay that God firſt intended to make man as the end of inferior Creatures, and after decred to make them for man. And he firſt decreed that there ſhould be fruit, and then that there ſhould be a Tree to bear it, and then that this Tree ſhould be rooted in the Earth, and then that it ſhould be planted, and then that there ſhould be Earth and Water to nouriſh it, &c. And if poor man be but a little part of Gods Creation, unleſs we could anatomize the whole frame of the Univerſe, how ſhould we know juſt what place and order our own intereſt hath in ſuch a frame among ſo many millions of millions of Creatures, of which Angels and the ſuperior World are nobler than we? Is he to be numbred with the Churches Friends, who will make us ſuch work, and lay mens love and peace upon it?

But what have you againſt the ſimpler way of two Decrees?

In God thoſe are not two but one: But I ſee not, but ſpeaking after the manner of men it may paſs, as the ſafeſt diſtribution by connotation and extrinſick denomination, if he had but rightlier deſcribed thoſe two. Of which I ſaid enough before.

How would you then denominatively order the Decrees according to the order of Intention?

According to Dr. Twiſſe's own rule and method, all that you can by that Order infer, is but this, that the infinite Creator firſt intended the pleaſing and fulfilling of his own Free-will as his Ultimate end, and next decreed to produce all things as he produceth them to that end, and ſo is pleaſed in all things in their proper time and place; but further to bring all this Univerſe finally to perfection, and in that perfection his Glory or Image ſhall be perfect, in which he will finally be pleaſed: And the glorification of man is a little part of that Perfection. And what will this do to the promoting of your Opinions?

But I further aſk you, Is it not certain that God decreed to make all things in the Order in which he maketh them in time?

Yes: If you ſpeak of the Order of Execution.

And is not this Order of Execution needful to be obſerved?

Yes, no doubt.

And is not this Order of Execution eaſier to be underſtood?

Yes; for we are little diſagreed about it.

If then this Order be plain, and ſure, and needful, and that which we are all agreed in; and your Order of Intention be either none, or uncertain, and paſt the reach of mortal man, judge you what Order we ſhould treat of, and who are the wiſe and peaceable men?

Yet the School-men before us have treated of that Order.

Davenant tells you, That Scotus was the firſt Artificer of that Invention. Whether that be ſo or not, it's ſure that you uſe to declaim againſt the School-mens prophane curioſity and audacity: And where (except about the Trinity) hath it been greater than in this? And you know that few of them that give you the ordinem ſignorum, as they call it, do agree in the ſame Order; (As I have ſhewed in ſome inſtances, lib. 2.) And if you will condemn your ſelves in condemning them, why ſhould we think that you have hit of the right Order any more than they? We have ſeen Beza's, Gilbie's, Perkin's, and we have ſeen Twiſſe's (much better,) and we have ſeen the Lutherans and the Arminians, and we ſee little agreement. Do you think that the Synod of Dort, that leaveth out ſuch things, was not as wiſe as any of you all? Or was not Davenant as judicious as any of you in theſe Controverſies, who openly and largely profeſſeth, that he is not one of thoſe Privy-Counſellors of God, who know in what Order things lie in his Mind, and can aſſign each Act its proper place; but he thinketh this Order of mental Intention in God to be utterly unſearchable, and the Order of Execution only fit for us to treat of. See his Diſſert. de Praedeſt.

The tenth Crimination.

They ſeem to err much, in that they deny the eternal Cauſe of eternal Vaſqu. 1. Tho. q. 14. d. 65. c. 4. vainly ſaith, Ens quod in univerſum eſt objectum intellectus non tantum eſt praeſens, ſ…d etiam futurum, preteritum & poſſibile & quod futurum eſt aliquid, contrary to common reaſon: For theſe are all termini diminuentes as to ens reale: That which only was or will be, Is not indeed, 1. The Idea in a mans mind de futuro, & de praeterito is ſomething. 2. And ſo is the Propoſition, Hoc ſuit, vel erit. And hence men falſly ſay, that futurum is aliquid; when it is only an aſſertion that aliquid erit. So alſo Aquinas ſaith, 1. diſ. 38. a. 4. & de verit. q. 1. a. 8. That quae non ſunt actu, aliquo modo ſunt, in potentia Dei vel creaturae ſunt, vel ſunt in potentiae opinandi vel imaginandi, vel quocun que modo ſignificandi: which is but to abuſe men with words, & play with the equivocation of [ſunt]. Poſſe vel potentia, opinio, imaginatio, &c. are ſomething: But muſt nothing therefore be ſomething? His queſtion is, Utrum ſcientia Dei ſit non-entium: And if he had no better way to prove the affirmative, than by ſaying that nothing is ſomething, it's equal to ſilence. Vaſqu. ibid. confeſſeth, Intellectui Divino ſecundum ſe, nunquam res objicitur niſi ſicuti eſt: Unde quod non eſt, non objicitur ſicuti eſſet. And here the School-men contend, An Deus cognoſcat actu infinita poſſibilia & futura: Aquin. Cajet. Ferrar. Bonav. Richard. Waldenſ. Vaſqu. &c. affirm it. Durand. Almain. and many later deny it. Blank de concord. lib. & decret. 1. n. 58. well noted that futurity may be with out a Decree to predetermine the Agent: For ſin is ſo, e. g. hating God, blaſphemy. And that Dr. Twiſſe ill maketh Gods Decree the ſole cauſe of futurity. As to the preſumptuous queſtion, how God knoweth future things, beſides that there is no time to meaſure Gods Acts by, there need no other anſwer than that Gods infinite Underſtanding knoweth all that is intelligible. But futures as ſuch are intelligible.—Quid divinus intellectus infinitae …tutis eſt: quicquid intelligibile eſt neceſſarie deb…t amplecti & intelligere: At futura contingentia intelligibilia ſunt, …o quod ſunt determinatae veritatis, Vaſq. 1. Tho. q. 14. d. 65. cap. 4. But whereas he himſelf alſo defendeth that futures are known in decretis divinis, he is forced to ſay that ſin is known in Gods Decree of the materiale peccati: where yet in his Doctrine of Simultaneous Concurſe, he maketh Gods concurſe to be but part of the determining cauſe, which would not without mans free co▪ operation do it. Therefore the Decree of a half cauſation is not enough to infer the effect.futurition; (while they make ſin that is eternally future, yet not to be eternally willed or decreed by God to be future.) How can things paſs without a cauſe enumero poſſibilium, in numerum futurorum?

Alas! what men, and what Engines muſt the poor Church ſuffer and be tortured by? ſure Paul fore-ſaw theſe things, when he fe…red leſt as the Serpent beguiled Eve, (with a promiſe of being as God in Knowledge) ſo he ſhould draw us from the ſimplicity that is in Christ. And when he warned us to beware lest any beguile us with vain Philoſophy, according to the rudiments of the world: And when he telleth us of a Wiſdom which is fooliſhneſs with God; and of ſome who profeſſing themſelves wiſe, became Fools.

Your Doctrine ſoundeth ſo unlike to Chriſt's and his Apoſtles, that I muſt crave your Interpretation of it, that we may underſtand before we wrangle. I pray you what is it that you call Futurition?

The name tells you what it is. You know what we mean by it.

I know that it is Grammatically a Noun Subſtantive, but doth it ſignifie ſomething or nothing?

It ſignifieth that ſomething will be hereafter.

Now you turn it to a Verb: But is futurity anything or nothing?

Suppoſe, I ſay, It is ſomething?

If it was eternally ſomething, it is God: For nothing elſe was eternal.

Suppoſe, I ſay, It is nothing?

If it be nothing, it is no effect, and therefore hath no cauſe, and therefore no eternal cauſe.

Suppoſe, I ſay, that it is neither ſomething nor nothing: You know there are five ſorts that Burgerſdicius placeth between Res and Nihil, and futurity may be one of them.

Five ſorts of what? You cannot tell. If you take Ens or Res limitedly for leſs univerſal than Aliquid, or a Species of it, you may ſay that Datur medium inter Rem & Nihil. But ſure eſſe and non eſſe are contradictories. And taking Aliquid, Ens or Res in the moſt univerſal notion, it is a contradiction, and a denial of the firſt principle of Knowledge, to feign a medium: Burgerſdieius'es five Non-entia quae non ſunt nihil, are Privatio, Denominatio externa, ens Rationis, Relatio, modus entis. And all this cometh from the pittiful narrowneſs of mans mind, that can know nothing at all by one ſimple Conception, but by parts; And then it frameth ſeveral names, according to all its inadequate Conceptions, as if they all ſignified ſeveral ſomethings. 1. Privatio is it ſelf a compound notion, including, 1. The abſence of the form. 2. The debitum ineſſe. 3. The matters capacity of it. The firſt is Nothing: the ſecond is a Relation (of which after): the third is the nature or mode of the matter, which is an inadequate Conception of Ens.

2. Denominatio externa, ſignifieth, 1. The Denominabilitas. 2. Or the actual denomination. The firſt is conſiderable, 1. Qua talis. 2. Or in cauſa velratione. Denominability in ſe is nothing elſe but an inadequate Conception of ens rationis: For I can call nothing by a Name. But the Ratio denominandi may be ſomething; and as now intended is Relation. 2. And the actual denomination is Res, that is, Verbum vel mentis veloris.

3. Entia Rationis taken effectivè & ſubjectivè are confeſſed to be real Entities: but objectivè it is denied. All Objects are ſo called, 1. As aptitudinal. 2. Or actually apprehended. 1. As aptitudinal they are not entia rationis, but ſomething antecedent. 2. As actual, they are quid reale: For they are conceptus humanus inadaequatè expreſſus, ſub ratione materiae. A thought or conception is an Act which is quid reale: And every Act conſiſteth of the modus agentis and the Object, which as ſuch is quaſi materia, and is eſſential to the Act: ſo that even Genus and Species, as in mans thoughts are quid reale. And out of mans thoughts, they are Relation or nothing.

4. Relation is a ſomething or nothing, which keepeth an exceeding room in all our Sciences. But when anatomized, it is conſiderable, 1. As in extrinſick Objects. 2. As in the mind of man conſidering them: 1. In the Object there is, 1. Quid abſolutum, that is, the ſubject, the terminus, the fundamentum, cum ratione fundandi. 2, The formal Relation. The firſt is quid reale, as is confeſſed. The ſecond is nothing beſides the firſt. It is nothing but rerum comparabilitas: And that comparability is nothing, beſides the quid abſolutum, or thing it ſelf. When an Egg is new laid at the Antipodes, an Egg here is newly related to it ut ſimile: But nothing is added to this Egg; But only now the mind of man can compare it with that at the Antipodes, and conſider, that in quantity, figure, colour, &c. they are like: which likeneſs as in ovo is nothing beſides the ſame quantity, figure, colour, &c. themſelves. But by thoſe Realities, it is capable of being compared, and the mind can raiſe an univerſal notion of both, as compared. 2. But this comparing Act of the Underſtanding is quid reale. So that Ockam in his Quodlibets hath well proved in many queſtions, that Relation is nothing beſides the quid abſolutum in re & in mente humana. And though his Gregor. Armin. at large diſpute that non-entia may be related, yet it is on this ſuppoſition, that non-entia may be imagined, and be the matter of a thought or conceptus, and as ſuch they are entia rationis realia; that is, that conceptus is quid reale. But beſides that, the Relatio non-entis is nothing but nonens, and a meer nihil.

Yet I confeſs that Rerum ordo is the ſum of Relations and of morality; and that this Ordo is exiſtent whether we think of it or not: But this Ord… is nothing diſtinct ab abſolutis & rebus ordinatis, cum omnibus ſuis modis & circumſtantiis realibus. Things are wonderfully diverſe by diverſity of quantity, quality, diſtance, &c. But this diverſity is nothing beſides the ſaid abſolute quantity, quality, diſtance, &c.

But I muſt not write a Logick for you: I am by this much remembred, that, as David ſaith, man walketh in a vain ſhew or Image; when multitudes of nothings go for ſomethings, and fill up ſo much of his thoughts and life, and conſtitute ſo much of his Learning which he glorieth in.

But you have ſaid nothing yet of the fifth, which is Modus Entis. And futurition may be reduced to that

A true modus entis is quid abſolutum & reale, and the ſame that we call an Accident: And Gaſſendus chooſeth to call Accidents, Modes or Qualities: And they are not really diſtinct from the ens cujus modi ſunt, if they be intrinſical Modes or Accidents, (as quantity, quality, action, &c.) But they are ſmall inadequate conceptions of the thing modified: not conceptions of its conſtitutive chief denominating part, but yet conceptions of quid entis, ſo that an entire perfect conception of the thing, would comprehend or include the conception of the Mode or Accident. So that they that deride the name of Pars accidentalis as put for Accidens, ſpeak not always ſo good ſenſe as they think they do.

But ſuch Accidents or Modes as are extrinſical to the thing, (as Cloaths to the Body, Servants, Lands, Riches, Honours,) are not properly Modes and Accidents at all, but Adjuncts.

Apply this to the point in queſtion, (of Futurity.)

If Futurity, as is ſaid, be an eternal Being, it is God: If nothing it hath no cauſe. If it be called Quid medium, the very Quid is a contradiction to it. To begin backward, 1. If it be Modus Entis, from eternity, it muſt be Modus Dei: For there was no ens ab aeterno but God: If it be Modus Dei, it is Dens: For all in God is God.

2. If it be Relatio, it is abſoluti alicujus relatio. If ſo, either of ſome real Being, or of nothing. If of a Being from eternity, it muſt be a Relation of God to the thing future, in that he either willed or fore-knew …. For nothing was eternal but God. And if ſo, that Relation of God to the thing future is ſomething or nothing. If ſomething, it is God himſelf, and ſo hath no cauſe. If nothing, it is no effect, and ſo hath no …. But if it be the Relation of nothing, viz. of the thing future, (to an Intellect poſſible or real that could know it future) than it is nothing it ſelf: For the Relation of nothing cannot be ſomething, a real accident without a real Subject.

3. If futurity was from eternity ens Rationis, it was Rationis Divinae; for there was no created Reaſon ab aeterno: And if ſo, either Aptitudinal or Actual. If Actual, it was God: For all his Idea's and entia rationis (for I ſuppoſe you one of the bold men that affirm entia rationis to be in God,) muſt needs be God himſelf, and ſo have no cauſe. If Aptitudinal, and not yet in mente divina, but objecta poſſibilia; either they were ſomething or nothing. If ſomething, then there was ſomething eternal beſides God, which is not ſaid by any of us. If nothing, to call them future, ſignifieth no more, but that Gods infinite knowledge extendeth to things that are not as if they were, which is true: But futurity it ſelf being nothing, hath no cauſe.

4. If you ſay that they are extrinſical Denominations, it is ſomething or nothing that is denominated future. I know you will ſay, It's nothing. If ſo quatenus extrinſical to God, it was from eternity nothing, which you call a Denomination. But if you mean the Act of God denominating, it was quid reale, that is God himſelf, who hath no cauſe. But yet this is the true foundation of the notion. Becauſe Gods Knowledge of all things, and his Will of all good things, extendeth to all intelligible and amiable Objects to all eternity; therefore we firſt juſtly denominate God to be an Intellect that knoweth what will be, and a Will which willeth all that he will do; And thence we ſay that the thing was future from eternity. And ſo from an extrinſick Denomination of Gods Mind and Will we run on to give names to numberleſs nothings, and then talk, and write, and make Sciences and Diſputes of them in our dreams, as if they were ſomethings. And this is the work of the fantaſtical World. And then we confound poor Scholars with the names of Entia Intentionalia, & Species, & Entia rationis, & Univerſalia. And with Ariſtotle, Themiſtius, &c. ſay that the Intellect is all things that it knoweth, &c. O what work have vain notions, and be-fooling Philoſophy made not only in the World, but in the Church, and among thoſe that call themſelves Orthodox, and cry up the ſufficiency of the holy Scriptures! (The notion of Privations, I need not here apply.)

But things future are future, whether any one think of them or not.

And ſome men will trouble and deceive themſelves and others, what-ever is ſaid to them. It is certain, that poſſible and futurum are termini diminuentes & negantes quoad exiſtentiam. That which only will be is not. Therefore the name ſignifieth nothing, but that the thing will be without any connotation of any cauſe of it; but it implyeth that there is ſome fundamentum vel ratio, which might warrant any perfect exiſtent Intellect to ſay, It will be. And there needs no more to that, but the eternal perfection of Gods own Intellect. But I have ſaid more of this lib. 1. and thefore here will add no more.

But how is it poſſible for God to fore-know that ſin will be, unleſs he firſt Will or Decree that it ſhall be (by his permiſsion)?

I abhor the queſtion and ſuppoſition. That ſuch worms as we, who know not what Gods Intellect or Will is, ſhould preſume to conclude that he cannot fore-know ſin, unleſs we can underſtand how he fore-knoweth it; yea, unleſs it be by a way that a man could fore-know it. When it is a wiſer way of arguing, to ſay, [This is the way that man knoweth by, and that man can comprehend: Ergo it is not like to be the way of Gods fore-knowledge.] But remember one thing, that here you plainly make God to will the form of Sin as well as the matter? For is not the form future?

Yes.

And is not Gods Will his Love?

Yes.

And do you not make God then to love the very form of Sin, which yet you ſay that no wicked man loveth?

No: It is but the exiſtence of the form that he willeth or loveth.

O excellent diſtinguiſhing! He willeth not the form of Sin, but only willeth that it be, or exiſt. The form is the Eſſence: He willeth that the Eſſence exiſt; but willeth not the Eſſence, which is nothing, but as exiſting! But do wicked men will any more, or ſo much, as that the form exiſt?

Dr. Twiſſe ſaith, No.

And if it were but the Act that exiſted, doth not Gods Law make it ſin, by forbidding it, and ſo cauſe the Eſſence?

Yes.

And if you ſay that God willeth the exiſtence of the form of Sin, why ſay you that he doth not cauſe it? Is not his Will effective? or is it any more contrary to his Holineſs to cauſe it, than to will or love it?

He cauſeth the exiſtence, but not the form or existence.

What jugling is this in ſuch tremendous matters? 1. What is it to cauſe the form, but to cauſe that it exiſt. To cauſe it to be, is all the cauſing that it can have. 2. And you confeſs that Gods Law, by forbidding it, maketh it ſin in ſpecie when it exiſteth. Remember that you ſay that it is not only the matter, but the form of ſin, which God willeth and cauſeth to exiſt. And is it not a contradiction to call it evil, and yet ſay that God willeth it? when his Will is the Rule of Goodneſs?

It is not evil to God, but to us.

So Dr. Twiſſe ſaith: And to be evil to us (even mans ſin or damna…n) is not evil to God. And ſo God is the great Lover of Sin and Damnation. But why then is he ſaid to hate it? And is it not an Enemy to God, and contrary to his Holineſs? Why did Chriſt die for that which God ſo loved?

Sin is nothing, and therefore God cauſeth it not.

1. Relations and Privations have their Cauſes, and ſo hath Sin. 2. Elſe man cannot be condemned for cauſing it.

The Synod of Dort and Reformed Churches teach no ſuch Doctrine: But it … ſuch as you that tempt the Arminians to revile them, and ſay, that you deſcribe God in the ſhape of the Devil, and much worſe, as loving and cauſing ſin and miſery more than he: that ſo the love of God may be extinguiſhed.

I think we muſt leave theſe Mysteries to God.

But, good Brother, though I have ſtopt your mouth and cenſures of your Brethren, in this and ſuch matters, do you expect that every …oneſt Chriſtian muſt be able to diſcuſs all your Logical Fallacies, or elſe go with you for unſound and heterodox? And have you dealt fairly by the Church of God, to borrow from the School-men ſuch ſnares for mens Conſciences? And muſt every man be perſwaded that God is the greateſt lover and willer from eternity of every wicked Act, that is not able to anſwer your ſmoaky Sophiſms about futurition and its eternal cauſe, with ſuch like. I tell you the Serpent hath beguiled us as Eve, and turned men from the ſimplicity that is in Chriſt.

I pray briefly give me the ſum of what you drive at.

The ſum is, That though every Party, and almoſt every perſon of each Party, have odd notions of his own, and peculiar weapons, to wound his Brothers Reputation with, and militate againſt Love and Concord, and manifeſt the Pride of his ſelf-conceited Underſtanding; yet all ſober Chriſtians, I think, are agreed in all this Controverſie of Gods Decrees, in all that is truly neceſſary to our brotherly love and peace. That is, All grant that God decreed to do all that he doth, and to give all the Grace and Mercy which at any time he giveth, whether to all or ſome. And that he abſolutely and properly decreed no more. (But improperly he may be ſaid to will an event in tantum, when he willeth only to do ſo much, or ſo much which naturally conduceth towards it, though he know that it will never come to paſs.) But what it is that God actually doth or giveth in time is all the controverſie, which is to be ſpoken of in the third Chapter. And were it not for your tenaciouſneſs of contentious notions, I needed to have ſaid no more than theſe few words here of Gods Decrees.

Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Conference 2

p. 24THE Second Days Conference OF PREDESTINATION. Between C. (a Calvinist) and B. (the Conciliator.)

The firſt Crimination.

The ſecond Crimination.

The third Crimination.

The fourth Crimination.

The fifth Crimination.

The ſixth Crimination.

p. 39The ſeventh Crimination.

The eighth Crimination.

The ninth Crimination.

p. 45The tenth Crimination.

THE Second Days Conference OF PREDESTINATION. Between C. (a Calvinist) and B. (the Conciliator.)

The ſeventh Crimination.

The tenth Crimination.