Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable — Richard Baxter

Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable · Richard Baxter

THE Firſt Days Conference ABOUT PREDESTINATION.

I perceive by your Writings, that you would make men believe, that the differences between the Arminians and Calvinists, are matters of no ſuch moment as they are commonly judged to be, *Iſta quae nullus in dubium vocant, Chriſtianis omnibus mee judicie ſufficere deberent abſquo ulteriori & curioſiori inveſtigations, tum intimae naturae, libertatis humanae, tum modi qu… gratia in nobis operatur, & quo ejus efficacia cum arbitrii noſtri libertate concilianda eſt, de quibus nulla diſerto, clara, & expreſſa extant in Scripturis or acula. But if they will needs be medling, he wiſhes them modeſty and moderation. Le Blank de diſtinct. Grat. Theſ. 83.and that the diſtance is very ſmall, if men underſtood themſelves; and you would have it thought that you are the man fit for ſo great an undertaking, as the conciliation of theſe differing Parties is. But to deal freely with you, I take it to be but the effect of your own Ignorance, not underſtanding the Controverſies; and of your Pride, in overvaluing your own Parts and Apprehenſions: Or elſe you would never dream that you can come after ſuch wits as Auguſtine, and Pelagius, and Celeſtine; ſuch as Aquinas, Scotus, Ockam, Gregory Armi. Durandus, and their Followers; even ſuch as Cajetane, Bannes, Zumel, Alvarez, &c. ſuch as Suarez, Vaſquez, Molina, Fonſeca, Ruiz, &c. ſuch Conciliators as Ariba, Gibieuf, Guil. Cameranius Scotus, Pennottus, Petr. à St. Joſeph, Ludov. à Dola, Janſenius, and his Followers, with abundance ſuch, and do that which none of theſe could do. But you are not the firſt Undertaker that hath miſcarried.

If I have been guilty of vain boaſting, cite my words, and I will retract them: If not, theſe expreſſions ſpeak but your prejudice. But, I pray let us ſpend no time upon ſuch Impertinences, but ſpeak that to the matter which tendeth to edifie, that one of us may become the wiſer at leaſt. I firſt deſire you to tell me, Q. Whether the ending or narrowing this difference be not exceeding deſirable, could it be attained?

Yes, there is no man doubts of that.

Q. 2. And is not deſpair the enemy of all endeavours, and will any thing be done without ſome hope?

And it's as true, that vain hopes cauſe labour in vain.

The worſt then will be but the loſs of my labour: And I will tell you of what moment I judge the work.

1. In regard of the ſinfulneſs of the Contentions: 2. In regard of the Calamitous conſequents.

1. The ſinfulneſs I take to lie, 1. In the matter. 2. And in the manner of proſecution.

I. Th…e things I judge to be ſinful in the …atter … 1. That many differences are pretended to be▪ where indeed are none. 2. Differences about wo…s▪ and ſecond …otions, and ration… En…ties ar… pretended …o be differences about real Doctrines. 3. Little Differences are aggravated into great ones. 4. Unſearchable things are diſputed, which no mortal man can underſtand.

….

As to the manner… it is done▪ 1. Prepoſterouſly, prefer…ing theſe Diſputes before the greater buſineſs of the Miniſtry. *Read in Procli Analect. pag. 646. the Epiſtle of Cyril Alex. to Proclus againſt the cenſuring of Theodor. Mopſueſt. and his works, leſt it tend to diviſion and tumult in the Churches, Et Ep. 7. ibid. Joan. Antiochini ad Cyril. It would make one aſhamed of humane nature, to read how baſely the Dominians and ſome others (Alvarez de Aux. Diſp. 115. p. 468, 469. & ſaepe Zumel, and many more, and Janſenius, Arnoldus, &c. yea, Gibieuſ, &c.) do abuſe Luther and Calvin, meerly to make other Papiſts believe, that they differ from them where they do not. And all through a carnal factious fear of loſing their intereſt in their own Popiſh Party; as if we differed not enough, but muſt perſwade the world, that we differ where we do not. See but Alvar…z. l. 12. Diſp▪ 121. pag. 492. where he citeth ſix Errors of Calvins, as differing from him; whereas the …our firſt are but one lye variouſly worded, and the two laſt no better▪ for in all of them Calvin ſaith not one jo… more in ſenſe than the D…minican… do, what-ever harſh word he may find in him; and the generality of the Calviniſts (as they are called by ſcorners) ſay much leſs.2. Perverſly, waſting abundance of time and ſtudy about them, by which the Church might have been better ſerved; and writing ſo many great Volumes of them, in crabbed Scholaſtick ſtile, I as muſt needs tempt multitudes to a lamentable loſs of their precious time, before they can come to know that they loſe it. 3. And, by ſidings, and factio…s, and ſharp reflections on each other, quen…ing Chriſtian Love, and deſtroying Concord, and weakening the Church.

II. The calamitous Conſequents are, 1. The long, and yet unhealed alienation of Contenders minds. 2. The foreſaid time and toil which thoſe Volumes coſt. 3. The abundance of idle talk, and loſt ſtudies about them, by the generality of Students. 4. The dangerous Factions made by it in the Churches. 5. The tempting each Party to confuſe, ſlander, and blot the Names of one another. 6. Multitudes of Prelates and Paſtors have been tempted by it into Perſecutions. 7. Yea, wars and blood-ſhed in more Countries than one hath followed …tly by this incenſion. 8. And hereby the poor people on each …e are kept in bitter uncharitable thoughts of one another; and eſpecially of thoſe Paſtors who are againſt their mind.

And becauſe things neareſt us are firſt diſcerned, begin at home, and try whether all this be true or not. 1. Hearken to the Miniſters and people on each ſide. Do you not hear that it ſeemeth enough to them to ſleight each other with uncharitable alienation, when it's ſaid, O ſuch a one is a Calviniſt, or ſuch a one is an Arminian; yea, perhaps the Jeſuite ſhall come in. Read over the many writings about Mountague's time, on his part, and againſt him, by Yates, Carlton, Watton, Burton, &c. But eſpecially read Peter Heylin his writings on this Subject, and above all, his Life of Arch-Biſhop Laud, where he perſwadeth us that this very Controverſie was a grand part of the difference, which on both ſides was proſecuted, till it brought us to our doleful War.

2. Go but to the Low-Countries, and ſee what work it hath made there, from the days of Arminius to this day▪ eſpecially between Prince Maurice and the States, at the death of Barnevelt, the impriſonment of Grotius, &c. The Synod at Dort, and all the ſtrife and diſcontent before and after it.

3. Peruſe but the Volumes written on one ſide by Suec…nus, Arminius, Grevinchovius, Corvinus, Tilenus, Epiſcopius, Curcellaeus, Grotius, &c. with many Lutherans; And on the other ſide by Gomarrus, Lubbertus, Macchovius, &c. Molinaeus, Ameſius, Dr. Twiſſe, Rutherford, Spanhemius, &c. and think how ſad ſuch Combats are.

4. Think what a lamentable diſtance to this day is kept up between the Lutherans and Calviniſts in all Countries, and much upon the account of theſe ſame Controverſies: And what bitter Books the Lutherans have written, comparing the Calviniſts to Papiſts, Turks, &c. and how little Mr. Ducy by forty years Labour did to reconcile them; and how ſmall ſucceſs all other Reconcilers have had, though excellent learned judicious men; ſuch as Calixtus, Johan. Bergins, Conrad. Bergins, Ludov. Crocius, Mat. Martinius, Iſleburg, Teſtaidus, Amyraldus, Placens, Capellus, Dallaeus, Blondel, Davenant, Hall, Carlton, Abbot, Morton, Preſton, &c.

5. Think of the great Conflicts in France and Flanders, between the Janſeniſts and their Adverſaries; and the multitude of elaborate Volumes between the Dominicans and the Jeſuites: And of how many Ages continuance thoſe conteſts have been.

6. Then riſe up to the Time and Caſe of Fauſtus Rhegienſis, Caſſianus, and the Maſſilienſes, and their Adverſaries; and the hard Characters left by thoſe controverſies on the names of worthy men.

7. From thence aſcend to Chryſoſtome and his Reproaches, and Auſtin's Cenſures on the other ſide, with all the Conflicts which he and his Abettors, Proſper and Fulgentius had with the Pelagians and Semipelagians of thoſe times.

8. And laſtly, read and pity almoſt all the Fathers, eſpecially of the Greek Church, whoſe Names are now blotted with the cenſure of ſpeaking too like our Arminians and Jeſuites; and after all this, you will ſure think this Contention was a very ill work, if it be proved cauſleſs; and you will think that it's time to end it, if it be poſſible. To which end, an attempt is not diſcommendable, if it ſhould prove loſt as to the greater part of men. And ſome, I doubt not, God will bleſs it to, at leaſt to increaſe their love of peace.

I pray you tell me what is your Undertaking, and in what meaſure it is that you think this Work may be accompliſhed?

My Undertaking is this, [To prove, that in the points of Predeſtination and Redemption, there is no difference between moderate men of each Party, *Eadem enim difficultas fuit ſemper donationis in tempore, & praefinitionis aut praedeſtinationis in praeſcientia. Cum ergo in tempore detur nobis (prima gratia) ſine ulla cauſa ratione, aut conditione ſine qua non, ſic etiam praedeſtinatur. Ne que ſolum negari debet ratio, cur unus praedeſtinetur, alii ver… non, ut quidam dicebant, ſed etiam quare aliquis praedeſtinetur nulla facta comparatio…, ſiquidem nulla ratio eſſe potuit ob quam Deus dederit primam gratiam, niſi per modum ſinis. Vaſquez. in 1. Them▪ Diſp. 91, c. 7. You ſee how much a Jeſuite granteth.but what is reſolved into the points of Grace and Free-Will; and in the points of Grace and Free-Will there is no real difference, but what is reſolved into the queſtion of the degree of Gods co-operating influx, compared with mans agency, and with it ſelf as on ſeveral Objects; which will prove either no difference at all, or elſe about a thing paſt mans Underſtanding: And, that only in the point of perſeverance, there is a real perceptible difference; but ſuch as is not worthy to be inſiſted on, to the breach of Charity, or the Churches peace, but muſt conſiſt with toleration and mutual love.]

I know not whether this great Undertaking look more ſmilingly on the Times to come, or frowningly on the Times paſt. For if this be true, what thoughts, what names do we deſerve for troubling the Chriſtian World, ſo perniciouſly and diſtractingly, with a feigned difference. But, I pray you, tell me in general, how you will manifeſt all this?

1. You muſt give me leave to tell you who they are that I undertake this Reconciliation of. 2. And then, how I ſhall perform it.

I. It is not every violent Contender, that runneth into ſuch palpable Errors as the common cauſe needeth not, and will ſay any thing rather than agree, that I am ſpeaking of. About theſe matters, there are two Parties that ſtand on each extream, who are not to be called Calviniſts and Arminians; but by other Names, for their other Opinions. Theſe I intend to confute diſtinctly, inſtead of reconciling them, which i… impoſſible, but by reforming them.

1. On the one ſide, I undertake not the Reconciliation of the Predeterminants, who hold, That [Free-will is nothing but will a related to Reaſon, Lubentia juxta rationem; and that all its acts are as truly neceſſitated by the efficacions premotion of God, as is the motion of a Clock, or other Engine, or of a Bruit (though they will needs call them free, becauſe they are Volitions, as if willing and free-willing were words of the ſame ſignification:) and that is deifying of mans Will or any Creature, to ſay, that it can move or determine it ſelf to this Object rather than another, without a Phyſical perdetermining efficient premotion by God, at the firſt total Cauſe, notwithſtanding God ſhould uphold its natural power, and … the cauſe of Nature afford his neceſſary univerſal Concourſe; and that to think that a Will thus predetermined by God could have forborn its act, it to deifie it alſo.] They that think that God cannot make a Creature, whoſe Will can determine it ſelf without his predetermination to that act as circumſtantiated, though God uphold all its powers, and all natural concurrent… elſe, and that a ſelf-determined, not predetermined by premotion is a God, or a Contradiction, I am to confute, and not to reconcile.

How will you confute them?

That is to be the work of a Diſputation on that Point. It ſhall now ſuffice to mind you, that it ſeemeth to me very plainly to ſubvert Chriſtianity, if not all Religion. For when Adam's ſin, and all the ſin in the World of Men or Devils, is reſolved into the abſolute unreſiſtible Will and efficiency of God, as the firſt total Cauſe, and that it had been as impoſſible to have done otherwiſe as to be Gods, or to Conquer God; it's eaſie to perceive whether God …ate ſuch ſin, and whether Chriſt died to ſignifie his hatred of it; and whether he will damn men for not being Gods; and whether he that is ſaid unreſiſtibly to predetermin… by immediate efficiency the thought, will and tongue of every Lyar to every lye that ever was ſpoken, can have any word, delivered by man, which we can be ſure is true. In a word, if this Opinion hold, it will allow no other Religion in the World, but this much, [To believe that moral Good and Evil are but like natural Good and Evil, which God doth cauſe a… a free Benefactor, differencing his Gifts in various proportions, as he ſeeth meet; as he differenceth Stars from Stones, and Men from Dogs, and equally cauſeth the wiſdom of Man, and the poyſon of the Toad or Serpent; and ſo will make ſuch differences in this World, and the next (if there be any) as pleaſeth him, as he doth here between one Horſe that's pampered, and another that is tired out with labour.] Well may they cry down the Doctrine of Merit and Demerit that go this way. It hath pleaſed God, by permitting Hobbs to reduce this Principle of the Wills neceſſitation unto its proper practice, thereby to caſt more ſhame upon it in our Times for this Authors ſake, than we could have expected, if none but ſuch excellent perſons as Alvarez *And more plainly, yet Bradwardine who maketh the neceſſitating cauſe of Sin and Hell, that God will have it ſo, and none can reſiſt him.and his Brethren, Dr. Twiſſe and Rutherford had maintained it. But as Davenant well ſaith, It is an Opinion of the Dominicans, which Protestants have no mind to own.

And there are two ſorts that thus ſubject the Will to abſolute cauſed neceſſity: 1. Thoſe aforeſaid, the Dominicans, who aſſiſt the predetermining premotion of God, as neceſſary to every act natural and free. 2. Thoſe that make the Will as much neceſſitated by a train of natural ſecond Cauſes, which is Hobbs his way, (and alas, the way of great and excellent healing C…mero). For they hold, That the Will is neceſſitated by the Intellect, and the Intellect by the Object … and God made both Will, and Intellect, and Object, (and Law). And ſo Camero hath nothing to reſolve the neceſſitating cauſe of Adams ſin into, but the Devil. But who neceſſitated the Devil to ſin? This will be all one, when it is diſcuſſed. And if ſelf-determining freedom of Will in Man be impoſſible, it will be impoſſible in the Angels; for they are not Gods.

Therefore I now deal with none but thoſe who confeſs, that God made Man's Will at firſt with a natural ſelf-determining power and freedo…, ſuited to this earthly ſtate of government; and that Adam's Will by that ſame meaſure of Grace which he had, could have forborn his ſin, at the inſtant when he ſinned.

II. The other extream which I reconcile not, but confute, *Yet I am not …tating the old way of ana…a thing all the hard ſayings or opinions of others, that being it that I write this againſt, of which courſe the Epiſtles of Joan. Antioch. 5. 6, &c. and of cyril. A…ix. to Pro…s againſt his ſo uſing Theoa…. Mopſ. in Pro… … are worth the rea…ing. beſides the fore named.Tis▪ the Pelagians, who deny Original Sin, and acknowledge not the pravity of vitiated nature; and conſequently muſt deny the need of Grace in the ſame proportion, and ſo far the need of a Saviour and a Sanctifier. And how far this alſo ſubverteth Chriſtianity, you may perceive.

But both theſe Parties have a great deal of very plauſible reaſon for their Opinions, as you may ſee in the Dom…n…oans on one ſide, and Hobbes againſt Bra…hall, and in Dr. Jeremy Taylor, his Tre…. of Repentance, on the other; and therefore are not to be ſo ſlighted.

I do not ſlight them, but confute them. I confeſs that the caſes are not without difficulty, yea not a little. But I am ſurer that Religion is not to be renounced, than they can be of the truth of their Opinions. And do you think that if one of them had written for the Cauſe of … ▪ li…n, Porphyrie or Celſus againſt Chriſt, that they would not have ſpoken as plauſibly, and made the caſe ſeem as difficult, at leaſt to be argumentatively anſwered as they here do.

Now let us here your way or terms before mentioned, what they are?

II. I ſuppoſe every ſober man will allow me, 1. To diſtinguiſh Names and Words from Things, and *Vaſ…u. in 1. Tho. q. 2…. a. 3. d. 4…. c. 1. Bona pars huju… controverſi… (an reprobationis detur cauſa ex part… reprobi) d… v…ce eſt.nominal Controverſies from real; and to that end to open the a…biguity of words as I go along: And to …ew when it is an arbitrary Logical notion, or an en… ration… only that men contend about, inſtead of a reality. 2. I may be allowed, when confuſion lapeth up many doubtful queſtions in one, to diſtinguiſh them▪ that each may have its proper anſwer. 3. I may be allowed to …aſt by, as unfit for contention, all thoſe un…evealed and unſearchable Points, which none of the Contenders know at all, nor ever will do in this World. 4. And I will take leave to lay by the raſh words of particular Writers, as not to be imputed to any others, nor to the main Cauſe; or as that which I am not obliged to defend, reconcile, nor at all to me…dle with. 5. And when all this is done, you ſhall ſee what A…to… the remaining differences will prove.

Begin then with the firſt Article of Pr…d…ſtination.

Remember my …ndertaking, that it is not to juſtifie every … words that hath written on the Point; and therefore I will not loſe time in citing or defending Authors: But produce you all your Acc…ſations, as againſt the Cauſe of the ſober moderate Cal…iſts, and ſuppoſe me to be the perſon with whom you have to do.

The first Crimination.

1. My firſt Charge is, That you hold that God doth from eternity Decree to damn in Hell fire the far greateſt part of men, without reſpect See the concluſion of the Canons of the Synod at Dort, where this very Charge is denied with deteſtation. And can you tell better what men hold than they themſelves. Epiſcop. Juſtit. Theol. l. 4. Sect. 5. cap. 6. p. 412. Col. 2. 52. Sect. 2. Statuitur, Deum cos ſecundum …peraſua judicare—& …b. rebellionem & contumaci-am corum dolere, iraſci, &c. dam…are, &c. cum tamen non modo abſolute eos perir… & peccare voluerit, ſed & originario tali labe infectos naſci fec…rit, unde omnia iſta peccata ſcaturire ac fluere inevitabiliter neceſſe erat. Quod quid aliud eſſe poteſt, quam hiſtrionica quaedam & ſc…nica actio?to any fore-ſeen Sin, or cauſe in them, but meerly becauſe … pleaſeth him to do it: This is your Doctrine of Abſolute Reprobation.

That words may not deceive us, let us in the beginning on… for all know what you mean by the word [Decree.]

I mean the reſolution or purpoſe of his Will de event…, tha… this ſhall be.

And, I ſuppoſe, we are agreed; 1. That Gods Will is nothing but his Eſſence denominated with reſpect to ſome Good as its Object. 2. And there was no Object really exiſtent from eternity but God himſelf. 3. That Understanding and Will are not univocal terms ſpoken of God and of man, nor of the ſame formal Conception. And 4. That our formal Conception of Underſtanding and Will is only of them as they are in man, and not as in God; and ſo this to us is the prius ſignificatum. 5. And therefore that God doth not underſtand or will in our ſence formaliter, but only eminenter. 6. And laſtly, That Mortals know not juſt how Gods eminent Intellection and Volition differ from the formal in Man. All this you muſt grant me, or be ſingular and ignorant.

All this is paſt denial; but proceed to the Caſe.

Do you differ from us de eventu, whether there be a Hell, or yet of the number of thoſe that are damned?

No: or if we do about the Caſe of Heathens, that belongeth not to this Point.

Do you differ from us about the Cauſe of mens Damnation? We ſay that God damneth no man, but for Sin; yea, for Sin impenitently continued in to the laſt, againſt all the mercy which tended to their Cure.

So far we are agreed: But it's not the cauſe of damnation which I ſpeak of, but the cauſe of the Decree.

Do you not hold that what ever God doth, he willeth to do?

Yes, God doth nothing without a will to do it, at leaſt conſequently.

Do you think that God willeth any thing to day, which he willed not yeſterday, and ſo from eternity?

No, we do not with Voſtius make God mutable.

Good ſtill: you grant then that God damneth men; that he damneth them for ſin; that he doth it willingly; that he willed it from eternity. And do you think that from eternity here was any thing but God?

No.

Then can that which is not be a cauſe; was there any thing but God himſelf to be the Cauſe of Gods Will from eternity?

Not in eſſe reali, but there was in eſſe cognito.

So: now the game begins: Thus the World is chea…ed and troubled by Logical Notions, and meer words. Is that eſſe cognitum any thing or nothing? If nothing, it is no Cauſe; If any thing, is it God or a Creature? It can be no Creature, becauſe it is eternal: If God, you do but ſay, That God cauſed his own Will.

It is Gods fore-knowledge of Sin, which cauſeth his Decree or Will.

1. Even fore-knowledge it ſelf, ſay the Schools, is but the ſame with knowledge, and ſpoken (ſay they) but to the reſpect and ſenſe of man. There being neither pri…s vel poſtori…s, before or after in eternity. But this I now inſiſt not on. 2. It is commonly taken for blaſph…my, to talk of a Cauſe of God, or any thing in God. If Gods Will be his Eſſence, it hath no Cauſe. He cauſeth not himſelf, being no Effect. 3. If this were ſo as you ſay, yet ſtill you make but God himſelf the Cauſe of his own Will by his knowledge. *Vaſquer in 1. Th…. d. 91. ſaith of the Cauſe of Gods Decree, Divin… voluntatis non ſolum nullam eſſe cauſam finalem & motivam, per modum objecti, ſed etiam nullum eſſe objectum creatum quod poſſit Deo eſſe ratio volendi aliud, ſed ſolam ſuam bonitatem: Poſſe tamen unum creatum objectum eſſe rationem & cauſam alterius: & italicet Deus non velit unum objectum creatum propter aliud, velle tamen unam rem creatam eſſe propter aliam, quia …na eſt cauſa alt…rius. Non erg… … mus an aliud … ratio … tiva Deo per modum … ut velit nos pr…d…ſtinare, praeter ſuam bonitatem nihil enim eſſe poteſt. Id. ib. diſp. 91. c. 4. Reſpectu voluntatis Dei nihil creatum eſt id cuj…s gratia, & ratio nolendi aliquid; ſed propter quod c…tera eſſe vult Deus.For Si… f…re-ſeen is no Sin, and nothing is no Cauſe; ſo that you your ſelf reſolve all into God. And indeed, what can be a cauſe of the firſt Cauſe, or any thing in him?

Uſe not tergiverſation, and vain words now, and tell me what you have to ſay.

A thing not exiſtent, but fore-ſeen, may be … moral Cauſe, though not a phyſical; and ſo fore-ſeen Sin may be to God.

1. Yet dare you talk of a Cauſe of God. There is nothing in God but God. To be a cauſe of his Will, is commonly ſaid to be a cauſe of his Eſſence; And ſhall ſo baſe a thing a… Sin cauſe God? 2. We are ſtill at the cheating Game, of playing with …rbitrary Notions. What mean you by a moral Cauſe? If a true cauſe of moral Being▪ that's one thing: If any thing that is not phyſically or properly, but by moral imputation only a cauſe of any event, that's another thing. The firſt you dare not own, as if any thing which is nothing (Sin not exiſtent) were a Cauſe of Gods Will. The ſecond Cauſe is called Cauſe metaphorica: It is really no Cauſe; but that, for which the Agent ſhall have ſuch praiſe or diſpraiſe as belongeth to one that … equivocally a Cauſe▪ 3. Therefore if you uſe not the word [Cauſe] equivocally, your rule is falſe. Nothing is no moral Cauſe. You will inſtance in good deſtr…d, in fine nondum exiſtente, &c. But I anſwer you, Good and amiable are Accidents or Modes, which are never found but in an exiſtent entity or ſubject. A negatione ſubjecti ad negationem accidentis, & à negatione eſt ſecundi Adjecti ad negationem eſt tertii, valet argumentum. That which is not, is not good or amiable: Therefore that which exiſteth not is no Cauſe. But if we will let go the toy, and come to the matter; It is no other good, but the deſire of good, or the apprehenſion of the …rity of good which cauſeth; ſo that all the Cauſe is in the Agent. 4. The common reaſon of man muſt acknowledge, that when any m…n ſaith, That ſin which is no ſin, and nothing as fore-ſeen is the moral cauſe of Gods Will, he muſt needs mean no real cauſe; Becauſe to be a cauſe, is tertium Adjectum, and preſuppoſeth to be▪ That which is not, is not a cauſe; much leſs of God, or of his Will.

I can ſhew you, that you overthrown the Chriſtian Religion by your Logick: For if this hold true, then the fore ſight of Chriſt's Incarnation and Sufferings, &c. was no moral true cauſe of Gods Will to pardon Sin, and ſave Souls, to …hoſe under the Promiſe before the Incarnation.

Your diverſion turneth us from the matter, but advantageth you not at all. Would you bring it to deny ſo evident a Principle as this, that nothing can do nothing, nor cauſe nothing. It was not Chriſt's Body or actual Suffering, not yet exiſtent, that cauſed Gods Will t… pardon Sinners. Nor had Gods Will any proper cauſe: But ſeeing God willed one thing to be the means of another, he willed that Chriſt's Incarnation and Death ſhould in the fulneſs of time demonſtrate his Juſtice, and make it agreeable to the ends of his Government to diſpence with the Law of Innocency, and to pardon Sin: And therefore (not Chriſt's Death it ſelf, but) God's Decree of the Death of Chriſt Incarnate, was the cauſe of the Promiſe, and of the New Covenant made with Adam, and of the Salvation of Believers then. Which Will or Decree is called by ſome the interpellation or undertaking of the eternal Word.

But at leaſt Sin fore-ſeen is cauſa ſine qua non.

Call it by what name you pleaſe, as long as you confeſs it to be no Cauſe, (for cauſa ſine qua non, is called Cauſa fatua, and is none) But it is not Sin which is Cauſa ſine qua non; for it is no ſin from eternity.

It is the futurity of ſin that is Cauſa ſine qua non.

Yet more notions! what is futurity? any thing or nothing? nothing certainly: For quoad ens, it is terminus diminuens; and nothing is no cauſe. But it is Gods knowledge that Sin will be, which is to be called the Cauſe of Gods Decree, as ſine qua non, if any be. But I muſt deal moſt about futurition with the Calvinists, when I come to ſave you from Dr. Twiſſe his Ferula.

I pray you then open me the matter as it is your ſelf.

I will make your Cauſe better than you have made it; But not by making other mens worſe, but by opening the reconciling truth. 1. I ſhall tell you in what ſenſe Gods Will and Decrees may and muſt be ſaid Predeſtinatio nihil ponit in praedeſtinato inquit Aquin. 1. q. 23. a. 2.to have an extrinſick cauſe, without change in God. 1. Know therefore that Gods Eſſence is his Will, but not as Eſſence. To ſay that God is God, and that God willeth this or that, are not terms of the ſame ſignification. 2. Gods Will is his Eſſence denominated from ſome amiable good as the Object; and ſo there is ever quid reſpectivum in the notion of Will. 3. As God willeth himſelf, the Act being perfectly immanent, his Will is called himſelf much more properly, than his Will of things extrinſick (which is ever either effectively, or at leaſt objectively tranſient;) Becauſe it is God that willeth, and that is willed or loved, (which made many Ancients ſay, That this was the third Perſon in the Trinity.) 4. But as God willeth things ad extra, though it is his Eſſence that ſo willeth them; yet it is unfit to ſay ſimply, that this Will is God; e. g. that to will Peter's Salvation is God, becauſe the name Will here includeth the thing willed. 5. And therefore when we ſpeak of Gods Will in the univerſal notion, as abſtracted from all particular Objects and Acts, it is leſs inconvenient to ſay ſimply, that this Will is God, than when we ſpeak of his Will in act ad extra. By this time you may ſee, that though Gods Will, as his Eſſence, hath no cauſe; yet his Will as denominated extrinſecally from the Object, may have ſome kind of Cauſe that is *Alvarez himſelf ſaith, that by a Cauſe he meaneth alſo any objective condition or reaſon of the Act.Objective, which is quaſi materia actus, and the terminus ſine quo non; that is, Gods Will is not denominated a complacency in Chriſt exiſtent, or in Peter regenerate, *This is all that Ruiz his Reaſons prove De Vol. Dei diſp. 115. Sect. 4. p. 102 Who ſaith, that there is more than extrinſick denomination; Et relatio rationis …um realis formalitas. But he doth but ſhew by his quodammodo, that he knoweth not what to ſay.or his underſtanding, a ſeeing that the World was good, before any of theſe things did exiſt. So that by extrinſick denomination, without any change in God, he may and ſhould be ſaid de novo to know things to be exiſtent, to be paſt, to will things as exiſtent with complacency, or will them with diſplicency: But not to will the futurity of mens damnation de novo; but yet his Will of the futurity of mens damnation hath ſeveral degrees of the Objective Cauſe, from whence it is denominated: As in eſſe cognito, the perſon who is the Object is in order of nature firſt a man, a ſubject, and then a Sinner, and a Deſpiſer of Mercy, and then a damnable Sinner. And ſo theſe are indeed conditions in the Object, or Cauſae ſine quibus non, or Objective material-conſtituent cauſes; not in themſelves, but the fore-ſight of them; not of Gods Will as his Eſſence, nor of his Will as a Will, but of his Will as extrinſecally denominated, a Decree to damn Judas; e. g. becauſe no otherwiſe is Judas an Object capable of giving ſuch an extrinſick denomination to Gods Will.

II. Both you and I hold, and muſt hold, that God decreeth to damn all that ſhall be damned. *Vaſquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 3. p. 709. Concluſio (quod Deus aliquos repro…at) eſt de fide conſtat …nim ex ſcriptura multos a Deo reprobari. Vid. Ru…z de pr…de fin. Tract. 2. per totum.But it is falſe, that we hold that he doth it without any reſpect to fore-ſeen ſin. For 1. He fore-ſeeth this Sin as the only meritorious cauſe of their damnation; what he doth in time, that is it which he decreed to do from eternity: But in time he damneth no man but for Sin; therefore from eternity he decreed to damn no man but for Sin: For ſin, I ſay, as the cauſe of damnation, which Dr. Twiſſe doth frequently profeſs. 2. And though this Sin can be no proper efficient cauſe of Gods Volition or Decree, yet it is a preſuppoſed neceſſary qualification in the Object, as fore-ſeen in the Mind of God, and ſo, as aforeſaid, is an Objective Cauſe as fore-ſeen.

III. The execution of Juſtice, and glorification of it, and Gods Holineſs thereby is good, and fit to be the Object of Gods Volition or Decree. But in the word Reprobation is in moſt mens ſenſe included much, which we hold not, which is to be opened further anon.

IV. And as to the abſoluteneſs of Gods Decree to damn thoſe that are dammed; I think you will not deny it your ſelf, ſuppoſing them to be fore-ſeen finally impenitent Sinners. God doth not only will, that all the finally impenitent ſhall be damned; nor only that, e. g. Judas ſhall be damned, if he be finally impenitent; But alſo that Judas as fore-ſeen finally impenitent, ſhall certainly be damned. So that when the condition is fore-ſeen in the Recipient or Object; it is no longer a meer conditional Decree, but abſolute, ſuppoſing that condition. In all this we are agreed.

The ſecond Crimination.

II. But that's not all; But you hold, That God eternally decreed mens ſin; yea, all the ſin of Men and Devils; ſome ſay, That he decreed to predetermine men inſuparably to the forbidden Act; and the moderateſt, that he *Vid. Epiſcopii Reſp. ad qu. 64. qu. 33. pag. 32. …bi dicit, Deum decreviſſe ut Judaei Chriſtum e medio tolleren, ex praeſcientia quod id liber… voluntate, facturi eſſent, atque inde praedictiones certas natas eſſe.decreed the event, that Sin ſhould come to paſs ipſo permittente quamvis non efficiente; or at leaſt, that he decreed his permiſſion of it.

I. The firſt ſort are thoſe few, whom I in the beginning renounced; of whom the Dominicans, and good Dr. Twiſſe, and Rutherford his Follower (de providentia) are the chief. I eaſily confeſs to you, that God made the Law, and God made man, and God maketh the Objects, and God cauſeth the Act as a natural Act in genere, by a natural general concourſe: And if it could be alſo proved, that God were the chief efficient Determiner of the Will, and that by neceſsitation to this Act or Object comparatively rather than to that, (e. g. that David willed the Acts which were Murder and Adultery,) I could never deny that God is the chief Author of the Sin. For the formal reaſon of Sin is Relative, viz. Its diſconformity to the Law of God. And the Relation reſulteth without any new Act or Agent, Poſito fundamento & omni abſoluto: And neither God nor Man do or can do more to cauſe the Relation. And Dr. Twiſſe and Rutherford ſo far ſaw this, that the up-ſhot of all their Vindication is; 1. That God cauſeth not ſin as ſin, but as a means to his Glory. 2. That God is under no Law, (as we are) and therefore can be no Author of Sin. But, to the firſt I anſwer; It's one thing to will Sin as Sin, and another thing to cauſe Sin as Sin. We charge them not, with inferring that God willeth Sin as Sin; but Nullus eſt Catholicus qui ignoret peccatum non eſſe effectum praedeſtinationis; etiam ſi praedeſtinatus occaſionem ex eo ſaepius capiat ſuae ſalutis. Nam cum Deus cauſa peccati eſſe nequeat, efficitur ut Deus peccatum nulla ratione praedeſtinare poſſit.—Ne que actus ipſe peccati ſecundum eſſe naturale, non eſt effectus praedeſtinationis, quamvis ſit hoc modo effectus divinae voluntatis, Vaſquez in Tho. 1. q. 23. cap. 2. diſp. 93.if he will it and cauſe it for another end, he cauſeth the formal nature of Sin, (that we may not play with the ambiguity of Quatenus) and that's as much as man doth. For Sinners do not all, if any, will ſin as ſin under this formal notion, as it is a breach of the Law of God, and diſpleaſeth him; but as it bringeth them ſome ſeeming good: And by doing evil for that good, they are Sinners.

To the ſecond, we do not charge the Dominicans with making God a Sinner: But with making him the chief cauſe of the ſin of man, even in its form.

II. But this is nothing to the Calviniſts in general. Therefore, I ſay, that your ſelves hold the ſame that they do in this point. Q. 1. Do not all the Jeſuites and Arminius hold, That God is the Decreer of what he is the Author of. And that God is the Author of the Act as an Act natural, in the general. See but Rob. Baronius his Metaphyſicks, and Bellarmine whom he followeth.

That is nothing to the moral ſpecification of the Act.

And Dr. Twiſſe hath oft enough told you, where Arminius ſaith, That God would have Ahab to fill up the meaſure of his Sin.

That is not that he willed the ſin, but that Ahab having made himſelf wicked, God decreed not to ſtop him, but let him go on.

Either you mean, that the Object of Gods Decree was but his own permiſsion (as the Arminians uſe to ſay) or elſe, that it was the Sin it ſelf (matter and form) permitted, (not becauſe it is ſin or evil, for ſo man oft willeth it not at leaſt, but) as an occaſion of Gods Glory. Arminius his words import the latter: And then you go as high as Dr. Twiſſe or Rutherford. But if you ſay, that it was but a raſh word of Arminius, which you ſtand not to; to make plain and ſhort work with you, I am ſo far from being liable to your charge, that I charge you as preſumptuous, if not erroneous, in ſaying, that God decreeth or willeth to permit Sin. And I aſſert.

1. That God doth not Decree the form of Sin as Sin. 2. Nor yet the event of that form for any good end (For, Ut peccatum eveniat, is but peccatum futurum;) and what is it to decree Sin, but to decree that it ſhall be? Nor 3. Hath he decreed, that this Act which is the Sin, ſhall come to paſs in its comparative circumſtantiated ſtate, from whence it is, that Sin in its form reſulteth. And ſo Auguſtines ſaying ſo much decantate by Dr. Twiſſe and others, *As Bradwardine who alſo tells us, That if God damn the Innocent, his Will is the rule of juſtice and equity: But I think they that ſo deſcribe his Juſtice, do rather think that none are damned, than that the Innocent are; or may be, as an act of Juſtice, whatever a meer Proprietor may do.is not found, that nothing cometh to paſs but what God willeth, either effecting it, or permitting it. It cometh to paſs without Gods willing it or decreeing it; ſo that he permitteth it, but decreeth not that it ſhall come to paſs. Not that it is againſt his contrary abſolute Decree; but as Lombard from other places in Auſtin telleth you plainly, God neither willeth that it ſhall be, (becauſe it is ſin) nor properly and ſimply willeth that it ſhall not be, for his Will is not overcome. 4. Yea, he cannot be proved to decree his own permiſsion; Becauſe to permit, is but not to hinder, which is nothing but a negation: And we have no ground to feign, that God hath Volitions or Decrees of nothing, or of negations.

So that I ſay, that Sin cometh to paſs without Gods Decree of the event, or of his permiſſion. (Though not without his Decree of the good which cometh by it; of which more, when I ſpeak to the other extream.) And of this alſo more anon.

The third Crimination.

III. You make God neceſſitate mens ſin and damnation by your negative decrees, as well as others by their poſitive: For you hold, That no man can believe and repent, but ſuch as God decreeth to give Faith and Repentance to: And no man can do any more good than God decreeth that he ſhall do. And ſome ſay that God decreeth, Not to give men any more Grace than he giveth them (which is a Decree objectively negative de non dando); And you and others ſay, That he doth not Decree to give them more. And ſo as a ſtone is not culpable for not flying, no more are Sinners, not elected, for not believing and obeying God.*Note what Vaſquez. granteth in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 5. diſp. 92. c. 2. Certum eſt praedeſtinationem gratiae, & ipſam primam gratiam (quod idem eſt) non eſſe in noſtra poteſtate, ſicut & praedeſtinationis & ipſius gratiae nullam cauſam aut occaſionem ex nobis praecedere.

You wholly miſtake and miſreport us. If we differ from you, it is by going further from the matter of the Objection than you do your ſelves.

1. We hold, that God giveth many men power to do more than they do: And conſequently that he decreeth to give it them. Men do not do all that they can do. Indeed we hold, That no man can do any thing, which God doth not give him power to do, and decree to give it him. And dare any of you deny this. There is no power but of God.

2. I hold not, that God hath any Will or Decree in proper ſenſe, Not to give Grace, not to give Faith, not to give Repentance, Help, Means, &c. But only that he doth not decree to give it, where he giveth it not indeed; But as Lombard afore-cited, ſaith, He neither Willeth, nor Nilleth Aquin. de Repub. a. 3. q. 23. ad 3. Reprobatio Dei non ſubtrahit aliquid de potentia reprobati. Unde cum dicitur quod quod reprobatus non poteſt gratiam adipiſci non eſt intelligendum ſecundum impoſſibilitatem abſolutam, ſed conditionatam.it. My Reaſons are, 1. Only Good is the Object of Gods Will, and Evil of his Nolition. But nothing is not Good, nor Faith, Repentance, &c. nor Grace, evil: Therefore God doth not will nothing, or nill the ſaid good.

2. Frustra fit per plura, &c. It is preſumptuous to feign needleſs Decrees and Volitions in God: But the Decree of nothing (of not giving Grace) is vain: For nothing will be nothing, without any Decree or Volition of God, as well as without any efficiency. If God neither make, nor will more Worlds, more Sons, more Men, there will be no more, though he have no Will or poſitive Decree that there ſhall be no more.

3. No man knoweth where to bound the Doctrine of Decrees de nihilo; And to make them infinite or boundleſs, ſoundeth ſo preſumptouſly and profanely, that common reaſon doth diſclaim it. It is poſſible that there be as many more ſands, pebbles, ſtraws, &c. made as are: It is poſſible to make every ſtone, or ſand, an Animal, or the choice of a thouſand other things: It's poſſible to give each man and Creature the choice of a thouſand other names, places, circumſtances: And muſt we feign in God a poſitive Will or Decree of every one of theſe poſſibles that they ſhall never be? That this Sand ſhall not be a Man, nor that Bird a Stone, Id. ib. ad ſecundum, Praedeſtinatio eſt cauſa & ejus quod expectatur in futur… vita a praedeſtinatis, ſcil. Gloriae & ejus quod praecipitur in praeſenti, ſcil. Gratiae: Reprobatio ver… non eſt cauſa ejus quod eſt in praeſenti, ſcil. culpae, ſed eſt cauſa derelictionis … Deo, eſt tamen cauſa ejus quod redditur in futur…, ſcil. poe…ae aeternae.&c. It is enough to conceive that Gods infinite Wiſdom knoweth what is fitteſt to be, and that all that he willeth ſhall be; and that he willeth no more; and therefore no more Creatures will be. But he willeth to give power to free Agents, to do or not do certain acts in ſpecie; and therefore they can do more than he decreeth they ſhall do.

2. And as to the neceſsity of mens ſin or miſery, you lay as much of it upon God as we; that is, no cauſal neceſsity at all, (as Rob. Baronius diſtinguiſheth it well in his Metaphyſicks.) To omit all the Diſtinctions of neceſſity which Hereboord, and many others give us, that we need not, it is here ſufficient to diſtinguiſh between meer Logical neceſſitas conſequentiae in order of argumentation; and Phyſical or cauſal neceſſity in order of Being. God's fore-knowledge (which you deny not) inferreth the former: For it is a good argument (what ever God fore-knoweth will come to paſs: But God fore-knoweth the ſins of all that ſin; Ergo they will come to paſs). The major is a neceſſary propoſition, and ſo is the minor; therefore ſo is the concluſion. But yet God's knowledge cauſeth not ſin; nor is it neceſſitated in any. Dr. Twiſſe, who goeth as high as predetermination, doth yet grant Arminius, that it is only neceſſitas conſequentiae, and not conſequentis, which Gods Decree or Will doth infer as to mens ſin and miſery; and profeſſeth, that all the School-men ſay the ſame; and blameth Arminius for pretending that we infer a neceſſitatem conſequentis: And the other Arminius owneth. And are they not then agreed whether they will or not? I doubt not but predetermination inferreth neceſſitatem conſequentis cauſally, though this be denied by them that hold it. But ſo doth nothing which we aſſert.

The fourth Crimination.

You will make either the pure maſs, or man as man, or the corrupted maſs, to be the Object of Predeſtination, (Election and Reprobation). And ſo make God deſert moſt men in Adam's ſin, as he did the Devils in their ſin, without remedy, or hope.*Vaſquez holdeth in▪ 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 8. d. 9. q. 4. c. 2. that Chriſt merited our Election out of the corrupted maſs; not as Election is in God, but in the Effect: And that Paul, Eph. 1. [Elegit nos in Chriſto, &c.] utitur nomine electionis, quae eſt ſeparatio illa a maſſa perditionis in qua multi relicti ſunt.

Theſe are words of confuſion, which, when opened, will appear nothing, and that we are all of a mind.

Either you will diſtinguiſh Gods Decrees by the Objects, or not. If not, you muſt not diſtinguiſh between Election and Rejection, willing and nilling, loving Peter, and hating Judas, &c. If yea, then you muſt not take up with the unexplained words, Reprobation and Election. 1. By Reprobation is meant either Gods Will to puniſh men. 2. Or his Will to give them no ſpecial ſaving Grace. 3. Or his not-willing to give it them. For the firſt, I told you before that the Object of God… Will to puniſh men in Hell, is a Sinner fore-ſeen finally rejecting Mercy. 2. The Object of his Will to puniſh men with poſitive temporal puniſhments, is the Sinner fore-ſeen in his immediate capacity for them. 3. Whether puniſhment by not giving that Spirit for Faith, Repentance, and Holineſs, be decreed (being nothing but a not-giving) is before diſcuſt. But if it could be proved, yet the Object of Gods denying further Idem d. 95. 1. Ferrarienſ. plane indicat Deum neminem damnare, aut rejicere a regno ſuo voluiſſe, quod ipſe appellat deſerere, niſi praviſa culpa.mercy and help, is evermore one that hath abuſed former mercy, or refuſeth that as offered to him. 4. But Gods non-Volition to give Grace i… no act, and hath no Object. But we judge that all mankind are now from under the meer Covenant of Innocency, and that none periſh but for the abuſe of mercy, which had a tendency to their recovery (The caſe of Infants muſt be ſpoke to in its place once for all.) But all this belongeth to the Caſe of Grace and Free-will.

*How Auguſtine diſtinguiſhed Election to Juſtification and to Glory. See him, lib. 1. ad ſimplic. q. 2. Et quae de …o habet, Vaſquez in 1. Thom. diſp. 89. cap. 6.And 2. As for Election, we ſay that 1. The Object of Gods Will to glorifie men, is man ſanctifying and perſevering in an immediate capacity for Glory in eſſe cognito. 2. The Object of Gods Will to give the Grace of perſeverance, is a fore-ſeen ſanctified perſon in the next capacity. 3. The Object of Gods Will to juſtifie, ſanctifie, and adopt, is a fore-ſeen Believer. 4. The Object of Gods Will, to give ſpecial Grace, which ſhall effectually cauſe men to repent and believe, is ordinarily a fore-ſeen diſpoſed Sinner prepared by his common Grace; but ſometimes an unprepared Sinner, whom, of his free will, he will ſuddenly convert, as it pleaſeth him freely to diſtribute his benefits (all being unworthy.) 5. The Object of Gods Will, to give the higheſt degrees of common Grace, external (in the pureſt preaching of the Goſpel, and other mercies,) and internal (in greater helps of the Spirit) is ſometimes a Sinner in eſſe cognito, who hath not groſly rejected lower helps, and ſometimes freely the worſer ſort of Sinners, who have abuſed former mercies. 6. The Object of Gods Will, to give the firſt common mercy which hath a tendency in its uſe to mens recovery and Salvation, is all mankind fallen in Adam: For all are under the New Covenant of Grace made with Adam, Gen. 3. 15. in ſome degree, (and with Noah) and all have much mercy tending to Repentance; and none are left as the Devils in diſpair, without any offered remedy or help. 7. The Object of Gods Will to give man the Covenant of Innocency, was Adam fore-ſeen as meer man. 8. The Object of Gods Will to create man, was nothing in the ſenſe that we now take an Object in; that is, for the materia circa quam. But if you will call the intended effect the Object, then the Object of Gods Will here (and in the reſt) is the thing willed. But if you will needs preſume to ſeek one higher in the Mind of God, *Man knoweth by Reception, and ſo hath Ideas: But God can be no Recipient.you muſt ſay that it was man as conceived fit to be, as well as poſſible. For we can think no otherwiſe of the Divine Conceptions and Volitions, but as we are led by the analogy of humane acts. And ſo we muſt ſay, that 1. Gods Power maketh it poſſible for all things to be. 2. Next God knoweth them poſſible. 3. He knoweth what is convenient or fit to be made, to his unſearchable ends. 4. He willeth that they ſhall be, and man among the reſt, and ſo on. If you will needs have the order of Decrees, this is all that we can ſay of them.

All this pleaſeth us well: but it will not pleaſe your own Party, or the Calviniſts; that you make ſo many acts of Election, which they tell you is but one entire thing, as mentioned in Scripture: Nor yet that you lay every Decree or Will upon fore-ſight.

You are miſtaken: No moderate conſiderate man of them will deny any thing that I have ſaid. For 1. As to the Scripture uſe of the word Election, it is not the meer name that we are now opening, but the matter in queſtion: Nor is it the expounding of particular Texts that I am upon: And if I were, no man will deny but that the word Election is variouſly uſed in the Scripture: Sometime for Gods eternal Will to make us Chriſtians of Infidels, and to ſave us by Chriſt; and ſometime for actual chooſing us by converting Grace in time; and ſometime for actual chooſing men in time by Vocation to ſome office or ſpecial work, &c.

2. And as to the diſtinguiſhing of all theſe Volitions of God, no man will deny the effects to be diſtinct; undoubtedly theſe are various effects of God; 1. To make man. 2. To give him the Covenant of Innocency. 3. To give him the Covenant of Grace, with all the common mercies of it. 4. To give ſome Perſons and Nations the Goſpel, and other mercies above the greateſt part of the World, with anſwerable helps of the Spirit. 5. To give men ſpecial Grace, effectual for Faith and Repentance. 6. To give men Pardon, Adoption, and Sanctification. 7. To give men Perſeverance. 8. To give them Glory. And if theſe are various works, either you will diſtinguiſh of Gods Will by his various works, or not. *Sive ſecundum noſtram rationem diſtinguamus illud decretum in plura, five dicamus eſſe unicum, non eſt multum curandum: Certum enim eſt apud omnes, Deum omnia & ſingula volutſſe unico ſimpliciſſimo acta ſuae voluntatis: Eſt enim ipſius voluntas, & voluntatis operatio idem quod ſua eſſentia ſimplex & individua ſi aliquis contenderet eſſe etiam noſtro modo intelligendi eſſe unicum actum ſimpliciſſimum voluntatis, ego non cur abo. Vaſquez in 1. Tho q. 14. a. 13. diſp. 65. And is not this à ſhort end of many Controverſies.If you do not, our whole Controverſie about the Order of the Decrees is quickly at an end (and I am content with the abreviation): For where there is no Diſtinction, there is no Order. And when I diſtinguiſh them never ſo much, I ſay, as well as any, that they are all one in regard of the one Will or Eſſence of God that willeth them. In God there is no real diverſity; but his Will is thus variouſly denominated extrinſecally from its reſpect to the various objects to which it doth tranſire, and of the various effects which it produceth. And thus do all men talk of God. Elſe they could not diſtinguiſh his ſaving Will from his damning Will; nor Election from Rejection, in his Decree. So that no man can tell how to differ here.

3. And as to fore-ſight, you as much miſtake. For 1. I ſay not that God fore-ſeeth any good in any man, but what he giveth him, and willeth to give him; But we ſpeak of the Order of thoſe Volitions, in the way of execution. *Alex. Aleſ. is noted by Vaſquez and others, as ſingular, for holding that Predeſtination to the firſt Grace was upon fore-ſight of the future good uſe of that Grace as the cauſe: But he denieth that the firſt Grace is actually given on the ſame Cauſe: Therefore Vaſquez thinks he changed his mind.2. And all men that aſcribe Intentions, Volitions, or Purpoſes to God, do and muſt make the Object of them as ſuch to be Quid cognitum, or ſomething which ſome call an Idea in the Mind of God; It is not a prius Volitum qua tale that is the Object of a Volition, but bonum intellectum. And therefore nothing but fore-ſight or apprehenſion of the thing, needs to be put in the deſcription of the Object.

Nor do I deny, but that we muſt in our ordinary Diſcourſe ſpeak comprehenſively, and denominate Election eminently from the nobleſt parts: For as our full Salvation includeth all, or almoſt all, ſo our Converſion and Glorification preſuppoſeth all that antecedeth. And therefore as we may and muſt talk of Salvation in general, and not always ſtand to mention all the parts of it; ſo muſt we eminently talk of Election to Salvation, as comprehending the reſt, and not always ſtand to diſtinguiſh of the parts. But when you will make a Controverſie of the Order and the Object of theſe acts or parts, we muſt diſtinguiſh.

The fifth Crimination.

But you make Gods Decrees to proceed according to the Order of Intention, *Vaſquez, in 1. Tho. q. 23. diſp. 89. c. 7. ſaith, That the duplex ordo alter intentionis, alter executionis, non ſ…nt in mente artificis ſed alter in mente & conſultatione illius, alter in re ipſa. But in man I ſuppoſe it muſt be ſaid, that both may be in mente, the firſt circa rationes operandi; the ſecond circa ordinem operandi vel effectum. For the mind it ſelf ſaith, I will do this firſt, and that next. But in God we know of no ſuch Order, except Relative and Connotative from the effect, becauſe there is nothing in God but God.De fine & mediis; and ſo you feign God to Decree mens damnation; yea, and the denying them Grace; yea, and their Sin, …ub ratione medii, as a means to his Glory: And ſo he firſt decreeth to damn them, and then to leave them in ſin to that end.

All this is your miſtake: what any particular men ſay, I now mind not: But that which we hold is this; 1. I have told you, That not to give men Grace, Faith, yea, and Heaven, is nothing: And nothing needeth no Volition or Decree: Though both the Threatning and the Sentence of theſe Privations is ſomething, and thoſe are willed or decreed.

2. I have told you, That God decreeth no mans ſin at all: It is no capable Object of Gods Volition; unleſs as circa quod, as he willeth what uſe to make of ſin preſuppoſed.

3. Sin is no means of the Glory of God; and therefore is not willed as a means: otherwiſe it ſhould have the rationem boni qua medium, and be elegible. But it is an evil preſuppoſed; the curing or puniſhing of it, and not it it ſelf, being the means of Gods Glory: And therefore God doth not will it as a means.

4. Do not you your ſelf ſay, 1. That God doth glorifie his Juſtice in the damnation of the Wicked? 2. And that he willed from eternity ſo to do? 3. And that he fore-knew who would be wicked? 4. And that he could have cured and ſaved them if he would? 5. And that he had no abſolute Will or De…ree eventually or effectually to cure and ſave them, but only in tantum, to do ſo much towards it, which he knew would be uneffectual through their fault? 6. And that therefore the Decree of damnation, upon this fore-ſight, did paſs upon the individuals, and not only on the Wicked and Impenitent in general? All this you hold, and muſt hold; and what hold we more?

5. For as to the Order of Gods Decrees, we further hold as followeth:

1. That though when there is need, we muſt diſtinguiſh them by their Effects and Objects; yet we dread the preſumption of feigning thoſe Orders in the Mind of God, which we know not of, and cannot prove. He had need to be better acquainted with the Divine Acts, that ſhall venture to tell us in what Order they lie in the Mind of God, than Mortals are, except where God hath plainly told us.*Vaſquez in 1. Th…. q. 23. d. 94. c. 1. ſaith Scotus iu … ▪ d. 19. q. 1. Hac ordine inſtantia ratione in Dei pr…ſcientia & providentia diſpon… ▪ In prime Deum ſeipſum intelleziſſe, in ſecunde intellexiſſe omnes creaturas; in terti… quoſdam ad gloriam & gratiam praedeſtinaſſe circa alios vero ſe habuiſſe negative: in quarto vidiſſe eos caſuros in primo parente, in quinto providiſſe illis remedium per Chriſti paſſionem, &c.

2. We hold, that God doth not intendere finem, or eligere medi… thereto, in the ſenſe as man doth; becauſe he wanteth nothing, and therefore doth not velle deſideratum, nor ſeek any thing which he wanteth. But that improperly God is ſaid to intend an end, when he doth but will to produce an effect, or elſe ſtill perfectly enjoyeth that which is improperly called His end. And in the firſt ſenſe, every Creature is his end; that is, the terminus or effect of his operation. And in the other ſenſe, He himſelf only is his own end; that is, the complacency of his own Will.

3. Therefore to undertake to delineate the Order of Gods Volitions or Decrees, according to the way of mental intention de fine & mediis, is a work unfit for us to meddle with, as being beyond our reach.

4. But thoſe that will needs meddle that way, can go no further than to ſay, That God is his own end, (or the fulfilling or complacency of his Will) and therefore that God firſt willeth the complacency of his own Will, and then willeth all Creatures as the means thereto. And what is this to any of our Controverſies? For the glorifying of his Juſtice, is but the means of the complacency of his Will. Or if you will ſay, that his Glory is his end, it is no created thing that you muſt mean by his Glory. For nothing created can be Gods Ultimate End. Or if you could prove that Scholaſtici omnes uno …re fatentur nullam cauſam realem Divinae voluntatis poſſe aſſignari, non ſolum efficientem, materialem aut formalem (id enim ſatis compertum eſt) ſed ne que …in… lem non ſolum inter object… creat… ſed …c ſu…m bonitatem, Vaſq. 1. Tho. q. 19. d. 82. c. 1. (But by his leave, that which hath no cauſ… formati… … nothing.) But cap. 2. he maintaineth that Gods own goodneſs (only) is his Ratio volendi, ſed non cauſa, which is held alſo by Al…nſ. 1. p. q. 28. …. …. q. 3. Gabri. 1. d. 14. q. 1. a. 1. Henric. quod, l. 4. q. 19. Dried. de concord. 1. p. cap. 4. …d ….a created Glory were Gods Ultimate End; that is, the appearance or refulgence of his Image or Likeneſs on the Creature: yet you muſt confeſs, that it is the Glory of God in his Conjunct Perfections, Power, Wiſdom, Goodneſs, and that the Glory of his Punitive Juſtice muſt be either taken as a means to that; or elſe that God hath his End continually in the Glory which is upon every Creature, and every man and act of man.

5. Though Dr. Twiſſe ſo frequently inculcate, Quod prius eſt intentione, poſterius eſt executione; he ſaith, that it is but de fine & med…is, and not de medii… inter ſe; and that no medium is properly Gods End (and then nothing but himſelf is his End); and he glorieth as the diſcoverer of this Truth, that all the means are one to God, and therefore have but one Decree; ſo that he reduceth all Gods Decrees to two, 1. Of his Glory as his End▪ 2. Of all the means thereto as one.

6. And other learned mens Writings I have ſeen, who come after him, and ſeek to prove that the Decree de fine & mediis are but one, and conſequently that there is no ſuch order to be feigned among them.

7. The plain truth is, Gods Will is the beginning and end of all: And all the World are the means of accompliſhing and pleaſing it: And it is always fulfilled and pleaſed, though not always by the ſame means: And God loveth no Creature finally for it ſelf, but for Himſelf, as his Perfection ſhineth in it, and as it fulfilleth his Will. And to feign any other Order of Intention and Election de fine & medii… in God, is preſumptuous; much more to lay our frames of them, and tye God hereto, and trouble the Church with contending for ſuch Models. But the Order of Execution is intelligible (in part) to man: And we are ſure that God eternally intended to execute his Will in that Order in which in time he doth it. And therefore this is the only neceſſary and the ſufficient method of Gods Decrees, which man can inveſtigate.

8. We deny therefore that God decreeth or willeth to damn any before he fore-ſeeth their Sin; or that he decreeth to damn any, but as impenitent Sinners; or that the damnation of any man is his End; or See this queſtion handled by Vaſqu. 1. Tho. q. 19. d. 82. c. 4. & 5. & 6. that inſtantia ſecundum …rdinem objectorum inter ſe aſſignanda ſunt, & non ex ſola Dei voluntate.that he decreeth any mans ſin; or that he decreeth not to give them Grace; or that Sin, or not giving Grace, or not believing, &c. need a Decree, being nothing; much more that theſe are decreed as means to Gods Glory. But if you ſpeak de fine, 1. As that which man is bound to intend, 2. Or as a meer effect; ſo no doubt all things have their relation, uſe, and order to each other.

The ſixth Crimination.

You deny all conditional Decrees in God, and ſo make them all abſolute, and conſequently arbitrary, meerly becauſe God will do it.

Do you think we differ in this? You dare not profeſs your diſſent L…g. Twiſſ. Vind. Grat. li. 1. Digreſ. 1. de Elect. p. 151. Et Epiſcopii Inſtit. Theol. li. 4. Sect. 6. cap. 6. pag. 412, 41….from any of this following explication of our ſenſe.

1. Gods Will is the Cauſe and End of the whole Creation: And what ever pleaſeth him to do he doth; whatſoever it pleaſeth him ſhall come to paſs, it ſhall come to paſs; and what ever he is pleaſed to make our Duty by a Law, is made our Duty. All that God doth and commandeth is Arbitrary: His Wiſdom indeed and his Will concur; but his Ends are within himſelf; and his Will is the end of his Will, ſo far as it may be ſaid to have an end. Arbitrarineſs and ſelf-willedneſs is Gods Perfection, which is mans Sin and Uſurpation. If you will ſtretch to that impropriety, as to ſay that He willeth it, becauſe his Underſtanding ſeeth it fitteſt to be willed; and ſo make Cauſes and Effects in God; yet muſt you add, that the fitneſs or goodneſs ſo underſtood, is the Aptitudinal congruency to his Will.

2. We affirm that God hath many Decrees which are conditional in reſpect of the thing decreed. *Inquit Twiſſus Vind. Grat. li. 1. de elect. Dig. 3. p. 163. Aquinas diſerte aſſerit, Deum velle hoc eſſe propter hoc; ſed non propter hoc velle hoc, p. 1. q. 19. …. 1. c. & ad primam voluntatem Dei rationabilem eſſe, non quod aliquid ſit Deo cauſa volendi, ſed in quantum vult unum eſſe propter aliud, Et q. 23. …. 5. c. Eodem mod… produxi…u… Bonavent…ram, Scotum, Durandum, conſpirantibus animis …adem per omnia quod ad hunc apicem attin…t p…ofitentes. Vide quae addit ex ſuare ſio ibid p. 164.So Dr. Twiſſe frequently tells you. He maketh one thing a means and a condition of the event of another. And we ſay that God hath conditional Promiſes and Threatnings; [If thou confeſs with thy mouth, and believe in thy heart, &c. thou ſhalt be ſaved]. And we believe that Gods Will made theſe Promiſes and Threats, and that they are the true ſigns of his Will: And that he will fulfil them. And ſo far he hath a conditional Will, and conditional expreſſions of his Will.

3. But as to the Act of Volition, we believe that his Wills are eternal, and have no proper condition of their existence, or not exiſting; becauſe being exiſtent, they are Neceſſary neceſſitate exiſtentiae; e. g. God never had ſuch a Will as this, [If thou repent, I will purpoſe or will to pardon thee if thou repent, or to make the pardoning conditional promiſe;] But [If thou repent I will pardon thee, and whether thou repent or not, I will conditionally pardon thee, or make that Covenant which ſaith, I will pardon thee if thou repent,] our Acts are the Conditions of Gods Gifts and Acts, but not of his Will, as ſuſpended on thoſe Acts.

4. Sure this is your own ſentiment: For you deny not that God knoweth from eternity whether the condition of each Event will it ſelf be or not; And if ſo, it muſt be only the condition of the Event, and not of his Decree: For he that e. g. willeth abſolutely that all ſhall periſh that repent not, and knoweth certainly that Judas will not repent, doth thenceforth abſolutely Will that Judas ſhall periſh, though only that he periſh conditionally. For that Will is no longer ſuſpended on a Condition, but it is the Event only that is ſuſpended. At leaſt you muſt ſay, that it is paſſed into a certainty, equal to an abſolute Will.

5. But we will come as near as truth will lead us. If by a Condition you mean only that Condition of the event which is not a ſuſpender of Gods Decree, but only a conſtituent qualification of the Object; ſo I grant to you, that though Gods Will as it ſignifieth his Eſſence, or his eſſential Principle of operation, in it ſelf, have no cauſe or condition; yet as it is extrinſically denominated, the Volition or Nolition of this or that, the Object hath its Conditions; that is, qualifications, without which Gods Will is not ſo denominable. And ſo Gods Will hath its Conditions of complacency or diſplicency in the Creature, without which he cannot truly be ſaid to be pleaſed or diſpleaſed in them; yea, I told you, that theſe may oriri de novo, without change in God. And whether his judicial Will to condemn men as Judge, have the ſame conditions, we ſhall enquire further hereafter. I have already manifeſted, that the Objects of it have their proper qualifications.

The ſeventh Crimination.

At least you make Election abſolute, if not Rejection; and ſay, that God electeth men to Salvation, without reſpect to any goodneſs in *To the queſtion, An electio ad beatitudinem praeceſſerit praedeſtinati… nem meritorum. The affirmative is held by Cajet. and moſt Thomiſts, by Scotus, in 1. d. 41. q. 1. Durand. q. 1. n. 8. Aegid. ibid. q. 1. a. 2. Major. 1. d. 4. q. 2. Sotu… in Ro…. …. Cordub. li. 1. q. 56. …pin. …. inquit Vaſquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. diſp. 89. c. 1. But Vaſquez holdeth the contrary, with Oſ…rius, Turrian, and many others, maintaining that Auguſtine held, Electionem ad gloriam eſſe e… meritis gratia pr…viſis. And no doubt but God decreed Glory to be given per modum praemii, if that be all.them.

I have ſaid enough to this already; 1. Do you think that men are good before they are elected? when they are not men? You do not certainly. 2. Do you think that God fore-ſeeth any good in men, when he willeth to them their first good? no doubt you do not. 3. Do you think that God fore-ſeeth in men any ſecond, third, or following degrees of goodneſs, before he intend to give it them? what need he purpoſe to give it them, if he fore-ſee that they will have it without his Gift? 4. Do you think that God fore-ſeeth any power to do good in men, but what he intendeth to give them? or any good act, but what proceedeth from that power which he giveth them, and from his concourſe, or co-operating influx? I dare ſay that you do not. 5. And do you think that we imagine that God giveth, or purpoſeth to give, any following mercy to him that hath not the neceſſary antecedent mercy? As to glorifie any that is not juſtified, or to juſtifie any that is not called. 6. You ſee then that it's neceſſary, if you will quarrel, that you diſtinguiſh of Election as before ſaid. Though Gods Will in it ſelf, as was now ſaid, have no proper ſuſpending condition; yet, 1. The effects of Gods Will have. 2. And the Objects of Gods Will have their neceſſary qualifications. 3. And ſome of Gods Volitions are thence extrinſically denominated conditional.

Now, 1. God giveth Salvation to no Unbeliever, but on condition of Faith. And God actually glorifieth none but penitent perſevering Believers: And both theſe he accordingly decreed or willeth. And can you ſay then that Election hath no reſpect to the perſons goodneſs. It hath not only reſpect to the good intended him, but to that good which is a neceſſary qualification found in him; that is, neceſſary to the benefit to which he is elected. God decreeth to give glory to none but perſevering Saints, nor perſeverance to none but the Holy, nor juſtification to none but Believers.

But I will confeſs to you, that we hold, 1. That God abſolutely willed to give Chriſt and the New Covenant to the World; 2. That he abſolutely willeth or decreeth to give the Goſpel and common Grace in a greater degree, to many a one that is no more worthy of it than others that are paſt by, and to give it to none but the unworthy. 3. That he abſolutely decreeth to give Faith and Repentance to many that have long reſiſted him, and are as great Sinners as thoſe that have them not, and to none but the unworthy in proper ſenſe. And dare you deny any of this your ſelf?

The eighth Crimination.

Thus you bring preſumption into the World, and encourage men to Marlorate, as from Calvin, ſaith, in Joh. 15. 2. Certum decretum Dei a nemine infirmari poſſe: Stat igitur firma ſententia, Quemcun que Deus ante conditum orbem elegerit, cum non poſſe perire: Quem vero rejecerit, cum non poſſe ſalvari, etiamſi omnia ſanctorum opera fecerit. (An ill ſuppoſition) which Epiſcopius citeth with diſtaſt. But Brentius ibid. cited by the ſame Marlorate, ſaith, Haec ſententia occurrit c…rioſitati carnis, quae ſ…let arg…te magis quam reveren…r de praedeſtinatione diſſerete, & pro ſuo ingenio colligere, nullum a domin… ad vitam a…rnam electum poſſe damnari, eti…ſi peſſi… vivat: nullum item a Domin… ad ignem aeternum deputatum poſſe ſalvari, eti amſi optime vivat: ſ… i…a que velle pro ſua libidin… vivere.ſin: If once they be elect, let them do what they can, they are ſure to be ſaved; for they are certain that Election will not change.

1. You are leading us towards the queſtion of Perſeverance, before the time.

2. Do you think your ſelf that Election changeth? Is not this as much imputable to you as us? or do we differ here? Do not you ſay that God fore-knoweth who will be ſaved? And can God be deceived? or ſhall not all certainly be glorified that are ſo fore-known? Nay, do you not ſay that, at leaſt, upon that fore-knowledge, God decreeth each perſons certain Salvation that ſhall be ſaved? And can that Decree which is upon fore-knowledge be fruſtrate? Do not you then as much encourage preſumption by a certain unchangeable Election as we.

3. It is factious perverſeneſs (reflecting on your ſelves as much as us) which puts in that word, [Let them do what they will, or live how they will, or ſin they never ſo much;] For it falſly intimateth that God electeth men to Glory, that live impenitently in wickedneſs; according to our Doctrine. Whereas we ſay, 1. That if the word Election be taken partially, for the act of Gods Decree to glorifie them, none but fore-ſeen perſevering Saints are the Objects; And a wicked Saint is a contradiction. Or if it be taken for Gods Decree to convert a man, we ſay that this is true, that let the World live never ſo wickedly, God doth decree to convert ſome of them from that wickedneſs, but not all: Do you queſtion this? 2. But if the word Election be taken comprehenſively, then mens Holineſs, Repentance, and Faith is part of the Salvation But Brentius ibid. cited by the ſame Marlorate, ſaith, Haec ſententia occurrit curioſitati carnis, quae ſolet argute magis quam reverenter de praedeſtinatione diſſerere, & pro ſuo ingenio colligere, nullum a domino ad vitam aeternam electum poſſe damnari, etiamſi p…ſſim… vivat: nullum item a Domino ad ignem aeternum deputatum poſſe ſalvari, etiamſi optime vivat: ſe ita que velle pro ſua libidine vivere.which they are elected to: And to ſay that God abſolutely electeth Peter to live and die a Saint, let him (after Converſion) live and die never ſo wickedly; this is a putid contradiction, ſuch paultry dealing faction cauſeth; what do you differ from us in all this?*Vid. Epiſcop. Inſtit. Theo. li. 4. ſect. 5. cap. 7. pag 415. col. 1.

4. But as to preſumption hereupon, I anſwer you, 1. That there is no mercy which Satan will not tempt men to abuſe, even Chriſt, and the hopes of Heaven it ſelf. 2. As long as wickedneſs is that evil which Election decreeth to deliver us from; he that is wicked may be ſure that he hath not the benefit nor mark of Election, and cannot have the leaſt aſſurance that he is elect. 3. And while he that is truly godly knoweth that he is no further elected to Salvation than he is elected to perſevere in godlineſs; this is no rational inducement to him to forſake godlineſs, any more than to renounce Heaven, but rather to conclude, I am decreed to perſevere in holineſs, therefore I muſt ſo do. 4. And to paſs by the Controverſie of perſeverance till we come to it, it is as all confeſs, ſo few of the Elect that are certain of their own Election, that this Objection can extend but to a few. 5. Laſtly, None are certain of their Election, but ſuch as have ſtrong clear active Grace and evidence; that believe firmly, and love God much, and obey him carefully: And ſuch as theſe are fit to improve aſſurance, and to live in the fruits of love and gratitude. Did you ever know what love, and thankfulneſs, and delight in God, and holineſs are, and yet can you think that they are the way to ſin? You know nothing in Religion, if you know not, that they are the life and ſoul of true Religion, and the moſt powerful principles of Obedience and Perſeverance. Nor do you underſtand the Goſpel-deſign, if you know not, that the greateſt manifeſtation of the love of God, is the greateſt means of love, and thankfulneſs, and deſire, and delight in God and goodneſs, unto man.

The ninth Crimination.

At leaſt thus *Suetonius ſaith Tiberius was a neglecter of Religion, becauſe he thought that all things were ruled by fate.Fate is ſet up in the World, and all things are under neceſſity, and unavoidable.

You had this Objection about neceſſity before, and to the anſwer of it I refer you further, 1. Immutable Election doth ſet up but a conſolatory quietting certainty in the World, without which mans mind muſt ſtill be in troubleſome, unquiet, if not tormenting terrours. Is it a wrong to you, if you can be ſure to be ſaved? Had you rather live and die under theſe apprehenſions, [I know not whether I ſhall be in Heaven Kipping Philonatur. l. 9. c. 11. p 431. voluntas iſta abſoluta hominem cum effectis ſuis ineluctabiliter neceſſitat hoc eſt ad unum oppoſitorum neceſſario conſtringit & determinat omnia ejus acta & eventa, ut non aliter evenire queant quam eveniant: where he confuteth Piſcators Arguments for ſuch neceſſitating Decrees, p. 432, &c.or Hell for ever?] If you have not certainty, or a hope that is ſomewhat near it; I think this concluſion, if you be awake, and in your wits, muſt needs make your life a conſtant bondage, and the fear of death your conſtant miſery, and muſt blaſt all the pleaſures of your fuleſt Proſperity. Thank God that his Foundation ſtandeth ſure, and the Lord knoweth who are his; and ſee that you keep his mark upon you, profeſſing Chriſt, and departing from iniquity. And do not cry out as if you were fatally carried to Heaven againſt your wills.

2. As for the word [Fate] it is ambiguous: Some by fate, mean but the certainty that God's Predictions ſhall be fulfilled; Quod fatur eveniet. Some mean only the certain connexion of Cauſes and Effects under Gods ſapiential Government of the World. (As Campanella maketh Neceſſity, Fate, and Harmony, to be the reſult of Power, Wiſdom, and Love; but not accurately enough.) And ſome ſay, (but how truly I know not) That the Stoicks took Fate for ſome primary neceſſitating Cauſe, which did neceſſitate all Acts of the Gods and Men. It is a word that we have no need of; they that will play them with it may.

3. But as to Neceſſity again, I ſay, 1. Election maketh no mans ſin or miſery neceſſary, nor tendeth to it. 2. It maketh no mans Salvation Thus Fewrbornius in Faſcicul. Diſſer. de termino vitae uſeth 17 Arguments, contra ſententiam Calvinianam de fatali & ſimpliciter neceſſario termino vitae, (quaſi Deus ex abſoluto & ſimplici decreto & abſ que ullo ad cauſas ſecundas phyſicas, & voluntarias reſpectu, c…i que hominum genus & horam mortis praeſixerat.) And all upon the encouragement of ſome ill and unſound words of Piſcator, who is moſt extream in this: whereas this is none of the Calviniſts ſenſe commonly, who hold that ſin is only fore-ſeen, and not decreed: but all true means are decreed with the end in one Decree; therefore reſpected as decreed.neceſſary againſt his will in ſenſu compoſito. 3. The more it maketh our Salvation neceſſary, that is, certain and inſuperable, the greater is Gods mercy, the greater our happineſs, and cauſe of gratitude and Joy. The Saints in Heaven are not offended at the certainty of their perſevering bleſſedneſs.

If you ſhall Object, That it neceſſitateth the periſhing of all others, becauſe none can be ſaved who are not Elect. Remember that this was your third Crimination, and is anſwered before. I ſay again, 1. Neceſſity and Impoſſibility are either Logical in ordine probandi; or Phyſical in ordine cauſandi. The firſt ſort followeth upon your own Doctrine: He that God fore-knoweth ſhall ſin and periſh, it neceſſarily followeth Neceſsitate conſequentiae; and it is impoſsible but it ſhould follow, that he will ſin and periſh, but not by Gods fore-knowledge.

Cauſal neceſſitating either taketh away the true power of eſcaping, or depriveth of ſuch power by prevention: But ſo doth not the Election or Decree of God.

2. Though we hold ſuch abſolute Election as hath been opened to you, and that God decreeth to cauſe men to believe, before he fore-ſeeth that they will believe, (in order of Nature, according to humane Conception;) yet we hold as you do, that Reprobation doth not ſo proceed, but that God decreeth men to Hell only on fore-ſight of final wickedneſs, which he never cauſed or willed. And if in this we agree with you, you muſt accuſe your ſelves as much as us.

3. God doth both Decree to give, and actually give men power to do more than they do; And his decreeing that another man ſhall well uſe that power which he hath, doth ſure take away no power from you.

4. Yea, Gods not decreeing to cauſe you to uſe your own power well, doth take none of it from you; But includeth that ſuch power you have: much leſs his Decree to do more for others.

5. All the World acknowledgeth, that a Benefactor as ſuch is free to give his own benefits as he pleaſes, unequally. And giving more to one taketh nothing from another. Suppoſe that God had for 4000 years, till Chriſt's Incarnation, but willed and given his mercy equally to all the World, even ſo much as might leave the matter meerly to their wills; and after that had given greater mercy to the Chriſtian Churches, taking nothing from the reſt: Had this been any injury or diminution to the reſt? Suppoſe now God ſhould fetch half the damned out of Hell, is this any more hurt or wrong to the reſt than if he had delivered none.

But all theſe things are here anticipated, and cannot be fully anſwered till we come to the Article of Grace; where we muſt ſhew how God doth differ his Operations on mens Souls: For none can deny, but as he differenceth them, ſo he decreed to difference them, and no otherwiſe.

The tenth Crimination.

At leaſt you make Gods Decrees and Ways unequal, and make him a Saith Vaſque… in 1. Tho. …. 2…. …. 3. d. 95. c. …. Nullam dari cauſam Reprobationis ex parte reprebi, dicunt Durard. in 1. d. 41. q. 2. …. 14. Greg. Armi. q. 1. a. 2. con. 1. & 5. Marſ…l. 1. q. 4…. a. 2. con. 4, &c. Dried… 1. p. de concord. c. 3. con. …. & 3. Adam in c. 9. ad Roman. Ferrar. 3. cont. Gent. c. 161. Aquin. 1. q. 23. …. 5. ad 3. …x his tamen Doctoribus T…om. Driedo & Durand. non dicunt abſolute, Reprobationis nullum dari cauſam ex parte reprobi: ſed nullam eſſe cauſam ob quam hic potius quam alius reprobetur, aut quod idem eſt, cur hic praedeſtinetur et diſcernatur a moſſa perditionis, ille vero in ea relinquatur & reprobetur, vid. Laetera.Reſpecter of perſons, as decreeing to ſave one, and not another; or to give …re Grace to one than to another, of equal demerit.

You may ſhew your ignorance about this your ſelf; but this is no difference between the parties. For, 1. No man can deny but that God ſtanding towards us in a three-fold Relation, as our Owner and the Lord of all, as our Ruler, and as our Benefactor, ſo he is free in the firſt and third Relation. A Proprietary may do with his own as he liſt: And a Benefactor may unequally give his benefits as he ſeeth meet: For he is ſuppoſed to give only that which is no mans Right, till he give it them (by promiſe or collation). But as God is a Rector, and governeth Mankind by a Law, which hath Rewards promiſed, and Puniſhments threatned to promote Obedience, and as he is Judge according to that Law, and as he is a Benefactor already obliged by promiſe; thus God doth keep an equality in his Judgments and Executions, and ever proceedeth according to his Word or Law. He will in juſt equity and equality forgive, juſtifie and adopt all penitent Believers, and no others, how great ſoever. He will glorifie all perſevering Saints, and no others, juſt according to his Word; Becauſe his Law is Norma judicii, or that which he will obſerve in judging. If God forgive and ſave one penitent Believer and not another, you may ſay that he ruleth not in equity and equality. But in caſes of other diſpoſals and benefits, which no man hath right to by any Law or Covenant, the caſe is otherwiſe.

2. And full experience tells us this. God made not every Man an Angel, nor every Stone a Star, nor every Star a Sun, nor every Beaſt a Man, nor every Toad a Bird, nor the Dirt and Water Fire. Wonderful is the Variety of his Works through all the World: No two Birds, Beaſts, Men, Stones, Trees, are perfectly equal and like. No two mens Faces, Conſtitutions, Parts, Diſpoſitions, Virtues, are perfectly equal. With what various temperaments come we into the World? And is God a Reſpecter of perſons for this? or are his ways unequal? As a free Owner and Benefactor he will diverſifie his Gifts, and do with his own as he liſt, though Sinners quarrel at it. You dare not ſay that God giveth his Benefits equally to all, that are of equal demerit.

3. The ſin of reſpecting perſons belongeth to a Judge, obliged by rules to equal diſtribution: By a Judge, I mean any judging and executing Governour, or obliged diſtributer of Rights. And it conſiſteth in partiality and injuſtice, becauſe of ſomething in the perſon, (as Greatneſs, Riches, Learning, Relation, Flattery, &c.) which is no juſt cauſe of that inequality. But this is nothing to God, who regardeth no mans perſon for any ſuch thing, nor denieth to any man his proper due.

The eleventh Crimination.

*Both ſides charge this on each other. Malderus, 1, 2. q. 111. a. 3. p. 519. Vocar…t illuſorie Deus ſi talem gratiam ſufficientem ſolum ideo daret quia non eſt efficax, &c. It is prophaneneſs thus to venture on blaſphemous charges againſt God, if … done by him ….You make God play the Hypocrite, to ſend abroad Miniſters to intreat men to repent and be ſaved, when he hath decreed that they ſhall be damned, and not repent. And you make all the preaching, and means that are uſed for ſuch mens Converſion, a meer mockery.

No more than you do; For there is no difference as to this. 1. Do not you ſay that God fore-knoweth from eternity that Judas, e. g. will not repent, or be ſaved? yea, that upon ſuch fore-knowledge he hath decreed before he was born to damn him? And doth this make God play the Hypocrite, or his Word to be a mockery? We ſay but the very ſame of all that periſh.

2. To help you to reſcue both your ſelves, and us from this accuſation, conſider, that Gods Decree hath ſeveral parts. As, 1. That the lapſed World ſhall have a Covenant of Grace, and be intreated to be ſaved. 2. That Judas, one of this world, ſhall have his part among the reſt. 3. Whereas Judas will not receive this offered Grace, for rejecting it he ſhall be condemned: Theſe are the material parts of Gods Decree; And is there any hypocriſie or mockery in this? God decreed not to condemn Judas, but for rejecting offered Grace: And this preſuppoſeth the offer: He cannot reject that which never was offered him. What would you have had God rather ſay, [I fore-ſee if I offer Judas Grace, that he will not accept it, and therefore I will offer him none, but condemn him, becauſe he would have refuſed it, had it been offered.] By this rule, the ſin of all the World againſt mercy and means of life, ſhould have been prevented by offering them no means or mercy; and yet men periſh and be damned for that which they never did, becauſe God fore-ſaw that they would have done it. Are not theſe ways unequal, in compariſon of Gods, which vain men quarrel with.

2. But again, I tell you that your feigning to hold, that God decreed that Judas ſhould not repent, is not true of thoſe that you now talk with: It is enough that God did not decree that Judas ſhould eventually repent.

The twelfth Crimination.

*The Jeſuites themſelves as well as the Dominicans deny as much as a poſſibility or power to unbaptized Infants (of being ſaved); And in their caſe are for as abſolute arbitrary Reprobation as the higheſt, not only Calviniſt but Antinomian, vid. Ruiz. de praedeſ. Tr. 3. diſp. 15. ſect. 1. p. 202, &c. And this upon the irrational Doctrine, that for want of baptiſm the Children of the holieſt perſons ſhall be condemned, though the Parents did their beſt to procure it, and ſo there is no will or ſin the Cauſe: And yet godly perſons have Merits to ſpare for ſouls in Purgatory, and none for their own Children.Though you ſay that God decreeth to give men more power than they uſe, yet you add, that none of that power will ever be well uſed, unleſs he fore-decree it; For you ſay that God abſolutely willeth or decreeth every good Act, as well as the Power. And ſo no ſuch Act followeth any Power, where God decreeth it not: And what good doth that Power do them.

Still you anticipate thoſe Controverſies which belong to the point of Grace. But I anſwer, 1. You muſt anſwer this for your ſelves firſt, for it as much concerneth you as us. For you teach that what ever Power God giveth men, it will never be exerciſed, unleſs he fore-know that it will be ſo: Yea, unleſs upon fore-knowledge of mans due cooperation with God, it be decreed. For you ſay that God fore-knoweth all the Acts of Grace and Power that will be exerciſed; yea, and decreeth them on the ſaid fore-ſight, as your Doctrine de ſcientia media inferreth.

2. By this Objection there is no way to reconcile you to Gods Providence, unleſs he will be ignorant of all mens future ſinful Omiſſions, or unleſs he will not be before-hand willing of all the good that is in the World, or at leaſt not decree it, and be the Author of it; Or elſe unleſs he will cauſe all men equally to uſe their powers, and do good alike. Now you dare not ſay, that ever any of theſe ſhall come to paſs. You ſee and confeſs that all men do not uſe their power equally, nor do good alike. And you know God will not be before ignorant of it. And you ſhall never abate Gods goodneſs ſo, as to keep him from willing and working too all the good that is the world. And will you therefore be unreconciled to him?

3. And where you ſay, what good then doth ſuch power; 1. I pray you mark that you confeſs that we hold, that they had power. And if they had power to do good, they could have done it. For what elſe is power, but that by which I can do the Act. 2. The power given was a proportionable demonſtration of Gods Power, Wiſdom and Mercy, and therefore it did good. 3. That it was not uſed to their own Salvation, was their own fault for which they ſuffer. And in all this we are agreed.

And now I appeal to your conſidering Reaſon, whether there be any difference hitherto left in the point of Predestination between you and me? And I again mind you, that were it not for the importunity and prejudice of contenders, all that I have ſaid of this had been needleſs. for it is obvious, that while we are all agreed of theſe generals, 1. That God decreeth to give all men juſt ſo much Grace or Mercy as in time he giveth them. *Apud veteres eccleſiae patres eadem omnino ſuit controverſia, de cauſae gratiae, & Praedeſtinationis ex parte noſtra. Vaſquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 5. diſp. 9. pag. 658.2. And that he abſolutely decreeth not to give them any more but what he giveth them. All this Controverſie of Decrees or Predeſtination, depends on the Controverſie of Grace, how much it is that God giveth unto men.

I confeſs that you have indeed proved your ſelf reconciled to me; But that is becauſe you are an Arminian, and do not know it: For you grant me all that I can juſtly deſire. But the Calviniſts will not be therefore reconciled to you, or give you thanks.

Except the few Predeterminants afore-excepted, and ſome odd words that drop from paſſionate or injudicious men; I am paſt doubt that the generality of ſober moderate Calviniſts will ſtand to what I ſay, or may do it I am ſure, in conſiſtence with their main cauſe. And I am confident that theſe are the healing-terms that muſt unite us. And remember, that you confeſs, that thus far we differ not.

Had you but this following Doctrine from one of the greateſt Jeſuites, V…ſquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. diſp. 91. c. 11. p. 659. it might put you to your ſtudy to be able to diſagree. Catholica ſententia est nullam cauſam, nul…ve initium, aut occaſionem ex parte praedestinati excogitari poſſe, ob quam De…s aut in tempore gratiam ipſi donaverit, aut in praeſcientia dare decreve…. Doctrina haec non ſolum intelligenda eſt de initio fidei, orationis, aut See all this largely proved by him to the end of the 18th Chap. ibid.…oluntatis conſequendi ſalutem; vel de aliis operibus quae circa Deum verſan…ur; qualia ſunt religionis; verum etiam de quovis opere moralis virtutis, …od in ipſum ſolum bonum honeſtum referatur. Et non ſolum excludimus initium, quod ſit meritum condignunt, ſed etiam meritum congruum ſeu impetratorium, aut diſpoſitionem, & quamlibet cauſam & occaſionem, ob quam Deus huic potius quam alteri gratiam donaverit, aut donare praefinierit; Ita … totaratio praeparandi huic potius gratiam quam illi, fuerit beneplacitum divinae voluntatis, nihil autem vel minimum ex parte praedeſtinati. Ita Thom. Marſil. Gregor. Armi. &c. And yet muſt we diſagree.

Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Conference 1

p. 1THE Firſt Days Conference ABOUT PREDESTINATION.

p. 6The first Crimination.