Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Section 12
SECT. XII. Somewhat more of Predetermination; with an anſwer to Dr. Twiſſe.
§. 1. THough I remit the Controverſie of *I remit the Reader to Strangius againſt the neceſſity of predetermination. Percipere non poſſum quomodo ſtatui poſſit Deum cauſas liberas, etiam ad actus intrinſice malos, phyſice praedeterminare, quin inde ſequatur Deum eſſe peccati authorem, &c. Le Blank Theſ. 56. de Concurſu, &c.Predetermination to a peculiar full Diſputation on that ſubject, yet this touch in tranſitu I ſhall give here.
1. It is not Gods meer Volition or Decree of the Event that we ſpeak of; but his Phyſical Motion.
2. †It's ſtrange the Dominicans are for burning and tormenting men for that which they hold God doth do in them and by them, and neceſſ…tate them to. See Bra…wardine li. 3. c. 1, 2. …od Deus quodammodo neceſſitat quamlibet Voluntatem creatam ad quemlibet liberum actum ſuum, & ceſſationem a… va…ationem ab a…u▪ & bo… neceſſitate naturaliter praecedent…: & cor. p. 649. Omnia qu… ſunt, fiunt aut eveni…t, ſunt, … & eveniunt … aliqu… neceſſitate ip… natural…t…r praecedent…. This is juſt Hobbs. So…. 5. … 654▪ that No creature hath ſimple liberty of Contradiction, or Contingency, but only ſecundum quid in reſpect to ſecond cauſes: but only Gods acts of will ad extra are ſimply free and contingent. As if God had given no creature Liberty to forbear ſin or do good; but doing it or not doing it were from Gods neceſſitation, though not from the creatures!The Dominicans (the Maſters of the Inquiſition, and Murderers of the Waldenſes and Albigenſes of old,) and therefore faulty as well as the Jeſuits, though there are very Learned men among them both, do commonly hold, that No Creature natural or free can act, unleſs God by Immediate phyſical efficient premotion predetermine it to that act, both in the act as ſuch (which they call the ſubſtance of it,) and all the modes, circumſtances and order of it.
3. Auguſtine and Janſenius after him, with their true followers hold not this neceſſity of predetermining premotion to all acts, natural, or ſinful; but only to ſpiritual good acts: which is not from the Nature, but the Corrupt…n of …an▪ and therefore the predetermination is not made, ſay they, by Gods Common Natural Motion, but by Medicinal Grace.
4. Durandus and his followers (as Lud. à Dola) and Aureolus partly, do hold, that if God do but uphold …ll creatures, as compaginate in the Univerſe, in the Nature he made them in, (and ſo natural Inclination, and media and objects all ſuppoſed) this ſuſtentation and Influx maintaining their Active Natures, and means, is ſufficient to cauſe an Act, without another particular predetermining premotion of God. As e. g. in Naturals, they think that if a Rock were violently held up in the Air, God continuing its Natural Gravity, and all other circumſtant Natures and Concauſes, this Rock if looſed can fall down of it ſelf, without another predetermining premotion of God. And that a new Act of God (ſuppoſing the ſaid ſupport of Nature) is more neceſſary to the not-falling, than to the falling of it: As it was to the fires not burning the Three Confeſſors, Dan. 3. And I am unable to ſee the error of this Opinion.
And ſo in Free agents, they think, that if God continue the Nature of a free-will, with all circumſtants and neceſſary natures, it can freely determine it ſelf, without another act of predetermining premotion; And doth ſo in each act of ſin: Though as Janſenius ſaith, by accidental corruption, for Converſion we need Medicinal Grace.
5. The Jeſuits, and all others explode this Opinion of Duràndus as ſingular, but give ſo little and ſlender reaſon of their diſſent, as would draw one the more to ſuſpect their cauſe. Inſtead of it they ſcarce know what to aſſert: But Bellarmine and the chiefeſt of them, under a pretended oppoſition, ſpeak (I think) the ſame in other words, Even an Univerſal Concurſe like that of the Sun, which operateth in ſpecification according to the nature of Recipients, which ſpecifie the effect. Which Univerſal Influx, no doubt, Aureolus and Durandus include in Gods ſuſtentation of Nature: For to ſuſtain an Active Nature in all its Active diſpoſition, by a ſuitable active Influx, is univerſally to cauſe its motion. The difference they are unable to aſſign.
6. After theſe come Hobbs, Carteſius and Gaſſendus, with a ſwarm of Epicureans, (a Sect commonly deſpiſed even in Cicero's time, and yet called Wits in ours by men that have no more wit than themſelves); and ſome of theſe ſay, that Motion needeth no continued cauſe at all, any more than non-movere: But when a thing is in motion, it will ſo continue, becauſe it is its ſtate, without any other continued cauſe than the motion it ſelf. And ſo they may as well ſay (and ſome do) that when a thing is in Being, it will ſo continue till it be poſitively annihilated, without any continued cauſation of its being. As if eſſe & exiſtere were nothing more than non eſſe; and agere were no more noble a mode of Entity than non agere, and ſo needed no more (that is, no) Cauſe. (For non eſſe & non agere need no Cauſe:) When this diſtraction is worn out and ſhamed, the next Age will reproach us for attempting the confutation of it; And yet the Wits of this delirant Age have not the wit to underſtand a Confutation.
Some of them ſay, that Spirits cannot move bodies for want of Contact (as Gaſſendus). Some ſay, that Matter and Motion are eternal, and that of themſelves; As if there were no God but Matter and Motion. Some ſay, that there is a God who gave matter one puſh at firſt, and ſo ſet it in that motion by which one body by a knock will move another to the end. And ſome ſay, There is no other Intellect; but the wonders of wiſdom and order in the World are done by ſuch fortuitous motion.
But Hobbes meeteth the Predeterminants and ſaith, that the Will is free in that its Act is Volition; but that this Volition is neceſſitated by ſuperiour or natural Cauſes as much as any motion in a Clock or Watch, and that it is unconceivable that any Act or Mode of Act can be without a neceſſitating efficient cauſe. But he differs from them in his conſequents, and in the Notion of a Spirit, acknowledging no being but Corporeal.
§. 2. The Predeterminants commonly build not their doctrine on Gods free-will, but on the Neceſsity of the thing: As if it were a contradiction, which God cannot do, for God to make a creature that can Determine it ſelf, ad ordinem actionis without his particular predetermining premotion; or to make a Stone that can fall from the Air of it ſelf, unleſs he move it downwards, beſides his ſuſtentation of its natural gravity, and all other natures, by his Influx, or univerſal Concurſe.
§. 3. But till they can prove the Contradiction, they muſt paſs for the denyers of Gods Omnipotency, which is to deny a God.
§. 4. *Let the Reader note, 1. That all the reſt of their arguments ſave this one are of no value. 2. And that Dr. Twiſſe affirmeth that God is not▪ alwayes the effector of all Good either of Profit or Pleaſure which yet he ſaith are Good. Now if there be no ſuch Entity in Bonum conducibile, vel Bonum Jucundum, as neceſſarily to require God to be the Cauſe of them, tell us if you can, Why there is ſo much entity in Malum morale, as that man is not able to cauſe it, unleſs God predetermine his will? Yea, as to Entity, there is no more in Bonum honeſtum, than in the reſt fore-named: His words are [Nos tueri poterimus, Malum fieri, eſſe Bonum per ſe: ne…pe in genere Boni conducibilis, ad certum aliquem fi…m: ſed arguit adverſarius, Ergo Deus eſſet non modo permiſſor, ſed & effector …jus mali. Prorſus invalida conſequentia: Apparet enim non neceſſe eſſe ut Deus ſit effector omnis Boni in genere conducibilis: (N. B.) Vix enim datur aliquod peccatum, quod non ſit alicui conducibile—Neque neceſſ… eſt ut Deus ſit author omnis boni jucundi, magis quam ut ſit author peccati. Nam certiſſimum eſt, & extra omnem controverſiae al…am poſitum, peccatum eſſe bonum in genere jucundi, etiam in genere conducibilis: poteſt enim peccatum nobis cedere in ſalutem—] Vind. Grat. li. 1. p. 1. ſect. 7. p. 133. But whereas the Doctor upbraideth Arminius for confuſion in not diſtinguiſhing the three ſorts of Good in this controverſie, An …li exiſtentia bonum ſit? viz. the bonum honeſtum, utile & jucundum; I muſt deſire the Reader to avoid alſo the Doctors confuſion, and to be ſo much more accurate than he, as to remember that this diſtinction is but de Bono Creaturae, whoſe pleaſure, profit and honeſty are diſtinguiſhable: But that above theſe God Himſelf is the abſolute and ſimple Good, and that things are firſt Good as related to him, the Prime and Ultimate Good: And that the higheſt formal notion of Goodneſs in the …creature, is none of thoſe three, but the conformity of things to the Will of God, the abſolute Rule of Goodneſs. And therefore when we ask, An bonum ſit ut ſit malum? we mean not an ſit bonum hominis ſecundum quid, but an ſit bonum ſimpliciter, viz. conforme Voluntati Divinae? And if they can prove that Deus velit▪ … fieri, we will confeſs it to be Good. But 3. Yet I deny it to be bonum utile, ſeeing it doth the ſinner no good. For Bonum jucundum in genere is not ſin. God would have men have more Pleaſure than ſin bringeth, and not leſs. But it is hoc minus jucundum ſenſibile preferred before hoc magis jucundum ſpirituale, which is ſin. Now the prelation of a Leſs Pleaſure to a Greater is no Pleaſure. So that ſin is neither utile nor jucundum. And the Doctor is quite out, in calling …ccaſio a medium▪ conducibile: and confeſſeth that ſin is no otherwiſe conducible to Gods Glory but as occaſio. Whereas occaſio, as ſuch, is no medium at all, no more than poſſibilitas eſt ens; unleſs you take Medium very largely.Their chief argument is, that the moral ſpecification of an Action is an Entity; and to ſay that any thing can cauſe any Entity without Gods firſt cauſing it, is to deifie that creature making it a firſt cauſe. Anſw. 1. The comparative Order of Actions, (as the terminating them on this object rather than that, and at this time rather than that, &c.) is but the modus modi entis; and ſo is no proper entity. 2. Or if the Name be the quarrell, it is no other Entity than what God is Able to make a creature Able to cauſe without his predetermining Cauſality. 3. This power is the excellency of the creature, and the honour of its Creator.
§. 5. As for their argument, that there is no effect without a cauſe, nor difference in effects without a difference in the cauſes; and that an undetermined cauſe cannot produce a determinate effect; I anſwer, 1. God is the cauſe of all differences without any diverſity in himſelf. And he is the Free cauſe of all things neceſſary in the World. 2. The ſoul is Gods Image. 3. The Will when undetermined hath a ſelf-determining power. Therefore this is but petere principium. 4. But there are many ſub cauſes that are a reaſon of the determination; As objects, opportunity, knowledge, the removing of competitors, &c.
§. 6. Therefore Gibieufs, Guil. Camerarius, &c. way of predetermination by the Cauſa finalis, is nothing to our queſtion; that being no efficient, but a Material, objective or Moral Cauſation.
§. 7. When they ſay, that elſe God dependeth on the creature, and is determined by it, (as to his Concurſe:) I anſwer, 1. How can Gods free upholding the power of a free agent, be his dependence on it, when it expreſly ſpeaketh its dependence on him, without whom it cannot be nor act? 2. No creature determineth Gods Immanent acts: nor his tranſient, as to the meer Impreſs and firſt effect; and ſo not Gods Act at all: unleſs Terminating be Determining. It is only its own Act which the creature determineth, which is a ſecondary effect of Gods act, as proceeding from the ſecond cauſe. Gods Influx maketh all that Impreſs on the ſoul which God intendeth abſolutely: But whether by that Impreſs the ſinner will conſent, the will determineth, and is the chief determiner in Evil.
§. 8. Saith Dr. Twiſſe Vindic. Grat. lib. 2. p. 2. Digreſ. 9. [The ſecond cauſe non agit in primam, &c. Hoc faceret vel volendo, vel ali…d agendo, &c.] Anſw. It's granted: God is not paſſive, nor doth any ſecond cauſe act on him as paſſive: Who is his Adverſary in this?
§. 9. He addeth [Neither on the Influx of God do we act: for an Act is not the ſubject of an act.] Anſw. 1. If by Gods Act and Influx he mean not the Effect on the ſoul, it is a falſe ſuppoſition that Gods Influx or Act is any other than his Eſſence: But if the ſaid effect be meant, I have ſhewed you that both Indiſpoſition in the Recipient, and a contrary Act may reſiſt it.
§. 10. Againſt our Paſsive determination of the effect, he ſaith, that [God is denyed to act by phyſical action on mans will—which if he did, he would rather determine it, than be determined by it, becauſe it cannot reſiſt him, &c.] Anſ. 1. The will doth not reſiſt by reaction on and againſt God; but by Indiſpoſition, and by its own not acting when it can, &c. 2. Who dare deny all Phyſical Action of God on mans will, when it is quaedam natura? 3. The will doth not Determine Gods will, nor reject his Impreſs, but only determine its own Act. 4. If God would act ad ultimum poſſe, the will would never diſobey or fail of the due effect.
§. 11. He ſaith ib. [Doth God move only to the Act in genere? or alſo to this ſpecies of action? The firſt cannot be ſaid, For Suarez, Hurtado, ſay that God determineth the Agent to this Individual act. And the creature hath as much need of help to the ſpecies of motion (which is perfecter than the genus,) as to the genus. And Gods Influx is ſingular, and not determined to Generical nature, &c.] Anſw. Gods univerſal motion (as the Suns) doth neceſſarily make its Impreſs on the creature, and giveth him ſufficient help ex parte ſui to Act; yea, neceſſarily continueth the ſoul in ſome Action. And that Action is ſingular, and not a non exiſtent univerſal. But it is only the General Nature of a ſingular Act which Gods Natural Influx neceſſarily cauſeth: And the Moral ſpecies (what need ſoever we have of help to it) is cauſed otherwiſe; not by this common Influx of God as the root of Nature, but by a ſpecial Gracious Influx with and by ſpecial ſupernatural means. And this it doth only to Good and not to Evil: and not alwayes with a cauſally neceſſitating influx, as to our act.
§. 12. He addeth [If the will need not Gods motion to its Act in ſpecie, it is either in genere entis, or in genere moris. The firſt cannot be ſaid: For the ſpecial Nature includeth the General and more. And the ſpecies in genere moris are no ſpecies of acts, but only accidents of humane acts, and that only by extrinſick denomination as tothe Law,] &c. Anſw. 1. The vanity of arbitrary Logical notions, is a wood for you to hide the matter in. You are not able certainly to define what phyſically ſpecifieth an Action, and what not. To ſay that one is the ſpecies of an Act, and the other is but an accident and no ſpecies, is but to ſay that you will ſay what you liſt. We uſe to ſay that Acts are ſpecified by their objects: And ſo when objects differ ſpecie phyſica vel morali, the acts do ſo. But when the queſtion is with Judas, ſhall I betray my Maſter or not? with another, ſhall I be perjured or not? with another, ſhall I commit this Adultery or not? with another, ſhall I pray in ſeaſon or out of ſeaſon? to another, ſhall I love God or the creatures more? ſhall I will or not will this? ſhall I will it or nill it? &c. Here you are ſo much at liberty that you may pleaſe your ſelf with ſaying, that to betray and not betray, to forſwear and not to forſwear, to love more or leſs in degree, &c. are phyſical ſpecies of entity, and ſo make phyſical ſpecies of Action. But I will not ſay that non agere & non ens is a ſpecies of Entity phyſical: Nor do I believe that we need Gods Influx ad non agendum as ſuch.
And as for your Accidents of Actions, if you mean Relations, it is their fundamentum that we are queſtioning. The extrinſick denomination is founded in Relation, or elſe it's Cauſeleſs. In a word, Man by Common Influx can determine his own will to go this way rather than that, and alſo not to go, and this without a further phyſical predetermining premotion of God.
§. 13. But here let the Reader note, that when he maketh Moral Good and Evil no ſpecies of Actions, but an extrinſick denomination (which is true, abſtracting the relation from the fundamental difference of the Acts), and maketh God the Naturally neceſſitating Cauſe of all that is phyſical in the acts, he maketh God equally the neceſſitating prime Cauſe of Good and Evil, which are but relations reſulting from the ſpecified acts.
§. 14. He addeth [If God move the will it is to that ſame act which it doth, or to another. If to another, why ſhould it be ſaid that God moved it to that which is not done rather than that which is done, when we ſpeak not of moral, but neceſſary phyſical motion?] Anſw. The Particle [To] doth cheat you by ambiguity. 1. As [to] noteth, the effect, of God alone, it is [to] the Impreſs which he maketh on the ſoul; which effect he ſtill obtaineth, which urgeth it towards its own act. 2. The ſame I ſay if [to] ſignifie an abſolutely intended end. 3. But if [to] ſignifie the natural tendency of Gods Impulſe as to an effect poſsible and deſirable, yea, and due by command from the ſubordinate cauſe (mans will,) then it was [to] our act of repentance, faith, duty, that God moved us: That is, he gave us that Power, and neceſſary influx by which it might and ought to have been done by us.
§. 15. It is but to make toil for the Reader to anſwer all theſe fallacies and quibbles, founded in ſome falſe ſuppoſition or ambiguous word: elſe I would anſwer the reſt of that Digreſſion, and his Digreſ. 5. li. 1. p. 2. contra Alvar. Only here I muſt take notice, that in this Digr. 9. he himſelf rejecteth Greg. Arim. and Hurtado's aſſertion of Gods Determining us to this or that Numerical Act, as diſtinct from another ejuſdem ſpeciei, ut merum figmentum, & ad curioſitati hominum nimium infoelici ſatiſfaciendum duntaxat introductum. Whereas were it not for wearying the Reader, I might ſhew, that the ſame Reaſons will hold for or againſt this numerical, as are for or againſt his ſpecifical predetermination. And the ſpecies having no exiſtence but in the individuals, and himſelf ſaying, that duplicate page duplicate page duplicate page duplicate page Gods motion is ad actus ſingulares, if he ſay that it is not to that ſingular act that is done, rather than that which is not done, he giveth up his whole cauſe.
§. 16. But to this he hath an anſwer that it is a fiction and unſound to ſay, that [Poſsibilia quae nondum exiſtunt do differre numero: cum differre numero eſt tantum exiſtentium.] Anſw. 1. He may as well ſay, that eſſe poſsibile is a fiction: when poſsibile is terminus diminuens ad eſſe. And is not poſsibile as much a fiction de ſpecie as de numero? That which is not, neither is in ſpecie nor in numero. But there is a Poſsibilitas numeri as well as ſpeciei. Yet with this anſwer he oft inſulteth over the Schoolmen, when at another time he would have ſaid that Poſsibile hath an eſſe cognitum in both reſpects.
§. 17. And I think the good man forgat that by this he quite overthroweth his Book de Scientia Media, and much of all his other Books, which are animated with the ſuppoſition of Gods Will cauſing faturition from eternity. For if only exiſtentia differunt numero, futura non ſunt exiſtentia: And if the futurition of differentia numero be not decreed nor eternal (as of this Sun, this Earth, Paul, Peter, and their ſingular acts, &c.) then nothing is future from eternity: And ſo we are brought to the Arminians election of ſpecies only, and not of individuals (in primo inſtanti) which is rejected. Sure God electeth Individuals, or none: And if ſo, it is future individuals. Individuation exiſteth not but in exiſtentibus. But if foreknowledge and Decree may be of futures and non-exiſtents, it may be of individuals that are ſuch, as well as of ſpecies.
§. 18. Yea, he proceedeth to ſay pag. 412. [Deum ſcire plura eſſe poſsibilia quam ſunt, non eſt ſcire multitudinem rerum poſsibilium; ſed tantum ſcire ſe praeſtare poſſe ut detur major multitudo rerum exiſtentium quam actu ſit: Quare multitudo rerum individuarum Deo notum eſt tantum exiſtentium, ſive ea ſit multitudo actualis, ſive potentialis, &c.]
And yet the ſoul of his Book de Scientia Media is [Cauſa tranſitionis rerum è numero Poſsibilium in numerum futurorum.] And my foreſaid oppoſition to his Eternal Cauſation of futurity, is hereby confirmed. 2. It's true, that to know quid poſsibile, is not to know it to be exiſtent, nor any more than to know what God (e. g.) can do; and ſo to denominate Nothing, quid poſsibile, as relating to Power: (And ſo Ariminenſ▪ ſaith Nothing may be Related.) But the like muſt be ſaid of futurity: And it holdeth equally of the ſpecies and de numero, & poſsibilium & futurorum; ſo that here we have confitentem reum about the dance and dream of notions and nothings which I have before ſhewed they beguile mens underſtandings with.
And hence alſo my former doctrine is confirmed, of the non-neceſſity of a cauſal decree of Negatives or Nothings, or of a Poſitive Volition of them.
§. 10. The truth is, an Act of mans ſoul is ſuch a thing, that de exiſtentibus it's hard for any of their ſubtilties to make known the difference of ſpecies, accidents or individuals ab objectis: And to know what interruptions they muſt be, that go to cut one Immanent act into two, or hinder unity.