Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Section 11
SECT. XI. What Free-Will Man hath to Spiritual Good, &c.
§. 1. THe underſtanding of the Nature of the Power and Liberty of the Will, is the very key to open all the reſt of the controverted difficulties in theſe matters: But having ſpoken of it ſo much before, in the former part of this Book, and more elſewhere, I ſhall no further weary the Reader with repetitions, than to note theſe few things following.
§. 2. If any like not the name of Free-will, Libera Voluntas, let them but agree about theſe two, the Power of the Will, and Free-choice, *Nolite eſſe adeo delicati, ut abhorreatis ab uſ… vocabuli [Lib. arbit.] Hypocritarum propri…m eſt rixari de vocabulis. Nemo offendatur hoc titulo, quia Auguſt. in multae Volum. & ſingulis fere pagellis ad faſtidium Lectoris hoc vocabulum inculcat. Melancth. Loc. Com. de lib. arb. c. 1.Liberum arbitrium, and they need not contend about Free-will.
§. 3. 1. As to the firſt, It is the very Eſſence of the Will to be a natural Power or faculty of Willing Good and Nilling evil apprehended by the Intellect; and commanding the inferiour faculties, either politically or deſpotically, difficultly or eaſily, perfectly or imperfectly, according to its reſolution and their Receptivity.
§. 4. 2. The Liberty of choice is not only Libertas Voluntatis, but Libertas Hominis, when a man may have what he chooſeth or willeth: Here the Act of chooſing is the Wills; but the object is ſomewhat elſe; either an Imperate act of ſome inferiour faculty, or ſome extrinſick thing. So we ſay truly, that the unbeliever, or unconverted ſinner, may believe, may repent, may have Chriſt and life, if he will (as Dr. Twiſſe frequently aſſerteth.)
§. 5. 3. But the Liberty of the Will it ſelf, is but the mode of its ſelf-determination, as without conſtraint it is a ſelf-determining principle in its elicite Acts, conſidered comparatively.
§. 6. The Liberty of the Will is threefold, 1. Liberty of Contradiction, or exercitii; 2. Of †Note, that the Papiſts confeſs, that by Chriſts Caſe it is proved, that Libertas ſpecificationis inter bonum & malum is not neceſſary to merit: So Pet. … S. Joſeph. Theſ. Univerſ. pag. 90.Contrariety or ſpecification in the Act: 3. Of objective ſpecification, which is Liberty of Competition. 1. The firſt Liberty is to will or not will; to nill or not nill. 2. The ſecond is Liberty to will or nill this. 3. The third is Liberty to will This object or That, or to nill This or That.*Of the real difference of theſe three, ſee Rob. Baron. Metaphyſ. I take not that which many Schoolmen call Liberty of Complacence to be another ſort of Liberty: Though I diſtinguiſh Liberty of ſimple Complacence, from Liberty of election; as being a prior diſtribution: And I deny not, but that Liberty (of Complacency ſpecially) may ſtand with neceſſity of immutable diſpoſition, yea▪ and with ſome ſort of neceſſitating operation of God; as is in Chriſt and the Glorified: And in this large eſſential ſenſe Liberum and Voluntarium are all one, ſuppoſing Voluntarium to be the act of a ſelf-determining unconſtrained will. So that the word [Free-will] being ſo exceeding ambiguous (as my foreſaid Scheme ſheweth) we muſt be ſure that we pretend not the Controverſies de nomine to be de re. But it is the Indifferency of a Viators will that we have now to do with, and not that ſtate of perfect determination, or that Amplitude or advancement of the will, which Gibie…f and ſuch others talk of: And note that by [Poſſe agere vel non agere] which we put into the definition of free-will, we muſt not mean that Potentia moralis metaphorica, which is nothing but the wills moral diſpoſition or habit; but the Potentia Naturalis: And ſo it may be ſaid of Chriſt and the glorified, that their not ſinning or not willing ſin, is not ex impotentia naturali, but ex perfectione.
§. 7. The Will hath not all theſe ſorts of Liberty about every object▪ For it cannot will known evil as ſuch, &c. But it hath all theſe about ſeveral objects.
§. 8. By this power and Liberty, the Will is made of God, to be a kind of Cauſa prima ſecundum quid, of the Moral ORDER or ſpecification of its own acts: Not ſimply or ſtrictly a Cauſa prima; For 1. It was God the firſt Cauſe that gave man this ſelf-determining Power. 2. It is God that upholdeth it: And ſo it ſtill dependeth wholly on his ſupporting will. 3. God concurreth by his univerſal Influx, to its acts. 4. God is ſtill the Lord of it, and can turn it as he pleaſe, and over-rule it to his Ends, and hath put no act of ours from under his power. But he willingly ſo forbeareth his own further operation, as that he hath made the Will able, on ſuppoſition of his foreſaid ſupport and univerſal influx, and rule, to Determine it ſelf to the ſaid ORDER of its Acts, without Gods particular predetermining premotion.
§. 9. As in the Vital and Intellectual faculties, it is Gods Image to be Able to Act Vitally, and to underſtand; ſo in the Will this ſelf-determining Power and Liberty, and Imperium over other faculties, is part of the ſame Image. And it is Gods wrong and diſhonour …o have his Image denyed and diſhonoured: And therefore to deny this Power of the Will is as much a diſgracing of Gods Image, as to deny man to be Rational.
§. 10. God made man ſuch an Intellectual Free Agent, that he might be a fit ſubject for Sapiential Moral Government: and accordingly he ſetled a Kingdom in the World: And as he governeth meer Natural Agents, by Natural motion, ſo he governeth Man as a Moral agent, by Laws and Moral means and motion: For he ruleth all things according to their Natures.
§. 11. Yet as man, even his will, is quid Natural… as the ſubject of his morality, and as Aquinas oft ſaith, Ipſa Voluntas eſt quaedam natura; ſo God doth by Natural agency and Cauſation continue and actuate man as Natural, that ſo he may govern him morally in the reſt, even in the moral ordering of his Acts.
§. 12. When men ſay that the will is free from co-action, they mean not all the ſame thing. By co-action ſome mean nothing, but that willing is not nilling; or that God doth not make it to be unwilling and willing of the ſame thing, in the ſame reſpect, at the ſame inſtant, that is, God cauſeth not contradictions, it being Impoſſible: And ſo with the Prede…erminants uſually to will, and to will freely, ſignifie the very ſame. And if this be all the Liberty of the Will, then to move it as Naturally as a Stone is moved, to hate God, to will all ſin, and nill all duty, ſo as that it can no more do otherwiſe than make a World, were no abatement of its Liberty, becauſe it is Volition and Nolition which are the acts that it is moved to, (whether by God or Satan.)
§. 13. But I yet ſee not why it may not as properly be called Coaction, to move the will by phyſical neceſſitation to will o… nill, as to move the Intellect to underſtand, or to move any natural agent.
§. 14. If you ſay, that the word [Coaction] importeth reluctancy, o… unwillingneſs, or oppoſition; I confeſs with Scotus, that Potentia paſſ…v… is well diſtinguiſhed, into naturalem, neutram, violentam: and that the word Coaction may be ſo ſtrictly taken, as to ſignifie no motion but of a viola…ed Patient: and ſo it is but lis de nomine: But a Neceſſitating motion o… … natural, and neutral patient is the ſame thing, what name ſoever you call it by. And they that acknowledge the pravity of the will, and its corr…pt averſneſs to God and ſpiritual good, muſt needs, by this rule, make Gods gracious change by predetermination to be a coaction, as being the motion of a contrarily diſpoſed patient: contrarily, I ſay, i… inſtanti priore; for the motus is ſuppoſed to change its diſpoſition and act at once: But if ſtill they ſay, that it is not contrary in eodem inſtanti, and that's its liberty; I ſay, then if the Devil had power as eaſily to effect by phyſical premotion a hatred of God and will to ſin, in all men, as I can move my pen, it were no loſs of Natural Liberty. And ſo mans liberty differeth not from a beaſts, or from a plants, indeed, but only in the Nature of the Act: one willeth, when the other doth but appe…er…, but all by the like phyſical unreſiſtible efficiency from other cau…es. This is but to play with the name of Liberty.
§. 15. We take not this Liberty to be inconſiſtent with all kind of Neceſſity, as is opened before in the Table of Liberty.
§. 16. Nor do we confound the ſeveral ſorts of Liberty, (as the ſaid Table ſheweth) 1. A Political Liberty from Reſtraint of Laws is one thing (not queſtioned in theſe diſputes;) 2. And a Moral or Holy Liberty from vice or ſinful diſpoſitions and acts is another. 3. But it is the Natural Liberty of mans will on earth, that we ſpeak of.
§. 17. So far as any man is vicious, he wanteth the Moral Liberty of his will, and ſo far as he is virtuous and ſanctified he hath it: that is, His will is ſo far freed from ſin.
§. 18. We take not Liberty of Will to conſiſt in Neutrality †See Fr. Mac…do againſt White.of diſpoſition or meer Indifferency: For the will acteth freely when it acteth according to its Inclination and habits, with the greateſt propenſity, yea, conſtancy of ſelf-determination.
§. 19. We take not the Indetermination of the will to be its perfection; but its Natural Imperfection: But ſuch as God hath made it in, in this World, where all his creatures have not the ſame perfection.*Therefore we do with judicious Strangius diſtinguiſh the eſſential Liberty which is ſelfdetermination according to Reaſon, from that liberty of Indiff…en…y, which is inconſiſtent with predetermination and neceſſitation.
§. 20. Therefore though God hath thought this Indeterminate, ſelfdetermining Will, to be fitteſt for a Viator in his tryal and preparation for felicity, yet perfection conſiſteth in the moſt Determinate ſtate of Love, with the greateſt neceſſity which proceedeth from the perfected nature of man, and the full communication of Love from God, which we hope to have in Heaven for ever. And he is beſt on Earth who is neareſt to this ſtate.